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Home , Cambio 90, Caudillo, Strongman (politics)

ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 5, pp 899± 911, 1997

Returnof the : autocratic democracyin

PHILIPMAUCERI

Theresounding defeat of the former secretary general of the United Nations, JavierPe Ârez deCuellar, by President in the 1995 elections con®rmed the latter’ s extraordinarypopularity. Fujimori won re-election with over64% of thevalid vote and, until mid-1997, his approval ratings have rarely dippedbelow 50% in most public opinion polls. Fujimori’ s popularityand re-electionwere largely the result of his administration’ s success inending hyperin¯ation and sharply reducing the levels of political violence predominant duringthe late 1980s. Nonetheless, these successes havecome at a highprice for thecountry’ s democraticinstitutions and norms. In 1992Fujimori suspended the constitutionand closed the Congress, claiming that such measures wererequired inorder to combat the Maoist insurgency of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Althoughelections for a constituentassembly and a newconstitution took place withina year,centralisation, personalism and the weakening of civilsociety raise seriousquestions about democracy in Peru. Thepurpose of this article is toanalyse the pattern of governmental decision makingand institutional prerogatives during the Fujimori administration and theirimplications for democracy. Centralisation of decision making by the executivehas beenaccompanied by a morevisible role for technocrats in the policyprocess. Both trends, which have been evident throughout duringthe last decade, have been crucial to the successful implementationof neoliberaleconomic reforms. Fujimori’ s highlypersonalist style of governance has furtherexacerbated centralisation. Viewed from the historical perspective of LatinAmerica’ s longexperience with caudillo ()rule, the personalism andsemi-authoritariani sm ofthe Fujimori administration is notunusual. Yet, eventhough this pattern of governance and leadership style have historical precedentsin the region, Fujimori has alsobeen astute in incorporating new elementsinto this traditional pattern, especially polling data, focus groups, image consultantsand television. Clever media campaigns directed by the atlargely sympathetic media companies, have had a powerfulimpact in shaping issues andperceptions of Fujimori. 1 As decisionmaking has beenincreasingly centralised in the executive, theFujimori administrati onhas reliedupon two groups in the governmen t toformulate and implement policies. First, a growingcadre of technocrats, manytrained in foreign universities, who implement governmen tdecisions withinthe state bureaucracy and who have overseen the most signi® cant

PhilipMauceri is attheDepartment of PoliticalScience, University ofNorthernIowa, Cedar Falls, 1A 50614, USA.

0143-6597/97/050899-13$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 899 PHILIP MAUCERI overhaulof the state apparatus in recent Peruvian history. Complementing this group,however, has beenan informal network of loyalists, connected through personal,familial or socialties with the president. Without a traditionalpolitical partyof his own, Fujimori has cometo rely on these dual networks of supportersÐpersonal loyalists and technocratsÐ to shape government policy. At thesame time,demands from various social groups have been held in check by aseries ofpolicies that purposefully limit political mobilisation, as wellas throughoutright repression of opposition groups. UnlikeLatin America’ s populists,such as ’s JuanPero ÂnorPeru’s ownAla ÂnGarcõÂa,the Fujimori administrat ionhas beenuninterested in political mobilisationamonglower class sectors. 2 Governmentof® cials assiduously cultivatepublic approval in opinion polls and in elections, yet nonetheless haveavoided creating pro-gover nmentorganisation stofoster or channel popularparticipati onin support of their policies. 3 Fujimorihas speci®- callyattacked political parties and, as weshall see below,his governmen t has openlydiscouraged lower class organisation.Moreover, the govern- menthas notadopted the redistribut ivepolicies typical of populist regimes inthe region. Avoiding class-orientated rhetoric or attacks on economic elites,the government has preferredto distribute goods among the poorthrough programmes organised by technocrats in the executive branch, ratherthan challenging the power of privileged sectors byredistributi ng wealth. Fujimori’sappealhas beenbased largely on a promiseof technology , ef® ciencyand `practical’ solutions to everyday problems. 4 Inthis regard, Fujimori’sJapanese ancestryplays a criticalrole, as heholdsout the promise ofaccess toJapan’ s technologicalknow-how . 5 Fujimorihas travelled extensivelyin East Asia, visiting Japan more than any other country as president.His administrati onhas promotedincreased economic links with theregion, successfully pushing for admission into the Asia Paci® c Economic Council (APEC)andexpressing open admiration for the political and econ- omicsystems ofsuch countries as Taiwan,Malaysia and Singapore. The attractiveness ofa `technocratic’problem-sol vingadministrati onled by a Japanese engineer-presidenthad a particularappeal for Peruvians after a decadeof ineffective populist government sthatleft behind a legacyof hyperin¯ation, a largeforeign debt, recession, declining productivi tyand politicalviolence. Inorder to understand the implications from these trends for democracy in Peru,the ® rst partof this article examines the `self-coup’ of 1992. Both the personalismand the authoritarian tendencies of Fujimori were most clearly displayedin theevents leading up tothe democratic rupture. The second section analysesthe growing centralisation of Peru’ s institutionalframework in the aftermathof the 1992 coup. It will be argued that the regime followed a purposefuleffort to weaken democratic institutions and accountability while furthercentralising decision making. The important role played by technocrats andpersonal networks is examinedin the next two sections, where it is argued thatthese have been used by the executive to increasethe autonomy of the state andreduce democratic accountability. 900 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU

Autogolpeand transition: 1992±96 Thesuspension of constitutional rule announced by President Alberto Fujimori on5April1992 brought to a closePeru’ s 12-yearexperiment with democratisa- tion.From 1980 until 1992 Peru experienced two peaceful transfers ofpower andlively multiparty competition. Nonetheless, the period also witnessed a prolongedguerrilla war with the Maoist Sendero Luminoso and a persistent economiccrisis. The election of the unknown Alberto Fujimori in 1990 on an independentticket was as mucha repudiationof establishedpolitical elites as it was anendorsement of his vague platform. 6 Oncein of® ce, Fujimori adopted a radicalneoliberal agenda that sharply reduced in¯ ation but induced a deep recessionas well.In the political arena Fujimori spent the ® rst twoyears in of®ce carefullyfashioning a supportbase inthe business community, the militarycommand and the international ® nancialcommunity. 7 Theprecise reasons forthe 1992 autogolpe remainunclear. 8.Ontheone hand, Fujimorihad demonstrated a virtualcontempt for most of the political institu- tionsin the country during his ® rst twoyears inof® ce, attacking the parties, Congressand the judicial system forcorruption and inef® ciency. Such attacks wereextremely popular because most people saw anelement of truth in them. Moreover,many regime allies believed that neoliberal reforms couldbe more effectivelycarried out through authoritarian methods. Although Peru’ s Congress hadpassed almostall Fujimori’ s legislativeagenda, as wellas cedingspecial legislativepowers to him during the administration’ s ®rst twoyears, increased oppositionby late 1991 raised the spectre of new dif® culties for neoliberal reforms inthe Congress. In what was viewedas asigni®cant threat, former presidentAla ÂnGarcõÂaPeÂrez beganto position himself as theleader of the oppositionusing his populist party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Ameri- cana (APRA)tomobilise opposition to neoliberal reforms. Intheimmediate aftermath of the autogolpe itappeared as ifthe government hadlittle interest in re-establishing democratic institutions. Fujimori proposed rulingby decree with periodic plebiscites on his actions. The regime’ s con®dence was boostedby overwhelming support in the polls for Fujimori’ s actions.9 Nonetheless,the autogolpe was criticisedinternationally and pressure- was quicklyapplied to Peru to move towards democratic rule. The USA suspendedits assistance toPeru, debt renegotiations with the International MonetaryFund were put on hold and several Latin American countries recalled theirambassadors forconsultation. More ominously, a meetingof the Organiza- tionof AmericanStates ( OAS)was calledin the Bahamas toreviewthe Peruvian situation,holding out the possibility of further international actions, including possibleeconomic sanctions. In theface ofthisunexpectedly harsh international reaction,President Fujimori personally travelled to the Bahamas meetingof the OAS todefend his actions, but also to offer a promisethat new elections would beheld for a constituentassembly that would write a newconstitution, thus pavingthe way for a returnof civilian institutions. On13 November 1992, just two weeks before the assembly elections wereheld, a conspiracyinvolving retired and active duty of® cers toremove Fujimorifrom of® ce andrestore the 1979 constitution was discovered. 901 PHILIP MAUCERI

