Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: PAK35019 Country: Pakistan Date: 17 July 2009

Keywords: Pakistan – Khyber Agency / FATA – Lashkar-e-Islam – Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan – Karachi – Relocation

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions 1. Please provide updated information to PAK34106 in terms of an outline of the security situation in Khyber Agency and the various networks operating there. What is the security situation for Pashtuns in Khyber more generally? 2. Please provide information on the prominent clan, or tribal, networks in Khyber. Are wealthy and/or prominent figures being targeted by any of the Khyber based militant networks? 3. Is there information to indicate that Khyber based militant networks have penetrated Peshawar? 4. Is there any information to suggest that Pashtuns fleeing Khyber base militants have been tracked down in Karachi?

RESPONSE

Militant Groups in the FATA and NWFP: a background note

The term, “Taliban”, is often used in reporting on events in Pakistan to refer to any one of the range of militant Islamist and/or militant tribal networks which are currently operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). Such broad use of the term “Taliban”, while it captures a general flavour of conservative Islamic militancy and sympathy with the cause of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, can belie the significant distinctions which exist between the various Taliban styled networks currently operating in the FATA and NWFP. More thorough studies of the networks operating in the FATA and NWFP, of the kind published by the Jamestown Foundation and the Belfer Center, report that such groups have generally formed locally, have a mostly localised membership and are generally driven by local grievances and agendas. Such groups also have a history of competing and clashing with each other. In December 2007 a number of these groups came together to form the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; Students’ Movement of Pakistan), an umbrella movement which has sought to coordinate the activities of these various groups in order to act collectively against the offensives of the Pakistan military. The TTP now reportedly includes groups from across the FATA and the NWFP but not all militant Islamist networks in the FATA and NWFP are part of the TTP, and some Taliban styled groups, who are not TTP members, are nonetheless still often referred to as “the Taliban” in general reporting. In the Khyber Agency groups like Lashkar-e-Islam (led by Mangal Bangh), Ansar-ul-Islam (led by Mehbub-ul-Haq) or Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Aneelmunkar (the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice force, formerly led by the recently killed Haji Namdar) are often referred to as “Taliban”. Such terminology is appropriate insofar as groups like Lashkar-e-Islam and the Vice and Virtue group are Islamist networks in the mode of the Taliban without being exactly similar. This noted, it would not appear that these Khyber based movements are acting as part of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan network. Lashkar-e-Islam has reportedly resisted incorporation into the TTP and it is believed that the Vice and Virtue movement’s Haji Namdar was recently assassinated by a TTP affiliate. Finally, it should be noted that Lashkar-e-Islam is reported to have a history of clashing with rival militant groups in the Khyber Agency as well as with the area’s traditional tribal elites and Pakistan security forces (for background, see: Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 9; Abbas, H. 2008, ‘A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, CTC Sentinel, vol.1: no.2, January pp.2-4 – Attachment 15; for the fractured nature of the TTP umbrella movement, see: Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part One – North and South Waziristan’, Terrorism Monitor, vol.6: no.18, 22 September – Attachment 62; Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban’, Terrorism Monitor, vol.6: no.3, 7 February – Attachment 63).

Militancy in the Khyber Agency: Lashkar-e-Islam

A Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor report of 29 May 2008 provides background on the groups operation in the Khyber Agency. The report details the manner in which this area, which is “inhabited by the Afridi and Shinwari tribes”, has in recent years come to be affected by militant Islamist networks of a similar nature to those operating in “the South and North Waziristan tribal agencies along the Afghan border”. Nonetheless, according to this report the situation in the Khyber Agency is also very different as “Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – the umbrella group of Taliban factions in various parts of the Tribal belt and NWFP led by militant commander Baitullah Mahsud – has not yet established a strong presence in the Khyber Agency”. The report relates that “Mangal Bagh and his Lashkar-e-Islam” have “clearly denied any kind of link with the Taliban despite Baitullah Mahsud’s insistence that he join the TTP”, and that Haji Namdar – founder of the Amr bil maroof wa nahi anil munkir – is said to have betrayed the Taliban for the handsome sum of $150,000”. Extended extracts follow:

Pakistan’s tribal belt has been the center of global attention for several years because of widespread speculation regarding the presence of al-Qaeda fugitives and Taliban leaders. Since the start of military operations in late 2003, violence and bloodshed has become a routine matter, particularly in the South and North Waziristan tribal agencies along the Afghan border. Besides Waziristan, Taliban militants have also developed a strong presence in the Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. Recently, however, the Khyber Tribal Agency has also been in the news – but not just for al-Qaeda- or Taliban-related violence. The strategically located Khyber Agency – an erstwhile peaceful and relatively prosperous and urbanized tribal agency compared to the rest of the six mountain agencies – is inhabited by the Afridi and Shinwari tribes. It is named after the famous Khyber Pass, a vital and important route leading to Central Asia from the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent via Afghanistan. For centuries it has been the key trade route between Central Asia and South Asia. In a not too distant past, visiting the Khyber Pass was almost a must for foreign tourists, but that is no longer the case. An Islamic warlord, Mangal Bagh Afridi, now holds sway in the Khyber Agency just half an hour’s drive from Peshawar, capital of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Though he denies links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, he openly defends the Taliban’s insurgency against U.S.-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan. If this Afghan jihad veteran is to be believed, he has thousands of fighters under his command who are ready to lay down their lives on his order (The News [Islamabad], May 11).

Militancy in the Shadow of Sectarianism

Unlike many troubled parts of Pakistan’s tribal region, the history of militancy in the Khyber Agency is very brief. There was no organized militant group until late 2003, when a local tribesman, Haji Namdar, returned from Saudi Arabia and established an organization named Amr bil maroof wa nahi anil munkir, borrowing the name from the Afghan Taliban’s “Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Virtue” organization. He placed a ban on music and in some places worshippers had to sign the mosque’s register to verify they had offered prayers. His organization sent threatening letters to music and CD shops in Landi Kotal, a town on the main Peshawar-Torkham highway (Dawn [Karachi], August 15, 2007). Haji Namdar even established his own private jails with names such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib to punish those who defied his orders (BBC, August 26, 2004). He was the first to establish pirate FM radio stations in the Khyber Agency – a phenomenon which quickly gained currency in the whole region. Tribal officials issued directives for the closure of these radio stations, but these fell on deaf ears (Dawn, December 2, 2004). Namdar hired a firebrand religious scholar as the on-air preacher: Mufti Munir Shakir, a controversial mullah who was expelled from his hometown in the Kurram Tribal Agency due to his extreme views against Shiite Muslims. In his FM broadcasts, Mufti, as he is commonly known, rarely targeted any other religious sect with his inflammatory sermons.

The town of Bara soon became a battleground between two sectarian groups: Lashkar-e- Islam, led by Mufti Munir Shakir, and Ansar-ul-Islam, led by Afghanistan-born Pir Saif ur- Rahman. The radicalizing effect of illegal radio stations can be seen in this small Khyber Agency town where these two radical clerics, dubbed “FM Mullahs” by the local press, waged a turf war through their private stations. Both non-local Sunni clerics – Rahman an Afghan national and Shakir from the Kurram Agency – attempted to dominate the area through recruiting followers by propagating their own interpretation of Islam. Rahman was following the Barelvi Sufi tradition, while Shakir was a disciple of the more austere Deobandi form of Islam. Fierce clashes erupted in early 2006 between the rival groups in which heavy weapons were used, resulting in the killing of scores of people (The News, October 25, 2006). A number of new armed sectarian groups emerged in the area due to the silence of law enforcement agencies over the sectarian strife (The News, December 16, 2006). In a belated response as the bloodshed between the two groups increased, authorities stepped in by beefing up security in the area and arresting some of the mullahs’ supporters. After a hectic series of jirgas held by Afridi tribesmen, both radical clerics were expelled from the area in February 2006.

The Rise of Mangal Bagh and his Lashkar-e-Islam

With the departure of two controversial radical clerics from the region there was hope that the situation would now stabilize and the mayhem would come to an end. The problem, however, persisted even after the expulsion of both leaders as the number of religious outfits continued to grow and their supporters continued kidnapping and killing members of rival groups. The Mufti group went a step further and organized Lashkar-e-Islam under the leadership of Mangal Bagh Afridi, a 35-year-old local tribesman. Known as “amir” (leader) among his followers, Bagh is illiterate and formerly drove a bus. His leadership provided a new momentum to Lashkar-e-Islam and it soon grew more powerful and more militant. Mangal Bagh wants the implementation of religious laws, by force if necessary. The stoning and shooting of two men and a woman on charges of alleged adultery last year in March by the Lashkar-e-Islam was a grim alarm of this worsening situation. A huge crowd assembled to watch the executions after Lashkar-e-Islam announced it through the mosque’s loudspeakers (The News, March 16, 2007). Mangal Bagh’s militants also tried to occupy land belonging to the head of their rival group in Bara, which led to fierce fighting between them and paramilitary troops which resulted in the killing of five tribesmen, including three children (Pakistan Times, April 24, 2007).

Since then Mangal Bagh and his Lashkar-e-Islam have run a parallel administration in the Bara subdivision. The group operates its own illegal FM radio despite the official ban as part of its effort to gain the sympathies of the local tribesmen, recruit new fighters and terrorize their opponents. The political administration has completely lost its writ in the area. Members of rival groups even accuse Lashkar-e-Islam activists of extorting money from truckers moving between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dawn, May 20, 2007; The Nation, March 4). Mangal Bagh’s rising influence can be gauged from the fact that he issues his own “code of conduct” to candidates contesting elections in the Bara subdivision of Khyber Agency. For example, candidates were warned against holding public meetings; each candidate must use only one vehicle and candidates were not allowed to hoist flags of any political party on their cars and buildings (Daily Times, November 27, 2007). In a bid to expand their influence across the Khyber region, his fighters fought with Kokikhel tribesmen in Jamrud and Landikotal, which led to the recent closure of the Peshawar-Torkham highway between Pakistan and Afghanistan for four days (The News, April 19). This highway is a main supply route for Coalition forces in Afghanistan. After establishing his stronghold in parts of Khyber Agency, dozens of Lashkar-e-Islam activists with rockets and other heavy weapons attacked Shaikhan village in the suburbs of Peshawar, killing 10 people (The News, March 4). Moving a step forward, Mangal Bagh openly offered his services to the people of Peshawar and other settled parts of the NWFP by saying: “I stand by the oppressed against the oppressors. Irrespective of where anyone or both the opponents hail from, I’ll help those subjugated, if I can” (The News, April 21).

The Taliban Factor

Unlike the situation prevailing in the other tribal agencies, Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – the umbrella group of Taliban factions in various parts of the Tribal belt and NWFP led by militant commander Baitullah Mahsud – has not yet established a strong presence in the Khyber Agency. Even Mangal Bagh has clearly denied any kind of link with the Taliban despite Baitullah Mahsud’s insistence that he join the TTP (The News, April 21). Similarly, Haji Namdar – founder of the Amr bil maroof wa nahi anil munkir – is said to have betrayed the Taliban for the handsome sum of $150,000 (Asia Times, April 26). However, the response for this betrayal was swift when Namdar narrowly survived a suicide bombing. Namdar blamed Baitullah Mahsud and his group for the attack, something quickly admitted to by the Hakimullah group – a local faction loyal to Baitullah – which took responsibility for the bombing. This group is led by one of Mahsud’s close aides, Hakimullah Mahsud.

Many believe that the Taliban in the Khyber Agency are getting stronger and stronger. Hakimullah’s claim of responsibility for the suicide attack is used as evidence for this growth by those opposed to the Taliban (Daily Times [Lahore], May 3). A month ago, more than 1,000 militants with heavy weapons mounted on trucks besieged a village in Mohmand agency and started house-to-house searches for alleged criminals which led to fierce fighting, killing 13 people. It is said that many of the Taliban from Khyber Agency took part in the operation against what they called “anti-social elements” (Dawn, April 28). Similarly, militants seem to have adopted a new policy of kidnapping members of key government and international organizations. In doing so, they exert great pressure on the government to force acceptance of their demands – usually an exchange of prisoners. It seems that militants have chosen the Khyber Agency for most of the kidnappings because of its strategic road link with Afghanistan. Recently, Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, was kidnapped from the Khyber Agency while on his way to Afghanistan. Similarly, paramilitary forces foiled an attempt to kidnap two World Food Program officials last month (Daily Times, April 23).

