Air Universlty Ubrary

OCT I ^ lf c b6

Maxwell afb, Ala. 36112

-| fcAIR UNIVERSITY R eview

REVOLUTION IN AIRLIFT...THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE... CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT...ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)

MARCH-APRIL 1966

THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

T he Revol ut ion in Air l if t ...... 2 Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., usaf

M a n a gemen t for Defen se...... 16 Maj. Gen. William S. Steele, usaf

China—T he Nuclear Threat...... 28 Lt. Col. Joseph E. Fix III, usa

Analysis in W.AR P lanning...... 40 Lt. Col. Richard C. Bowman, usaf Cost-Effectiveness Analysis as an Aid to Wea pon Syst em Sel ec t ion ...... 49 Lt. Col. Robert S. Berg, usaf

I nformation Sciences: S ome Resea r c h Dir e c t io n s ...... 56 Mrs. Rovvena W. Swanson Military Opinion Abroad R efl ec t ion s on Vie t n a m ...... 68 Gen. André Beaufre Translated by Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata

O bjec t ive and Subjective Dlalectics...... 74 Lt. Col. M. Yasukov Translated by Norman Preeoda In My Opinion T he Use and Misu se of Cost Effectiveness...... 81 Robert L. Petersen Books and Ideas Air Exploration of the Arctic...... 85 Lt. Col. Donald A. Shaw, usaf Castroism...... 91 Capt. David H. Zook, Jr., usaf

T he Intellectual in National Sec ur ity Affa irs...... 95 Col. Marshall E. Baker, usaf T he Contributors...... 97

the cover Address manuscripts to the Editor, Air Uni- The C-141 Starlifter, a familiar sight at Tan versity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Son Nhut since August 1965, is latest of Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed by the the increasingly sophisticated and productive Govemment Printing Office. Washington, transport aircraft added to the Military Air­ D.C. Subscriptions are sold by the Air Uni- versity Book Department, Maxwell Air Force lift Command inventory. General Howell M. Base’ ,41a-; year'y *4.50, back issues 75 Estes, Jr., discusses current MAC capa- cents. USAF recurri.vc pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. bilities and envisions much greater future achievements in “The Revolution in Airlift.” Vol. XVH No. 3 March-Apr m. 1966 REVOLUTION IN A IR L IF T

Gen er a l Howell M. Est es, J r TH E capability to quickly deploy relatively large fully equipped k forces—which can be attained only with an aircraft possessing the performance eristics of the C-5—improves the U.S. military position in, and reduces the length of various possible wars in a variety of theaters and situations, decreases casualties, and reduces the total costs of fighting such a war. fí t —D r . H auold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force, before the Military Airlift Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed Services, October 1965

í ti l

HE SECRETARY’S statement crystal- Admittedly, words like “revolution” and '»lizes forme the entire rationale behind “breakthrough,” employed so broadly and cas- the current revolution in airlift. Im- ually these days, strike the mind with a power- kát io this single comprehensive sentence is ful connotation of suddenness or discontinuity. è idKcapablefact: The deep, searching anal- They imply that, in human affairs and in tech- is vthat has penetrated into every facet of nology, abrupt changes spring up indepen- ^númerousstoutly defended Army, Navy, and dently of antecedent developments—much as Air JSorce^ vveapon system proposals and has an electron might make a quantum jump from jjouná manv of them lacking in one conceptual one discrete energy levei to another. KSf techniéál respect or another—that same un- The empirical fact of the matter is, of onal ánalytical process stamped global course, that every revolution, every break­ mbuf airlift as not only essential in the na- through, is essentially the cumulative end >hal int^est but also, in terms of time, lives, product of a lengthy chain of cause and effect. 9 a n d money, an espeeially cost-effeetive instru- The atomic breakthrough or nuclear revolu­ ^ OÍent o f national policy. tion, as one case in point, traces its lineage as 4 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

far back as the fourth century b .c . and Democ- threat of unacceptable consequences to any ritus—or, on a more scientific plane, at least to who would challenge it. In other words, the Dalton’s atomic theory of 1803. The long line aggressor is guaranteed to fail, and he can of workers between Dalton and Alamogordo clearly understand that the price of that failure would include, at the very minimum, Einstein, is ruin. Rutherford, Lawrence, Urey, Curie, Joliot- To the degree that the probability of gen­ Curie, Fermi, Bohr, and Wheeler—and this eral war is thus reduced to a minimum—to that listing leaves out far more contributors than it same degree the probability of some form of includes. limited conflict is increased. The price of failure The other great breakthrough of our era, in limited war, however, is not necessarily the breaching of space, likevvise owes an in- ruinous, and as a result this type of conflict is calculable debt to a long line of researchers, far more difficult to deter or prevent than gen­ going back at least as far as Kepler, Galileo, eral war. Limited war, like general war, will be and Nevvton. Newton himself acknowledged deterred only when there has been a decisive that, if he savv farther than other men, it was demonstration that it will not be profitable to only because he stood on the shoulders of the those who try it. The obvious difference is that giants who had preceded him. a nuclear explosion carries overwhelming con- Whether any of these individuais, or the viction with it; any counterargument is, at best, many others who helped increase the sum of feeble. But this is not true of the tools of limited human knowledge, considered his own achieve- conflict. The proof that limited war is also fruit- ments revolutionary is doubtful. And yet, taken less will require long and arduous demonstra­ in the aggregate, one outcome of centuries of tion, unflagging determination for years and basic and applied research was the mating of perhaps decades, supreme patience, and the the nuclear warhead with the space-capable utmost military flexibility of which we are ca- rocket to produce the intercontinental ballistic pable. missile. This was unquestionably a revolution; Of all the time-honored principies of war, individuais, nations, and governments have perhaps none has increased in significance in been forced to revolutionize their thinking, the present age more than that of flexibility. As their policies, and their grand strategies in technology has provided the communication order to accommodate to the existence, the and transport means to encompass the whole reality, and the profound implications of such earth in one arena, the military importance of a weapon. flexibility has become paramount. The most obvious and immediate effect Global military airlift has been shown, was the unarguable necessity to design against throughout the era of the cold war, to be a what the engineer calls the “worst case”—in principal médium of achieving maximum mili­ this context, general nuclear war. That overrid- tary flexibility. If this is revolutionary, it is only ing requirement dictated the highest national because it is easier for most people to argue priority—a crash program of such magnitude the limitations of any new way of doing things and complexity as to dwarf the wartime Man­ than to visualize the almost limitless potential. hattan Project—and virtually all the funds al- In my own view, the revolution in airlift was located to military programs. inherently contained in the invention of the The successful establishment of an over- heavier-than-air craft. Once given a mechanism whelmingly superior strategic nuclear deter- that could lift itself and some sort of load off rent, however, while it all but foreclosed the the earth and could be guided directionally “worst case,” as it was designed to do, was un- under its own power, the breakthrough had able by its very nature to provide for the host of been made. After that, it was inevitable that the other bad cases along the entire speetrum of ultimate versatility of the maehine would be conflict. A powerful and survivable strategic realized. nuclear capability, after all, deters aggression The Wright brothers, then, provided the in its own realm by the strong and explicit basis for the revolution in airlift. Bevond that THE REVOLUTION IN AIRLIFT 5

fundamental establishment of potential, I see Service in June 1948 from what had been the the airlift revolution in t\vo distinct phases: Air Transport Command and Naval Air Trans­ (1) the acceptance and utilization of mili- port Service. In the atmosphere of peace then tary airlift as a médium of combat deplovment prevailing, the ma t s charter prescribed the and employment and logistical support, on a carriage of people and things in a logistical large-scale basis, despite its limitations; and context. No actual military mission was men- (2 ) the removal of limitations on airlift. tioned, nor was there any hint of any such con- In the first phase, in which the many ad- cept as combat airlift. vantages of airlift have been recognized as The Berlin Airlift, ma t s’ first major opera- outweighing its traditional disadvantages, the tion, was of course a makeshift and in no sense growth and progress of the Military Airlift the application of a ready force according to Command ( ma c ) have been basically linear. established plan. Over and above the political, In the second phase, in which those disadvan­ diplomatic, and doctrinal ramifications, Opera- tages will have been largely obviated, the tion Vittles demonstrated two things: (1 ) the growth of airlift requirements and capabilities enormous potential force of the airlift médium will without question trace out a steep ex- and (2) the tremendous difficulties com- ponential curve. pounded by the fact that aircraft essentially ma c is today on the threshold of the quan- designed for the purpose did not exist. tum transition from the first to the second phase When the Communist blockade was lifted of this airlift revolution. The concrete manifes- despite the difficulties, it was easy to become tation of that transition will appear in the Lock­ sanguine once again—until the North Koreans heed C-5A. violated the 38th parallel a year later. From As with all revolutions, the interim be- that time to this, any peace the world has tween Kitty Havvk and the C-5 has not been a known has been, at best, tenuous, partial, and vacuum of discontinuity. The history of military illusory. airlift. and of ma c and its predecessors, has For five years following the termination of been a long continuum, complete with its high hostilities in Korea, the Air Force utilized ma t s points and lovv points. with increasing intensity as a means of tighten- It is not my purpose here to trace that his­ ing its own logistics management. The dramatic tory in any detail, from the Hump to Berlin, improvements that resulted from the concept across a long stretch of time and gecgraphy to of direct airlift support—overseas depots elimi- the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Nor to nated, domestic depots reduced in number recite a list of humanitarian airlifts whose des- and size, tremendous reductions in inventories, tinations would constitute a good-sized inter- drastic shortening of personnel and high-value national gazetteer. Nor will I name off a lengthv supply pipelines—are an extensive story in series of joint airlift tests and exercises that themselves. This success prompted ma t s to have helped to analyze and refine Air Force/ “sell” airlift logistics to the Army and Navy, Army airlift practices, methodology, and tech- and they did to some extent increase their use niques in every potential theater of operations of airlift. However, after institution of the Air­ throughout the globe. And finally, I will not lift Service Industrial Fund in 1958 required dwell upon the related revolution in military the military departments to pay for ma t s airlift medicine that has been the result of the reverse (formerly provided grátis) out of their own side of the combat airlift coin—aeromedical o &m funds, a harder sell was necessary before evacuation. It will, however. be necessary to the skeptics were convinced that airlift usually underscore a few events that provide the basic reduced the total cost of distribution. key to the revolution in airlift. Meanwhile, specified ton-mileage require­ As one of the first applications of the au- ments were written into Emergency War Plans thority contained in the Armed Forces Unifica- premised on general nuclear war. Under such tion Aet of 1947, Secretary of Defense James assumptions, the Strategic Air Command had Forrestal established the Military Air Transport the first and overriding prioritv, to support its 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

restrike capability; airlift for the nuclear- retaliation. The interim modemization of ma t s, capable elements of Tactical Air Command initiated by the Congress in the wake of big carne next; and the remainder of the airlift sl a m, was stepped up with accelerated de- capability, if any, would be allocated to the liveries of the C-135 and C-130E, and the White Army. House itself announced the award of the C-141 That was the beginning of a potential com- development and produetion contract. bat mission for ma t s, but the commands ton- mile capability, even when backed up by the civil airlines in a projected logistical role, was T HE M il it a r y Air l if t Co mma n d chronically behind the requirements. And of combat airlift is now an essential factor in the course, there was no formal provision for detailed limited-war plans of the unified and limited-war situations requiring massive specified commanders, plans which demand ground force deployments. an almost infinite variety of response capa- The almost total commitment of military bilities. They range in magnitude from small funds to the B-52 and B-58 force and the three plans to large and extremely complex plans families of ic bm s necessarily precluded any for greatly expanded activities. ma c is com- possibility of increasing ma t s’ capability mitted not only to the deployment phase but through modemization of the airlift force. often to the assault phase of contingency plans By late 1959, ma t s and the Army, mutually as well. and seriously concemed about the inability of In effect then, ma c , as the global airlift the former to provide realistic support to the command of the Air Force, has become the latter, began to plan a major offshore airlift ex- key element in a far-reaching change in na­ ercise, a mass airlift deplovment and redeploy- tional policy: to a strategy of multiple options ment of the Strategic Army Corps. for flexible, measured response to any situation The exercise, Operation bic sl a m/pu er t o in the spectrum of war. That fact is funda­ pin e, was executed in March 1960, deploying mental to the revolution in airlift and the basis 21,000 troops and 11,000 tons of equipment upon which airlift demands have been in­ from more than a dozen bases in the United creasing steadily to this day. States to Puerto Rico and redeploying them The buildup in Vietnam, although only within a total time of 15 days. one instance of the surging demand, is repre- big sl a m helped to shift the emphasis from sentative of the entire trend. In the first half of the logistical mission of ma t s to its total airlift fiscal year 1965, ma t s had carried almost as potential, of which global logistics was merely much tonnage to Southeast Asia as during all one facet. The exercise also focused national of 1964. In the first quarter of fiscal year 1966, attention on the limitations of ma t s in the mass that volume had already been doubled—all movement of Army forces, resulting from the told, an increase in the ratio of 1:2:8. use of outmoded aircraft types. Over all, total ton-mileage increased 82% At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff of the between fiscal years 1960 and 1965, from 1.25 Air Force and the Army reached a historie billion passenger and cargo ton-miles to 2.29 agreement on quantitative Army requirements billion. At the same time ma t s was concen- for airlift within specified time frames. This trating more and more exclusively on the “hard “White-Lemnitzer Agreement” pointed a goal core” military airlift mission consisting of joint rather than suggesting that the specified vol­ training and exercises and special-assignment ume of time-phased airlift was actually avail- airlift ( the unscheduled, point-to-point mis- able at the time. sions supporting emergency and contingency The stage had thus been set and the operations, humanitarian purposes, and remote- groundwork established when the Kennedy area, hazardous, and outsize-cargo require­ Administration took office and immediately de- ments). The routine logistical portion of the manded a range of strategic options over and total mission, operating between established above the single choice of spasmodic nuclear ports on fixed schedules, was handled to an ever increasing degree by commercial airlines C-124 Globcmasters, after 15 years’ Service, are operating under ma t s contracts. During the now the mainstay of U.S. airlift to Southeast Asiu. 1960-1965 period in question, airline contract Some will go to Air Reserve units as more C-141 amounts went up 260*. to last years record Starlifters are added to MACs working inventory. S231.3 million. This essentially linear progress, it bears repeating, has been made in the first phase of the airlift revolution—the phase in which the obvious advantages of airlift have been ac- cepted as substantially outweighing the limita- tions. The seeond phase, which will constitute the real revolution in airlift, will have been achieved when the limitations have been es­ sentially eliminated. It would be profitable, therefore, to examine the traditional limitations on airlift and then discover to what extent they are about to be overcome. Historicallv, the constraints on airlift have been made up of various combinations of at least nine factors, which are necessarily inter- related and overlapping: speed range/pa\ load trade-off flexibilitv of employment § • • * é cubic capacity <* TRu&txr sentKi loadability U.S.AIR FORCE self-sufficiency terminal base requirements fuel dependency direct operating cost No single aircraft to date has made a significant improvement in alleviating these self-limiting constraints. The C-124, for exam- ple, offered a cube and payload capacitv that was a marked improvement over previous models, but its absolute productivity was re- duced by slow speed and short range. Its trans- oceanic capability, therefore, was contingent upon intermediate bases, vvith all of the com- plications of diplomacy, vulnerability, and saturation and the problems of maintenance, supply, and personnel. The C-135 jet resolved the problems of speed and range/payload to some extent, since it can carry 19 tons 3600 miles at high subsonic speeds. As a cargo aircraft, however, it has disadvantages: it is loaded from the side to a high cargo Hoor, is not stressed for sustained maximum-load operations, requires long run- A C-130 Hercules taxies by a Vietnamese Armij gun mission of ma c . Its 280-knot speed, however, emplacement at Saigons Tan Son Nhut Air Base, places a definite limit on its productivity, which delivering another priorittj load to the combat is also constrained by the ability to carry only zone. . . . Palletized cargo and lhe C-133 Cargo- 16 tons across the Atlantic. While it probably master (center) are typical sights at Travis AFB, is the most flexible airlifter built to date, its Califórnia, MAC’s principal takc-off to the Pacific and Vietnam. . . . At Clark AB, Philippines, a rapidity of response is low. C-135 (right) rolls out, destination Vietnam. Based The C-133, notable for its performance in at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, the Stratolifter carrying Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman missiles, flies a seven-day “Embassy Rttn” around the globe. is at present the largest outsize cargo carrier in the command. This aircraft holds a world record in lifting 59 tons to altitude; however, its turboprop speed, complexity of maintenance, cost of operation, and range/pavload charac­ teristics (20-25 tons/3500 miles) combine to ways of high vveight-bearing capacity, and limit its usefulness and rapidity of response. lacks the important airdrop capability. In addition, despite its large capacity, many The C-130E, on the other hand, is loaded large items of Army equipment cannot be air- from the rear to a cargo floor at truck-bed lifted in the C-133. height and is capable of operating into the To date, therefore, complex and interact- most primitive landing areas. It has excellent ing trade-offs and compromises have been airdrop and assault characteristics, which necessary in order to maximize the volume of render it especially useful to the total airlift airlift available for any specific operational pur- pose. Even with the full mix of C-124’s, C-130’s, of employment. The C-141 is loaded from the C-135’s, and C-133’s, however, the overriding rear and has a troop/cargo airdrop capability. requirement—the moving of sizable forces, with Not being an outsize carrier, though, it is equipment, to distant areas within weeks— limited to airlift of only 60-65? of current major could not be met in its entirety. items of Army divisional equipment. With the advent of the fanjet C-141. now Thus all ma c aircraft presently in the in- entering the ma c force in volume, we have ventory have been essentially a part of the first come within sight of the goal. Using air- phase of the airlift revolution. The C-141, when craft productivity (the product of allowable fully operational in force, represents the be- eabin Ioad and block speed) as a “figure of ginning transition to the second phase. The real merit,” the workhorse C-124 rates 2500. The revolution, however, is attendant upon produc- productivity factor of the C-141, by compari- tion of the giant C-5A. son, is on the order of 10,(XX). Although the C-5, with the possible exeep- The C-141 obviates many of the historie tion of its engines, does not radically breach the constraints by virtue of its high speed ( above State of the aeronautical art, it will to a very 425 knots) and its range/payload options ( up great extent minimize the airlift limitations of to 32 tons or 154 troops nonstop to Europe, or the past. It will for the first time permit the ma c nonstop from the West Coast to Tokyo with force to respond without qualification to total reduced speed and payload). Requiring only airlift requirements, including the maximum some 4000 feet of runway for take-off or land- demand—the division-force move. And it will ing, it can use about 1850 airports around the come mueh closer to putting airlift in a cost world, which greatlv enhances its flexibility competitive position with surface transport. -1

C-141 and Automated Cargo Handling

The C-141 Starlifter (right), fhying over Robins AFB and Lockheed-Georgia, has been airlifting to Southeast Asia since August 1965. . . . The automated 463L Materials Handling System at Travis speeds the sort- ing, palletizing, loading, and unloading of the transports. . . . A flatbed truck and 463L vehicle, both rollerized, haul away 25 to 30 tons of cargo within 20 minutes of a C-141’s “blocking in” at Tan Son Nhut.

Briefly, the C-5 will overcome the nine the C-141 and tvventy times that of the C-124. limitations by virtue of the following charac- Range/payload. This trade-off potential is teristics and capabilities: far more favorable than in any aircraft built to Speed. The C-5 will sustain a speed of 440 date. Design wartime payload capacity is 132 knots under long-range cruise parameters and a tons. At basic mission weight, the C-5 will carrv maximum cruise speed of 470 knots. This is not 55 tons a distance of 5500 nautical miles. Over a great advantage in speed over the C-141; the shorter transatlantic range of 2700 nautical however, when correlated with the far higher miles, it will lift 110 tons. As a result, depend- payload capacity, it gives the C-5 a produc- ence upon intermediate bases, with all tlieir tivity rating of about 50,000—five times that of complications, is largely eliminated.

12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Flexibility of employment. The range/ the condition of hundreds of system compo- payload potential, combined with the airdrop nents, isolation of faults, and Computer read- capability, ability to operate on support area out. With this monitor the aircraft will, in airfields, and speed of response, will give the effect, diagnose its own ills while in flight. Once C-5A an employment flexibility surpassing that on the ground, the maintenance crews will be of any aircraft previously built. spared the troubleshooting phase, which is gen- Cubic capacity. With a total volumetric erally the most taxing and time-consuming, and capacity of 35,000 cubic feet, the C-5 will ac- can proceed at once to the more straightfor- commodate virtually every item of Army equip- ward remedial procedures. ment except the CH-54 flying crane, the larger Terminal base requirements. Although it fixed-wing aircraft, and higher-capacity fork- will be the largest aircraft in the world, the lifts and straddle trucks. C-5 will be capable of operating normally from 8000-foot runways and landing on 4000-foot Loadability. In this criticai efficiency pa- runways of relatively light load-bearing capaci- rameter, the C-5 oífers a dramatic improvement ties. This breakthrough will be the result of a over its predecessors. Full-width cargo open- 28-wheel landing-gear assembly—a high flota- ings at both ends of the aircraft, including the “visor” nose hatch, provide ready access to the full cargo cross section, as well as a tremen- dously rewarding “drive-through” capability. This innovation and the “kneeling” feature of the landing gear, which permits the cargo floor to be lowered to truck-bed height at both the forward and aft openings, greatly simplify the loading and unloading of vehicles—previously a laborious, time-consuming process demand- ing highly skilled personnel. C-5 loadability is further enhanced through the use of advanced devices of the 463L (Materials Handling Sys­ tem ) family. Self-sufficiency. This, of course, is a com- plex function of numerous variables, making it an enormously difficult condition to satisfy. Maintenance factors, for instance, have a ter- rific bearing on the degree of self-sufficiency that can be achieved; hence it is a great deal to ask that more sophisticated, higher perform­ ance aircraft be produced, with order-of-magni- tude advances, and in the same breath insist upon a reduction in maintenance requirements. Nonetheless, the industry has responded with great improvements in reliability and maintain- ability, and each successive year brings a better The C-5A will bring about the real revolution tnl position on the learning curve. The C-5, be- airlift. With its intercontinental range, cruiyingBjj cause of its true intercontinental range with speed of 470 knots, and design payload of I3SB a good load, will require fewer take-offs under tons. its productivity rating will be five times f/uí« full load in any given mission, thereby reducing of the C-141 and twenty times that of the C-J24» the maintenance requirement. The aircraft will . . . Loading and unloading will be facilitated by f/uH also contain an extremely advanced Malfunc- C-5’s full-width openings fore and aft, its "drietH tion Monitor System for continuous sensing of through” feature, and its “kneeling landing gcarl THE REVOLUTION IN A1RLIFT 13

tion gear—designed to give the C-5 a footprint Fuel dependency. The C-5 represents the comparable to that of an elephant with the first large step toward relative independence effective footprint pressure of a cat. The tires in this area. It will carry 49,000 gallons of fuel, \vill be inflatable and deflatable in flight, en- and its specific fuel consumption will be about abling the crew to optimize the gear con- one-third less than that of present jets. In con- figuration for the landing surface. The kneeling crete terms, a C-5 will be able to take off from capabilitv of the landing gear will permit easier Dover, Delaware, with 100,000 pounds of pay- tire changes without the necessity for jacking load, land on a 4000-foot runway in the Middle up hundreds of tons of airplane. The chore will East, unload, and fly back to Naples, Italy, be further simplified by the fact that the main without refueling. Or, going west, it can leave landing gear will have no hard-to-get-at “in- Honolulu with 100,000 pounds, land and unload side” tires. In Southeast Asia, the C-5 will be on a small field in South Vietnam, and fly to able to use 600* more airfields than are avail- the Philippines without refueling. Coupled able to present cargo jets. The same order of with the small-field performance of the air- mcrease will obtain in other less developed craft and its relative self-sufficiency in other areas of the world, which are always the most respects, this means that ma c will be able to fertile seedbeds for limited war. airland or airdrop troops and heavy equipment 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

far forward in the battle zone without placing ing to follow from single advancements in a burden on the forward area for long, modem materiais or cooling methods, to double power runways, maintenance support, or fuel. Obvi- at lower specific weight and one-third less ously, the same order of improvement may be specific fuel consumption, to the considerable expected in aeromedical evacuation capabilitv payloads and ranges thereby made possible operating directly from the battle zone. at lower cost, to the end result: a powerful Direct operating cost. By virtue of its un- amplification of the strategic range of military/ precedented productivity, the C-5 will have a diplomatic options available to the President direct operating cost of approximately 4',í

ade and 20:1 and bevond not too long after. structural or operational compromise, so that Variable airfoil geometry, in its infancy pavload weights will continue to increase— with the F-lll, will \vithout doubt be further and with them. productivity. developed and advanced, since it offers so The aircraft will continue to increase in broad a spectrum of performance in different their degree of independent self-sufficiency, operating regimes. with an important assist from grcatlv extended The entire science of aerodynamics has full-load ranges. With a 10,000-mile radius of untapped potentials remaining to be exploited. action, for example, the requirement to trans- Wing and fuselage design will be improved port bulk fuel to the rear and forward combat by orders of magnitude, new and more efficient areas can be drastically curtailed. high-lift devices will be perfected, and tech- In the aggregate, developments like these, niques for controlling the boundary layer for strongly foreshadow'ed in the C-5A. mean that any desired combination of low drag and high global military airlift will be completely revo- lift will advance significantly. lutionized. Gigantic combat loads or vast ton- More eflBcient fuels and other energv nages of supplv and resupply will be deliver- sources—liquid hydrogen for one—are con- able in hours or days from any small originating stantly being developed. fields in the United States to any area in the Along with basic aerodynamic and pro- world, up to and including the edge of battle. pulsion advances, we must and will have great Until now, airlift has been utilized because advances in navigation aids, all-w^eather land- of its relative efficiency when time, criticai ing svstems, telemetered maintenance informa- urgencv, priority, or the sheer value of the tion from air to ground, new concepts of cargo were the determining factors. containerization, new geneTations of loading Beginning with the C-141/C-5A airlift and unloading methods, terminal and cargo- force of the Military Airlift Command, and handling systems, and great orders of improve - continuing with the inevitable followr-on air­ ment toward 1005? reliable global Communi­ craft and aerospace craft, airlift will come much cations. closer to standing on its own in a purely abso- As all of these relate generallv to military lute sen se. It will be more nearly cost-eom- aviation in its entire broad perspective, so they petitive with other modes of transport, far more impact specifically upon airlift. Here, technol- rapid and responsive, vastly more productive, ogy will open up variable choices: increasing unaffected by obstacles of terrain or ocean, and aircraft size by a factor of 2 or 3 without adding independent of elaborate docking, receiving, to weight or, conversely, retaining aircraft size and transshipping facilities in the theaters of and reducing the empty weight by half. Struc- war. ture, fuel, and engines will represent a decreas- Those characteristics, to me, define and ing proportion of total aircraft weight without describe the true Revolution in Airlift. Hq Military Airlift Command MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE

M ajor Gen er a l YVil l ia m S. Steele

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces prepares sênior officers for vital roles in defense management.

RADUATES of the Industrial College In both course content and methodology, of the Armed Forces who receive their we strive to keep our program attuned to the G resident course diplomas next June new management philosophies and techniques vvill emerge from this sênior joint military edu- that have come into play as a result of explosive cational institution as job-oriented, nonparo- progress in the scientific and technological as- chial candidates for key positions in the real-life pects of national defense. Tire ready availability environment of defense management. Each of high-speed, high-capacity digital computers graduate’s effectiveness in immediate and fu­ has not only facilitated the flow of information ture assignments will depend basically, of in defense management but has also imposed course, on his own abilities and the sum total new requirements for knowledge, with a result- of his job experience. But a very important ant wide influence on the entire management factor will be the decision-making skill that he process. has gained in ten months of deep personal in- We teach our already highly trained stu- volvement in an intensive graduate-level course dents that the high-speed Computer is all too tailored to fit his midcareer needs. often directly equated with decision-making. A The basic purpose of our resident course is Computer alone does not solve the problems of to take this mature, highly motivated, carefully interest to defense decision-makers; all it can selected, already well-qualified individual and do is execute a series of instructions that may broaden his Outlook and capabilities to the de- lead to a solution. It is just a tool. Solutions by gree that he not only is better qualified, more computers are only as good as the people who highly motivated, and even more mature when State the objective, define the problems, and he leaves us but also feels comfortably at choose the criteria. home in the environment of high-level defense We are interested far more in the indi­ decision-making. vidual than in the Computer. If we can help our students master these machines and at the same of 1920. The mission of the new college was to time become masters of themselves in the exact- conduct studies in the broad problems of in­ ing world of the defense manager, our job will dustrial mobilization to provide instruction for have been well done. Problem-solvers can be officers who might be called to important posts trained; decision-makers must be educated. in a wartime procurement organization. As Problem-solving utilizes the skills and such, it was the first institution of its kind in the techniques the student has leamed. Decision- world. making involves his experience and abilities. During the years between the First and Our problem-solving instruction in operations Second World Wars the college made signifi- analysis, Systems analvsis, per t , etc., leads the cant contributions to the successive industrial student to the altemative decisions that are mobilization plans of the period, and in the possible and the consequences of each. If we emergency years of 1940 and 1941 the tempo of have enhanced the student’s experience and instruction was stepped up. Then carne the ability to select the right altemative, we have attack on Pearl Harbor, which forced a tem- then, in truth, educated him as a potential high- porary cessation of the academic program, the level manager of national security affairs. last class graduating on 23 December 1941. Except for an interruption during World For the first two years of World War II, War II, our college and its predecessor have the college remained inactive, but earlv in 1944 been in the business of educating defense it resumed operations in the Pentagon with a managers for more than 40 years. The origin of number of short, intensive courses in contract the Industrial College of the Armed Forces goes renegotiation, contract termination, propertv baek to the Army Industrial College, founded disposal, and cost and price analysis. in 1924 at Washington, D.C., as part of the In Tanuary 1946 the peacetime program of machinery created to carry out the Army s re- the Army Industrial College was resumed with sponsibilities under the National Defense Act a six-month interim course, and the following 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

