ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 5, pp 899± 911, 1997 Returnof the caudillo: autocratic democracyin Peru PHILIPMAUCERI Theresounding defeat of the former secretary general of the United Nations, JavierPe Ârez deCuellar, by President Alberto Fujimori in the 1995 elections con®rmed the latter’ s extraordinarypopularity. Fujimori won re-election with over64% of thevalid vote and, until mid-1997, his approval ratings have rarely dippedbelow 50% in most public opinion polls. Fujimori’ s popularityand re-electionwere largely the result of his administration’ s success inending hyperin¯ation and sharply reducing the levels of political violence predominant duringthe late 1980s. Nonetheless, these successes havecome at a highprice for thecountry’ s democraticinstitutions and norms. In 1992Fujimori suspended the constitutionand closed the Congress, claiming that such measures wererequired inorder to combat the Maoist insurgency of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Althoughelections for a constituentassembly and a newconstitution took place withina year,centralisation, personalism and the weakening of civilsociety raise seriousquestions about democracy in Peru. Thepurpose of this article is toanalyse the pattern of governmental decision makingand institutional prerogatives during the Fujimori administration and theirimplications for democracy. Centralisation of decision making by the executivehas beenaccompanied by a morevisible role for technocrats in the policyprocess. Both trends, which have been evident throughout Latin America duringthe last decade, have been crucial to the successful implementationof neoliberaleconomic reforms. Fujimori’ s highlypersonalist style of governance has furtherexacerbated centralisation. Viewed from the historical perspective of LatinAmerica’ s longexperience with caudillo (strongman)rule, the personalism andsemi-authoritariani sm ofthe Fujimori administration is notunusual. Yet, eventhough this pattern of governance and leadership style have historical precedentsin the region, Fujimori has alsobeen astute in incorporating new elementsinto this traditional pattern, especially polling data, focus groups, image consultantsand television. Clever media campaigns directed by the government atlargely sympathetic media companies, have had a powerfulimpact in shaping issues andperceptions of Fujimori. 1 As decisionmaking has beenincreasingly centralised in the executive, theFujimori administrati onhas reliedupon two groups in the governmen t toformulate and implement policies. First, a growingcadre of technocrats, manytrained in foreign universities, who implement governmen tdecisions withinthe state bureaucracy and who have overseen the most signi® cant PhilipMauceri is attheDepartment of PoliticalScience, University ofNorthernIowa, Cedar Falls, 1A 50614, USA. 0143-6597/97/050899-13$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 899 PHILIP MAUCERI overhaulof the state apparatus in recent Peruvian history. Complementing this group,however, has beenan informal network of loyalists, connected through personal,familial or socialties with the president. Without a traditionalpolitical partyof his own, Fujimori has cometo rely on these dual networks of supportersÐpersonal loyalists and technocratsÐ to shape government policy. At thesame time,demands from various social groups have been held in check by aseries ofpolicies that purposefully limit political mobilisation, as wellas throughoutright repression of opposition groups. UnlikeLatin America’ s populists,such as Argentina’s JuanPero ÂnorPeru’s ownAla ÂnGarcõÂa,the Fujimori administrat ionhas beenuninterested in political mobilisationamonglower class sectors. 2 Governmentof® cials assiduously cultivatepublic approval in opinion polls and in elections, yet nonetheless haveavoided creating pro-gover nmentorganisation stofoster or channel popularparticipati onin support of their policies. 3 Fujimorihas speci®- callyattacked political parties and, as weshall see below,his governmen t has openlydiscouraged lower class organisation.Moreover, the govern- menthas notadopted the redistribut ivepolicies typical of populist regimes inthe region. Avoiding class-orientated rhetoric or attacks on economic elites,the government has preferredto distribute goods among the poorthrough programmes organised by technocrats in the executive branch, ratherthan challenging the power of privileged sectors byredistributi ng wealth. Fujimori’sappealhas beenbased largely on a promiseof technology , ef® ciencyand `practical’ solutions to everyday problems. 4 Inthis regard, Fujimori’sJapanese ancestryplays a criticalrole, as heholdsout the promise ofaccess toJapan’ s technologicalknow-how . 