Political Reviews
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Political Reviews 7KH5HJLRQLQ5HYLHZ,QWHUQDWLRQDO,VVXHVDQG(YHQWV nic maclellan 0HODQHVLDLQ5HYLHZ,VVXHVDQG(YHQWV david chappell, jon fraenkel, solomon kantha, muridan s widjojo 7KH&RQWHPSRUDU\3DFL²F9ROXPH1XPEHU¥ E\8QLYHUVLW\RI+DZDL©L3UHVV 351 394 the contemporary pacific 25:2 (2013) kol, Kanaky Online. Daily blog. injured), 2012 saw a higher number http://fr.groups.yahoo.com/group/kanaky of violent cases (67 instances resulting Lanteigne, Marc. 2012. Water Dragon? in 45 deaths and 120 injured). The China, Power Shifts and Soft Balancing in number of casualties during 2012 was the South Pacific. Political Science 64 (1): lower than in the previous year only 21–38. http://pnz.sagepub.com/ because 2011 saw three communal mnp, Madoy–Naku Press. Kanaky New clashes during the local election in Caledonia news site. http://madoy- Puncak in which casualties were high nakupress.blogspot.com (35 dead and about 500 injured). In line with the government’s secu- NC, Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes. Daily. Noumea. http://www.lnc.nc rity policy, the political policy during 2012 looked stagnant on the surface. pir, Pacific Islands Report. East-West The government tried to maintain an Center, Honolulu. http://pireport.org image that Papua was under control. Wesley-Smith, Terence. 2007. China in Disturbances were framed as minor Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics. and insignificant. The real policy, Pacific Islands Policy 2. Honolulu: East- hidden from the public and civil West Center. society, was implemented behind the scenes. Intelligence units associated with the military/police/civil govern- ment bodies as well as formal intel- Papua ligence bodies such as Badan Intelijen In 2012 the Government of Indonesia Negara (bin, the State Intelligence failed in dealing with the sporadic Agency) and Badan Intelijen Strategis attacks by the armed resistance groups (bais, the Armed Forces Strategic called the Free Papua Movement Intelligence Agency) played a domi- (Organisasi Papua Merdeka [opm])– nant role. But among these intelligence National Liberation Army (Tentara units there is a lack of coordination, Pembebasan Nasional [tpn]) and and rivalries are rampant. The over- other “unknown persons.” As far as arching goal of “defending the sover- their responsibility for this failure is eignty of Indonesia” is not formulated concerned, the Indonesian government in a clear policy but rather emerges in sometimes showed its frustration by reactionary and ad hoc ways. blaming difficult geographical condi- This closed political policy reflects tions, limited numbers of personnel, the dominance of old political play- and lack of equipment. Even though ers within the central government the challenges were greater this year, bureaucracy, who were mostly high the security policy of the government officers recruited from the army. These was similar to that of 2011 and did officials tend to look down on Pap- not succeed in coping with the com- uans. The situation is worsened by plex reality. In general, it did not dem- a deep mutual distrust between the onstrate to the public that the state government and the people of Papua. was present and that laws were being The resulting policy has constructed a enforced justly. Compared to 2011 (38 political configuration overwhelmed attacks resulting in 52 deaths and 573 by intrigue, rumor, suspicion, and political reviews melanesia 395 character assassination among politi- ber 2011 only focused on social and cal factions, nongovernmental organi- economic issues. What the special zation activists, journalists, and even envoys of the president had arranged security officers and tpn/opm fight- with Papuan leaders in Papua in 2011 ers. Mutual mistrust and fear, which in terms of dialogue was not followed have grown for so long, continued to up by the president himself. The old spread steadily in 2012. political players, under the umbrella of For its part, the tpn/opm retained the Coordinating Ministry of Political, its usual pattern of movement in 2012, Legal, and Security Affairs (includ- but the organization also produced a ing the bin, the home ministry, and new group and became more active the army) maintained a status quo, in hunting for weapons from the security-heavy policy. Many Papuan police and the military. The Paniai leaders, mostly the well-educated and Puncak Jaya regions were more moderates, now question the goodwill dynamic, while the Kerom group, of the government. led by Lambert Pekikir, was quieter The central government is aware due to the pressure being applied by of the political and security difficul- a military operation. The Jayapura ties. As compensation, the government group shrank, as its leader, Danny has been giving greater attention to Kogoya, has been detained since Papua development. During the period September 2012, while a new fighting 2002–2012, funds provided under spot emerged in Lanny Jaya (Tiom). the special autonomy law (otsus) The latest trend shows that the action amounted to Rp 28.4 trillion (us$1 locus and guerilla fighters are concen- is the equivalent of approximately trated mostly in the highlands—areas 9,650 Indonesian rupiah, or Rp). For where the police and army presence 2009–2012, the otsus budget for is growing. The tpn/opm sees these West Papua Province amounted to Rp police officers and soldiers as targets, 5.2 trillion. The funds were primar- ambushing them when possible to ily for infrastructure development, confiscate weapons and to increase with Papua Province receiving Rp their reputations. 