April the institution was renamed the Industrial dent program in mind. Extending these con- College of the Armed Forces, in formal recogni- cepts into the field by means of seminars and tion of its interservice character. Shortly there- the correspondence course is primarily a matter after the college moved to the historie Army of adapting the course material and educational post in Southwest Washington now called Fort techniques to meet the objectives of these two Leslev J. McNair, where it is presently located. extension programs. The official establishment of the Industrial College in its present status dates, however, from 3 September 1948, when it was formally The Resident School reconstituted a joint educational institution op- erating under the direction of the Joint Chiefs Our resident student body is comprised of of Staff and recognized as being one of the 180 selected sênior officers and civilian execu- highest-level educational institutions in the Na­ tives representing all major areas of functional, tional Military Establishment. command, and technical responsibility in the In a February 1962 revision of its charter military Services and manv of the govemment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the college was agencies and departments. They possess ca- designated “capstone of the military educa­ pabilities in depth across the entire span of the tional system in the management of logistic military and defense executive environment. resources for national security.” This charter These students work and study together un- revision provided the impetus for a funda­ fettered by operational responsibilities. Since mental reorientation of our program designed 1946—not including the present class—2745 to keep the college at the top in its field. military and civilian students have completed In the revised charter, the mission of the the course. Industrial College of the Armed Forces is This year, the class composition is 49 stated as follows: Army, 49 Air Force, 40 Navy, and 9 Marine Corps officers and 33 civil servants. Of the mili­ To conduct courses of study in the economic and industrial aspects of national security and tary students, 57 wear the eagles of Army, Air in the management of resources under all con- Force, or Marine Coq)s colonels or Navy cap- ditions, giving due consideration to the inter- tains, and 90 wear the silver leaves of Army, related military, political, and social factors Air Force, or Marine Corps lieutenant colonels affecting national security, and in the context or Navy commanders. of both national and world affairs, in order to The civilian grades are fairly evenlv di- enhanee the preparation of selected military vided between GS-15’s and GS-Í4’s or their officers and key civilian personnel for impor- Foreign Service equivalents. Half the civilian tant command, staff, and policymaking posi- students are from Department of Defense ac- tions in the national and International security tivities and the other half from manv of the strueture. govemment departments or agencies with There are three educational entities in the headquarters in Washington: among others, college. The Resident School is responsible for Agriculture, Small Business Administration, the operation of the ten-month resident course Atomic Energy Commission, Treasury, Nation­ —the core of the educational program. The Na­ al Aeronautics and Space Administration, and tional Security Seminar School conducts a series Central Intelligence Agency. of two-week seminars, based on the resident The average student age is 44 vears, rang- course, in selected cities throughout the United ing from 34 to 52. The average serviee of the States. The Correspondence School conducts a military officers is 23 years. There is a signifi- worldwide correspondence course, adapting cant range in formal education in the student the essentials of the resident course to the cor­ body, with 7 students having doctorates; 62, respondence method of study. masters degrees; 80, bachelors degrees; and Our basic educational philosophies and 31, no degree. All resident students have one policies are formulated, always, with the resi­ thing in common—an outstanding career. This MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE 19

factor is essential for selection to attend a management of logistic resources sênior service school, an achievement realized The central theme of the resident course in the military bv only one of every five career is the management of logistic resources, mate- officers. riel, programs, and systems to combat threats and challenges to the security of the United States. In the development of this theme, cer- a civilian-military faculty tain subject areas are singled out for emphasis. Thus the course stresses study of the national The college faculty which conducts and economv, especially its industrial sector, and supports the resident program consists of 13 of science and technology, as essential sources Civil Service members and 37 military mem- of national strength. bers in the grade of colonel or Navy captain. The fundamental academic disciplines un- (Four of these civilians and two of the officers derlving the course are economics and manage­ are in the Correspondence School; 12 officers ment. To a large degree, the course may be re- are in the National Security Seminar School.) garded as an application of these disciplines The civilians are selected primarily as experts to the field of national security affairs. in a particular field, such as economics. Their Civil Service grades are generally at the GS-15 Four basic courses constitute the major and GS-14 leveis. Eight of the thirteen have subdivisions of subject material. Each course doc-torates and the other five have masters is divided, in tum, into two or three units, re- degrees. Of the military faculty, one has a doc- flecting less sharply defined, more flexible in­ torate and three are studving for doctorates. ternai boundary lines within the material. Of the remainder, most have masters degrees The academic program begins with nine in the various disciplines of concem in our cur- weeks of foundational study (Course A), con- riculum. sisting of a brief survey of the environmental The role of the faculty member, particu- aspects of national security affairs—the domes- larly that of the military officer, has been sig- tic and world political situation, major ideo- nificantlv altered by the pronounced shift in logical systems, major govemmental systems, emphasis made this year from a lecture-orient- U.S. national security organization, current de- ed course to small-group leaming activity and velopments in science and technology, the na- by the introduction of some new and highlv ture of modem warfare—and a more intensive substantive subjects. orientation in the principies of macroeconom- No longer is military experience alone a ics, management, and scientific decision-mak- sufficient foundation for service on the faculty. ing. Today the military faculty member needs, in The program then moves into a nine-week addition to his service background, a high de- worldwide survey (Course B), viewed from the gree of academic professional competence in vantage point of U.S. national security policv- one of the major disciplines or subject areas makers, of the basic elements of national taught at the college. Beyond this, he must be power, categorized in terms of human, natural, able to use effectively such modem educational and developed material ( mainly industrial) re­ techniques as case studies, role-plaving, simu- sources. lation exercises, the incident method, and the For the next nine weeks (Course C) the many variants of group discussion. student is guided through national security Faculty duty at the college is now com- planning and policy-making in the United parable, in effort and hours of vvork required, States, at the Presidential and Cabinet leveis, to the most difficult assignments in the service. leaming first about the system of decision-mak- There are many rewards, including a compre- ing and policv-formulation and then about its hensive program in which members are encour- operation in two principal areas: the building aged to develop and expand their capabilities and maintenance of economic and social as educators. strength, and the projection of this strength out- 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ward in combating externai threats to the na- masters degree and elective programs tions security interests. Under a cooperative program with George Finally, the program is brought to its prin­ Washington University, resident students can cipal area of focus and emphasis (Course D) obtain the degree of Master of Science in Busi­ with a concentrated 13-week examination of ness Administration while attending the Indus­ the vvhole range of management—systems, proc­ trial College. Effective at the beginning of this esses, policies, programs, and major “worrv” academic year, the university allows 16 semes- areas—in the Department of Defense, includ- ter credits for our regular course ( instead of the ing the three service departments. 9 previously allowed) and 6 credits for a stu­ The program also contains three “horizon­ dent research paper when it is submitted as a tal” course elements, general subjects sched- thesis and meets university requirements. Eight uled over the greater part of the academic year. credits remain to be acquired, and these are They include a program of executive develop- customarily eamed in the 8-week period im- ment; a program of elective courses, of vvhich mediately following completion of our course, each student is required to take one; and a the students attending university courses con- program of extended individual and group re- ducted in our academic building. The Services search projects. traditionally permit students to remain for this

A group of incoming students on orientation tour of the Industrial College MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE 21

educational activity prior to reassignment. ing, running parallel with regular units of the There was a time when our resident stu- resident course, which is designed to enable dents took additional George Washington Uni- the student to use and develop his executive versity courses concurrently with Industrial knowledge and skills by placing him in prob- College courses, causing a fundamental conflict lem-solving and decision-making situations that is eliminated by the present arrangement. related to the subject areas of the course. The universitv fumishes or approves the fac- ulty members who teach the Industrial College methodology courses invrolved in the graduate program. Thus we have maintained the integritv of our Methodology at the Industrial College is own curriculum while enhancing the student s based upon the adoption of two widely aceept- chances of attaining a masters degree in addi- ed beliefs in the field of adult executive eduea- tion to his Industrial College diploma. tion: (1) all development is self-development; The concurrent program of graduate-level and (2) developing requires action and deep elective study is designed to enable students to individual involvement on the part of the stu­ develop further their background knowledge dent, else he may merely learn about manage- and understanding of selected disciplines and ment rather than learn to manage. This meth­ environmental subjects related to the college odology, as applied at the Industrial College, mission and essential to their professional takes full advantage of our students’ diversi- growth as defense managers. Elective courses fied knowledge and skills. Students come here are approximately equivalent in length to an expecting answers. lnstead, they get questions. average universitv 3-semester-hour course. We strive to educate by objectives, to Twenty-two periods are allotted to the schedule instruction by exception. Limitations elective program, which is conducted from late of time and the breadth of the field surveyed October to mid-April. During the current aca- preclude intensive examination of major sec- demic year, the following courses are being tors or systematic acquisition of leaming as an conducted: Automatic Data Processing Sys­ end in itself. We are constantly seeking econ- tems, Defense-Oriented Cost Analvsis, Human omy of effort and elimination of the nonessen- Relations in Organizations, International Poli- tial. The college makes intensive use, there- tics and Organization in the Nuclear Age, Law fore, of teaching and leaming techniques which for the Defense Manager, Management of In­ stress individual and group participation and formation Systems, The Theory and Manage­ challenging intellectual endeavor. In each sub- ment of Systems, and Contemporary Economic ject area examined, emphasis is placed on se- Theory. lective research and study, delineation and ex- ploration of problem areas and the techniques of analysis, comparison, meaningful generaliza- decision-making and executive development tion, and synthesis. The scientific decision-making course is a The college recognizes the individual stu­ concentrated program of study in mathematical dent as the focal point of its educational effort. principies and techniques used in-managerial Participative educational techniques are em- decision-making. Stress is placed on those ployed which exploit the students capacity for tools, techniques, and procedures which en- leaming and development under the stimuli of compass quantitative analysis in order to op- a small-group setting. This basic educational timize decision-making. Areas examined in- setting consists of approximately 15 students clude mathematical analysis, quantification, under the guidance of a facultv member, some- and model building, emphasizing the mana- times supplemented by one or more visiting gerial aspects of operations research and other experts in the role of instructors or panelists. selected managerial mathematical techniques. On occasion a larger group of 30 or 40 students The executive development program is a is the pattem, when a combination of direct program of applicatory instruction and leam- instruction and group participation is desired. 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EXV

Small-group activity takes the following tured presentations by guest panelists with or forms: without class participation through questions from the floor, and briefings and orientations • Discussion and practical exercises by faculty, guest speakers, or briefing teams. based on demanding preparation Auditorium activity, of whatever kind, is nor- through assigned reading and studv mally liinited to one period in an academic day. • Case studies involving problem-solv- ing and decision-making in-depth field studies • Student presentations, single and group The overall emphasis on studying manage- • Opinion-seeking panei discussions ment in depth has also been extended to our • Role-playing and simulation exercises, field studies. In this years program, in addition ineluding games to one-day field trips in the Washington-Balti- • Simulations conducted both with and more area, 23 small groups of students, each without Computer assistance and in a accompanied by a faculty trip director, visited variety of forms a total of 109 industrial organizations and other • Exercises designed to further indi­ facilities during December in selected areas vidual executive growth throughout the United States. One week was devoted to these studies, during which certain • Group analysis designed to promote student groups spent this entire period with understanding of the nature of group single large industrial enterprises instead of processes dividing their time among a number of firms. • Direct on-site observation and analy­ The educational experience gained from these sis of operations and processes in-depth studies ( which were started in 1964- through organized fiekl studies 65 as a pilot program) has proved so rewarding • Instruction by faculty or guest in- that this approach will undoubtedly be extend­ structors ed in the future. During all field studies, students engage in • Otlier methods conducive to student frank and informal discussions of defense in­ participation and involvement. dustry’s problems with management personnel The resident program includes a carefullv at the top leveis. Our primary purpose is to integrated schedule of about 100 lectures each provide students with opportunities to conduct year by leading govemment officials and emi- intensified research and analysis of industrial nent authorities in business, industry, labor, management problems, rather than the more education, science, and other professional areas traditional on-site observation of produetion related to the college mission, ineluding the processes. militarv. In addition to these one-week domestic The lecture method is regarded at the col­ field studies, two weeks have been set aside as lege as primarily a vehicle for direct communi- an integral part of the final unit of study for cation of authoritative opinions and insights either foreign or domestic travei that might be and illuminating syntheses of complex infor- required for researching important aspects of mation by individuais uniquely qualified to defense management problems assigned to stu­ expound and inteq>ret their special fields of dent committees. knowledge. The college also employs the lec­ ture method to impart information when writ- ten study materiais are inadequate or unsuit- The National Security able and, when appropriate, to supplement Sem inar School other techniques of education. Other types of auditorium activity include The first of the two extension programs committee presentations by students, unstruc- conducted by the Industrial College dates back to 1947. The National Securitv Seminars, as Prcsident Lyndon B. Johnson is greeted by Honorahle jthey are now called, are factual auditorium Cyrus R. Vance, Depoty Secretary of Defense, and ipresentations conducted in 14 cities each year Lt. General August Schomburg, Commandant of the by two teams of officer faculty members repre- Industrial College, before addressing a joint con- jsenting all the military departments. vocation of that college and National War College. Originally designed for selected sênior re- |serve officers, the program was later expanded 4o permit participation by interested represent­ ativos of the local business, academic, and civic community. At the end of 1965 a total of 270 seminars had been completed in 153 cities, 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

vvith a total enrollment of 160,970 military and cannot receive resident instruction and who in civilian conferees. current and future security programs may serve This program has won wide acclaim from in key positions in the nation’s military, govem- govemment, civic, educational, and business mental, or economic structure. The course leaders, and (along with our correspondence further seeks to assist in the development of a course) it has won honors for the past five con- better-informed leadership and management secutive years from the Freedoms Foundation in support of national security objectives. It is at Vallev Forge. It is regarded by many as one designed not to train specialists in any par­ of the most effective means available to the ticular field but rather to impart knowledge Department of Defense for keeping military of the various elements of our diverse, com- reservists and representatives of the public in- plex economy and of the interdependence of formed about national security affairs. our economy and national security. Military and civilian conferees who attend The course is open to military officers of all a required percentage of the scheduled pro­ components of the Department of Defense and gram periods are presented certificates of com- the Coast Guard, serving in active or inactive pletion. In addition, military participants re- status in the grade of major or lieutenant com- ceive active duty training credits provided for mander and above; civilian executives, mem- by pertinent regulations. bers of the several professions, and federal em­ The suggested quotas for each seminar are ployees with ratings of GS-11 and above; and 50 each from the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, certain military and federally employed na­ and Air Force Reserve. In addition, the military tionals of friendly foreign countries. quota may include persons in uniform from the For admission, a college education or its National Guard, Coast Guard, Regular Forces, equivalent is highly desirable, but compensat- and Public Health Service. ing education and experience may be accepted for enrollment. All applicants are considered on their individual merits. The A certificate of completion is awarded to Correspondence School every student who satisfactorily completes the course, that is, who attains a minimum passing Our graduate - levei correspondence average of 60 percent on the evaluation exam- course, “The Management of National Secu­ inations. Reserve officers not on extended active rity,“ previously entitled “The Economics of duty who enroll may eam as many as 48 credit National Security,” has been conducted since points for retention and retirement. The aver­ 1950. More than 21,000 active and reserve offi- age time required to complete the course is, cers, federal govemment employees, business 14 months. executives, and selected foreign students have completed it. Present enrollment is 4750, in- cluding 650 foreign nationals. -A.s a graduate-level educational The texts are in use in hundreds of libraries institution, the Industrial College depends throughout the United States and in 51 friendly heavilv on the products of research in fulfílling foreign countries, including foreign war col- its educational objectives. The Director of Aca- leges. Of the 22 course volumes, 20 have been demic Plans and Research provides staff super- translated into five languages: Spanish, Por- vision over all research activity in the college tuguese, French, German, and Chinese. Five and does a significant amount of research re- nations—Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and lating to curriculum and methodology plan- Venezuela—have incorporated the major por- ning. The Textbook Development Group of the tions of the course into their military educa­ Correspondence School, a small group of pro- tional systems. fessional writers with specialized competence The objective of the course is to extend the in broad areas of the college mission, develops facilities of the Industrial College to those who course educational materiais, which are used MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE 25 to some extent in the resident course and ex- devoted to advanced research projects or to tensively outside the college. The National Se- further professional education or to a combi- curitv Seminar School employs a professional nation of both. researcher to assist the members of its faculty In the Resident School, each student re­ in developing their seminar presentations. search project is devoted to analysis in depth Apart from these speeifically assigned re- of a “live” problem area of defense manage- sponsibilities, faculty members engage in re- ment. Most of these projects are selected from search of vaiying depth in connection with lists of such problems suggested, at the request their teaching and professional self-develop- of the college, by various agencies in the De­ ment and with ad hoc projects. Under a policy partment of Defense. inaugurated during the past year, sabbatical This research program is completely flexi- leaves by members of the pennanent civilian ble with respect to the form of the written faculty for periods as long as a vear may be paper representing the end product. The stu-

Believing that professional development requires action and deep individual involvement, the College affords students the opportunitij to address student committees, the 15-member basic educational unit. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

dent may vvrite a staff paper, an article, a re- varying theories on how this subject should search report, a monograph for use in the col- be taught. We are currently conducting an lege textbook series, a case study, or whatever extensive inquiry into methods employed by type of paper is most suitable to the project. govemment agencies, industry, and other edu- He may also write a thesis in fulfillment of re- cational institutions. Ultimately, we expect to quirements for an advanced degree. be able to present a program of our own, using Collaborative researeh bv small teams of carefully selected instructional materiais best two or three students is highly encouraged, in suited to the objectives of the Industrial Col­ recognition of the vital importance of expe- lege. rience in group researeh. One group of care- fullv selected students, for example, is current- planning for the future ly engaged in becoming thoroughly familiar with the computer-assisted simulation project As a basis for planning, we have under- of the Joint War Games Agency known as the taken a continuous program of researeh and Technological, Economic, Military, Political study in four main areas, sequentially: Evaluation Routine ( temper). A conference • student analysis and panei discussion on the status of this proj­ • govemment requirements of gradu- ect was conducted at the college last Novem- ates ber by the Interagency Group on Strategic • course content Studies ( in a g r o ss). The potentiality of this • curriculum effectiveness project as a vehicle for education at the Indus­ trial College is now being studied in depth. As soon as we obtain incoming student lists, we communicate with the students, de­ termine capabilities, and shape our instruc- problems tion. When students arrive, this analysis is con- We are not without problems. Three are tinued and adjustments made accordingly. currently being given serious examination: After graduation, assignment patterns are (1) The possible need for organizing instruc- studied to determine the effectiveness of our tion by basic disciplines, each under a professor program in terms of produetivity of graduates. so designated. These disciplines might include, The basic problem in this area is to under- among others, Military Science, Political Sci­ stand thoroughly the diversified professional ence, Behavioral Science, Economics, and and educational backgrounds of the students. Management Sciences. The pattem from one class to the next is never (2) A longer term of assignment for military constant. This points up a great need for what facultv members to permit the full benefits of can be termed pvramidal development in mili­ their background and experience to be realized. tary education: to make sure that students Assignment at present is for three years, with enter sênior educational institutions at a fairlv the possibility of extension to four. A minimum uniform levei of education and then continue of four years would be desirable with a maxi- to develop together the basic knowledge and mum tumover of one-quarter of the faculty skills required in their midcareer environment. each year. However, we recognize the prob­ Leaming more about govemment require­ lems faced by the military Services in this re­ ments for graduates is a key objective toward gar d. which we are proceeding. There is much to be (3) The scientific decision-making course, done in this area. Once these requirements are as presented this year, demonstrated that the more fully known, we can maximize the quality college should further develop the course con- of instruetion for each student by determining tent and methodology. Our objective is to ori- the higher plateau of leaming desirable in his ent the course in such a way that the needs case and then guide him accordingly. of defense managers for knowledge in this With respect to course content, the con- area will be more fully satisfied. There are tinuing analysis of student backgrounds and MANAGEMENT FOR DEFENSE 27

requirements for graduates enables us to de­ trial College educational activities. Like all termine the most effective vvays to improve our plans that attempt to divine the future, we are curriculum. Continued work in this regard well aware that we must be content with a fair should pav big di\’idends in terms of meaning- amount of estimate and conjecture; but this ful student leaming. we are willing to accept with the knowledge Curriculum effectiveness is a measure of that the plan will be seasoned with opinions progress toward our objective. Much of this from the best minds inside and outside the De­ effectiveness will be determined by faculty ex- partment of Defense. perience. Our rationale is quite simple. The It is well to remember that in less than five govemment spends over a million dollars on years our student body will include not one the Industrial College program each year. As World War II veteran. Students will be men in any business, \ve must show a profit in terms who consider nuclear energy and space con- of acceptance and effectiveness of our “prod- quest routine. uct.” Our program cannot be based on tradition We are determined that we shall not be or intuition. We cannot sit in an ivory tower, found guilty of teaching in isolation from the divorced from realities. real and future world. We intend to survey our This rationale rests on the premise that we market, keep abreast of change, and keep in are mission-oriented. We strive for a clear un- constant touch with our environment. In this derstanding of our mission, and we do what is way we hope to maintain a high degree of wanted of us. In the real world of national de­ vitality in our efforts to assist outstanding mili- fense, we believe that education for the sake tary officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and of education itself is an absolute waste of time. Marine Corps and selected executives from the In order to provide a logical and concep- federal govemment to increase their effective­ tual framework for long-range development, ness as leader-managers of national security we are working out a five-year plan of Indus­ affairs. Industrial College of the Armed Forces L ieu t en a n t Colonel Joseph E. Fix III

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which tlie U.S. engineering and technical personnel, scientific person- reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but nel, and all working personnel engaged in building up in fact it isnt. Of cotirse, the atom bomb is a weapon of China’s national defenses, as well as various regions mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by and departments throughout the country which, under the people, not by one or two new types of weapons the leadership of the party [emphasis added], displayed a spirit of relying on their own efforts and making Mao Tse-tung (1946) enterprising endeavors. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council warmly congratulate themr China exploded an atom bomb in the western re- gion of China at 1500 hours (Peiping time) on 16 Octo- Communiqué—Red Flag, Peiping (1964) ber 1964 and thereby conducted successfully its first nuclear test. The success of China's nuclear test is a major HE TIME distance between the fore- achievement of the Chinese people in the strengthen- going pronouncements is measurable ing of their defense and safeguarding of their mother- land, as well as a major contribution made by the T finitely as eighteen years. Not so readilv Chinese people to the cause of the defense of world ascertainable are the multitudinous factors peace. leading up to the complete change of philoso- The success of this test was due to the hard work phy regarding nuclear weapons as expressed in and the great coordinated effort of China’s workers, the Red F/tzg communiqué. The purpose of this: CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT 29

discussion will be to explore and analyze the out of Chinas nuclear program was minimized. developments within China, and vvithout, that As late as April 1964, a United States spokes- contributed to this apparent dichotomy. man stated that China would not become a It can be said with some eertainty that, of nuclear military threat in this decade. He went all the major powers, the world has awaited on to say that the Chinese program “will not with most anxiety Chinas appearance in the produce . . . meaningful results in weaponry. ranks of nuclear-armed nations. For the past ”5 several years worldwide speculation has been On 29 September 1964 the period of long rampant as to when that day might come. waiting started to draw to a close. On that date The estimates ranged from as earlv as 1961 Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced to to as late as 1965 or 1966. Disparities in date the world that the Chinese Communists “were of achievement notwithstanding, all sources approaching the point where they might be agreed on the inevitabihtv of the event. able to detonate a first nuclear device.” He One other similarity of the estimates should added that the United States would announce be noted: the tendency to deprecate Chinas the explosion when it occurred.6 efforts in the nuclear field and to underestimate On 16 October President Lyndon B. the levei of scientific achievement that she Johnson confirmed that the Chinese had in- might be expected to attain with the explosion deed exploded their first nuclear device at 1500 of her first nuclear device. For instance, one hours Peiping time (0300 Eastem Daylight noted United States scientific observer, physi- Time). Analysis of the resultant airbome radio- cist John A. Berberet, writing in 1960, flatly active debris bv U.S. agencies subsequently rejected the possibihty that the Chinese could indicated that enriched uranium-235 (not make use of gas ultracentrifuging techniques plutonium-239) had been employed. The yield to separate uranium-235 from natural uranium. was estimated as being equivalent to twenty He felt that centrifuges had not been estab- kilotons. The explosion had taken place near lished as feasible for use in the development Lop Nor in the Taklamakan Desert in Sinkiang of weapons and (as of 1960) “would not affect Province in the far northwest reaches of China.T the capability of the Chinese to produce nu­ There is one interesting sidehght with re- clear armaments.”3 gard to the timing of the first Chinese nuclear In this connection a whole series of postu- explosion that can be noted. Early on 16 Octo­ lates was developed as to why the Chinese ber, Radio Moscow announced the overthrow would opt to develop initially a plutonium of Khrushchev. Almost simultaneously Peiping bomb rather than a more complex weapon published the official Chinese communiqué on utilizing uranium-235. In sum, these reasons the explosion, the congratulations of the Partv were proffered: Central and the Cabinet on the explosion, and —An abundance of open literature on all a cable of congratulations to Brezhnev and phases of plutonium technology, including Kosygin. The latter cable, signed by Mao, Liu bomb technology, was available. Shao-chi, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai, also ex- pressed the hope that the Chinese and Soviet —Technological processes for making plu- peoples would eontinuously develop “fraternal tonium-239 were simpler than for making and unbreakable friendship.”8 The coincidence uranium-235. is quite remarkable, although nothing to date —Plutonium-239 was cheaper to produce has suggested that it was anything other than than uranium-235. coincidence. —The processes for making plutonium-239 The Chinese government has long been were similar to the processes for making atomic aware that the position it had adopted on nu­ power. This fact was believed to be especially clear arms had placed it in a disadvantageous attractive to the Chinese, since the results position vis-à-vis the United States and the would be twofold.4 Soviet Union as far as world opinion was con- Similarly, any military capability growing cemed. Precluded from signing the Nuclear 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Test Ban Treaty of 1963 by its own compul- ist nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail sive desire to attain nuclear status, China con- policy.”11 stantlv put forth counterproposals that were On 17 October 1964 Chou En-lai sent a neither realistic nor acceptable to the majority message to the heads of govemment of the of the test ban signatories. In the main, China countries of the world. In this message Chou proposed a summit conference of the govem- officially conveyed the Chinese govemment’s ments of the world at which agreement would proposal, contained in the statement of 16 be sought to ban the use of nuclear weapons October, for a summit conference on nuclear and to obtain their ultimate destruction.” weapons. The purpose of this conference would No suitable occasion was allowed to pass be if China felt that it could serve as a platform . . . to discuss the question of the complete for propaganda purposes to serve its ends. An prohibition and thorough destruction of nu­ example was the meeting of the lOth World clear weapons and that, as a first step, the Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen summit conference should reach an agreement Bombs which convened on 27 July 1964 in to the effect that the nuclear powers and those Tokyo, Japan. Chou En-lai, in his capacity as countries which may soon become nuclear Premier of the State Council, sent a warm mes- powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, sage to the conference on 28 July, a portion of neither to use them against non-nuclear coun­ which read: tries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other.12 The Chinese govemment and people have unswervingly stood for the complete prohibi- China’s gambit was not successful. The tion and thorough destruction of nuclear weap­ impact of its scientific accomplishment was too ons. They have consistently stood on the side significant to be minimized by any propaganda of the people of all countries who oppose offensive, no matter how well conceived or imperialist aggression and defend world peace, long implemented. Additionally, the real mo­ and resolutely support the Japanese people’s tive that underlay Chou’s proposal was more struggle for national independence, peace, than obvious to all but the most svmpathetic of and democracy. It is our belief that with the observers. joint efforts of the people all over the world, The United States, of course, rejected out- nuclear war can be checked and world peace right the Communist proposal. President John­ safeguarded.10 son on 18 October said that China “fools no one Chinas ambivalence in this matter of crucial when it offers to trade away its first small ac- concem to the well-being of the world was cumulation of nuclear power against the mighty highlighted by the timing of Chous message. arsenais of those who limit Communist Chinese In retrospect one can see that it was drafted ambitions.” To prove their sincerity, the Presi­ and dispatched to serve its singular purpose dent called upon the Chinese to sign and sup­ at the precise period when preparations to ex­ port the Test Ban Treaty.13 plode China’s first nuclear weapon were enter- Reaction varied throughout the rest of the ing their final phase. world. The general consensus in Great Britain Concurrently with the announcement of was that China s achievement, while significant, the nuclear test, the Chinese govemment did not alter immediately the strategic balance launched a determined effort to defend its ac- of force. The British felt that, while there was tion in the face of expected unfavorable world no doubt that the weaker Asian nations would opinion. The press communiqué, govemment be impressed, the impact might prove tem- statement, and the congratulatory message of porary.11 the Central Committee and State Council, all The French govemment, based on its own issued on 16 October, reiterated the theme that experiences, was more sympathetic to the China’s accomplishment was a “major contribu- Chinese. The explosion also tended to support tion . . . to the cause of the defense of world President Charles de Gaulle s version of the peace” and “an effective blow to U.S. imperial­ world arena and bases of power. Notwithstand- C ti IN A—THE NUCLEAR TH RE AT 31

ing this factor, Paris saw Peiping as being at We feel grave doubts about the intentions the beginning of a “long—and painful—road.”15 of the Communist Chinese leaders who launeh The Latin American nations were gen- a nuclear test explosion with a view to devel- erally restrained in voicing their impressions. oping their nuclear arsenal and who in the same breath advocate the holding of a world On the whole, however, there was an apprecia- summit conference on the prohibition of nu­ tion of Chinas technical prowess. The feeling clear weapons. was also expressed that Chinas new status If the People’s Republic of China truly could have an effect on military and political desires a ban on the use of nuclear weapons alignments throughout the world.16 and their total destruction, the course it should In África and Southeast Asia reaction was take is not to work for the buildup of their mixed and encompassed fear, anger, and ad- nuclear strength but, first of all, to adhere to the miration. An influential newspaper in Cairo partial test-ban treaty, then to cooperate with said that the test was “progress in the wrong the other nuclear powers to expand it into a direction.” índia denounced the act as an comprehensive test-ban treaty and to facilitate “aggression on peace and securitv.” Speculation the achievement of nuclear disarmament.20 also was voiced as to whether Chinas nuclear No clearer or blunter exposé of China’s explosion might not in time redound to her fraudulent posing could have been spoken. disfavor.17 That it carne from a foremost Asian nation, and Particularly significant was the Soviet one that has loomed large in Chinas future Union’s handling of Chou En-lai's call for a economic plans, made it all the more important summit conference. First, the Russians took and significant. China reportedly was “dis- until 28 December to reply to the Chinese mes- mayed” by this expression, and similar others, sage. Second, they made no obvious attempt to and issued a series of statements denouncing publicize their action but left it up to the Japanese “hostility” toward Peiping.21 Chinese to do so. Third, the Russian message A completely valid evaluation of the ef- appeared to be purposely low-keyed: Premier fects of China’s first nuclear explosions cannot Kosvgin merely agreed to attend the conference yet be made. Obviously they have caused many and stated that Chous proposal was in com­ of the govemments of the world to make certain plete accord with Soviet policy.ls If the Peiping changes in their policy toward China. govemment was searching for spirited Russian In Asia, however, China’s immediate neigh- support, it appears that they were doomed to bors cannot feel much more threatened than disappointment. they have felt heretofore. Japan—a key Asian The Chinese Communists also fared poorly nation—has reacted to date more in indignation at the United Nations. Secretary-General U than fear. This fact is very important, for nu­ Thant deplored the test and said it was “par­ clear weaponry, with its fallout, is a well- ticularly regrettable.” In his view the Test Ban remembered and crucial issue in Japan. That Treaty indicated how deeply the world was the Japanese have responded so far in this way concemed over the matter of nuclear tests. He can have widespread repercussions far beyond did feel, however, that a conference of the Japan’s borders. As one authoritative Asian nuclear powers might prove profitable if it newspaper has observed, “Peking may yet be could be arranged sometime in 1965.lfi Implicit sorry for her adventure into the realm of atomic in U Thant’s modification of the Chinese pro­ armaments.”22 posal was the apparent desire to avoid fumish- Among the many statements made by ing the Chinese govemment a propaganda agencies of the United States following the sounding board, which a worldwide conference first Chinese test, one of the most significant would inevitably become. was that of the Department of Defense given Of all of the nations’ reactions, the one on 22 October 1964. China’s nuclear capabili- which may well have caused the Chinese the ties were then evaluated as follows: ideepest concem was that of Japan. Foreign iMinister Etsusaburo Shiina expressed his gov­ First, . . . the device that was detonated emment s concem in these blunt words: . . . was of a primitive character. . . . Because 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

