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Fire and Riparian Lands Riparian land and bushfire Resource Document This document has been prepared by Helen Bull, obliqua pty ltd, with input Acknowledgments from the Project Working Group and other contributors. Project Working Group for Version 1 published 2014: Disclaimer DELWP and predecessor organisations: Peter Vollebergh (Project Manager), Al Beaver (up to July 2012), Adam Whitchurch (from July 2012) obliqua pty ltd, its directors and employees accept no liability for loss or damage resulting from use of this information, whether due to unintended CFA: Justine Leahy (from September 2011), Owen Gooding (September - inaccuracy, error or omission or any other cause. December 2011), Lisa Keedle (up to September 2011) CFA makes this information available on the understanding that you take Goulburn-Broken CMA: Mark Turner, Christine Glassford reasonable care when using it. If you have any uncertainty about the East Gippsland CMA: Clint Bain application of the information to your particular circumstances, you should obtain further professional advice. CFA does not accept responsibility for how Data and comments: you apply, or rely on the information in this publication. CFA: Mark Holland, Chris Cowley, Marianne Jopling, Nicole Harvey, Len Leslie, Cover photograph Owen Gooding, Anthony Watts and Jude Kennedy DELWP and predecessor organisations: Bill O’Connor, Martin Spence, Helen Revegetated riparian land, Boolarra, Gippsland Gwilliam, Anne Buchan and Nic Gellie (contractor) Preferred citation Glenelg Hopkins CMA: David Nichols Country Fire Authority (2017) Riparian land and bushfire. Resource document. Landowners: Hayden Farman, Terry Hubbard Version 2. Report prepared by obliqua pty ltd for the Country Fire Authority and Melbourne Water: Craige Brown, Tony Scherl Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning. CFA, East Burwood, Victoria. North Central CMA: Adrian Martins North East CMA: Anthony Wilson and Natalie Ord Participants in the workshops held October and November 2014 Images: CFA (Table 5), DELWP (Figure 1, Figure 2), East Gippsland CMA (Photographs E, F and K), Google Earth (Figures 1, 2 and 19 and Photograph L), Goulburn Broken CMA (Photograph H), Melbourne Water (Figures 6 to 9), North Central CMA (Figure 3), obliqua pty ltd (Photographs A, B, C, D, G, I and J), West Gippsland CMA (cover) RLF 03-2014-1 Updated March 2017 Riparian land and bushfire risk: Resource document Page 2 Contents Summary of key points .......................................................................... 4 Definitions and abbreviations................................................................. 5 1. Introduction .................................................................................. 6 2. Bushfire behaviour ........................................................................ 7 3. Bushfire behaviour and riparian areas ............................................ 9 4. Bushfire threat and risk................................................................ 11 5. Bushfire threat and risk scenarios ................................................ 16 6. Managing bushfire risk from riparian revegetation programs ....... 22 7. Frequently asked questions ......................................................... 26 8. Further information ..................................................................... 32 9. References .................................................................................. 33 Appendix 1: Worksheet 1 – Estimating bushfire threat ........................ 35 Appendix 2: Worksheet 2 – Estimating bushfire risk ............................ 36 Appendix 3: Worksheet 3 – Estimating vegetation setbacks ................. 37 Appendix 4: Scenarios - inputs and assumptions .................................. 38 Riparian land and bushfire risk: Resource document Page 3 Summary Many landholders with river frontages have voiced concerns that fencing and In addition, trees may filter some embers as well as reducing wind speed and the rate revegetating riparian land may result in a fire risk to their property. These concerns of spread and intensity of fire. may be contributing to reluctance from landholders to participate in catchment Fire behaviour and the threat it poses is only one aspect that needs to be taken into management authority (CMA) programs to protect and improve riparian land. consideration in determining bushfire risk associated with riparian areas. Other The likelihood of a bushfire starting and its rate of spread and intensity in a riparian factors which need to be considered include the likelihood of a fire starting or area will depend upon the presence of an ignition source, fuel, topography and reaching the assets and the vulnerability of the asset to fire. weather. Bushfire controls do