PRAVDA AND MASKIROVKA: ​ ​ ​ How the Soviet Union Publicized the June 1967 Six Day War

Berkeley Newhouse-Velie

Undergraduate Honors Thesis

Department of History

University of Colorado Boulder

April 6, 2020

Committee:

Dr. David Shneer, Thesis Advisor, History, Jewish Studies, Religious Studies

Dr. Miriam Kingsberg Kadia, History

Yuliana Gunn, Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literatures

Velie 1

Introduction

Although more than fifty years have passed since the Six Day War ended in June 1967, its legacy remains highly debated. In the years immediately following the war, many Westerners and Israelis believed the Six Day War was a just war, fought between “peace-loving” Israelis and

“hostile Arabs” who had Soviet backing.1 As documents on the Six Day War continue to be declassified, however, this narrative has faced increasing scrutiny. In the context of Arab-Israeli relations, peace is a relative term. In June of 1967, little more than 19 years after the creation of the state of Israel, the Israelis and the Arabs went to war for the third time, the second time in only eleven years. The Six Day War, referred to as “the setback,” and the innocuous June War, in the Arab world, radically reshaped the Middle East. Though it remains one of the shortest wars in modern history, the Six Day War laid the foundation for the current state of Israeli and

Palestinian affairs. The Six Day War was hardly the last time the Arabs and Israelis would take up arms, but it cemented Israel’s place as the dominant military power of the Middle East and dealt a humiliating defeat to Egypt, and by proxy, its primary arms dealer, the Soviet Union.

The Six Day War attracted global attention, but it was primarily a regional conflict, a series of crises in a hotbed region that erupted into all-out war. Like many regional conflicts of the 1960s, it could not help but be overshadowed by Cold War politics. The Six Day War may have officially been between the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel, but the

United States and the Soviet Union remain integral to the broader context of the war. During the

Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in countries where they felt

1 Guy Laron, “Historians’ War Over the Six Day War,” The Nation, June 5, 2017, ​ ​ ​ https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/historians-war-six-day-war/ Velie 2 their ideological or economic interests were at stake, often in covert ways.2 While the Soviet

Union may not have been officially involved in the war, it provided Egypt and Syria with an ample supply of weapons prior to the war, and dramatically lobbied on their behalf in the United

Nations afterward.

By June 1967, both the Egyptian and Syrian militaries were composed almost entirely of state of the art Soviet weaponry, and their defeats were viewed as a reflection of the Soviet

Union’s own military capabilities. As a result, the Soviet Union attempted to distance itself from

Egypt and Syria’s losses in its domestic press coverage of the war. In the press, the Soviet Union focused on its efforts in the United Nations Security Council and masked Syria and Egypt’s losses by including false reports of Arab victories over Israel. As the official newspaper of the

Communist Party, Pravda was tasked with relaying official party statements and policies, and in ​ ​ turn, the Soviet Union’s official narrative of global and domestic events. Pravda may translate to ​ “truth,” but it was not expected to be truthful in its reporting. In the Soviet Union, the press was ​ consistent, often repeating phrases and timelines in multiple articles. In its coverage of the Six

Day War, Pravda acknowledged Israel’s role in starting the war, but it was quick to draw ​ attention to the United States and other Western nations, repeatedly claiming they were behind

Israeli actions, while accusing Israel of acting as an overseer. In this thesis, I argue that, through

Pravda, the Soviet Union painted the Six Day War as an ideological struggle between socialism and Western imperialism.

While there is extensive scholarship on the Six Day War, the scholarship on Pravda, ​ ​ specifically during the mid-twentieth century, is surprisingly limited. This thesis will examine

2 Megan Ward, Shannon Pierson, and Jessica Beyer, “Formative Battles: Cold War Disinformation Campaigns and Mitigations Strategies” The Wilson Center, 2019. Velie 3 how Pravda publicized the Six Day War, and how its coverage masked elements of the war. The ​ Soviet Union’s level of involvement in the war is a question that continues to be debated. Many of the works on the Six Day War published after the early 1990s incorporate additional Soviet archive material, and in turn, provide a more detailed look into Soviet decision making during the weeks preceding the war and through its end. Of the works concerning the Six Day War,

Michael Oren’s Six Days of War, Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov’s The Soviet Union and the ​ ​ ​ June 1967 Six Day War, and Tom Segev’s 1967 offer the most comprehensive analyses of the ​ ​ ​ war.3 Published in 2002, Oren’s Six Days of War gives a broad account of the war, including a ​ ​ ​ detailed analysis on each day of war on the battlefield, as well as what was taking place in the

United Nations Security Council, the primary diplomatic arena of the war. Six Days of War ​ traces the transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from the days of British Palestine to the aftermath of the Six Day War. Oren refrains from discussing the role of the Soviet Union in depth, but he provides extensive information on many other aspects of the conflict, though at times is more sympathetic towards Israel. Tom Segev’s 1967 provides a detailed analysis of the ​ war as well, though it is not as detailed as Six Days of War. 1967, however, provides a more ​ ​ ​ ​ objective analysis of Israeli, Syrian, and Egyptian actions during the second half of the war.

The Soviet Union and the June War of 1967 provides the most thorough analysis of the ​ ​ Soviet Union’s role in the conflict but features a limited account on the events of the war.

Published in 2008, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War is a compilation of essays ​ that analyze the decisions of Soviet leadership during different phases of the war. Ro’i and

3 Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University ​ ​ Press, 2002); Yaacov Ro’i and Boris Morozov, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War (Washington: ​ ​ Woodrow Wilson Сenter Press, 2008); Tom Segev, 1967, trans. Jessica Cohen (New York: Metropolitan Books, ​ ​ 2005). Velie 4

Morozov argue that the Soviet Union gravely miscalculated the situation in the Middle East, but tried in vain to placate its allies and prevent the outbreak of a full-scale war.4

Before the War: The Soviet Union and the Middle East

The end of World War II led to the departure of Britain and France from the Middle East, the two countries that colonized the region after the first World War. In the wake of the collapse of the British and French empires, newly independent Arab governments emerged. The departure of Western empires from the Middle East presented an opportunity that had eluded the Soviet

Union for decades: a foothold in the Middle East. The Soviet Union had recognized the geopolitical importance of the Middle East since the 1930s, but as Cold-War tensions intensified, the need for a presence in the Middle East became especially important.5 Since its earliest days, the Soviet Union had made the denouncement of “colonialist systems” a hallmark of its foreign policy, and advocating for its own military bases on foreign soil dramatically contradicted its own principles.6 The Soviet Union had consistently been against Zionism, regarding the British

Mandate of Palestine as “an agent of imperialism,” but it believed Israel could be its golden opportunity in the Middle East. In the recently chartered United Nations, the Soviet Union became a tireless advocate for the creation of the Jewish state.7 Though the Soviet Union’s pro-Zionist stance seemed out of line with its previous policies, it was in line with a far more

4 Ro’i and Morozov, June 1967 War, 23. ​ ​ 5 Alexey Vasiliev, Russia’s Foreign Policy from Lenin to Putin, (London: Routledge, 2017) 13. ​ ​ ​ 6 Vasiliev, Russia’s Foreign Policy, 13,77. ​ ​ 7 Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six Day War (New ​ ​ Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 17. Velie 5 important aspect of Soviet policy, which was the policy of doing “whatever is best for the Soviet

Union.”8

In addition to the belief that an independent Jewish state would hasten the departure of the British from the Middle East, the Soviet Union felt Israel would be the perfect satellite state, under the leadership of “socialist-oriented” Russian-speaking Jews.9 In the United Nations,

Soviet delegate Semen Tsarpkin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko crafted an argument that was both pro-Israel and anti-Western, which claimed that the Jewish people should no longer be dependent on the “goodwill and mercy” of other nations. Gromyko believed the creation of Israel could be beneficial for the Arabs as well, arguing that Palestine had become a “police state” under British leadership. Gromyko concluded the argument with a statement that foreshadowed the Soviet’s relationship with the Arabs, predicting that Arab states would be “looking towards

Moscow” to help them in their “struggle” in the future.10 On November 29, 1947, the United

Nations General Assembly adopted the partition of Israel, Resolution 181. The adoption of

Resolution 181 was largely due to Soviet support, but Soviet support of Israel proved to be short-lived.11 Israel quickly showed that it had no desire to be a Soviet pawn, and the relationship between the fledgling nation and the superpower quickly cooled. Orienting itself towards the

West, Israel turned away from Communism and established a parliamentary government.