it was large and unwieldy, it is difficult to de- It was during this same period that the- liver. It will be important, therefore, that they Chinese leadership reorganized the nation’s en­ concentrate on advancing their technology to tire scientific and technological community. A reduce the size, increase the power, increase key feature of the reorganization was the es- the efficiency of the device, making it both more effective when delivered, but particularly tablishment of a new Scientific Planning Com- making it easier to deliver. I think it will mittee as the responsible agency in lieu of the take years for them to accomplish what Great Academy of Science. The committee subse- Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States quently selected the fielcl of atomic energy as have accomplished. being of the highest priority. Secondly, as to supersonic aircraft, it will As part of their assistance program, the be years and years before they develop those. Russians built and put into operation at Peiping VVith the assistance of the Soviets, they were on 1 July 1958 a 10,000-kilowatt reactor. Ac -í beginning to fabricate or assemble aircraft in tually the first chain reaction is reported to have the late 1950’s. That assembly and fabrication occurred on 13 June 1958. From that time for-; stopped at that time. It will be a very difficult ward China can be considered to have become matter for them not only to start the assembly a nuclear energy producer.25 operations again, but particularly to produce and manufacture the parts for that assembly. The year 1958 was important for the . . . So we would expect no sophisticated air­ Chinese in other respects. The University oi craft production from Communist China for a Science and Technology opened in Peiping in number of years. the fali. Stressing subjects dealing with the Thirdlv, with respect to missiles, they development of atomic energy, the university' have been carrying on missile research, missile acted as a focal point for other Chinese uni- development, rather unsuccessfully. . . . These, versities and institutes engaged in atomic tech­ however, are short-range missiles. It will be nology. It performed the same function foi years and years before they are able to develop atomic research centers that many of the prov- those successfully and still additional years be­ inces and cities had established. In 1958 the fore they will be able to develop missiles of first uranium also was produced in China.26 intercontinental range.23 The foregoing developments were noi While these views are essentially correct, they without special significance. Indications now may be undulv optimistic. Information avail- are that Mao had decided in 1957 to produce hn able in many unclassified, nongovemmental own nuclear armaments.27 In part, this decisior sources indicates that Chinas nuclear program may have been based on a secret Sino-Soviei may be more advanced—scientifically and mili- agreement, signed on 15 October 1957, b\ tarily—than is generallv believed. In view of which the Russians promised to provide Chiní this situation, an analysis of China s entire nu­ with a sample nuclear bomb and sufficiem clear program, based on open sources, seems to teehnical information to enable the Chinese tc be in order. build their own. Because of subsequent Chinês* intransigence toward Soviet demands for closei control of the Chinese military forces, the Rus Cbina’s N uclear Capabilities sians broke this promise in 1959. According t( According to available information, it ap- the Chinese govemment when it released the pears certain that China began the develop­ secret documents in 1963 during the height O' ment of a nuclear technology in 1953. Initially the Sino-Soviet dispute, no nuclear bomb evei the program was carried on under the guise of was fumished.28 From 1959 onward, China pro developing peaceful uses for atomic energy. ceeded on its own to develop its nuclear capa The following year the Soviet Union signed an bility. agreement with China to cooperate in the fields China was not without native resources ii of Science and technology. In 1955 Rússia the pursuit of this gigantic undertaking. Th* agreed to help China in building an experi­ head of the nuclear program was Dr. Chiei mental reactor and accelerators.24 San-chiang, a brilliant nuclear phvsicist wh* CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT 33

had eamed his Ph.D. at the University of Paris nuclear status.31 One indication that the prob­ in 1943. Dr. Chien had worked closelv vvhile in lem has been alleviated is a recent report which France with Madame Irène Joliot-Curie, and claims that there are now “thousands” of top- the Scientifie Committee of France had notch nuclear scientists and technicians in awarded him a príze for his work in this field. China.3- Dr. Chien also could rely on many other sênior Equally important to the Chinese leader- Chinese scientists who had been trained in the ship was the availability of the natural resources United States, other Western nations, and Rús­ required for the manufacture of nuclear weap­ sia and who had retumed to China. It has been ons. On this score they were well supplied. As estimated that China had available to work in early as 1944 Chinese prospectors discovered this program severa! hundred scientists who sizable deposits of uranium in Sinkiang.33 Com- had majored in the field of nuclear phvsics."9 mercial exploitation of this rich deposit com- In this latter connection. a studv conducted menced in 1951. Subsequently, other uranium in 1960 bv two United States scientifie analysts deposits were discovered in Kashgar, Anshan, has special significance. The purpose of the Altai, and Chuguchak. By 1954 uranium out- study was to determine the number of scientifie put was 320 percent greater than in 1951. Since and technical personnel required bv a nation to that date produetion has increased.34 It is ob- build installations in which nuclear weapons vious that China has more than enough raw could be produced on a continuous basis.30 On uranium to meet its needs. the basis of projected data, approximately 1300 Similarly, other studies indicated that engineers and 500 scientists were foreseen as China had adequate stockpiles of the other being needed to meet the maximum require- materiais required for the support of nuclear ments of the task.° The numbers needed from technology. Graphite, aluminum, various fer- the major professions were as follows: rous produets, Chemicals, and special materiais such as zirconium, lithium, enriched boron, Chemists—325 magnesium, indium, gallium, thulium, niobium, Physicists—150 Chemical Engineers—400 and others were reported in produetion as long Mechanical Engineers—350 ago as 1960.35 Electrical Electronics Engineers—200 In brief, it appears quite obvious that the Radiological Engineers—130 rupture which saw the Russians withdraw their Metallurgists—125 aid from the Chinese nuclear program in 1959 Civil/Architectural Engineers—75. was not fatal, even coming as it did in the midst of the chaotic years of the “Great Leap For- The study results indicate that China had suf- ward.” While the Chinese were probably ficient personnel to undertake the nuclear slowed in their progress, they possessed suf- weapons project without outside help. The fieient manpower, technical know-how, and main problem, it would appear, probablv resources to continue on their own. stemmed from the qualitv of the personnel At the beginning of 1961 the Chinese had available. To get the best scientists for this top- at least three reactors in operation: the 10,000- priority project, the Chinese were probably kilowatt reactor at Peiping and others located forced to cannibalize other sectors and suffer in Paotou and Shanghai.30 The amount of the resulting inefficiencies in their quest for uranium or plutonium that this reactor complex has produced is difficult to estimate because of

°The study stipulated that these prrsonnel would be con- the paucity of published, open information on cemcd directly with research and devflopment, design, con- this subject. One source estimated that the Struction. operation, and homh testing. If other furictions were tonsidered. suth a4 “produetion of raw materiais or finished Chinese had available in mid-1960 sufficient produet* for the variou* facilitir*," the number of professional perrvmnd would ha ve to br doubled. Based on data available in plutonium for one device.87 Extending the data 1^60, the authors comluded that the program would iB t up the fullowing pertentages of China*s scientifie and technical per­ on which this estimate was based would in­ sonnel: 1.15 percent of the scientists; 1.5 percent of the dicate that, at the time of their first explosion, phvsicists, 2.16 percent of the chemists. and 0.65 percent of the total number of engineers, without regard to types of engineers. the Chinese could have had sufficient material 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW for at least three bombs. A report published in “gun-barrel” technique. While both techniques October 1964, just before the first explosion, are known to the United States—in fact were was less sanguine of Chinese capabilities. This developed here—nonetheless the use of the report speeulated that only one or two nuclear more difficult ímplosion method, in which tests vvould consume all the nuclear stockpile fissionable material is wrapped in high explo- that the Chinese had.38 As of this writing, all sives and then compressed by the detonation that can be stated definitely is that the Chinese of the high explosive to create a self-sustaining had sufíicient uranium-235 to explode two nu­ nuclear reaction, “surprised United States au- clear devices. A more accurate quantitative esti- thorities.”42 mate will have to await more definitive data It would seem from the foregoing that the than have been published. Chinese test—particularly considering that it This last statement leads logically to the was their first test and accomplished with.out most puzzling—and disturbing—of the ques- outside help from Rússia or any other nation tions relating to China’s nuclear capabilities. as far as it is known—was indeed a scientifically Just how far advanced are the Chinese in their sophisticated operation. A repórter who at- nuclear weaponry? As indicated earlier, the tended the various press briefings expressed Chinese scientific efforts in this area have un- his impressions in these words: dergone a certain amount of denigration. For . . . administration experts were surprised by instance, the Department of Defense referred the fact that it involved a more advanced tech­ to the first Chinese device as “primitive.” De- nique using enriched uranium rather than plu- spite statements such as these, there is con- tonium. . . . [It was not indicated] whether siderable evidence that the explosion on 16 China has a gaseous diffusion plant, as indi­ October 1964 indicated a higher degree of cated by the Atomic Energy Commission’s sophisticated technology than had been be- disclosure that the device used enriched ura­ lieved the Chinese were capable of.39 nium . . . [or] whether U.S. intelligence knew Just prior to the first shot, inklings ap- in advance that it involved U-235 instead of plutonium.43 peared that China was doing quite well. On 12 October 1964 a national newsmagazine re- There the matter rests at this writing. It ported that United States intelligence sources should be noted, though, that the majority of believed China was building a large-scale, unclassified sources agree that China’s achieve- gaseous-diffusion plant. A plant of this type is ments were greater than had been expected. necessary to mass-produce the ingredients of From these facts a new line of conjecture nuclear weapons. The story went on to say that has evolved. United States observers already while the development of this capability was have discussed the possibility that China might costly in terms of money and time, China had try to develop thermonuclear weapons as to attain this capability if it expected to become quickly as possible.44 A noted Japanese nuclear a first-rate nuclear power.40 physieist, Dr. Seitaro Nakamura of the Tokyo After the Chinese explosion and subse- University Institute for Nuclear Physics, is even quent analysis of the airbome radioactive de- more specific. Based upon his analysis of bomb bris, the evidence was quite startling. First, the debris which yielded uranium-238 and ura- Chinese had employed a complex technology nium-237 “in surprisingly great quantities,” Dr. and had used uranium-235 rather than the Nakamura feels that the Chinese test was ac- comparatively simpler plutonium-239. Second, tually a “moderator test,” which is usually made the use of uranium-235 strongly indicated that just before a hydrogen bomb test. The Japanese the Chinese had in use a gaseous-diffusion plant expert firmly believes that the Chinese will to extract the radioactive isotope from natural progress from “fission to fusion at a far more uranium ore.41 rapid pace than expected.45 This is a disturbing Equallv revealing was the evidence that possibility indeed. the Chinese had used an ímplosion technique The all-important question of how well for firing its device, rather than the expected China is doing can only be answered by analy- CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT 35

sis of her future tests. ! these shots are gen- would truly make militarily credible a threat erally the same as regareis vield-to-weight ratio which is now mostly propaganda. The impact and have the same gen« ral characteristics, it of this development on Chinas Asian neighbors will tend to indicate tha( Chinese research still would be considerable. has some distance to go in the weapon design With regard to a missile-delivered weapon, field. If, on the other hand, successive shots there are indications that China may not be show dramatic improvement, or a thermonu- “vears and years” away from develop ing a clear weapon is developed more quickly than short- or medium-range missile, as has been is anticipated, all doubt will then be removed indicated. At least one highly respected foreign as to the nuclear capability of China.46 Con- agency has stated flatly that “China is well sidering all the foregoing factors, it would seem along in developing her missile technology.”40 the better part of prudence at least to expect This claim is bome out by a U.S. observer the latter eventualitv. who has said that the Chinese rocket program The abilitv of China to deliver anv nuclear has been a development parallel to the nuclear weapon that she may develop is difficult to bomb program. Dr. Chu-yuan Ciieng, a mem- assess. There have been no known reported ber of the Center for Chinese Studies at the firings of Chinese missiles, and the test device University of Michigan, feels th.u. too many are used in the first shot allegedlv was too large to making the mistake of also undei estimating the fit either in any aircraft currently in the Chinese capability of the Chinese in the rocket field. Air Force inventory or in any that China might The Chinese Communists are well aware, Dr. be expected to have in the near future.47 Data Cheng points out, that a missile capability will on the second shot are no more revealing. How- make their nuclear threat infinitely more cred­ ever, in view of what has been discussed ible.50 They are therefore pressing to attain that heretofore, it would be wise not to be overly capability. optim is tic. The project manager for China’s rocket As was pointed out, the scientific qualitv program is Dr. Chien Hsueh-sen, a scientist of Chinas nuclear test shot far surpassed considered among the top aeronautical and jet Western expectations. Thus, it is logical to as­ propulsion engineers in the world. A graduate sume that one of the first orders of business for student in science from Massachusetts Institute the Chinese nuclear physicist will be to reduce of Technology, he also holds a doctorate in the size and weight of the device used in the aeronautical engineering from Califomia In­ subsequent shots (unless, that is, they are at- stitute of Technology. Dr. Chien has had exten- tempting a quantum jump to a fusion weapon). sive experience in his field, teaching at M.I.T. Consider that the Russian-built Tu-4 bomber from 1947 to 1949 and serving as a consultant to has roughlv the same capabilities as the U.S. the United States Navy. When he retumed to B-29 bomber48 that delivered the 20-kiloton China in 1955, he started work immediately Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons, and con­ on a missile program. He was assisted in his sider further that China’s first shot was far more work by a number of other Chinese rocket ex- advanced than the 1945 Alamogordo test shot. perts who also had been trained in the West.51 In light of these facts, reduetion in the size and Starting in 1959, several schools were set weight of Chinese weapons to fit them into the up by the Chinese to work on jet and rocket Tu-4, 11-28, or Viscount aircraft does not seem propulsion and allied programs. Among these to pose an insuperable technical problem. schools were the Institute of Upper Atmosphere Accomplishment of that step would enable Physics in Wuhan and the Institute of Automa- China to have an air-deliverable weapon within tion and Remote Control and the Institute of a relatively short period of time, possibly by Mechanics and Electronics, both in Peiping. late 1965 or early 1966. Although the aircraft The overall program was under the Institute of mentioned are not supersonic aircraft, China Mechanics in the Academv of Sciences. does not now require any. The simple fact that To back up this ambitious training and she would have an operable weapon system developmental program, China has had to go 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

abroad to obtain mueh of the requisite sophis- ment. In 1958, at the time the 10,000-kilowatt ticated instrumentation and hardware that reactor was put into operation, the scientific were beyond her technical and industrial ca- budget was increased dramatically to $133 pacity to produce. As a result, in recent years million. This figure was increased to $340 mil­ China has imported a large amount of precision lion in 1959, and to $459 million in 1960. All in instruments from Czechoslovakia, East Ger- all, 1960 represented an increase of 28 times many, Japan, France, and Great Britain. Cur- over the 1955 budget, with the greater part rent expert opinion is that she now has suffi- apparently going into the nuclear program.56 cient technical means to proceed quite success- Experts have projected the 1958-60 ex- fullv in her programs for missiles and even for penditures forward into 1964 and have con- space satellites.53 cluded that the monies spent for Science and With the foregoing in mind, it would seem technology by China carne to approximately $3 more logical that the Chinese leadership would billion for the seven-year period. Assuming that opt for a missile system to make its current nu­ one-half of this amount went for the nuclear clear threat more credible rather than strive to program, this would indicate that China has develop a hvdrogen bomb. The decision could expended about $1.5 billion in this area.57 An- be changed, on the other hand, if the Chinese other estimate which ties in closely with the desired to capitalize in propaganda from the foregoing is that China .currently is spending shock waves which undoubtedly would be $.5 billion a year to develop her nuclear capa­ caused by their developing a hydrogen bomb bility.58 more quicklv than believed possible. Expert It is obvious that China has spent an in- opinion in the United States feels, however, ordinatelv large percentage of her budget on that the Communists will pursue first the at- nuclear weapons and weapon systems. This tainment of a missile capability.53 fact alone indicates the extreme need that the In this connection, the Chinese missile Sys­ Chinese leaders feel for an independent nuclear tem is expected to be of short- or medium-range capability. It is apparent that they realize fully capability. An intercontinental capability ap- the potential that this capability will add to the pears to be still quite far distant in the future.54 image of China as a first-rate world power. This last fact should not, and probably does not, bother Mao and Company. George Harris, writing in Look, presents what could well be Indications from the Past— the Chinese rationale in this matter: Im plications for the Future It is quite obvious that China is some years away from where the United States stands with As noted earlier, the world has awaited regard to an ic b m capability. But this sophisti- with apprehension the attainment by China of cated tvpe of weapon system is not needed by a nuclear capability. Now that she has exploded the Chinese to threaten her nearby neighbors. her first nuclear devices and is proceeding They [China] can pressure very effectively apace toward further improvements in her by building crude rockets or by rebuilding nuclear posture, the crucial question centers Russian-furnished IL-28 bombers so as to be around Chinas behavior once she achieves full able to carry nuclear weapons.55 status as a nuclear power. World opinion has The cost of nuclear weapons and weapon preponderantly tended toward the most pes- systems comes high. This truism applies to simistic of views. According to this school of China, as well as to any other nation, despite thought. China can be expected to be im- China’s relatively low economic levei of price petuous, irrational, reckless, adventuristic, war- indexes. Some idea of the impact and cost to like, unreasonable. Any adjective is acceptable the Chinese govemment of its bomb can be if it conjures a mental picture of a powerful gleaned from studies of the state budget. In giant hovering perpetuallv on the lcnife-edge 1955, approximately $16 million was being between petulant quietude and berserk rage. spent on scientific and technological develop- Is this image correct? If it is incorrect, does it CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT 37

serve anv natiorTs purpose, except Chinas, to On the contrary, it complicates it. But it is not perpetuate the legend? A world paralyzed by so terrifying a prospect as if we were to as­ unreasoning fear can hardly be expected to sume an irrational, irresponsible, or fanatical develop realistic policies to deal with the verv enemy in control of such immense powers of real challenge of China, which is serious enough destruetion.00 with ou t being overblown. In 1962 Mrs. Alice Langley Hsieh pre- A careful analvsis of the facts in the case dicted the use that China would make of her should tend to quiet the fearful and allay the enhanced prestige once she exploded her first worried as to how a nuclear-armed China might nuclear weapon. Stressing the fear complex be expected to act. At least this is the consensus that this achievement would engender, Mrs. of the more acutely perceptive Sinologists. Hsieh pointed out that this would enable Writing in 1960 and accurately foreseeing China, “within limits, to practise nuclear black- the pessimistic ambience of the period fol- mail toward her neighbors.”91 Implicit in this lowing the Chinese nuclear explosion, Allen rationale are two significant points: (1) fear Whiting attempted to place in proper focus would tend to paralvze all but the most resolute claims about“Chinas irrationahty.” He pointed of Asian states; (2) Chinas use of its nuclear out that the U.S.S.R. would never have given power would be rational and politic rather than China assistance in her nuclear program if the irrational and militarily violent. Soviet leadership truly had had doubts on this In June 1964 Mrs. Hsieh further elarified score. He further noted that during the vears the position of China with regard to nuclear 1950 to 1960 Peipings actions were “quite re- war. She pointed out that a key issue in the markable in the balance . . . chosen in the use Sino-Soviet dispute centered around Khrush- of revolutionary and traditional aspects of chevs charge that the Chinese believed in the policy.”59 inevitability of a third world war and advocated Whitings evaluation of the Chinese atti- “the creation of a thousand times higher civili- tude toward military use of nuclear power is zation on the corpses of hundreds of millions of best summed up in the following passages: people.”62 In Mrs. Hsiehs view, this charge was Certainly Mao’s repeated boast about the particularly irksome to the Chinese and they ‘superiority of men over weapons’ portends have taken pains to refute it or—at least—to greater belligerence when he possesses both blunt it. men and weapons. Yet Mao’s strategy does not In a similar vein and after analyzing the make military power the exclusive or even the contents of 29 classified Chinese Army Work primar»' means of policy. True, he once re- Bulletins, which carne into the hands of United marked, ‘Power grows out of the barrei of a States authorities a few years ago, Mrs. Hsieh gun.’ But this does not mean that the gun must stated: be field-fired to achieve one’s ends. Instead, .Vlao employs military power in a political way, The material underlines the caution that to threaten, to eajole, to harry, and to isolate charaeterizes Chinas externai military policies his enemies. Only in the final instance, where —a caution that was more than evident in the other means have failed and when victory is Quemoy incident in 1958 as well as in the re- certain [italics added], does he launch a frontal cent operations on the Sino-Indian border. In assault. suin. there is little in Chinese military doctrine, Here again the past decade is instructive. policy or behavior to support the thesis that the In the Indian and Burmese border disputes [in Chinese are militarily reckless or adventurist 1960], Peking’s military superiority was only [italics added ].fi3 marginally employed. Its mere presence was sufficient to advance the desired objectives. Ralph L. Powell, another noted observer Thus, we may expect Peking to use its nuclear of military matters in China, concurs with Mrs. capability primarily in a political, rather than Hsieh. Powells thesis is that it would be “sui­ a military way. Indeed, this is precisely what cidai” for China to engage in nuclear war, at its stronger ally has done so far. This does not least for the foreseeable future. China, there- simplify the problem for the United States. fore, in his view can be expected to use its 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

nuclear power primarily for “psychological and So it is with this brief survey of the nuclear propaganda purposes.”'14 aspect of China’s panoply of power. I well real­ In considera ti on of the foregoing, the idée ize that the many points made here are subject fixe that the leaders of China will suddenly be- to disagreement. Particularly is this true of the come rashly impetuous once they are nuclear- immediately preceding discussion dealing with armed is unrealistic and enervating: unrealistic the possible future course of China where I in the sense that experience has shown Mao and have indicated that a nuclear-armed China may Company to be coldlv calculating and opportun- not be as rashly impetuous as is commonly be- istic onlv when the chances for success appear lieved. to be high in their favor, as they gauge it; ener­ None of this is intended in any way in vating in the sense that fear can rob the nations diminution of the threat that China poses to the of the world of requisite judgment and reduce United States—and the world. On this score altematives to spastie reaction or pusillanimous Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, during a bril- inaction. Tendencies such as these must be liant speech at the United Nations, reindicted guarded against. Knowledge of Chinas future China for its continued threat to world peace. course, based on empirical data, is an important Speaking of Marshal Lin Piao’s recent state- asset indeed. ment entitled “Long Live the Victory of the There is one other aspect of this problem Peoples War," Ambassador Goldberg charac- worthy of note. In the preceding discussion of terized it as follows: Chinas attempt to influence world opinion, mention was made of the action taken by It is a call to change world order by force China s leaders to rebut Japan’s hostile reac- and violence in a period where force and vio- tions to the nuclear test. George Harris has lence can lead to the most disastrous conse- commented, apropos of this, as follows: quences for the entire world.66

For the free world, Red Chinas new But, just as we are meeting this threat power and ambition can only be a menace. today in Vietnam, led as it is by the “apostles of But. as Rússia found, such ambition brings . .. [China’s] philosophy,”67 so must we be pre- new discipline and the beginnings of restraint. pared to meet the threat when it is reinforced China’s heavy trade with Japan is jeopardized by nuclear arms in the future. At that crucial by fall-out. China’s infiltration project in África time it will be well to remember that, to date, would be blown to bits by further atomic ex- China has usecl her slim resources in a con- plosions. Aware of the stakes, Mao accompa- summately skillful way to attain her ends, yet nied his boast of his bomb with a pledge, ‘never in such a manner that she has not needlessly at any time and under any circumstances to be exposed herself. the first to use nuclear weapons.’63 Given that this same condition will prevail in the future, as I feel that it will, the course for Harriss proposition is one that should be the United States—and the world—is plain. kept in mind. There are indeed restraints on all China must then be convinced, beyond doubt, nations’ ambitions—China included. that nuclear blackmail will be no more profit- Churchills famous description of Rússia as able than have been the political and military being a “puzzle wrapped in a paradox inside of techniques that she has used so far. This con- an enigma” holds true in all respects for China vincing absolutely will require the most com- today. No analysis of China—either as an entity plex and skillful of diplomatic approaches, or as a segment of that entity—can be much underlaid if required with the use, implicit or more than speculation. The relative absence of explicit, of coercive force. But the nature of the hard data, the protective coloration of propa­ threat and the pressing requirement to search ganda on all that is visible to the outside world, for a viable world order realistically allow for and the tendency of observers to view things no other choice. Chinese either brightly or darkly—all have their effect. Air War College CHINA—THE NUCLEAR THREAT 39

Notes 1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: Interna­ category of material. Additionully, he speculates on the capabili- tional Publishers Co.. Inc.. 1954). Vol. V. p. 100. The quote is ties and problems which the Chinese might have in related fields extracted from Mao’s well-known talk with United States cor- such as reactor theory, control and instrumentation, Computer respondent Anna Louise Strong m August 1946. operutions, and bomb design. The results of the Chinese test 2. Press Communiqué. Hung-chi iRed Flag), Peiping, No. bore out closely Mr. Berberet’s speculations. ’0 28 October 1964. translated and published by U.S. Depart­ 36. Dr. C. Cheng, p. 32. Dr. Cheng believes that a fourth ment of Commerce. Joint Publications Research Service, Wash­ reactor was located at Lanchou. ington D.C., G.P.O., 9 December 1964, p. 1. Hereinafter cited 37. Ibid., p. 104. as JPRS—Red Flag. . 38. "With Red China Getting the Bomb," U.S. News and 3. John A. Berberet, Science and Technology in Com- World Report. LVII. 15 (12 October 1964), 38. munist China. Research Memorandum RM-60TMP-72, Santa 39. “China's Shot Tells u Startling Story,” Business W eek, Barbara. Califórnia, General Electric Company, 8 December Number 1834, 24 October 1964, p. 144. 1960. p. 103. 40. “With Red China Getting the Bomb,” p. 38. 4. Ibid.. p. 105-6. 41. “China’s Shot Tells a Startling Story/’ p. 144. Also 5. “Peking Not a Nuclear Threat This Decade . . . Stars see Howard Simons. "China’s Blast Raises Test Ban Fall-Out," and Stripes—European Edition, 16 April 1964, p. 3. Washington Post, 23 October 1964, reprinted in Current News, 6. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, quoted in “The Chinese Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 23 October 1964, Communist Nuclear Explosion." For Commanders—This Chang- p. 3. Mr. Simons wrote, “The employment of enriched uranium ing World. Department of Defense, Volume 4, No. 11, 1 means that the Chinese have completed and have in operation a December 1964, p. 1. Hereinafter cited as For Commanders. complex and costly gaseous diffusion plant, apparently sooner 7. Ibid., pp. 1. 4. than had been anticipated.” 8. Quoted in “K, Atom: Victory,” China News Analysis, 42. Simons, p. 3. No. 538, 23 October 1964. pp. 3-5. Hereinafter cited as CNA 43. John G. Norris, "McNamara Discounts Peking’s wo. Atomic Might,” Washington Post, 23 October 1964, reprinted in 9. For Commanders, p. 3. Current News, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 23 10. "Chou En-lai Greets lOth World Conference Against October 1964, pp. l:2-3:3. Also see Simons, p. 3: “. . . there Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs," Peiping, NCNA, 31 July 1964, was no doubt yesterday that the Chinese use of enriched uranium translated and quoted in Communist China Digest No. 131, carne as a surprise to many American officials." U.S. Department of Commerce. OfBce of Technical Services, 44. Simons, p. 3. Also see “China's Shot Tells a Startling Joint Publications Research Service, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., Story," p. 146. 20 October 1964, p. 2. 45. "Japanese Physicist on Chinese Thermonuclear Poten- 11. ]PRS—Red Flag, pp. 1-6. tial,” Statist (London, England), 20 November 1964, p. 481, 12. Ibid., pp. 7-8. reprinted in Current News, Department of Defense, Washington, 13. For Commanders, pp. 3-4. D.C., 14 January 1965, p. 13f. 14. “Red China's Bomb: How It Alters Things in the 46. “China's Shot Tells a Startling Story,” p. 146. World,” U.S. News and World Report, LVII, 17 (26 October 47. Norris, p. 3:3 . 1964), 50. 48. Ibid. In this connection, the possibility exists of using 15. Ibid the 11-28 jet bomber or even the British-built Viscount propjet 16. Ibid. transports which China bought in 1963. These could be modified 17. Ibid. Also see “China’s Shot Tells a Startling Story,” to haul bombs on short missions. See Ted Sell, "China’s Nuclear Business Weefc. Number 1834, 24 October 1964, pp. 144-45. Debut to Change U.S. Defenses,” Los Angeles Times, 18 October 18. “China Claims Soviets Back Nuclear Plan.” Washing- 1964, reprinted in Current News, Department of Defense, Wash­ ton Post, 2 January 1965, reprinted in Current News, Depart­ ington, D.C., 23 October 1964, p. 7:1. ment of Defense, Washington, D.C., 3 January 1965, p. 6. 49. “Chinese Missile Capability,” Royal Institute of 19. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Thant Asks Talks by Atom Technology, London, England, extract of which was presented Powers, Including Peking,” .Veie York Times, 23 October 1964, to Class 65, Air War College, during Course 65-3, Science, reprinted in Current News, Department of Defense, Washington, Technology and Weapons Systems, 7 December 1964. D.C., 23 October 1964, pp. 1:1, 2:1. 3. 50. Dr. C. Cheng, p. 30. 20. “Japan Tells Peking To Prove Intentions by Halting 51. Ibid. A-Tests,” Washington Post, 5 December 1964, reprinted in 52. Ibid. Current News, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 8 53. Ibid. December 1964, p. 4. 54. Ibid. 21. Seymour Topping, "Peking Attacks Tokyn ‘Hostility’: 55. T. George Harris, “The Chinese Bomb Menace,” Reds Said To Be Dismayed by Japan’s Altitude,” New York Look, XXVIII, 24 (1 December 1964), 28. Times, 9 December 1964, reprinted in Current News, Depart­ 56. Dr. C. Cheng, p. 29. ment of Defense, Washington, D.C., 9 December 1964, p. 4. 57. Ibid. 22. CNA 538. p. 4. 58. “Red China's Bomb: How It Alters Things in the 23. Press conference on 22 October 1964, quoted in For World,” p. 49. Commanders, p. 2. 59. Allen S. Whiting, “The Logic of Communist China’s 24. Dr. Chu-yuan Cheng, interview, “The Truth about Red Policy: The First Decade,” included in China, the Emerging China’s Bomb,” U.S. News and World Report, LVII, 26 (28 Red Giant: Communist Foreign Policy. compiled and edited by December 19641, 32. Hereinafter cited as Dr. C. Cheng. De Vere E. Pentony (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Com­ 25. Ibid. pany, 1962), p. 83. 26. Berberet, p. 122. 60. Ibid., pp. 83-84. 27. Ibid. 61. Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Stratcgy in 28. Dr. C. Cheng, p. 32. the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 29. Ibid.. pp. 30-31. Inc., 1962), pp. 170-71. 30. Berberet, pp. 109-12. The author cites as his authority 62. Alice Langley H.;ieh, “Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue,” the following study that he made in conjunction with H. C. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. June 1964, reprinted in Mattraw: Scientific and Technical Manpower Required To Pro- Survivat, Institute for Strategic Studies (London), VI, 5 (Sep- t ide and Operate Facilities for the Production of Atom Bombs, tember-October 1964), 229. unpublished, Santa Barbara. Califórnia, Technical and Militarv 63. Ibid., p. 230. Planning Operation, General Electric Company, 1960. 64. Ralph L. Powell, "Communist China’s Military Pow­ 31. Ibid., p. 111. er," Current History, XLV1I, 277 (September 1964), 142. 32. “Red China’s Bomb: How It Alters Things in the 65. Harris, p. 29. World.” p. 49. 66. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, “Statement to the 33. Berberet. p. 112. United Nations in the Plenary Session in General Debate, 34. Dr. C. Cheng, p. 32. September 23, 1965,” Press Release No. 4649, Department of 35. Berberet. pp. 114-19. The author examines in some State, 23 September 1965, p. 6. detail the capahility for production that the Chinese have in each 67. Ibid. IN W A R

CoLONEL i o L eeutenant R CHARD C . B WMAN . . . Maralhon became a magic uord; sim plr exercise in quantitative analysis. After this IThúh utterd. to the hearers ey e appear nod to the past, he presents the more complcx role The camp, the host, the fight, the conquerurs career, th at analysis play» in today’s m ilitary strategy The flying Mede, his shaflless broken bou; and tactics. The fiery Greek, his red pursuing spear; This second installm ent of .4ir Vniversity lie- Mountains abote, Earth's, Oceaii s plain belou ; rietrVs co n tin u in g series on theory and ap plication Death in the front, Deuruclion in lhe rear! of m ilitary analvsis (begun in the Jan u ary - Byron, Childe HaroId's Pilgtimage February issue) includes also L ieutenant Colonel Robert S. Berf»'s *‘Cost-Eflectiveness Analvsis as VI ITH theseevoeative words Lord Byron celebrated an Aid to W eapon System Selection,” illustrating the stunning battle of Marathon, where in 490 an instance of how analvsis may be used by the B. C. a valiant Greek force put to rout a Persian Air Force. army twice its size. O f related interest in this issue are Mrs. In this article Lieutenant Colonel Richard Rowena W . Sw anson's ‘“Inform ation Sciences: C. Bovtman recalls th al until M arathon the de- Some Research Directions” and Robert L. Peter- term ination of m ilitary victory involved a rather sen’» “The Use and Misuse of Cost Effecliveness.”