not directly affect riparian revegetation proposals at present. The relative degree to which fuel, topography and weather will determine fire However, bushfire planning and building controls can be used as a guide for planning behaviour and its impact will vary from site to site. the separation of riparian revegetation proposals from houses or other accommodation, or other community buildings such as schools. In well-managed riparian vegetation with limited grass and weed growth and low slopes, and under a Low to Moderate Fire Danger Rating, bushfire may be difficult to Fire management needs to be considered in riparian management activities. For ignite and may only burn very slowly and at a low intensity. example, setback distances from the vegetated riparian land to assets need to be considered in conjunction with the landholder, fire planners, and where appropriate, Under protracted drought, and extreme fire weather, such as experienced during the broader community. February 2009, all vegetation can burn. Historically, extreme bushfire events of this scale are relatively rare. However, their frequency is expected to increase under Access points need to be established not only for managing the riparian land but also climate change. to allow access for fire suppression, and particularly reliable water supplies. As the amount of riparian land is limited, compared with other land uses, riparian Bushfire risk can be substantially reduced by reducing vulnerability of assets. It is land can be expected to have only a limited influence on bushfire spread at a important that all landholders have measures in place to minimise the vulnerability of landscape scale. In addition, if spotting is limited, a fire burning in a forested riparian assets to fire, including protecting homes, sheds and stock from flame contact, area is expected to be slower and therefore less likely to contribute to fire spread at a radiant heat and embers. landscape scale than a fire burning in grass or crops. It is important that revegetation planning addresses actual rather than perceived risks Contrary to some beliefs, riparian areas do not generally act as a ‘wick’ or ‘fuse’. Fires to both community safety (from revegetation proposals) and environmental values will generally only burn in the direction of the wind (while spreading more slowly (from bushfire management). sideways) or slope if burning under lighter wind conditions. Where, after exploring options, a conflict between conservation and community Fire in newly revegetated areas which have significant grass cover is likely to behave safety objectives cannot be achieved, priority should be given to protection of human in the same way as fire burning in neighbouring pasture or crops and spread rapidly life. but its contribution to spread at a landscape scale will be determined by the presence Options for managing risk also include accepting any risk that cannot be practically of continuous fuel (e.g. cured pasture) around it. Barriers such as grazed areas, roads treated. or firebreaks may slow or prevent fire spread from grassy riparian areas. While revegetated riparian land may have only a limited influence on bushfire spread at a landscape scale, compared with other land uses, extensive areas of native vegetation may pose a direct threat to nearby houses and agricultural assets. However, revegetation proposals which involve creating narrow vegetated strips which are remote from assets, may not significantly add to bushfire threat. Riparian land and bushfire risk: Resource document Page 4 Definitions and abbreviations Bushfire: An unplanned vegetation fire. A generic term which includes grass fires, Adapted from: CFA (2012a, 2012b) where applicable, except as cited. forest fires and scrub fires Risk management definitions Curing: Curing is the annual drying and death of grass which increases its ability to burn Bushfire risk: The chance (likelihood) of a bushfire igniting, spreading and causing damage to the community or the assets they value (consequences) CFA: Country Fire Authority Bushfire threat: Potential impact of bushfire on assets based upon fuel hazard, CMA: catchment management authority separation distance and the slope under a given climatic condition. Can be described DAFF: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry by the Bushfire Attack level (BAL) Defendable space: An area of land around a building where vegetation is managed to Consequence: Outcome or impact of a bushfire event reduce the effects of bushfire on it Fuel hazard: Vegetation or other material that contributes to bushfire threat DELWP: Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning (formerly DEPI and Likelihood: The chance of a bushfire igniting and spreading DSE) Risk acceptance: An informed decision to
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