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IN the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the DISTRICT OFCOLUMBIA JUMA MOHAMMED ABDI. L; A,ATIF AL DOSARI, Et Al. Petitioners

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IN the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the DISTRICT OFCOLUMBIA JUMA MOHAMMED ABDI. L; A,ATIF AL DOSARI, Et Al. Petitioners IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OFCOLUMBIA JUMA MOHAMMEDABDI. L; a,ATIF AL DOSARI,et al. Petitioners, Civil Action No. 04-CV-1227(RBW) GEORGEW. BUSH, President of the UnitedStates, et al., Respondents. DECLARATIONOF JAMES R. CRISFIELD JR. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, CommanderJames R. Crisfield Jr., Judge Advocate General’s Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of myknowledge, information and belief, the followingis true, accurate and correct: 1. I am the Legal Advisor to the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunals. In that capacity I amthe principal legal advisor to the Director, CombatantStares ReviewTribunals, and provide advice to Tribunals on legal, evidentiary, procedural, and other matters. I also review the record of proceedingsin each Tribunal for legal sufficiency in accordancewith standards prescribed in the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal establishment order and implementing directive. 2. I hereby certify that the documentsattached hereto constitute a true and accurate copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal related to petitioner JumaMohammed Abdul Latif At Dosari that are suitable for public release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcementsensitive are not 1824 attached hereto. I have redacted information that wouldpersonally identify certain U.S. Governmentpersonnel in order to protect the personal security of those individuals. I have also redacted internee serial numbersbecause certain combinationsof internee serial numberswith other information becomeclassified under applicable classification guidance. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoingis true and correct. CDR, JAGC, USN 1825 Department of Defense Director, CombatantStatus ReviewTribunals OARDEC/Ser: 0204 11 October 2004 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #~ Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order of 7 July 2004 (b) Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 July 2004 1. I concur in the decision of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal that Detainee ISN #~ meets the criteria for designation as an EnemyCombatant, in accordance with references’IT,-and (b). 2. This case is now considered final, and the detainee will be scheduled for an Administrative Review Board. ¯ M. McGARRAH RADM, CEC, USN Distribution: NSC(Mr. John Bellinger) DoS (Ambassador Prosper) DASD-DA JCS (J5) SOUTHCOM (COS) COMJTFGTMO OARDEC (Fwd) C1TF Ft Belvoir FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1826 UNCLASSIFIED 9 Oct 04 From: Legal Advisor To: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Subj: LEGAL SUF~CIENCY REVIEW OF COMBATANTSTATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #~. Ref: (a) DeputySecretary of DefenseOrder of 7 July 2004 (b) Secretary of the NavyImplementation Directive of 29 July 2004 Encl: (1) Appointing Order for Tribunal #8 of 13 September2004 (2) Record of Tribunal Proceedings 1. A legal sufficiency review has been completedon the subject CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal in accordancewith references (a) and (b). After reviewingthe record of the Tribunal, I find that: a. The detainee was properly notified of the Tribunal process and voluntarily elected not to participate in the Tribunal proceedings. b. The Tribunal was properly convenedmad constituted by enclosure (1). c. The Tribunal compliedwith the provisions of references (a) and Co). Note that some information in exhibits R-5, R-6, and R-18 was redacted. The FBI properly certified in exhibit R-2 that the redacted informationwould not support a determinationthat the detainee is not an enemy combatant. d. The detainee madeno requests for witnesses or evidence. e. The Tribunal’s decision that detainee #~is properly classified as an enemycombatant was unanimous. f. The detalnee’s Personal Representative was ~ven the opportunity to review the record of proceedingsand declined to submit coma’nentsto the Tribunal. 2. Theproceedings and decision of the Tribunal are legally sufficient and no corrective action is required. 