Theconspiracy was anindication of deeper unrest in the military. Conspiracies andsecret societieswithin the armed forces werethe result of an increasing uneaseamong retired and active duty of® cers overthe military command’ s close linksto Fujimori and reforms thatthreatened its perceived institutional preroga- tives.10 Suchdiscontent was keptin check by careful surveillance of of® cer loyaltyand improvements in living standards for the high command. More importantly,the capture of Shining Path’ s leader,Abimael Guzma Ân,in October 1992and the adoption of counterinsurgency measures themilitary had long advocatedmuted much of the dissatisfaction with the government. 11 Theassembly elections produced an overwhelming victory for the government party,-Nueva Mayoria, which controlled almost two-thirds of the 80-memberassembly seats. Followingnearly a yearof acrimonious debate, the constituentassembly approved the constitution and submitted it toareferendum inOctober 1993. The political opposition to Fujimori, which had remained fragmentedsince the autogolpe of1992,coordinated their campaigns against the constitution.Opposition parties capitalised on public discomfort with the central- isingfeatures of the new constitution, discussed below, and argued that its adoptionwould consolidate the . With a largelysympathetic press andwidely publicised polling data that suggested an overwhelming government victory,of® cials appeared con® dent. It was thusseen as asigni®cant setback whenthe constitution was approvedby the narrowest of margins (52%). That vote,along with better than expected opposition showings in theNovember 1993 municipalelections, indicated the steady erosion of supportthe regime had been sufferingduring the year. Afterthree years ofcontinuous economic adjustments there were few signs thateconomic reforms weregoing to improve the lives of Peru’ s lowerclasses anytime soon, as povertyincreased and wages continued their downward spiral.12 AlthoughFujimori initially discussed the need for a socialassistance programmeto ease thepain caused by reforms,there had been virtually no social initiativesundertaken. The referendum results were a clearwarning signal to the regimethat, unless the needs of Peru’ s poorwere addressed, it would face dif®culties at the polls in the 1995 presidential elections.. Beginningin 1993 the Fujimori administration gave renewed attention to socialwelfare programmes. Large sums ofmoney were poured into previously moribundagencies and new social programmes, including the National Develop- mentand Social Compensation Fund ( FONCODES),theNational Housing Fund (FONAVI)andthe National Nutritional Assistance Programme ( PRONAA). The majortask of these organisations was toprovide for the basic needs of Peru’ s poor,in both the shantytowns of and the impoverished villages of the Andeanregion. Funding for the programmes came fromprivatisations and improvedrevenues and had the support of international lending institutions, whichhad previously lamented the lack of a socialsafety net during the implementationof adjustment programmes. 13 Asthepace of socialspending and public works projects picked up, Fujimori astutelytravelled the country in an attempt to link himself with these improve- ments,a tacticthat became central to his re-election campaign. An improving economicsituation also contributed to Fujimori’s prospects.With in¯ ation under 902 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU controland much of itsforeign debt being renegotiated, Peru experienced a 12% increasein its GNP in1994. Increased foreign investment, a risingstock market andthe successful sale ofanumberof statecompaniesÐ including the Peruvian TelephoneCompany ( CPT)forthe unexpectedly large sum ofUS$2billionÐ con- tributedto growing optimism among the public about the direction of the country. Fujimori’s popularitywas alsoaided by thecontinued dif® culties faced by the opposition.Although most opposition parties demonstrated a surprisingdegree ofunity in backing the candidacy of JavierPe Ârez deCuellarfor the presidency, theystill faced a numberof serious obstacles. Pe Ârez deCuellar’ s lacklust speakingstyle and the formality of his presence contrasted sharply with Fuji- mori’s tendencyto dress upin a traditionalponcho and press intocrowds of supportersto kiss babiesand shake hands. Even military clashes alongdisputed areas oftheEcuador± Peru border in January 1995, which saw greaterlosses for thePeruvian side, did not seem toaffect Fujimori’ s popularity.In April 1995 Fujimoriwas re-electedwith 64% of the valid vote, far abovethe 51% needed toavoid a secondround run-off election. Fujimori’s re-electionvictory represented not only the consolidation of his personalisticstyle of governance, but also the new political institutions which werecarefully crafted by his government in theaftermath of the1992 autogolpe. Althoughmany opposition ® gureshad initially argued for the need to overturn the1993 constitution, in the aftermath of the 1995 elections most leading oppositionpoliticians conceded that it wouldbe dif®cult to changethe post-1992 rulesand norms, and focused rather on incremental reforms. 14 Butthe concen- trationof power, and the willingness of Fujimori’ s supportersto change rules andinstitutions to meethis needs, made even incremental change dif® cult. Only ayearafter winning re-election, Peru’ s Congressadopted a resolutionreinter- pretingthe constitution to allow Fujimori to be re-elected in 2000. When the ConstitutionalTribunal objected to this action in June 1997, its members were removedin an unconstitutional action by the Congress.

Technocracyand bureaucratic reforms TheFujimori administration has beenone of themost active in recent Peruvian historyin redesigningthe country’ s institutionalstructures. A ®rst set ofreforms has beenaimed at increasing the ef® ciencyand effectiveness of state bureau- craticstructures through privatisations, streamlining and new training and resources forpublic agencies. The overall effect has beento increase the capacityof the state sector to establish and realise policy goals after a long periodin which the Peruvian state was virtuallyparalysed by corruption and inef®ciency. Theeffort to reformPeru’ s administrativestructure was undertakenalmost as soonas Fujimoritook of® ce in1990. Political appointees from the previous regimewere removed throughout the country’ s bureaucraticstructure in a veritablepurge. As resourceneeds were assessed, itbecame apparent that little couldbe done without improving revenue collection, which had declined precipitouslyduring the 1980s. The tax collection agency (Superintendencia 903 PHILIP MAUCERI

