The Future of the Kurds

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The Future of the Kurds August 6, 2017 15 News & Analysis The future of the Kurds Unlike Russia, regional powers reserved about Kurdish vote Sami Moubayed in northern Syria, did not seem to mind the new manoeuvres, urging the Kurds to set up their own gov- Beirut ernment while remaining part of Syria. yrian and Iraqi Kurds have A Russian-authored constitution marked a handful of im- for Syria, presented to negotiators portant dates that would at the UN-mandated Geneva talks put them closer than ever earlier this year, specifically called before to independence for adopting the Kurdish language Sfrom the central governments of next to Arabic and mandated local Damascus and Baghdad. parliaments with broad powers, Iraqi Kurds are to have a long- such as voting for their own mu- delayed referendum on September nicipalities, electing their own gov- 25, cementing the quasi-independ- ernors and getting a share of their ence of Iraqi Kurdistan, which has region’s wealth. Previously that been a de facto reality since 1991. wealth went to Damascus and very Their brethren in Syria are to vote little of it reached its places of ori- for their local communes on Sep- gin, resulting in poverty through- tember 22. out the Syrian north, while all po- Local council elections in Kurd- litical and administrative decisions ish territories of Syria are to follow were imposed on these territories on November 3. Broad elections for from the faraway capital of Syria. the three Kurdish-led districts ear- The newly proposed charter, marked for the federal government which is still being debated in of northern Syria are scheduled Switzerland, states all this would for January 19, 2018. They would become a thing of the past and be accompanied by a conference the federal laws would apply to all for all major players in that part of parts of Syria, including the four the war-torn county organised by de-conflict zones that were recent- Kurdish parties and to be attended ly agreed upon by Moscow, Tehran Divisive ambitions. A man sewing an Iraqi Kurdish flag bearing a portrait of Iraqi Kurdistan Regional by 300 delegates with the blessing and Ankara; north of Homs, east Government President Masoud Barzani in Erbil. (AFP) of Moscow and the United States. of Damascus, in Idlib in the Syr- ian north-west and throughout the generally regarded as part of the process of being liberated by the (PKK), which hopes to carve 50% The new Syrian south alongside the Syrian- United States’ fiefdom in Syria. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). of historic Kurdistan from the mod- arrangements would Jordanian borders. The second canton would be in Its council is to decide by Septem- ern Turkish Republic. New laws written recently in Aleppo province, including the ber on whether it wants to join the Other Kurds, including the 6 mil- infuriate Turkish Rmelan said that members of the Kurdish towns of Kobane, immedi- Kurdish-led federal project. The lion in Iran and approximately 5 President Recep federal assembly would be elected ately south of the border with Tur- same applies to the oil-rich city million-6 million living in the dias- Tayyip Erdogan, who by universal suffrage for 2-year key, and Tal Abyad, within Raqqa of Deir ez-Zor on the Euphrates, pora, would certainly be inspired would likely work terms and municipality elections governorate. which is being contested by gov- by the elections but Tehran will not hard to obstruct the would take place every four years. Third would be the canton of Af- ernment troops, ISIS and the SDF. like the idea and nor will Damas- project. The Kurdish delegates of Rmelan rin, west of the Euphrates River. The new arrangements would cus, perhaps giving the two allies came short of calling for a breaka- It would take in the city of Afrin, undoubtedly take the region by and Turkey enough reason to set way state in Syria, settling for uni- which is in the hands of the Rus- storm, infuriating Turkish Presi- aside their differences and work The ground-breaking resolution fication of three Kurdish provinces sians, and Shahba in the country- dent Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who together to abort the project alto- was reached on July 31 by 156 Kurd- within a broad federal government, side of Aleppo. would likely work hard to obstruct gether or try to manipulate and in- ish delegates who met in Rmelan in encompassing both Arabs and Many of these cities and what the project through any possible fluence its voting outcome, coming the northern Kurdish province of Kurds. lies between them are not fully means, because it would automati- up with regime-friendly delegates Hasakah, passing their own elec- The first Kurdish canton would Kurdish and are still occupied by cally trigger the ambitions of the and MPs in Syrian Kurdistan. tion law without consulting with be in Hasakah province and it an Arab majority. 