Despite the Soviet Union’s failure to incorporate Israel into its sphere of influence, its interest in the region remained high. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 brought a new government

8 Lester Velie, Countdown in the Holy Land (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 19. ​ ​ 9 Ginor and Remez, Foxbats, 17. ​ ​ 10 Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem: Twenty Years of Relations between Israel and the Soviet Union (New ​ ​ York: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), 24-26. 11 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 181,” in Israel and the Middle East, ed. Itamar Rabinovich and ​ ​ Jehuda Reinharz (London: University Press of New England, 2008), 61. Velie 6 to power, which both the United States and the Soviet Union hoped to befriend.12 Assuming the

Egyptian presidency in 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to pursue a policy of nonalignment and positive neutrality for Egypt, believing Egypt could benefit from both nations while avoiding becoming a pawn of either.13 Egypt clashed with both the United States and the Soviet Union from time to time, but Nasser’s policy of positive neutrality allowed Egypt to reap economic benefits from both the United States and the Soviet Union for a time. Nasser, however, did not remain unaligned for long.

On July 23, 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal, which was built as an international waterway but was owned by an Anglo-Franco holding company, controlled the passage of 45 percent of Western Europe’s oil, amounting to approximately 70 million tons.14

Prior to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Egypt had banned Israel from using the Canal, preventing even ships carrying food to Israel from passing through.15 Hoping to reopen the

Canal, Britain, France, and Israel formed an unlikely tripartite alliance and launched a joint attack on November 5, 1956. The United States quickly condemned its three allies in the United

Nations and called for an immediate cessation of all hostilities.16 Despite the United States’s quick condemnation of Israel, Britain, and France, Egypt credited Moscow for coming to its defense and encouraged other Arab countries to cooperate with Moscow instead of the West.17

12 From 1958 to 1971, Egypt was officially known as the United Arab Republic (UAR), along with Syria until the Syrian Revolution of 1961. Many of the primary sources used in this thesis refer to Egypt as the UAR, but for clarity Egypt will be used exclusively. 13 Ali M. Yaha, Egypt and the Soviet Union, 1955-1972: A Study in the Power of the Small State (Washington: ​ ​ Harbinger, 1989), 54. 14 Yagil Henkin, The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East (New York: Lexington Books, ​ ​ 2015), 74. 15 Henkin, Suez, 33. In 1954, Israel attempted to test the Egyptian ban, which was a violation of international law ​ ​ and UN Security Council resolutions, only for the crew to be arrested and jailed on false charges. 16 Henkin, Suez, 211. The United States had already warned the British and the French against attacking Egypt, ​ ​ calling for a UN resolution for a ceasefire on November 1, 1956. 17 Yaha, Egypt, 69. ​ ​ Velie 7

Capitalizing on the Egyptians’s disappointment with the United States, the Soviet Union granted

Egyptian appeals for medicine and wheat that the United States had previously denied.

With a pledge to “strengthen the anti-imperialist front,” Moscow worked to secure its relationship with Cairo, investing millions of dollars into the Egyptian military.18 Relations between Moscow and Cairo were not always smooth, but the Soviet Union recognized Egypt’s influential position in the Middle East. In addition to the aid and weapons it provided to Egypt, the Soviet Union began investing heavily in Syria as well, becoming particularly philanthropic after the 1961 Syrian revolution brought the Communist-friendly Ba’ath regime to power.19 By

1966, the Soviet Union had supplied Egypt with approximately $1.2 million dollars worth of weapons, and provided Syria with $428 million dollars of aid in 1966 alone.20 In an attempt to strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East and limit “Syrian adventurism,” the Soviet

Union engineered the mutual Syrian-Egyptian Defense Pact.21 Signed on November 4, 1966, the pact required Egypt to aid Syria should it become involved in a conflict, which the Soviets believed would give Egypt enough leverage to curb “Syrian inclinations” to get involved with

Israel.22

The Waiting: May 14, 1967, to June 4, 1967

18 Michael Oren, Six Days of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 96. ​ ​ 19 Oren, Six Days of War, 28. While the Communist Party remained illegal in Egypt, the new Syrian regime included ​ ​ Communists. 20 Yaha, 100, and Oren, 28. 21 Yaacov Ro’i, “Soviet Policy Towards the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow’s Relations with Egypt and Syria,” in The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov, (Washington: ​ ​ Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 4. 22 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy”, 4. Velie 8

By mid-May 1967, relations between Syria and Israel were especially tense. The

Egyptian-Syrian defense pact had managed to calm tensions along the Syrian-Israeli border for a few weeks, but the number of conflicts along the border began to rise again in January 1967.23

The number of border skirmishes rose throughout 1967, and it was these circumstances that enabled the Soviet Union to exercise the influence it had in the events that precipitated the Six

Day War. By May 1967, the Soviet Union had expressed its desire for Egypt to coordinate all of its political and diplomatic maneuvers with them, but Egypt ultimately made decisions that the

Soviets had not approved.24 The coverage, or lack thereof, of these events in Pravda reflects how ​ ​ the Soviet Union was no longer making decisions for Egypt, but reacting to them. Through

Pravda, the Soviet Union wrote a narrative that masked the role it played in the conflict. ​ On May 13, the Soviet Union issued a report to Egypt which claimed Israel was starting to concentrate troops along the Syrian border.25 There are multiple theories as to why the Soviets issued the report, and whether or not they believed it to be true, but there is no evidence to support their claim and it is widely accepted as false. One theory proposes that the Soviets issued the report with the intention of testing the Egyptian-Syrian defense pact, but the evidence to support this theory is limited.26 Regardless of what Soviet intentions were, the report had a nearly instantaneous effect. Only a day after the report was issued, Egyptian General Muhammed Fawzi traveled to Damascus to survey the area, reporting to Cairo that there were no unusual Israeli troop concentrations, and that the Syrian army was not in a state of alert.27 Despite General

23 Oren, Six Days of War, 45. ​ ​ 24 Boris Morozov, “The Outbreak of the June 1967 War in Light of Soviet Documentation,” in The Soviet Union and ​ the June 1967 Six Day War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, ​ 2008), 53. 25 Richard B. Parker, Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 3. ​ ​ 26 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 5. 27 Oren, Six Days of War, 64. ​ ​ Velie 9

Fawzi’s denial of Israeli troop concentrations, Egypt requested for the United Nations

Emergency Forces (UNEF) to be withdrawn from the Sinai on May 16.28 The UNEF had been stationed in Sinai since the Suez crisis as part of an effort to prevent the outbreak of another

Arab-Israeli war. In a decision that alarmed even the Soviet Union, UN Secretary-General U

Thant conceded to Egypt’s request. Hoping to mitigate the crisis, the Soviet Union began to pursue a policy with the Egyptians that they hoped would prevent war. The withdrawal of the

UNEF from the Sinai, however, was the first of multiple Egyptian actions that the Soviet Union had not approved and increased tensions with Israel, but as it was a Soviet report that prompted the Egyptian demand, the Soviets now had little choice but to support Egyptian actions. Held hostage by its own policies, the Soviet Union remained supportive of Egyptian decisions in the press.29

The Soviet press quickly began integrating the events taking place in the Middle East into a larger, global context. A May 18 Pravda article titled “Tuchi nad blizhnem vostokom” ​ ​ (“Clouds Over the Middle East”) was among the first articles published on the rising tensions.

