THESIS – M.A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TITLE: Theory-Based Motives for the Impasse in Counterspace Weapons Regulation

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THESIS – M.A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TITLE: Theory-Based Motives for the Impasse in Counterspace Weapons Regulation THESIS – M.A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TITLE: Theory-Based Motives for the Impasse in Counterspace Weapons Regulation AUTHOR: Patrick Allan Schrafft Olmsted Scholar, Colombia Project Evaluation Form Student: Patrick A. Schrafft ([email protected]) The below signature indicates the formal submission of this thesis document. Signature: __________________________________________ Date: ____________________ Advisor: Theodore A. Kahn ([email protected]) The following grade is assigned in accordance with scoring criteria and project guidelines provided by the 2019 UTADEO Thesis Manual. Grade (0.0 – 5.0): ____________________ (40% of Written Grade) The below signature indicates formal approval of this thesis document. Signature: __________________________________________ Date: ____________________ Evaluator: ______________________________ (______________________________) The following grade is assigned in accordance with scoring criteria and project guidelines provided by the 2019 UTADEO Thesis Manual. Grade (0.0 – 5.0): ____________________ (60% of Written Grade) The below signature indicates formal approval of this thesis document. Signature: __________________________________________ Date: ____________________ ii Table of Contents Project Evaluation Form __________________________________________________ ii Table of Contents ________________________________________________________ iii Abstract ______________________________________________________________ v Acronyms ______________________________________________________________ vi I. Introduction ________________________________________________________ 01 II. Theoretical Perspectives on Space Governance __________________________ 03 a. Applicable International Relations Paradigms __________________________ 03 b. Applicable International Relations Theories __________________________ 07 c. The Relation to Space Governance ________________________________ 09 III. The Space Environment ____________________________________________ 11 a. Utility, Congestion, and the Tyranny of Distance ____________________ 11 b. Environmental Factors ____________________________________________ 11 c. Orbital Mechanics ____________________________________________ 14 1. Fundamental Laws ______________________________________ 15 2. Orbital Elements ______________________________________ 16 d. Orbital Regimes ____________________________________________ 18 IV. The Principles of Space Operations ________________________________ 22 a. Space Operations Functional Areas ________________________________ 22 b. The Space and Ground Segment ________________________________ 24 c. Prominent Space Actors ______________________________________ 25 V. Counterspace Weapons ____________________________________________ 28 a. Kinetic Physical Counterspace Weapons __________________________ 28 b. Non-Kinetic Physical Counterspace Weapons __________________________ 29 c. Electronic Counterspace Weapons ________________________________ 31 d. Cyber Capabilities with Counterspace Effects __________________________ 32 e. The Dual-Use Dilemma ____________________________________________ 33 VI. Orbital Debris __________________________________________________ 35 a. Debris Types __________________________________________________ 35 b. Effects on Space Systems ______________________________________ 37 c. The 2007 Chinese ASAT Test ______________________________________ 39 d. 2009 Iridium 33 - Cosmos 2251 Collision __________________________ 42 e. Orbital Debris Management ______________________________________ 44 1. Orbital Debris Measurement ________________________________ 44 2. Modeling and Simulation ________________________________ 46 f. Environmental Capacity and the Kessler Syndrome ____________________ 48 iii VII. Relevant International Space Law - Existing Regulatory Institutions ________ 50 a. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee ____________________ 50 b. Conference on Disarmament ______________________________________ 50 c. The United Nations ____________________________________________ 51 1. Committee on Peaceful Use of Outer Space ____________________ 51 2. Office for Outer Space Affairs ________________________________ 53 3. United Nations Disarmament Commission ____________________ 54 4. Office for Disarmament Affairs __________________________ 55 5. Economic and Social Council ________________________________ 55 d. Private & Commercial Entities ________________________________ 56 VIII. Relevant International Space Law - Existing Regulatory Instruments ________ 58 a. Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ______________________________________ 58 b. The Outer Space Treaty ______________________________________ 61 c. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ________________________________ 65 d. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices and International Guidelines __ 66 e. Transparency and Confidence Building Measures ____________________ 68 f. Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities ________ 71 IX. The Shaping of Modern U.S. Space Policy ________________________________ 75 a. Recent Events - Russia ____________________________________________ 75 b. Recent Events - China ____________________________________________ 78 c. Recent Events - India ____________________________________________ 81 d. Resulting U.S. Policy Positions ______________________________________ 82 1. National Security Strategy ________________________________ 83 2. National Strategy for Space ________________________________ 85 3. National Defense Strategy ________________________________ 86 4. Defense Space Strategy ________________________________ 87 e. Affirmation of Research Hypothesis ________________________________ 88 X. Recommendations __________________________________________________ 91 a. International Relations Line of Effort #1 __________________________ 92 b. International Relations Line of Effort #2 __________________________ 92 c. International Relations Line of Effort #3 __________________________ 93 d. National Line of Effort #1 ______________________________________ 97 e. National Line of Effort #2 ______________________________________ 97 f. National Line of Effort #3 ______________________________________ 98 XI. References ________________________________________________________ a iv Abstract Taking into account the profound global utility of near-earth space, and the increasing threat posed to it by orbital debris, this thesis attempts to explain why a seemingly well-established system of international governance has failed to deter the testing, and genuine considerations for operational employment, of counterspace (CS) weapons. In doing so, it seeks to identify motives based in fundamental international relations (IR) theory. While recognizing the criticality of a U.S. commitment to any effective CS weapons regulation, it is hypothesized that the nation’s well-established opposition to such legislation can be explained using constructivist principles. Structure is added through the application of specific research objectives (SROs). These include describing the physical and operational complexities of the space environment, the nature of CS weapons and their employment considerations, and the orbital debris problem (SRO 1), conducting an analysis of applicable IR forums, existing international space law, and pertinent historical events as they pertain to shaping modern foreign policy positions (SRO 2), and formulating realistic proposals for advancing the conduct of responsible behavior in space by curtailing the employment of CS weapons (SRO 3). While the pursuit of SRO 1 provides context, SRO 2 directly addresses the research question. A review of regulatory instruments confirms their inadequacy in providing enforceable guidelines. However, it also establishes that normative standards of behavior have been explicitly defined. A subsequent analysis of recent events indicates a blatant disregard for these standards by Russia and China, validating modern U.S. policy and strategy positions. From a constructivist point of view, this partially validates the research hypothesis. Aspects of realist theory, specifically Power Transition Theory, are also necessary to account for the actions of Russia and China as strategic competitors. Finally, in addressing SRO 3 the thesis provides a starting point for subsequent research and debate. v Acronyms ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ADAC Attitude Determination and Control ASAT Anti-Satellite ASI Italian Space Agency BLOS Beyond Line-of-Sight C2 Command and Control CD Conference on Disarmament CNES French National Center for Space Studies CNSA Chinese National Space Administration COPUOS Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space COTS Commercial-Off-the-Shelf CPLA Committee, Policy and Legal Affairs Section CS Counterspace CSA Canadian Space Agency CSOC Combined Space Operations Center CSSI Center for Space Standards and Innovation CSTD Commission on Science and Technology Development DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DLR German Space Agency DoC Department of Commerce DoD Department of Defense DoS Department of State DoT Department of Transportation DRDO Defense Research and Development Office DSS Defense Space Strategy E.U. European Union ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council EM Electromagnetic EMP Electromagnetic Pulse ESA European Space Agency EW Electronic Warfare FAA Federal Aviation Administration FCC Federal Communications Commission FoV Field of View GB Great Britain GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit GGE Group of Governmental
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