…When considering the grim situation in the Khyber Agency, it is not difficult to believe that the rising influence of Lashkar-e-Islam and other such organizations represents only the opening moves of the militants in what may prove to be a very long struggle for dominance (Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 9).

On 30 June 2008 The Economic Times reported that: “Pakistan has banned three militant groups in the restive Khyber Agency where security forces have launched a crackdown, even as the local Taliban pulled out of peace talks and scrapped all deals signed with the authorities”. According to the report “Lashkar-e-Islam led by Mangal Bangh” was among the groups banned. Details follow:

The Lashkar-e-Islam led by Mangal Bangh, Ansar-ul-Islam led by Mehbub-ul-Haq and Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Aneelmunkar (promotion of virtue and prevention of vice force) all militant groups operating in Khyber Agency have been banned by the interior ministry.

The ban was imposed following a request from the secretariat of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to outlaw all criminal organisations involved in creating problems and causing hardship for the people, said an official statement issued late last night.

The government is determined to end the “nefarious activities” of these groups in the tribal areas, the statement said. The move came after security forces launched a crackdown against militants in the Khyber Agency on Saturday.

The troops have blown up several militant bases, including headquarters of Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansar-ul-Islam, though the two groups have offered no resistance to security forces.

On the other hand, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has accused the government of violating peace deals and announced it is ending peace talks and scrapping accords signed with authorities in tribal areas and North West Frontier Province.

Pakistani Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar told The News daily that a meeting of his organisation’s ‘Shura’ or supreme council, which was chaired by commander Baitullah Mehsud yesterday, decided to scrap peace deals in the Swat valley, Darra Adam Khel and Mohmand Agency (‘Pak bans three militant outfits in Khyber Agency’ 2008, The Economic Times, 30 June http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Pak_bans_three_militant_outfits_in_Khyber_Age ncy/rssarticleshow/3180281.cms – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 2).

The Research Service has completed a number of reports on the activities of Lashkar-e-Islam and other Khyber Agency based groups in previous years, and these are available as follows: • Research Response PAK34106 of 26 November 2008 provides a timeline overview of the activities of Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islam since 2004 (RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response PAK34106, 26 November – Attachment 64).

• Research Response PAK34010 of 17 November 2008 provides an overview of the range of source information available on the activities of Lashkar-e-Islam in recent years (RRT Research & Information 2008, Research Response PAK34010, 17 November – Attachment 65)

• Research Response PAK30614 of 11 October 2006 provides extensive information on governance in the Khyber Agency and the role of tribal jirgas (RRT Country Research 2006, Research Response PAK30614, 11 October – Attachment 66).

The Tehrik-i-Taliban

In January 2008 the Belfer Center’s Hassan Abbas provided an overview of the Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan umbrella movement which was launched in December 2007. Abbas’s overview details the manner in which a number of militant Islamist groups in Pakistan, which were sympathetic and had links to the Afghan Taliban movement, came to form a Taliban organisation in Pakistan with its own separate leadership and identity.

…in late 2001, allies and sympathizers of the Taliban in Pakistan were not identified as “Taliban” themselves. That reality is now a distant memory. Today, Pakistan’s indigenous Taliban are an effective fighting force and are engaging the Pakistani military on one side and NATO forces on the other.

The transition from being Taliban supporters and sympathizers to becoming a mainstream Taliban force in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) initiated when many small militant groups operating independently in the area started networking with one another. This sequence of developments occurred while Pakistani forces were spending the majority of their resources finding “foreigners” in the area linked to al-Qa`ida (roughly in the 2002-04 period). Soon, many other local extremist groups, which were banned in Pakistan, started joining the Taliban ranks in FATA – some as followers while others as partners. During this process, the Pakistani Taliban never really merged into the organizational structure of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar; instead, they developed a distinct identity. From their perspective, they intelligently created a space for themselves in Pakistan by engaging in military attacks while at other times cutting deals with the Pakistani government to establish their autonomy in the area. By default, they were accepted as a legitimate voice in at least two FATA agencies – South Waziristan and North Waziristan.

During this process, the Pakistani Taliban effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to the traditional tribal elders. By the time the Pakistani government realized the changing dynamics and tried to resurrect the tribal jirga institution, it was too late. The Taliban had killed approximately 200 of the tribal elders under charges of being Pakistani and American spies.

These developments explain the genesis of a new formation: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP refers to the Taliban “movement” in Pakistan that coalesced in December 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud – a wanted militant leader from South Waziristan. This analysis discusses the origin, nature, capabilities and potential of this organization.

…The name “Tehrik-i-Taliban” had been used prior to the latest December 14 announcement. An organization with a similar name emerged in FATA’s Orakzai Agency in 1998. Some reports also mention a similar organization by the name of Tehrik-i-Tulaba (Movement of Students) also operating in Orakzai Agency that even established an active Shari`a court. The name and idea, therefore, is not original.

More recently, on October 23, a credible newspaper in Pakistan disclosed that five militant groups joined hands to set up an organization named Tehrik-i-Taliban in Mohmand Agency with a goal “to flush out gangs carrying out criminal activities in the name of Taliban.”

... Less than two months after this announcement, another group claiming to be Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan announced its formation. The December 14, 2007 announcement was viewed suspiciously in terms of authenticity, since it followed after the October 23 announcement. It soon became clear, however, that the December 14 announcement was unique and alarming. It showed that the authentic Taliban were quick to establish their ownership over the title “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.”

Structure, Activities and Goals of the TTP

A shura of 40 senior Taliban leaders established the TTP as an umbrella organization. Militant commander Baitullah Mehsud was appointed as its amir, Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan as senior naib amir (deputy) and Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur Agency as the third in command.6 The shura not only has representation from all of FATA’s seven tribal agencies, but also from the settled North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner and Malakand. This reach demonstrates the TTP’s ambitions. Since its establishment, the TTP through its various demarches have announced the following objectives and principles:

1. Enforce Shari`a, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform “defensive jihad against the Pakistan army.” 2. React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District and North Waziristan Agency. 3. Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area. 4. Demand the release of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz. 5. Refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan.

…Although the TTP is young as an organization, there is no dearth of operational capabilities at its disposal. Baitullah Mehsud already is an established leader—with the command of some 5,000 fighters—and has been involved in militant activities for the last few years in FATA and the adjacent areas. Many other militant groups seem anxious to join in. On December 23, 2007, for instance, five soldiers and six civilians were killed in the Mingora area of the Swat Valley when a suicide bomber targeted an army convoy. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariate- Mohammadi (TNSM) quickly claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the TTP (Abbas, H. 2008, ‘A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, CTC Sentinel, vol.1: no.2, January pp.2-4 – Attachment 15).

In February 2008, Rahimullah Yusufzai discussed the diffuse manner in which constituent members of the TTP have operated in the months leading up to, and following the umbrella movement’s formation. Yusufzai finds that while “[o]n paper, the TTP looks impressive, with powerful components in all seven tribal agencies and in most of the six semi-tribal Frontier Regions and several settled districts of the NWFP”, that it would appear from various incidents that “these groups also have regional and local political agendas” which have resulted in refusals to assist other TTP insurgents and which have even provoked inter-TTP clashes. According to Yusufzai the various networks must be understood as regional groups which maintain a local tribal identity, even as such groups challenge the traditional tribal elites in their region. Extracts follow:

Though members of militant Islamic groups such as the Pakistani Taliban and other jihadis have almost the same anti-United States and pro-al-Qaeda worldview, they are not especially disciplined when it comes to organizational matters. Difficulty in this area explains the existence of so many extremist factions operating under different leaders and commanders who sometimes express conflicting opinions on domestic and international issues.

The formation of an umbrella organization, Tehrek-e-Taliban-Pakistan (Movement of Pakistani Taliban, or TTP) on December 14, 2007, was meant to bring the different Taliban groups operating in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) into one formation and improve their coordination (The News International [Islamabad], December 15, 2007). Its spokesman, Maulvi Omar, a shadowy figure using a fake name, claimed that 27 Taliban factions operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were part of the movement. Nobody was surprised when Baitullah Mehsud, amir of the Taliban in the territory populated by the Mehsud Pashtun tribe in South Waziristan, was named as leader of the TTP. He was the most powerful among the Pakistani Taliban commanders and it was natural that he would lead the organization.

Tribal Nature of the Pakistani Taliban

The tribal nature of some of the Taliban groups soon became evident when militants in North Waziristan warned the Mehsud-led Taliban in neighboring South Waziristan not to launch attacks against the Pakistan Army in their part of the tribal region (The News International, January 30). The warning came from Hafiz Gul Bahadur, the amir of the Taliban in North Waziristan, despite the fact that he was earlier named deputy to Mehsud in the Tehrek-e- Taliban-Pakistan. Association with the TTP and being its deputy leader did not mean much when it came to the territorial and tribal limits of each Taliban group and commander. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was particularly furious when Mehsud’s men started firing rockets into the army’s camp at Razmak, a town in North Waziristan, during the recent fighting between the military and the Mehsud-commanded militants.

It was also evident that Hafiz Gul Bahadur and his Taliban fighters failed to abide by one of the major decisions of the TTP by refusing to coordinate attacks on the security forces in North Waziristan to help ease pressure on the Taliban fighting under Mehsud’s command in South Waziristan. This failure defied a Taliban decision that every Taliban group was required to come to the assistance of others in its area of operation that were under attack from the Pakistan Army.

…Command Structure in the Pakistani Taliban

The lack of coordination between the Taliban factions in South Waziristan and North Waziristan also showed that the TTP had yet to attain unity in the ranks of the militants operating in different tribal regions and districts. On paper, the TTP looks impressive, with powerful components in all seven tribal agencies and in most of the six semi-tribal Frontier Regions and several settled districts of the NWFP. Its command structure also appears strong, with representatives from tribal regions and districts where the militants had fought the army to a standstill or forced the government to deploy large numbers of troops to secure the area. Led by Mehsud from South Waziristan, the TTP’s deputy leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur belongs to North Waziristan and the second deputy head, Maulana Faqir Muhammad, is from Bajaur. Taliban groups in Swat and elsewhere are also represented on the TTP’s 40-member decision- making shura (consultative council). However, these groups also have regional and local political agendas and are, therefore, under pressure from their tribes and communities not to become involved in wider conflicts that could transform their areas into battlegrounds and contribute to their suffering.

A case study of Baitullah Mehsud’s leadership in South Waziristan would be instructive in understanding the tribal influences that impede unity among Taliban factions in FATA. As a Mehsud tribesman, he cannot freely operate in the Wana area, which is inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, even though both the tribes live side by side in South Waziristan and are almost equally affected by Talibanization. Past rivalries have kept the Ahmadzai Wazir and Mehsud tribes apart, and their relations to this day are uneasy and uncertain. As a consequence, Taliban members belonging to the two tribes maintained separate command structures to avoid friction and prevent tribal animosities from poisoning their relations. The Taliban among the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe thus functioned independently of commander Mehsud, first under the command of the late Nek Muhammad and then Haji Omar, Noor Islam, Maulvi Muhammad Abbas, Javed Karmazkhel and Maulvi Aziz. Last April, a split occurred among these Taliban commanders, with Maulvi Muhammad Nazir and Haji Hannan ousting Haji Omar and his allies for offering protection to foreign militants from Uzbekistan and other countries and accepting arms and money from the Pakistan Army. The Taliban in Wana have thus parted ways on the issue of supporting or opposing the presence in their area of Uzbek militants aligned with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (The News International, January 26). In fact, tribal animosities have also influenced the decision of some Taliban fighters to join one or the other side on this issue. Haji Omar and Maulvi Nazir belong to different sub-tribes of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe and this was a factor in pushing them into rival Taliban camps.

