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Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov About a Multipolar World of the XXI Century

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Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov About a Multipolar World of the XXI Century 1. Russia in a Multipolar World: 5 Foreign Policy and Bilateral Cooperation Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov about a Multipolar World of the XXI Century Abstract The article is dedicated to the great public official of the USSR and Russia Yevgeny Primakov. The article analyzes a multipolar system of the international relations, promoted in his works. A multipolar system, according to Primakov, does not set the trend towards the confrontation between poles and centers of power in the world. The reasons for this trend are the integration processes between the countries and transnationalization of business activities. Key words: Russia, Y. M. Primakov, a multipolar world, the US, China, India, unilat- eralism. Author Gorokhov Andrey Anatolyevich Ph. D. in Political science, Head of the Scientific Division, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University (Moscow, Russia). OUTIN evgeny Primakov (1929–2015) — ac- Deputy of the Russian Federal Assembly ademician, Member of the Russian (1999–2001), Chairman of Chamber of Com- YAcademy of Sciences, statesman, pub- merce and Industry. lic figure, scientist, politician and diplomat, In 2014, he was awarded the State Prize director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Federation for his significant and the Institute of World Economy and In- contribution to scientific and analytical sup- ternational Relations (1985–1989), Chairman port of the Russian foreign policy. of the Board of the Supreme Soviet of the In 2014, he became President Emiratus USSR (1988–1991), Director of Russian For- of the Russian Society of Political Scientists, eign Intelligence Service (1991–1996), Minis- Emiratus Professor (since 1998), Emiratus ter for Foreign Affairs (1996–1998), Chairman Doctor (since 2006) of Lomonosov Moscow of the Government (1998–1999), State Duma state University. Peacemaking prominent scientist and an outstan- making. He was an active participant of the ding politician Yevgeny Primakov international peace movement. Since 1970, Agave much of his attention to peace- he was the participant of Pugwash scien- 6 Русская политология — Russian Political Science № 1, 2016 Topic of the issue: «Multipolar World of the XXI Century» tists’ movement1. Primakov has made a sig- nificant contribution to the work of US-So- viet Pugwash Group on disarmament and re- search of conflicts2. Moreover, his input into the preparing of the Treaty on Ballistic Mis- sile Defense and of the Agreements on the Strategic Offensive Arms between the USSR and USA was imposing. In the years between 1970 and 2015 he was the member of the So- viet-Pugwash and later of Russian-Pugwash (since 1991) Committee. From 2002 to 2014, he was the member of the Presidium of this Committee. We should keep in mind that the funda- Photo. Y. M. Primakov giving a lecture on mental document of the Pugwash move- Faculty of political science of Lomonosov ment, that is Russel-Einstein Manifesto Moscow State University. April 2014 (1955), said «We should learn to think in a different way. We should ask ourselves not ing for all the participants» [1]. That was the about what steps to do to achieve the victory question Yevgeny Primakov had been trying in the side we belong to, for such steps no to answer all his life, whenever political or longer exist, but we should ask ourselves the military conflict appeared. Then he found question, what steps can prevent the armed the answer and started to act for the sake struggle that is going to turn to be devastat- of peace. Primakov did a lot to establish a political 1 Pugwash scientists’ movement (Pugwash dialogue between the USA and the USSR, and Conferences on Science and World Affairs is later with Russia. He actively participated in an international nongovenmental scientific or- the Soviet-American Dartmouth conferences, ganization. The movement acquired its name was the co-chairman of the working group on from the town of Pugwash (Nova Scotia, Cana- conflict3 situations. Based in the results of da), where in 7–10 July 1957 the first meeting of the work of this group the measures for nor- scientists took place, where the most important malization of the situation in the Middle East aspects of the global politics and the nuclear have been developed. war were discussed. 