The Institutional Origins of Competitiveness and Hegemony in Post-Cold War Africa
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PARTY MATTERS: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND HEGEMONY IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Yonatan L. Morse, M.A. Washington, DC August 23, 2013 Copyright 2013 by Yonatan L. Morse All Rights Reserved ii PARTY MATTERS: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF COMPETITIVENESS AND HEGEMONY IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA Yonatan L. Morse, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Marc M. Howard, Ph.D. ABSTRACT What explains differences in electoral authoritarian outcomes? Why are some regimes able to utterly dominate elections with comparatively lower levels of fraud and coercion, while in other cases regimes can only muster slim vote margins? What explains differences in the competitiveness and hegemony of electoral authoritarian elections? This dissertation focuses specifically on Africa’s former single-party regimes and argues that differences in party capacity developed under single-party rule is a primary factor differentiating forms of electoral authoritarianism. Through typological theorizing and case-studies of Tanzania, Kenya, and Cameroon this project shows how single-party regimes that elevated the party as an important decision-making institution, made credible investments into party institutionalization, and kept open avenues for elite recruitment were less likely to experience elite defection during multiparty elections. Likewise, single-party regimes that built strong party-affiliated mobilizing structures and engaged in wide practices of social incorporation were able to rely on persistently large electoral support. In the absence of these party capacities regimes were forced to rely more heavily on fraud and a range of contingent factors to survive. By differentiating these forms of electoral authoritarianism and their variant institutional underpinnings this dissertation has significance importance for our understanding of the durability of authoritarianism and the potential path toward democratization. iii This project could not have been finished without the help, prodding, and support from so many people met along the way. My first thanks go to the members of my Ph.D. committee at Georgetown University’s Department of Government. Marc Howard, Daniel Brumberg, Scott Taylor, and Andrew Bennett’s deep insights and expertise helped shape and sharpen my arguments, and they have all taught me enormously about research and what it means to be a teacher. My thanks also go to the department for their financial support and my peers who have read and influenced significant portions of this dissertation – Hesham Sallam, Beth Mercurio, Michael Koplow, Zacchary Ritter, Cory Julie, David Buckley, Jennifer Raymond, and Anjali Dayal. Outside of Georgetown I have benefitted from the insights of several advisors and friends. Even if our meetings were brief, they have all shaped this dissertation. My sincere thanks go out to Joel Barkan, David Waldner, Steven Heydemann, Steven Levitsky, Thad Dunning, Catherine Kelly, Rachel Riedl, Leonardo Arriola, Keith Weghorst, and Philip Roessler. Big thanks also given to the faculty and students of the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, and especially David Collier, Jason Seawright, Gary Goertz, and James Mahoney. Without that intensive and invigorating training this dissertation would look very different. Deep thanks also go to the countless people I met while researching and interviewing in Kenya and Tanzania. You are too numerous to list here, but your hospitality and willingness to let me into your worlds and ask deep questions about your lives was one of the highlights of this project for me, to which I am ever grateful. Much gratitude is also deserved to the faculty at the departments of political science at the University of Dar es Salaam and the University of Nairobi, the staff at the Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), and to the faculty of the Institute for International Development in Nairobi. In particular, thanks to Samuel Mushi, Max Mmuya, Mwesiga Baregu, Adams Aloo, Njunga N’gethe, Michael Chege for spending time with me and teaching me so much about your history and politics. Finally, none of this is possible without the support and encouragement of family, friends, and loved ones. You know who you are, and you know that I owe you all big time. Many thanks, Yonatan L. Morse iv TABLE OF CONTENTS! ! Chapter 1 : The Puzzle, Setting, and Argument ............................................................................................ 1 The Puzzle: Electoral Authoritarian Variation .......................................................................................... 2 The Setting: Africa’s former Single-Party Regimes .................................................................................. 7 The Argument and Cases: Divergent Patterns of Party Building and Electoral Authoritarianism ......... 13 Methodological Notes and Research Design ........................................................................................... 15 Plan of the Dissertation ............................................................................................................................ 19 PART I : THE BROADER PICTURE ........................................................................................................ 22 Chapter 2 : Single-Party Regimes and Electoral Authoritarian Variation ................................................... 23 What Do Authoritarian Parties Do? Elite Retention, Social Mobilization, Public Monitoring .............. 25 Conceptualizing Authoritarian Parties and Single-Party Regimes: An Overview of Approaches .......... 29 Developing the Concepts of Structural Articulation and Social Robustness .......................................... 39 How Party Capacity Influences Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes ........................................................ 44 Alternative Theories and Approaches to Electoral Authoritarian Variation ........................................... 47 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 55 Chapter 3 - From Single-Parties to Electoral Authoritarian Regimes, a Typological Theory .................... 57 Party Capacity in Single-Party Regimes ................................................................................................. 58 The Role of Economic Performance: Patronage and Voter Grievance ................................................... 65 Opposition Behavior: Eroding Vote Share and Leveling the Playing Field ............................................ 71 Western Linkage and Leverage: Constraining Incumbents, Empowering Oppositions .......................... 77 Putting the Space Together: Pathways to Electoral Authoritarian Outcomes ......................................... 83 PART II – THE EVOLUTION OF PARTIES UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE .................................... 86 Chapter 4 – The Evolution of Strong Party Capacity in Tanzania .............................................................. 87 The Nyerere Era: Ujamaa and Party Supremacy .................................................................................... 87 The Mwinyi Era: From Ujamaa to Ruksa ............................................................................................. 102 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 105 Chapter 5 – The Evolution of Weak Party Capacity in Single-Party Kenya ............................................. 107 The Kenyatta Era: The Foundations of Clientelism .............................................................................. 107 The Moi Era: Attempts at Party Revitalization ..................................................................................... 123 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 129 Chapter 6 – The Evolution of Moderate Party Capacity in Single-Party Cameroon ................................ 131 The Ahidjo Era: The Push toward Centralization ................................................................................. 131 The Biya Era: The “New Deal” and Transition to the CPDM .............................................................. 144 v Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 149 PART III – SINGLE-PARTY REGIMES IN COMPETITION ............................................................... 150 Chapter 7 : The CCM and the Path to Competitive Hegemony ................................................................ 151 The Party Resilient: Elite Defection in Multiparty Tanzania ................................................................ 153 The Party Dominant: Patterns of Social Support in Multiparty Tanzania ............................................. 158 Assessing Alternative Explanations in Tanzania ................................................................................... 167 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 185 Chapter 8 – The KANU and the