It would also be wrong to assume that all Mehsud clans and tribesmen support Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. Many blame him for bringing suffering on the tribe and making their villages a battleground for the military and the militants. However, they cannot speak out against him due to fear of reprisal. The Mehsuds living outside their tribal homes in South Waziristan are relatively free to express their opinion about the Taliban commander, though they must be careful because Mehsud has followers and informants even in places like Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, where Mehsud families have migrated and become largely urbanized. The Shabikhel sub-tribe of the Mehsud is apparently proud of Baitullah because he is one of their own, but other clans do not have that kind of bond with the Taliban leader. Tribal affinities are fairly strong in Waziristan and it is common for members of a tribe to become closer in the event of a dispute with other tribes.

…There is no denying the fact that tribal affiliations play a major role in the formation of Taliban groups and the choice of commanders. The Taliban and other jihad advocates often claim that they believe in the concept of a common Muslim ummah (community) and reject the division of their religion into groups based on ethnicity, language, geographical borders and tribes. In practice this is easier said than done. In tribal societies such as that of the Pashtuns inhabiting Pakistan and Afghanistan, even ideologically-driven radical Taliban and jihadist fighters gravitate toward their own tribe and local commander whether fighting U.S.- led Coalition forces or the armed forces of Pakistan (Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban’, Terrorism Monitor, vol.6: no.3, 7 February – Attachment 63).

1. Please provide updated information to PAK34106 in terms of an outline of the security situation in Khyber Agency and the various networks operating there. What is the security situation for Pashtuns in Khyber more generally?

The security situation of the general populace in Khyber agency is unclear. It would appear that the Khyber Agency is currently the scene of significant military activity with reports of Pakistan military strikes against alleged members of Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar-ul-Islam and the TTP. In addition to ground forces the Pakistan military has reportedly employed heavy weapon systems, such as helicopter gun-ships, in the Khyber Agency in recent weeks. It would not appear, however, that there have been reports of the kind of mass displacement which was recently seen in the Swat District of the NWFP where an “estimated 2 million people” fled the area following the Pakistan military’s renewed offensive in the area. This said, it has been reported from the Khyber Agency that the Pakistan military has recently bulldozed the homes of thousands of Afghan refugees and expelled them from the Khyber area as part of the current offensive. In addition to the fighting involving the Pakistan military, there have also been reports of clashes between Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansar-ul- Islam, and continued attacks on NATO supply convoys. On 22 May 2009 it was reported “land route” through the Khyber Agency is increasingly “considered unsafe mainly because of the increasing incidents of kidnappings for ransom in Khyber Agency” (Shawl, I. 2009, ‘One soldier martyred, three hurt: two foreigners, commander among 28 terrorists killed’, Business Recorder, 16 July http://www.brecorder.com/index.php?id=936368&currPageNo=1&query=&search=&term= &supDate= – Accessed 17 July 2009 – Attachment 67; ‘Fighters killed in Khyber clashes’ 2009, Al Jazeera, 2 July http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/20097271586758.html – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 1; for the recent Swat displacement figures, see: Toosi, N. & Shahzad, A. 2009, ‘Pakistani refugees return to Swat’s main town, 23 militants killed in clashes elsewhere’, Associated Press, 15 July – Attachment 68; for an overview of the problem, see: an overview of the current displacement situation in the region, see: International Crisis Group 2009, Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, Asia Briefing no.93, 3 June – Attachment 72; and: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2009, ‘Pakistan: NWFP Displacement OCHA Situation Report No. 05’, Relief Web website, 18 June http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA- 7T62H8-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf – Accessed 17 July 2009 – Attachment 73; for clashes between Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansarul Islam, see: ‘Clashes between religious groups in Pakistan tribal area kill 19’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, source: Ausaf, Islamabad, in Urdu (7 July 2009), 8 July – Attachment 69; for attacks on supply convoys, see: ‘Two die as Kabul-bound oil-tankers blown up’ 2009, The Nation, 15 June http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/15-Jul- 2009/Two-die-as-Kabulbound-oiltankers-blown-up – Accessed 17 July 2009 – Attachment 70; see also: Khattak, D. 2009, ‘Possible closure of Peshawar-Kabul flight irks passengers’, The News, 22 May http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=178915 – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 3; for the displacement of Afghans from the area, see: Hashimzada, J. 2009, ‘Pakistan expels thousands of refugees from Khyber’, Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 June http://www.pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=76093 – Accessed 17 July 2009 – Attachment 71).

2. Please provide information on the prominent clan, or tribal, networks in Khyber. Are wealthy and/or prominent figures being targeted by any of the Khyber based militant networks?

It would appear that at least two pro-government Khyber Agency tribal leaders (elders or maliks) have reportedly been killed in recent months, and Lashkar-e-Islam is thought to have had a hand in at least one of these killings. Another Khyber tribal elder was reportedly killed in August 2008 (a TTP affiliated group claimed responsibility for this). Numerous other killings of tribal leaders have also taken place in other northern areas affected by the insurgency, notably the South Waziristan and North Waziristan agencies of the FATA and the Swat District of the NWFP. It is generally suspected that militant Islamist networks, and in particular the TTP, are behind the numerous attacks upon the FATA’s traditional tribal elite. Those killed are often reported to have been working with the Pakistan government against the insurgency. In October 2008 Newsline reported that: “militants have killed more than 250 tribal elders in FATA until now and there aren’t many left in the Taliban-controlled areas such as South Waziristan and North Waziristan, to challenge the Taliban or speak in favour of the government”. According to the Belfer Center’s Hassan Abbas the Pakistani Taliban have “killed approximately 200 of the tribal elders under charges of being Pakistani and American spies”; and have “effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to the traditional tribal elders”. Some sources report that a similar process in now underway in the Khyber Agency. Articles have also appeared which report that this challenge is being conducted in such a way as to appeal to the Khyber Agency’s poorer inhabitants who have long felt exploited and disenfranchised by the traditional tribal elites (for the recent killings in the Khyber Agency, see: Shahzad, S.S. 2008, ‘Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass’, Asia Times, 26 April http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD26Df01.html – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 4; ‘Pro-government Pakistan tribal leader killed: officials’ 2009, Hindustan Times, 1 July http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=NLetter&id=250e 2d06-f9ae-4454-95f7-d0ba41d83b87&Headline=Pro- government+Pakistan+tribal+leader+killed%3a+officials – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 6; http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=186001 – Accessed 9 July 2009; ‘Tribal elder killed in Khyber Agency’ 2009, Samaa, 2 July http://www.samaa.tv/News10030-Tribal_elder_killed_in_Khyber_Agency.aspx – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 7; ‘Anti-Taliban tribal leader shot dead in Khyber’ 2009, Dawn, 8 July http://www.dawn.com.pk/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-anti-taliban-tribal-leader-shot-dead-khyber-qs-10 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 10; Mughul, M.I. 2009, ‘Baitullah rival Qari Zainuddin shot dead in D I Khan’, Dawn, 23 June http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/07-baitullah-rival-qari-zainuddin-shot-dead-in-d-i- khan-ha-02 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 8; Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 9; for the wider pattern of the killing of tribal elders across the FATA and the NWFP, see: Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The Tribes Fight Back’, Newsline, 4 October http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsOct2008/cover4oct2008.htm – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 11; ‘Pakistan tribal elders shot dead’2008, BBC News, 7 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7174425.stm – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 12; ‘Gunmen kill two tribal elders in Pakistani tribal region’ 2007, People’s Daily, source: Xinhua, 9 July http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/6211299.html – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 13; ‘Blast, shootings kill two Pakistani soldiers, four civilians in Swat’ 2008, ABC News, source: Agence France-Presse, 29 June http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/06/29/2289058.htm?section=justin – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 14; ‘FATA Timeline – 2009’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/index.html – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 16; for analysis suggesting that militant Islamist networks are attempting to replace traditional tribal networks of power in the FATA, see: Abbas, H. 2008, ‘A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, CTC Sentinel, vol.1: no.2, January pp.2-4 – Attachment 15; and for the Khyber Agency specifically, see: Gannon, K. 2008, ‘Abductions, thefts in Khyber Pass threaten supplies for US and NATO troops in Afghanistan’, Star Tribune, 20 May http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=19102894 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 18; Khattak, I. 2008, ‘Khyber’s Shinwaris, Afridis feel ‘humiliated’ by LI’, Daily Times, 14 December http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C12%5C14%5Cstory_14-12- 2008_pg7_14 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 19; for the challenge to traditional tribal elites as wealth owners, see: Kilkins, D. 2008, ‘Right at the Edge’, New York Times, 7 September http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan- t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 20; Nelson, D. & Khattak, D. 2008, ‘“Robin Hood” dishes out Nato booty’, The Times, 16 November http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5162346.ece – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 21).

An overview of pertinent available source information follows below under the following subheadings: Attacks on pro-government tribal leaders in the Khyber Agency; and: Background on tribal networks and governance in the Khyber Agency.

Attacks on pro-government tribal leaders in the Khyber Agency

There have been reports, in recent months, of the murder of Khyber Agency tribal leaders (maliks or tribal elders) known for being opposed to the current insurgency. Such reports relate that insurgent militant networks are suspected to be responsible for these attacks. Examples follow:

• On 26 April 2008 an Asia Times reported that: “The Americans were fully aware of the Taliban’s designs on Khyber Agency and invested a lot in the tribes to protect the route. In response, the Taliban threatened tribal chieftains, and launched a suicide attack on a jirga (meeting) convened to discuss eradicating the Taliban from the area. Over 40 tribals were killed” (Shahzad, S.S. 2008, ‘Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass’, Asia Times, 26 April http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD26Df01.html – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 4).

• On 1 July 2009 Agence France-Presse reported that a “pro-government tribal leader” had been gunned down in the Khyber agency by unknown assailants. The slain leader was reportedly “Guli Shah, 60, was a main leader in the Koki Khel tribe” and was reportedly a “vocal critic of Islamist militants”. The report also relates that: “An intelligence official, [who] confirmed the killing, said Shah was a founding member of the banned group but later favoured the government and the militants accused him of disloyalty” The News reported that: “Malik Guli Shah Kukikhel” was “a tribal elder known for his close contacts with the government”; and that: “Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Khyber Agency-based religious organisation Lashkar- e-Islam (LI), headed by Mangal Bagh”. In commenting on the event SAMAA news reported that: “Several tribal elders have been targeted and killed” (‘Pro-government Pakistan tribal leader killed: officials’ 2009, Hindustan Times, 1 July http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=NLetter&i d=250e2d06-f9ae-4454-95f7-d0ba41d83b87&Headline=Pro- government+Pakistan+tribal+leader+killed%3a+officials – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 6; http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=186001 – Accessed 9 July 2009; ‘Tribal elder killed in Khyber Agency’ 2009, Samaa, 2 July http://www.samaa.tv/News10030-Tribal_elder_killed_in_Khyber_Agency.aspx – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 7). • On 8 July 2009 Agence France-Presse reported that: “Malik Zardad Khan, 55, was kidnapped on Tuesday, and his bullet-riddled body was found early Wednesday in Tirah valley in northwest Pakistan’s Khyber tribal district”. According to a “local administration official” the malik was “organising a lashkar (a tribal militia) against the Taliban and was consulting other tribal elders” (‘Anti-Taliban tribal leader shot dead in Khyber’ 2009, Dawn, 8 July http://www.dawn.com.pk/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-anti-taliban-tribal-leader-shot-dead-khyber-qs-10 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 10).

• Dawn has reported that: “anti-TTP militant commander, Haji Namdar, was killed in a similar fashion by one of his own bodyguards in Bara, Khyber Agemcy, in August, 2008”. And that: “The assassin later admitted to having been trained and sent by the TTP chief to kill Namdar”. According to several sources Haji Namdar Khan had become a target after working with the Pakistan government. According to a Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor report: “Haji Namdar…is said to have betrayed the Taliban for the handsome sum of $150,000…the response for this betrayal was swift when Namdar narrowly survived a suicide bombing”. The report relates that: “Namdar blamed Baitullah Mahsud and his group for the attack, something quickly admitted to by the Hakimullah group – a local faction loyal to Baitullah – which took responsibility for the bombing”. Italian news agency Adnkronos International has reported that: “Pakistani security forces” had been “using a pro-Taliban local tribal leader Haji Namdar who helped them to wipe out the Taliban in the area” (Mughul, M.I. 2009, ‘Baitullah rival Qari Zainuddin shot dead in D I Khan’, Dawn, 23 June http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/07-baitullah-rival-qari-zainuddin-shot-dead-in- d-i-khan-ha-02 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 8; Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 9; ‘Pakistan: Oil trader kidnapped by militants in Karachi’ 2008, Adnkronos International, 9 May http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2147108962 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 5).

