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JIHADUL ISLAMIC DE LA "|NFRÂNGEREA TERORII" {I "R+ZBOIUL SFÂNT" LA "SPERAN}A LIBERT+}II" JIHADUL ISLAMIC 1 Foto coperta I • SHEIKH MAWLANA MUHAMMAD HISHAM COD CNCSIS 270 ANDREESCU, ANGHEL Jihadul Islamic de la ''|nfrângerea terorii'' [i ''R=zboiul Sfânt''ANDREESCU, la ''speran]a ANGHEL libert=]ii'' / Anghel Andreescu, NicolaeJihadul Radu. Islamic - Bucure[ti: de la ''|nfrângerea Editura Ministerului terorii'' [i ''R=zboiulInternelor [iSfânt'' Reformei la Administrative,''speran]a libert=]ii'' 2008 / Anghel Andreescu, Bibliogr.Nicolae Radu. - Bucure[ti: Editura Ministerului Internelor ISBN[i Reformei 978-973-745-011-1 Administrative, 2008 Bibliogr. I.ISBN Radu, 978-973-745-011-1 Nicolae 329.7(¡411.21)I. Radu, Nicolae Jihad 329.7(¡411.21) Jihad Opera]ii editoriale: colectiv Editura MIRA Tip=rit: Tipografia Codex Anghel ANDREESCU, Nicolae RADU 2 Chestor general de poli]ie Comisar [ef prof. univ. dr. Anghel ANDREESCU conf. univ. dr. Nicolae RADU JIHADULJIHADUL ISLAMICISLAMIC DE LA "|NFRÂNGEREA TERORII" {I "R+ZBOIUL SFÂNT" LA "SPERAN}A LIBERT+}II" BUCURE{TI – 2008 – JIHADUL ISLAMIC 3 Cuprins Gând pentru toleran]= . 9 Prefa]= . 11 Introducere . 15 Introduction . 29 Introduction . 43 Lista abrevieri . 59 Capitolul 1 De la Islam la cunoa[terea Jihadului . 65 Cât de bine cunoa[tem Islamul? . 65 Unicitatea lui Allah . 79 |n numele credin]ei . 96 Calea spre Mecca . 98 Ebraismul confirmat . 103 Moartea Profetului . .104 Urma[ii lui Mahomed . 106 Dinastia Abbasida [i civiliza]ia islamic= . 109 |n=l]are [i dec=dere . 110 {ii]i [i suni]i . 111 Religia \ntre [ii]i [i suni]i . 113 Cartea Sfânt= a Islamului . 115 Nemurirea sufletului . 132 Dimensiunea islamic= a atacurilor sinuciga[e . 134 R=spândirea fundamentalismului islamic . 162 Islam vs. terorism? . 175 Jihad \n Balcani . 178 Reconcilierea civiliza]iilor! . 192 Recurs la memoria colectiv= . 196 Capitolul 2 Enciclopedia Terorii. Calea spre Emir [i Al-Qaida Alb= . 209 Paradigmele cunoa[terii . 215 Geneza terorii . 219 JIHADUL ISLAMIC 5 Terorismul contemporan . 221 Incubatoarele radicaliz=rii . 229 Calea spre Emir . 230 Al-Qaida Alb= . 246 Emirul . 247 Chemarea la Jihadul Sfânt . 250 Emirii cu ochii alba[trii . 255 Exist= un \nlocuitor pentru [eicul terorii? . 260 Capitolul 3 Jihad pe internet - Cyberterorism, Cyberspionaj, Mass-media [i "Brandul" Al-Qaida . 267 Omniprezentul cyberterorism . 267 Pira]ii cibernetici . 274 Lovitura la comer]ul electonic . 278 Suprema]ia informa]iilor . 282 Cybercomandament la Air Force . 284 Site-uri jihadiste . 285 Forumul Al-Tajdid . 288 Marketing on-line . 289 Juc=tori pe scena media . 304 "Brandul" Al-Qaida . 305 M=suri ac]ionale post 11 septembrie 2001 . 316 Capitolul 4 Organiza]ii jihadiste [i grup=ri teroriste interna]ionale . .329 Organiza]ii [i grup=ri teroriste din Orientul Apropiat [i Mijlociu . 331 Organiza]ii teroriste armene, kurde [i turce[ti . 351 Organiza]ii extremist-teroriste din Asia . 358 Organiza]ii [i grup=ri teroriste din Europa . 363 Organiza]ii [i grup=ri de pe continentul american . 381 Organiza]ii [i grup=ri paramilitare . 390 |ndemn la reflec]ie . 397 Glosar de termeni pentru Jihad . 399 Anexe . 407 Bibliografie selectiv= . 442 Prezentare autori (englez=, francez=) . 462/463 Anghel ANDREESCU, Nicolae RADU 6 MOTTO: Cine a spus c= noi vom deschide calea r=zboiului? FADLALLAH, cleric [iit, 2008 JIHADUL ISLAMIC 7 Gând pentru toleran]= Aflu cu bucurie despre apari]ia lucr=rii Jihadul Islamic, care se refer= la un subiect de actualitate [i care ne preocup= pe noi ca musulmani. Adept al adev=rului fiind, readuc \n aten]ie frumuse]ea Islamului [i prezen]a istoric= a comunit=]ii musulmane \n ]ara noastr= exprimându-mi [i punctul de vedere la Islam ca realitate etern=. Practica Islamului – religie divin=, a p=cii [i toleran]ei – \n România este legat= de stabilirea popula]iei turco-t=tare din secolul al-XIII-lea. Modelul de convie]uire inter-etnic [i inter-religios dobrogean a func]ionat exemplar, secole de-a rândul, de[i el ar fi putut s= fie subminat de interminabilele r=zboaie ruso-turce sau româno-turce. Musulmanii autohtoni sunt suni]i, iar din cele patru [coli sunite: malekismul, [afiismul, hambalismul [i hanefismul, musulmanii dobrogeni apar]in [coli hanefite (predominant \n Turcia [i ]=rile sub domina]ia turc=). Dup= 1990 \n România \ntâlnim prezen]a [i a celorlalte [coli cât [i adep]i ai ramurei [iite. |n acest col] de ]ar= Dobrogea, considerat= \n folclor "loc de pribegie", t=tarii, turcii [i românii, sunt uni]i de religiozitatea lor, de credin]a \n Divinitatea unic=, de Creator numit fie Allah, fie Dumnezeu. I-a unit, de asemenea, nevoia de identitate, de lini[te, de reculegere, de c=ldur= comunitar= [i chiar de mister, de culoare, de frumos etnic-religios [i cultural. Pân= \n 1940, turcii - t=tarii au p=r=sit masiv, \n valuri succesive, Dobrogea, l=sând \n urm= o comunitate relativ mic= – azi, 70.000 –, dar puternic ata[at= de valorile sale tradi]ionale, morale [i spirituale. Ast=zi, pericolul cel mai mare, pentru credincio[ii musulmani este cel al sectelor, al intoleran]ei, al extremismului. Aceste secte sunt sus]inute logistic [i financiar de diferite state, \ncercând s= dezbine comunitatea musulman= [i s= aduc= prejudicii modelului de via]= inter- etnic [i inter-religios care a existat de opt secole \n România. JIHADUL ISLAMIC 9 Islamul nu ar trebui s= fie exploatat \n interese personale, politice cum se \ntâmpl= la ora actual=. Din p=cate, cauza apari]iei conflictelor, a a[a-zisului Jihad, a extremismului cum \l denumesc acele grupuri de interese se datoreaz= nerespect=rii Coranului cel Sfânt. Conform versetului 32 din capitolul Al-Maida ''cel care ucide un suflet nevinovat sau comite o alt= stric=ciune pe p=mânt, este ca [i când i-ar ucide pe to]i oamenii, iar cel care las= \n via]= un suflet este ca [i cum i-ar l=sa \n via]= pe to]i oamenii''. La \nceput de secol XXI, musulmanii din România sunt cei care sus]in dialogul, respectul fa]= de valorile religioase, dorind s= promoveze acest lucru [i \n comunitatea european=. Uniunea European= trebuie s= ia act de modul de organizare a comunit=]ii, de contribu]ia pe care ace[tia o au pe lâng= popula]ia majoritar= la progresul economico-social al României. M= rog la bunul Dumnezeu s=-i c=l=uzeasc= pe acei oameni pe calea cea dreapt=, s=-i fac= s= \n]eleag= cu adev=rat principiile divine, iar pe cititorii acestei c=r]i s= \n]eleag= de fapt ce \nseamn= Jihadul Islamic, nu cel care se propag= la ora actual=. Yusuf Murat Muftiul–{ef al Cultului Musulman din România Anghel ANDREESCU, Nicolae RADU 10 Prefa]= |n ciuda eforturilor depuse, conceptualiz=rile [i limitele de