Written by Yevgeny Primakov, Pravda’s Middle Eastern correspondent who would go on to ​ ​ write the majority of the articles on the conflict, the article repeated the claim that Israel was concentrating troops along the Syrian border.30 In addition, Primakov described a meeting at the

United Nations Security Council where the Syrian representative read a letter which contended that Israel was planning a “second Suez Crisis,” and that its actions were part of a larger conspiracy involving the United States. Building on the assertion of a larger Western conspiracy,

28 Morozov, “The Outbreak,” 53, and Oren, Six Days of War, 7. ​ ​ 29 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 8. 30 It is widely accepted that Yevgeny Primakov’s position as a foreign correspondent for Pravda was a cover for ​ ​ espionage for the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). Velie 10

Primakov mentioned that Israeli diplomats had been meeting with officials in Washington and

London.31 The reference to the Suez Crisis served as a way to situate the growing conflict between Syria and Israel as a conflict against imperialism, with Israel acting as a proxy for wealthy Western nations. Primakov also referenced a letter from President Nasser that confirmed

Egypt’s commitment to the mutual defense pact, claiming it would strike Israel if it took any aggressive actions against Syria. Primakov did not clarify whether or not the Soviet Union would become involved if Syria was attacked. This article served as a way to frame the growing tensions as not only a regional conflict, but as a conflict between an agent of Western imperialism, and two states that were only recently independent from Britain and France. While

“Clouds Over the Middle East” primarily featured letters by Egyptian and Syrian officials, it featured the false report, which had been discredited days before the article went to press.

Primakov made no mention of Nasser’s remilitarization of the Sinai peninsula with Egyptian troops, or of his request to withdraw the UNEF, suggesting that the Soviet Union learned of these actions after the fact.32

Wasting no time after the departure of the UNEF, Nasser decided to block Israel from the

Straits of Tiran on May 22.33 The Soviet Union had hoped to coordinate its diplomatic and political activities with Egypt, but it believed Egypt was no longer committed to calming the tension.34 Closing the Straits of Tiran gave Israel casus belli and increased the chance of war ​ ​ considerably, but Moscow still believed the outbreak of war could be avoided. The Soviet Union made statements supporting Egypt’s request for the withdrawal of the UNEF and its

31 “Tuchi nad blizhnem vostokom,” Pravda May 18, 1967. All Russian sources are translated by the author. ​ ​ 32 Oren, Six Days of War, 70. ​ ​ 33 Oren, Six Days of War, 86. ​ ​ 34 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 7. Velie 11 remilitarization of the Sinai, but it made no mention of the closure of the Straits of Tiran. After

Nasser requested to withdraw the UNEF, the Soviet Union privately acknowledged that Egypt had already scored a “political and military victory,” but that if the Egyptians chose to take actions that would deepen the crisis, it would like to be notified in advance.35 The Egyptians did not give advance notice of their decision to close the Straits of Tiran, and the Soviet Union was taken by surprise. The Soviet Union could not publicly contradict its ally, so it simply ignored the closure.36 In a May 23 government statement, the Soviets repeated the assertion that Israel was “acting as the colonial overseer” of imperialist powers and continued to initiate a conflict, but it did not directly threaten Israel, and the statement hardly mentioned the United States, though Nasser had hoped it would.37

35 Laron, Six-Day War, 249. ​ ​ 36 “Statement of the Soviet Government,” in From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet ​ Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973, ed. Yaakov Ro’i (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 440. ​ 37 “Statement of the Soviet Government,” 440. Velie 12

Fig. 1. “Events Leading to the Six Day War (25-30 May, 1967),” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 38

Covering the events in the same fashion as the official government statement, Pravda’s ​ ​ coverage omitted the closure of the Straits of Tiran entirely. Instead of covering the events that actually happened, in a May 28 article titled “Kto platit za muzyku” (“Who Pays for the

Music?”), Primakov continued to accuse the United States of influencing Israeli policy.39 In addition, Primakov made no mention of the Egyptian militarization of the Sinai, choosing instead to report on Israeli troops along the Syrian border, and other “aggressions.” Primakov also accused American politicians of trying to deceive the public, suggesting that the United States was lying when it claimed it had no plans to participate in an Israeli strike.40 Additionally,

Primakov claimed that the United States’s support of the UNEF was part of a larger plan to occupy Syria. While Primakov’s article may have been critical of the United States, behind the scenes, the Soviets were beginning to negotiate with the United States.41

By May 27, both Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Johnson recognized the growing possibility of war between Israel and Egypt, and more importantly, the catastrophic consequences Soviet and American involvement would have. Kosygin sent a letter to Johnson requesting for the United States to do whatever it could to prevent an armed conflict, and confirming that the Soviet Union would not get involved as long as the United States agreed to do the same. 42 In addition, the Johnson Administration denied Israeli requests for arms and

38 “Events Leading to the Six Day War (25-30 May 1967),” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed March 27, 2020, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Events%20leading%20to%20the%20Six%20Day%20War-%201967.aspx 39 “Kto platit za muzyku,” Pravda, May 28, 1967, p.3. ​ ​ 40 “Kto platit za muzyku,” Pravda, May 28, 1967, p.3. ​ ​ 41 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 10. 42 Guy Laron, The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), ​ ​ 251, and Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 12. Velie 13 assistance with reopening the Straits, informing Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that the most extreme measure the administration would be willing to take was exerting economic pressure on

Egypt, a far cry from Primakov’s claim that the United States was orchestrating Israeli actions.43

Furthermore, despite claims that Israel was the primary aggressor in the conflict, Moscow had urged Cairo to “consolidate its gains” and to resolve the conflict peacefully and diplomatically. In a May 25 Moscow meeting between Shams Badran, the Egyptian Minister of

War, and Andrei Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Grechko had warned Badran that

Egypt needed to avoid being pulled into a “war with the imperialists,” believing the result of such a war would almost certainly be a political defeat.44 Moscow informed Cairo that while it remained committed to supporting the Arabs if they were attacked, it would not be so supportive if they were the ones to issue the first strike.45 Finally, much of the Soviet Union’s policy regarding its Middle Eastern allies and the Arab-Israeli conflict was contingent upon a desire to avoid war with the United States. If anything, it was the Soviet Union, not Israel, that was responding to American policy moves in the Middle East.

Motivated by a desire to prevent confrontation with the United States, the Soviet Union attempted to calm Egypt, but it underestimated the importance of the Straits of Tiran to Israel.

Both British and American intelligence created independent reports analyzing the military capabilities of the Arab States and Israel. The reports came to similar conclusions, assuming that while the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had a 2:1 advantage over Israel in weaponry, an Arab victory over Israel was practically inconceivable.46 Israeli military leadership

43 Oren, Six Days of War, 138. ​ ​ 44 Laron, The Six-Day War, 249. ​ ​ 45 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 13-14. 46 Jermy Bowen, Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003), 52-53. ​ ​ Velie 14 was aware of its superiority over its adversaries, but nevertheless, a sense of an imminent calamity gripped the Israeli psyche. Coffins were ordered by the thousands, while rabbis hastily consecrated parks and public spaces for use as cemeteries.47 Citing fear that the “ring of aggression” was tightening around Israel, the Israeli Security Cabinet debated for days over whether or not to strike Egypt.48 As Israel continued to debate whether or not to go to war, Soviet press coverage began to wane, even though the Soviets recognized that a war was likely coming soon.49 During the first few days of June Pravda published only a handful of brief articles on the ​ ​ situation, with only two making the front page. The final article written before the war broke out was published on June 5 and covered a June 4 meeting of the UN Security Council. The article, titled “V bezopasnosti OON” (“At the United Nations Security Council”), only mentioned Israel a handful of times.50 The article covered the June 4 meeting of the UN Security Council, where debates were primarily about the closure of the Straits of Tiran, but hardly added any new information on the conflict.