On 20 May 2008 Associated Press reported that “the authority of tribal elders in Khyber has been weakening” as “the proliferation of radical clerics who are sympathetic to the Taliban and have established parallel administrations and their own militias”. Extracts follow:

Thieves, feuding tribesmen and Taliban militants are creating chaos along the main Pakistan- Afghanistan highway, threatening a vital supply line for U.S. and NATO forces.

Abductions and arson attacks on the hundreds of cargo trucks plying the switchback road through the Khyber Pass have become commonplace this year. Many of the trucks carry fuel and other material for foreign troops based in Afghanistan.

…Fuel tankers, in particular, have become a target for militants seeking to disrupt supplies to NATO and the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

…Shah, the former regional security chief, said local tribes are paid a government stipend to secure the route for regular trade as well as military supplies. But the authority of tribal elders in Khyber has been weakening, as it is all along the frontier. Ikramullah Khan Afridi, a tribal leader, blamed that trend on the proliferation of radical clerics who are sympathetic to the Taliban and have established parallel administrations and their own militias.

“The traditional mechanism of controlling the area through the jirga (council of elders) of the tribal area has been weakened while the mullahs are taking the law into their own hands,” Afridi said. “Now they are out of control.”

Rivalry between extremists has also spawned violence, such as a May 1 suicide bombing that wounded dozens of people near Bara, one of Khyber’s main towns. It targeted the headquarters of an Islamic fundamentalist group calling itself Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. The group accused Taliban militants from nearby Waziristan of sending the bomber.

Khyber was once regarded as one of the safest of Pakistan’s seven semiautonomous tribal regions on the rugged frontier. It was one of the few that foreigners, including diplomats and aid workers, were allowed to venture into, although only to travel to Afghanistan.

The deteriorating security comes despite a relative lull in violence in other parts of Pakistan’s frontier regions in recent months. The Pakistani government that came to power in February elections is using tribal intermediaries to try to forge peace with militants, most notably in South and North Waziristan, where the Taliban and al-Qaida are strongest.

Maulvi Abdul Rahman, a Taliban leader, claimed the militants have strong enough ties with influential clerics in Khyber to scuttle any peace talks (Gannon, K. 2008, ‘Abductions, thefts in Khyber Pass threaten supplies for US and NATO troops in Afghanistan’, Star Tribune, 20 May http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=19102894 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 18).

A Daily Times report of 14 December 2008 provides similar information noting the manner in which the authority and respect traditionally accorded to Khyber Agency tribal elders (or maliks) is being challenged by Islamist militant networks in day-to-day encounters.

Khyber Agency’s Shinwari and Afridi tribesmen say they are abused and humiliated by Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), a private militia, which has taken it upon itself to ‘preserve tribal traditions and Islamic values’.

“I feel disgraced and humiliated at the way the LI men treat us at checkposts,” a tribal elder who migrated to Peshawar from Khyber following the emergence of the private militia and the Taliban in the area told Daily Times.

Fines: Mobile phones with musical ring tones or images will be confiscated, a fine of Rs 500 will be imposed on owners of cars playing music and anyone not wearing the local cap will have to pay a Rs 100 fine to the LI vigilantes on the main Torkham highway, tribal sources said.

“The Shinwaris and Afridis have never been disgraced and humiliated in this manner. Sometimes I think we, the proud people of Khyber, are so weak that we cannot face this bunch of people.”

…Besides witnessing the rise of the private militia recently, Khyber is also becoming known for the presence of Taliban with strong allegiance to the country’s most-wanted Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. The Taliban are expanding their sway in the area providing a strategic supply route for NATO and US forces in Afghanistan (Khattak, I. 2008, ‘Khyber’s Shinwaris, Afridis feel ‘humiliated’ by LI’, Daily Times, 14 December http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C12%5C14%5Cstory_14-12- 2008_pg7_14 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 19).

On 8 September 2008 New York Times correspondent Dexter Filkins reported that: “Everywhere I traveled during my stay in the tribal areas and in Peshawar, I met impoverished Pakistanis who told me Robin Hood-like stories about how the Taliban had challenged the wealthy and powerful people on behalf of the little guys”. Filkins relates the account of “an illiterate wheat farmer living in Khyber agency” who was dispossessed of hid land but who had had the land returned to him after Haji Namdar (of the Vice and Virtue organisation ) intervened where “the local malik nor the government agent” had failed. Extracts follow:

Everywhere I traveled during my stay in the tribal areas and in Peshawar, I met impoverished Pakistanis who told me Robin Hood-like stories about how the Taliban had challenged the wealthy and powerful people on behalf of the little guys. Hamidullah, for instance, was an illiterate wheat farmer living in Khyber agency when, in 2002, a wealthy landowner seized his home and six acres of fields. Hamidullah and his family were forced to eke out a living from a nearby shanty. Neither the local malik nor the government agent, Hamidullah told me, would intervene on his behalf. Then came Namdar, the Taliban commander. He hauled the rich man before a Vice and Virtue council and ordered him to give back Hamidullah’s home and farm.

Now Hamidullah is one of Namdar’s loyal militiamen.

“There are so many guys like me,” he said, cradling a Kalashnikov.

The social revolution that has swept the tribal areas does not bode well for the plans, laid out by Governor Ghani, to oust the Taliban by boosting the tribal elders (Kilkins, D. 2008, ‘Right at the Edge’, New York Times, 7 September http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 20).

On 16 November 2008 The Times also reported that Taliban styled militants were conducting activities in the mode of Robin Hood in the Khyber Agency. Extracts follow:

A Taliban “Robin Hood”, who distributes cut-price food from Nato convoys to the poor, is disrupting supply lines to British and US troops in Afghanistan.

In an audacious raid in Pakistan’s border region last week, two American Humvee armoured personnel carriers and 10 lorries laden with food were seized by Taliban fighters.

In the past year the Taliban have increased attacks on convoys carrying hardware, food and oil as they make their way from Karachi to Peshawar and through the Khyber Pass.

Lorry-loads of hijacked grain have been sold off cheaply in local markets and the Humvees paraded as war “booty”, giving the rebels a propaganda boost. More than 30 tankers with fuel bound for allied forces have been destroyed in bomb attacks on the road this year. …The lorries loaded with grain were driven to two other towns where Taliban fighters used loudspeakers to invite locals to buy it at knockdown prices.

Eyewitnesses said the militants were welcomed because the grain was being sold for a quarter of its normal price (Nelson, D. & Khattak, D. 2008, ‘“Robin Hood” dishes out Nato booty’, The Times, 16 November http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5162346.ece – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 21).

Background on tribal networks and governance in the Khyber Agency

A review of the 2000 study, Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes along the Pak-Afghan Border, provides the following overview of the Afridi tribe which dominates most of the Khyber Agency. The extract details the manner in which: “The tribal chieftains hierarchy has been divided into two groups according to their status and influence in their respective clans”. The extract follows:

The Afridis live entirely within the Pakistani side of the Pak-Afghan border, mainly in the Khyber agency. Afridis inhabit the most important geo-strategic point of the border, the Khyber Pass. This pass has remained and is an important gateway to the Sub-continent. In all historic movements to and from India the Afridis have played a decisive role. They have eight large clans: Malikdin Khel, Kuki Khel, Qambar Khel, Sepay, Aka Khel, Adam Khel, Zakah Khel, and Kamar Khel. The tribal chieftains hierarchy has been divided into two groups according to their status and influence in their respective clans. These are Muwajib and Lungidar. At present there are 779 Muwajibs and 2493 Lungidars in the Khyber Agency. The number of the Muwajib elders is fixed while that of the Lungidars keeps varying. The former is by succession, while the latter is by nomination. They all are called ‘Spin Giree’, or the white beards and they act as a bridge between the Tribal Political Administration and their respective tribes.

The area inhabitted by the Afridis stretches from the eastern spurs of the Sufaid Koh to the northern half of Tirah and from the Khyber Pass to the west and south of Peshawar. Besides the Afridis, small pockets of Shinwari, Mullagori, Mohmand, and Shalmani tribes also live in this region. Some of the Afridis are very well off, but the majority is poor. They come down to the plains in order to find means of earning, mainly by labouring. They are very strict in their religious beliefs, which is blended with the Pukhtoowali, and some times they have no hesitation in following practices which go far into antiquity (Shah, B. 2000,’Review: Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes Along The Pak-Afghan Border’, Institute of Strategic Studies http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_4/review/3r.htm – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 22).

Information on the tribal make up of the Khyber Agency and the nature of Khyber governance was sourced from the Pakistan government’s FATA website as part of Research Response PAK30614 of 11 October 2006. According to the information sourced at this time: “The Afridis are the main tribe of the Agency. They are further divided into eight Sub- sections viz Qamber Khel, Malikdin Khels, Kuki Khels, Aka Khels, Zakha Khels, Sepah, Kamar Khel and Adam Khel”. Other tribes of note in the area are said to be the Shinwaris, the Mullagoris and the Shilmanis. Extracts follow below detailing the manner in which the Khyber Agency is administered through payments made to Maliks (the tribal heads who serve as councillors in the jirga system), Khassadars (the tribal militia whose responsibilities include law enforcement) and Lungi holders (other persons of influence in the area).

…THE TRIBES

There are four main tribes which are as under:

1. Afridis2. Shinwaris 3. Mullagoris 4. Shilmanis

The Afridis are the main tribe of the Agency. They are further divided into eight Sub-sections viz Qamber Khel, Malikdin Khels, Kuki Khels, Aka Khels, Zakha Khels, Sepah, Kamar Khel and Adam Khel.

…ADMINISTRATION

The Political Agent is the Head of the Agency. He functions as a District Magistrate and Session Judge and also as a coordinator who coordinates the functions of all the Nation Building Departments in the Agency.

The Agency has three Sub-divisions viz Landikotal, Jamrud and Bara with three Assistant Political Agents, seven Tehsildars and a number of other administrative functionaries. The Head Quarter of the Political Agent is at Peshawar but has also a Camp Office/Residence at Landikotal. The Assistant Political Agents have their Headquarters at Landikotal, Jamrud and Bara respectively.

The Administration is run through Maliks, Khassadars and Lungi holders (Sufaidresh). The tribal Administration and system of justice is based on the concept of territorial, tribal (collective) and protective responsibility. Adjudication is through the Jirga system which is something the tribesmen comprehend and accept.

…MALIKS AND SUFAID RESH

…A Maliki is hereditary and devolves on the son, and his son so on and so forth.

In Khyber there are 24 Maliks getting Rs. 1813455/- per annum as allowances. Sub-tribe-wise break-up of Maliks are as under:

Kuki Khel 4 Zakha Khel 6 Qambar Khel 3 Malikdin Khel 2 Aka Khel 2 Sepah 1 Kamar Khel 2 Shinwari 3 Mullagori 1 Lungi system, commonly known as “Sufaid Resh” in Khyber Agency is also a form of formal recognition although at a slightly lower level. A Lungi signifies the holding of a position of favour with the Government and of influence in the tribe. In Khyber there are 3713 Lungi holders (Sufaid Resh). The Lungi is for an individual and is not hereditary. In practice, however, the Lungi of a deceased Lungi holder is usually granted to his elder son. Annual Allowances paid by Govt: to allowances holder is cancelled in connection with kidnapping/death of Younis Abid, Income Tax Commissioner.

KHASSADARS

…The Khassadars are generally ill disciplined, mostly un-trained and are a loosely organized force who are armed with their own weapon and have to use their own ammunition. They are given a pair of Chapplies and a Mazri Cloth uniform once a Year. They are the representative of the tribe to whom they owe loyalties rather than to the Political Administration. Every Agency has its own rules and conventions for the Khassadari service. They are also a non pensionable force.

