The Neo-Caliphate of the “Islamic State”
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CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 166, December 2014, Editor: Christian Nünlist The Neo-Caliphate of the “Islamic State” The so-called “Islamic State” represents a new phase in global jihad, wherein efforts will be made to seize and retain territorial control in the face of overwhelming Western military superiority. While this potentially makes jihadist groups vulnerable to destruction, it also increases the risk of home-grown radicalization as foreign fighters flock to join the new “Caliphate”. By Prem Mahadevan The jihadist takeover of Iraq’s second-larg- est city Mosul in June 2014 sharply focused international attention on the country. Coming at a time when Western policy concerns were oriented towards Ukraine, the South China Sea, Gaza, and Afghani- stan, the takeover’s abruptness came as a surprise. Shortly thereafter, the responsible jihadist group named itself the “Islamic State” (IS) and declared the formation of a new Caliphate, signaling that its ideologi- cal agenda was not confined to distinct po- litical or geographic boundaries. The IS has been since projecting itself as a rival to al- Qaida, by competing for credibility and le- gitimacy among the global jihadist com- munity. The IS is unusual in that, until very recent- ly, it had a record of impressive operational A militant Islamist fighter celebrates the declaration of an Islamic “caliphate” in Syria’s northern success, combined with a slick propaganda Raqqa province in June 2014. Reuters machinery to showcase this success. In contrast, al-Qaida remains weakened as a result of counterterrorism efforts in the Af- ghanistan-Pakistan region. Leaders of the What now confronts Western policymak- cohesiveness of government forces and older group are being upstaged by a new ers is the possibility of a strategic rivalry paralyze its opponents while it occupies generation of jihadists with a more sectar- between two jihadist movements with al- fresh territory. However, after being target- ian agenda that fits well with the political most identical aims, but divided by person- ed by US-led airstrikes since August 2014, climate of some Arab countries reeling ality clashes and divergent priorities. Al- its rhetoric has started to emulate that of from the revolts of 2011. Al-Qaida now Qaida remains focused on attacking al-Qaida, in calling for attacks on Western has competition from the IS in Libya and Western targets in order to isolate “apos- homelands. Given the attractiveness of the Syria, with possibly another front opening tate regimes” in the Arab world, while the IS to Western jihadists, this is a worrying up in Algeria. Meanwhile, jihadist factions IS is keen to overthrow these regimes by development. The group potentially could in Nigeria and Egypt have claimed align- military force. By playing upon sectarian develop a long-distance strike capability ment with the IS. tensions, the latter seeks to undermine the that would operate directly or indirectly, © 2014 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 166, December 2014 depending on whether its leadership orders Salafists brought a degree of ideological tioned in the area. Sectarian rifts between specific attacks or sanctions them post hoc. fervor that few other insurgent groups pos- Shi’ites and Sunnis were exploited to dis- sessed. integrate military units, whose command- Origins of the “Islamic State” ers were in any case fleeing upon hearing of The IS is descended from a group set up by The appointment of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the IS’ brutality towards government loyal- Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. as leader of the IS in 2010 was a turning ists. IS columns, mostly composed of thin- Following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, point. Al-Baghdadi had the support of a skinned SUVs with heavy machine guns, Zarqawi and his followers joined the former Iraqi colonel, who helped him for- used the extensive road network to outma- Ba’athist-led insurgency against the occu- mulate a long-term plan for territorial ex- neuver scattered and ill-coordinated secu- pation forces. In 2004, he formally aligned pansion. The outbreak of civil war in neigh- rity detachments. For shock effect, the with Osama bin Laden, with whom he boring Syria, although initially perceived as group employed suicide bombers as a form previously had had differences, and named a distraction, was later appreciated for the of cheap artillery, softening up military tar- his group “al-Qaida in Iraq”. After Zarqawi strategic depth it provided the jihadist gets before engulfing them in well-coordi- was killed by the US in 2006, the group movement in Iraq. With the al-Assad re- nated light infantry assaults. This was an adopted the name “Islamic State of Iraq”. gime being excoriated for its repression of operational-level innovation unseen previ- This was changed once again in April 2013, Sunnis, Syria was a cause célèbre among ously in other theaters of war, where sui- as the group established a direct presence jihadists worldwide. The IS established a cide bombers have mainly been used either in Syria, to the “Islamic State of Iraq and presence in the country through a subsidi- for tactical purposes and occasionally or for the Levant” and finally in June 2014, to ary organization known as Jabhat al-Nusra. strategic effect. “The Islamic State”. Over time, the latter began to carve out an independent identity for itself and made Planning for the June offensive had been From an early stage, the group embarked direct overtures to the core al-Qaida lead- conducted by a former Iraqi army captain. on a sectarian agenda, much to the discom- ership in Pakistan. Seeking to regain con- Like many of the IS’ key operatives, he used fort of al-Qaida’s core leadership in Paki- trol of its proxy, the Islamic State of Iraq professional knowledge of small-unit tac- included the “Levant” in its tics to develop an intricate battle plan, Mosul was the focus of a targeted own name. This worsened ten- which was then implemented with preci- sion between Jabhat al-Nusra sion. However, this also heralded a weak- killing program in which several and al-Qaida on the one hand, ness in the group, which might come into hundred government employees and the IS on the other. A for- effect during 2015: the IS is good on hu- mal split was announced in man and physical terrain that it knows, but were assassinated. February 2014, but the subse- has shown itself to be relatively brittle at quent battlefield successes of strategic adaptation. The battle for Kobane stan, which advocated Shi’ite-Sunni unity the IS through the remainder of the year in Syria is an example of such brittleness – against the West. Between 2003 and 2007, substantially weakened its opponents. despite coming under withering attack the IS attacked Shi’ites despite advice from from Western air power, the IS continued the core leadership to concentrate on for- The fall of Mosul was a key event. In hind- to dispatch fighters to the combat zone, eign soldiers. By 2007, resentment against sight, it appears as though the IS had oper- thereby refusing to cap its losses. Across the group had permeated even the Sunni ated according to a long-term plan to iso- Syria and Iraq, its advances have been community of Iraq, resulting in a popular late the city and build up pockets of support greatly aided by intelligence networks cre- tribal uprising against the group. Since the among its Sunni community. Between No- ated over a period of time among the local IS drew heavily on foreign jihadists for its vember 2012 and November 2013, 57 per Sunni population. When confronting or- operations, it lacked a strong local network cent of IS operations were concentrated in ganized forces in areas where it has no local and suffered very severe losses of personnel. just two of Iraq’s 18 provinces – Nineweh support, the IS has been unable to replicate The underlying alliance of Sunni tribal and Salah ad-Din. Mosul as the capital of its successes in the Sunni heartland. leaders and US forces constituted one of Nineweh was the focus of a targeted killing the pillars of the successful US “surge” in program in which several hundred govern- The group has shown a relatively sophisti- 2006 – 7, pulling Iraq back from the brink ment employees were assassinated, crip- cated command and control model, where- of sectarian civil war. pling the city’s administrative machinery. in the top leadership issues operational ob- Salah ad-Din, meanwhile, served as a cor- jectives to be met by local commanders Between 2008 and 2010, however, the ridor to Baghdad, which was rocked by ve- who rely on their own discretion as to the group developed an indigenous cadre of hicle bombs on a daily basis. This pincer means employed. This does have the nega- leaders who were intimately familiar with movement – simultaneous attacks in the tive effect of dissipating some of the group’s Iraqi demographics and were capable of north and the south – became a staple tac- offensive power in subsidiary operations, long-term planning. This cadre was a com- tic of the IS and an effective means of dis- but overall it still serves to confuse adver- bination of Ba’athists and Salafists, who persing Iraqi government forces over a sary forces as to the chosen axis of an IS had been incarcerated together in US-run wide area. advance. Combined with night-fighting prisons. The most famous of these was skills and the determination to follow Camp Bucca, in which at least nine top Leadership and Characteristics through with an attack once launched, the members of the IS were detained.