The Six Day War: June 5, 1967, to June 10, 1967

Flying low enough to avoid radar detection, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) jets took off for

Egypt and Syria during the early hours of June 5. The Egyptians believed the Israelis would not try to attack after dawn, and the strike took them by complete surprise.51 Indeed, the success of the strike succeeded even the IAF’s own expectations. Nearly every Egyptian plane was on the ground at the time of the strike, enabling the IAF to destroy 204 planes, roughly half of the

47 Bowen, Six Days, 71. ​ ​ 48 Segev, 1967, 336. ​ ​ 49 Bowen, Six Days, 92. ​ ​ 50 “V bezopasnosti OON,” Pravda, June 5, 1967, p.5. ​ ​ 51 Oren, Six Days of War, 171. ​ ​ Velie 15

Egyptian air force.52 The Egyptian air force, which the Soviet Union had steadily invested in for over ten years, was destroyed by Israel in approximately thirty minutes. As the air raids continued, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) quickly advanced past Egyptian troops and into the

Sinai, progressing far quicker than its own previous estimates.53 Despite Israel’s early success along the Egyptian front, it encountered a setback along the Jordanian border. As a monarchy,

Jordan was not as close to Egypt and Syria as other “progressive” Arab states, and Israel had tried to capitalize on the strained relationship. Hoping to form an alliance of sorts, Israeli leadership sent a message to King Hussein of Jordan stating that Israel would refrain from attacking Jordan as long as Jordan did the same.54 King Hussein, however, chose not to pursue a policy of neutrality, opting to shell West Jerusalem and Tel Aviv instead.55 Conducting an air raid on the Jordanian air force had previously been discussed and ultimately decided against, but

Israel now had the pretext it wanted to justify a raid. While IDF troops fought on the ground for

East Jerusalem, the IAF conducted a strike that essentially eliminated the Royal Jordanian Air

Force.56 Though only a third of its air force remained after the IAF’s morning strike, Syria remained committed to the notion of Arab unity and continued to shell northern Israeli settlements.57

By that evening, peace, let alone victory, remained inconceivable. Israel had made significant gains and effectively neutralized the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, but an

Israeli victory did not appear to be inevitable. Although Egypt suffered heavy losses, it

52 Oren, Six Days of War, 174. ​ ​ 53 Oren, Six Days of War, 186. ​ ​ 54 Segev, 1967, 341. ​ ​ 55 Segev, 1967, 341 and Oren, Six Days of War, 186. ​ ​ ​ ​ 56 Oren, Six Days of War, 185-186. ​ ​ 57 Oren, Six Days of War, 186, 195. ​ ​ Velie 16 committed to present a victorious front to its citizens. Throughout the first day of fighting, there were celebrations in the streets of Cairo and reports of Egyptian victories. According to an

Egyptian government communiqué, Israel had launched a strike at 9 that morning, which Egypt had successfully held off, and then destroyed close to 75 percent of the IAF. Radio Cairo broadcasted reports of Egyptian victories, while informing the public that Tel-Aviv was burning.

Chants of “Down with Israel” and celebrations filled the streets of Cairo.58 While the jubilant mood in the streets did not extend to Egyptian Supreme Headquarters, the attitude in headquarters hardly reflected the substantial losses Egypt had endured. In contrast to the

Egyptians, Israeli leadership wanted to appear to be losing the war. Fueled by the belief that if ​ ​ Israel seemed to be losing there would be no pressure from the international community to stop its attacks, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan ordered that all coverage of the war be censored. As a result, Israel’s silence indirectly strengthened the credibility of Radio Cairo’s coverage, as there was nothing to contradict its reports.59

Initially, the Soviet Union initially believed the Arabs’s reports of victory. Fearing an

Israeli defeat might spur the United States to get involved, the Soviet Union quickly began working to secure a ceasefire. The “hotline,” the secure line running between the Pentagon and

Moscow that had been installed as a response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, was used for the first time. Just hours after the fighting broke out, Kosygin messaged Johnson on the hotline, telling him that it was the duty of the Soviet Union and the United States to achieve the “immediate cessation” of the conflict.60 The Soviet Union encouraged its Arab allies to work for a ceasefire, but despite their losses, Syria and Egypt were in no hurry for a cessation of hostilities or for the

58 Segev, 1967, 342. ​ ​ 59 Segev, 1967, 342. ​ ​ 60 Bowen, Six Days, 156, and Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 17. ​ ​ Velie 17

UN Security Council to discuss the war. While the Soviet Union worked privately to secure a ceasefire, publicly, it did not press for an immediate ceasefire and continued to support Egypt’s version of the conflict.

Along with the Soviet government’s June 5 statement on the conflict, Pravda published a ​ ​ small collection of articles on the conflict on June 6, all running under the title “Tuchi voĭny nad blizhnem vostokom” (“Clouds of War Over the Near East”).61 Emphasizing the conflict’s global importance, there were articles written from Rome, Cairo, London, and Washington. The article from Cairo was written by Primakov and was titled “Slochenie i reshimost” (“Unity and

Determination”).62 Primakov began the article by referencing the Suez Crisis, and then described the IAF’s strike on Egyptian air bases.63 Primakov quickly diverged from the truth, however, and repeated Cairo’s claim that multiple Israeli pilots had been captured and that Egypt was in the middle of an effective counter-strike.64 In addition to reiterating the Egyptian version of the war,

Primakov praised the unity of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and included Kuwait, Lebanon, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia’s commitments to Egypt and their willingness to join the fight.

While the fighting was far from over on June 6, “Unity and Determination’” featured the same false events as Radio Cairo, leading to the view that an Egyptian victory was the most likely outcome. Given the Soviet’s desire for a ceasefire, publishing false claims about Egyptian military victories and the potential involvement of three additional Arab states, seemed to work against obtaining a ceasefire. In addition, the Soviet government’s June 5 statement omitted the losses Israel inflicted on the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian air forces. Instead, the statement

61 “Tuchi voĭny nad blizhnem vostokom,” Pravda, June 6, 1967, p.3. ​ 62 “Slochenie i reshimost’,” Pravda, June 6, 1967, p. 3. ​ ​ 63 “Slochenie i reshimost’,” Pravda June 6, 1967, p. 3. ​ ​ 64 “Slochenie i reshimost’,” Pravda June 6, 1967, p. 3. ​ ​ Velie 18 accused Israel of carrying out the agenda of certain “imperialist circles,” which was a thinly veiled reference to the United States, though the United States had issued a statement confirming its neutrality that morning.65 The statement ended with the Soviet government reiterating its desire to “extinguish the conflagration,” along with what could easily be interpreted as a threat to get involved, and claiming that it had the right to “take all steps that may be necessitated by the situation.” 66 The threatening tone of the Soviet statement and Pravda’s inclusion of the false ​ ​ Egyptian reports have previously been justified by the assertion that the Soviet Union believed

Egypt was winning the war at the time, but in light of more recent scholarship, this seems very unlikely. Furthermore, in 2006, Yevgeny Primakov, who was later the Prime Minister of the

Russian Federation, published a memoir that suggests the Soviets knew early on that the

Egyptian reports were inaccurate.67 According to Primakov, Radio Cairo broadcast multiple bulletins on June 5 that made it sound as if the entire IAF had been completely “wiped out.” 68

Primakov, however, was quickly informed by Soviet military advisors that Radio Cairo’s bulletins were false, and of the severity of the damage to the Egyptian fleet from the Israeli strike.69 As a Pravda correspondent, Primakov’s job was not necessarily not to write the truth, ​ ​ but to mask it and present the Soviet Union’s version of the truth. After only a day of fighting, it was clear a favorable outcome for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan was unlikely, and Pravda chose to ​ ​ mask their losses from the public while it still had the option. While the Soviet Union would not

65 “June 5 Statement of the Soviet Government,” in Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet ​ Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973, ed. Yaakov Ro’i (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), 441, and Segev, ​ 1967, 364. ​ 66 “June 5 Statement,” 441. 67 Yevgeny Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the ​ Present, trans. Paul Gould (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 102. In addition to Primakov’s claim, in Six Days of ​ ​ War Michael Oren also claims that Soviet military officers knew the full extent of the “Egyptian disaster” by the ​ evening of June 5. 68 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, 102. ​ ​ 69 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, 102. ​ ​ Velie 19 be able to hide the outcome of the war forever, repeating the claims of Cairo and painting the war as an imperialist conflict served as a way to distance itself from the severe losses the Arab states sustained.