…after partition of the Sub-Continent and with the change in the Role of the Scouts due to the withdrawal of the Army from tribal areas, the Political Administration has been left mostly to rely on the Khassadars for arrests and other such like duties. It is because, the availability of the Scouts to the Political Administration has become very difficult. Besides the reluctance of the Headquarter Frontier Corps it also depends on the whims and caprices of the local Scouts Commandant to provide force to the Political Agent. This has proved to be a great set back to the Administration in tribal areas and has made the task of the Political Agents more arduous and up-hill. Most of the operations and duties which the field officers have to carry out with the help of the Khassadars fail because of their unreliability and inherent deficiencies.

In Khyber there are 2753 Khassadars ranging in ranks from Subedar Major, downwards upto a Sepoy. They are appointed by the Political Agent who is their Commanding Officer as well. The recruitment is made from amongst the local tribes in the ratio of their tribal distribution which is known as “NIKKAT”.

The Khassadars are deployed for protection of strategic roads and other Govt: utilities. They also perform guard duty, export duty and protection of various installations. Annual expenditure on the Khyber Khassadars Force is Rs, 90338919/- including pay and various allowances etc (Khyber Agency’ (undated), Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) website http://www.fata.gov.pk/fatakhyber.htm – Accessed 20 September 2006 – Attachment 23).

A 2004 World Bank paper provides background on Pashtun tribal structures detailing the significance which surrounds the manner in which a shared patrilineal “Plareena of same ancestors make a Kandae/Tapa, (sub clan) giving birth to a Khel (clan)”; while: “The sum total of various Plareena, Tapa, Kandae, and Khel constitute a Qaum tribe”. The report also details the various traditional institutions of tribal justice employed in Pashtun culture including the jirga and lakhkar and the manner in which these institutions and the customary code of Pakhtunwali interact with the power of the local Political Agent in the day-to-day living of the various Pashtun communities spread across Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pertinent extracts follow:

According to the 1973 Constitution, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are special areas which fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, comprises seven Agencies namely Kurram, Khyber, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Orakzai along-with six Frontier Regions (FR), including Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Tank and D.I. Khan. The President of Pakistan is the constitutional head and enjoys the powers to make regulations for the peace and good governance of FATA. However, he has delegated his authority to the Governor of the NWFP for administrative purposes.6 There is no constitutional guarantee to safeguard basic human rights. No Federal or Provincial laws apply to the areas. The Frontier Crimes Regulation, FCR-1901, popularly known as Black Law rules supreme, neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court exercises any jurisdiction over the areas. An Agency administration is the combination of Political Agent, Maliki system and rule of the FCR. Backed up by Para-and-Military forces, such as Militia, Levy, Khassadar and Army (in the rear), reinforced with the economic and administrative powers that has given, in return, great significance to the person called the Political Agent.

The social structure of Pakhtun society is based on clan and genealogical order. Mostly, kinship relationships unite its members primarily in social, political, economic, recreational and military spheres. As an acephalous society, it holds each man equal to his fellow Pakhtun. Individuals are assumed to be essentially independent actors, however, strong men compete for secular power, but the actual power of an individual is transient and undermined by the resistance of peers and the institution of Jirga. Within a culture ethos of equality and autonomy, another logical possibility for validating legitimacy is the spiritual authority. They exhibit distinct characteristics, possessing sacred knowledge of the Koran, and following the Prophet’s (PBUH) traditions, display mystical virtuosity and ascetic sanctity and an austere emulation of the life of the Prophet (PBUH), as Sufi, Pir, Sayed and Mullah. Religious leadership has always played a central role especially in the time of internal crises and external invasions.

Beside, landed aristocracy and religious leadership, a large number of people fall in the category of Kasabgar (professionals with certain specialization, such as carpenters, barbers, gold and blacksmiths, weavers, shoemakers, artisans etc,) mostly landless lot called Shahkel, the people of little traditions.

…Since time immemorial, the Pakhtun society has been functioning on the basis of traditional code of Pakhtunwali. This covers almost every aspect of Pakhtun society including provision of justice, conflict resolution and distribution of shared resources. In spite of the introduction of modern state institutions such as executive authority, judicial institutions, and law enforcement agencies, Pakhtunwali is still a living force and plays a pervasive role in Pakhtun social setting, especially in rural areas.

…The whole paradigm of Pakhtun tribal organization is based on the patrilineal principle based on blood relationship. Its traditional social structure is based on interclan linking and tribal affinity uniting the Pakhtun people in a web of kinship relationships. A family is the primary building block, making the overall social organization of the Pakhtun society. It is a far more complex and a multi-purpose social organization than mere a group of related individuals with shared family honor, property, traditions, and intra- familial hate and love relationships. The tradition of joint family system, in some cases, more than four generations living together in a perfect communion is still prevalent. Members of each family acknowledge with deep respect the authority of the elders, age is often considered to be the most important factor. Usually, grand father, father or the eldest member is the head, both in internal and in external affairs of the family. Pakhtun are always proud of their ancestors, the proverb “to be a man like your forefather” expresses this in their daily interactions. The stability and solidarity of the social structure is the continuity of their lineage and its connection to a clan, tribe or groups of tribes. For an individual, his primary duty is to that of his family and tribe. A family is usually represented by a father (Plar), tied together into a Plareena, a congregation of different families having the same lineage, represented by a grandfather/s. Thus, various Plareena of same ancestors make a Kandae/Tapa, (sub clan) giving birth to a Khel (clan). The sum total of various Plareena, Tapa, Kandae, and Khel constitute a Qaum tribe.

Furthermore, Pakhtun society is not a close society. Since time immemorial, Pakhtun living among different ethnic groups have had imbibed various other people not necessarily Pakhtun by birth among their tribes, clans and sub-clans. Most practicable foundation of their organization is the area, or the village wherein they live and interact with one other on a daily basis. The term Taal is commonly used in case of heterogeneous families (not necessarily having the same ancestors) living together in an area or village. The tribal Pakhtun concept of democracy urgently demands an equal participation in collective village/area affairs. Instead of having one single common leader, they have to pick and choose a man from each and every major and minor group to ensure the practice of pluralism. Each Taal (segment of population) is considered to be a separate unit, thus, their interests, feelings and wishes are ascertained by the community through their respective representatives in the village Marka/jirga.

…Pakhtun society is governed by their customs and traditions which are working like policies. Collective and unanimous decisions (called sareshta as in Afridi and Orakzia tribes) are made in the Jirga. Duties and responsibilities for the executions of the decisions are assigned to the youngsters called by different names in different areas and tribes as arbaki in the Province of Pakteya of Afghanistan, rapakae /ameer as in Kurram, chalweshtai in North and South Waziristan, lakhkar in Afridi and Orakzai tribes of FATA. These organization act as tribal policemen, having the authority to punish those who do not comply with the tribal decisions, that range from a small and nominal penalty (nagha) in terms of cash or kind to burning down the house/s of the guilty.

Chalweshtai or lakhkar is another form of a force raised by a tribe on a voluntary basis to make concerted efforts regarding any eventuality. Its aim and purpose is to deal harshly with anti-social elements involved in various crimes of gambling, narcotics or to combat terrorism and terrorists operating in the areas, a recent phenomenon after 9/11 incident in the USA. There are several instance where Chalweshtai or tribal lakhkar have burnt down houses, inflicted severs injuries and even death on members of the same tribe, without invoking tribal or individual hostility or feuds. It is a social force which is also employed to prevent murders and other heinous offences in a tribal Agency.

Chagha is another form of Qaumi lakhkar raised spontaneously on the occasion of dacoity, robbery, lifting away of cattle and other offences of the sort. Previously through drum beat and now through loudspeakers, people are informed to come out of their houses fully armed to chase the offenders. These forms of organization are neither permanent nor formal. They are mostly event or situational based without any formal hierarchy or centralized leadership and substantial financial backup. vi. Traditional justice

In traditional justice, there is an intimate connection between rights and remedies, wrongs and punishments. As Olaf Caroe rightly points out, “Pathan custom requires the satisfaction of the aggrieved rather than the punishment of the aggressor. The law as we understand it concentrates against the aggressor, and compensation for the aggrieved hardly enters the picture. The Pathan in fact treats crimes as a kind of tort.” The administrative courts in an Agency award a variety of sanctions and remedies. They are more prohibitory, declaratory and compensatory in nature. The protagonist of the system has a point to boast of better substantive justice and simpler procedural rules. They are of the opinion that the tribal jirga system not only levy penalties for the crimes but also compensates the victims.

Besides, tribal set-up has an in-built system for the cessation of hostility or immediate resolution of serious disputes over property or customary rights. Most of the disputes are solved by mutual consultation or, failing that, through arbitration by impartial parties in a Jirga/ Maraka. An immediate effort is made to obtain a truce between the parties. This arrangement is locally termed as placing a Tiga. Literally it means to place a stone among the parties till such time when their tempers cool down and sanity returns. Whether or not the matter can be decided on merit and principles of justice or to the satisfaction of both the parties, however, violation of truce is punishable in accordance with the terms already decided, and often there is a provision of a substantial fine or forfeiture of a right. If the political authorities are a party to the truce, the violation may result, in addition, in their displeasure, as it entitles them to suspend any of the economic benefits enjoyed by the offending party.

The questions of how does the system of customary laws and rules satisfy the needs and demands of natural and legal justice? It’s an open ended question with several interpretations.

vii. Representation mechanisms for authorities (leaders, bodies): selection/ election / inheritance

The leadership in Pakhtun society is based on the strength of family, clan, khel, and qaum. The general mechanism for the selection of traditional leadership at local levels for a jirga is such that each family and clan is represented by its leader determined by age, reputation and influence. The Jirga represents the essence of democracy in operation under which every individual has a direct say in shaping the course of things around him. Democracy operates as a spiritual and moral force instead of becoming an automation of votes.”

There are also Malik, and Lungi-holders (individuals entitled to stipend from the government), registered with the government (political administration) and are considered officially recognized leaders. This privilege enables them to act as government contractor to become a member of Electoral College, Agency Council and a Jirga, constituted under the FCR 1901 by the Agency Administration.

There are three distinct types of Malik: those granted Maliki during British period; during 1960s in President Ayub Khan era as a result of BD membership; anyone conferred Maliki / lungi by the Political Agent with the approval of the Governor of the NWFP. All three types have varying perks and privileges in respective descending order. These positions of recognized traditional leaders have taken a hereditary character, in most cases, the eldest son inherits.

viii. Destitution mechanisms, if any, for incapable leaders

All traditional leaders are leader by inheritance; therefore, there is no mechanism to remove them from leadership in case of incapability by the tribesmen. However, Political Agent can withdraw, suspend or cancel, with the prior consent of higher authorities, the Malik and lungi. Mostly, it happens if they disobey or become hostile to the administration (Lutz, G. & Linder, W. 2004, ‘Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development: Desk study prepared for the World Bank Institute’s Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Programme’, World Bank website http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/153053/Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 8 July 2009 – Attachment 24).

For a study of tribal networks in the Khyber Agency which addresses the complexities involved in still greater detail (along with illustrative structure charts) see pages 7 to 13 of the June 2007 Land Acquisition, Resettlement, and Tribal Peoples Plan produced by the Pakistan National Highway Authority (sourced from the Asian Development Bank website and supplied as Attachment 25). According to this source: “The Afridi, a predominant tribe further divided into 8 clans (Khels), spreads all over the Khyber Agency of which they constitute about 80% percent of the population” (Pakistan National Highway Authority 2007, Land Acquisition, Resettlement, and Tribal Peoples Plan, Asian Development Bank website, June http://www.adb.org/Documents/Resettlement_Plans/PAK/40075/40075-PAK-RP.pdf – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 25).

