From Function to Flourishing: Neo-Aristotelian Ethics and the Science of Life
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From Function to Flourishing: Neo-Aristotelian Ethics and the Science of Life by Seyedeh Parisa Moosavi Tabatabaei A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright 2019 by Seyedeh Parisa Moosavi Tabatabaei From Function to Flourishing: Neo-Aristotelian Ethics and the Science of Life Parisa Moosavi Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2019 Abstract Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to place moral virtue in the natural world by showing that it is an instance of natural goodness—a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the biological realm of plants and non-human animals. One of the central issues facing this metaethical view concerns its commitment to a teleological conception of the nature of life that seems radically out of touch with the understanding of life in modern biology. In this dissertation, I aim to mend the relationship between neo-Aristotelian ethics and the science of biology by way of three contributions: First, I argue that contrary to what many contemporary neo-Aristotelians have claimed, the science of biology is relevant to assessing central commitments of neo-Aristotelian naturalism regarding the domain of life. Second, I provide new foundations for neo-Aristotelian naturalism by engaging recent and unexplored work in philosophy of biology on theories of function and the nature of living organisms. Lastly, I develop and defend a novel account of the neo-Aristotelian concept of natural goodness that is distinctive for incorporating our scientific understanding of the nature of life. ii Acknowledgments I owe the deepest debt of gratitude to Sergio Tenenbaum and Denis Walsh, whose supervision and support was crucial for the completion of this dissertation. Sergio was an exceptional supervisor who was extremely generous with his ideas, time, and energy, not to mention his quick-witted humor. Many of the ideas presented here became clear only after long discussions with him. Denis is the intellectual predecessor to most of the work on philosophy of biology that appears in this dissertation. His work has inspired the direction I took with many of my proposals, and his clarifications and comments were always there when I needed them. I also owe a great deal to the other members of my committee, Phil Clark and Andrew Sepielli, whose suggestions led to critical improvements. Phil has heavily influenced the way I think about many key aspects of neo-Aristotelian naturalism, as I first started thinking about the subject when I took a reading course with him. Andrew also read drafts of all parts of this dissertation and helped me improve them greatly through fruitful discussions. I am also very grateful to Tristram McPherson and Brendan de Kenessy, my external and internal examiners, for reading this dissertation with great care and sharing many insightful questions and comments. In addition, this project has benefited from the feedback of many people who read and commented on drafts of the chapters or essay versions of the material presented here. Comments from John Hacker-Wright, Antoine Dussault, Reid Blackman, Said Saillant, and Benjamin Wald proved especially helpful. While working on this project, I have also been helped, encouraged, and inspired by many people in the philosophical community at the University of Toronto and beyond. I would like to thank Jennifer Nagel, Karolina Hübner, Alex Koo, Mary Frances Ellison, Margaret Opoku-Pare, and Belinda Piercy for superb professional insight and support. Among my fellow graduate students, colleagues, and friends, I would like to thank Johanna Thoma, Jonathan Payton, Zac Irving, Dominic Alford-Duguid, Etye Steinberg, Hasko von Kriegstein, Luke Roelofs, Fermin Fulda, Sean Smith, Jeremy Davis, Jessica Wright, Robyn Forman, Jared Riggs, iii Melissa Rees, Jacob Stump, Steve Coyne, Joshua Brandt, Cory Lewis, Alex Djedovic, Benjamin Chin-Yee, Sareh PourYousefi, and Federica Berdini. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the incredible support of my family and friends. I wish to thank my parents Azizeh Ghorbanoghli and Saeed Moosavi for their unconditional love and support and for always believing in me; my brother Farshid Moosavi for being a constant source of emotional support and laughter; my friends Farimah Hakemzadeh, Keiwan Wind, and Sanaz Fesharaki for their friendship and understanding during my most discouraged and frustrated hours; and my partner Steve Abra for making the last stages of writing this dissertation coincide with some of the happiest times of my life. iv Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 Part I: The Relevance of Biology to Assessing Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism 1 Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism as Ethical Naturalism ............................................... 4 1.1 Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism: Virtue as Natural Goodness ...................................................... 4 1.2 The Question of Ethical Naturalism ............................................................................................... 8 1.3 In Defense of a Naturalist Interpretation .................................................................................... 12 1.4 The Neo-Aristotelian Argument for Naturalism and Its Limitations .................................. 16 2 The Evolutionary Objection to Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism ............................ 19 2.1 An Evolutionary-Inspired Dilemma ............................................................................................. 19 2.2 The Pollyanna Problem ................................................................................................................... 22 2.3 Naturalness as Continuity with Nature....................................................................................... 26 2.4 The Selfish Gene Problem ............................................................................................................... 29 2.5 Are Flourishing-Based Functions Natural? ................................................................................ 33 2.6 The Argument from Representation of Life ............................................................................... 36 2.7 Making Peace with the Relevance of Biology ............................................................................ 41 Part II: New Biological Foundations for Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism 3 Is the Neo-Aristotelian Concept of Organism Presupposed in Biology?......... 45 3.1 The Need to Examine the Representation of Life in Biology ................................................. 45 3.2 The Modern Synthesis ..................................................................................................................... 50 3.3 The Evo-Devo Approach ................................................................................................................. 56 3.4 In Search of the Concept of Organism in Biology .................................................................... 62 4 From Biological Functions to Natural Goodness ................................................... 65 4.1 Toward a Novel Defence of the Grounding Premise ............................................................... 65 4.2 Biological Functions Revisited ....................................................................................................... 68 4.3 Organizational Functions as Flourishing-Based Functions .................................................... 73 4.4 From Organizational Functions to Natural Goodness ............................................................. 81 v Part III: A Novel Form of Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism 5 Natural Goodness and Natural-Historical Goodness ............................................ 89 5.1 The Natural-Historical Conception of Natural Goodness ...................................................... 89 5.2 Natural-Historical Evaluations and the Problem of Anti-Individualism ............................. 94 5.3 Thompson’s Case against Individualism ................................................................................... 102 5.4 Can Natural Goodness Be Given an Individualistic Account? ............................................ 108 6 Natural Goodness without Natural History .......................................................... 110 6.1 Teleological Explanation and Patterns of Counterfactual Dependence ............................ 110 6.2 Toward an Alternative Account of Natural Goodness .......................................................... 118 6.3 A Modal-Explanatory Account of Natural Goodness ............................................................ 129 6.4 Concluding Remarks: Natural Goodness without Anti-Individualism .............................. 136 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 141 vi Introduction This dissertation provides new foundations for thinking about morality in a world that increasingly seems to be the domain of natural science. One of the leading contemporary accounts of how morality fits into the natural world comes from Aristotle. The present-day Aristotelian view in metaethics, known as neo-Aristotelian naturalism, explains morality as based in human nature and thus part of the domain of life. But, in its current form, the view remains objectionably