Out of the public eye, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to discuss their wish to avoid becoming directly involved in the conflict, and their desire to resolve the conflict diplomatically through the UN Security Council. The Security Council met during the evening of

June 5, when an Israeli victory had started to appear to be the most likely ending to the war.70

Despite their shared desire for a ceasefire, tensions rose between the United States and the Soviet

Union over the terms, with one delegate claiming the failure to reach a ceasefire was in part due to the United States and the Soviet Union’s “penchant for dramatic steps.”71 The first proposal for a ceasefire, which was presented by India, suggested an immediate ceasefire and a return to the conditions of June 4. The United States and the United Kingdom rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would legitimize Egypt’s closure of the Straits of Tiran and its remilitarization of the Sinai, and instead proposed an alternate resolution which was worded to encourage Egypt to reopen the Straits of Tiran.72 Both Nikolai Federenko, the Soviet representative, and Mohamed el ​ ​ ​ Kony, the Egyptian representative, refused to even consider the alternate resolution.73

As the situation continued to grow worse for the Arabs, the Soviet Union switched its stance and agreed to accept a simple ceasefire, and urged its allies to do the same.74 For the Arab states, the days that followed proved to be just as bad as June 5. By June 7, Israel had captured the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. On June 8, Israel took control of the Sinai and the West Bank.

70 Oren, Six Days of War, 200. ​ ​ 71 Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 75. ​ ​ 72 Oren, Six Days of War, 200. ​ ​ 73 Oren, Six Days of War, 200. ​ ​ 74 Ro’i, Encroachment, 442. ​ ​ Velie 20

75 Having suffered heavy casualties in the battle for East Jerusalem, Jordan begged for a ceasefire on June 7.76 As it became clear that an Arab military victory was unlikely, the Soviet Union hoped it could at least achieve a political victory, and Pravda turned its attention away from the ​ ​ war and towards the diplomatic arena. As a result, much of the coverage from the final days of fighting focused on the deliberations of the Security Council. Published in Pravda, the Soviet ​ ​ government’s June 7 statement accused Israel of violating the Security Council’s ceasefire and of pursuing an “adventurist” policy. Unlike the Soviet government's June 5 statement, this time it did not threaten military involvement, but instead claimed it would sever all diplomatic relations with Israel.77 The threat of severing diplomatic relations with Israel was taken seriously, as

Israeli leadership feared it could lead to the entire Eastern bloc severing diplomatic relations, in addition to Communist-friendly nations in Africa and Asia. Israel worried this could lead to its expulsion from the United Nations.78 Though neither Syria or Egypt had accepted the Security

Council’s ceasefire at the time, the Soviet statement only mentioned Israel’s violation of the ceasefire.79

By the evening of June 8, an Israeli victory appeared to be all but certain. After Israel seized the Sinai, Egypt decided it had little choice but to accept the ceasefire the Security

Council passed the day before.80 Realizing the severity of its military defeats, Egypt was willing to accept a ceasefire on the basis of reciprocity alone.81 Arriving in the Security Council late that

75 Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 123. ​ ​ 76 Segev, 1967, 356. ​ ​ 77 “June 7 Statement of the Soviet Government,” in Moscow and Jerusalem: Twenty Years of Relations between ​ Israel and the Soviet Union, ed. Avigdor Dagan, (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), 229-230. ​ 78 Oren, Six Days of War, 274. ​ ​ 79 Oren, Six Days of War, 260. ​ ​ 80 Bowen, Six Days, 270. ​ ​ 81 Bailey, Resolution 242, 83. ​ ​ Velie 21 evening, Mohamed El-Kony tearfully accepted the ceasefire on Egypt’s behalf. Many questioned the sincerity of El-Kony’s statement, as it seemed unlikely that Egypt would accept a ceasefire that did not explicitly demand the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Any doubts the Security Council entertained, however, were promptly dismissed when Egyptian Supreme Headquarters confirmed its acceptance of the ceasefire, claiming it had only been defeated because British and American troops were secretly fighting alongside the Israelis.82 The Supreme Headquarters’s statement did little to reassure Israel, however, which continued to debate if it should invade the Golan

Heights. Believing the Egyptian statement to be a ploy, Israel feared it could end up fighting a two-front war with Egypt and Syria.

In comparison to Jordan and Egypt, Syria had emerged from the first four days of fighting relatively unscathed. Aside from a failed Soviet-advised offensive on June 6, Syria had, for the most part, stayed out of the fighting.83 There was a high likelihood that Syria would soon accept the ceasefire, but Israeli leadership had been debating about seizing the Golan Heights since before the start of the war.84 While the Israeli Security Cabinet deliberated over the question of the Golan Heights, Israeli public opinion quickly proved to be in favor of the invasion.85 Citing Syria's shelling of northern Israeli settlements for over two years, Israeli leadership felt it could not allow Syria to “walk away with a victory.”86 Though they were surprised by the attack, the Syrians still fought back.87 Both sides suffered heavy losses in the battle that ensued, and Syria appealed to other Arab countries for help.88 When it became clear

82 Oren, Six Days of War, 274. ​ ​ 83 Laron, Six Day War, 296. ​ ​ 84 Segev, 1967, 387. ​ ​ 85 Segev, 1967, 387. ​ ​ 86 Bowen, Six Days, 283. ​ ​ 87 Oren, Six Days of War, 280. ​ ​ 88 Oren, Six Days of War, 284. ​ ​ Velie 22 that no one would be coming to its aid and Israeli forces continued to advance, Syria demanded that an emergency session of the Security Council be called.89 This request drastically limited the time Israel had to finish the offensive. In the Security Council, Israeli representative Moshe

Dayan agreed to a ceasefire that would take effect at 6:30 that evening.90

Written before Israel’s invasion of the Golan Heights on June 9, Pravda published an ​ ​ article titled “Araby splachibaiutsia” (“Arabs Rally”), which detailed the deteriorating conditions of Syria and Egypt, and Israel’s violation of the Security Council’s ceasefire resolutions.91

Similar to previous articles, “Arabs Rally” featured claims of successful Arab military counterstrikes. The article also claimed Israel’s violation of the Security Council’s ceasefire was part of a larger plan to use the conquered territory as leverage in negotiations, arguing that

Israel’s actions throughout the war followed a course set by the United States.92 In addition, the

Egyptians attempted to capitalize on the USS Liberty incident, contending that it proved earlier ​ ​ assertions of American involvement on Israel’s behalf. The USS Liberty incident occurred on ​ ​ June 8 when the IAF attacked the USS Liberty, a naval spy ship sailing off of the Sinai coast, ​ ​ mistaking it for a Soviet or Egyptian ship.93 While Egypt argued that the presence of an

American military ship so close to the Sinai war zone confirmed American involvement, the

Liberty incident actually put significant strain on American-Israeli relations.94 Similar to earlier ​ Pravda articles, “Arabs Rally” continued to focus on the global significance of the war. Hoping ​ to punish nations they suspected of aiding Israel, the article mentioned the oil embargo that

89 Oren, Six Days of War, 289. ​ ​ 90 Segev, 1967, 398. ​ ​ 91 “Araby splachibaiutsia,” Pravda, June 9, 1967, p.1. ​ 92 Araby splachibaiutsia,” P ravda, June 9, 1967, p.1. ​ 93 Bailey, Resolution 242, 81-82. ​ ​ 94 Bowen, Six Days, 267. ​ ​ Velie 23

Saudia Arabia, Libya, Qatar, and Bahrain levied on the United States, Britain, and West

Germany.95 Syria, Kuwait, and Lebanon were mentioned as having taken similar actions, although the Amir of Kuwait reportedly told the British Ambassador that he did not believe the