15 million Kurds living in his coun- or taking orders from Damascus. would include the Kurdish cities of The strategic city of Raqqa, the try, many of whom have long sup- Sami Moubayed is a Syrian The Russians, however, who have Hasakah and Qamishli, both east former self-proclaimed capital of ported a separatist movement led historian and author of “Under the been cutting deals with the Kurds of the Euphrates River in territory the Islamic State (ISIS), is in the by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Black Flag” (IB Tauris, 2015). Kurdish push for independence likely to unleash new cycle of violence in an already volatile region Viewpoint crossed into Iraqi Kurdistan on distracting attention from a majority in three provinces Iraq accepts us. For this reason, in February 2003 as the US other problems or strengthening — Kurdistan, Kermanshah and Without we seek to use appropriate invasion loomed against their hand in talks with Baghdad Ilam. Buoyed by the example of compromise, opportunities… to demand our Saddam Hussein. In a hotel over oil revenue and control over Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdistan rights.” in Dohuk, I requested coffee Kirkuk. Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) Iraq is Zebari has been franker, in basic Arabic but the young Squabbling between the two wants federalism and is vying for heading for warning that Tehran wants a Iman at reception understood not main parties — the Kurdistan influence with the PKK-allied security corridor to Syria through more conflict one word of what had been the Democratic Party (KDP) and Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). northern Iraq policed by Shia official language before Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Nazim Dabagh, a KRG repre- and ethnic militias. “They are breathing de facto autonomy in 1991. — goes back to the PUK’s birth in sentative in Tehran, has tried to cleansing. down our neck all along the Gareth Smyth Months later, with fighting 1975. Promises of a unified give reassurance. He recently told Kurdish front line from Sinjar to persisting in the city, I went into Kurdistan Regional Government Agence France-Presse: “For now, Khanaqin,” Zebari told Reuters. Mosul with Hoshyar Zebari, who (KRG) and army have foundered we do not have the intention of “So far, we have been accommo- pointed out where he’d been and the Kurdish parliament in separating… We don’t feel that dating, patient, coordinating to swimming in the Tigris as a boy, Erbil hasn’t met for two years. prevent skirmishes or flashes but before his two brothers were Baghdad argues the referendum this is building up.” killed by Ba’athist security and he upends the 2005 constitution, Chronology As if to confirm his claim, Ali fled Iraq on a donkey. based on Iraq’s territorial integrity Akbar Velayati, president of Iran’s A generation apart, the recep- with a Kurdish federal entity. The 1946 — Short-lived Expediency Council and close to tionist and Zebari, later Iraqi Shia-led government wants to Kurdish Republic in Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah foreign minister and finance keep Kirkuk, the oil city absorbed Ali Khamenei and President minister, each had reasons not to by the Kurds during the crisis over Mahabad, Iran Hassan Rohani, spoke of a want to be part of Iraq. Older the Islamic State (ISIS), while “resistance highway” from Kurds experienced Saddam’s Iraq’s Sunni Arabs fear a Kurd-less 1991 — Iraqi Kurds Tehran through Mosul to Beirut. repression, including chemical Iraq would be 75% Shia. Without This precludes an independent weapons. Younger Kurds — today compromise, Iraq is heading for establish de facto Kurdistan. After meeting with half of Iraqi Kurdistan’s 5.2 more conflict and ethnic cleans- autonomy under senior PUK official Kosrat Rasul million people are under 20 ing. Western air cover Ali, Iran’s top security official Ali — view Baghdad as a distant, Baghdad is only part of the Shamkhani called the referendum hostile place. There is every opposition to Kurdish independ- a plot by “colonialising” powers. reason, then, for the independ- ence. Neighbours rattled by 2003 — US-led invasion The Iraqi Kurds will look for ence referendum scheduled for Syria’s collapse into fiefdoms are topples Saddam help to Washington, which has September 25 by the Kurds’ disinclined to treat the referen- Hussein 5,000 troops in Iraq, but Donald leaders to yield an overwhelming dum as a tactical ploy. Turkey has Trump is an erratic president and “yes” vote. called it a “grave mistake.” Ankara US plans for a post-Saddam But what do the Iraqi Kurdish was alarmed by the Kurdish 2005 — Kurdish federal federal Iraq, not to mention $60 leaders seek and what effect will Democratic Union Party (PYD) entity recognised in billion in reconstruction, have the referendum have? The Kurds running territory in Syria and gone up in smoke.
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