3. Is there information to indicate that Khyber based militant networks have penetrated Peshawar?

As is noted above, the Khyber Agency is currently the scene of a major military offensive against Lashkar-e-Islam and other militant groups. Over the year prior to the renewed Pakistan military offensive numerous reports have appeared which have reported that Lashkar-e-Islam, and other militant groups, had been conducting kidnappings in Peshawar. Some news articles have even reported claims that it is feared that such groups will overrun the city. It is not clear, at present, whether the current military offensive in the Khyber Agency has had an effect upon Lashkar-e-Islam’s ability to operate in Peshawar (‘Raid kills 28 militants in Pakistan’ 2009, The National, source: Agence France-Presse, 2 July http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090702/FOREIGN/707029978/1002 – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 26; Siddique, A. 2008, ‘Khyber Operation Seeks To Secure NATO Supply Route’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 30 December http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistan_Suspends_NATO_Supplies_To_Tackle_Militants/136 5003.html – Accessed 10 July 2009– Attachment 27; Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 9; Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The grim dangers in FATA’, The News, 28 June http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=120959 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 17).

Previous reports on Lashkar-e-Islam’s operations in Peshawar

On 2 July 2009 Agence France-Presse reported that: “Pakistani authorities accuse the radical Lashkar-e-Islam of kidnapping for ransom in Peshawar”; noting that the group “is also accused of attacking convoys ferrying supplies to Nato and US troops in Afghanistan that travel through the historic Khyber Pass” (‘Raid kills 28 militants in Pakistan’ 2009, The National, source: Agence France-Presse, 2 July http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090702/FOREIGN/707029978/1002 – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 26).

A December 2008 report by Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reports as follows on the security situation in the Khyber Agency noting that Khyber Agency based militant groups like Lashkar-e Islam had launched “attacks in Peshawar city” and that at this time: “Some observers even feared that they could overrun Peshawar”.

Located west of Peshawar, Khyber is the most strategically significant tribal district among the seven tribal districts or agencies that collectively form the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border. It is also the main supply route for the more than 65,000 Western troops in Afghanistan.

This region was relatively peaceful until recently. But at the beginning of this year, local pro- Taliban militants groups – particularly Lashkar-e Islam and Tanzeem Amar Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Aneelmunkar (Organization for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) began launching attacks in Peshawar city. Those groups also reportedly provided shelter to foreign and Pakistani militants from other regions.

Some observers even feared that they could overrun Peshawar. Faced with that threat, the government responded last summer by launching an operation against the militants in Khyber.

Afridi, the tribal leader, told RFE/RL that the Khyber operation failed to curb militancy in the region. He said locals are now worried that they will ultimately suffer the brunt of the latest operation, since previous military attacks in the tribal areas and the Northwest Frontier Province achieved little – with civilians often suffering the most (Siddique, A. 2008, ‘Khyber Operation Seeks To Secure NATO Supply Route’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 30 December http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistan_Suspends_NATO_Supplies_To_Tackle_Militants/1365 003.html – Accessed 10 July 2009– Attachment 27).

In September 2008 Khyber based militants had reportedly surrounded the NWFP capital of Peshawar and were even making sorties into the city itself. According to a September 2008 New York Times report:

The situation was serious indeed: Peshawar, the capital of North-West Frontier Province and just east of Khyber agency, was almost entirely surrounded by Taliban militias, which had begun making forays into the city. The encirclement of Peshawar was the culmination of the Taliban’s advance: first they conquered the tribal areas, then much of the North-West Frontier Province, and now they were aiming for the province’s capital itself. The Talibs were cutting their well-known medieval path: shutting girls’ schools, banishing women from the streets, blowing up CD kiosks and beating barbers for shaving beards (Kilkins, D. 2008, ‘Right at the Edge’, New York Times, 7 September http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 20).

In May 2008: “An Islamic warlord, Mangal Bagh Afridi, now holds sway in the Khyber Agency just half an hour’s drive from Peshawar, capital of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)” (Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009 – Attachment 9).

A June 2008 article reports of the expansion of Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islam into Peshawar as follows:

The former, under its military commander Mangal Bagh, is spreading its influence into Peshawar and abducting people for not coming up to the moral standards set by Lashkar-e- Islam. The remaining tribal Agency, Kurram, is once again suffering from sectarian violence. One keeps hearing sad and horrible stories of revenge killings from Kurram Agency. Even more depressing is government inaction, or should one call it belated action, over the tackling of the problems that have plagued Kurram and some of the other tribal agencies and made life miserable for the Pashtun tribes inhabiting FATA (Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The grim dangers in FATA’, The News, 28 June http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=120959 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 17).

4. Is there any information to suggest that Pashtuns fleeing Khyber base militants have been tracked down in Karachi?

No specific reports could be located which referred to persons from the Khyber Agency having been tracked down by Khyber Agency based groups after relocating to Karachi. On 29 May 2009 the Research Service conducted an interview by telephone with Dr Aneela Babar of the Monash Asia Institute. One of the issues discussed was the question of whether any persons targeted by the TNSM in Swat had ever been pursued to Karachi. Dr Babar advised that she was aware of some incidents where militant networks from the NWFP had, in previous years, tracked down Pathans in Karachi, but that in these incidents the victims were wanted for betraying a particular resistance network to Pakistan security forces. The advice is recommended in its entirety and is supplied as Attachment 30 (RRT Research & Information 2009, Record of Conversation with Dr Aneela Babar of the Monash University Monash Asia Institute on 29 May 2009, 29 May – Attachment 30; completed as: RRT Research & Information 2009, Research Response PAK35068, 18 June – Attachment 31).

While no reports could be located of persons being pursued from the Khyber Agency to Karachi by Khyber based militants, one report was located of a Khyber Agency Afridi being abducted and subsequently killed in Karachi by persons suspected of belonging to a militant network. On 9 May 2008 Adnkronos International reported that Shaukat Afridi, “originally a Pashtun from the Khyber Agency”, “was abducted in the Pakistani city of Karachi on Friday by armed men believed to be linked to an al-Qaeda cell”. According to the report it is believed that Shaukat Afridi was targeted because of his involvement in the supply of “oil to NATO forces in Afghanistan” (“NATO oil supplies come through the port of Karachi and are transported through the Khyber Agency in the North West Frontier Province across the Afghan border and then transferred to Kabul”). On 27 December 2008 The Nation reported that, according to police, Shaukat Afridi was killed by his kidnappers after a tip-off led to a raid on a suspected militant safe-house. The November 2008 Peshawar abduction of Hashmatullah Attaar Zadeh, an Iranian commercial attaché, and his recovery in Karachi in January 2009 is also worth noting. According to The Nation: “about 35 suspected terrorists, including four militants belonging to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other banned religious outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi” were arrested in Karachi in the recovery of the Iranian diplomat. Bloomberg subsequently reported that kidnapping has become a major source of revenue for militant networks and that: “Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in New York, there have been 355 reported kidnappings for ransom in Karachi, compared with 68 in the previous five years, said the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, a volunteer group”. The report points to the kidnapping of Shaukat Afridi, and the 2002 abduction and execution of the US journalist Daniel Pearl, as examples which illustrate how a person’s political profile may make some persons a target for abduction by such groups (‘Pakistan: Oil trader kidnapped by militants in Karachi’ 2008, Adnkronos International, 9 May http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2147108962 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 5; for further background on the manner in which Khyber tribal elders have assisted in the movement of supplies to troops in Afghanistan, see: Ali, I. 2009, ‘NATO’s Khyber Lifeline’, Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, vol.7: no.1, 9 January http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34320 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 29; Khan, M. 2008, ‘3 terrorists killed in Karachi raid’, The Nation, 27 September http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily- english-online/Politics/27-Sep-2008/3-terrorists-killed-in-Karachi-raid – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 28 for the abduction and recovery of the Iranian diplomat, see: Khan, M. 2009, ‘Two cops die in raid to recover Iranian diplomat’, The Nation, 16 January http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/16-Jan- 2009/Two-cops-die-in-raid-to-recover-Iranian-diplomat – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 54; Khan, F. 2009, ‘Shootout at Sohrab Goth’, Daily Times, 16 January http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C01%5C16%5Cstory_16-1- 2009_pg12_1 – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 55).

It may also be of interest that, in February 2009, police in Karachi arrested four men “accused of financing Mangal Bagh Afridi” and his Khyber Agency Lashkar-e-Islam network. According to a police source: “the men were absconding from the tribal areas as they were wanted in several cases including murder, attempted murder, bank robbery and police encounters”. Police also told the press that: “After they were declared as absconders in the tribal area, they came and hid in the Sohrab Goth area, while continuing their criminal activities in the city”, conducting several robberies (‘4 men linked to terrorist outfit held’ 2009, Daily Times, 7 February http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\02\07\story_7-2-2009_pg12_4 – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 62).

In addition to the incidents noted above, a range other incidents involving the arrest, or discovery, of militant Islamist groups in Karachi have been reported in the recent year. And while no further reports could be located of the discovery, or arrest, of persons suspected of belonging to the Khyber Agency based Lashkar-e-Islam (the Mangal Bangh group), a number of persons suspected of belonging to groups affiliated with the TTP have reportedly been discovered in Karachi. On 14 July 2009 it was reported that: “Two alleged members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) namely Sher Muhammad Khan alias Shero and Bakht Wali were remanded to the custody of Special Investigating Unit”. In April 2009 it was reported that police and intelligence agents had arrested Badshah Deen Mehsud, reportedly a close aide of the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) chief Baitullah Mehsud and a prominent figure in TTP kidnapping activities. In June 2009 it was reported that: “Five alleged associates of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief, Baitullah Mehsud have been killed in a police encounter”; and that the “security officials got credible information that some TTP extremists had entered the city in the guise of refugees from Swat”. These claims were later disputed. Following the June 2009 killing of five alleged TTP militants it was reported that, according to Asian News International: “People residing in the Sohrab Goth area, where the encounter took place, raised questions about the credibility of police’ claims and described the shootout as an ‘engineered encounter’” in which four local night watchmen were murdered by police (‘2 alleged TTP men remanded till July 18’ 2009, Daily Times, 14 July http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\07\14\story_14-7-2009_pg12_5 – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 61; ‘Pak intelligence agencies arrest Baitullah Mehsud’s close aide’ 2009, Thaindian News, source: Indo-Asian News Service, 14 April http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-intelligence-agencies-arrest-baitullah- mehsuds-close-aide_100179359.html – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 58; ‘Five suspected aides of Mehsud killed in Karachi encounter’ 2009, Breaking News 24/7, source: Asian News International, 27 June http://blog.taragana.com/n/five-suspected-aides-of- mehsud-killed-in-karachi-encounter-93487/ – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 60; ‘Questions being raised over “fake” Karachi encounter’ 2009, Breaking News 24/7, source: Asian News International, 28 June http://blog.taragana.com/n/questions-being-raised-over- fake-karachi-encounter-93966/ – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 59).