2.5 trillion and West Papua Province The political will of the government receiving Rp 2.2 trillion. In the 2013 to employ peaceful means of solving national budget, the otsus funding the Papua conflict appeared more for Papua Province has been increased clearly at the end of 2011 and during to Rp 4.3 trillion and for West Papua the early part of 2012. On 9 Novem- to Rp 1.8 trillion. However, the ber 2011 and again on 2 February development implementation has been 2012, President Yudhoyono stated hampered by corrupt practices—funds that the government was prepared have been intercepted at lower lev- to hold open dialogue with Papuan els—and the lack of capacity of the leaders. However, the dialogue did local governments. The main prob- not materialize in 2012. The Unit for lems remain in the basic education Acceleration of Development in Papua sector and health services (subdistrict and (West) Papua Barat (up4b) that and village clinics), as well as in the the president established in Septem- economic empowerment of the people. 396 the contemporary pacific 25:2 (2013) Significant improvements have been The Papua Legislative Body (Dewan seen in several districts/municipalities Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, or dprp), in the development of education and under the law of special autonomy, health facilities, but these have not felt entitled to conduct a registration yet been accompanied by the presence of prospective governors and deputy of adequate officers, so the quality governors, and it did so unilaterally. of service is still problematic. In the This process, however, was rejected midst of this situation, the government by the General Elections Commis- created up4b. sion of Papua (kpu Papua). The long up4b started operations in the debate over this process resulted in beginning of 2012 and became the the general election being stalled. The new coordinator of socioeconomic question of who had the authority to development, filling in the blanks conduct the gubernatorial election was between development actors, espe- brought to the Constitutional Court cially various development programs (Mahkamah Konstitusi, or mk), which funded by the national budget (called decided on 12 September 2012 that the Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja kpu Papua had the authority. How- Negara, or apbn). Thanks to its ever, the court also found that the efforts at facilitation and mediation, registration process already completed a number of decision-making bottle- by dprp could be considered valid. necks hindering implementation of Toward the end of 2012, another construction were overcome. During election-related issue arose. On 14 2012, a number of affirmative policies December 2012, kpu Papua decided were put in place allowing the accel- that the most recent governor, eration of infrastructure development. Bar nabas Suebu, and his running However, the ultimate success and mate, John Tabo, did not qualify to consistent implementation of up4b’s stand in the election because they efforts depend on the performance of lacked the required level of sup- the various ministries and agencies port—15 percent—from politi- as well as the local governments. If cal parties. These two candidates, the weaknesses of the ministries and known as Bas-John, claimed that related agencies are not addressed and they were supported by eight par- the capacity of the local governments ties with eighteen seats, or 32.13 remains low, then the facilitation and percent, but during the verification mediation conducted by up4b will not process kpu Papua determined that be effective. Bas-John was supported by only six The term of office for the governor parties, representing only four seats, of Papua Province officially expired or 7.14 percent. The Bas-John team on 25 July 2011, but by the end of did not accept the determination of 2012 no gubernatorial election had kpu Papua and vowed to seek legal been held. Over this period, Papua redress. Despite the ongoing Bas-John Province has had no definitive gover- lawsuit, kpu Papua announced that nor and vice governor. At first there the voting would be conducted on 29 was a dispute over who actually had January 2013. Six pairs of candidates the authority to conduct elections. were set to contest the election: Lukas political reviews melanesia 397 Enembe-Klemen Tinal, Habel Suwae- public services. In fact, very few new Yop Kogoya, Manase Kambu-Blasius districts are experiencing any improve- Pakage, and Alex Hesegem-Marthen ment in public services.