S WE USE machines to record and re­ It may be useful to speculate on the role late the massive amount of data de- that analvsis might have played in earlier war A^ scribíng modem military forces, there planning. In World War II, for example, just is a sense of exhilaration in our ability to grasp prior to the collapse of Allied defenses in 1940, truths that seem beyond the naked reason of a tabulation of divisions or even tanks would mortal man. Surely we have arrived at the ulti- have shown almost equal numbers on both mate triumph of reason over confusion. Yet, sides. What sort of analvsis would have helped even todav we fínd “analysts” counting num- Allied war planners to avoid the fali of France? bers of soldiers to prove that one army is equal Three common types of analysis are often to another or counting bombs to prove that a associated with war planning: (1) detennina- nuclear force is adequate or “over” adequate. tion of relative strength, (2) evaluation of mili­ Perhaps we know more about analvsis than we tary courses of action, (3) weighing of altema- do about war planning, or perhaps we have tive weapons and force structures. Each of failed to combine expertise in analvsis and ex- these approaches would seem to have been pertise in war planning in the same individuais. most useful in particular historical settings. A 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

brief consideration of history might yield some tions would have been necessary. An elemen- insights into the most useful types of analvsis tary knowledge of the theory of numbers would for war planning in today’s world. have indicated the necessity of ascertaining that the cost scale of effectiveness of swords war as determination of relative strength was a proportional measure of relative values. If one sword cost twice as much as another, Throughout most of man’s history, strate- was it exactly twice as effective? If not, the gists, technicians, and political-military think- total cost estimates might not prove very re- ers have considered war an art rather than a liable measures of combat effectiveness. Science. But in very early times, before the One might have been deceived also in the battle of Marathon, warfare might well have simple matter of counting personnel. Some been reduced to an exercise in pure quantita­ armies need mess halls in order to be able to tivo analysis. It would have been possible to test fight, while others seem to sustain themselves the soldiers of the Persian and Egyptian armies on almost nothing. Some units might need in their ability to use weapons, and perhaps many men for extensive medicai facilities, per­ some battery of psychological tests could have sonnel systems, and Services, while others placed their bravery and determination on a could get by on few. numerical scale. When armies met, they met In any case, the age when wars could be man against man, and a Computer could have understood as a simple determination of been programmed to predict the probable re- strength carne to an end at Marathon in 490 sult. b .c ., where Miltiades and some ten thousand Barring great inequities in individual skill Greeks carefully planned a double envelop- and morale, the total number of soldiers would ment that defeated some twenty thousand have been criticai. As two armies approached Persians. each other, the one with the greater number would lap around the flanks of the other, bring- war as an analysis of military ing it under attack from more than one direc- courses of action tion. Thus the computers, after revealing the relative density of soldiers required in the line Marathon marked the beginning of an era to match the enemy there, could then indicate when strategy and tactics govemed over quan­ whether the numbers were sufficient to extend titative comparisons. At Leuctra, 371 b .c ., beyond the enemy’s flanks and insure a decisive Epaminondas, faced with Computer odds of victory. two to one against him, invented the oblique Perhaps even an easier method of planning order of battle which permitted him to strike sueh a war would have been to bring in the at the criticai point and control the course of Services of a good cost accountant. Rather than battle. Through the succeeding centuries, such undertake the very difficult and probably in- battles as Issus, Arbela, Cannae, Pharsalus, conclusive tests of weapons effectiveness, indi­ Rossbach, Leuthen, Rivoli, Marengo, Ulm, vidual skill, and unit morale, one could get a Austerlitz, Second Bull Run, Chancellorsville, much more precise quantitative figure merely Vicksburg, Nashville, the Mame, Norway by recording the cost of the opposing units. 1940, France 1940, Kiev 1941, Stalingrad, Nor- Assuming equal efficiency on the part of mandy, and Leyte provided examples of how the armorers on each side, the replacement cost simple comparisons of strength could be ren- of each weapon in terms of one s own experi- dered meaningless. ence would provide an indication of its effec­ Certain ly there were other battles that tiveness. Similarly, the cost of the total support were just man-to-man, weapon-to-weapon slug- for a particular sized unit of soldiers could also fests—meeting engagements, frontal attacks, at- be figured rather easily, thus providing an over- tempts merely to overpower on the basis of all measure of relative effectiveness. comparative strength. One might cite the fol- Of course, even in those days, certain cau- lowing as examples: Eylau, Essling, Borodino, ANALYS1S IN WAR PLANNING 43

Leipzig, Shiloh, Antietam, Fredericksburg, tle by the simple error of attempting to defeat Gettvsburg, Wildemess, Spotsylvania, Cold massed infantry and artillery with cavalry. Harbor, the Somme, and the second battle of Many other examples could be cited to the Aisne. But it was this tvpe of battle that show that the choice of strategic and tactical commanders sought to avoid, and for that rea- courses of action was more criticai than the son the science of exactly calculating total op- choice of weapon systems. The machine gun, posing strength took second place to the art the tank, and the military aircraft drastically of visualizing and carrying out decisive courses altered the nature of the battlefield, but thev of action relative to the enemys actions in a did not prove decisive in themselves. The key given situation. factor has been how the new weapons were Tactical innovation also involved careful used. choice of weapons and force structures. Rough In World War I the aircraft was used in cost analvsis certainly must have played some a tangential manner, and the British found it role in this area. It has been pointed out that necessary to introduce the tank in piecemeal the choice of iron swords over bronze swords fashion, thus preventing any decisive effect. At might have been decisive even if the iron the beginning of World War II the Germans swords were inferior, since the latter were less combined the mobile tank force and close sup- costly to produce and more men could be port aircraft into a formation that meant blitz- armed.1 But, since weapons choices were rather krieg and decisive victory in Poland and simple and since few countries put their total France. Similarlv the Japanese used the air­ resources behind war preparations, choosing craft as their primary weapon in gaining a con- the best altemative for the money took second siderable advantage over Allied naval forces place to recognizing how much money needed in the Pacific. Then in the Normandy break- to be spent. through United States forces used air interdic- Far more important than cost efficiencv tion to prevent the necessary defensive action was the tactical strueturing of the force in ways on the part of the Germans. that would take the enemy by surprise. The But perhaps the most significant innova­ tightly packed Greek phalanx, bristling with tion of modem times was the idea of strategic the points of long pikes, proved a most effective bombing, the attempt to destroy the enemy’s shock force, while the same weapons employed warmaking potential at its source. Strategic without the phalanx formation would have bombing together with the development of the been nearly useless. nuclear weapon again changed the character During the Middle Ages Swiss pikemen of war. used the same sort of weapons to overcome heavily armored knights. But the Spanish used war as the choice of alternative the short sword and shield to penetrate under weapons and force structures the pikes as the Romans had done against the phalanx. Recognizing that the cavalry was vul- With the advent of the nuclear weapon, nerable to pikemen, the pikemen to light in- war seemed to mean holocaust. All the time- fantry, and the light infantry to cavalry, Gus- honored skills of the professional soldier now tavus Adolphus put together a balanced force, appeared old-fashioned and unnecessary. Of including all three, with the addition of mus- what purpose is leadership in battle if battle kets and artillery. means the end of the world? Of what use is Napoleon laid the basis for many of his generalship when only two courses of action victories through a weapon that cost him very remain, first strike or second strike, and even little, esprit de corps, with elements of both first strike means unacceptable destruetion to national and personal loyalty. While he com- ones own country? bined this weapon with perhaps the greatest Some argued that not even the determina- genius of all time for selecting the decisive tion of relative strengths was meaningful. What course of action, he may have lost his last bat­ matter whether the enemy had half as many 44 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW or twice as many aircraft or missiles if the re- tributing system to the levei that provides max- sult was total destruction in either case? imum efficiency for any given goal—and Only after the Soviet Union began to de- budget. velop new types of strategic weapons did the Unfortunately this entire type of macro- delicate nature of the “balance of terror” be- analysis depended on a clear-cut, easily mea- come evident.2 If a strategic war were fought, sured objective, and it was this requirement it would be because the weapons of one side that prevented a final easy solution to the prob- had been successfully neutralized through lem of war planning. The simple standard of technological superiority. The bombs that total destruction began to break down on clos- seemed to mean instant holocaust would be de- er examination. Does it mean destruction of all stroyed before launch or en route to the target, the enemys industry? All his population? Or and the holocaust would be certain but one- 75%—50%—25%? sided. Suppose that the capability to destroy 40% The principal form of war planning now of the population of an aggressor nation cost became the weighing of altemative weapon $100 billion and to increase this destruction Systems and force structures. Quantitative anal- to 50% cost an additional $100 billion. Obvious- ysis carne into its own at last. The all-out war ly the point of diminishing retums has been simplified conflict to the point that only scien- reached. Would it be worthwhile to spend the tific weapons data were relevant. Generais extra $100 billion? If the aggressor state were would have no role except to push the buttons. willing to sacrifice 40% but not 50% of its popu­ Fighting men would have no role but to nurse lation in order to rule the world, then the extra the computers and Chemicals. The objective expense would be well worth it. But there was given: total destruction. All human factors may not be much difference to an aggressor were thus removed. It was only necessary to state whether 40%, 50%, 60%, or 70% of its people program the computers to tell which weapon are lost. systems would create the desired destruction Perhaps the key is rather the positive ben­ at the least cost. efit sought by the aggressor leaders. Destruc­ Strategic war planning required the tion of various percentages of population may weighing of a wide range of altemative force not be a meaningful criterion of war planning structures, each in the context of a similar wide for either aggression or deterrence. Aggression range of force structures open to the enemy. is usually the child of a special-interest group The amount of data to be related in such an of war leaders. And especially in a totalitarian exercise was almost infinite. It was necessary state, the leaders might care very little for their to determine the exact state of the technological own population. The totalitarian war leader art with regard to each component of a weapon might well be most interested in his ability to system and to predict the improvements that dominate politically more and more of the were likelv in the course of a given number of world, to seize industrial capacity in neutral years. Once all the possible new and improved or poorly defended areas, and to maintain the weapon systems were visualized, the analyst power to coerce anvone and everyone if neces­ was required to go another giant step forward, sary. If this is the case, it is ridiculous to base estimating the cost of producing each of these planning on some arbitrarv quota of destruc­ possible weapons. Then the various weapons tion. Deterrence will depend not on the capa­ could be compared on the basis of their cost bility to destroy but on the capability to main­ for a given contribution to United States ob- tain a clear postwar advantage in particular jectives. And since each weapon system tends circumstances. to reach a peak efficiency beyond which fur- Going a step further, one might ask ther improvement costs more and more to whether mass destruction is ever worth plan­ achieve an equal objective (that is, the mar­ ning, even as a deterrent. If one-fourth of the ginal benefit for each dollar of expense dimin- world were destroyed, would it be rational to ishes), it should be possible to build each con- follow that monstrous act with one equallv as ANALYSIS IN WAR PLANNING 45 monstrous? If not, might not a clever aggressor faulty intelligence estimates and capability pre- some day deduce that he had nothing to fear dictions, e.g., an unexpected enemy penetra­ from our vaunted “assured destruction ’ capa- tion capability paired with a less effective per­ biüties? One could argue that the only objec- formance of defensive radar than had been tive worth pursuing is the ability to defeat the anticipated. enemys military forces, to frustrate his efforts A mix of weapons might also be desirable to destroy, to disarm his remaining weapons, to deal more efficiently with distinct parts of to limit his actions, regardless of the type of what appears to be a single problem. An air- conflict or the type of peace. In this circum- bome missile intercept capability might be able stance, the classic militarv method of detailed to defend against the threat from submarine situational study again would become the most missiles launched at short ranges more efficient­ meaningful form of analysis. ly than an additional capability grafted onto This is not to imply that quantitative anal­ an abm system that was designed to counter a ysis would have no role to play but only that different type of trajectory. macroanalysis of the whole military world, Still another possible retum from a care- using thousands of highly doubtful assump- fully planned quantitative analysis would be tions and equally doubtful criteria of national some idea of the sensitivity of conclusions to objectives, might not be of much value. Quan­ possible uncertainty in the basic data. But even titative analysis of strategic weapon systems when properly constructed and limited, the should be keyed rather to specific questions apparent clarity and conciseness of quantita­ and subgoals. tive comparisons must not be misread as a true For example, examining the objective of picture of reality. Many sources of unexpected preventing missile damage to the continental error will remain. Conclusions will be no better United States, one anti-ballistic-missile ( abm) than the assumptions, and the latter are likely system might well be compared with another to be questionable in areas of technological on the basis of the cost of stopping a desired and cost predictions, especially with regard to number of incoming warheads. Also of interest potential enemy countries. The analysis must would be the probable cost to the enemy in be tied to appropriate military situations, and penetration aids to overcome each additional the key military factor of surprise may invali- unit of defense, though a particular defense date assumptions respecting force employment might still be worthwhile during a particular as well as assumptions in the more obvious area period of time even if the enemy could soon of technological development. defeat it at one-tenth the cost.3 As always, uncertainty must be assumed The study of trade-offs between quite dif- with regard to intelligence data, and this fac­ ferent types of weapons that contribute to the tor may be important with regard to the enemy same objective is also worthwhile, remember- intelligence operations as well. It may be desir­ ing that this is not likely to be the whole story. able to proceed with a new development even With regard to the anti-ballistic-missile prob- though the enemy can easily counter it, pro- lem, the use of ofFensive missiles against enemy viding it can be concealed for several years in launch sites could be less expensive under some order to allow a given period of effective capa­ conditions than an effort to eliminate the entire bility before the countermeasures can be com- threat through a defensive abm system. But pleted. even if this were not the case, one would not necessarily reject the ofFensive missile as one war as a test of wills element in opposing the threat of incoming mis­ siles. This would be particularly true in an ex- The uncertainty with regard to military tended strategic war when it might be impor- objectives makes it evident that an analysis tant to deal with certain threats at times of our limited to the massive strategic exchange omits own choosing. Additionally, dual provisions for most of the security problem. Since World War this task would provide insurance against II, in spite of nuclear weapons, regular armies 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

have launched attacks against South Korea, reply with similar ranges of violence. Fortu- Tibet, Hungary, and Laos. Guerrilla armies nately, as in the past, the defender has the ad- formed bv agents and infiltrators have conduct- vantage in the war of wills, since fighting to ed carefullv planned campaigns of terrorism the end in self-defense is more meaningful than and hit-and-run assaults in Greece, Malaya, the destroying oneself to gain additional power or Philippines, Venezuela, and Vietnam, while territory. While the aggressor may be willing foreign-trained agents have tried to prepare for to risk his own destruction for great gain, he similar actions in most of the newly developing is not likely to do so if the defender can deny nations. The nuclear vveapon has not reduced him any hope of success. If our war planning is warfare to a mechanical conflict of machines. adequate, it may become clear that aggression In fact, by making all-out warfare unattractive is obsolete, regardless of the variety.4 to aggressors and defenders alike, the nuclear Since we are dealing with the expression weapon has opened up every historical and of national will through a wide span of possible hvpothetical form of conflict as a possible tool militarv actions, the analysis of courses of ac­ of the aggressor. The aggressor attempts to tion again becomes the most valuable form of choose a militarv action tailored to the par­ war planning. The size of military forces and ticular aggression in a way that will discourage the choice of appropriate weapon systems must any opposition from possible opponents. In be weighed in the context of necessary and de- this sense war is novv chieflv a test of national sirable potential for specific military action. will. In attempting to find the levei of force War has always involved a contest of wills most likely to prove successful, the aggressor in which leaders of states sought to achieve may trv subversion and guerrilla activity in their goals at the expense of other states by hopes that it will not be recognized as aggres­ force of arms. The goals in question were some- sion. He may select a small-scale conventional times shared by a whole people, either for the war like the one pursued by the North Viet- redress of injustice or for the hope of national namese in Laos, hopeful that his opponents aggrandizement. More often they were merely will become weary and lose interest in the long the goals of the leader alone, with the people run. Finally, he may choose an attack so large of the state deceived, coerced, or indoctrinated that his enemies would be paralyzed with fear to take orders blindlv. When a country clearly and surprise, unable to defend except by total fought in defense of its own people and homes, war and unwilling to risk that. The attack the will to fíght was usually intense though the against South Korea and the action against means might have been lacking. In some cases Hungary were of this type. DeGaulle has the strong will to resist was the deciding factor charged that the United States’ advocacy of a because the aggressor lacked the will to mus- conventional defense option in Europe could ter all of his superiority in means. The defense lead to just such an enemy strategv against of the Netherlands against Spain in the six- nato. To the European this is a powerful argu- teenth century and the perseverance of our own ment, since he remembers the destruction forefathers during the Revolutionarv War are wrought by conventional arms in World War examples of victory through greater strength II and he knows that there could never again of will. be an allied retum across the Channel in the In the age of nuclear weapons most wars face of nuclear defenses. can be viewed chiefly as contests of will. Since This does not mean that we must be pre- the actions of the aggressor or defender may pared to match every form of aggression with draw into play nuclear weapons of his own or exactly the same type and levei of force any of a supporting power, the contestants are not more than it means that all aggression must be limited by available force or simply by stra- opposed by massive retaliation, as some misin- tegic or tactical defeats. Almost any levei of de- terpreted the words of John Foster Dulles. All struction may be visited on the enemy, what- that can be said is that too high a levei of re­ ever the circumstances, just as the enemy may sponse may bring the total war that no one ANALYS1S IN WAR PLANN1NC 47 wants, while too low a levei may mean the ticipation at the highest leveis of govemment. eventual success of aggression or a spiraling Regardless of the elaborate nature of the escalation, since the enemy may feel that just a various techniques of analysis, it is essential little more force will give him a victorv. The to keep in mind the severe limitations involved vagueness of these general observations re- in trying to simulate the world of reality. The emphasizes the need for situational analysis in military leader must expect surprises, seek to depth. achieve surprises, and plan for surprises. The The type of situational analysis required, aggressor must be told enough about our capa­ however, is somewhat different from the classic bilities and intentions to discourage aggression, e.xamination of militarv courses of action. It is but if he attacks anyway it means that he be- not enough to plan the deployments, tactics, lieves he has found a way to negate our prepa- and logistic support necessarv for a given situ- rations. He must then be countered with the ation. War planning must also consider the unexpected. Deployments must be faster; more political and economic effects of particular powerful weapons must be used; tactics must courses of action, predict most likely enemy negate his advantage of initial surprise. responses, and provide a long-run strategy Since this is the nature of war, it must also leading to an acceptable war termination. This be the framework for effective war planning. means that the soldier needs the help of the po­ The military leader must not count on appar- litical scientist even more than he needs the ent advantages in weapons and forces which mathematician. These various tvpes of ex- may be eliminated by the initial surprise attack pertise must be drawn into military analysis. of the aggressor. If the enemy prepares for The chief vehicle for militarv analysis must lightning war, the defender cannot decree a remain the written study, whether an individ­ war of attrition without first dealing with light­ ual or group effort. But studies must draw on ning war. He cannot provide “just enough” other essential methods. At the most basic forces, since the enemy will conceive a plan levei, field tests, unit and command post exer- to change the measure. He cannot count on cises, and major war games must provide data using weapons that may not be politically ac­ with regard to weapons characteristics, systems ceptable in the given circumstances. But politi­ capabilities, unit performance, and tactical cal planners also must be made aware of the feasibility. Studies can then be used to relate military limitations that result from political the resulting basic data to other possible mili­ restraints. tarv situations, studies that mav include simu- In summary, military analysis in the nu­ lated war games and Computer combat. clear age can gain little from the counting of At the most theoretical levei, militarv anal­ soldiers and weapons—the overkill syndrome. ysis is combined with political analysis in the Instead it must look to the situation and update political-military game. A team of experts is the classical type of evaluation of military assigned to play the role of each of a number courses of action. In the analysis of altemative of key countries that might be involved in a weapons and force structures, assumptions future political-military confrontation. The must be continually challenged and improved. play of the game can reveal previouslv over- Expense must be weighed against the probable looked political effects of militarv actions and cost of the war that is deterred as well as militarv effects of political actions. It can sug- against the other measures of military value. gest pitfalls and new directions for planning. For those who become too enamored of their Care must be taken that the game experience charts and figures, Charles Hitch has a word is not confused with ultimate reality, since the of caution: game will not provide answers or predictions I am the last to believe that an “optimal —only possibilities and insights. This type of strategy” can be calculated on slide rules or game is currently conducted by the Joint War even high-speed computers. Nothing could be Games Agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further from the truth. Systems analysis is sim- in some cases with political and military par- ply a method to get before the decision-maker 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the relevant data, organized in a way most times applies. The naive or unscrupulous useful to him. It is no substitute for sound and analyst selects his data, constructs his assump- experieneed military judgment, and it is but tions, and designs his models to support his one of the many kinds of information needed preconceived views, the views of the superior by the decision-maker.5 he hopes to please, or even the reflection of some narrow interest. military leadership in the age of analysis There is, however, no tuming back. Quan­ titative analysis will remain with us because it Civilian managers and scholars are often has the potential to provide valuable informa­ quite criticai of the military officer for “not tion. The professional military officer must rec- knowing his business.” They feel that it is the officers job to know the exact effectiveness of ognize that analysts and computers can help him with what is really the first part of his various types and numbers of forces. But to problem: understanding the relationships be- the military leader such exact calculations are tween the surface characteristics of military meaningless. He sees the quantitative mea- forces. He must then place this new tool in sures as only the surface features of a three- proper perspective. In the nuclear age the need dimensional müitarv world. In fact, the ofR- for both quantitative analysis and comprehen- cers whole career is devoted to leaming how sive military judgment is much greater than to make those same surface features insignifí- ever before. cant. He does this by leaming about the fog of war—how to live with it, see through it, and make it thicker—and by leaming how to make F or those who fear the loss of the pure those apparent surface capabilities perform in balance-of-terror model on the one hand and ways the enemy does not expect. the simple comparison-of-strength model on The military leader, for his part, is tempt- the other, for those who fear the war-of-wills ed to scom the studies of the civilian analyst concept and the retum to situational war plan- as hopelessly oversimplifíed and naive. He re- ning because they feel the result will make war acts with frustration and alarm to neatly cal- seem more rational, one can only suggest that culated military comparisons because the proof burying one’s head in the sand has little effect comes only in actual combat and even then may on reality. In fact, it is only meaningful war be obscure. Quantitative analysis seems like planning that can frustrate the will of would-be just another obstacle to effective military judg- aggressors. If we can remain strong, mankind ment. Results from the computers provide an- may yet leam to make the self-restraint of swers too tempting for military and civilian moralitv effective in intemational relations. leaders alike. And, of course, the old adage that “figures never lie, but liars figure” some- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Notes 1. Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berke- military analysis is Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, ley and Los Angeles: University of Califórnia Press, 1965), pp. The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, 47-48. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965). 2. For the classic discussion see Albert J. Wholstetter, 4. For a longer discussion of war as a test of will see my “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, January “National Policy in the War of Wills,” United States Naval 1959, p. 211. Institute Proceedings, April 1955. 3. The basic source book for the methods of quantitative 5. Hitch, p. 53. COST-EFFECTIVENESS AN ALYSIS AS AN AID TO WEAPON SYSTEM SELECTION

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Robert S. Ber g

HE USE of cost-effectiveness analysis but the art of relating weapon system effective- as an aid in the development of Air ness to dollar costs has advanced rapidly in the TForce weapon systems has increased past few years. Advances in operations research significantly in recent years. The emphasis methods and widespread use of automated given to this trend by the Office of the Secretary data systems have contributed new techniques of Defense is undeniable, and Air Force man- and sources of information for performing this agement has become increasingly aware of the analysis. The major task for the Air Force pro- value (and iimitations) of such analysis. The fessional is to distill all of this—and simplify it, variety, complexity, and costs involved in the if possible—into something meaningful at the selection of modem aerospace weapon systems decision-making levei. have required careful and detailed study by the The intent of this article is to illustrate Air Force to achieve the most in mission effec- how cost-effectiveness techniques were applied tiveness for dollar resources expended. in Air Force studies leading to the definition of The basic purpose of cost-effectiveness a new weapon system, an advanced strategic analysis is to provide the decision-maker with aircraft. The necessary background for this ap- a logical and quantitative framework for a plication will first be covered briefly, and then judgment decision. This principie is not new, several samples of cost-effectiveness analysis 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW will be described. The studies concentrated on five major areas: operatíonal requirement technical trade-offs system costs selection of design characteristics intersystem comparisons.

Although these areas represent a conven- ient breakout, their interrelationships caused numerous iterations back and forth as subse- quent phases of study required additional cov- erage or more detail. This process was typical of the conceptual phase of weapon system development. The operatíonal requirement provided the cornerstone for the studies. It described the mission and tasks for the new weapon system, the concept of operations, the force size and take-off roll basing, and it addressed essential support areas Figure 1 such as command and control, personnel, and logistics. The operatíonal requirement also es- tablished key weapon system characteristics and contained sufficient detail to identify the five, was selected as the operating period for total resource implications of deploying the costing purposes. This provided a better ap- new aircraft. proximation of the first-line life of a strategic The next phase of study generated de- weapon system and a more reasonable amorti- tailed technical trade-off data for the key de­ zation of the development costs for a new sys­ sign characteristics established by the opera- tem. tional requirement. The use of automated data- With this extensive background of techni­ processing techniques in this area enabled cal Information and costs, it was possible to thousands of different aircraft designs to be begin cost-effectiveness analysis leading to the generated and recorded, each optimized for a selection of aircraft design characteristics. The particular set of operatíonal specifícations. Air­ operatíonal requirement had specified that craft gross weight was normally used as a com- short take-off characteristics were desirable in mon denominator for the designs, and this the new aircraft to allow it to operate from a value was recorded as the design point for each large number of airfields. Figure 1 is a typical characteristic varied between reasonable lower graph of ten-year system cost versus take-off and upper bounds. Each design case defined roll, developed from the technical trade-off and the airframe, propulsion, avionics, and crew re- cost data. Since none of the other major design quirements to achieve a specified set of opera- points had been selected at this stage, the tional capabilities such as take-off roll, speed, information was plotted for parametric values range, payload, and weapon effectiveness. of payload (Pi), range (R/), and speed (Sk). Total system costs were developed, which The graph shows that aircraft system cost in- included the direct and indirect costs for re- creases geometrically as the take-off roll design search and development, procurement, and point is reduced. operation of the weapon system. Sufficient sets Next, it was desired to establish the rela- of cost data were required to match the range tionship of take-off roll to the number of air­ of aircraft designs generated by the technical fields available for use. Figure 2 shows this trade-off study. Ten years, rather than the usual relationship for three sets of airfields. Number take-off roll

Figure 2 Figure 3

1 represents the total population of available an evaluation of altematives, and overall com- airfields under unrestricted condi tions, No. 2 patibility with the operational requirement. represents that portion of the total which were A second major design point examined was found usable under adverse weather condi- aircraft payload. The basic cost curve devel- tions, and No. 3 shows that portion of the oped from background data is shown in Figure airfields in No. 2 which had no undesirable 4. The curve was plotted for an aircraft with location characteristics such as proximity to the selected take-off roll ( T ) and parametric major urban areas. The dashed portions of the values of range ( K,) and speed ( Sfc). The curve curves represent areas vvhere lack of data or depicted a gradually increasing cost for higher other factors caused the relationship to be payloads until the point was reached where approximate or tenuous. the necessary payload volume became primary Further efforts to refine the presentation of in sizing the aircraft. At this point the cost this information were marked by excessive de- curve rose more sharply. Higher payloads in tail or narrow application. Consequently, it was the strategic aircraft resulted in the capabilitv decided to combine the graphs in Figures 1 and to carry more weapons. It was pertinent to ex­ 2 in the simple, generahzed manner shown in amine, then, whether the additional capabilitv Figure 3. Interesting points along the cost curve to deliver weapons was worth the cost of in- were identified for the decision-maker. For creased payload. Figure 5 was designed to example, point No. 1 may meet the minimum illustrate this kind of cost-effectiveness trade- requirement for available airfields in terms of off by plotting the cost per delivered weapon the operational concept. Point No. 2 may rep­ for various payloads and for several values of resent a degree of airfield utilization which aircraft attrition between weapon release provides additional capabilitv within particular points (A,, A2, A:j). It was found that a cost- scenarios. The cost curve, in itself, offered no effectiveness solution to this design point did cost-effectiveness solution to the selection of exist (dotted line) as a function of the defense a take-off roll design point. The selection of environment. The decision-maker was able to the design point had to be based on judgment, use this relationship as a framework for choice payload

Figure 4 Figure 5 baseei on his evaluation of the future defense A graph of these costs is shown in Figure 7. environment and the operational factors re- For illustration, two cost curves are shown. lated to delivering weapon payloads within Number 1 represents a set of nominal assump- the cost-effectiveness solution range. tions, whereas No. 2 represents the increased A third major design point examined was cost of the task resulting from assumptions of aircraft range. The selection of a design range a more effective defense environment or other was complicated by such factors as air refuel- appropriate variations. ing considerations, penetration tactics, and the These cost curves were typical of many target system geography. Figure 6 was an at- situations where cost-effectiveness Solutions tempt to relate these factors. For an aircraft were reached. Although these minimum points with a selected take-off roll and payload and a had a wide spread in optimum design range, parametric value of speed capability, ten-year it was possible because of the shapes of the system cost was plotted as a function of target cost curves to choose a design range point such coverage for various penetration speeds or as fí, that was near optimum for the assump­ tactics (PS,, PS2, PS3). A horizontal line on the tions examined. Thus in this case it was not so chart represented a specific design range much the minimum cost point as the behavior (based on ten-year system cost) and indicated of the cost curve around the minimum point the fractions of the target system that could be that was of interest to the decision-maker. This reached when range was converted to various information provided him with the framework penetration tactics. Penetration tactics, in tum, to judge many factors other than those explicit- were related to aircraft attrition and the prob- ly considered in the cost-effectiveness analysis. ability of delivering weapons to target. Estab- The last major design point examined was lishing a relation between penetration tactics speed capability. Figure 8 shows the basic cost and attrition permitted calculation of the ten- curve developed from technical and cost data. year system costs to accomplish a fixed target- The cost curve indicated that additional speed ing task with aircraft of various design ranges. capability could be achieved at reasonable cost range