2 With the growth of the Pugmash move- 3 Dartmouth meetings (conferences) are ment and after long discussions in 1964 the the conferences of the representatives of Standing Committee established the Sovi- the Soviet and the American public, held al- et-American Pugwash Group on Disarmament ternately in the USSR and the USA. The first and Arms Control. The co-chairmen of the conference held in 1960 in the United States Group that year were M. D. Millionsikov, the in Dartmouth College (Hanover, state New Head of the Soviet Pugwash Committee, and Hampshire). The second Dartmouth confer- the American Professor of biochemistry P. Doty ence took place in the USSR, in the Crimea, (See: Pugwash Movement of Scientists — one in May 1961. The participants of the second of the oldest leading international scientific meeting insisted on reaching of the agreement organizations in the field of security, disar- in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear mament and scientific cooperation — Nobel tests between the USSR, USA and Great Britain peace prize 1995 // the Website of the Russian in 1958. From 1960 to 1990, 17 meetings took Pugwash Committee at the Presidium of the place. (See: The History of the United States in Russian Academy of science. — URL: http:// 4 volumes. vol.4: 1945–1980. — M.: Science — www.pugwash.ru (accessed date: 21.06.2016). 1987. — P. 744). Gorokhov Andrey Anatolyevich 7 Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov about a Multipolar World of the XXI Century Photo. Y. M. Primakov with Rector of Moscow State University V. A. Sadovnichy (on the left) and Dean of Faculty of Political Science A. Y. Shutov (on the right) before the lecture in MSU. April 2011 In 2007, Primakov became the co-chair- State Secretary Henry Kissinger. The agenda man of the Russian-American group in the of the group included the following ques- public dialogue «Russia-USA: looking to the tions: geopolitical reviews focused on the future». The group targeted to improve Rus- relationships of Russia and the United States, sian-American relations and to develop ap- the world economy, the non-proliferation of propriate recommendations to the political nuclear weapons, energy, the coincidence of leaders of the two countries. The American the interests of Russia and the United States. side of the group was headed by former Multipolar or unipolar world? n Russia, Yevgeny Primakov is considered ganizations (such as UN, «Group of 20» (G20) as the theorist of the concept of a mul- and others). Itipolar world. This concept presupposes The concept of a multipolar world proves the development of the world in a peaceful an alternative to the concept of unipolar way. The unipolar development model leads world. Primakov’s opinion was that American inevitably to suppression of independent po- neocons (neoconservatives) were the ideol- litical and economic centers, which interact ogists of the concept. They developed the independently, and not through the unified doctrine of American unilateralism. center, sometimes applying military force. According to this doctrine, after the Multipolar world serves an arena for differ- cold war the United States gained the right ent world actors to coordinate their foreign to determine which countries present the policy through the dialogue and in the frame- threat to the world community, and without work of international formal and informal or- the decision of the UN Security Council and 8 Русская политология — Russian Political Science № 1, 2016 Topic of the issue: «Multipolar World of the XXI Century» Photo. Y. M. Primakov on Faculty of Political Science of Lomonosov Moscow State University. April 2014 without the consent of NATO bloc allies, can As for the victory of the USA in the «cold apply armed force against such countries. war», according to Primakov, «the collapse The doctrine was based on the following of the Soviet Union could not be treated as statements: the defeat in the cold war» [2]. for former re- 1. The United States won the «cold war», publics of the Soviet Union did not sink into and only one dominating power in the chaos, and the nuclear missile potential was world left; preserved in Russia (the successor state of 2. The United States after the «cold war» the USSR). preserved all the qualitative and quan- Considering the second statement, it titative indicators of a superpower and is important to mind the fact that the inte- joined a number of the countries that gration around the United States is possible submitted their foreign policy to the US only in the presence of a global or regional interests in order to provide their own military threat from any country (or a group security. of countries). In case there is no such threat, Regarding the first argument, even then it must be created and maintained by during the «cold war »period there existed all means, including mass media. Otherwise, more than two global centers in the world as the partners of the United States would not far as the countries-participants of the Non- need much support. Isn’t that the real reason Aligned Movement existed1. for the United States to create such a threat from Russia, especially in the eyes of Europe- 1 The history of the Non-Aligned Movement ans? Imaginary military threat from Russia al- started in September 1961, when on the initia- lows the US to develop military-political bloc tive of Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito, Suharto of NATO, and to affect military and economic the First Conference of Heads of Developing potentials of the European countries.
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