5 Fujimorihas travelled extensivelyin East Asia, visiting Japan more than any other country as president.His administrati onhas promotedincreased economic links with theregion, successfully pushing for admission into the Asia Paci® c Economic Council (APEC)andexpressing open admiration for the political and econ- omicsystems ofsuch countries as Taiwan,Malaysia and Singapore. The attractiveness ofa `technocratic’problem-sol vingadministrati onled by a Japanese engineer-presidenthad a particularappeal for Peruvians after a decadeof ineffective populist government sthatleft behind a legacyof hyperin¯ation, a largeforeign debt, recession, declining productivi tyand politicalviolence. Inorder to understand the implications from these trends for democracy in Peru,the ® rst partof this article examines the `self-coup’ of 1992. Both the personalismand the authoritarian tendencies of Fujimori were most clearly displayedin theevents leading up tothe democratic rupture. The second section analysesthe growing centralisation of Peru’ s institutionalframework in the aftermathof the 1992 coup. It will be argued that the regime followed a purposefuleffort to weaken democratic institutions and accountability while furthercentralising decision making. The important role played by technocrats andpersonal networks is examinedin the next two sections, where it is argued thatthese have been used by the executive to increasethe autonomy of the state andreduce democratic accountability. 900 AUTOCRATIC DEMOCRACY INPERU Autogolpeand transition: 1992±96 Thesuspension of constitutional rule announced by President Alberto Fujimori on5April1992 brought to a closePeru’ s 12-yearexperiment with democratisa- tion.From 1980 until 1992 Peru experienced two peaceful transfers ofpower andlively multiparty competition. Nonetheless, the period also witnessed a prolongedguerrilla war with the Maoist Sendero Luminoso and a persistent economiccrisis. The election of the unknown Alberto Fujimori in 1990 on an independentticket was as mucha repudiationof establishedpolitical elites as it was anendorsement of his vague platform. 6 Oncein of® ce, Fujimori adopted a radicalneoliberal agenda that sharply reduced in¯ ation but induced a deep recessionas well.In the political arena Fujimori spent the ® rst twoyears in of®ce carefullyfashioning a supportbase inthe business community, the militarycommand and the international ® nancialcommunity. 7 Theprecise reasons forthe 1992 autogolpe remainunclear. 8.Ontheone hand, Fujimorihad demonstrated a virtualcontempt for most of the political institu- tionsin the country during his ® rst twoyears inof® ce, attacking the parties, Congressand the judicial system forcorruption and inef® ciency. Such attacks wereextremely popular because most people saw anelement of truth in them. Moreover,many regime allies believed that neoliberal reforms couldbe more effectivelycarried out through authoritarian methods. Although Peru’ s Congress hadpassed almostall Fujimori’ s legislativeagenda, as wellas cedingspecial legislativepowers to him during the administration’ s ®rst twoyears, increased oppositionby late 1991 raised the spectre of new dif® culties for neoliberal reforms inthe Congress. In what was viewedas asigni®cant threat, former presidentAla ÂnGarcõÂaPeÂrez beganto position himself as theleader of the oppositionusing his populist party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Ameri- cana (APRA)tomobilise opposition to neoliberal reforms. Intheimmediate aftermath of the autogolpe itappeared as ifthe government hadlittle interest in re-establishing democratic institutions. Fujimori proposed rulingby decree with periodic plebiscites on his actions. The regime’ s con®dence was boostedby overwhelming support in the polls for Fujimori’ s actions.9 Nonetheless,the autogolpe was criticisedinternationally and pressure- was quicklyapplied to Peru to move towards democratic rule. The USA suspendedits assistance toPeru, debt renegotiations with the International MonetaryFund were put on hold and several Latin American countries recalled theirambassadors forconsultation. More ominously, a meetingof the Organiza- tionof AmericanStates ( OAS)was calledin the Bahamas toreviewthe Peruvian situation,holding out the possibility of further international actions, including possibleeconomic sanctions. In theface ofthisunexpectedly harsh international reaction,President Fujimori personally travelled to the Bahamas meetingof the OAS todefend his actions, but also to offer a promisethat new elections would beheld for a constituentassembly that would write a newconstitution, thus pavingthe way for a returnof civilian institutions. On13 November 1992, just two weeks before the assembly elections wereheld, a conspiracyinvolving retired and active duty of® cers toremove Fujimorifrom of® ce andrestore the 1979 constitution was discovered. 901 PHILIP MAUCERI