Figure 6 Figure 7 up to a point where the cost curve increased expenditures on improved defense systems to sharply. This reflected the technology gained counter the offensive tlireat imposed by the bv previous expenditures for researeh and de- weapon systems being compared. This led to velopment and the high cost of extending tech- the development of a basic cost curve such as nology beyond this point. Further analysis failed to develop a strong justification for fur­ Figure 8 ther tec-hnological development in this area for the aircraft, so the presentation to the decision- maker was limited to this simple graph. The design characteristics of the new stra- tegic aircraft and the associated ten-year Sys­ tem costs having been established, it remained to compare this new svstem with other means of accomplishing the tasks described in the oper- ational requirement. Other weapon Systems, both existing and proposed, which competed with the new aircraft were identified. Compa- rable ten-year costs were established for these Systems. The ground rules for comparing the different Systems were carefully spelled out, and qualitative differences that did not appear in cost-effectiveness comparisons were identi­ fied. This assisted the decision-maker in ev alu- ating the scope of the quantitative comparisons. One approach emploved in the intersystem comparisons was to evaluate the efiFcct of enemy speed Y, provided sufficiently different offensive threats, independent responses would be re- quired from the defense. This forced the de­ fense to consider the best allocation of his expenditures between defense against weapon system X and defense against weapon system Y. The nature of the defense allocation problem is illustrated in Figure 10. Development costs for X and Y were not included for this graph, since tliey do not affect the interaction of oppos- ing capabilities. The graph shows along line AB the cost for the offense to accomplish a fixed task with system .Y alone as the defense allo- cates increasingly to defense against system X ( Dj.) within a constant budget. The same in- formation was plotted for system Y from the opposite side of the horizontal scale along line CD so that defense allocations D r and Dy defense expenditures totaled 100% of the defense budget. At defense mix M, the cost to the offense is the same for Figure 9 either pure force or, therefore, for any mixed force (costing $.1/) of X and Y. With an offen­ sive threat from a single system, say Y, the Figure 9. where the cost for competing weapon defense would allocate 100% D„ and charge Systems (.V, Y, and Z) to accomplish some fixed task was plotted as a function of new defense expenditures. The cost for each competing Figure 10 weapon system to accomplish the task at exist- ing leveis of defense effectiveness, plus its de- velopment costs, was plotted at the zero levei of defense expenditures. The increase in cost for the additional weapon systems necessarv to accomplish the task as the enemy spent in- creasing amounts for improved defenses was shown. As can be seen from the figure, the levei of defense expenditures at whieh the improved capabilities of the newer and more effective systems ( Y and Z) paid their wav was indicated bv points of intersection. This allowed an eval- uation of the worth of “nonproductive” devel- opment costs in terms of countering an im­ proved defense threat. Another technique used in studying the competing systems was an interesting applica- tion of game theory. The results of this analysis did not illustrate the advantages of one system over another but rather indicated the potential advantages of a mix of the two offensive sys­ 0 ------d , ------100% tems being compared. The basis of this com- 100% ------D * ------0 parison was that if two weapon systems, X and defense allocation the offense $D to accomplish the task. Against a mixed offensive threat, however, the defense must allocate at mix M to charge the offense the maximum. $AÍ, to accomplish the task. At this mLx. the defense is, in effect, indifferent to the offense mix. There is a corresponding offense mLx which is indifferent to the defense mix. The cost, $A/, is the minimax solution to mixed force the offense-defense game. Since development costs for one or both offense systems mav have to be incurred be- fore any eapability can be deployed, the final determination of the advantages of a mix over a pure force had to include adding appropriate pure force development costs to the values $A/ and SD. In addition, these relationships were based on a game which implies no knowledge of the de- ployment intentions bv either side. As can be seen from the graph, prior knowledge of the defense cost-effectiveness defense allocation would cause the offense to Figure 11 choose a pure force rather than a mix. Con- versely, knowledge of an offense allocation other than the appropriate mix would allow T hese il l u st r a t io n s have been intended to the defense to deplov so as to raise the offense show some of the cost-effectiveness techniques cost above SM. that were applied to the conceptual phase of The solution to the offense-defense game development for a new Air Force weapon Sys­ was dependent on assumptions for the enemy tem. The methodology for this analysis was to defense budget and cost effeetiveness. The assemble available quantitative data, manipu- “solution” to this game was displayed, there- late them, and present them in such a way that fore, in such a manner that these factors were the decision-makers attention eould be focused treated as variables. Figure 11 shows the area on the qualitative or judgment areas. As a prac- of mixed force advantage bv the use of an in- tical matter, the simplest approach was pre- difference curve, that is, the locus of points ferred, and yet it was not difficult to oversim- where the costs for the mix and the pure force plify complex problems to the point where the were equal. This type of presentation allowed analysis had lost its usefulness. The ingenuity the decision-maker to input his judgment values required was in adapting operations research of these parameters and determine the best methods to the analysis and devising the most choice of offensive systems. Full offense costs, cogent manner of summarizing and displaying including development, were appropriate for the information. The results proved to be a this presentation. valuable aid in the decision process. Hq United States Air Force INFORM ATION SCIEN CES: SOME RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

R owena W. S wanson

Evcry machine is a reasoning machine, in so much Babbage and Lull, hovvever, no tool existed as there are certain relations between its parts, before the electronic Computer that gave the which relations involve other relations that tvere practical possibility of using machines to proc- not expresslij intended. ess large quantities of information quickly and — Charles S. Pierce, “Logical Ma­ economically. Today s age of computers began chines,” American Journal of in the mid-1940s with the mechanical and elec- Psychology, Vol. I, November trical machines developed for such purposes as 1887. fire control, precision bombing, and navigation. The Computer industry has mushroomed since H ERE IS nothing new in man’s at- World War II with ever faster machines, in- tempts to classify information, to store creasing storage capacities, and greater flexi- T books according to a scheme for quick bility with respect to peripheral equipment. retrieval, or even to give machines these jobs. The task of hamessing these machines to use- Except for suc-h early inventions as those of ful jobs and developing new machines to do INFORMATION SCIENCES 57

jobs that existíng ones caiinot do has given rise mation-processing activities that man has to a new field called "information Sciences.” customarily performed. Many studies in the Air Force experience with computer-based information Sciences center about man—how Systems spans the period from sa c e (semiauto- he as a system acquires and uses information; matic ground environment) of the 1950’s to how he performs as a node in a network, i.e., todays usst r ic o m command and control Sys­ in a group; and how the systems within him tem 492L. The Air Force is the largest govem- (e.g., his nervous svstem, his brain) dynami- ment agency user of computers. Based on the callv internet to make him an information proc- current rate of defense spending for electron- essor. The information Sciences also look at ics, an estimate of $2.5 billion for eleetronic how man behaves with machines—the ma­ data-processing equipment has been projected chines he selects, i.e., analog, digital, or hybrid for 1970.' Computers are used for such varied devices, his use of tape typewriters or cathode- operations as management data processing, ray-tube screens, his preference for printouts long-range Communications, photo interpreta- or displays, on- or off-line processing, etc.; the tion, intelhgence, logistics, combat reporting, way he formulates problems for machine proc­ tactical and strategic planning, missile trajec- essing, determined either by his preferences or tory calculation, fire control, and space flight by machine limitations; the "languages” he and simulation. the machine find acceptable for “communi­ The success of computers for these pur- cation,” etc. By extension, the information poses does not mean that all problems in con- Sciences also deal with machine-machine nection with the use of computers have been systems. solved. A recent survev, for example, discusses Within the Air Force, a number of pro- the need to perfect target acquisition, self- grams are concemed with various aspects of location, Communications security, and com­ the information Sciences. Mission-oriented mand and control components in various problems are being investigated at the Data Department of Defense weapon systems.- A Sciences Laboratory, Air Force Cambridge March 1965 listing of 21 major “L ” systems Research Laboratories,1 and the Electronic indicated that only one, the 496/474L for track- Systems Division, Air Force Systems Com­ ing and reporting on space satellites, was fully mand, both at Laurence G. Hanscom Field, operational.' We need to know more about how Massachusetts; the Information Processing to acquire. process, and displav information Branch, Rome Air Development Center, New and how to organize communication and com­ York; and the Electronic Technology Division mand systems. We have still to dissect the and 6570th Aerospace Medicai Research Labo­ communication process itself, i.e., what the ratories, both at Wright-Patterson afb, Ohio. significant or information-bearing elements are The Directorate of Information Sciences, Air and how they should be coded to serve the Force Office of Scientific Research, Washing­ needs of different users. ton, D.C., sponsors an extramural contract and The information Sciences are concemed grant program. This program is oriented to with studying the processes involved in iden- basic research, i.e., the discovery of new prin­ tifving, classifying, representing, storing, ma- cipies and procedures for future applications. nipulating, and presenting information. These studies examine the fundamental behavior of document and data systems the processes to determine the rules and prin­ cipies underlving how they function. An under- The computer’s facility in handling bits of standing of the characteristics or parameters information gave rise in the late 1940’s to the of the processes optimizes their incorporation question whether the Computer could also be into systems and provides the basis for de- used to manipulate the nonnumeric types of signing machines able to perform some of the information processed in libraries. Processing tasks. The library problem, at least with respect These tasks include many of the infor- to technical reports, is also an offspring of 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

World War II and the postwar years. There- all its essential details to the installation capa- tofore libraries for the most part stored pub- ble of remedying it. This presupposes a system lished documents, i.e., books and periodicals. design for materiel with uniform or translatably The technical report is a different type of docu- uniform encoding at all stations. Such a system ment: it is usually a provisional report of results is today but a planning objective, according (neither a comprehensive treatise nor a literary to a recent statement of the Honorable Paul work of art) and requires different treatment Ignatius, Assistant Secretary of Defense (In- for its bibliographic control. To circumvent the stallations and Logistics).5 difficwlties faced bv conventional libraries in Another severe and unsolved problem Processing these materiais, libraries were and area pertains to engineering drawings and are still being formed in the laboratories of graphics. Does one digitize, assign word de- govemment and industry to service the infor- scriptors, or retain graphic forms? Reduction to mation needs of research and development words may compound the difficulties, since the scientists with respect to this literature. Staffs designing of systems for fact retrieval from for these libraries have frequently been re- documents has disclosed problems with word cruited from the r &d corps itself rather than meaning. Does word X mean the same to A, B, from library schools. Often transfer to the li- and C? If X is commonly understood and Y brary vvas for the purpose of exploring mech- has a similar meaning in some contexts and a anization possibilities. So began the field of different meaning in others and Y is not com­ automated information storage and retrieval. monly understood, how does one automatically The popular belief was (and mav still be) process X and Y? that storage and retrieval problems can be One use of miniaturized circuitry and solved bv converting all manual systems to slow-speed, high-density magnetic tape record- mechanized systems. However, marks on mag- ing suggests a class of presently feasible sys­ netic tapes or discs are no more accessible tems. aids (Aircraft Integrated Data Systems) than marks on paper. Machines can save time has been designed to telemeter records on air­ and human labor, but thought must go into craft equipment during flight into automated incorporating them into systems. A manual maintenance and supply systems at ground ter­ svstem mav not need mechanization; it may minais. The system should be useful in mission only need a svstem design tailor-made to its scheduling as well as for maintenance, per­ data base and its user requirements. A ma- formance studies, and crash investigations.0 chine-based svstem must be similarly designed, Properties information centers such as those but it incorporates the added variable of the sponsored by the Air Force Materials Labora- machine. The machine introduces the possibil- torv, Wright-Patterson afb, operate another ity of designing new ways of storing and manip- class of mechanizable systems. In addition to ulating data and new tvpes of answers from machine-produced indexes of materiais and information systems. It mav be an abuse of properties, Thayne Johnson of epic (Electronic machines to use them solely to copv manual Properties Information Center) expects to use operations. machines for statistical reports, state-of-the-art The inventory type of record is readily surveys (including identification of gaps in the amenable to Computer manipulation. The items literature), and to measure the growth of re- have formats that are essentially fixed or con- search activities in particular areas.7 Machine veniently modifíable, with characteristics or techniques have been incorporated into the properties that can be standardized and there- operations of the ai crl Research Library. The fore encoded, stored, sorted, updated, etc. library is using an MP-3 Polaroid camera for Even for such records, however, not all prob­ preliminary searches, machine-generated au- lems have been solved. Control on logistics, thority lists for cataloguing, tape typewriters for example, requires a system-subsystems net- for bibliography and catalogue card prepara- work so interlinked that a crisis faced at one tion, and the Itek Crossfiler. a special-purpose installation can be quickly communicated in data processor." INFORMATION SCIENCES 59

Today’s and tomorrows research is con- by which words are strung together to make cemed \vith the signal-in-noise problem and grammatically correct and meaningful mes- \vith analyzing tíie basic nature of information. sages; and, second, a synthesis of artificial lan­ What is a meaningful signal, i.e., item of in­ guages whose elements approximate natural formation, to the user? How much noise can language for comprehension but are recogniz- he tolerate? How can meaningful signals be able to a machine as processing instructions. clustered, i.e., classified and grouped, or in- These language studies have attracted people de.xed? How can signals be organized, i.e., how from many disciplines. Linguists, aided by can files be structured, to serve many different mathematicians and logicians, are formalizing users? What new signals or codes can be de- natural languages. Electrical engineers and signed which compress but retain information? mathematicians are principais in the construc- How can they be more efficiently presented for tion of programming languages. Crossovers oc- man and machine processing? We have not yet cur as artificial languages acquire natural lan­ leamed how to identify information, how to guage constructions and as models for natural code without losing information, or how to languages become more apparent. build a system to serve a complex of informa­ An impressive number of artificial lan­ tion needs, i.e., a system able to provide A, guages have been written to accomplish the B, ... Z with different parts from a whole, the objectives of a variety of computer-based Sys­ parts being necessary and suffieient but noise- tems. One survey" classifies these systems in free. six categories: —general-purpose programming and execu- languages tive systems What might be called “computer Science” These systems aim toward exploiting the power springs from early work of such university and flexibility of computers to manipulate com­ mathematicians and electrical engineers as plex programs, including complex housekeep- Howard H. Aiken of Harvard, J. Presper Eck- ing routines. ert and John W. Mauchly of Pennsylvania, and others. Industry rapidlv followed with labora- tories for hardware and software research. The Experimentei Dynamic Processar (DX-1) at the Though hardware problems (e.g., the selection Air Force Camhriclge Research Laboratories can derive of materiais, microminiaturization, etc.) are by the characteristic attributes or subtle distinguish- no means secondary, software is the key to ing features of a wide variety of data. The DX-1 being able to use a machine, often beyond the can project a cathode-ray-tnbe display of the human limits expected of it. “Software” refers to the heartbeat, analyze it on a real-time basis, and program by which the machine operates and perform correlations. Similar analyses are made to the machine language and all the system of speech signal input directly by a microphone. design concepts incorporated into the program. Research on converting nonnumeric infor­ mation to machine-manipulable form almost immediately runs head-on into the “language problem,” i.e., how should such information be described? In a program written to tell a ma­ chine what to do, it would be simpler to use nonnumeric information, for example, words or mnemonics, instead of sets of symbols that are not readilv intelligible. The study of “ma­ chine’ languages, therefore, is a study from two directions: first, an examination of natural languages to discover the rules and principies 60 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

—functional systems grammar, and the relation between writing and Languages for functional systems emphasize speech. Studies in which machine processing the requirements of a particular application, of natural language is a goal must develop mod­ e.g., collngo (Compile On-LINe and GO) for els and methods for manipulating natural lan­ the usst r ic o m ínterim Command and Control guage in its spoken and printed forms, for System. transforming one form into another, and for —man-machine interface systems translating from one language into another. There has been much work in model building Languages to facilitate man-machine interac- based on the syntax or structure of language,10 tion either add a new dimension of information but ndes for generating grammatically correct Processing into a system or simplify the expres- sentences do not necessarily generate seman- sion of particular types of problems. For ex- tically meaningful ones. Machine translation ample, with sket c h pa d a cathode-ray tube that that is being done now, and effectively, is a presents information graphically is the inter­ word-matching game and involves the selec- face between the man and the machine, a light- tion of words from a large dictionary on a pen (hand-held photocell) being used for weighting basis.11 While the study of syntax input. joss (Johnniac Open Shop System) was is by no means complete, increasingly more designed for rapidly solving mathematics emphasis is being put on semantics or the problems not requiring large memory capacity. meaning content of language. Semantic analy- —special-purpose programming systems sis may require a fairly extensive examination Special-purpose languages are more narrowly of the relationship between words, word by oriented to particular problems. Whereas word, and of strings of words (words in sen­ sket c h pa d is useful for a variety of graphic tences, sentences in paragraphs, etc.), though problems, st r ess has been designed specifi- less exhaustive analyses may suggest short- cally as a STRuctural Engineering Systems cuts.12 Solver. The skeptics’ contention that no machine —t i m e - s h a r i n g s y s t e m s will be able to manipulate natural language as These systems give many users simultaneous man does is not viewed as a relevant criticism. access to a central Computer facility and In this as in other research on transferring the are application-independent. This requires an performance of complex tasks to machines, the executive program that can efficiently schedule aim is not to build an artificial man but to and shuffle user programs so that each user at exploit the information-processing operations his remote console experiences little or no de- that machines can be made to do. If machines lay. The programming and executive system can handle the bulk of the load in producing ctss (Compatible Time Sharing System) at translations, abstracts, indexes, and documents Project ma c can accept programs in many lan­ in written form from spoken input and the con­ guages— FAP, FORTRAN, MAD, COMIT, LISP, verse, the natural-language barrier that exists st r ess, etc.—from multiple users as well as ac- today can be obviated in many respects. Infor­ commodate conventional batch processing. mation buried in records could be made visi- ble, and man could be relieved of much time- —generalized data-management systems. consuming paper work. The goal is to mecha- (See “managemcnt and command systems” nize as much as is possible, not to abandon p. 64.) machines because they cannot become sensible Models for natural language are still in robots. the emergent phase, since research has shown that all aspects of linguistics must be consid- man-machine interface ered. Linguistics not only pertains to the units and structure of language but also includes Programming languages have, only in part, phonetics, phonology, morphology, accent, served the needs of engineers, physiologists, syntax, semantics, general and philosophical psychologists, mathematicians, librarians—per- INFORMATION SCIENCES 61 sons who want to work directly with the Com­ of a real-time dialogue where both parties con- puter rather than through programmers to tribute their best capabilities. Thus, an essential whom they cannot fully describe their prob- part of the research effort is the evolutionary lems. The increasing availability of machines development of a large, multiple-access Com­ puter System that is easily and independently and the desirabilitv of conducting experiments accessible to a large number of people, and on-line create a demand for easily usable and truly responsive to their individual needs. The efficient procedures and equipment to enable ma c Computer System is a first step in this man to communicate with machines. More- direction.13 over, for tracking, command and control, and Hosts of questions about man and ma­ other militarv operations. on-line interaction of chine are being asked, and answered, at ma c man with machine is becoming essential. and the Computation Centers of Camegie In­ The design of effective man-machine in­ stitute of Technology and Stanford University, terfaces requires a basic understanding of two to name but a few. How does man go about factors: first and probably foremost, how to solving problems in such diverse fields as engi- optimize rnans performance in his use of ma­ neering design, education, information retriev- chines; and, second. how to design and inter- al, the medicai Sciences, the physical Sciences, connect machines to be most useful to man. the management Sciences? How does he com­ Much analysis of human behavior is necessarv municate? How does he track signals? How to gain this understanding. We lcnow that hu- does he make decisions? How does he execute mans become fatigued in performing routine commands? On the hardware side, how can tasks. Some humans are adept at using key- equipment such as tape typewriters, telephone boards, others at drawing pictures. Some peo- links, cathode-ray-tube displays, plotters, and ple diagram or mathematize problems, others remote consoles best be used? As experience is use words and descriptions. Some process in- gained at these laboratories, speeial-purpose formation visually, others aurallv. Some prefer devices such as key sets, light-pen tablets, sig- to work on a problem from start to finish, nal generators, and links between different others to batch-process. Humans digest and classes of computers and peripheral hardware generate information by difFerent mechanisms. are beginning to appear which have been The stimuli that provoke leaming and response tailor-made to test and demonstrate hypotheses. differ. Decision-making is also personalized. It should be emphasized, however, that It is the task of those working on the man- this research is not primarily directed to the machine interface to observe the variables in solution of problems, though Solutions are by- human performance, to design experiments products. At this stage, research is more heavily that will examine and evaluate behavior pat- concentrated on examining the cognitive proc­ tems, and to specify requirements for appro- esses of man and discovering how these proc­ priate machine configurations. esses can be augmented by complex Computer One of the best known of dod’s research systems. Experiments are concemed with man projects on the man-machine interface is Proj- both as an individual and as a member of ect ma c at the Massachusetts Institute of groups of various sizes. The computer-based Technology. The acronym refers to both Ma- laboratory is making it possible to test not chine-Aided Cognition and Multiple-Access only rnans relations with machines but rnans Computer, indicative of major objectives of relations with man. Studies of large-group or- this project. A principal goal, according to the ganizations permit the simulation of such op­ director, Dr. Robert Fano, is “the experimental erations as are required for logistics support, investigation of new ways in which on-line use intelligence communication, and industrial of computers can aid people in their individual complexes. The simulations appear useful as intellectual work.. . .” He further stated: an aid in structuring such organizations and One envisions an intimate collaboration be- in testing various configurations of men and tween man and Computer systems in the form machines at the blueprint stage.14 Console, card reader, printer, and tape unit of the IBM 7094, use d in DOD’s research Project MAC at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are part of a typical large Com- puter installation. In a Project MAC work area (right), man can interact with the machine store through cathode-ray-tuhe display, typewriter input, and program control.

Perhaps one of the most significant contri- responsible whether or not a Computer backs butions of work with machines has been the him up or even disagrees with him." sharpening of mans awareness of the anatomv The primary purpose of this research is of problem solving. Each basic step in a prob- to find out how to build systems. Improving lem-solving task must be identified and under- the quality of access to computers and making stood to provide the most useful concatenation computers more accessible to researchers are of men and machines. “Computer people” such todays goals. As man becomes accustomed to as Oliver Selfridge do not foresee machines having large Stores of data available to him and replaeing man in establishing and grading to using new types of hardware, he will prob- goals, making insightful pereeptions, or in ably develop new methods for problem solving. complex decision-making.i;i Selfridge also cau- He will probably also develop new approaches tions that automation not be used to degrade to the acquisition, storage, and manipulation the quality of a job to be done through the ac- of data. The basic concept of what constitutes ceptance of easy, computer-generated decisions “information” may simultaneouslv be revised rather than the proper decisions. “A com- and made more clearly definable. Probably the mander will know that he is the one who is most salutan^ effect of man s working with machines may be the demand placed on him by in fields of psychology, psychiatry, neurophysi- the machines to be precise and specific in what ology, and education. The Computer age now he wants to do and what he wants to know. injects physicists, electrical engineers, indus­ trial engineers, mathematicians, logicians, phi- intelligent systems and new mathematics losophers, and linguists into the arena. This suggests no single definition for human intelli­ Marvin Minsky has defined “artificial in- gent behavior, no single approach to its study, telligence” simply as “the problem of making and many purposes for trying to understand it. machines behave intelligently.”,r> The anthro- Intelligent behavior, in the context of arti­ pomorphic suggestion implies a definition for ficial intelligence, is problem-solving behavior. human intelligent behavior. VVithout defining In order that this equivalence not be inter- terms, one may assume that the reader is an preted as an oversimplification, this definition intelligent human and probably has some def- is intended to include all of the discovery, initions of his own on what constitutes intelli­ identification, matching, and judgment proc­ gent behavior. Analysis of intelligent behavior esses that are involved in pattem recognition, was an age-old avocation and is a current topic search, leaming, and planning.17 A brief but 64 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW

classic analysis of this area of research is upgrading the leaming process and making the Minsky’s“Steps Toward Artificial Intelligence,” communication process more effective. It is thongh the literature is rich with anthologies, aimed toward providing tools which will stimu- proceedings, and reports.ls Minsky dismisses late man to make better use of his abilities to the literature with the statement, “The major think and to create. It is aimed toward building problems have not yet been generally recog- sensors that will explore hostile and adverse nized and challenged.”1'’ I believe his criticism environments beyond man’s physical reach. It is too severe, but it does emphasize the nas- is aimed toward building prosthetic devices cency of this field. that are truly interactive with biological Sys­ Problem-solving behavior is the process of tems to overcome the adversities of aceident identifying and analyzing the problem, deter- and nature and augment sensory capacities. mining a procedure for solving it, collecting This Science is nascent. Moreover, Von the tools and information needed for the solu- Neumann, among others, strongly believed that tion, appropriately concatenating the proce­ a new mathematics would be needed to de- dure and the collected materiais to give the scribe the type of arithmetic and logical struc­ solution, and storing an abstracted version of ture which a machine would need in order to these activities for future reference. This de- have the information-processing potentials of scription is an oversimplification. A problem is man and of his nervous system.21 Todays not a problem until it is recognized as such. studies include the examination of algebraic Given recognition, the problem may not be concepts and concepts deriving from mathe- easilv divisible into mutually exclusive and matical logic to describe automata. Computa- formalizable components. A poorly structured bility theory, the study of what can be com- problem may lead the solver through cut-and- puted by the most powerful automata, is being try procedures and useless collections of ma­ extended.22 However, in discussing the role teriais. From them no solution (i.e., result or of mathematics for biological systems, Michael product responsive to the problem) may be Arbib recently said: “Today we try to coerce obtained in real time, and there is little to physical mathematics to describe systems very leam from the exercise save that the approach different from those usually studied by the was wrong. Poor problem-solving behavior physicist; for the study of the brain we must goes on among humans all the time, with and eventually develop forms differing from pres- without justification. Research in artificial in­ ent-day mathematics even more radically than telligence is not only feeding back to itself in the theory of algorithms differs from differen- a self-improving way but is also teaching areas tial calculus.”23 On the other hand, we are still overlapping and tangential with it about what far from an understanding of brain, nervous must be leamed for the construction of intelli- system, and behavior mechanisms.24 Concur- gent machines and systems. This research is rentlv, theories of programming, theories of helping man to differentiate between what is machines, and theories of language are being and what is not human intelligent behavior and developed which may lead to new hardware efficient organizational structure. designs and configurations to fit machines Henry Eyring said recently, “Science is a to the structures of the problems they have to little like a roller coaster which frightens and solve. Associative processors and large data fascinates those who ride it.”20 It would be Stores are very likely but a first step toward difBcult to predict today what tomorrows pay- the n-th generation Computer.2'' Progress in ar­ offs in this field are likely to be. Work in arti­ tificial intelligence will probably be made by ficial intelligence has already suggested ways bootstrapping from results in one discipline to for improving production and quality in com- those in another. mercial operations. It has yielded automatic management and command systems character recognizers and graph plotters. It is providing signal analyzers and sound synthe- Much of what has been leamed from re­ sizers. It is pointing to ways of automating and search in the information Sciences has been INFORMATION SCIENCES 65

fed back into the management and command and the processing of telemetry and tracking svstems of today and prototvpes for future Sys­ data from a variety of local radiation sensors tems. The face-lifting which management Sys­ will employ a multiprogrammed, multiprocess- tems experienced with the advent of the Com­ ing Computer for on-line and off-line jobs. puter can be seen, for example, in Air Force Apparently, however, “one of the most diffi- uses of computers. About 70 percent of the Air cult design problems is finding the most ef- Forces Computer strength is for such opera- fective way for range controllers to use the tions as personnel selection, record keeping, Computer.”30 vvorldwide supply inventories, fund status It appears likely that there will be no lack and projection, decision-making aids, program of developments in the areas of programming management, and quality control.26 The once languages and hardware that can be applied dull task of bookkeeping has become as chal- to management and command systems. But the lenging to inventiveness as the requirements concem of wsmr, for example, to provide the for command and control svstems. needed information to the controller at the Many of the needs for both management proper time from a voluminous data base is and command systems are similar. Both use illustrative of a different class of developments large data bases and face problems of data which are too scarce in the marketplace. This acquisition, editing, regrouping, and updating; concem goes to the core of information proc­ fast access to various portions of the file; out- essing. Part of the problem can be solved puts in various formats, including displavs at through analysis of the data base and pre- stations remote from the Computer facilitv; and screening, i.e., omission of redundant and ir- preferably a capability of user interaction with relevant data. Even this is not a simple task the system on-line for input and output. because data which may be irrelevant for one One current prototype called adam (Ad­ purpose may be relevant for another. Another vanced DAta Management) is a system of gen- part of the problem may be solvable with new eralized programs which anticipate most of the hardware. The realm of software that will give features of an on-line, real-time, multiaccess difficulty, however, pertains precisely to in- information-processing system.-7 colingo and stilling intelligence into the systems. The sys­ the 473L system (the latter designed for the tem must be able to use past experience and management of usaf resources) are examples anticipate future requirements to make accu- of command and control systems built for flexi- rate predictions and selections of information bility in processing a variety of data bases. The for the controller. The system will have to leam 473L is planned to include such capabilities as to do more than sequence events. It will have multiple time-shared user consoles, remote in­ to leam to evaluate data and internally do a put and output, priority assessment and auto- higher levei of data matching and comparison matic interrupt, and distinctions between op- than it does now, to generate the responses erations activities and training exercises.28 A which the human decision-maker, manager, popular system called Vigicon accepts data commander, and planner must have. from a variety of input sources, including many So-called “game playing” offers sugges- types of communication and data-processing tions for approaches to predictive modeling. equipment, and can provide projections of Samuels often-cited heuristic technique for static maps, charts, etc., from slides by auto- playing checkers is a sufficiently intelligent matic selection from storage magazines; gener- leaming program to win games from cham- ated line images such as graphics, alphanumer- p i o n s . 31 H e u r i s t i c p r o g r a m s c o u l d b e a p p l i c a b l e ics, and symbols; and dynamic traces with tem- over a range from war gaming to technology porary display of instantaneous vector posi- planning.32 Another direction for research is tions.V igicon can present information in real toward formalizing the process of induction, time and in color. The system envisioned for the discovery of rules or universais from an the White Sands Missile Range (wsmr) for enumeration of particulars, especially an in- closed-loop control of overland missile flights complete enumeration. Shannon provided a 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

measure for the communication capacity of a Only recently has there been concerted channel. Similarly, measures are needed for the effort to develop curricula for the information semantie capacity and the information content Sciences. A fine summary report of work in this of a message. direction was made in September 1965 by a curriculum committee of the Association for epilogue Computing Machinery.37 Curricula have been announced by universities under the head- The information Sciences are not a Science ings of “Computer Sciences,” “communication in the sense of being a single branch of stndy, Sciences,” “information Sciences,” etc. Such as is mathematics or chemistry. They have clarifications are important, not only as a be- evolved from a broader curiositv of man for ginning to adequate formal education in this knowledge—on the one hand from man s pen- field but also as a stimulant to cohesion and chant for data, whieh have now engulfed him, cooperation that should benefit such activities and on the other from man's classic desire to as have been discussed in this article. better understand how he functions and how “One cannot li ve without ideas,” wrote he interacts and can interact with his environ- Aniold Hottinger. “Every step one takes is di- ment. The information Sciences are a synthesis rected, if not by a conscious, at least by an from an effusion of activities related in part unconscious or subconscious idea.”38 The in­ to the presence of computers and stemming formation Sciences will be one of the major idea from ideas incorporated in such publications contributors of our generation. The informa­ as McCulloch-Pitts’ “Logical Calculas,”'3 Nor- tion Sciences are a produet of our generation, bert Wieners “Cybernet ics,”'1 the Macy and they could give to the next human freedom Conference papers,35 and Princetons Annals and produetivity whieh we cannot now envi- No. 34, Automata Studies.36 The information sion. Sciences are a bridge aeross disciplines in a quest to systematize knowledge on information Air Force Office of Scientific Research Processing.