NacionalTributaria, SUNAT)thusreceived priority attention during the ® rst monthsof the new administration and its efforts quickly paid off. Tax revenue dramaticallyincreased, rising from just under 5% of GDP in1989 to 10% in 1992.In several major operations involving the police and the military, the Fujimoriadministration sent tax collectors and other administrators into the streets andmarketplaces of majorcities to enforce the tax code among pavement vendors. Byfar theboldest measures undertakento reform the state involved privatisa- tions.Peru had one of thelargest public sectors inLatinAmerica, a resultof the expansionof the public enterprise sector during the reformist military govern- mentof GeneralVelasco (1968± 75). 15 Previousefforts to privatise state compa- niesduring the Belau Ândeadministration (1980± 85) foundered on internal politicaldisputes within the governing party. By contrast, the Fujimori adminis- trationviewed privatisation as anintegral part of reformingPeru’ s statestructure fromthe start. Within a yearof taking of® ce theadministration had enacted a newprivatisation law and set upaspecialagency, the Comisio ÂndePrivatizacioÂn (COPRI)tooversee the privatisation process. Although few ® rms wereinitially sold,the pace of sales rose dramaticallyin theaftermath of the autogolpe. COPRI of®cials viewed the suspension of democraticrules as anopportunity to acceler- atethe privatisation process, and took advantage of the suspension of Congress byexpanding their own power and autonomy. 16 As with the SUNAT, the COPRI staff is composedof highly trained professionals, predominately lawyers and economists,who have been active and creative in planning the sale ofstate companies.Following privatisation models elsewhere, especially in Chile, COPRI restructurescompanies, organises the ® nancingand coordinates activities with otherstate agencies to ensure successful privatisations. Perhapsthe most successful privatisationeffort involved the sale ofthe state telephonecompanies, ENTEL and CPT,toSpain’ s TelefoÂnicaInternacional for around$2 billion. As withother privatisations, an internal privatisation com- mittee (CEPRI)was designatedwithin each company. The committee was com- posedof technocrats appointed by COPRI’sdirector,at that time ,an important con® dant of PresidentFujimori. CEPRI inturncontrac- tedseveral private foreign companies to provide legal and technical assistance, includingthe New York-based accounting ® rm Coopers& Lybrandand the Chicago-basedlaw ® rm ofMackenzie & Baker.After conducting several staff `workshops’to assess ENTEL’ s and CPT’sassets andorganisation, CEPRI coordi- natedwith the Ministry of Transport and Communication to change Peru’ s communicationlaws, the purpose of which was tomake the companies more attractiveto foreign investors. These included laws guaranteeing a ®ve-year periodin which the companies would continue to enjoytheir monopoly in Peru’s telecommunicationindustry. In February1994, nearly two years afterthe start of theprocess, the state telephone companies were of® cially put on sale. Theprivatisation process highlightsthe central role that technocrats have had inreorganisingthe state’ s administrativestructure. In additionto providingvital technicaladvice on ® nancing,operations and the drafting of new rules and regulations,they have also played a keyrole in forging links between govern- mentpoliticians, international ® nancialinstitutions or companies and the dom- 904 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU esticbusiness sector. T hese effortsin turn have provided the governmen twith theideas and support it has neededfor the success ofits restructurin g programme.Technocrats are foundat alllevels and in allareas oftheFujimori government,from the Oxford-tr ainedMinister of Economybetween 1991 and 1993,Carlos Bolon Äa,whopreviously worked in privateinternatio nalbanks and theWorld Bank, to directors of new agencies, such as BeatrizBoza, president ofPromPeru Â(thegovernment ’spromotionalagency), who had worked at a majorlaw ® rminNewYork on privatisationissues. 17 Internationalconnection s amongadvisors, even if not new, have become more apparent under the Fujimorigovernment .Moreover,the administrati onhas beenless concerned aboutpossible con¯ icts of interest than on the ability of technocrats with internationalexperience and connections to facilitateits dealings with ® nancial actors.18 Althoughmost of the reforming technocrats are Peruvian,external advisors haveplayed a keyrole. Much of the funding, and in some cases thepersonnel themselves,have come from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank andthe Inter-American Development Bank. Private think-tanks, business associ- ationsand universities have also played an important role in providing the governmentwith a cadreof trained technocrats. Of particular importance has beenthe Instituto de Libertad y Democracia( ILD),afree-marketthink-tank whosedirector, Hernando De Soto, played a crucialrole in introducing a newly electedFujimori in 1990to leaders of international® nancialinstitutions and the country’s largestcreditors. The ILD has continuedto play an important part in advisingthe government on subjectsranging from revisions in electoral laws and thetax code to anti-drug policies and land reform.