United States or Britain had intervened on Israel’s behalf. 96 “Arabs Rally” claimed Egyptian pilots had successfully shot down several Israeli planes, but failed to acknowledge that Egypt, like Israel, had violated the previous day’s ceasefire resolution.97 “Arabs Rally” concluded with the claim that Tel Aviv was preparing for a victorious end within the next couple of days, but

Egypt continued to put up a valiant effort.98

The war ended faster than “Arabs Rally” estimated. On June 10, when Israel once again accepted the Security Council’s ceasefire, and as all combatants had now agreed to observe it, the war ended. Pravda published “Vosstanovit’ mir na blizhnem vostoke” (“Restore Peace in the ​ ​ Middle East”), which featured the Soviet account of the events of June 9. “Restore Peace in the

Middle East” was the longest article Pravda published on the conflict, and it gave the most ​ ​ comprehensive look at the conflict. The article focused primarily on the draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union and the two emergency meetings of the Security Council on June 8 and June 9. Opening with the Soviet Union’s draft resolution, the article mentioned Israel’s previous violations of the ceasefire resolution from June 6, and expressed the Soviet Union’s desire for Israel to “immediately cease hostilities” and withdraw all its troops from Arab territory.99 “Restore Peace” was critical of the draft resolution submitted by American

95 “Agressiia izrailia bezopasnosti nar,” Pravda June 9, 1967, p.5. ​ 96 Bowen, Six Days, 267. ​ ​ 97 Segev, 1967, 270. ​ ​ 98 Araby splachibaiutsia,” P ravda, June 9, 1967, p.1. ​ 99 “Vosstanovit’ mir na blizhnem vostoke,” Pravda June 10, 1967, p. 1. ​ ​ Velie 24

Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, which it claimed “laid the blame” on the Arab countries.100 The ceasefire referenced in the article was adopted on June 7 as Resolution 234, and it requested that all governments involved take all the steps necessary to obtain an immediate ceasefire.101 Despite the critical coverage of the American draft resolution and Ambassador Goldberg, Resolution 234 was actually a compromise between Goldberg and the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations,

Nikolai Federenko. In addition, Resolution 234 was originally accepted by Israel and rejected by

Egypt. Goldberg informed Federenko that Israel would not be satisfied with the resolution, as it sought to initiate talks on the return of the seized Arab territories, which Israel had hoped to use as leverage for negotiations, but that the United States would accept the resolution as long as the

Soviet Union did as well.102

Abba Eban, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, accepted the Goldberg-Federenko resolution, as did the Jordanian ambassador, Muhammad al-Farra. Egyptian ambassador

El-Kony, however, rejected the resolution after receiving instructions from Cairo that he was not to accept any ceasefire resolution that did not require the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory.103 The Soviet Union desired a quick end to the fighting, especially after it became apparent that Syria and Egypt had little chance of winning the war.

“Restore Peace” did not shy away from the opportunity to speculate on the role the

United States played in the war, and claimed Israel continued to receive “support and encouragement” from Washington.104 The article levied direct accusations against the United

100 “Vosstanovit’ mir na blizhnem vostoke,” Pravda June 10, 1967, p. 1. ​ ​ 101 Security Council Resolution 234, S/RES/234 (1967), available at https://undocs.org/S/RES/234(1967) ​ 102 Oren, Six Days of War, 235. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ 103 Oren, Six Days of War, 236. ​ ​ 104 “Vosstanovit’ mir na blizhnem vostoke,” Pravda June 10, 1967, p. 1. ​ ​ Velie 25

States, blaming the American delegation of sabotaging the negotiations of the Council as a way to “prevent the condemnation” of Israeli aggression.105 In reality, the Soviet Union and the

United States remained in agreement about staying out of the conflict. On June 10, after Israel had broken the ceasefire by invading Syria, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sent a message warning President Johnson that if Israel did not stop military action that morning that the Soviet

Union would consider intervening on Syria’s behalf. Brezhnev warned Johnson that Soviet involvement could lead to a clash between the two countries, which would likely result in a

“grave disaster.” 106 President Johnson reportedly claimed that he had a “firm commitment” from

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol honoring the ceasefire, but that Eshkol had broken their agreement.

107 As the article reported, Arthur Goldberg did accuse Fedorenko and the Soviet delegation of engaging in political maneuvers at the cost of human lives, but unlike the article’s report, the

United States was not angling to sabotage the work of the Council.108 The Syrians had already agreed to accept a simple ceasefire resolution, but Federenko demanded that the resolution be amended to condemn Israel and order its troops behind the armistice line.109 Federenko’s maneuvering inadvertently gave Israel more time to complete its offensive, which ended up having high costs for Syria, as the Security Council did not reconvene until later that evening.

While “Restore Peace and the Middle East” did not make claims that are explicitly false, it omitted valuable information that provided the necessary context to fully understand the conflict and actions of the countries involved.

105 “Vosstanovit’ mir na blizhnem vostoke,” Pravda June 10, 1967, p. 1. ​ ​ 106 Yair Even, “A Paper Bear: Similarities and Contrasts in Soviet Involvement in the 1956 and 1967 Wars,” in The ​ Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Washington, DC: Woodrow ​ Wilson Center Press, 2008), 84. 107 Oren, Six Days of War, 290. ​ ​ 108 “Vosstanovit’ mir na blizhnem vostoke,” Pravda June 10, 1967, p. 1. ​ ​ 109 Oren, Six Days of War, 290-291. ​ ​ Velie 26

Consequences

With the reopening of the Straits of Tiran and the elimination of the Egyptian military threat, Israel had accomplished its primary objectives.110 In addition to achieving its two main military objectives, Israel had more than tripled in size, occupying the West Bank, East

Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. Egypt suffered heavy material losses, losing approximately $2 billion dollars worth of equipment and 85 percent of its air power.111 Egypt’s losses were not limited to machinery, however, as Egyptian casualties greatly surpassed those of any other combatant. In only six days of war, over 10,000 Egyptians, 700

Jordanians, and 450 Syrians were killed. Even more were reported missing or taken as prisoners of war.112 Though Israel never directly received any aid from the United States during the war, it remained highly conscious of American opinions. Initially, Israel planned to trade conquered territory for peace agreements, but it quickly changed course when it learned that the Johnson

Administration did not expect it to return any of the occupied land.113 Prime Minister Eshkol did not hesitate to confirm Israel’s commitment to retaining the territory it had gained, announcing that, with the reunification of Jerusalem, “the prophecy had been fulfilled,” citing what he felt was Israel’s “historic and spiritual” right to the land.114 Israel lost 679 soldiers and 20 percent of its air power, but in comparison to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, it had scored an unmitigated victory. Largely unconcerned with the exacerbation of the number of the Palestinian refugees,

110 Bailey, Resolution 242, 90. ​ ​ ​ 111 Oren, Six Days of War, 306. ​ ​ 112 Oren, Six Days of War, 305. The death rate of 10,000 for Egypt is a conservative estimate, some believe this ​ ​ figure is closer to 15,000. 113 Laron, The Six Day War, 306. ​ ​ 114 Bailey, Resolution 242, 107. ​ ​ Velie 27

Prime Minister Eshkol rushed to create policies that would make Israel’s newly occupied territory into a “low-cost” and permanent situation.115

In only a matter of days, Israel had solidified its place as the dominant military power of the Middle East. In contrast, President Nasser saw his influence wane, while discontent rose.