As will be apparent from the above, reports vary in the extent to which credence is given to claims of an expanding Taliban presence in Karachi. This issue, often reported on as “Talibanization”, has been an ongoing topic of debate in the press and in local Karachi politics. In reporting, or commenting, on the arrest or discovery of suspected militant Islamist groups in Karachi, some sources have claimed that Karachi increasingly a sphere of operations for Taliban styled networks. Other commentators find such claims to be an exaggerated assessment of the problem. Some have argued that the MQM party is attempting to generate political support from Karachi’s Urdu speakers (often referred to as ethnic Mohajirs) via a xenophobic scare campaign which stigmatises Karachi’s migrant Pashtun communities as safe houses for militant activities in the city. Large numbers of Pashtuns have fled to Karachi to escape the military offensive being conducted in their home districts and agencies, and the arrival of displaced Pashtun’s in Karachi has reportedly added to the communal tensions in the city. Such tensions have already seen two significant outbreaks of communal violence in the recent year, in December 2008 and April 2009. Of the December 2008 violence, Reuters reported that “At least 40 people [were] been killed…in clashes between activists from the city’s majority community of Urdu-speakers and ethnic Pashtuns from northwest Pakistan”. According to BBC News police sources: “The violence began…following the killing of a Pashtun tea-stall owner in an MQM-dominated neighbourhood in the north of the city”. By 2 December 2008 it was reported that: “Life in the southern Pakistani city of Karachi [was] returning to normal following three days of violence which killed at least 35 people”. Violence broke out again in April 2009. According to a Guardian report the trouble began after several MQM supporters were shot. Reports vary in the number of persons subsequently killed in reprisal attacks, putting the figure at anywhere between 28 and 32. Anatol Lieven of King’s College London has reported that: “32 people were killed – the great majority of them Pashtuns”. The violence was reportedly quelled after the deployment of security forces (‘Talibanization of Karachi: Fear or Fact?’ 2009, Center for Research and Security Studies website, 23 November http://crss.pk/wpager08/we23Nov08.pdf – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 33; ‘ANP, JUI blame MQM for Karachi riots, MQM denies’ 2009, The News, 2 May http://www.thenews.com.pk/print3.asp?id=21871 – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 40; ‘ANP, JUI blame MQM for Karachi riots, MQM denies’ 2009, PakTribune, 2 May http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=214396 – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 41; ‘NA-MQM comes harsh on Sufis statement against parliament, judiciary’ 2009, Pakistan Press International, 21 April – Attachment 49; for Pashtun IDPs facing resentment, see: Siddique, A. 2009, ‘Pakistani Civilians Flee Fighting, Not Difficulties’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 26 May http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistani_Civilians_Flee_Fighting_Not_Difficulties/1740229.ht ml – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 43; for reports of militants in Karachi, see: Shahzad, A. 2009, ‘Pakistani army may face bloody urban fight’, Associated Press, 18 May – Attachment 45; Siddiqi, K. 2009, ‘Taliban retreat from Buner’, Yahoo News, 25 April http://in.news.yahoo.com/32/20090425/1067/twl-taliban-retreat-from-buner.html – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 46; ‘Karachi getting out of hand?’ 2009, Daily Times, 12 May http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\12\story_12-5-2009_pg3_1 – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 44; ‘Taliban ready to defend Pakistan against India’, Reuters, 2 December http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/12/02/taliban-ready-to-defend- pakistan-against-india/ – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 34; ‘Tense Karachi returns to normal’ 2009, BBC News, 2 December http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7759980.stm – Accessed 18 June 2009– Attachment 35; ‘Arrests in Pakistan following Karachi riots – Sonia Randhawa interviews Dr Christopher Sneddon, Jamil Yusuf, and Babar Khan Ghouri’ 2008, ABC Radio – Connect Asia, 3 December http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/connectasia/stories/200812/s2436381.htm – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 36; Walsh, W. 2009, ‘Spate of shootings kill 29 in Karachi’, The Guardian, 30 April http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/30/karachi-shootings- pakistan/print – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 37; Lieven, A. 2009, ‘Mistrust of the West is stronger in Pakistan than fear of the Taleban’, The Times, 5 May http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article6221874.ece – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 42; ‘Karachi tense after fatal clashes’ 2009, BBC News, 30 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8026215.stm – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 38; ‘Troops Patrol Pakistan’s Karachi After Clashes Kill 24’ 2009, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 30 April http://www.rferl.org/content/Troops_Patrol_Pakistans_Karachi_After_Clashes_Kill_24/1618 852.html – Accessed 18 June 2009 – Attachment 39).

It may, finally, be of interest that Karachi has recently seen numerous bomb attacks and that some of these attacks have affected Karachi suburbs said to be both Pashtun and working class (July 2009 and May 2008 saw attacks of this kind). Reports on such attacks generally relate that it is unclear who the perpetrators behind such attacks are; though the ongoing Mohajir/Pathan tensions in Karachi are often noted. A Stratfor report of July 2008, for instance, observes that: “The July 7 attacks targeted the poor segment of Karachi’s Pashtun population – a popular target for the MQM’s attempts to stir up ethnic unrest in Karachi”. Karachi has also seen numerous other unclaimed bomb attacks on various parts of the city. A range of public places, including a textile factory (January 2008), a shopping centre (June 2009), and a KFC food restaurant (November 2005), have been attacked in recent years. More prominent political targets, like the Karachi US Consulate (June 2002), have also been bombed. Karachi has also been the scene of a number of political assassinations in recent years as well as failed assassination attempts. In June 2009 a legislator of the “Baluchistan National Party in Pakistan’s national assembly” was the target of a parcel bomb attack at his Karchi residence. And in August 2008 it was reported that a Karachi “town police officer of Lyari, who had also been instrumental in smashing several Al Qaeda and Taliban-linked groups and sectarian outfits, and a motorcyclist were injured on Saturday in a remote- controlled bomb blast near the Saddar police station” (for attacks on Pashtun suburbs in Karachi, see: ‘One killed, dozens injured in Karachi bomb blasts’ 2008, Thaindian News, source: Indo-Asian News Service, 7 July http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south- asia/one-killed-dozens-injured-in-karachi-bomb-blasts-second-lead_10068801.html – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 32; ‘String of bombings kills one in Pakistan’s Karachi: police’ 2008, News Safety, source: Agence France-Presse, 7 July http://newssafety.org/index.php?view=article&catid=126%3Apakistan- security&id=5501%3Astring-of-bombings-kills-one-in-pakistans-karachi- police&option=com_content&Itemid=100402 – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 42; for the May 2008 attacks, see: ‘Pakistan: A Politicized Bombing in Karachi’ 2008, Stratfor, 7 July http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/pakistan_politicized_bombing_karachi – Accessed 3 July 2009 – Attachment 47; for the January 2008 bombing of a textile factory, see: Mansoor, H. 2008, ‘Ten dead in Karachi bomb blast: minister’, The Age, 15 January http://news.theage.com.au/world/ten-dead-in-karachi-bomb-blast-minister-20080115- 1lz8.html – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 48; for the shopping centre incident, see: ‘Bomb squad defuses explosive material in Karachi’ 2009, Geo TV, 15 June http://www.geo.tv/6-15-2009/44229.htm – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 50; for the restaurant attack, see: Ashraf, A. 2005, ‘Car bomb kills 3 outside KFC in Karachi’, Red Orbit website, source: Reuters, 16 November http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/306277/car_bomb_kills_3_outside_kfc_in_karac hi/ – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 53; La Guardia, A. 2002, ‘Karachi car bomb kills 11 outside US consulate’,The Telegraph, 15 June http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1397397/Karachi-car-bomb-kills-11- outside-US-consulate.html – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 52 ‘Parcel bomb wounds Pakistan MP, family in Karachi’ 2009, Times of India, 5 June http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Parcel-bomb-wounds-Pakistan-MP- family-in-Karachi/articleshow/4620388.cms – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 51; for an attack on a policeman, see: ‘Anti-terrorism official attacked in Karachi’ 2008, Dawn, 23 August http://67.222.134.214/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/sindh/bomb+attack+on+police+official+in+karachi – Accessed 16 July 2009 – Attachment 57; for the Bloomburg report, see: Mangi, N.A. & Sharif, F. 2009, ‘Taliban Hole Up in Karachi as Pakistan Weeds Out Swat Valley’, Bloomburg, 19 June http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=UL:US&sid=aFdI.CMmw_Sw – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 56).

The Shaukat Afridi incident

On 9 May 2008 Adnkronos International reported that Shaukat Afridi, “originally a Pashtun from the Khyber Agency”, “was abducted in the Pakistani city of Karachi on Friday by armed men believed to be linked to an al-Qaeda cell”. According to the report it is believed that Shaukat Afridi was targeted because of his involvement in the supply of “oil to NATO forces in Afghanistan” (“NATO oil supplies come through the port of Karachi and are transported through the Khyber Agency in the North West Frontier Province across the Afghan border and then transferred to Kabul”) (‘Pakistan: Oil trader kidnapped by militants in Karachi’ 2008, Adnkronos International, 9 May http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2147108962 – Accessed 9 July 2009 – Attachment 5; for further background on the manner in which Khyber tribal elders have assisted in the movement of supplies to troops in Afghanistan, see: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34320 – Accessed 9 July 2009).

On 27 December 2008 The Nation reported that, according to police, Shaukat Afridi was killed by his kidnappers. According to the report: “police alongwith other secret agencies officials on Friday morning raided a house in Mochko Village, Sector 11 of Baldia Town on a tip-off regarding presence of suspected terrorists including Ali Hassan alias Raheemullah, Mufti Ilyas and Khalid Darawala”. A firefight ensued. The report relates that: “The militants killed abducted oil supplier of NATO forces Shaukat Afridi, Crime Investigation Department (CID) SSP Fayyaz Khan told The Nation” (http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news- newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/27-Sep-2008/3-terrorists-killed-in-Karachi-raid – Accessed 10 July 2009).

Kidnapping in Karachi

Following the incident Bloomberg reported that a number of figures in Karachi had expressed concern that militant Islamist groups were increasing their activities in Karachi. The reports relates that: “Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in New York, there have been 355 reported kidnappings for ransom in Karachi, compared with 68 in the previous five years, said the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, a volunteer group”. The report points to the Shaukat Afridi and the Daniel Pearl incident as examples which illustrate that a person’s political profile may make some persons a target for kidnapping by such groups. On June 7, Pakistan’s anti-terrorist police burst into a house in the Sohrab Goth suburb of Karachi. Inside, they said, were 10 suicide-bomber jackets, 60 kilograms of explosives, 10 grenades and Taliban militant Naeemur Rahman.

Fayyaz Khan, senior superintendent in the police’s crime investigation department, who led the raid, said the arrest of Rahman, an aide of Taliban Commander Baitullah Mehsud, is part of a daily battle to root out terrorists from Pakistan’s biggest city and prevent a major attack.

“Terrorists have a network here and whenever they get a chance to carry out an attack, they will grab it,” said Khan, “They want to do something major because when something happens here, it creates much more pressure on the government.”

Even as Pakistan’s military drives the Taliban from bases in the Swat Valley, 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) to the north, militants are holing up in Karachi, making it harder to rid the country of Islamic extremists. U.S. officials say the extremists pose a security threat in the nuclear-armed state and aid Muslim insurgents battling NATO forces in neighboring Afghanistan.

Karachi, a city of 18 million people, has two faces. One is the commercial capital, where women are seen in the workforce and in public life, entrepreneurs live in million-dollar homes and jeans-clad teenagers hang out in shopping malls and cafes.

…The other face is the rundown warren of narrow streets in districts like Sohrab Goth and Baldia Town, where authorities have little control and walls and bridges are daubed with slogans like “Welcome welcome Taliban” and “Long live Taliban.”

“Karachi has more bombs, dynamite and Kalashnikovs than any other city in Pakistan,” said Fateh Muhammad Burfat, head of criminology at Karachi University.

Investors have been drawn to Karachi after Mayor Mustafa Kamal spent 200 billion rupees ($2.5 billion) in the last three years building bridges, underpasses and roads.

…The unmapped slums are perfect hiding places for Taliban seeking respite from the fighting, said Arif Hasan, an urban planner and author of “Understanding Karachi.”

“In a city as large as Karachi, anyone can hide,” Hasan said. “Police surveillance is weak and a high level of corruption means any one who has money can easily hide.”

Militants also use the commercial center as a source of money by kidnapping for ransom, robbing banks and trafficking drugs and arms, according to Kamal.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in New York, there have been 355 reported kidnappings for ransom in Karachi, compared with 68 in the previous five years, said the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, a volunteer group.

In October 2008, film maker Satish Anand was kidnapped and held for six months until he paid a ransom, police said. A month earlier, Shaukat Afridi, who ran a fleet of oil tankers and supplied NATO forces in Afghanistan, died when his kidnappers blew up the house where he was being held. Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was abducted in Karachi and killed in 2002 (Mangi, N.A. & Sharif, F. 2009, ‘Taliban Hole Up in Karachi as Pakistan Weeds Out Swat Valley’, Bloomburg, 19 June http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=UL:US&sid=aFdI.CMmw_Sw – Accessed 10 July 2009 – Attachment 56).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Research Groups International Crisis Group http://www.satp.org Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown.org South Asia Analysis Group http://www.southasiaanalysis.org South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org Regional News Services Daily Times http://www.dailytimes.com.pk Dawn http://www.dawn.com Geo TV News http://www.geo.tv The Nation http://www.nation.com.pk The News http://www.thenews.com.pk The Pak Tribune http://www.paktribune.com/index.shtml Internews Pakistan http://www.internews.org.pk Other News Services ABC News http://www.abc.net.au Al Jazeera http://english.aljazeera.net BBC News http://www.bbc.co.uk The Christian Science Monitor http://www.csmonitor.com New York Times http://www.nytimes.com Reuters http://www.reuters.com The Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com Staggernation Google API Proximity Search search engine http://www.staggernation.com/cgi-bin/gaps.cgi

Databases:

FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. ‘Fighters killed in Khyber clashes’ 2009, Al Jazeera, 2 July http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/20097271586758.html – Accessed 10 July 2009.