Notes 1. Air Forte Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 August 10. “Current Research and Development in Scientific 1965, p. 3. Documentation,” National Science Foundation, No. 13, Novem- 2. “Mvriad R&D Problems Await Solutions," Missiles and ber 1964. NSF-64-17. See particularly sections 3, 5.2, and 5.3. Rockets, XVI, 3 (29 March 1965), 40. 11. “An Evaluation of Machine-Aided Translation Activi­ 3. “Major Command and Control, Communications Sys­ ties at F.T.D .,” Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, tems Managed by USAF’s Electronic Systems Division,” Aviation May 1965. AF 33(657)-13616. Week ir Space Technology. 15 March 1965, pp. 240-41. 12. See, for example: 4. Hans H. Zschimt, “Research in Computer Sciences,” Paul L. Garvin, ed.. Natural Language and the Com- Air University Review, XVI, 1 (November-December 1964), puter (New York: McGraw-HiU Book Co., Inc., 1963). AF 47-66. 49(638)-1128. 5. Excerpts from an address by the Honorable Paul R. Emst von Glasersfeld and Jehane Bums, “Automatic Ignatius, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations & Logis- English Sentence Analysis,” IDAMI Language Research Section, ties), address before DOD-NASA Technical Information Sym- Milan, Italy, June 1965. AF-EOAR-64-54, ILRS-T11. posium for Management, Los Angeles, Califórnia, reproduced Noam Cliomsky, Aspects of the Theorxj of Syntax in Defense Industry Bulletin, 1, 8 (August 1965), 15-16. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965). 6. Maj. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, “Aircraft Integrated Data AF 19(628)-2487, ESD-TDR-65-157. AD 616323. Systems,” Air University Review, XVI, 5 (July-August 1965), 13. Excerpt from Robert M. Fano’s Preface in “Project 72-77. MAC, Progress to July 1964,” Cambridge: Massachusetts Insti­ 7. H. Thayne Johnson, “The Electronic Properties Infor­ tute of Technology, 1965. mation Center," Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, Califórnia, 14. Beatrice Rome and Sydney Rome, “Programming the Spring 1964. The documentation System is described in “Elec- Bureaucratic Computer,” IEEE Spectrum, I, 12 (December trical and Electronic Properties of Materials Information Re- 1964), 72-92. AF 49(638)-l 188. trieval Program,” Hughes Aircraft Co., Culver City, Califórnia, 15. O. G. Selfridge, “Description of Complex Systems, February 1963. AF 33(6161-8438. ASD-TDR-62-539. Proceedings of a NATO and SHAPE Technical Center Confer­ 8. Patricia T. Sievers and Paul J. Fasana, "Automated ence on Analysis and Evaluation of Command and Control Houtines in Technical Services,” A FCRL-64-70 (Bedford, Systems, Paris, Í6-20 November 1964, pp. 102-20. Massachusetts: Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, 16. Marvin Minsky, “A Selected Descriptor-Indexed Febniary 1964). Bibliography to the Literature on Artificial Intelligence,” in 9. "Advanced Programming Developments: A Survey,” Computers and Thought, ed. Edward A. Feigenbaum and Directorate of Computers, Electronic Systems Division, and Julian Feldman (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.. Inc., 1963), Computer Associates, Inc., Wakefield, Massachusetts, February p. 453. 1965. ESD-TR-65-171. AD 614704. 17. This categorization is a modification of that of Marvin INFORMATION SCIENCES 67

Minsky in "Steps Toward Artificial Intelligence,” first pub- Vol. I, Finite Automata; Vol. II, Global Models and Computa- Ushed in Proceedings of the IRE, XLIX (January 1961), 8-30, bility Theory" (Yorktown Heights, New York: Thomas J. Watson and republished in Computers and Thought. Research Center, IBM, May 1965). AF 39(602)-3340. RADC- 18. Two early proceedings: TR-65-113. Vol. I, AD 617404; Vol. II. AD 617410. Cybemetics: Circular, Causai, and Feedback Mecha- J. J. Florentin, “Notes on the Theory of Finite Ma­ nisms in Biological and Social Systems, ed. Heinz v. Foerster, chines,” Research Institute for Advanced Studies (RIAS), Bal- Margaret Mead. and Hans Lukas Teuber (New York; Josiah timore, Maryland. August 1964. AF 49(638)-1206. Macy Jr. Foundation, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1955, trans- 23. Michael A. Arbib, "A Few Commenls on the Role cif actions of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Confer- Mathematics and Computers,” Neurosciences Research Program ences, respectivelv). Bulletin, III, 2 (1965), 45-47. Automata Studies, ed. C. E. Shannon and J. McCarthy, 24. Brain Mechanisms and Lcaming, ed. A. Fessard, R. W. Annals of Mathematics Studies No. 34 (Princeton: Princeton Gerard, and J. Konorski, Proceedings of a Symposium, Monte- University Press, 1956). video, Uruguay, 2-8 August 1959 (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Two anthologies: Publications, 1961). Information Processing in Neurones and Small Nets, 25. R. H. Fuller, R. M. Bird, and R. M. Worthy, "Study ed. Anatol Rapoport and William J. Horvath (Ann Arbor: Uni­ of Associative Processing Techniques," General Precision, Inc., versity of Michigan, December 1960). AF 33(616)-6272. Glendale, Califórnia, August 1965. AF 39(602)-3371. RADC- VVADD-TR-60-652. TR-65-210. Computers and Thought, ed. Edward A. Feigenbaum 26. AF Policy Letter for Cominanders, 15 August 1965. and Julian Feldman (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 27. "Advanced Programming Developments: A Survey," 1963). pp. 83-88. The interest of other countries in this area is reflected in 28. Ibid., pp. 27-51. such publications as 29. Charles D. LaFond, “Flexible Display System Gaining Mechanisation of Thought Processes, Proceedings of a Users," Missiles and Rockets, XVII, 13 (27 September 1965), Symposúim held at the National Physical Laboratory, 24-27 36-37. Xovember 1958. Symposium No. 10, 2 vols. (London: Her 30. Rex Pay, “WSMR Consolidating Control Center," Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1959). Missiles and Rockets, XVI, 5 (1 February 1965), 32-34. The joumal Problemy kibernetiki (Problems of Cyber- 31. A. L. Samuel, "Some Studies in Machine Leaming neties) published by the State Publishing House of Physical and Using the Game of Checkers," IBM Journal of Research and Mathematioal Literature, Moscow, and translated by the Joint Decelopment, III, 3 (1959), 210-29. Publications Research Service. Vol. 10, for 1963, is JPRS 32. Morris Rubinoff et al., “The Evaluation of Techniques 26.341. and Devices as Applied to Problem Solving," Philadelphia: Uni­ In the Technical Cybemetics series, No. 4 (December versity of Pennsylvania, February 1965. AF 39(602)-3065. 1963) is JPRS 22,224; No. 5 (January 1964) is JPRS 22,648. RADC-TDR-64-402. AD 614228. In the Mathematical Problems in Cybemetics and 33. Warren S. McCulloch and Walter Pitts, “A Logical Computer Technology series, No. 1 (February 1964) is JPRS Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity," Bulletin 23,277. of Mathematical Biophysics, V, 4 (December 1943), 115-33. See also Michael A. Arbib, “Notes on a Partial Survey 34. Norbert Wiener, Cybemetics or Control and Com- of Cybemetics in Europe and the U.S.S.R.,” P.E.C. Research munication in the Animal and Machine (Cambridge, Massa- Associates, Inc-, Boulder, Colorado, May 1965. AF 49(638)- chusetts: M.I.T. Press; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Ist 1446. AFOSR-65-1412. ed. 1948, 2d ed. [enlarged] 1961). 35. Foerster, Mead, and Teuber, op. cit. 19. Computers and Thought, p. 454. 36. Annals of Mathematics. (See Note 18). 20. Henry Eyring, “This Changing World,” AAAS Bulle- 37. “An Undergraduate Program in Computer Science— tin, X, 3 (September 1965). Preliminary Recommendations," Communications of the ACM, 21. John von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain VIII, 9 (September 1965), 543-52. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958). 38. Amold Hottinger, The Arabs (Famborough, Hants, 22. C. C. Elgot et al., "Mathematical Automata Theory: England: Thames & Hudson, 1964). Military Opinion Abroad

REFLECTIONS ON VI ETNAM

G en er a l André B ea ufr e Translated by Dr. Joseph W. Annunziata

Translators Foreword General André Beaufre had wide experience with the French army in Indochina. He was a eommander in the 1947 North Tonkin operations, assistant to the commissioner of the French Republic for the command of troops in Cochin China and Cambodia in 1948, eommander in the 1951 Tonkin operations, and eommander of the 2d Tonkinese Route Division in 1952. Since his voluntary retirement in 1961 he has written several books on military strategy, among which is An Introduction to Strategy (1963), recently translated and published in the United States. Beaufre has also been featured as military analyst on the front page of the news- paper Le Figuro. This paper is one of the most influential in France, with a wide middle- class circulation. Its political position is generally center, and its editoriais often reflect a middle view between French nationalism and international cooperation. Although Beaufre criticizes the Americans for failing to appeal politically to the Vietnamese villagers, he has opposed the French left-wing predictions of an American repeat of France’s loss at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. He is convinced that American strategy in Vietnam, especially its air and sea support, has precluded another Dien Bien Phu disaster. The war has now reached the stage of a “contest of strength” between tech- nology on one side and Viet Cong elusiveness and tenacity on the other. J. W. A. MILITARY OPINION ABROAD 69

I. the help of the North—the underground move- Two Pliases Strangely Sim ilar ment in the South. From 1960 to 1964, the “corrupting” of the South was accentuated. In T he abscess in Vietnam is serious enough to 1965 battles occurred in which at first entire warrant an exact diagnosis bv looking closelv Viet Cong battalions, then regiments, ap- at its most recent evolution, without losing peared. The Americans attempted limited pres- sight of the lessons offered in a more distant sure on the North by aerial bombing. Far from past. The juxtaposition of these two points succeeding, this pressure set off an escalation of view sheds a unique light upon the present of guerrilla warfare, and the arrival of a Viet­ situation. minh division in northem South Vietnam be- The French phase of the war in Vietnam came apparent. The Americans then decided goes from December 1946 to May 1954, a little to land in force and take the war into their own more than seven years. From 1946 to 1950 the hands. Vietminh were constantly repelled and our con- The parallel consideration of these two trol was extended; but everyvvhere there re- phases brings out their extraordinary similar- mained large pockets, especially in Tonkin, ity: there is the same progression in the con- where they covered a large part of the high flict; still more striking, there is the same time region connected to China. In 1949 Mao Tse- lapse. The recent American intervention corre- tungs troops were on the border. Shortly there- sponds exactly to the landing of General de after the first Vietminh divisions were formed Lattre with reinforcements toward the end of in China. In 1950 these divisions entered the 1950; the Vietminh needed four years, from action and chased us from the high region. At 1947 to 1950, to build up their militarv power, the beginning of 1951 they attempted a general just as the Viet Cong needed from 1960 to offensive on the Tonkin delta, which Marshal 1965. The analogy leads one to think that we de Lattre stopped bv his victory at Vinh Yen. are entering into a test-of-strength phase simi­ A certain balance was then established: we lar to the one which took place between 1951 dominated the flat countrv, where we had the and 1954. advantage of firepower and road mobilitv; the Other analogies are apparent: China is a Vietnamese dominated the mountains and the constant and decisive factor in this part of the forests through their mobilitv based upon world. Towards the end of the nineteenth cen- coolies. With De Lattre gone, the Vietminh turv we pacified Tonkin only after having, with command, having leamed at Vinh Yen that it Admirai Courbet, directly attacked China. In was powerless in a pitched battle, undertook in 1950-54, thanks to the American armistice in 1953 a general offensive founded upon two Korea, China was able, without risk, to bring courses of action: fixing our troops in the delta, its effort to bear on Tonkin and cause us to where the Vietminh “corrupted” the villages lose Dien Bien Phu. In 1965 China, although by infiltrating them with guerrillas, and extend- farther off but still present, opposes the nego- ing their control over the high land towards tiations which the Americans are trying to the Thai region and Laos. We responded to this initiate. latter threat first by establishing a stronghold One can therefore point out several ele- at Na San, which, by luck, was too successful. ments of a diagnosis. The stake in the struggle The stake was then doubled by establishing a of which Vietnam is the theater is the establish- stronghold at Dien Bien Phu to cover Laos. It ment of a status in Southeast Asia. The Chinese was then that the well-known catastrophe took would like this status to give them, in the eyes plac-e, in which Chinese cannons participated of the third world, a posture as the leading decisively. Communist power which succeeded in making After the 1954 Geneva Conference, South the United States bend and which would open Vietnam enjoyed four or five years of peace. up a liaison with Indonésia. The Americans, But Diem’s dictatorship created growing oppo- on the contrary, would like to prove to the sition, which reawakened—undoubtedly with third world that guerrilla strategy can be de- 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

feated and thus prevent a China-Indonesia ferred to retain the maximum risk in order to liaison in order to protect the Indian archipel- obtain maximum dissuasion. France main- ago, Australia, and the South Pacific. The con- tained the principie of total response for its tradiction is complete and can only be resolved nuclear force; the Germans asked that their after a serious test of strength. territory continue to be covered by tactical As long as the test of strength is limited to atomic weapons, whose presence materialized the Vietnam theater, one can suppose that it the threat of using American strategic forces. will end in a clash producing a certain balance. When Kennedy sent General Maxwell Provided the balance is not broken, a solution Taylor to Vietnam, Taylor thought it possible can only come about as a result of weariness. to extrapolate from his theory of “defensive One must hope that the weariness then will be dissuasion” by “variable response” the concept mutual, which is the sole solution in establish- of “offensive pressure,” which he himself called ing a compromise that will be acceptable to “controlled escalation.” Kennedy played a deaf both parties. ear, and it was President Johnson who gave his consent last May to this strategy, which had Le Figaro, 26 August 1965 been requested for some time by the young Vietnamese generais. The idea, seductive at II. first sight, was to threaten the industrial centers Tíie Failure of the Escalation of North Vietnam and to materialize this threat with bombing raids directed towards nearby G en er a l Maxwell T aylor left Vietnam at the military objectives. end of a one-year assignment, which had been The activation of this strategy has met up agreed upon. Whatever his real reasons for to now with complete failure. To be sure, the leaving, one can’t help thinking that they were morale of the South Vietnamese army was lift- in some way allied to the failure of his strategy. ed for a time by this show of resolution. And, This strategy was very brilliantly present- to be sure, the voices of the third world have ed in his book The Uncertain Trumpet, which not yet dared to rise up publicly against this appeared in 1960. After taking over the govem- new form of aggression. But the reactions of ment, President Kennedy selected General the targeted adversary have in no way corre- Maxwell Taylor as his close military adviser, sponded to what Maxwell Taylor desired: the until appointing him Chairman of the Joint escalation has not led Hanoi to change its atti- Chiefs of Staff. Maxwell Taylor s thesis, which tude; on the contrarv. Kennedy had adopted, was that “massive re­ This failure is very instructive for manv sponse” no longer is the answer to the possible reasons. First, it has been confírmed once again situation in which each of the great adversaries that air power, when it is armed only with clas- still destroys the other, whether or not he is sical bombs, has not the strength that too many the first to fire. It was thus necessary to limit theorists grant it. It was the plane-tank com- the response to a hostile action on the part of bination which was decisive in 1940. Although the adversary to a degree of violence just the airplane played a major role in Normandy enough to retaliate without, however, setting in 1944, one must not forget that then there off the great catastrophe. Under the name of were thousands of thern. Finallv, the airplane “variable response,” this was an attempt to limit needs “paying” objectives, which guerrilla war- nuclear war to more humane proportions and fare hardly affords. in keeping with what is at stake. But the most important lesson is on a more Although logical from an American point subtle point: the dissuasive or persuasive virtue of view, this thesis met serious opposition in of “escalation” is in the automatic or uncon- Europe: it was opposed for whittling down the trollable aspect which one gives it. A minor nuclear threat and thus its dissuasive value; the action does not become a serious threat until idea of a nuclear war limited to Europe did not it announces the possibility of a greater action. seem too attractive to Europeans, who pre- What the Vietnamese experiment has shown M1L1TARY OPINION ABROAD 71 is that restricted action, far from creating a escalation of Vietnamese guerrilla warfare is fear of escalation, on the contrary reassures the responding to the escalation of American adversarv. In order for the pressure to have bombing. We encountered this phenomenon been effective, it would have been better to in Tonkin after 1950 and up to 1954; it was dis- have very quicldy climbed the rungs of vio- concerting when compounded with strictly lence; the fact that these rungs vvere climbed guerrilla warfare. only reservedly and slowly proved that the The “big guerrilla warfare” is a type of phenomenon was perfectly controlled; at that operation which remains essentially dominated point, the expected reaction should correspond by the strategy and tactical procedures of guer­ to a conclusion, drawn from an objective and rilla warfare but which employs relatively large reasonable analysis of the situation, which ex- and well-armed forces. The golden rule of guer­ cludes all recourse to the catastrophe. The rilla warfare is the secret, the surprise, the threat was taken out of Américas awesome air systematic refusal to fight as long as one is not power. in a position of force, and the exploitation by Moreover, the adversary retained all his rapid combat of a local advantage acquired freedom of action bv not reacting, while the by the unexpected concentration of very supe­ Americans found themselves somewhat con- rior means. Big guerrilla warfare retains this strained to continue progressively in this un- line of conduct, but instead of doing so by alterable direction. sections, companies, or battalions it does it These observed conditions are very impor- with regiments and whole divisions which, like tant, since they will not fail to influence the patrols, advance and take cover in the forests. next developments in strategy: persuasion bv It is still guerrilla warfare but enlarged to the the release of limited and tightly controlled re­ dimensions of classical warfare. In the vocabu- action has no significance unless one can main- lary of Mao Tse-tung’s strategy, it is called tain the threat of much more serious reaction. “general counteroffensive.” Its goal is to obtain But since the latter is not logical when the large-scale militarv results. stake is not vital, the only thing proved bv a The first examples of this for the French moderate action is that one is reasonable. In were the destruction at the end of 1950 of the this psvchological duel, then, the advantage Charton column, which was retreating to Cao- goes to the one of the adversaries who seems bang, and the retaking of Langson. The most the more capable of irrational reaction. This characteristic action was the battle of Vinh Yen is perhaps not very acceptable to the mind— in Februarv 1951, which General de Lattre nor to the interest of peace—but it is better finally won but not without having to surmount to be fully aware of it. several trying surprises. The battle began by Besides, it has been known for a long time an attack on a delta border post, which imme- that the sign “Beware of the dog,” or “Wolf diately asked for help. The local commander traps,” or even “Beware of mines,” could have sent in a column of several battalions. These a certain dissuasive effect; but this would not were ambushed on the way by a whole divi- be so if one saw the dog firmly chained and sion! General de Lattre then took the matter in muzzled or the mines carefullv marked by little hand—reinforcements carne from everywhere— flags. but another division was setting a second am- bush for the help coming to relieve the first Le Figaro, 25 August 1965 reinforcements. Several days of struggle were needed, with the concentration of the entire air III. power and a deluge of artillery, in order to “Big Guerrilla W arfare” repulse completely the whole Vietminh army unit, and with heavy losses. Then it disap- T his title may be surprising and seem con- peared into the forest. . . . tradictory ( for a guerrilla war is a “little war”), The same procedures seem to be taking but this is what is taking place in Vietnam. An place now in Vietnam. The news of the infiltra- 72 AIR UNLVERSITY REVIEW

tion of an entire North Vietnamese division the final compromise, which will probably arise into South Vietnam announces the retum of from the diplomatic circumstances that will such action. The normal zone of action is the come about on a world scale, the local issue of vast region of the Moi plateaus, to the west of this new phase will depend on the American the Annam mountain range. There the Viet aptitude, amphibious and supported by coastal Cong can easily circulate, hide, and set up bases, to maintain, thanks to its arms and air gigantic snares bv utilizing as bait one of the power, a sufficient control of the interior, as- Vietnamese garrisons that defend the centers. saulted by the termites of an increasingly pow- Their only diffieultv is to supply the troops in erful guerrilla warfare which is serviced by the this poor area. Thev have to build rice depots coolie armies. in advance, set up by long ehains of coolies. The problem is not easy for the Amer- Le Figaro, 30 Ju ly 1965 icans: to evaeuate the posts is to lose face and give a psychological advantage to the enemv; IV. to maintain the former dispersion is to offer Test of Strength in Vietnam the enemv an occasion for easy success. The first solution is necessary, despite the unpleas- T he America n military commitment in Viet­ antness, just as it was for the French at the nam is now several months old and has been end of 1950. Regrouping is now taking place, capable of letting its action be felt. Of course, and there will be more to come. it is still too soon to predict how it will end, but But one cannot evaeuate everything, and one can already sum up the early results. one cannot help thinking of Dien Bien Phu, At the beginning of the year [1965], the which seemed to many to be a garrison strong Vietnam conflict was getting progressively and enough to resist any assault. . . As often in assuredly worse. Contrary to the opinion of history, one should be warv of facile parallels, many observers, who were then very pessimis- for there are many differences: Dien Bien Phu tic, the situation did not present any immediate was close to the China frontier, and the Moi danger, but the long-term prospects were bad. plateaus are very far from the bases of North Thus it was necessary either to do something Vietnam. or to accept a very disadvantageous political But most of all, American air power is compromise. much superior to that which we had in Indo­ The first American reaction, requested for china in 1954, which allows the Americans to some time by the South Vietnamese army chiefs intervene with very efficacious fire support; of staff and reeonsidered by the American strat- moreover, they have many helicopters ( which egists in keeping with the concept of nuclear I called for vainly in 1952 . . .), which give the dissuasion, consisted of direct aerial attacks on classical forces on the ground the mobility and North Vietnam. As everyone knows, this in- logistics which they have not had because of direct solution was too sophisticated for a prim­ the lack of roads. After several reverses, which itive and resolute adversarv, and it did not give are inevitable until necessary adjustments are the essential result which was aimed at, namelv, made, it is not impossible that a new equi- a form of honorable compromise with Hanoi. librium will be established. And so, President Johnson retumed to But let us not forget that these marginal simplicity: the traditional intervention of pow- wars do not have a military victory as an object. erful classical military forces capable of direct- They are only a hard form of negotiation. In ly engaging the Viet Cong. There are now this framework, the United States had hoped 150,000 Americans in Vietnam, and soon there to aequire a “position of force” by recourse to will be 200,000, serviced and supported by a a controlled escalation. It only set off a retalia- thick cloud of helicopters and planes. Massive tion by big guerrilla warfare, which is also bombardments and helicopter operations are seeking a “position of force” in view of another abruptly modifying the rhvthrn of this war, Geneva Conference eventually. While awaiting which was bogging down. The Viet Cong are M1L1TARY OPINION ABROAD 73

losing a good part of the relative impunity fruit immediately: the amelioration of the situ- which the semipassivity of the South Vietnam- ation is certain, and without much chance of ese army afforded them by being too vvholly error one can predict that it will continue. This preoccupied with the zones of pacification. The amelioration has created in the United States— Viet Cong battalions and regiments, which as I was able to judge recently—a strong wind were able to regroup and begin the big guer- of optimism. Quite a few Americans now be- rilla warfare, are now constrained to disperse lieve that they are going to win this war, that and find themselves in the uncomfortable posi- they have a formula which will solve the diffi- tion of quarry at the beginning of a hunt. Be- cult problem posed by guerrilla warfare and hind the Americans, some 400,000 regular what the Chinese call “wars of liberation.” troops and territorial forces of the South Viet- However, at this juncture a definitive prog- namese army are organizing the pacification nosis would be premature, for numerous signs process. show that the Viet Cong are accepting the test The originalitv of the American military of strength. The “siege” of Piei Me showed the action is that it utilizes a large quantity of high- Viet Cong’s ability to absorb heavy bombard- ly perfected technical means. The power of the ment and to elude encirclement by the airmo­ aerial fire is overwhelming: the large-scale use bile reinforcements. The identification of pris- of napalm and wide-fragmentation bombs ren- oners belonging to two North Vietnamese regi­ ders concentration by the adversary very dan- ments recently infiltrated into the South indi- gerous once it has been located. Consequently cates a willingness to combat the American the Viet Cong have a tendency to dig in, which offensive by other means than temporarily dis- hinders their mobility, while tear gases are persing. The Viet Cong commandos who infil­ used to reach them in their tunnels. The land trated the large American base at Da Nang troops have at their disposal numerous inge- right up to the flying areas, where they de- nious gadgets which aid them in guerrilla fight- stroyed about thirty planes, confirm the great ing to avoid being surprised or to recognize the ability of the guerrillas in acts of terrorism. enemy. But the great innovation of this cam- Furthermore the mass employment of aerial paign was the commitment of the lst Cavalry fire inflicts upon the Vietnamese population Division Airmobile, which alone has at its dis- frightful experiences whose psvchological in- position 400 helicopters. This large unit realizes fluence is unpredictable. Finally—and especial- almost completely the plan which I had vainly lv—the American action does not seem to be proposed for the French army in 1953 and founded upon a political theme capable of which would have prevented the Dien Bien rallying the people in an enduring manner. Phu disaster. Thanks to these airmobile troops, It is thus necessary to await the results the Americans enjoy great tactical mobility in of the test of strength which is taking place at the countryside. this moment in the forests of the Moi plateaus This mobility allows them to quickly sup- as well as in the Annam mountain range, in port isolated posts and to gather large concen- the plantations to the north of Saigon as well trations of forces against the adversary’s units as in the rice fields and the vast inundated after they are weakened by massive aerial fire. areas of the Mekong River. A complete Amer­ At this levei, it is an extremely interesting ex- ican victory could bring on the moral collapse periment bearing upon a combat procedure of the Viet Cong. But if the victory were to be whose theoretical possibilities are considerable incomplete, all would still have to be done. when fighting in the 'wide areas of tropic re- The war will be long, the Americans sav. This gions. is the only prognosis that one can presently Thus the struggle is taking on the aspect make on the war in Vietnam. of a conflict between high technology and rus- But guerrilla warfare is not only fought ticity, between a machine for killing and the in the field. A good portion of the rebels’ morale combatant covered by hostile nature. is dependent upon the intemational mood and The resolute action of the Americans bore upon the hopes of externai support which they 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW can nourish. From this point of view, one must and even a permanent commitment in South- note that the determination shown by the east Asia. These are externai factors which Americans has restored their prestige, while would be very favorable to the Americans if the attitude of the Chinese, at once intransigent they were to succeed in ameliorating consider- and careful, has caused them to lose points on ablv the internai situation in South Vietnam. the world chessboard. Finally, despite certain In this ameliorated context a settlement, hostile demonstrations against the war in Viet- which normally depends upon China’s attitude, nam which were more spectacular than sub- could be brought into play in Vietnam. But stantial, a great majority of American opinion the test remains to be made in the coming has now rallied to the idea of a prolonged effort months. Le Figaro, 10 November 1965

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE DIALECTICS

L ieu t en a n t Colonel M. Yasukov Translated by Norman Precoda

Translators Foreworcl In this compact and carefully written article, Colonel Yasukov describes and pre- sents arguments for the operations of the principies of war and of armed conflict. The subject is a vital one, an extraordinarily complex one, and the vvriting reflects much thought. I suggest that this analysis be read carefully and slowly and considered on its own merits—that is to say, on the basis of the arguments and evidence—keeping in mind, ahvays, the roles such publishing media play in the Soviet Union. A principal instrument of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the newspaper Red Star, is in the main for officers of the armed forces—or in Soviet phraseology, perhaps, “for officers, generais, and admirais. . . .” Such articles ought, therefore, to be viewed as expressions of approved attitudes, as statements of policy, et al. So much for the introduction: now something of my own, and certainly subjective, impressions. I confess puzzlement and curiosity. Judgments are, of course, always in- volved in reading and translation, the more so as one tries to stand in the author’s shoes, to look through his eyes. Many thoughts come to mind. A first question: Why was this somewhat esoteric title chosen? Why not something more on the order of “On the Principies of War”?—for surely, it seems to me, this would be more accurate and reveal- ing. Is my understanding so far from the Soviet mainstream; could it be purposeful couching; or is there stül some other reason? Too, the persistente of emphasis on the existente and presente of numerous and powerful nonmilitary factors in war (viz., political, psychologital, economic, chance . . .) strikes me as a bit curious. Few, it seems to me, would dispute the basic point and also the emphasis. It is largely in execution or practice that our various interpretations or understandings are put to test and that differences show. The basic theme, therefore, hardly seems very controversial. Heavy emphasis, however, would seem consistent with creating a rationale reservoir for responsible decision-makers; it is consistent, too, with the kind of anticipatory dampen- ing action one might use where a major component of national power showed or was suspected of significant unhappiness. These and many other thoughts come to mind, but the footing here, though fascinating, is also exceedingly treacherous. N. P.