Around the Arab world, protestors criticized Moscow’s unwillingness to get involved, and

Egyptians began to “question the value” of the Soviets as allies.116 Egypt remained the most influential country in the Arab world and the Soviet Union knew anger over Egypt’s loss would reverberate around the region, and with the rest of its allies. So, in addition to rebuilding the militaries of Egypt and Syria, the Soviet Union continued to push for a ceasefire with more favorable terms for Syria and Egypt in the Security Council. Aware of growing anti-Russian sentiment in Egypt, the Soviet Union sought to ensure that the United States and the United

Kingdom remained unpopular alternatives. The Soviet Union stayed committed to portraying the war as a battle against imperialism and never shied from an opportunity in the Security Council or in Pravda to falsely accuse the United States or the United Kingdom of coming to Israel’s aid. ​ ​ In addition to its resolute support of Egypt in the Security Council, the Soviet Union used

Pradva to show the Soviet people’s support for the Arab cause at home. In the months that ​ followed the war, however, more conclusive reports were produced that revealed some of the inconsistencies in Pravda’s coverage. Pravda’s articles from June 11, Brezhnev’s report to the ​ ​ ​ ​ plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on June 20, and Yevgeny Primakov’s secret letter to Pravda’s editor-in-chief Mikhail Zimianin were each about the conflict, but each ​ ​

115 Levi Eshkol, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 12 June 1967,” http://www.israel.org/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/23%20Statement%20to%20the%20K nesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Eshk.aspx. 116 Yaha, Egypt, 125. ​ ​ Velie 28 document told a different story, with these discrepancies largely being a consequence of each document’s intended audience.

Pravda produced the most simplistic version of the conflict, focusing its coverage on ​ criticizing Israel for acting as an overseer for former colonial powers. Although Pravda omitted ​ ​ many of the Egyptian actions that the Soviet Union had not approved, it was never critical of the

Arabs. On June 11, a day after the fighting had officially ended, Pravda published a small ​ ​ collection of articles. The war was still front page news, though most of the articles were about the Soviet Union’s decision to finally sever diplomatic relations with Israel, and the Eastern bloc’s decision to do the same.117 This did not come as a complete surprise, since 1955 there were multiple instances where Soviet Jews were arrested for “maintaining ties” with staff members of the Israeli Embassy in the Soviet Union.118 Although the hostilities had ended,

Pravda published a government statement that claimed the Soviet Union would apply sanctions ​ to Israel if the fighting continued.119 It also published an article that covered protests outside of the Moscow embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, featuring a photograph of angry Soviet citizens with signs with slogans such as “Shame on the aggressors” and “Stop the aggression against the UAR.”120 Pravda also included a statement by the All ​ ​ Union Central Council of Trade Unions that condemned Israel. Taken together, the articles gave the appearance of widespread support for the Arab cause across the Soviet Union.

117 Ro’i, Encroachment, 443. ​ ​ 118 Yaakov Ro’i, “The Soviet Jewish Reaction to the Six Day War,” in The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day ​ War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), 252. ​ 119 “Nota Sovetskogo pravitel’stva pravitel’stvu Izrailia,” Pravda June 11, 1967. ​ 120 “Potushit’ ochag voĭny,” P ravda June 11, 1967. ​ Velie 29

On June 20, ten days after the war ended, Brezhnev presented the official Soviet version of the conflict in a report to the plenum of the Party’s Central Committee.121 As Soviet attempts to score a victory in the diplomatic arena remained largely unsuccessful, the official Soviet version of the war changed. Brezhnev’s report, titled “On Soviet Policy following Israeli

Aggression in the Middle East,” gave an account of the conflict that was similar to Pravda’s ​ ​ coverage, though it did contain notable events from the days preceding the conflict that Pravda ​ omitted.122

Although Brezhnev naturally blamed Israel for starting the war, he did not absolve the ​ ​ Arabs of their role in precipitating the outbreak. Prior to the outbreak of the war, Moscow was committed to acting in a way that would not “risk a conflagration,” but deter one.123 The Soviet

Union was clear about its intention to coordinate all diplomatic and political activities with the

Egyptians, but Nasser requested the removal of the UNEF from the Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran without consulting the Soviets.124 The Soviet Union retroactively approved Nasser’s removal of the UNEF, stating that it was Egypt’s “unquestionable right to do so,” though it never mentioned the closure of the Straits of Tiran in any government statements or Pravda articles.125 ​ ​ Brezhnev revealed, however, that Soviet leadership felt the decisions to remove the UNEF and to close the Straits of Tiran were “ill-advised.”126 In addition, Brezhnev defended his country’s commitment to de-escalating the tension, claiming the Soviet Union had warned Egypt and Syria

121 Yair Even, “A Paper Bear: Similarities and Contrasts in Soviet Involvement in the 1956 and 1967 Wars,” in The ​ Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Washington, DC: Woodrow ​ Wilson Center Press, 2008), 97. 122 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 123 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 7. 124 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 8. 125 Ro’i, “Soviet Policy,” 8. 126 Leonid Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy Following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East,” June 20, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) KC PZPR 2632, pp. 358-408. Obtained by Kryztof Perzak and translated by Gennady Pasechnik. Velie 30 that “calls for a war of annihilation against Israel” could lead to a confrontation.127 Although

Brezhnev voiced his disapproval with Egyptian efforts, or lack thereof, to mitigate the situation, he ultimately attributed the outbreak of war to an attempt by “American-led western imperialism” to “suppress progressive Arab regimes.”128

Deflecting attention away from Soviet involvement during the days preceding the crisis,

Brezhnev argued that the Soviet Union had not played any role in encouraging Egyptian aggression. The principle aim of Soviet foreign policy, according to Brezhnev, not only in the

Middle East but around the world, was to help “progressive regimes consolidate their independence” and to defend them from “imperialist aggression.”129 Although Pravda initially ​ ​ reported on Egyptian victories during the first few days of the war, Brezhnev acknowledged that the Egyptian government had passed along false information before the war and during the first days of fighting. Apparently, Nasser had claimed the situation “rapidly improved” after the removal of the UNEF.130 In addition, Nasser offered the Soviet Union an “optimistic” assessment of Egypt’s situation on June 6, the second day of fighting, claiming Western propaganda had exaggerated the extent of Egypt’s losses, only to recant the claim that evening and admit that

Egypt’s situation was “dangerous and deteriorating.”131 Brezhnev claimed Marshall Abdel Amer was sent on Nasser’s behalf to request a ceasefire on the evening of June 6, but Egypt did not agree to accept a ceasefire in the Security Council until June 8, and only on the basis of reciprocity.132 Brezhnev attributed the discrepancy to the vacillation of the Egyptian government,

127 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 128 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 129 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 130 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 131 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 132 Bailey, Resolution, 83. ​ ​ Velie 31 however, and claimed that while Egypt asked the Soviets to call for a ceasefire in the Security

Council, Egyptians “did not rush” to officially announce their acceptance of a ceasefire.133

Pravda’s coverage of the conflict remained unwaveringly supportive of the Arabs, which ​ made Brezhnev’s criticisms somewhat surprising. Brezhnev’s speech, however, responded to many of the criticisms levied on the Soviet Union after the war. Brezhnev cited the success of

Israel's initial strike and the failures of Arab military leadership as the reason why Israel won, asserting that Arab countries were “indisputably superior” in terms of military equipment to

Israel prior to the war.134 As the Soviet Union became aware of the severity of the situation and the diminished capacity of the Egyptian army, it felt that the only way to help its allies was through “political and diplomatic means.”135 Reflecting the Cold War politics that overshadowed the war, Brezhnev noted the “terrible catastrophe” that could occur between the United States and the Soviet Union if either country became involved.136 In addition, Brezhnev claimed Israel’s primary goal in invading Syria was “the liquidation” of all socialist governments, and that the fall of Nasser’s regime could lead to the end of socialism in the region.137 Brezhnev concluded the report by referencing the Soviet Union’s interactions with the United States, claiming Soviet warnings to the United States “brought about desired results” in obtaining a ceasefire in the

Security Council.138

As protests erupted around the Arab world and demonstrators voiced their displeasure at the Soviet Union’s failure to come to the defense of its allies, the Soviet Union became

133 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 134 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 135 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 136 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 137 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 138 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” Velie 32 increasingly concerned about the damage its reputation had sustained.139 Brezhnev’s speech responded to the challenge of presenting the crisis in a way that did not hold Syria and Egypt entirely accountable for their losses, but at the same time refrained from placing any blame on the Soviet Union. Brezhnev claimed that its aim in passing along the knowledge of Israeli troop concentrations along the Syrian border was to warn Egypt and Syria, and to give them time to take the necessary steps to prepare their armies.140 Brezhnev did not mention that the report contained false information, nor that only the Egyptian and Syrian officials took “ill-advised” steps.141 Even though the Soviet Union had not approved many of the actions taken by Egypt in the days leading up to the war, all of Egypt’s actions were in response to the Soviet Union’s false warning. Brezhnev’s criticism reflected the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to stand behind

Nasser’s earlier decision to close the Straits of Tiran, and the Soviet Union’s surprise at the removal of the UNEF.142 In this speech, Brezhnev shifted the focus of the conflict away from the

Soviet Union, and unlike Pravda coverage, criticized the Egyptians. Although Brezhnev ​ ​ communicated many of the same themes as Pravda, his report revealed many of the real reasons ​ ​ behind the Soviet Union’s irritation at the Six Day War.