2. ‘Pak bans three militant outfits in Khyber Agency’ 2008, The Economic Times, 30 June http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/Pak_bans_three_militant_outfits_in_Khy ber_Agency/rssarticleshow/3180281.cms – Accessed 10 July 2009. 3. Khattak, D. 2009, ‘Possible closure of Peshawar-Kabul flight irks passengers’, The News, 22 May http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=178915 – Accessed 10 July 2009.

4. Shahzad, S.S. 2008, ‘Taliban bitten by a snake in the grass’, Asia Times, 26 April http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD26Df01.html – Accessed 10 July 2009.

5. ‘Pakistan: Oil trader kidnapped by militants in Karachi’ 2008, Adnkronos International, 9 May http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2147108962 – Accessed 9 July 2009.

6. ‘Pro-government Pakistan tribal leader killed: officials’ 2009, Hindustan Times, 1 July http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=NLetter&id =250e2d06-f9ae-4454-95f7-d0ba41d83b87&Headline=Pro- government+Pakistan+tribal+leader+killed%3a+officials – Accessed 9 July 2009.

7. ‘Tribal elder killed in Khyber Agency’ 2009, Samaa, 2 July http://www.samaa.tv/News10030-Tribal_elder_killed_in_Khyber_Agency.aspx – Accessed 9 July 2009.

8. Mughul, M.I. 2008, ‘Baitullah rival Qari Zainuddin shot dead in D I Khan’, Dawn, 23 June http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/07-baitullah-rival-qari-zainuddin-shot-dead-in- d-i-khan-ha-02 – Accessed 13 July 2009.

9. Ali, I. 2008, ‘Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’, Terrorism Monitor, 29 May http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4952 – Accessed 13 July 2009.

10. ‘Anti-Taliban tribal leader shot dead in Khyber’ 2009, Dawn, 8 July http://www.dawn.com.pk/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-anti-taliban-tribal-leader-shot-dead-khyber-qs-10 – Accessed 9 July 2009.

11. Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The Tribes Fight Back’, Newsline, 4 October http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsOct2008/cover4oct2008.htm – Accessed 9 July 2009.

12. ‘Pakistan tribal elders shot dead’2008, BBC News, 7 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7174425.stm – Accessed 9 July 2009.

13. ‘Gunmen kill two tribal elders in Pakistani tribal region’ 2007, People’s Daily, source: Xinhua, 9 July http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/6211299.html – Accessed 9 July 2009.

14. ‘Blast, shootings kill two Pakistani soldiers, four civilians in Swat’ 2008, ABC News, source: Agence France-Presse, 29 June http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/06/29/2289058.htm?section=justin – Accessed 9 July 2009. 15. Abbas, H. 2008, ‘A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, CTC Sentinel, vol.1: no.2, January pp.2-4.

16. ‘FATA Timeline – 2009’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/timeline/index.html – Accessed 9 July 2009.

17. Yusufzai, R. 2008, ‘The grim dangers in FATA’, The News, 28 June http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=120959 – Accessed 9 July 2009.

18. Gannon, K. 2008, ‘Abductions, thefts in Khyber Pass threaten supplies for US and NATO troops in Afghanistan’, Star Tribune, 20 May http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=19102894 – Accessed 9 July 2009.

19. Khattak, I. 2008, ‘Khyber’s Shinwaris, Afridis feel ‘humiliated’ by LI’, Daily Times, 14 December http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C12%5C14%5Cstory_14- 12-2008_pg7_14 – Accessed 9 July 2009.

20. Kilkins, D. 2008, ‘Right at the Edge’, New York Times, 7 September http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07pakistan- t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all – Accessed 10 July 2009.

21. Nelson, D. & Khattak, D. 2008, ‘“Robin Hood” dishes out Nato booty’, The Times, 16 November http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5162346.ece – Accessed 10 July 2009.

22. Shah, B. 2000,’Review: Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes Along The Pak-Afghan Border’, Institute of Strategic Studies http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_4/review/3r.htm – Accessed 10 July 2009.

23. Khyber Agency’ (undated), Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) website http://www.fata.gov.pk/fatakhyber.htm – Accessed 20 September 2006.

24. Lutz, G. & Linder, W. 2004, ‘Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development: Desk study prepared for the World Bank Institute’s Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Programme’, World Bank website http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/153053/Pakistan.pdf – Accessed 8 July 2009.

25. Pakistan National Highway Authority 2007, Land Acquisition, Resettlement, and Tribal Peoples Plan, Asian Development Bank website, June http://www.adb.org/Documents/Resettlement_Plans/PAK/40075/40075-PAK-RP.pdf – Accessed 9 July 2009.

26. ‘Raid kills 28 militants in Pakistan’ 2009, The National, source: Agence France- Presse, 2 July http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090702/FOREIGN/707029978/1002 – Accessed 10 July 2009. 27. Siddique, A. 2008, ‘Khyber Operation Seeks To Secure NATO Supply Route’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 30 December http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistan_Suspends_NATO_Supplies_To_Tackle_Milita nts/1365003.html – Accessed 10 July 2009.

28. Khan, M. 2008, ‘3 terrorists killed in Karachi raid’, The Nation, 27 September http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/27- Sep-2008/3-terrorists-killed-in-Karachi-raid – Accessed 10 July 2009.

29. Ali, I. 2009, ‘NATO’s Khyber Lifeline’, Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, vol.7: no.1, 9 January http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34320 – Accessed 9 July 2009.

30. RRT Research & Information 2009, Record of Conversation with Dr Aneela Babar of the Monash University Monash Asia Institute on 29 May 2009, 29 May.

31. RRT Research & Information 2009, Research Response PAK35068, 18 June.

32. ‘One killed, dozens injured in Karachi bomb blasts’ 2008, Thaindian News, source: Indo-Asian News Service, 7 July http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south- asia/one-killed-dozens-injured-in-karachi-bomb-blasts-second-lead_10068801.html – Accessed 10 July 2009.

33. ‘Talibanization of Karachi: Fear or Fact?’ 2009, Center for Research and Security Studies website, 23 November http://crss.pk/wpager08/we23Nov08.pdf – Accessed 18 June 2009.

34. ‘Taliban ready to defend Pakistan against India’, Reuters, 2 December http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/12/02/taliban-ready-to-defend-pakistan- against-india/ – Accessed 18 June 2009.

35. ‘Tense Karachi returns to normal’ 2009, BBC News, 2 December http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7759980.stm – Accessed 18 June 2009.

36. ‘Arrests in Pakistan following Karachi riots – Sonia Randhawa interviews Dr Christopher Sneddon, Jamil Yusuf, and Babar Khan Ghouri’ 2008, ABC Radio – Connect Asia, 3 December http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/connectasia/stories/200812/s2436381.htm – Accessed 18 June 2009.

37. Walsh, W. 2009, ‘Spate of shootings kill 29 in Karachi’, The Guardian, 30 April http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/30/karachi-shootings-pakistan/print – Accessed 18 June 2009.

38. ‘Karachi tense after fatal clashes’ 2009, BBC News, 30 April http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8026215.stm – Accessed 18 June 2009.

39. ‘Troops Patrol Pakistan’s Karachi After Clashes Kill 24’ 2009, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 30 April http://www.rferl.org/content/Troops_Patrol_Pakistans_Karachi_After_Clashes_Kill_2 4/1618852.html – Accessed 18 June 2009. 40. ‘ANP, JUI blame MQM for Karachi riots, MQM denies’ 2009, The News, 2 May http://www.thenews.com.pk/print3.asp?id=21871 – Accessed 18 June 2009.

41. ‘ANP, JUI blame MQM for Karachi riots, MQM denies’ 2009, PakTribune, 2 May http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=214396 – Accessed 18 June 2009.

42. ‘String of bombings kills one in Pakistan’s Karachi: police’ 2008, News Safety, source: Agence France-Presse, 7 July http://newssafety.org/index.php?view=article&catid=126%3Apakistan- security&id=5501%3Astring-of-bombings-kills-one-in-pakistans-karachi- police&option=com_content&Itemid=100402 – Accessed 10 July 2009.

43. Siddique, A. 2009, ‘Pakistani Civilians Flee Fighting, Not Difficulties’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 26 May http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistani_Civilians_Flee_Fighting_Not_Difficulties/174 0229.html – Accessed 18 June 2009.

44. ‘Karachi getting out of hand?’ 2009, Daily Times, 12 May http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\12\story_12-5-2009_pg3_1 – Accessed 18 June 2009.

45. Shahzad, A. 2009, ‘Pakistani army may face bloody urban fight’, Associated Press, 18 May. (FACTIVA)

46. Siddiqi, K. 2009, ‘Taliban retreat from Buner’, Yahoo News, 25 April http://in.news.yahoo.com/32/20090425/1067/twl-taliban-retreat-from-buner.html – Accessed 18 June 2009.

47. ‘Pakistan: A Politicized Bombing in Karachi’ 2008, Stratfor, 7 July http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/pakistan_politicized_bombing_karachi – Accessed 3 July 2009.

48. Mansoor, H. 2008, ‘Ten dead in Karachi bomb blast: minister’, The Age, 15 January http://news.theage.com.au/world/ten-dead-in-karachi-bomb-blast-minister-20080115- 1lz8.html – Accessed 10 July 2009.

49. ‘NA-MQM comes harsh on Sufis statement against parliament, judiciary’ 2009, Pakistan Press International, 21 April. (FACTIVA)

50. ‘Bomb squad defuses explosive material in Karachi’ 2009, Geo TV, 15 June http://www.geo.tv/6-15-2009/44229.htm – Accessed 10 July 2009.

51. ‘Parcel bomb wounds Pakistan MP, family in Karachi’ 2009, Times of India, 5 June http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Parcel-bomb-wounds-Pakistan- MP-family-in-Karachi/articleshow/4620388.cms – Accessed 10 July 2009.

52. La Guardia, A. 2002, ‘Karachi car bomb kills 11 outside US consulate’,The Telegraph, 15 June http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1397397/Karachi-car-bomb- kills-11-outside-US-consulate.html – Accessed 10 July 2009. 53. Ashraf, A. 2005, ‘Car bomb kills 3 outside KFC in Karachi’, Red Orbit website, source: Reuters, 16 November http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/306277/car_bomb_kills_3_outside_kfc_i n_karachi/ – Accessed 10 July 2009.

54. Khan, M. 2009, ‘Two cops die in raid to recover Iranian diplomat’, The Nation, 16 January http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english- online/Politics/16-Jan-2009/Two-cops-die-in-raid-to-recover-Iranian-diplomat – Accessed 16 July 2009.

55. Khan, F. 2009, ‘Shootout at Sohrab Goth’, Daily Times, 16 January http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C01%5C16%5Cstory_16-1- 2009_pg12_1 – Accessed 16 July 2009.

56. Mangi, N.A. & Sharif, F. 2009, ‘Taliban Hole Up in Karachi as Pakistan Weeds Out Swat Valley’, Bloomburg, 19 June http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=UL:US&sid=aFdI.CM mw_Sw – Accessed 10 July 2009.

57. ‘Anti-terrorism official attacked in Karachi’ 2008, Dawn, 23 August http://67.222.134.214/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/sindh/bomb+attack+on+police+official+in+karachi – Accessed 16 July 2009.

58. ‘Pak intelligence agencies arrest Baitullah Mehsud’s close aide’ 2009, Thaindian News, source: Indo-Asian News Service, 14 April http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/pak-intelligence-agencies-arrest- baitullah-mehsuds-close-aide_100179359.html – Accessed 16 July 2009.

59. ‘Questions being raised over “fake” Karachi encounter’ 2009, Breaking News 24/7, source: Asian News International, 28 June http://blog.taragana.com/n/questions- being-raised-over-fake-karachi-encounter-93966/ – Accessed 16 July 2009.

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