demarca]ie pentru terorism [i islam au r=mas controversate. Cea de-a 44-a Conferin]= privind politica de securitate, desf=[urat= la München, \n perioada 8 – 10 februarie 2008, este una dintre cele mai recente \ntâlniri \n cadrul c=reia s-a \ncercat s= se defineasc= categoriile de terorism, crim= organizat= [i migra]iune ilegal=. |n contextul lucr=rilor, eforturile comune de cre[tere a eficien]ei combaterii terorismului ale statelor membre ONU, NATO, UE, OSCE, ale altor state [i institu]ii multina]ionale se cer concertate strâns cu o solidaritate [i cooperare interna]ional= l=rgite. Dac= pentru FBI, terorismul reprezint= "recurs ilicit la for]= [i violen]= \ndreptat \mpotriva persoanelor sau bunurilor cu scopul de a intimida sau de a constrânge puterile publice, popula]ia civil= sau orice segment al acesteia, \n atingerea unor obiective politice sau sociale", Departamentul de Stat al SUA consider= fenomenul terorist, drept "violen]= premeditat= motivat= politic, \ndreptat= \mpotriva ]intelor necombatante de c=tre agen]i subna]ionali sau clandestini, de obicei cu inten]ia de a influen]a publicul." Sensul identitar al terorismului nu este u[or de stabilit. "Jihadul Islamic", o lucrare destinat= unei mai bune \n]elegeri a islamului, dar [i a diferen]elor culturale aflate la originea conflictualit=]ii dintre state, na]iuni, civiliza]ii, reprezint= un demers pe atât de nea[teptat din partea autorilor, chestor general, prof. univ. dr. Anghel Andreescu [i comisar-[ef, conf. univ. dr. Nicolae Radu, pe cât de complex este. |n economia spa]iului destinat islamului se procedeaz= la o analiz= asupra Jihadului, a semnifica]iei ce revin celor cinci stâlpi ai credin]ei islamice – M=rturisirea de credin]=, Rug=ciunea, Pelerinajul la Mecca, Postul din luna Ramadan, Dania ritual= – interpreta]i [i din perspectiva "Eschatologiei islamice" ce JIHADUL ISLAMIC 11 se ocup= de Qiyamah (Sfâr[itul Lumii) [i judecata final= a umanit=]ii. Cum foarte bine se subliniaz= \n lucrare, conceptul fundamental \n islamism este dat de c=tre unicitatea lui Allah (tawahid), monoteismul fiind absolut, [i nu relativ sau pluralistic. Coranul, numit [i "Cuvântul lui Dumnezeu", promoveaz= o etic= bazat= pe cump=tare [i bun-sim]: "mânca]i [i be]i, \ns= nu fi]i \mbuiba]i" (Sura 7, 29). Pornind de la inten]ia de cunoa[tere a Jihadului [i acordând aten]ia cuvenit= izvoarelor istorice, marcate de Coran, Hadith [i Shari/ah, autorii reu[esc s= aduc= \n prim plan teologia r=zboiului, a p=cii, istoria Profetului Mahomed [i a urma[ilor s=i, comanderiile Fida'i [i secta asasinilor, organiza]ii teroriste [i structurile antidemocratice, de tipul Hizballah ("Hesbollah"), Hamas, Jihadul Islamic Palestinian, Al-Qaida, Al-Qaida Alb=, urmate de Al Haramain Islamic Foundation [i Al-Masjed al Aqsa. Lupta propriu-zis= \mpotriva terori[tilor presupune informa]ii reactualizate, t=ierea surselor de finan]are, o cooperare interna]ional= permanent=, o legisla]ie adecvat=, metode [i tactici noi, [i nu \n ultimul rând for]e specializate preg=tite \n riposta antiterorist=. Dar \n acela[i timp, autorii atrag aten]ia c= este necesar= [i o stabilire clar= a identit=]ii celor ce se fac r=spunz=tori de crime comise \mpotriva umanit=]ii, asocierea, f=r= fundament concret, dintre terorism [i islam fiind una dintre cele mai grave erori ale \nceputului de mileniu III.
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    Charitable and Humanitarian Organizations in the Network of International Terrorist Financing | the Washington Institute

    MENU Policy Analysis / Congressional Testimony Charitable and Humanitarian Organizations in the Network of International Terrorist Financing by Matthew Levitt Aug 1, 2002 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Matthew Levitt Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony estimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on T International Trade and Finance I. INTRODUCTION The synchronized suicide attacks of September 11 highlighted the critical role financial and logistical support networks play in the operations of international terrorist organizations. According to financial profiles released by the FBI, the attacks cost between $303,672 and $500,000.1 Unfortunately, the network of international terrorist financing is both established and sophisticated. The investigative value of following the trail of terrorist financing has long been known. Then-FBI Director Louis Freeh testified before Congress in 1999 that a shortage of funds prevented the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center from being as devastating as it otherwise could have been. After his capture in 1995, Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind behind the 1993 bombing and other attacks, admitted that the terrorists were unable to purchase sufficient material to build as large a bomb as they had intended because they were strapped for cash. In fact, the operation itself was rushed and carried out earlier than planned because the cell simply ran out of money. In the end, the terrorists' attempt to reclaim the deposit fee on the rental truck used to transport the bomb provided a key break in the case.2 The al Qaeda suicide hijackings underscored the post-blast, investigative utility of tracking the money trail, but they also drove home the critical need to preemptively deny terrorists the funds they need to conduct their attacks.
  • BENJAMIN C. MIZER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Dire

    BENJAMIN C. MIZER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Dire

    Case 3:15-cv-01343-SI Document 1 Filed 07/20/15 Page 1 of 34 BENJAMIN C. MIZER Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director, District Court Section Office of Immigration Litigation COLIN A. KISOR Deputy Director, District Court Section Office of Immigration Litigation CHRISTOPHER W. DEMPSEY Assistant Director, District Court Section Office of Immigration Litigation U.S. Department of Justice P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: (202) 532-4110 Facsimile: (202) 532-5393 [email protected] Attorneys for United States UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) No. 3:15-cv-1343 ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) v. ) ) ) COMPLAINT TO REVOKE MOHAMED SHEIKH ABDIRAHMAN ) NATURALIZATION KARIYE, a.k.a. MOHAMED SHEIKH ) ABDIRAHMAN a.k.a. SHEIKH KARIYE ) a.k.a. SHEIKH MOHAMED ) ABDIRAHMAN a.k.a. MAXAMED ) SHEIKH CABDIRAXMAN KARIYE a.k.a. ) MOHAMED ABDULRAHMAN SHEIKH ) CABDIRAXMAN KARIYE a.k.a. ABU ) ABDUL RAHMAN a.k.a. ABU ) ABDIRAHMAN a.k.a. ABU AL RAHMAN ) a.k.a. ABU RAHMAN ) ) Defendant. ) - 1 - Case 3:15-cv-01343-SI Document 1 Filed 07/20/15 Page 2 of 34 I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This is an action under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) to revoke and set aside the order admitting Mohamed Sheikh Abdirahman Kariye a.k.a. Mohamed Sheikh Abdirahman a.k.a. Sheikh Kariye a.k.a. Sheikh Mohamed Abdirahman a.k.a. Mohamed Abdulrahman Maxamed Sheikh Cabdiraxman Kariye a.k.a. Abu Hafsa a.k.a.