O BECOME more acquainted with Na- plays the detennining role as against the sec- Tture’s objective laws and those of the evo- ond. Tliis unity between political content and lution of society, to be able to take their re- military conflict constitutes one of the most quirements into account in practical aetivities, important principies of war. The main point to lean on them—is one of the special Leninistic of the action is that the political content of the methods of scientific leadership. V. I. Lenin war defines its aims, the aetivities of the State emphasized that the laws of the outside world in mobilizing all its resources for victory over were “the main foundations of the expedient the antagonist, the attitude toward the war of action of man.” one or another of the classes, parties; and de­ It is quite understandable that the occur- termines the character of military operations, rence of war and armed conflict is not an ex- the degree of its intensity. Knowledge of the ception to this rule. The conscious activitv of observable principies enables proper appraisal our military personnel is built, not on the un- of the character of the war. steady ground of subjective assumptions and The very progress of the war defines a fantasies, but on the solid base of Marxist- whole series of other objective principies. One Leninist science, on the basis of the correct of these is the principie of the dependence image of objective reality. of the course and outeome of the war on the coordination of economic, ethical-political, I scientific, and appropriate military potentials. Knowledge of this principie, reflecting the very W ab is a special State of society, carrying on essential connections and relationships, permits of armed conflict for the attamment of definite thorough appraisal of the adversarys capabili- political goals. This State is characterized by ties to properly build military polities and skill- the operation of various sociological principies fully manipulate economic, moral, political, which differ from the principies of peacetime and war resources themselves. This is extremely and which constitute a special system—a system important for the achievement of victory. of principies of war. In it, in this system, only But war—a phenomenon of unusual com- those essential internai ties and relationships plexity, according to expressions of V. I. Lenin enter which arise simultaneously with the be- —is an extraordinarily variegated thing. It nec- ginning of war and which continue their influ- essarily assumes armed conflict between two ence during its entire course. The essence of sides with its own inherent speeific principies. war is found in the unity of the political con- Reflecting fundamental connections and rela­ tent and the armed conflict, where the former tionships directly in the phenomena of unusual 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW militarv actions, these have decisive influence military missions given the troops obviously on the development of all conflict, battle ac­ exceed their fighting capabilities and lead to tions. If the principies of war viewed as a whole fruitless sacrifice and even to defeat. Sec- show that the most powerful wins, then the ondly, commanders now and then underap- principies of armed conflict show just how the praise their ovvn strength and resources and stronger can and does vvin. overestimate the strength and resources of the This vietory is achieved in the course of opponent and thus lose the chance of vietory. fighting operations vvhich at each historical Examples of the first divergence appear moment have their ovvn forms and modes. Their in the operations of our troops in the Suvalkai characters are specified hy the objective causes region in the Great Fatherland War when on and circumstances vvhich constitute the essence 23 June 1941 four mechanized corps in sup- of one of the most important lavvs of armed con­ port of front and bombardment aviation were flict formulated by Engels. As early as 1878, in ordered from the Kaunas and Grodno regions the vvork “Anti-Dühring,” Engels revealed the to execute a concentrated blow in the Suvalkai objective essential connection between qualita- direction, encircle and destroy the enemy tive changes in fighting equipment and human group there, and, with this accomplished, the material and, following this, the changes in next day take possession of the Suvalkai re­ forms of military organizations and modes of gion. Hovvever, our forces were not fullv fighting actions. manned; they had limited quantities of equip­ The operation of this principie predeter- ment. Control of the troops and rear Services mined the scale and eontent of those core was in disorder. Forces and means obviously changes vvhich occurred and take place in mili­ did not correspond with the given task, and tary affairs. Especiallv wide inclusions in the our counterattack ended in misfortune. armed strengths of the largest of the world Divergence of the second type may be povvers, nuclear weapons brought forth a chain demonstrated by operations of Allied forces reaction of radical changes in technical equip­ in Western Europe in 1944-45. Possessing ment as well as in principies of training troops great numerical superiority in equipment and and in their organizational structure. In the men against German-Fascist troops, the Allies armed forces of the U.S.A., for example, the nonetheless suffered serious misfortunes in a three-regiment structured Infantrv Division series of instances. And one of the main rea- was replaced by Pentomic Divisions, consist- sons for tht‘se misfortunes was passive guid- ing of five fighting groups. Then, associated ance of the military by the Allies, vvhich were with the changed Outlook on. utilization of nu­ set limited, minimal aims. Their actions, ac- clear weapons and on forms and modes of cording to a statement of the German general armed conflict, the Pentagon drew back from Speidel, “were like a poorly mobile wagon- Pentomic Divisions and created formations ette.” based on new organizational principies. Observance of the requirements of the This is one of the manifestations of the principie of correspondence assists attainment principie of the dependence of forms and of success in battle. But this success may have modes of armed conflict on weapons and a particular character if the military leader military equipment. During the course of war has forgotten the other principies of armed it interacts with other objective lavvs and in conflict—and in particular that principie of the particular with the principie of correspond- dependence of the course and outeome of the ence of force and means with the specified struggle on the concentration of force in the aims, i.e., with the military mission. main direction at the decisive time. The significance and importance of this As is knovvn, troops operate in definite principie does not require special proof. But military formations which permits them to in practice deviations occur from its require- most fully and organizationally utilize their ments. These deviations are of two types. povver. These formations possess, like a living Firstly, there are instances when aims and organism, more or less important essential- MILITARY OP1NION ABROAD 77

for-life centers. This means that to destroy an addition to the preceding, in it enter the prin­ opponents militar)' formations it is not at all cipies of troop interactions, principies of coor- necessary to strike along the entire front but dination of strategic operations, operatives, is sufficient to wipe out their most vital strong- tactical problems, and many others. In ex- points and most important centers. This cir- amining these principies we must take into cumstance dictates direction of the main blow consideration their complex interweaving, their and the necessit)' to concentrate the principal mutual contradictions, and their coinciding force on it. tendencies. And here unavoidably arises the Thus it has been at all times in the most question: What is the role of personalitv in diverse wars of various epochs. However, the armed conflict, the correlation between objec­ forms and degree of manifestation of the prin­ tive principies and the conscious activities of cipies under consideration changed in accord- the commander? ance with the changed conditions of armed conflict. In the past, the basic aid to establish- ment of superiority in strength in directing the II main blow was concentration of troops, which moved into the given region from other parts Ox the question of the role of personalitv in of the front and also from the interior. Under the processes of armed conflict, there have modem conditions such superiority in strength been and exist different opinions. In bour- c-an be obtained by the concentrated blows geois military science the problem presents made possible by nuclear-carrying rocket two contrasting points of view. weapons. The first of these is voluntarism. This is Similar changes, associated with the ap- the philosophical course which absolutizes plication of nuclear-carrying rocket weapons, mans will, picturing its independence of take place with formations, the extent of de- objective conditions. In militar)' affairs such velopment, and other principies of armed attitudes lead to adventurism, manifesting conflict, which bear testimony to their histori- themselves in a cult of strong personalitv, cal character. But unchanging is the fact that standing as though above the soldiery and able the actions of these principies will be dialecti- to act in spite of objective circumstances and callv interdependent. Thus in one instance the principies. This was shown especially clearly actions coincide; in others, these or other prin­ in the actions of Hitler, with the idea of his cipies oppose each other. all-powerful will. True, one can in contem- As a result of this, in the process of mili- porary bourgeois science find widespread tary actions a large number of chance events discussions on “principies of war and armed occurs. They may just supplement, reinforce conflict.” However, bourgeois militar)' theore- the action of one or the other principie, ticians inteq>ret the notion of “principie” in an weaken it, bring it to naught. Accidents, which idealistic spirit, that is, in the category of are verv frequent in armed conflict, advance consciousness, completely without objective the principies of armed conflict by supple- support in reality. menting their effects and, on the whole, by the The other extreme in the solution of this form of their appearance. The principie comes problem is associated with the fatalistic course out as a tendency, pressing through a great in philosophy. Fatalism (from the word fatum number of accidental events. Affeeted by these —fate, destiny) denies any free, conscious ac- events, distinct deviations from some average tivitv of people, considers that historical neces- line are unavoidable. But such deviations do sity, principies (or God) predetermine all not appear determining, for the principies al- actions of the military commanders and vic- ways remain very close to the essence of things tory or defeat in war. The English military and express the general, the primary. theoretician Fuller, for example, one time Thus the armed conflict is subordinated absolutized the role of military equipment. to the fixed system of objective principies. In Under present-day conditions “atomic fatal- 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ism” has spread widely, which fosters mans drawing nearer of thought to objective, devel­ feeling of doom before nuclear weapons. opment is not halted. Besides these, the al- Underlying all these viewpoints of the ready known principies of armed conflict, in bourgeois thinkers lie different idealistic and every distinct conflict one finds specific forms metaphysical theories. Thus the basis of the of manifestation that possess their own inter- military doctrine and science of the U.S.A. is weavings, tendencies of development. idealism in the form of pragmatism, the es- The extent of the relationship of these sence of which can be expressed by the motto, or other occurrences of armed conflict with “That is true which to us is advantageous.” definite principies varies considerably. One Soviet military science is foreign to this of them spontaneously flows out of the opera- antiscientific approach to the phenomena and tion of a given principie and crops up every processes of military conflict. Based on the time when the corresponding conditions are materialistic world Outlook and dialectical created; others are less associated with such method, Soviet military science proceeds from a principie. They may be in a specific battle the objective character of the principies of situation, but also may not. These are those armed conflict. At the same time it does not chance events which always accompany oper- fetishize these laws, but leams deeply to ation of the principies of armed conflict. recognize them, to actively take advantage of Can one make one’s way through all this them. seeming chãos? Yes, one can. Knowledge of Soviet military science, proceeding from the statistical principie of armed conflict, Marxist-Leninist studies of the role of the which operates in the realm of large num- masses and of personality in history, considers bers, homogeneities, and repeated events, en- that the Creative action of the commanding ables us to do this and with distinct proba- personnel, their military mastery, proficiency bility to establish some average line of the of instruction, education and training of further development. troops, their organizing abilities—all are im- Principies of armed conflict possess even portant factors upon which depend achieve- other peculiarities. Their effects spread on ment of victorv in conflict. Dependent on un- both fighting sides and hence obligate com- derstanding of the principies of armed con­ manders of all ranks to leam the dialectics of flict and its problems, dependent on the levei armed conflict, to avoid one-sidedness, sub- of technical military preparedness, the com- jectivism, and pattems in making decisions. mander may with his actions speed up or slow Einstein once observed that Nature was down the development of military operations, complex but not evil-intentioned. This cannot ease or make more difficult attainment of the be said about armed conflict. In its progress is specified objectives. the contest of two conscious wills, and this Cognition of the principies and practical introduces a whole series of difficulties in the utilization of them are the required conditions realm of military cognition. for the conscious actions of the commander, In the first place, the commander fre- for random adaptation to the requirements of quently reaches a decision on the basis of par- the principies costs people a pretty penny and tial data, which not infrequently are contra- in war is not infrequently associated with dictory in character, for the opponent under- heavy losses. However, cognition of the prin­ takes all measures to cloak his own true in- cipies of armed conflict, of concrete forms and tentions. Second, it sometimes is difficult to manifestations, is a verv complex process. The take into account the subjective peculiarities requirements of these principies are fixed in of the opponent, to completely predict the view of the rules and standards in military character of his action. Third, the action of regulations. In them are contained many cen- the commander takes place under the condi- turies of experience, the roots of change in tion of the maximum exertion of all mental military affairs. But on that which defines and physical power, which in specific in- even the process of cognition as an endless stances may negatively express itself on the MILITARY OP1NION ABROAD 79

results of his cognition. Fourth, the peculiar- The “mechanism” of the interaction be- ity of militarv cognition shows itself in the tween man and the outer world can be set fact that the requirements of the laws of armed forth in the form of a two-directional-influ- conflict, the images found in regulations and ence-flow problem in which each of the two manuais, can become antiquated, for opera- primary parameters influences the other. From tions change even faster than the sphere of gen­ the outer world to man is one influence direc- eral knowledge. Consequently, the commander tion. It appears determinate, for the principies must approach this or that requirement of the of the objective world stipulate not only the regulations creativelv. possibility but also the limits of possible at- All these and other peculiarities have an tainments in human activities. The second in­ influence on the process and reliabilitv of fluence direction is from man to the outer military cognition and. preserving their o\vn world. Man changes his environment in ac- force, have become more visible and pressing cordance with his aims, with his undertakings. in present-day situations. Associated with “The world does not satisfy man,” wrote V. I. these changes, the utilization of mass-destruc- Lenin, “and man resolves to modify it by his tion weapons, rockets, nuclear submarines, actions.” and radioelectronics has speeded up the flow These modifications of the environment of militarv actions and increased their intensi- take place according to the plan which arises ties and scopes. Factors affecting the flow and preliminarily in rnans consciousness. Observ- outcome of the conflict continue to unfold ing that consciousness not only reflects the ob­ rapidly and uninterruptedly. It is becoming jective world but also creates it, V. I. Lenin more and more difficult to immediately allow emphasized: “The action of man, putting to- for all elements, relationships, and deviations gether for himself an objective picture of the which interact on the field of battle. world, changes externai reality, destroys its Now as never before has arisen the neces­ definiteness, modifies one or the other of its sita- to extraordinarily speed the logical think- fac-ets, its character.” ing of the commander in mathematical meth- Applying these principal conditions of ods of analvsis. The commander must in par­ Marxism to the commanders action, one can ticular be able to analyze vast quantities of examine the basic direc-tions of reinforcement information for the purpose of sifting out the according to changed conditions of armed most general relationships and determining conflict, according to utilization of its princi­ objective requirements of the development pies. Take, if vou will, calculation by the com­ of the militarv- situation. Awaiting to give the mander of those contradictions in his activities commander reliable assistance are electronic which give rise to the military situation. computers, radar, infrared, and television Among its major components one must be equipment, which come forth with powerful concemed with the opponent, with all his means of validating cognition. characteristics and actions, his troops, terrain and meteorology, time. Of course, not all these items contribute to change in the desired III course of action. For example, time and cli- matic conditions are not yet under man’s con- Acknowledcinc the knowability of the prin­ trol, and the problem leads to this: to correct- cipies of armed conflict, Soviet military Science ly take into account and skillfully utilize these shows our military personnel their actions in factors during organizing of the conflict. Such perspective, emphasizes its conscious, Creative considerations as the opponent, one’s own character. Such knowledge permits influence troops, the terrain are another matter. By defi- by distinct form on the conditions of armed nite actions the commander can modify them conflict, checks the effect of one of the princi­ to his advantage. pies, and gives full play to and takes advan- Take, let us say, the correlation between tage of other principies towards our objectives. our strength and that of the opponent. Ap- 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW praising it, the commander works up and ex- troops, their fighting spirit. For on steadiness, ploits to his advantage measures in accord- courage, military skill, cohesiveness, disci­ ance with changes in relative strengths for pline, and faith in victory by the personnel the direction of the main blow. This can be depend to great extent the flow and outcome achieved by various means. In one situation of battle. it is provided by counterattacking maneuvers The active Creative character of the com- vvhich force the opponent to group his troops manders actions is cultivated and formed yet in conformity with our plan. In another situ­ in peacetime, in the process of political and ation, secretly moving our own forces, and so fighting preparation. For such creativity is forth. Thus, in the course of the Great Patri- based firmly on knowledge; and for skillful otic War, the commander of the llth Guards utilization of the objective principies of armed Armv, now Marshal of the Soviet Union I. X. conflict, our commanders must continuously Bagramyan, at the time of counteroffensive study military Science, military skills, army near Kursk, concentrated on the section of the and navy experiences, to know thoroughly the breakthrough which constituted 39 percent origins of modem-day conflict, the capabilities of the general vvidth of the armys front 90 of modem arms and equipments. Only deep percent of his rifle divisions, all his artillery, penetration into the base of Marxist-Leninist all his tanks. In this vvay, most fullv utilizing studies in objective reality will enable military the principie of the dependence of battle personnel to actively, consciously influence progress on concentration of force in the direc­ all facets of life of the military organism, on tion of the main blow, he achieved success. a truly scientific basis direct troops, and It is no less important to allow for the strengthen their military preparedness and also important factors such as the morale of military abilities. Red Star, 12 November 1965

Major General Victor R. Haugen, Commandant, Air Force Institute of Technology, informs us that AFIT School of Systems and Logistics is not operated by Ohio State University, as was erroneously indicated in the article by Colonel Horace W. Lanford, Jr., “What Is Coordination?” in the November-December 1965 issue of Air University Revicw. Rather, General Haugen States, “The School of Systems and Logistics is an organic school of the Air Force Institute of Technology and Air University." The Editor 1 $ & »$< m m $$3 m m <$$$ *'$3>trt' £$$$: &$$$ $$$$! >$$$$3 &$$$ í$$$$3 $$$$ &$$$$3 $$$3 $$$$$4 $$$3 $$$$$3 $$$3 $$$$$3 $$$3 $$$$$3 $$$$$3 ^$$$$$$$3>s ,$$$$$3 ^$$$$3>$$$$$$3>. ;$$$$$3 ;$$$$$3 >$$$$$3 $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ -$$$>* ^$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$, >$$$$$$$$$$$3 4

THE USE AND MISUSE OF COST EFFECTIVENESS

R obert L. P et er sen

UCH HAS been said about the use of costs of the two systems are as follows.® cost effectiveness in the Department M Force A Force B of Defense. So much, in fact, that there seems to be scarcely any need for additional discus- RDT&E $1 billion $2 billion sion of the matter. Yet, despite the wealth of Procurement $7 billion $12 billion literature on the subject, there still remain Operating (10 yr) $2 billion $3 billion some points which merit more widespread Totais $10 billion $17 billion recognition. Among these is the fact that even though the analytical method emplovs the ob- To arrive at the necessary estimates of jective logic of mathematics, conclusions drawn effectiveness, we invoke the inevitable war from such studies may be affected dramaticallv game. A scenario is prepared, forces for both by subtle changes in point of view, in assump- sides are “laid on,” and the battle is given to tions, or in methods of treating the data. a Computer. After thoroughly masticating the To illustrate what is meant by the fore- mass of assumptions, conditions, and data going statement, consider a “typical” strategic which we have fed it, the machine produces a force structure study. In competition are a new Consolidated listing of important combat re- missile and a new aireraft. That force structure sults: which includes the missile we will call Force A. Force B will be the same basic force but with °Cost data. as well as all other data presented here, are completely fictitious—an obvious requirement for unclassified a new aireraft substituted for the missile. The discussion of defense matters. 82 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

Force A Force B does provide a conceptual framework within Enemy casualties 50 million 60 million which to evaluate the results of our war game. U.S. casualties 50 million 45 million These results indicate that no matter which of Enemy industry the two forces we deploy, the enemy would destroyed 40 percent 45 percent pay a rather awesome penalty for initiating a U.S. industry general war. The price in either case is certain- destroyed 50 percent 45 percent ly more than we would be willing to pay, and we therefore conclude that either force is prob- At this point we must establish something ably sufficient for the deterrent role. Since the which would ordinarily have constituted our missile is the cheaper of the two competing initial point of departure but which for the systems, we then select it as the “most cost- purposes of this discussion we have saved until effective” deterrent system. now. It is necessary, in order to evaluate the There remains now the criterion of limit- relative effectiveness of the two forces, to spec- ing damage to the United States. ify the military objectives they are intended In terms of cost, the aircraft of Force B to accomplish, objectives which should be con- represents a 70 percent increase over the mis­ sistent with a more general national policy. In sile of Force A. In retum for this additional other words, we must decide what it is the expenditure, Force B reduces casualties below forces are to do so that we may judge how well Force A’s levei by only about 2 to 3 percent of each of them has satisfied the desired goals. the total population. Industrial losses, like cas­ Resorting to the recent literature on gen- ualties, are heavy no matter which of the two eral-war strategy, we find two military objec­ forces we deploy, although they are somewhat tives which consistently reappear. The first of lighter in the case of Force B. We are therefore these is deterrence, the prevention of a general faced with the problem of deciding whether nuclear engagement. The second, which be- or not these small reductions in damage are of comes an objective only upon failure of the any great importance once we have lost about first, is limitation of damage to the United one-quarter of our population and almost half States in terms of both casualties and destruc- of our industrial capacity. tion of material resources. One could probably get many opinions The numerical results of the analysis do on this question. Rather than sacrifice the pres- not, however, provide us with any direct mea- ent analysis to a philosophical debate of this sure of the deterrent capability of the two kind, we shall simply conclude for the moment forces. Therefore, we resort to introspection in that the more expensive force does not show an effort to estimate how the enemy will react any marked superiority over Force A. This to each of the two proposed force structures. conclusion is made more comfortable by the The reasoning goes something like this: Con- uncertainties inherent in the problem, which sider that we, as a nation, would be unwilling are probably greater than the observed differ- to initiate any war in which we would assured- ences in effectiveness. In any event, since we ly sacrifice a large segment of our population have already decided that both forces are ca- and suffer industrial losses so extensive as to pable of preventing a nuclear holocaust, the jeopardize our survival as an intemational difference in damage-limiting capability seems power. Looking at the problem from the oppo- somewhat unimportant. We recommend, then, nent’s view, we judge that any rational enemy that the new missile be purchased, since it would be similarly deterred from initiating probably retums more per dollar than the air­ general war if our forces possess the capability craft. to inflict damage of this kind on his homeland. At this point, let us rearrange our logic and This criterion of deterrent-effectiveness is approach the problem in a different manner. somewhat qualitative in that we can state no The first thing we shall challenge is the concept precise levei of damage that will be acceptable of cost used in the preceding analysis. We shall or unacceptable to the enemy. However, it then revise the manner of treating deterrence. IN MY OP1NION 83

One can argue that the costs we have used Deterrence and damage-limitation are not, are perhaps the most trivial expenses involved we shall argue, two criteria, but simply one. in the establishment and maintenance of a mili­ For deterrence is the ultimate in damage-lim­ tary capabilitv. They include only the dollars itation, since no damages ( or “use costs”) are required to develop, procure, and operate a incurred. If deterrence is assumed to hinge in force. But dollars are nothing more than a a two-valued manner on what we may regard symbolic representation of resources and not a as “unacceptable damage” to the enemy, our verv good one at that. The important resources most important military objective is washed of a nation are found in its people, their mate­ out of the problem. This happens because in rial possessions, and their way of life. And all the nuclear age virtually any reasonable stra­ these are in some degree at risk in time of war. tegic force may be viewed as being capable Considered from this point of view, one of inflicting “unacceptable damage.” Many can conceive a potential or “expected cost for forces may thus be equal in deterrent capa- a military system. This cost will include not bility. As in the preceding example, the cost- only the price of acquiring the system but also effectiveness comparison then hinges solely on the losses which may be incurred if it is ever damage-limitation. And this involves the com­ used in the role for which it was designed and parison of forces under the paradoxical assump- created. Thus, the price of a limited-war force tion that none of them has the capability tc may be relatively low, for its use probably accomplish the primary mission of deterrence. would involve only casualties in the thousands Looking to the future, we see that neither and dollar losses in the millions, with no dam- general war nor its deterrence is a certainty. age to the zi industrial capacitv and little threat There is, on the contrary, some finite prob­ to the civilian population and the national cul- ability that the nuclear catastrophe with which ture. Employment of strategic forces, by com- everyone is concemed will in fact materialize parison, can be extraordinarilv expensive. At during the life-span of systems now being pro- stake mav be millions of lives, zi industrial posed. Assessing this probability is a difficult damage amounting to many billions of dollars, task, for what is required to deter probably and perhaps the loss of freedom itself for those varies from day to day and from one situation who survive. to another. Any probability value which one The “expected cost” of a system is not, selects is not, therefore, likely to meet with however, the same as the cost involved in using widespread approval, nor will it be easily de- it, for there is no assurance that any given force fended in the face of dissenting opinions. Yet, or system will ever be used. To arrive at the the assumption of some specific probability that “expected cost,” we must consider not only general war will occur within some period of the cost of the system if it is used but also the time seems scarcely less tenable than the im- probability as to its being used. Ineorporating plicit assumption that the likelihood is either a “probability of use” in the analysis can change zero or 100 percent. the comparison of costs for systems and forces For the purpose of illustrating the effect rather impressively. A general-purpose force of such a probabilistic treatment, let us assume obtained at a modest price ( as such things go) that Force A has a 96 percent chance of deter- may become relatively expensive if the prob­ ring general war during its lifetime, while ability of its use is extremely high. And a stra­ Force B has a deterrent probability of 98 per­ tegic force that is developed and procured at cent. Conversely, the probability of war with a high cost may be cheap if its creation virtu- Force A is 4 percent; with Force B, 2 percent. ally precludes “use costs” that might otherwise We can then evaluate the two forces in terms be incurred. With this concept we have opened of what we have called “expected costs.” These, the door for a different viewpoint on the treat- added to the other customary costs, produce a ment of deterrence—a viewpoint which, like new total cost for each system. most other concepts, requires some discussion If we estimate the U.S. industrial resources of the supporting logic. at $1000 billion, this multiplied by the prob- 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ability of general war and its consequences will Since this last treatment of our problem give us the “expected cost” in terms of indus­ is quite different from what is customary today, trial losses. there will of course be questions. Is it feasi- Force A = (.04) ($1000 billion) ble to State a probability for the occurrence (.50)=$20 billion of general nuclear war? Can one really put a Force B = (.02) ($1000 billion) price on human life, or on such intangibles as (.4 5 )= $9 billion freedom? Perhaps one cannot. But on the other hand, can one with any confidence estimate To reduce casualties to some value com- attrition, envision enemy tactics, or predict the patible with other costs, we will assume that character of future enemy forces, as we do in each Citizen is worth $10,000 in taxes to the our present studies? govemment over the time period of interest. If the cost-effectiveness technique cannot Then: treat with the intangible but crucial variables Force A = (.04) (50 million) in todays defense problems, a more basic ques- ($10,000)=$20 billion tion arises. What, then, is the value of cost- F o r c e B = (.02) (4 5 million) effectiveness analysis in the management of our ($10,000)= $9 billion resources? To this there appeàrs to be at least one good answer. The total costs for the two systems now The value of cost effectiveness lies not so appear as follows: much in the results it may produce under a Force A Force B given set of assumptions and conditions as it Rdt &e $1 billion $2 billion does in the fact that the nature of the problem is exposed. Cost-effectiveness analysis enforces Procurement $7 billion $12 billion some systematic thinking about the variables Operating (10 yr) $2 billion $3 billion and their interrelationships. It focuses atten- Expected (industrial) $20 billion $9 billion tion on the tenuous nature of assumptions re- Expected (casualties) $20 billion $9 billion garding uncertainties of the future, thus point- Totais $50 billion $35 billion ing to areas of risk. And it highlights the sensi- tivity of conclusions to the various factors in- So it is seen that with our revised ground volved in the problem. Thus it makes explicit rules the aircraft of Force B is far cheaper than the basis for decision—a far different thing the missile. This is of course a direct reversal than the implicit and therefore unobservable of our previous conclusion. What is perhaps logic which underlies decisions based on intui- more important is that it is now evident that tion or opinion. The decisions reached on the our selection between the two altematives is basis of analysis are not necessarily more cor- critically dependent upon the values we may rect, but they probablv are more enlightened. choose to place on human life and on our esti- mate of the likelihood that general nuclear war Hcadquarters Strategic Air Command will actually occur. Books and Ideas

AIR EXPLORATION OF THE ARCTIC

Luxtenant Colonel Donald A. Shaw

ISTORICAL accounts, field reports, and ous to be worth printing and to sell news- records of pioneering in the arctic are papers. The routine drudgery of preparing for Hloaded with inaccuracies, misinterpretations,expeditionary action and surviving in the field conflicting statements, and imaginatíve deeds soon became an old story and poor copy. Any- rather than fact. Why this confusion exists can thing unusual was seized upon and enlarged all be explained perhaps by an analysis of the out of proportion to make good copy. mood of the era. Pioneers depended upon private and busi- Communication from the arctic to the out- ness sponsors to finance their expeditions. The side world was poor in the early davs, if it more difficulty they encountered and hardships existed at all. The recording of data in the field they endured in the field prior to achievement, at the time was rarely achieved. At best, dailv the more idolization (and support) they re- logs or diaries were prepared at some con- ceived from the public. By identifving them- venient time after the fact when the explorer selves with the heroic exploits of the pioneers was not exposed to the harshness of the ele- through financial support of expeditions and ments. Fatigue, hunger, and discomfort resulted explorations, individuais and business concems in only dilatory effort toward record keeping could capitalize upon the publicity given to and the substitution of imaginatíve action for their arctic adventures. Thus the accounts of fact. More often than not newspaper reporters arctic aviation and ground expeditions were accompanying expeditions were the first to highly flavored with verbiage designed to report progress or failure. They were apparent- arouse the admiration and sympathy of the ly obsessed with the premise that a story had public rather than report accomplishment in to be sensational, romantic, heroic, or scandal- a straightforward, factual manner. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

On the other hand the hardships and the ship between Amundsen and Byrd in their uncertainty of overcoming unknown conditions efforts to fly over the pole. They cooperated and were real, and some pioneers lost hands, feet, assisted each other. Amundsen lost his life in fortune, and even life. One might philosophize searching for Nobile, an extreme example of that, in the face of the hardships endured and activity and sacrifice that were not character- problems overcome, the reporters and the pio­ istic of the times. neers should be permitted considerable edi­ The deeper one delves into the mass of torial license. data conceming arctic pioneering, the more Competition to be “first” to reach the pole, confused the details become. Although there fly over it, or explore unknown territory was was frequently more than one on-the-spot wit- fierce, and cutthroat tactics among competitors ness of achievements, it is rare indeed to find to obtain financial support and reach their much similarity in their reports. The cold, iso- goals were not uncommon. Jealousy of achieve- lation, starvation, and the hardships of the ment was severe among sponsors, whether gov- harsh climate were about the only common in- emment, organization, or individual. Large gredients in all accounts. To unravel the actual newspaper companies financially supported achievement and set it down in factual terms pioneers to obtain exclusive, first accounts, and requires a tremendous amount of research, the stories emphasized ( even exaggerated) the comparison of data, and interpretation by the more sensational aspects of exploration in order historian. In his final draft he still may be un- to enhance sales and realize a profit on the certain whether he has obtained the true de­ publishers investment. tails. A notable exception to the fierce competi­ The historian can be fairly certain that tion among arctic explorers was the relation- pioneer X went from point A to an unknown

Polar expedition routes BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

point and arrived either back at point A or at feeling that he is an expedition member partici- another point ( unless he disappeared, as sev- pating in the experience being described. Sim­ eral did). What happened between the point mons has been able to do this through keen of departure and the point of retum depends insight and understanding that can be attained upon the veracity of the log keeper; and herein only by thorough research or actual experience lies the historians dilemma. in the field. An attempt to retrace early pioneer flights If the reader of Target: Arctic suspects that from recorded data can be a most frustrating the author must have spent at least a few years experience. The descriptions of positions en in arctic exploration himself because of the in- route and even at destination do not agree with timate knowledge and sensitivity he applies what we lcnow to exist there todav. Cartog- to events, his suspicions are wrong. Simmons’ raphy techniques and place-name changes closest approach to physical contact with the make it impossible to retrace pioneer routes arctic was probably during his early childhood. with anvthing approaching accuracy. Crude He was bom in Saint Petersburg, Rússia. He navigational instruments, inaccurate naviga- was four years old at the start of the Russian tion, uncharted land forms, and difficult iden- Revolution in 1917. His father was imprisoned tification of terrain undoubtedly placed the by the Bolsheviks, and his mother spent most pioneer in the position of not knowing what of the family fortune bribing Bolshevik officials his exact location was at any given time. Many to make it possible for her husband to escape. claims remain unverified, and some have been Simmons, his mother, and brother moved to established as false or based on rather flimsy Berlin, where he attended high school. He went evidence. On the other hand some remarkably to medicai school in Bologna, Italy, and he good navigation was performed. There are a taught languages in his spare time to supple- few accounts of one explorer following another ment his income. He eventuallv carne to the to the exact position the first attained. Even in United States and practiced medicine in New such instances the destination could well have York. He served in the Medicai Corps during been inaccurate in relation to known points. World War II. He is a writer, linguist, and It is conceivable that Amundsen and Scott teacher as well as a physician. He has traveled never reached the exact South Pole, that Pearv to Europe and beyond the Iron Curtain on and Cook never reached the North Pole, and three occasions in search of material for Target: that Bvrd never flew over either pole in terms Arctic, spending approximatelv seven years in of the exact accuracy that can be achieved to- research and writing. day. It cannot be denied, though, that these Target: Arctic is neatly organized by eras. pioneers did penetrate the then unexplored The first era, “Pioneers,” takes the reader polar regions of the globe and provided a basis through attempts to get over the rough arctic for our knowledge of them. The controversies terrain and ice by free balloon, guided only that have been investigated and published still by and at the mercy of the wind. Such a tech- remain unresolved as to technical accuracy. nique might well be considered ridiculous in From all this confusion, George Simmons light of todays knowledge, but one must ad­ has derived a most comprehensive and accu- mire the faith and determination of those who rate account of arctic flight from 1896 to 1963. persisted by the only available means. In his Target: Arcticf he traces arctic aviation Simmons deals with the promotional ideas from the beginning of the flying era, in a well- for exploration by aircraft—and nonacceptance organized sequence of events and with a pleas- of the proposals — that were advanced by ant-to-read style. His ability as a writer sets a Amundsen, Bvrd, Riiser-Larsen, Ellsworth, precedent in style that many historians would Wilkins, and others as though he had fírsthand do well to emulate. He brings to the reader the knowledge of their desires and frustrations.

tGeorge Simmons, Target: Arctic—Men in the Skies at the Top of the World (Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1965, $7.50), xii and 420 pp. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

During the period when Amundsen and others northem air route from North America to were thinking and planning arctic exploration Europe. Particularly interesting is the role of bv aircraft, a Russian, Jan Nagursky, demon- aviation in the development of Russia’s north­ strated the feasibility of arctic air exploration. em sea route. Simmons has brought out many By the end of World War I, aviation had de- details of Russian flving in the arctic that are veloped to the extent that arctic pioneers began not well known and not readilv available in predicting its use in the arctic. Riiser-Larsen, English writing, particularly his account of the Amundsen, Byrd, and Stefansson all savv the first massive airlift in history. The “Milestones” polar route as the shortest one for air travei era of development brings arctic aviation out between Europe and the U.S. and between of the exploratory and pioneer stage into an Europe and the Orient. Others saw flight as accepted transportation médium to support an the most feasible method of travei to and across all-out scientific assault on the arctic. the arctic for scientific investigation. Simmons’ In the section entitled “Transformation” other eras of development are “Quest,” “Con- Simmons covers the era 1936-1963. It is a com- quest,” “Disaster,” “Milestones,” and “Trans- prehensive summary of flights and expeditions formation.” supported by air and a host of combined ac- The era “Quest” covers the early attempts tivities including scientific investigations and of Ellsworth, Wilkins, Eielson, Byrd, Amund­ submarine activities. Eight appendices, notes, sen, Riiser-Larsen, and MacMillan to exploit and a comprehensive bibliography follow the the airplane and the dirigible. MacMillan con- text, to make a complete history and reference cluded, after futile attempts by Byrd to fly work on arctic aviation. successfully in the arctic, that flving heavier- In the course of his research Simmons has than-air planes was extremelv hazardous and gathered enough material for several encyclo- that the lighter-than-air machines could do the pedic volumes. His condensation of this mate­ work. rial in Target: Arctic will be a delight to stu- The era “Conquest” is marked by Byrd’s dents of aviation who wish to obtain an success in flving the arctic in heavier-than-air overview of the role of aviation in the develop­ planes after assistance and guidance from the ment of the arctic. Although designed for popu­ later famous flyers Bemt Balchen and Flovd lar reading, the book could well serve as a Bennett. Amundsen, Riiser-Larsen, Ellsworth, student textbook in the history of aviation. Its and Nobile reached the pole in a dirigible three span is intemational. days after Byrd and Bennett had flown over it To their less intrepid brothers, arctic ex- in an airplane. The lighter-than-air machine ac- plorers, pioneers, and enthusiasts have long complished the first flight across the Arctic been known as men whose drives and ambitions Ocean. Wilkins and Eielson flew in a heavier- are difficult to understand. They have been than-air plane from Point Barrow to Spitsber- considered fame seekers and exploiters, even gen. These events marked the beginning of suc- on the verge of insanity, rather than men with cessful arctic exploration by air. terrific ambition for pure accomplishment. Simmons devotes considerable space to Their endeavors did not necessarily have to Umberto Nobile’s adventures and failure in his achieve specific scientific goals or other tangi- attempt to use the lighter-than-air machine. Al- bles. In this respect they are akin to mountain though not an era, the account of the Nobile climbers who climb onlv to reach the top. Their disaster makes interesting reading and helps drives spring from their desire to realize the the reader understand a great deal about the pure satisfaction of overcoming obstacles and problems of exploring the arctic by air. This meeting challenges. They accepted challenges section is very appropriately called “Disaster.” because they enjoved the personal thrill of con­ “Milestones” is an excellent account of the quest. Material gain and monetary reward less-well-known flights in the arctic by Lind- could hardly have been an incentive to these bergh, Cramer, Hassle, Watkins, and others in men. Some spent and lost their personal for- the early exploration and development of the tunes, and others lost their lives. Fame and The semirigid Italian dirigible Norge arrives at Pulham, England, on its tcay to Norwatj aiui the North Pole. With Roald Amundsen, Lincoln EUsworth, and Umherto Nobile aboard, the Norge reached the pole on 12 May 1926, three days after Commander Richard E. Byrd and Floyd Bennett had sucessfully flown hy airplane from Spitsbergen over the pole and back. 90 AIR UN1VERS1TY REV1EW

fortune were bv-products which mattered little strategic sites for surveillance for both aircraft once they reached their goal. This was not true and missiles. It will continue to be interested of all, however. A notable exception is Umberto until space surveillance stations are established, Nobile, whose apparent primary drive was the replacing over-the-horizon sensor surveillance attainment of personal fame. Simmons accom- with direct observation from space. plishes an excellent exposure of his character To Air Force personnel stationed and fly- through straightforward presentation of históri­ ing in the arctic today, who are provided all ca] data which permit the reader to judge the the wants and needs of man except home, it man for himself. should be a most interesting revelation to com­ These arctic men were extremely jealous pare their living and working facilities with of their hard-won achievements. Their motiva- those of Simmons’ pioneers. tion has been dubbed “arctic fever.” There were The only criticism of Target: Arctic as his- other men of less fame or no fame at all who tory is the imbalance of detail given in relation have contributed to pioneer work for the sheer to the significance of events. One entire sec- personal joy or satisfaction of accomplishment tion ( IV) is devoted to the disaster of the diri- against great odds. Men imbued with the gible Italia, whereas some far more significant “fever” are still making important eontribu- happenings are treated in less detail. The Italia tions in support of scientific investigations in disaster does make fascinating reading and en- the arctic and antarctic. able reader insight into the problems of arctic Air Force readers as well as others who aviation development, but there are many ac- are interested in the development of arctic air complishments that could have served the same routes will find much satisfaction in leaming purpose. more of the part plaved bv men known to them A most significant fact about Target: Arctic personallv or bv name. They will be particu- is that the stories are true and the people real. larlv interested in the role the Air Force played It recreates the profound ambitions of some in collecting knowledge and experience about notable men and their resulting successes and the arctic from 1940 through 1960. Until the failures. No other earthly arena has offered development of long-range jet bombers and re- greater challenges to its gladiators than the fueling aircraft, arctic air bases were essential arctic; and though the methods of attack have to strategic operations and air defense of the improved, the arctic remains a merciless and U.S. These bases still play an important al- powerful opponent to faulty or halfhearted en- though less significant role. Emphasis and con- deavor. cem for military operations through the arctic Arctic enthusiasts are notably severe critics have shifted somewhat from the Air Force to of their colleagues. If George Simmons has the Navy as a result of the capability of nuclear- written a book which doesn’t arouse the ire powered submarines to navigate beneath the of people who have been intimately associated ice of the Arctic Ocean. The Army is concemed with the stories set forth, he will have indeed with the arctic as a northem approach for con- performed a miracle, and the book should be ventional forces. The Air Force is primarily in­ considered a masterpiece. terested in the arctic today because it offers Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center CASTROISM

Captain David H. Zook, J r .