Political centralisation Reforms toimprove the ef® ciencyof the state apparatus and ease Peru’s integrationinto the increasingly competitive global marketplace were ac- companiedby another set ofreforms thatcentralised political power and decisionmaking in the executive. Government of® cials argued that the need to reformthe state required a highlevel of centralisation if efforts to revamp the bureaucracywere to avoid being impeded by special interests. Many recent analysesof neoliberal reform efforts in Latin America have also pointed to the factthat such reforms havebeen state-directed and involved strong centralisa- tion,suggesting that their success ispredicatedon a highlevel of centralisation ofauthority within the executive, producing a sortof `’ Market-Leninism’. 19 Centralisationalso re-enforces the personalist control of the executive over governmentalaffairs andreduces the president’ s institutionalaccountability. As O’Donnellnotes, the president and his technocratic advisors are thusshielded fromthe pressures, opinionsand demands of society between elections as reforms are beingimplemented. 20 The1993 constitution signi® cantly weakens the powers of the Peruvian Congress vis-aÁ -vis thepresident. The most apparent change regarding the Congressis theshift from a bicamerallegislature with 240 members toa unicamerallegislature with a mere 120members. As severalanalysts have 905 PHILIP MAUCERI pointedout, this has hadthe practical effect of severely restricting political representation,reducing both the number of parties and of provinces that have electedlegislators. 21 Asidefrom being much reduced in size, the Congress has far fewerpowers than under previous constitutions. The president no longer requireslegislative approval for international treaties, ambassadorial appoint- mentsor high-level appointments in the armed forces. Moreover,the executive is givenextraordinary legislative powers, extending apracticethat existed under the 1979 constitution which allowed the Congress tocede decree powers to the president on speci® c issues fora limitedperiod of time.22 Inpractice, during most of the 1980s, legislatures controlled by the president’s partywere all too willing to cede powers to the executive when presidentsrequested it. The 1993 constitution allows the president to exercise legislativedecree powers without having to request them beforehand. In a particularlyegregious limit on congressional authority, decrees whichare de- clared`urgent’ by the executive cannot even be revised or changed by the Congress.Between July 1995 and June 1996 Congress passed 99decree laws, whilethe executive issued 119 legislative decrees, of which 76 were listed as decrees ofurgency. 23 Thepower acquired by the Ministry of the Presidency, created in 1992 and chargedwith overseeing the executive branch bureaucracy, highlights the degree towhich centralisation has occurredunder Fujimori. The ministry’ s budget increasednine-fold between 1990 and 1995, re¯ ecting its growing control over newand old programmes. All the new social programmes discussed above (PRONAA, FOCODES, FONAVI)weremanaged by the ministry, as was mostof the government’s spendingon infrastructure, such as road-buildingand school construction.At such construction sites, bright orange billboards proclaim that theproject is ®nancedby the Ministry of the Presidency. 24 Bycoincidence, orangeis alsothe colour of Fujimori’ s party,Cambio 90. Many of the programmesadministered by theministry had previously been overseen by local orregionalgovernments, including the popular Glass ofMilkprogramme, which was startedin the mid-1980s by the leftist-controlled Lima city council and quicklyspread to municipalities around the country. The programme, which providesa glass ofmilk to all needy children, was animportant source of local autonomyand grassroots organisation, especially for parties of the left. 25 In 1996 anexecutive decree transferred the programme to theMinistry of the Presidency, inpart because it had provided an important focal point for local politicians to opposegovernment policies. Thefate of the Glass ofMilk programme also re¯ ects thestunning loss of localgoverning autonomy during the early 1990s. In the ® rst sixyears ofthe Fujimoriadministration no fewer than 49 decrees orlaws were issued limiting theprerogatives of municipal . 26 Thesedecrees includedsuspending localauthority to issue taxes,regulate markets or designatebus routes. By far the greatestsetback for decentralisation was thesuspension of regionalgovernments afterthe 1992 autogolpe.Althoughthese governments had been set uponly in the1980s, they had underscored a commitmentby allpolitical parties in Peruto increaselocal self-government. Under the 1993 constitution, however, the presidenthas theright to appoint the governors of Peru’ s designatedregions, 906 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU whoare largelylimited to supervising the implementation of the central government’s programmes. Aswiththe legislature and regional authorities, Peru’ s judiciaryhas alsolost powerand autonomy to the executive. Following the 1992 autogolpe the members ofthe country’ s SupremeCourt and other judges were dismissed. The judicialsystem hadbeen pilloried by critics, including President Fujimori, for beingcorrupt and inef® cient, an opinion widely shared by the public. Many of thereforms institutedby the 1993 constitution attempt to restore public con®dence in thejudicial system byrequiring judges to pass awrittenexam and byestablishinglocally elected justices of thepeace. Nonetheless, the promise of amoreef® cientjudiciary was soonovershadowed by repeated executive efforts tolimit judicial independence. Ina numberof high pro® le cases ofcorruption or malfeasance involving governmentof® cials, the executive has pressuredjudges and the state prosecutor toendtheir investigations or toofferinconclusive ® ndings. 27 Aveiledthreat has continuedto hang over the judiciary in the form of successive `reorganisation’ plans.In 1993 and again in 1996, ostensibly independent consultative commit- tees wereformed to evaluatejudges and dismiss thosedeemed incompetent. The 1996committee was ledby aretiredadmiral with little experience in thecivilian judicialsystem andclose ties to the Fujimori administration. Even more disturbinghave been government efforts to limitinvestigations into human rights abuses committedby security forces. In 1995, in the wake of conclusive evidencethat secret paramilitaryforces hadbeen involved in theassassination of studentsat the University of La Cantuta, the Congress, at the behest of the executive,passed ablanketamnesty for military of® cials involved in human rightsabuses andrejected calls for further investigations into the matter. 28 Since1992 trials for terrorism have been carried out by militarytribunals over whichthe civilian courts, including the Supreme Court, have no jurisdiction. Criticsof the military’ s anti-terrorismstrategy and the government’ s poorhuman rightsrecord have been systematically harassed. In November 1996, when a retiredarmy general released information regarding the continued operation of paramilitaryorganisations in Peru, he was violentlydetained by theintelligence service (SIN)andheld incommunicado for several days. The impunity enjoyed by themilitary demonstrated the consolidation of its power under the Fujimori government,which has reliedon the armed forces notonly in its counter- subversivecampaign, but also to intimidate opponents.

Personalist networks Thecentralisation of power in the presidency and the increased role of tech- nocratsin the policy-making process havebeen accompanied by the develop- mentof anextensive network of of®cials with personal, familial or socialties to Fujimoriwho occupy both of® cial and unof® cial positions in the government. Thisnetwork provides the president with the sort of loyal following within the statebureaucracy that is oftenassociated with a politicalparty. Yet, unlike party leaders,these of® cials do nothave a powerbase oftheirown and are dependent fortheir position on the person of the president. 907 PHILIP MAUCERI

Lackinga formalpolitical party, Fujimori early on turned to a networkof friendsand supporters to staff hisnew administration. Although many were competenttechnocrats in theirown right, others appeared to havelittle more than theirties to Fujimori. Some, such as VictorJoy Way, a Chinese±Peruvian businessmanfrom the Andean department of Huanuco, had been part of Fujimori’s long-shot1990 presidential campaign. Of particular interest is the administration’s recruitmentamong the Japanese± Peruvian community, which hadpreviously not been politically mobilised. 29 Severalhigh-level appointments atboth the ministerial and vice-ministerial level have come from the Japanese± Peruviancommunity. 30 Byfar themost prominent ® gurehas beenJaime Yoshiyamawho, ® rst as Ministerof Energy and Mines and later as directorof theMinistry of thePresidency, oversaw many of theefforts to restructurePeru’ s bureaucracy.Often mentioned as apossiblesuccessor toFujimori, Yoshiyama was thegovernment’ s candidatefor mayor of Lima in November 1995, but narrowlylost. Yoshiyama’ s ambitionsand efforts to build an independent politicalbase mayaccount for his summary dismissal from of® ce inlate 1996. Fujimorialso turned to members ofhis own family, especially his brother SantiagoFujimori, who during the ® rst sixyears ofthe administration acted as aninformal chief of staff, overseeing staff andcabinet appointments. 31 Oneof the most controversial and powerful of the administration’ s informal advisorshas beenVladimiro Montesinos. Although he occupies no formal positionin the government, he has effectivelyoverseen the SIN andthe security forces since1990. Originally an attorney for the Fujimori campaign during the ®nalphase of the 1990 presidential campaign, Montesinos was akey® gurein introducingFujimori to members ofthe high command in the armed forces. A shadowy® gure,who had been dismissed from the army for espionage in the 1970sand who has madeno formalpublic appearance, Montesinos has overseen therestructuring of Peru’ s securityforces. Military promotions and counter- subversivestrategies in both the SIN andthe armed forces havebeen strongly in¯uenced by Montesinos, whose power is bothrespected and resented within thesecurity forces. Repeated revelations concerning Montesinos’ connections withdrug traf® ckers havenot affected his in¯ uence, either within Peru’ s security forces orwith the US government,which has hadclose contacts with Montesinos. 32 Changesintroduced regarding promotion and training in Peru’ s armedforces underscorethe growing power of personalist networks under the Fujimori administration.Before 1990 promotion in thearmed forces was strictlyregulated byinstitutional criteria in place since the 1950s. The highest ranking of® cers in thearmy, the Commander Generals, served a singleone-year term and, as with otherhigh ranking of® cersÐ including the Chief of Staff and regional comman- dersÐwere drawn from the top 5% of their graduating class atthe army’ s graduateschool, the Escuela Superior de Guerra ( ESG).Aseries oflaws and normsissued by theexecutive in late1991 and early 1992 signi® cantly changed themilitary’ s internalinstitutional regulations. Promotions are nolonger tied to ESG rankingsor even prior experience. In practice this has increasedthe importanceof political ties and beliefs over abilities and performance. Legisla- tiveDecree Law #752 promulgated in November1991 allowed the Commander Generalsof the different service branches to remain in their positions 908 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU inde®nitely, serving at the pleasure of the president. The law was passed atthe behestof Fujimori’ s allyin the army, General Nicola ÂsdeBari Hermoza Rios who,as CommanderGeneral of theArmy and President of theJoint Command, has beenthe most powerful person in the armed forces since1991.

Conclusions Eventsin Peru in the aftermath of the 1992 democratic rupture have demon- stratedthe continued fragility of democratic norms and institutions in the country.Elections and separation of powers exist; however, their ability to providedemocratic accountability has beenlessened by the centralisation of powerin the executive and the persistence of personalism. Human rights violationshave continued and, despite several reform efforts, the judiciary remainsfar frombeing an independent body. The extraordinary formal powers acquiredby the president since 1992 have been accentuated by the in¯ uence of technocratsand personalist networks in theadministration who owe and express loyaltysolely to the president. Thesemi- of Peru’ s post-1992political system has astrong precedentin thecountry’ s longexperience with caudillo personalism,centralisa- tionof power and heavy-handed presidentialism. Moreover, although Peru was aciviliandemocracy in the 12 years leadingup to the 1992 breakdown, its humanrights record was oneof theworst in thewestern hemisphere, largely the resultof the emergency powers enjoyed by the military in its efforts to curb terrorism.Democratic institutions and norms were weak and often ineffective. Nonetheless,the outright reversal of democratisation in 1992 and the growing consolidationof autocraticcontrol by thepresident since then suggest a danger- ousnew level of semi-authoritarianism,that if leftunchecked, could provide the basis forfuture instability. The zeal with which Fujimori and his supporters pursuedchanges in the law allowing for his re-election in 2000 suggests the fundamentaldilemma facing the administration. With no apparentsuccessor and anopposition that still rejects many of the institutional changes wrought by Fujimorias illegitimate,his supporters, particularly in the security forces, view theperson of Fujimori as fundamentalto the maintenance of Peru’ s post-1992 politicalsystem. Without a stronginstitutional and normative base, Peru’ s democracyhas becomecontingent on the decisions, ideas and plans of Alberto Fujimori.

Notes 1 Onthe role of the media inthe Fujimori era, see CConaghan, PublicLife in theTime ofAlberto Fujimori (WorkingPaper #219), Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, June 1996. 2 Somehave suggested that the Fujimori administration itself isa`populist’regime. However,this would be anextreme case ofconceptstretching. For the populist interpretation, see KRoberts,`Neoliberalism andthe transformationof in Latin America: thePeruvian case’ , WorldPolitics ,48(4),October 1995, pp 82±116; and B Kay,ª `Fujipopulismºand the liberal state inPeru, 1990± 1995’ , Journalof Inter-American Studiesand World Affairs ,38(4),Winter 1996, pp 55± 98. 3 Theability, or at least desire, tochannel popular mobilisation into some institutionalmechanism has been 909 PHILIP MAUCERI

ade®ning aspect ofLatin America’ spopulistmovements. See RBCollier& DCollier, Shaping the PoliticalArena ,Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991. 4 Fujimori’s 1990campaign slogan was `Honesty,technology and work’ and he clearly capitalised onthe reputationof Japanese± Peruvians as hardworkers, as well as onJapan’ s reputationas aworldleader in technology.Moreover, Fujimori is oftenfond of pointingout that, as anengineer, he is interestedin ®nding solutionsthat work rather thantalking or `politicking’ . Onthe 1990 campaign, see GSchmidt,`Fujimori’ s 1990upset victory in Peru: electoral rules,contingencies and adaptive strategies’ , ComparativePolitics , 28(3),April 1996, pp 321± 354. 5 Theimportance of Fujimori’ s Japanese ancestry inhis formation as apoliticianis emphasised inLuis Jochamovitz, CiudadanoFujimori: La Construccio Ândeun Politicao Lima: PEISA, 1993. 6 See especially thediscussion in MA Cameron, Democracy andAuthoritarianism in Peru: Political Coalitionsand Social Change ,New York:St. Martins Press, 1994. 7 See PMauceri,`State reform, coalitionsand the neo-liberal autogolpe in Peru’ , LatinAmerican Research Review,30(1),1995, pp 7± 37. 8 See FTuesta Soldevilla, LosEnigmas del Poder: Fujimori, 1990± 1996 ,Lima: FriedrichEbert, 1996. See alsoMA Cameron,`Political and economic origins of regime changein Peru: the eighteenth brumaire of AlbertoFujimori’ in MA Cameron &PMauceri (eds) ThePeruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Economy and Society,UniversityPark, PA: PennState UniversityPress, 1997,pp 37± 69. 9 Mostpolls showed that over 70% of the public approved Fujimori’ s actions.However, as Conaghanhas noted,that support appeared to be conditionalon theability of Fujimori to `reform’ governmentinstitutions rather thancreate anoutright dictatorship. C Conaghan,`Polls, political discourse and the public sphere: the spinon Peru’ s Fuji-golpe’, inPeter HSmith(ed), LatinAmerica inComparative Perspective: New Approachesto Methods and Analysis ,Boulder,CO: Westview,1995, pp 227± 255. 10 Amongthese groupswere LeoÂnDormidoand COMACA,whosemembers largelyincluded junior of® cers. Insightinto the motivation for military discontent was providedby one of the leaders ofthe 13 November movement.Interview with General Jaime SalinasSedo Â,inLima, 20August 1996. General Salinaswas imprisonedby the Fujimori regime inthe aftermath of13Novemberin aprocess thatviolated many of the military’s owninstitutional norms. 11 Thisassessment is basedon a series ofinterviews carried outby the author with retired military of® cers duringAugust 1996 in Lima. 12 Theability of Fujimori to maintain high personal approval ratings even as supportfor the government’ s programmewas founderingis discussedby S Stokes,`Economic reform andpublic opinion in Peru, 1990±1995’ , ComparativePolitical Studies ,29(5),1996, pp 544± 565. 13 Peruwas oneof the slowest countriesin Latin America toset upa social compensationfund during the periodof neoliberal reforms. Fora comparative perspectiveon this theme see CGraham, SafetyNets, Politicsand the Poor: Transitions to Market Economies ,Washington,DC: BrookingsInstitution, 1994. 14 These debates were especially prominentin the remnants ofPe Ârez deCuellar’ scoalition,Unio ÂnporPeru  (UPP).These insightswere providedin an interview with UPP CongressmanCarlos Chipoco, in Lima, 13 August1996. 15 See EVKFitgerald,`State capitalism inPeru’ , inC McClintock& ALowenthal(eds), ThePeruvian ExperimentReconsidered ,Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1983,pp 65± 93. 16 Interviewwith former COPRI of®cial, 26July 1996. 17 See inparticular their written works, C BolonÄaBehr, Cambiode Rumbo ,Lima: Institutode Economia de LibreMercado, 1996; and B Boza, DoingBusiness in Peru:The New LegalFramework ,New York,1994. 18 Oftenthe line between governmentadvisor and representative ofan international ® nancialcompany can become blurred.Such is theapparent case withSusanna de la Puente,a close con®dante of President Fujimoriand his economic advisors who is alsoa vice-presidentof investment banking at theWall Street ®rmofJPMorgan. See FMattos,`Nuestra mujer enWall Street’ , LaRepu Âblica:Dominical (Lima), 21July 1996,pp 6± 7. 19 See forexample thediscussion regarding by MACenteno, Democracy WithinReason: Technocratic Revolutionin Mexico ,UniversityPark, PA: Penn State UniversityPress, 1994.pp 34± 37. 20 GuillermoO’ Donnell,`Delegative democracy’ , Journalof Democracy ,5(1),1994, pp 55± 69. 21 Thispoint is made especially byF Tuesta,`El sistema electoral peruano:sus efectos enel sistema polõÂtico’ , inF Tuesta (ed.), SimposioSobre Reforma Electoral , Lima: IFES,pp125± 162. 22 Adetailedexamination of changes in legislative authority are foundin E Bernales, `Estructuradel estado ymodelopolõ Âticoen la constitucioÂnde1993’ , in LaConstitucioÂnde1993:Analisis y ComentariosI Lima: ComisioÂnAndinade Juristas, 1995, pp 97± 108. An important historical overview of presidential power in Peruis foundin C McClintock,`Presidents, messiahs andconstitutional breakdowns in Peru’ , inJ Linz& AValenzuela (eds), TheFailure of Presidential Democracy: TheCase ofLatin America ,Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1994.pp 286± 321. 23 Jdela Puente,`Los palaciegos’ , LaRepu Âblica:Dominical ,21July 1996, p 9. 24 See, MRubio,`Ministerio del presidencialismo’ , CuestioÂndeEstado ,1(2),1993, p 23. 910 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU

25 See, PMauceri, StateUnder Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru ,Boulder,CO: Westview Press, 1996,pp 108± 111. 26 `Ensuma, muchas restas’ , Caretas,16January 1997, p 58. 27 AngelPaez, `La orden:archõ Âvese’ , LaRepu Âblica:Dominical ,28July 1996, p 10. 28 MRubio,`Ley Cantuta o coÂmofabricar unasentencia’ , QueHacer 87(1),1994, pp 4± 7. See alsoSA Yupanqui,`Cuando la Amnistia se convierteen impunidad’ , QueHacer,95(3),1995, pp 19± 23. 29 Aninteresting insight into this community and the shaping of AlbertoFujimori is foundin L Jochamovitz, CiudadanoFujimori . 30 These haveincluded Alejandro Afuso Higa, director of the social programme FONCODES;VictorKobashi- gawa, Vice-Minister ofEducation; Ana Kanashiro,director of the food and health agency INABIF; and Daniel Hokama, Ministerof Energy and Mines. 31 `La partidasecreta’ , Caretas,25April 1996, pp 16± 19. 32 Thelatest revelationsare discussedin `Acusacio Ân:la denunciade Vaticano’ , Caretas,22August 1996, pp 16±19. In the midst of seriousevidence regarding Montesinos’ connections to drug traf® cklng,US anti-drug czar, retiredGeneral BarryMcCaffrey, laudedMontesinos on a briefvisit to Lima inlate 1996.

The Round Table EDITOR Peter Lyon, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, UK Supported by an International Editorial Board

Founded in 1910, The Round Table provides analysis and commentary on all aspects of international affairs. The journal is the major source of coverage of the policy issues concerning the contemporary Commonwealth and its role in international affairs, with occasional articles on themes of historical interest. SUBSCRIPTION RATES Volume 86, 1997, 4 issues. ISSN 0035-8533. Institutional rate: EU £168.00; Outside EU £198.00; North America US$364.00. Personal rate: EU £44.00; Outside EU £50.00; North America US$92.00.

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