3. I recommendthat the decision of the Tribu~ ap(~an.. ~the(~ be considered final. /&MF,~R. ~LD JR. CDR, JAGC, USN UNCLASSIEIED 1827 Department of Defense Director, CombatantStatus Review Tribunals 13 Sep 04 From: Director, CombatantStatus ReviewTribunals Subj: APPO/NTIvlENTOF COMBATANTSTATUS REVIEWTRIBUNAL #8 Refi (a) ConveningAuthority AppointmentLetter of 9 July 2004 By the authority given to mdin reference (a), a CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal established by "Implementationof CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal Proceduresfor EnemyCombatants Detained at GuantananaoBay Naval Base, Cuba"dated 29 July 2004 is herebyconvened. It shall hear such eases as shall be broughtbefore it withoutfurther action of referral or otherwise. Thefollowing commissionedofficers shall serve as membersof the Tribunal: ~ Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve; Pmsideut Colonel, U.S. Army;Member (jA~~I~; Lieutenant Colonel, JAG-C, U.S. Army; Member J. M. McGARRAH Rear Admiral Civil EngineerCorps United States Naval Reserve 1828 HEADQUARTERS, OARDEC FORWARD GUANTANAMOBAY, CUBA APOAE 09360 6 October 2004 MEMORANDUMFOR DllLECTOR, CSRT FROM: OARDEC FORWARDCommander SUBJECT: CSRT Record of Proceedings ICO ISN#~ 1. Pursuant toEnclosure (1), paragraph (1)(5) of hnplementation of Combatant Stat us Review Tribunal Procedures for EnemyCombatants Detained at GuantanamoBay Naval Base, Cuba dated 29 July 2004, I am forwarding the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal Decision Report for the above mentionedISN for review and action. 2. If there are any questions regarding this package,point of contact on this matter is the undersigned at DSN660-3088. Colonel, USAF 1829 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 (I.r) CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet (U) This Documentis UNCLASSIFIEDUpon Removal of Enclosures (2) and (U) TRIBUNAL PANEL: (U) ISN#: Ref: (a) (U) ConveningOrder for Tribunal #8 of 13 September2004 (U) (b) (U) CSRTImplementation Directive of 29 July 2004 (U) (c) (U) DEPSECDEFMemo of 7 July 2004 (U) Encl: (1) (U) Unclassified Summaryof Basis For Tribunal Decision (U) (2) (U) Classified Summaryof Basis for Tribunal Decision (S/NF) (3) (U) Summaryof Detainee/Witness Testimony ~/FOUO)- ~/A) (4) (U) Copies of DocumentaryEvidence Presented (S/NF) (5) (U) Personal Representative’s Record Review(U) 1. (U) This Tribunal was convenedon 30 September2004 by references (a) and (b) makea determination as to whetherthe Detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemycombatant, as defined in reference (c). 2. (U) On 30 September2004 the Tribunal determined, by a preponderanceof the evidence, that Detainee #~is properly designated as an enemycombatant, as defined in reference (c). 3. (U) In particular, the Tribunal finds that this Detaineeis a memberof al Qaidaand affiliated with the Taliban, as morefully discussed in the enclosures. 4. (U) Enclosure(1) provides an unclassified accountof the basis for the Tribunal’s decision. A detailed account of the evidence considered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are containedin enclosures(1) and (2). DERVFM: Multiple Sources SECRET//NOFORN//X1 DECLASS: XI 1830 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF BASIS FOR TRIBUNAL DECISION O~nclosure (1) to CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal Decision Report) TRIBUNAL PANEL: #8 ISN #: ~ 1. Introduction As the CombatantStatus ReviewTribunal (CSRT)Decision Report indicates, the Tribunal has determinedthat this Detainee is properly classified as an enemycombatant and is a memberof al Qaida, whichwas affiliated with the Taliban and provided support to it whenit wasengaged in hostilities against the UnitedStates and/or its coalition partners. In reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The following is an account of the unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and other pertinent information. Classified evidence considered by the Tribunal is discussed in Enclosure (2) to the CSRTDecision Report. 2. Synopsis of Proceedings The unclassified evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Recorderindicated that the detainee is a memberof al Qaida and traveled from the United States to Afghanistanvia Bahrain and Iran in November2001. The Detainee was present at Tora Born and crossed the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan in December2001 with neither documentation nor authority andsurrenderedto Pakistani authorities. The Detainee chose not to participate in the Tribunal process. He called no witnesses, requested no documentsbe produced, but provided through his Personal Representative responses to the allegations in the Unclassified Summaryof Evidence ~xhibit R-l). The Detalnee’s responses were identified verbally by the Pe~sonalRepresentative in the Tribunal session and were also submitted in written form as Exhibit D-b. The Detainee proclaimed he was innocent of all allegations. 3. Evidence Considered by the Tribunal The Tribunal considered the following evidence in reaching its conclusions: a. Exhibits: D-a through D-b and R- i through R- 18. b. Testimonyof the Personal Representative on behalf of the DetNnee. 4. Rulings by the Tribunal on Detainee Requests for Evidence or Witnesses The Detainee requested no witnesses and requested no documentsbe produced as evidence; therefore, no rulings on these matters were required. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO ~SN ~ Enclosure(I) Page1 of 3 1831 UNCLASSIFIED/fFOUO 5. Discussion of Unclassified Evidence The Tribunal considered the following unclassified evidence in makingits determinations:
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