Nearly two months after the war ended, Primakov, Pravda’s Egyptian foreign ​ ​ correspondent, sent a secret report on the war to Pravda’s editor-in-chief Mikhail Zimianin. With ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ a focus on the long term implications of Egypt's loss, Primakov detailed the problems Egypt was facing and offered solutions on how best to combat the growing anti-Soviet and anti-socialist

139 Yaha, Egypt, 125. ​ ​ 140 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 141 Brezhnev, “On Soviet Policy.” 142 Boris Morozov, “The Outbreak of the June 1967 War in Light of Soviet Documentation,” in The Soviet Union ​ and the June 1967 Six Day War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center ​ Press, 2008), 56. Velie 33 sentiments. The report concluded that although Israel had not achieved its goal of “overthrowing

Nasser’s regime,” it had emerged from the war considerably weaker.143 In the months following the war, Egyptians feared Israel would launch an attack across the Suez Canal. Primakov addressed these concerns in his letter, claiming the only reason Israel avoided doing so was out of fear of Soviet retaliation.144 Primakov focused on the growing presence of anti-Nasser groups and their desire for Nasser to openly criticize the Russians, whom they blamed for Egypt’s military defeat.145 In addition, the memory of British control over Egypt was a recent memory for many, and people feared the Russians simply sought to replace the British.146

Primakov, however, attributed Egyptian losses to a failure to build socialism in the country. The emergence of a “military bourgeoisie” in Egypt meant that military leadership had become more concerned with increasing their own material wealth than training soldiers.147 In addition to the political problems the war brought for Nasser, Primakov covered the political repercussions the Soviet Union faced abroad. Rumors circulated that questioned the adequacy of

Soviet weaponry, damaging the prestige of the Soviet Army abroad.148 Primakov came to the conclusion that to save his regime, Nasser needed to build socialism in Egypt through the

“politicization of the masses” and the removal of the bourgeoisie from the military. Primakov closed his letter with the recommendation that the Soviet Union begin its own propaganda campaign to counter the recent surge of anti-Soviet propaganda in Egypt.149

143 Yevgeny Primakov, “Several Questions Relating to the Situation in the UAR,” in The Soviet Union and the June ​ 1967 Six Day War, ed. Yaakov Ro’i and Boris Morozov (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), ​ 348. 144 Primakov, “Several Questions,” 349. 145 Primakov, “Several Questions,” 349. 146 Primakov, “Several Questions,” 350. 147 Primakov, “Several Questions,” 352. 148 Primakov, “Several Questions,” 353. 149 Primakov, “Several Questions,” 353. Velie 34

In comparison to the Pravda articles from the war and Brezhnev’s speech, Primakov’s ​ ​ letter is remarkably candid. Considering that Primakov’s letter was written without the intention of being published this is not especially surprising, but the differences between the Pravda, ​ ​ Brezhnev’s speech, and Primakov’s letter provide considerable insights on why the Soviet Union portrayed the conflict the way it did. Primakov addressed his time spent in Egypt as a Pravda ​ correspondent and the secret letter he wrote to Zamimin years later in his memoir. Primakov’s findings on the war and the situation in Egypt, however, were reportedly at odds with the predominant viewpoint taken up by the international section of the Soviet party’s Central

Committee.150 Primakov claimed his conclusions on Egypt’s failure to create socialism and the emergence of a military bourgeoisie were rejected because Soviet leadership denied that socialism in Egypt could have failed to take hold.151 Communism in the Middle East, Primakov argued, was a lost cause that Soviet leadership during the 1960s had failed to mask.152

Primakov’s account of having his findings censored because they were inconsistent with the predominant view of Soviet leadership is a testament to the Soviet’s commitment to its own version of events.

Pravda’s articles, Brezhnev’s speech, and Primakov’s letter all primarily frame the war ​ as a conflict between socialism and Western imperialism, but while Pravda projects a ​ ​ complimentary portrayal of Egypt, Brezhnev and Primakov offer a deeper analysis of the war, criticizing Soviet allies in a way that would have only been permissible behind closed doors.

Primakov was more critical in his analysis than Brezhnev, citing the Egyptians’s failure to build

150 Primakov, Russia, 122. ​ ​ 151 Primakov, Russia, 123. ​ ​ 152 Primakov, Russia, 75. ​ ​ Velie 35 socialism as the reason behind their loss. For the Soviet Union, the June War was another front in the Cold War, a regional conflict embroiled in the politics of east versus west.

Conclusion

It may have only taken Israel six days to win the war, but obtaining a peace settlement proved to be a lengthier process. The United Nations continued to meet throughout the summer of 1967 and into the fall, adopting Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967. Five resolutions were submitted, but it was the British resolution that was ultimately adopted, which called for the withdrawal of troops from territories that Israel obtained during the war.153 Because of “Israeli insistence” and American support, the resolution famously omitted the word “all” from “before territories,” prompting considerable debate.154 The British draft had another important omission, this time from the United States and the Soviet Union’s draft proposals. Both countries called for a “limitation of the arms race” in the Middle East, which the Soviet Union called “wasteful” and the United States called “useless.”155 The United States and the Soviet Union, however, ultimately voted to adopt Resolution 242, which remains integral to Israeli-Arab peace settlements.

The Six-Day War radically changed the map, along with the political climate, of the

Middle East, in a matter of days. While debate continues on why the war started in the first place, how Israel won so quickly, and the effect its legacy has on the current state of affairs in the Middle East, the role the Soviet Union played cannot be ignored. The press was an extremely powerful tool in the Soviet Union, and it remains useful for gauging what mattered politically to

153 Bailey, Resolution 242, 157. ​ ​ 154 Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 162. ​ ​ 155 Bailey, Resolution 242, 149. ​ ​ Velie 36

Soviet leadership. Pravda’s reporting on the Six Day War was straightforward and simplistic, ​ ​ and typically had little regard for the truth, but it made it clear that, in the Soviet Union, the Six

Day War was an ideological conflict. It was another front in a global war, another chance for capitalism and socialism to go toe-to-toe. While Pravda never corrected articles that were later ​ ​ found to contain false information, as Arab losses became worse, Pravda shifted from covering ​ ​ the war to implying the United States was behind Israeli actions. The Soviet Union spent years developing alliances with Egypt and Syria, and openly criticizing Egyptian and Syrian decisions would have put these alliances at a higher risk, especially as anti-Soviet sentiment grew. Pravda ​ gave the most favorable portrayal of Egypt and Syria, and the Soviet Union went out of its way to placate its allies. After the Arabs lost the war, many criticized the Soviet Union for being

“aloof and resigned” towards the Arabs, but it was never in a position to become directly involved in the war.156

The Soviet Union masked its fear of a confrontation with the United States by frequently accusing it of being the driving force behind Israeli actions. By continuously referencing the

United States and accusing it of aiding Israel, the Soviet Union made its portrayal of the conflict more about the United States than Israel. The focus on the United States extended outside of the press and into the rhetoric of Soviet politicians and private letters, demonstrating there was only one acceptable view of the conflict.

156 Bailey, Resolution 242, 91. ​ ​ Velie 37

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