HE DOMINICAN crisis beginning in Communist until he announced himself one in T April 1965 brought sizable United States December 1961. The book’s most important military forces into a Latin American country chapter, “What Is Castroism?” endeavors to for the first time in nearly four decades. This show from speeches and statements—and no operation of combined arms probably would little inductive reasoning—that Fidel Castro never have occurred had it not been for Fidel was a revolutionarv leader in search of a move- Castro. The existence of his Communist regime ment, a movement in search of power, and with its large-scale propaganda and subversion power in search of an ideology. For lack of any effort has been an unsettling factor in parts of philosophy better suited to the demands of his the Américas. Cuba might be dismissed as an complex and peculiar personality, Castro fell insignificant backwash of the Communist world in with Marxist Leninism although he did not were it not for a major product which it has even understand it. sought to export—the aggressive revolutionarv To support his thesis, the author explains doctrine of Castroism. that early statements of Castro were merely In Castroism: Theorij and Practicej Theo- liberal reformist in tone. After his arrest for dore Draper, who has concemed himself with leading an attack on the Moncado barracks, this phenomenon since its explosive seizure of his 1953 “History Will Absolve Me” speech and Cuba in 1959, attempts to explore the ideologi- pamphlet therefore ostensibly “represented a cal nature of Castros revolution and to place it program of radical social reform well within in context among the various ideological shad- the framework of traditional Cuban left-wing ings of the intemational Communist conspir- politics.” Written at his mountain guerrilla acy. Although he is neither a historian nor a camp, the later “Manifesto of the Sierra Maes- political scientist, nor even properly a joumal- tra" aimed to promote a program which could ist, Mr. Draper has established himself as a attract wide support from anti-Batista groups free-lance writer on affairs of the left in this of all political colorations. It proposed estab- country’ and abroad. Known for his two-volume lishment of a provisional govemment to preside history of the American Communist Party and over free elections after President Batista fell for his contributions to intellectual joumals of and suggested a popular front ( a typical Com- liberal-left orientation, Draper has become a munist ploy) to effect this objective. Castro, ac- serious student and has taught at the University cording to Draper, encouraged the assump- of Califórnia, Davis. tion that the central issue of his struggle was In his latest book Draper advances the free, democratic elections, and his statements theory that Cubas bearded dictator was not a were steadily more moderate and mild during

fTheodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965, $5.95), xiii and 263 pp. 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW his 1956-1958 stay in the mountains. There, as struggle. From a doctrinaire Moscow view- all now know, Castro drew the favorable atten- point, this constitutes dangerous “adventur- tion of deluded U.S. newsmen. ism but to Fidel such a stance may be neces- Draper admits that aceording to Castros sary to sustain his claim to a Communist sphere henchman Ernesto “Che” Guevara this was a of influence—Latin America. Draper sees Cas­ deliberate deception. Old-line Cuban Commu- tro as a new type of cauclillo or Latin American nist Carlos Rodríguez stated that Fidel, “with strong man—the Communist caudillo who feels extraordinary tactical and strategic clarity,” a need ideologically to justify his power. Re- perceived during the revolutionary struggle placing Batista in power with one ideology, that no proposal should be made which would Castro has held power with another. His em- alienate middle-class anti-Batista elements. phasis on leadership seems to Draper more Thus the subversive seemed moderate, if ideal- closely related to fascism or Peronism than to istic. Draper recognizes that Castro himself has communism. Nevertheless Draper thinks Cas­ been effective in proudly confessing the decep­ troism must not be separated analytically from tion which he carried out and in showing that world Communism but should be viewed as a he was really far more radical than he pnbliclv “tendency” within it characterized by a cult admitted. Draper says that the “Castro-Com- of the leader (which has been repudiated in munist alliance” was formed in 1958, that in general by Moscow). Rather than emerging 1960 Castro decided to merge the Communists like Titoism or Maoism as variants within in­ with his own 26th of July movement, and that temational Communism, Castroism has had thereafter he at first paid homage to the Com- an “externai origin,” an unorthodox road to munist party members and then proceeded to power, and has led to its own sphere of influ­ neutralize and destroy many of them. Castro’s ence. tortuous route required that he altemately use While Draper can hardly be ignored as an pro- and anti-Communist groups to achieve analyst and expert on Communism, he may be balance; this explains in part the rise and fali overly concemed with establishing that Castro of underlings since Castro took over Cuba on was not part of a Communist conspiracy. While 1 January 1959. admittedly the man has been a despicable— Castro neither understood nor was pre- however skillful—opportunist who has made pared for guerrilla warfare; rather, he hoped many contradictory statements, there is good in more or less conventional Latin American reason to believe that at least as early as his terms to provide a catalyst for a golpe cie estado 1955-56 stay in México Castro carne under ( usurping of authority or coup cVétat) in the strong Communist influence and at least partial urban power centers. First in 1952 he attacked Communist direction. Then and after, Fidels a barracks. Then in 1956 he landed a small in- closest associates were his younger brother vasion force which had been assembled in Raúl, an avowed Communist, and the Argen- México. Only as a last resort did he take to the tine Communist adventurer Che Guevara. He mountains. Consequently, Cuban guerrilla also had contact in México with various prom- warfare theory was developed after rather than inent Communists, and their literature was before the revolution. later found in his camp. His defector sister Draper presents Castroism as a unique seg- Juanita says Fidel was indeed a Communist at ment within intemational Communism. Castro- that time. The explanation that Castro only ites, for example, have been dedicated to vio- tumed Red once he was in power seems sim- lent revolution as a means to gain power in plistic. Instead, he revealed himself as a skilled opposition to the preference for a peaceful employer of Leninist conflict theory and Marx- route among traditional Latin American Com- ist morality, acting in a manner which exceed- munist parties. Cubans assert that preparation ed the grasp of old-line Cuban Communists for revolution need not be lengthy, for a hand- who were tactically less astute, albeit ideologi­ ful of dedicated men under proper command cally more advanced. The fact that these Com­ is sufficient to launch a successful guerrilla munists did not openly claim Fidel in the fíOOKS AND IDEAS 93

1950’s does not confirm the assumption that he holdings, à la Staün, to form collective farms. was not a Communist; rather it suggests that Mr. Draper also explains that the working class he was subject to a general externai direction or industrial proletariat played little role in striving to accomplish what the tamished and Fidels rise. corrupted Cuban Communist leadership could Draper then gropes for an economic ex­ not do. That Castro was neither an ideologue planation for the revolution. He dismisses such nor a pure Marxist does not refute that he was causes as the Cuban monoculture and low a Communist nor that he was a Communist standard of living. In fact Cuba had already instrument. Although Mr. Draper takes many taken long strides toward economic diversifi- Castro statements at face value, he seems un- cation. Sugar was disproportionately important able to accept Fidels open avowal of his long- only in generating foreign exchange, not in term Communist affiliation. emploving people or domestic capital. Further- The exact moment when Castro tumed more Cuban per capita income was about equal Red is unimportant; it probablv is more trou- to that of Italy or of the U.S.S.R. Far from back- blesome for those liberais who were initially ward, as Castro later attempted to present it, deceived into thinking he was a “good” revo- Cuba was among Latin Américas most ad- lutionarv and who later went through the vanced republics. Draper therefore ranges over puerile stage of behevring that he tumed “bad” several other possible explanations, such as dif- only because the United States was unkind to ferences in cultural advance between town and him. country — a truism — and tension between Draper next offers a chapter-long class Cubans and foreign investors—another clichê as analvsis of revolutionary Cuba, perhaps unnec- Draper himself shows by indicating the long- essarv because most Cubans of the middle term pre-Castro percentage decline in U.S. in- class and up who were able to do so have long vestment. Finally, in an unconvincing argu- since fled the island. The chapter in part con­ ment, he suggests that strains created within tinues with the Castro search for ideology— the middle class by a pletho^a of factors ( which Drapers thesis—set forth earlier. It is partially he blames on Batista) were responsible for an explanation of Che Guevaras guerrilla war- Fidels success. From this, the author traces fare doctrine. More important, since Che s ideas what he regards as the betraval of the middle are by now so familiar, is Draper s exposure class, difficult for him to do because of his theory of the myth that Castro led an agrarian revolu- of “sharp shifts” in dictator Castros policy as tion. The author asserts that Castro had but he moved toward his “sudden” transformation limited peasant backing even in the Sierra into a Marxist. Draper rightlv falis back, how- Maestra; conventional stereotyped notions of ever, upon the charismatic nature of the Castro “agrarian reform” as involving land titles for leadership, a charisma enabling him to lead the the peasants who work the land were inappli- nation over which he gained control along al- cable to most Cuban agriculture. The numer- most any path. Castro therefore “belongs to a ous sugar workers were reallv rural industrial leadership type . . . which establishes a direct laborers unattached by sentiment to the cul- personal, almost mystical relationship with the tivation of particular pieces of soil. Tenant masses that frees him from dependence on farmers had long enjoyed satisfactory legal classes.” protection. Only about 10 percent of the agri- In a long third chapter called “Castro’s cultural population, characterized by Draper Economics” Draper summarizes the mistaken as squatters, were interested in agrarian reform development of Communist Cubas socialist of the land-title type; interestingly enough, the economy, an intermingled comedy of errors bulk of these were concentrated in eastem and tragedy of destruction of a functioning Cuba where Castro started. Nevertheless there capitalist machine in favor of a collectivist was no national peasant rebellion on Fidels program in which most of the people work more behalf, and Draper shows how Castro later be- and have less. Communist duplicity and oppor- trayed the small landholders by taking their tunism, and the compulsion exercised by a 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW self-appointed ruling elite, are the characteris- As a specialist in intemational Commu­ tics of the direction of this economy. It has nism, Draper is perhaps too much concemed ironically led, as Draper points out, to a mono- with fitting Castroism into a Marxist framework culture—sugar—more severe than Cuba had and too little concemed with viewing Castro­ ever lcnown! ism in its Latin American context. Nevertheless, The volume closes with a short discussion Fidel’s September 1965 announcement of the of Cuba’s future and its implications for the transformation of the official party into a Com­ U.S., taking as a point of departure the foreign munist Party, with all the customary structural policy pronouncements of Senator J. William features, and the apparent fali of Guevara for Fulbright. “The one thing that could pull Cas­ errors in running Cubas economy lend cre- tro through every danger threatening him,” dence to Drapers analysis. On the other hand, writes Draper, “would be US ‘acceptance of Guevara may have been penalized for advo- the continued existence of the Castro regime,’ cating strong support of insurgents abroad, es- as Senator Fulbright recommended.. .. Every pecially in Latin America, at a time when Cas­ time a Communist povver needs a breathing troism was entering a consolidation phase at spell, it begins to make cooing sounds and dan- home. In any event, Draper has presented gle offers of trade. Just as predictably, a strange much that is provocative. Just as he states, “I alliance of svmpathizers and businessmen think it is safe to say that future historians will springs up. . . . T h e C om m un ist reg im e ob tain s not regard the resolution of the [1962] missile the means of long-term survival and power; crisis as the perfect, grandiose triumph that has the West obtains short-term profits, if there sometimes been claimed for it,” so it may be are any, for a few entrepreneurs. This short- said that only time can test Drapers tentative sighted view of the national interest was im- assessment of Castroism. plicit in Senator Fulbright’s remarks on Cuba.” Whether in Cuba, in the council halls of Draper argues instead that Communism world Marxism, or among potential insurgent in Cuba is reversible, that economic pressure elements in Latin America, Castroism seems must be maintained upon Castro, that the pos- likely to remain a threat to stability so long as sibility of military action must not be ruled its progenitor rules. out, but that ultimately Castro can be over- Bolling Air Force Base thrown only bv Cubans themselves. THE INTELLECTUAL IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Colonel Marshall E. Baker

URING the earlv days of World War II, leaders at various leveis of govemment have D General H. H. “Hap” Amold in- had to assume new and broader responsibili- vited the Army Chief of Staff, General George ties—responsibilities which often merge or C. Marshall, to lunch with several members of overlap and which only a short time ago the National Research Council. The group in- would have rested almost exclusively in the cluded such prominent scientists as Robert A. domain of either one or the other. Millikan, Vannevar Bush, Karl T. Compton, Much has been published to show the op- Charles F. Kettering, and James B. Conant. In portunities afforded to military officers for his book Global Mission, Amold gives this ac- broad-gauge training in subjects and disci­ count of MarshalFs reaction and the later con- plines formerly unassociated with the military versation: art. Similarly, there has been no dearth of cov- erage given the participation of academicians . . . He was amazed that I knew them. “What in public affairs. But relatively little has ap- on earth are vou doing with people like that?” peared in print to reveal how the intellectuals he exclaimed. have gained credentials that enable them to be “Using them,” I replied. “Using their brains to help us develop gadgets and devices for our heard so widely on military strategy and to airplanes—gadgets and devices that are far too move so readily into official positions where difficult for the Air Force engineers to develop they assume important policy roles in the realm themselves.” of national security affairs. We are indebted to Professors Gene M. To recall this incident in hght of the pres- Lyons and Louis Morton for extensive research ent participation of the intellectual in virtuallv in this area and the important contribution every facet of public policy and administration which their book, Schools for Strategy,f has provides not only cause for amusement but also made toward filling this gap. a basis for judging the degree of sophistication The authors begin by defining the field that permeates today’s conduct of national se- of national security studies and discussing at curity affairs. The technological revolution and some length the relation of knowledge and sys- the intemational tensions of the cold war have tematic analysis to policy formulation, decision- given rise to an environment in which the de- making, and public debate. They treat with the mands of national security can no longer afford approaches to national security affairs taken the luxury of professional insularitv. The dis- by scientists, scholars, lawyers, and business- tinction between civilian and military affairs men, giving particular emphasis to the develop- has decreased markedly. Indeed, the line of ment of these approaches in programs of public demarcation between war and peace, histor- education. This well prepares the reader for ically so readily discemible, has become in- the next portion of the treatise, which deals creasingly blurred. Both civilian and military with institutional innovations that have con-

tGene M. Lyons and Louis Morton, Schools for Strategy: Education and Research in National Security Affairs (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, September 1965, $7.50), 356 pp. 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tributed to the diversity and range of participa- Professor of Government and a member of the tion by the intellectual in the conduct of na- Center for International Affairs at Harvard; tional security affairs. William W. Kaufmann, presently with the Cen­ It is a basic premise of Professors Lyons ter for International Studies at Massachusetts and Morton that the newly acquired role of Institute of Technology and formerly of rand; civilians “demands a new kind of profession- and Robert Strausz-Hupé, Director of the For­ alism” requiring knovvledge not only of militarv eign Policy Research Institute at the University matters but also of history, politics, economics, of Pennsylvania. law, sociology, technology, and psychology— The pioneering efforts of rand, the Air and of their relationship in terms of human Force-sponsored “think factory,” doubtless values and social goals. This, of course, por- have had a significant impact upon the Amer­ tends a type of interdisciplinary education out- ican university. Grouping academicians from side the traditional design of college curricu- various disciplines to study a wide range of lums. The orientation in pursuing advanced defense-related problems proved to be a prac- degrees has been and continues to be toward tical approach readily adaptable to the college the established disciplines. The area of na- campus, rand alumni and associates have con- tional security affairs has not been generally tributed importantly to the activities of many recognized as an accepted field of specializa- of the university research programs as well as tion. But growing numbers of universities are to privatelv sponsored ones. Alluding to these striving to attain a posture more responsive to innovations in academic circles, a rand staff this new challenge to higher education. Re­ member recently remarked to me, “Today we search centers and institutes chartered in the can do much the same type of research at many field of intemational relations in which the of the universities which a few years ago could study of national security affairs has a promi- be accomplished only at a place like rand. nent place constitute the pattem. The authors of Schools for Strategy make The organization of these activities varies no sweeping or categorical appraisals relative considerably. Frequently faculty members as- to the impact of the scholar on govemment signed to various academic departments serve policy. In two areas, however—arms control and in additional roles as members of research cen­ limited war—the important influence of the ters. In these roles, they may do only research, academician is clearly recognized. but more often they teach and conduct or par- Also apparent is the response of the in­ ticipate in seminars structured along interdis­ tellectual community to contemporarv national ciplinary lines. The results of their research, security affairs. Scholarly articles and publica- enriched by their associations with both col- tions have doubtless raised the levei of public Ieagues and students having a wide range of debate and caused it to focus more meaning- interests, provide much material for publica- fullv on relevant issues. They have helped gen- tion.° In fact much written on defense-related erate that official ferment deemed essential for subjects during the past decade has flowed keeping national security policy and strategy from this environment. Among the voices in the responsive to rapidlv changing security de­ academic community that have gained great mands. Former members of research organiza- respect by their articulate portrayal of complex tions now hold secretarial posts and numerous national security issues are those of William other important positions in the highest eche- T. R. Fox, Director of the Institute of W ar and lons of govemment. They serve as consultants Peace Studies at Columbia; Henry A. Kissinger, and advisers in virtually everv segment of the policy-making machinery and have entered in- “Under the USAF Research Associates program, an Air to contractual arrangements to conduct innu- Force colonel is presently assigned to each of the following re­ search activities: Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia merable studies and analyses for the use of University; Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; public officials in both the executive and Council on Foreign Relations; Stanford Research Institute; In­ stitute for Strategic Studies, London; Center for International legislative branches. Few familiar with the Studies, M.I.T.; and the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University. national security decision-making and policy- IÍOOKS AND IDEAS 97 formulation processes toclav would take seri- many years.” They voice some dissatisfaction ous exception to the point intended by the with the Foreign Service Institute and the war authors in citing the following analogy: colleges but do not support the idea of estab- lishing another high-level school. Rather they From [ rand] and from other research centers throughout the country there issues a stream feel that this problem should be resolved by of distinguished consultants who, wrote one improving the intellectual quality and profes- British critic, ‘move freelv through the corridors sional standards of educational programs of the Pentagon and the State Department, offered within the existing institutional frame- rather as the Jesuits through the courts of work. Vienna and Madrid, three centuries ago.’ Schools for Strategy provides valuable in- But it would be erroneous to conclude that sights into the institutional environment that these efforts always meet tlie highest standards prepares the intellectual for his broader and of scholarly research. There is evidence to sup- more active role in national security affairs. But port the authors’ contention that some scholars the scholar tumed strategist offers no panaceas, in their effort to influence the policy-maker mav however essential his contribution. His efforts write in haste “to capitalize on superficial complement but do not supplant those of the trends" and “resort to teehniques of exploita- militarv professional. To be sure, major ad- tion.” justments have occurred in the military-civilian In examining training programs for career relationship. The book contributes much to- oflBcials, the authors observe that “only recent- ward a better understanding of the interaction lv has the govemment begun to provide the and mutuality of effort that c-haracterize this Foreign and Civil Services with the opportu- newly evolved partnership. It warrants careful nities for career development and graduate reading and a convenient place on the refer- education that militarv officers have had for ence shelf. Institute of War and Pcace Studies, Columbia University

The Contributors

G en er a l Howell Marion Est es, J r . (USMA) is Com­ mander. Militarv Airlift Command. After three years with the 7th and lst Cavalry Divisions, Fort Bliss, Texas, he took flying training in 1939—40 and then served at Brooks Field, Texas, successively as Hight instruetor; Commanding Otficer. 23d Pursuit Squadron; Commandunt of Cadets, later Director of Training, Advanced Flying School, 1940-44. He com- manded Blackland Armv Air Base, Texas. February-June 1944, and Lubbock AAF, Texas, 1944-45. Other assignments have been at Hq USAFE, 1946-48, successively as Chief, Plans and Poiicy Branch, Operations Division; Chief, Plans Section, Deputy Assistant C/S, Operations; and Assistant C/S, Plans-, at March AFB, Califomia, 1949-51, successively as Commander, lst Air Base Group; Commander, 22d Bomb Wing; and Commander. 44th Bomh Wing, on combat duty and as Vice Commander, FEAF Bomber Command, March— July 1951; at March AFB as Commander, 106th Bomb Wing and later Commander, 12th Air Division, 1951-53; as Com­ mander, Air Task Group 7.4, Joint Task Force Seven, for Operation CASTLE, Eniwetok ísland, 1953-54; as Director, Weapuns Support Operations, Wright Air Development Center, later Assistant Deputy Commander for Weapon Systems and Commander, Detachment 1, Hq ARDC, and Director of Systems Management, Wright-Patterson AFB, 1954-57; as Assistant C/S, Air Defense Systems, later Assistant DC/S, Operations, Hq USAF, 1957-61; as Deputy Commander for Aerospace Systems. Air Force Systems Command. Los Angeles, 1961-62; and as Vice Commander, AFSC. Andrews AFB, Maryland, from 1962 until his prvsent appointment in July 1964. General Estes is a 1949 graduate of the Air War College. M ajor Gen er a l Wil l l v m S. S teele (USMA; M.A., George Wash­ ington University) is Deputy Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He was Operations Officer, 18th Fighter Group, in Hawaii when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and from then until March 1943 he commanded the 15th Fighter Group. He then beeame Director of Operations of the New York Fighter Wing and later com­ manded the 326th Fighter Group. As A-3 of the Seventh Air Force he participated in the operations leading to the direct air assault on Japan. Other assignments have been as Deputy Director for Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna­ tional Security Affairs; Deputy Air Force Member, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Executive Assistant to the Secretary’ of the Air Force; Deputy Assistant for Mutual Security, Hq USAF; and in Europe as Deputy Special Assistant to the Chief of Staif, SHAPE, and Deputy Director, Military Assistance Division, United States European Command. General Steele is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and National War College.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Joseph E. Fix III (M .S., George Washington University) is a project officer, Office of the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army. Following graduation from Infantry Officer Candidate School and the Parachute School at Fort Benning, Geórgia, in 1945, he served with the llth Airbome Division in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan through 1947. Other assignments have been with the 82d Airbome Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1948-51; as student, Infantry Officers Career Course, 1952; with the 3d Infantry Division, Korea, 1952- 53; as a parachute test officer, Airbome Service Test Division, Board No. 5, USCONARC, 1954-56; as student, Command and General Staff College, 1956-57; on the staff and faculty, Infantry School, 1957-60; as student, Armed Forces Staff College, 1960; and from 1961 to 1964 in Germany, first as G-2 Air Reconnaissance Officer, Central Army Group ( NATO), later as Commanding Officer, lst Battalion, 4th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division. Colonel Fix is a 1965 graduate of the Air War College.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Ric h a r d C. B owman (Ph.D., Harvard University) is a military assistant to General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and serves as the Chairman’s representative on the staff of the National Security Council. A 1949 graduate of the U.S. Military Academv, Colonel Bowman was a B-26 flight commander in the Korean War in 1951 and served in the Air Training Command as a pilot instructor and group staff officer from 1952 to 1955. He was the Staff Training Officer for the Commandant of Cadets on the originnl staff at the Air Force Academy, 1955-57, with responsibility for the airmanship curriculum, and later beeame an instructor and Associate Professor of Political Science at the Academy. 1959-63. He served in Air Force Plans, Hq USAF. 1963-64, where he assisted in the preparation of Air Force Manual 1-1, l nitnl States Air Force Basic Doctrinc; he was also a member of the Policv Panei of Project Foreeast. He has contributed a number of articles to military joumals. u»« R owexa W. S waxson ( B-S.C-E., Cathoüc Cniversity of America; J-D.. George Washington Cniseraty serves as Actmg Director. Directurate oi Informá­ tico Sciences. Air Force Office oi Scientific Research. Washington, D.C. She «n5 wrth the Arroed Services Technical Information Agency and its predecessor. the Technical Information Division of the Library of Congress. engaged in docu- mentaboe and admimstrative activities. 1950-37. and she was a patent examiner. Office oi Research and Devdopment. C A Patent Office, Department of Com- BMTce. from 1957 unbl her present appointmcnt in 1961. She is secreta rs of the Systems Science and Cyberoetics Group, IEEE, and her pape rs have bren pub- bshed in American Documecntatum. Contmrt. and O AR Research Rrrk-ic.

LiEm xasT Colo-vei. Kobert S B eh c i CSX A; M.A., Ceorge Washington Cmversits i is a Mis- BOB Analyst m the Strategic D ui- sion. Directorate of Operational Rcquireraents and Development Plans. Headquarters CSAF. Aftet graduation from Annapolis in 1949. be completed Sight tnun- ing and was assignrd as a Flight Instructor with Air Trainmg Coromand. Hr sen ed w ith thr 13th Bomb Squadron as B-26 FUght Commander and was a Flight Test Maintrnance Officer with the 17th Bomb Group dur- ing the iiurean War. In 1957 he was aasigned to the initiai cadre oi what iater bevame the Au Bat- tíe Anais sis Ceutrr. Hq USA/. He was in the Plans Directurate, Hq Strategic Air Command, pruu to his current atsignmrat.

Dr Joush W. A » * v w m i ( Ducturate. Surhonnr is

Ruwaai L. Ps na ta s l MA., t a n n a t i ai Mtami Is Dep.it> Cbsmi. Operatlons iru Jiin Headquarters Straleg» Air Coro- " if Alter three sears nas the facute» d Uam i Cniversity. taa

C aptain David H. Z ook, Jn. (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is an Air Intelligence Officer on duty in Washington. From 1951 to 1953 he held psychological warfare assignments, including OIC of detachments in Korea and Japan. Following pilot training, he flew C -124’s in WESTAF until his assignment to the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy, where he was Associate Professor of History until 1963. Captain Zook is the author of The Conduct of the Chaco War (also published in Spanish by the Argentine Army’s Circulo Militar) and of Zarumilla-Maranon: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute, and he is coauthor of A Short History of Warfare. He has been selected to attend the Naval War College in 1966.

C olonel Marshall E. B aker (M.A., University of Marvland; M.P.A., Harvard University) is assigned as a Research Associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. Commissioned in England, he served as a staff officer in Hq lst Air Division, Eighth Air Force, during World War II. Subsequent assign­ ments have been as Chief, Requirements Branch, A -l, Hq Fifteenth Air Force; Chief, Publications Review Branch, AAG, Hq USAF; Chief, Officer Personnel Division, Hq Air Proving Ground; Assistant Executive Officer, MAAG, France; Chief, Programs Guidance Branch, and later Deputy Director of MAP Administration in ODMA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), with additional duty as Defense Liaison Officer with the Bureau of International Education and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; and as a member of the Aerospace Studies Institute. Colonel Baker is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the midcareer course of the Foreign Service Institute. His articles have been published in Armed Forces Management and Airpower Historian.

AWARD x The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “High-Altitude Nuclear Effects” by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Mock, USAF, as the outstanding artiele in the January-Fehrnary 1966 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Eldon W. D owns, USAF, Editor J ack H. M ooney, Managing Editor M ajor Robert G. S pa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrativa Munager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J h.. Art Director and Productíon Manager E nrique G aston, Ph D .. Associate Editor, Spanish Lunguagc Edition L. Mid o si May Patterson, Assista nt Editor, Portuguesa Language Edition M atthew H. Pacillo, Illustrator

ADVISERS

C olonel Glen W. Clark, Hq Air Dcfense Command C olonel Robert B. G ood, Hq Air Force Logistics Command C olonel J oseph A. S tuart, J r ., Hq Military Airlift Command C olonel K enneth F. G antz, USAF ( Ret), Historical Adviser L ie u t e n a n t C olonel J ack Rose, Hq United States Strike Command L ie u t e n a n t Colonel J ames F. S underman, Hq Pacific Air Forces D r . H arold Hel fma n , Hq Air Force Systems Command L a Y er n e E. W oods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning oerospace doctrines, strategy, tacHcs, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW