American Caudillo: the Rise of Strongmen Politics in the United States and Latin America

American Caudillo: The Rise of Strongmen Politics in the United States and Latin America

Dinorah Azpuru, PhD, Wichita State University

Mary Fran T. Malone, PhD, University of New Hampshire

Orlando J. Pérez, PhD, Millersville University

Abstract

Why do citizens vote for leaders who disregard democratic norms? The 2016 U.S. election has propelled this question to the forefront of political discussions not just in academic circles, but among journalists and practitioners as well. To answer this question, we examine support for populist “strongmen” in the United States and the ALBA countries of Latin America. Relying upon the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer and the American National Election Study (ANES), we identify similar survey questions to predict votes for caudillos in very different national contexts. To understand why voters support strongmen and their authoritarian values, we analyze the impact of perception of threat, authoritarian values, alienation from the political system, nationalism, populism, and intolerance. When we compare the results across our ALBA and U.S. models, we find two variables tend to explain support for strongmen: support for a strong leader who will bend the rules/limit the voice of the opposition and ideology.

Paper prepared for delivery at the 2017 conference of the Latin American Political Science Association, ALACIP, Montevideo, Uruguay.

American Caudillo: The Rise of Strongmen Politics in the United States and Latin America

The 2016 American presidential elections were historic. These elections marked the first time a major political party nominated a woman as well as the rise of an outsider, real estate magnate and TV reality show host Donald J. Trump. Mr. Trump’s appeal to law and order, nationalism, protectionism, and populist politics parallels that of multiple “strongmen” in Latin America.1 As Javier Corrales (2016) notes, “For me, as a long-time observer of Latin American politics, what’s most unnerving about Trump’s rise is just how familiar it feels.” Many scholars of Latin American politics echoed Corrales’ observation, citing the many similarities between the rise of Donald Trump and that of numerous Latin American caudillos, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Ecuador’s Rafael Correa. These strongmen typically disparage political institutions, political insiders, and oftentimes different racial and ethnic groups. They mobilize disenchanted voters who feel “left behind,” promising to act decisively to “fix the country.”

Why do voters support such strongmen? We answer this question by identifying the factors that explain support for strongmen in Latin America and the United States. For this cross-national study, we rely upon the 2016 post-election American National Elections Survey (ANES) survey2 and data from the AmericasBarometer, a survey conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP) from Vanderbilt University.3 These data sources allow us to compare the determinants of voting for Trump and the elected leaders of ALBA. ALBA, formally the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, is an alliance centered on the leftist leaders of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela – all of whom have exhibited caudillo characteristics.4

1 “Strongman” is used in a non-gendered meaning since women candidates could also follow similar political strategies. In fact, in Latin America the former Argentinian president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was identified with populist, authoritarian and “strongmen” politics. 2 The American National Elections Survey (ANES) has been conducted since 1948 by the University of Michigan and Stanford University as an effort to measure electoral attitudes and behavior among United States voters. The 2016 study “features a dual-mode design with both traditional face-to-face interviewing (n=1,181) and surveys conducted on the Internet (n=3,090), and a total sample size of 4,271. The target population for the face-to-face mode was 222.6 million U.S. citizens age 18 or older living in the 48 contiguous states of the USA or the District of Columbia, and the target population for the Internet mode was 224.1 million U.S. citizens age 18 or older living in the 50 US states or the District of Columbia. In both modes, the sampling frame was lists of residential addresses where mail is delivered, and to be eligible to participate, a respondent had to reside at the sampled address and be a U.S. citizen age 18 or older at the time of recruitment” (User’s Guide and Codebook for the ANES 2016 Time Series Study, http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_2016/anes_timeseries_2016_userguidecodebook.pdf) 3 For over three decades, LAPOP has been the leading organization collecting public opinion data in Latin America, and its surveys include several questions on voting behavior, ideology, attitudes towards government, and political values, among others. The authors would like to thank LAPOP and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. 4 In this paper, the Latin American portion of the analysis focuses on voting behavior in the four ALBA countries; however, in the future our analysis will extend to include leaders outside ALBA who have also exhibited caudillo tendencies, and position themselves on different points throughout the ideological spectrum.

Using data from Latin America allows for a most-different system design, in which we demonstrate that the observed correlation between independent and dependent variables holds regardless of the variation in contextual settings. Culturally, historically, economically, politically, and socially, Latin America and the United States could not be more different, yet the rise of Donald Trump might represent the Latin Americanization of American politics in which socio-demographic, economic, and geopolitical changes have culminated in the support for a political strongman, giving rise to an American caudillo. Furthermore, since the ALBA leaders are noted for their leftist leanings, and Trump’s appeal is primarily to the ideological right, our analysis allows us to identify the factors that predict votes for strongmen across the ideological spectrum.

In the lead up and aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, several scholars have sought to explain public support for Trump. Matthew MacWilliams (2016) found that authoritarianism and fear of terrorism were the only two statistically significant correlates of support for Trump and that increased threat perception enhanced support for authoritarian measures. Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler (2009) found that increasing polarization among the American electorate around issues such as race, gay marriage, immigration, and the use of force were primarily correlated to authoritarian values. Hetherington and Weiler argue that the Republican Party has increasingly attracted those with authoritarian values by focusing on traditional cultural values and on law and order issues. Socio-demographic changes (such as immigration, growth in minority populations, women moving away from traditional roles, homosexual rights, and economic changes produced by globalization) increased perceptions of threat and triggered authoritarian tendencies.

Evidence from Latin America suggests that strongmen are able to capitalize on these perceptions of threat when traditional political parties undergo a crisis of representation. When established political parties weaken, strongmen succeed by organizing outside, and in opposition to, the traditional political structures. Their ability to organize is facilitated by their “mass communication” skills. Strongmen use rallies, television, and, more recently, social media to link the leader with the masses. They aim to use mass communication to transcend the traditional media and create unmediated links between the leader and the population (Boas 2005). Social media outlets like Twitter are ideal for this purpose, as they allow a strongman to communicate directly to the mass public without the filter of the media. Traditional media such as radio and television also play an important role. Strongmen use these communication strategies to build alternative means of social mobilization through new political parties and social movements, or the development of plebiscitarian mechanisms. These mechanisms have an added advantage in that they bypass the institutional checks of a liberal democracy and marginalize the traditional political opposition. Furthermore, strongmen tend to wrap themselves in the national flag. They attempt to appropriate national symbols and myths in order to garner support and advance their agenda. Oftentimes this approach involves the creation of national enemies (foreign and/or domestic) who serve as scapegoats for national problems. Strongmen often use these scapegoats to rally popular support and also use this combination of national symbols and common enemies to divert attention from domestic problems. Finally, strongmen base a significant portion of their legitimacy on

3 charisma and personal appeal. They seek to establish an “organic” relationship between the leader and the led. The leader is the “interpreter” of the will of the people. Thus, only the leader can understand the people’s wishes or needs.

In sum, recent U.S. research suggests a link between support for Trump and authoritarian values, and the Latin American literature identifies the ways in which strongmen can mobilize these authoritarian values and leverage them into a successful electoral bid. With our study, we aim to synthesize these two lines of research and identify commonalities among the United States and Latin American cases. To this end, our paper consists of three parts. First, we rely upon the caudillo literature to identify the variables that could predict votes for strongmen across very different national contexts. To understand why voters support strongmen and their authoritarian values in a wide range of cases, we develop several hypotheses related to: perception of threat, authoritarian values, alienation from the political system, nationalism, populism, and intolerance. Second, we use binomial logistic regression to test these hypotheses in the United States and ALBA cases. Using the LAPOP survey from 2012, we test the ability of these hypotheses to predict voting for each ALBA leader in the previous presidential election,. We then use the 2016 ANES study to test the ability of these hypotheses to predict voting for Trump. Third, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings in the United States and Latin America.

Predicting Support for Strongmen

With the rise of the ALBA leaders in Latin America, scholars have sought to explain why citizens support populist strongmen, who frequently disparage key elements of democratic life, such as a free press, civil liberties, or the rights of the opposition. In the context of the ALBA countries, this literature mainly focuses on voting choices for leftist parties and leaders, but a few studies also examine support for specific policies and/or the approval ratings of leftist, populist presidents. For example, several studies have sought to explain the determinants of voting for leftist populist leaders in Latin America (Remmer 2012, Blanco and Grier 2013) or for specific presidents, in particular Chávez (Weyland 2003, Lupu 2010, Nadeau, Belanger and Didier 2013). Other scholars have focused on explaining related issues, such as the durability of the competitive authoritarian regime in Venezuela (Handlin 2016), the rise of outsiders (Carreras 2012), or the legitimacy of populism (Doyle 2011). This literature has identified several factors to explain support for populist candidates in Latin America in the 21st century, particularly: public perceptions of the economy; leftist ideological orientations, distrust of traditional government, and lower levels of income.5 For example, Pérez (2012) found that the approval ratings of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2010 were linked to a positive perception of the national economy, levels of wealth and

5 In addition to quantitative research, there is a wealth of qualitative explanations for the rise of leftist populist leaders in Latin America; this includes general assessments of populism (Weyland 2013, Levitsky and Roberts 2011, Ulloa 2013) and specific discussions about the election or reelection of Correa in Ecuador (Freidenberg 2014, Moncagatta 2013, De la Torre 2014), of Morales in Bolivia (Mendoza-Botelho 2014) and of Chávez in Venezuela (Derham 2002, Lupien 2015, Corrales 2006).

4 participation in the so-called ‘government mission programs.’ In turn, Ortiz and García (2014) concluded that there is a positive link between personalist government style and presidential approval.

Some of the variables highlighted in studies of ALBA might not be generalizable beyond these cases, however. In other regional and temporal contexts, scholars have reported discrepant results. For example, John Booth and Mitchell Seligson found that the broad category of economic class was not a strong predictor of authoritarian attitudes; when their analysis focused squarely on education, they found education alone was the key determinant of two of their three indicators of authoritarian attitudes (1984, 116). Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992) dispute the notion that lower-class groups are inherently authoritarian. They highlight the historic role of the working classes in promoting democracy, particularly by advocating extensions of suffrage and associational autonomy (namely through unions). Indeed, observers of the 2016 US election note that many Trump supporters are economically well-off, earning above the national median income (Silver 2016).

Other scholars have also emphasized the importance of perceived threats to understanding support for authoritarian attitudes and leaders. For example, Stanley Feldman and Karen Stenner (1997) found that societal threat activates authoritarian predispositions. According to their theory, certain subsets of people hold latent authoritarian tendencies. These tendencies can be triggered or "activated" by the perception of physical threats or by destabilizing social change, leading those individuals to desire policies and leaders that we might more colloquially call authoritarian. Under conditions of social, economic, or security threats, individuals’ predisposition to authoritarianism is enhanced. Individuals who perceive their own personal economic situation negatively are expected to be even more inclined to support authoritarian policies and leaders. Likewise, authoritarian attitudes are also primed by high levels of insecurity due to crime, social disorder, or sudden changes in the status quo. Strongmen often capitalize on such fears or incite fear to create the perception of threat, and pledge to respond to such insecurities firmly and swiftly, even if such action requires jettisoning democratic laws and procedures (Appialoza and Dammert 2011). In Latin America, people’s fear of crime and insecurity has been linked to authoritarian tendencies, such as less support for democracy (Cruz 2003), greater support for coups (Pérez 2011), and a willingness to allow authorities to act outside of the law to tackle criminality (Malone 2014; Azpuru 2016). Perceptions of personal safety in the U.S. have also been tied to support for Trump; however, in the case of the U.S. it is not just fear of crime that shapes perceptions of personal safety, but mostly fear of terrorism as well (MacWilliams 2016)

It is important to emphasize that it is the perceptions that matter, not necessarily actual, observable changes in economic or social indicators. Scholars have long noted that people’s insecurities about crime and the economy are often linked to broader insecurities about rapid social change (e.g., Sparks, Girling, and Loader 2001; Godoy 2006). For example, David Garland (2002) ties fear of crime to anxiety over sweeping societal change, particularly when these changes reconfigure racial, class, and gender power relations. Indeed, pre-existing racial and/or ethnic divides can politicize insecurities, making it easier for societies to create convenient scapegoats and target “dangerous members of distinct racial and social groups which bear little resemblance to us’”

(Garland 1996, 461). Members of historically marginalized racial and ethnic groups, as well as immigrants or religious minorities, are particularly vulnerable when strongmen seek to blame outsiders for national problems. For example, shortly after Trump’s election the Department of Homeland Security launched a new office for victims of crime at the hands of undocumented immigrants, the Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE).6 In sum, threat perceptions can activate authoritarian values, particularly if people are not tolerant of other socio-economic groups or lack basic political knowledge. Strongmen can mobilize these authoritarian attitudes, especially when people perceive their political system as dysfunctional, and strongmen wrap their populist appeals in nationalist rhetoric.

Garland’s (1996) focus on the scapegoating of marginalized groups underscores the importance of including perceptions of racism, xenophobia, and nativism (the belief that people who belong to the respondent’s own group or culture should protect their interests and privileges). Strongmen can make stereotypes about out-groups politically salient. Strongmen can also create out-groups by defining who is a “real” citizen and who is not. Of course, depending upon the socio-economic cleavages of a country, the characteristics of an out-group will vary substantially by national context.

This emphasis on perceived threat and attitudes towards marginalized groups has featured prominently in the growing literature on support for Trump. As a leading expert on authoritarian behaviors, Altemeyer (2016) provides insight into Trump’s rise in American politics, arguing that:

“Research suggests that 20-25% of the adults in North America are highly vulnerable to a demagogue who would incite hatred of various minorities to gain power. These people are waiting for a tough “man on horseback” who will supposedly solve all our problems through the ruthless application of force. When such a man gains prominence, you can expect the authoritarian followers to mate devotedly with the authoritarian leader, because each gives the other something they desperately want: the feeling of safety for the followers, and the tremendous power of the modern state for the leader.”

Finally, support for populist outsiders is strongly tied to evaluations of the current political system. As abundant qualitative evidence from the Trump campaign indicates, alienation from the political system is an important factor in support for strongman candidates. When voters perceive that traditional parties do not support them or represent their interests, they register disdain for the political establishment and consequently more support for a populist strongman. The rise of Trump and other political outsiders around the world has been associated with this disdain, as voters have rejected a status quo linked to corruption and high levels of inequality. Indeed, the populist leaders in Latin America, most of whom can be considered political outsiders, have made inequality one of the key components of their discourse. There is indeed fertile ground for this rhetoric in the region, as Latin America is the

6 An overview of VOICE is available here: https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-announces-launch-new-office-victims-illegal-immigrant-crime.

6 most unequal region in the world (Bárcena and Byanyima 2016). Corruption has also caused widespread disillusionment with the political status quo (Seligson 2002). For example, the large demonstrations against corruption in Guatemala in 2015 and Brazil in 2016 were the final manifestations of protracted and deep-seated anger with the corruption of politicians in those countries. Long before this, the electoral success of populist outsiders Chávez, Correa and Morales was largely a result of their discourse against the corruption of establishment politicians in their respective countries.

From this overview of the literature, we generate several hypotheses to predict support for strongmen in the ALBA countries and the United States:

H1. Respondents who are more willing to limit the opposition will be more likely to vote for a strongman.

H2. As negative evaluations of personal and national economic conditions increase, respondents will be more likely to vote for a strongman.

H3. As respondents’ fear for their personal safety increases, they will be more likely to vote for a strongman.

H4. Respondents with more negative perceptions of out-groups are more likely to vote for strongmen.

H5. As trust in political institutions decreases, respondents are more likely to vote for strongmen.

H6. Respondents who evaluate democracy more negatively will be more likely to vote for a strongman.

H7. As levels of nationalism increase, respondents are more likely to vote for a strongman.

To test these hypotheses, we examined the 2016 ANES Post-Election Survey and the 2012 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey questionnaires to identify comparable questions. The LAPOP questions contain identical wording, enabling us to test our hypotheses within each individual country. We then matched each LAPOP question with a similar question in ANES. The wording on the ANES questions does differ somewhat from those of LAPOP, so we are cautious in comparing the results in our Latin American cases to those of the United States. The exact wording of our LAPOP and ANES measures of our independent variables are listed in the appendix. In addition to including independent variables to test our hypotheses, we also follow standard practice in survey research and include variables to control for socio-economic and other characteristics that typically shape political attitudes and behaviors. Ideology, measured on a scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right), is an important control variable in Latin America, particularly because the

ALBA leaders appealed to those on the left. We also include a series of standard sociodemographic variables to control for age, education, wealth, gender, civil status and ethnicity. One variable that measures whether religion is very important, somewhat important, a little important or not important in the respondents’ lives is also included as a control variable. Scholars have noted the relationship between religious identification and religiosity and voting behavior; most recently, Stone (2017) mapped changes in religious identification, particularly the decline of mainline churches, to higher levels of support for the GOP. Given the importance of religiosity in studies of authoritarianism in the United States, we include this measure in our analysis to ascertain its import in another global region.

Data and Methodology

We test these hypotheses using cross-sectional analyses with binary logistic regressions for each country. For the Latin American analysis, we rely upon LAPOP’s 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.7 The LAPOP samples are of national probability design using multi-stratified and cluster methods with a minimum sample size of 1500 interviews. For the analysis of the United States, we rely upon the ANES, sponsored by Stanford University and the University of Michigan. Following its inception in 1948, the ANES collects survey data on American political attitudes and behavior before and after every presidential election.

To measure the dependent variable (vote for strongmen) in Latin America, we rely upon a LAPOP question that asks respondents, “Which candidate did you vote for in the last presidential election?” We recoded the question into a dichotomous variable: (1) “Strongman” and (0) “other candidates.” To measure support for a strongman in the United States, we rely upon the 2016 ANES Post-Election Survey, which asks respondents, “Who did you vote for?” (POSTVOTE_PRESVTWHO). We coded a vote for Trump as a vote for a strongman (1), and a vote for all other candidates (0). Table 1 reports our results for the ALBA countries.

7The 2012 survey represents the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2006, the election of Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2009, and the election of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2011. In all cases, these leaders were reelected in these elections.

Table 1: Vote for ALBA Presidents (LAPOP 2012)

Hypotheses Tested Independent Variables Venezuela Bolivia Ecuador Nicaragua (Chavez) (Morales) (Correa) (Ortega) Limit the Opposition Support for Unchecked -.011 .010* .013** .009* (H1) Presidential Power (.008) (.005) (.005) (.004) Economic National Economic .023 .007 .015* .022* Perceptions (H2) Perceptions (.013) (.008) (.008) (.008) Personal Economic .019 .000 .012 .021** Perceptions (.015) (.009) (.008) (.008) Belief Government -.008 .008 .021*** .002 Should Reduce (.009) (.005) (.005) (.005) Inequality Perception of Threat Perception of Security -.006 -.002 -.002* .013* (H3) (.009) (.005) (.006) (.005) Feels less Safe than five .007 -.003 -.011 -.011** years ago (.009) (.004) (.004) (.004) Perceptions of Out Interpersonal Trust .006 .001 -.004 .010* groups (H4) (.008) (.005) (.006) (.005) Alienation from Perception of -.002 -.007 -.003 -.005 Political Institutions Corruption (.010) (.005) (.005) (.005) (H5) Democracy Satisfaction with .051*** .026*** .007 .049*** Evaluations (H6) Democracy (.013) (.006) (.007) (.008)

Nationalism (H7) Proud to be a national .003 -.003 -.004 -.013 of the country (.012) (.005) (.007) (.008) Control Variables Gender -1.159* .047 .104 -.404 (.515) (.246) (.299) (.293) Age -.319 .110 -.115 -.056 (.176) (.091) (.111) (.106) Education -.546 -.191 .083 -.075 (.398) (.199) (.214) (.202)

Wealth -.088 -.166 -.152 -.116 (.205) .096 (.119) (.101) Married -.140 .405** .259 -.376 (.522) (.266) (.293) (.295) Indigenous 1.745 2.129 -1.145 1.500 (3.165) (.633) (.881) (1.030) Religiosity -.007 -.006 -.003 .001 (.007) (.004) (.005) (.004) Ideology -.431*** -.138* -.151* -.335*** (.094) (.057) (.063) (.050) Attention to News 1.518 .377 -.419 -.384 (1.061) (.366) (.442) (.495) Constant .958 -.333 .123 .286 (2.280) (1.329) (1.492) (1.489) Nagelkerke R Square .686 .294 .317 .583 N 267 306 792 589 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

When we examine the results across all four ALBA cases, a few patterns emerge. First, in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, respondents’ willingness to limit the voice of the opposition was a significant predictor of votes for strongmen. Second, in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, satisfaction with democracy was a significant predictor of votes for strongmen. These results indicate that in most of the ALBA cases, votes for strongmen may have been at one point in time a linked to a dissatisfaction with the way democracy worked in the country and the political elite, but after several years of strongmen rule, things turned around. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship between satisfaction with democracy and votes for ALBA leaders, highlighting the strong positive correlation between these two variables.

Figure 1: Satisfaction with Democracy and Votes for ALBA Leaders (LAPOP 2012)

Not surprisingly, ideology also consistently predicted votes for ALBA leaders, as those to the ideological left were more significantly more likely to vote for ALBA leaders (see Figure 2). The other hypotheses found far less empirical support, however. Economic perceptions were significant in half of the cases, but again, it is interesting to note that after several years in power, these strongmen were able to gain the vote of those who perceived that the economy was heading in the right direction. The perceptions of personal safety produce mixed results. Nationalism and perceptions of corruption were not significant in any of the ALBA cases, and for the most part, the control variables were also not significant predictors of votes for strongmen

Figure 2: Ideology and Votes for ALBA Leaders (LAPOP 2012)

We turn now to examine empirical predictors of self-reported votes for Donald Trump in 2016. We aimed to identify similar questions in the ANES and LAPOP surveys (depending upon availability), but since the exact wording of these questions was different, it is imperative to make comparisons cautiously. Table 2 reports the results of the ANES analysis. As Table 2 reports, the most important variables predicting votes for Trump are party identification, ideology, economic perceptions, perceptions of marginalized groups, support for a strong leader that “takes the country back to the true path,” distrust in government, perception of threat of terrorism, and lower tolerance of divergent moral standards. Not surprisingly given increasing polarization in the United States, party identification is particularly robust. Ideology is also a robust predictor for support for Trump with self-described conservatives far more supportive than liberals.8

Table 2: Vote for Trump (ANES 2016)

Hypothesis Tested Independent Variables United States Limit the Opposition (H1) Leader able to bend rules 0.104 (0.0828) Strong leader to take us back to true path 0.531*** (0.0924) Economic Perceptions (H2) Economy better/worse than last year 0.267** (0.134) Unemployment getting worse 0.281** (0.121) Economy worse than in 2008 0.348*** (0.0933) Perception of Threat (H3) Worried about terrorist attack -0.149* (0.0886) Perceptions of outgroups (H4) Positive view of immigrants -0.0211*** (0.00521) Blacks are treated better 0.210*** (0.0413) Interpersonal Trust 0.0998 (0.113)

8 Respondents that are extremely conservative exhibit a large amount of variability with some very supportive and others very opposed to Trump. This might reflect the ideological conflict engendered by Trump’s political history in which he exhibited ideological “flexibility.”

Alienation from Political Trust government to do what is right -0.318*** Institutions (H5) (0.111) Democracy Evaluations (H6) Satisfaction with Democracy 0.145 (0.0945) Nationalism (H7) Feels good when seeing the American flag 0.0650 (0.0857) Control Variables Gender -0.217 (0.192) Age 0.00724 (0.00587) Education 0.0205 (0.0522) Income -0.00337 (0.0142) Married 0.205 (0.132) Black -1.312** (0.530) Asian -1.036* (0.549) Native American -3.026 (2.039) Latino -0.607* (0.351) Other -0.192 (0.501) More emphasis on traditional values 0.0377 (0.0931) More tolerance of different moral values -0.230*** (0.0848) Religion is important 0.205 (0.202) Ideology 0.498***

(0.0999) Follows politics in the media 0.0857 (0.127) Party ID 0.622*** (0.0568) Constant -9.409*** (1.196) Observations 2,101 Number of obs = 2101 Wald chi2(26) = 521.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log pseudolikelihood = -425.14437 Pseudo R2 = 0.7053 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities of voting for Trump by attitudes toward a “strong leader that takes the country back to the right path.” The probability of supporting Donald Trump goes from 6% for those who strongly disagree with such a leader to slightly more than 50% for respondents who strongly agree. Figure 4 maps the predicted probabilities for another key variable in our model: partisan identification. As Figure 4 documents, the probability of voting for Trump hovers just above zero for strong Democrats, compared to over 80% for strong Republicans (holding all other variables at their mean).

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Trump by Support for Strong Leader that takes Country Back to True Path (ANES 2016) .6 .4 .2 of forof Voting Trump Predicted ProbabilitiesPredicted 0

Strongly Somewhat Neither agree Somewhat Agree Agree Disagree Disagree nor disagree Strongly Country needs strong leader to take us back to true path

Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Voting for Trump by Partisan Identification (ANES 2016)

.8 .6 .4 of of votingfor Trump Predicted probablityPredicted .2 0

Strong 2 3 4 5 6 Strong Democrat Reublican Party ID

Our analysis finds that fear of terrorism is weakly related to voting for Trump, but in the opposite direction than expected by our hypotheses. This finding requires further analysis. Religiosity was not significant in this analysis, nor were the control variables of gender, education, and wealth. Racial identity was very important, however, as most of the dummy variables measuring race (black, Asian, and Latino,) were significantly less likely to vote for Trump than white Americans. Additionally, respondents who had a positive perception of immigrants were significantly less likely to vote for Trump. Respondents who believed that blacks are treated better by the federal government and police are significantly more likely to support Trump.

When we compare the results across our ALBA and U.S. models, we find two variables tend to explain support for strongmen: support for a strong leader who will bend the rules/limit the voice of the opposition and ideology. In contrast, the other variables did not find as consistent support across these different national contexts.

Discussion

The results of this analysis indicate that satisfaction with democracy is an important variable for understanding why voters are willing to endorse strongmen. In the ALBA countries those who are satisfied are curiously more willing to elect strongmen who champion their disrespect for the democratic rules of the game. The linkage between satisfaction with democracy and votes for ALBA leaders merits particular scrutiny, as votes for these leaders are also correlated with a willingness to limit the voice of the opposition. Respect for the loyal opposition is a crucial component of democratic governance, but an element that is particularly dispensable is the willingness to limit the voice of the opposition/allow the leader to bend the rules. In order to save the country from peril, some voters are willing to give the strongmen latitude to circumvent this crucial component of democracy. Furthermore, in the United States, respondents who believe the country needs a leader to take “us in the right path” are significantly more likely to vote for Donald Trump. Ideology is also a common predictor in the case of the vote for Trump and the ALBA leaders, although in the opposite direction

Interestingly enough, our analysis did not find consistent cross-national support for the impact of perceived threat, economic perceptions, and alienation from political institutions. In the case of Ecuador, Nicaragua and the United States, economic perceptions were significant factors, but not in Bolivia and Venezuela. In the United States evaluations of the economy are inversely related to support for Trump; whereas in Ecuador and Nicaragua economic evaluations are positively related. However, before dismissing the importance of these hypotheses in a cross-regional perspective, however, we plan to conduct additional analyses using additional years of data for the ALBA cases, particularly the first election of these leaders.

With this research design, we aim to explain why people vote for strongmen in the United States and the ALBA countries of Latin America. This cross-regional approach provides for a more robust test for theories on authoritarianism, as our most different systems design allows us to observe correlations between our independent and dependent variables in dramatically different national contexts. Our research also carries practical ramifications. Given the toll strongmen have taken on democratic practices throughout the Americas, it is imperative to identify the conditions that allow strongmen to rise and become electorally competitive. A greater understanding of authoritarian attitudes will help insulate democratic politics from the call of the caudillo.

Appendix

ANES LAPOP AmericasBarometer Hypotheses (2016 Survey) (2012 Survey)

POP101. To what extent do you V162170 POST: Country needs agree or disagree with this statement: strong leader to take us back to It is necessary for the progress of this true path country that our presidents/prime 1. Disagree strongly ministers limit the voice and vote of 2. Disagree somewhat opposition parties, how much do you 3. Neither agree nor disagree H1. Respondents who are more agree or disagree with that view? 4. Agree somewhat willing to limit the opposition will (Scale 1-7) 5. Agree strongly be more likely to vote for a strongman. V162263 POST: Strong leader is good for U.S. even if bends rules to get things done 1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree somewhat 5. Agree strongly

IDIO1. In general, how would you V161140x PRE: SUMMARY - categorize your own economic economy better/worse in last year situation? 1. Much better (1) Very good – (5) Very bad 2. Somewhat better 3. About the same SOCT1. In general, how would you 4. Somewhat worse categorize the economic situation of 5. Much worse the country? 1.-Very good to 5.- H2. As negative evaluations of Very bad V161142x PRE: SUMMARY: personal and national economic more/less unemployment in last conditions increase, respondents ROS4. The (Country) government year will be more likely to vote for a should implement strong policies to 1. Much better strongman. reduce income inequality between 2. Somewhat better the rich and the poor. To what extent 3. About the same do you agree or disagree with this 4. Somewhat worse Statement? 5. Much worse

V161235x PRE: SUMMARY - Economy since 2008 1. Much better 2. Somewhat better 3. About the same 4. Somewhat worse 5. Much worse

AOJ11. Thinking of the place or V162160 POST: How worried neighborhood where you live and about terrorist attack next 12 thinking of the possibility of being a months victim of assault or robbery, do you 1. Not at all worried H3. As respondents’ fear for their feel (1) Very safe – (4) Very unsafe. 2. Slightly worried personal safety increases, they will 3. Moderately worried be more likely to vote for a 4. Very worried strongman. AOJ20. And thinking about your and 5. Extremely worried your family’s security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago? (1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA

IT1. And speaking of the people V161219 PRE: How often can from around here, would you say that people be trusted people in this community are very 1. Never trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, 2. Some of the time not very trustworthy or 3. About half the time untrustworthy...? [Read options] 4. Most of the time (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat 5. Always trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy V162268 POST: Immigrants are generally good for America's economy 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat H4. Respondents with more 3. Neither agree nor disagree negative perceptions of outgroups 4. Disagree somewhat are more likely to vote for 5. Disagree strongly strongmen

V162269 POST: America's culture

is generally harmed by immigrants

1. Agree strongly

2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly V162270

POST: Immigrants increase crime rates in the U.S. 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly EXC7. Taking into account your own V161215 PRE: REV How often H5. As trust in political institutions experience or what you have heard, trust government in Washington to decreases, respondents are more corruption among public officials is do what is right likely to vote for strongmen. [Read] (1) Very common (2) 1. Agree strongly

Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very 2. Agree somewhat

uncommon? 3. Neither agree nor disagree

4. Disagree somewhat

5. Disagree strongly

PN4. And now, changing the subject, V162290 POST: CSES: Satisfied H7. Respondents who evaluate in general, would you say that you with way democracy works in the democracy more negatively will be are very satisfied, satisfied, U.S. more likely to vote for a dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with 5. Not at all satisfied strongman. the way democracy works in 4. Not very satisfied country? (1) very satisfied – (4) very 2. Fairly satisfied dissatisfied 1. Very satisfied B43. How proud are you to be a V162125x POST: SUMMARY: H8. As levels of nationalism (Nationality)?(1) not at all proud – How good/bad does R feel to see increase, respondents are more (7) very proud American flag likely to vote for a strongman.

Age Q2D-Y. On what day, month and V161267 PRE: Respondent age year were you born? Attention to media GI0. About how often do you pay V162257 POST: R follows politics attention to the news, whether on in media TV, the radio, newspapers or the 1. Not at all internet? (1) Daily – (5) Never 2. Not very closely 3. Fairly closely 4. Very closely

Ideology/ Party ID L1. Nowadays, when we speak of V162171 POST: 7pt Scale Liberal- political leanings, we talk of those on Conservative: self-placement the left and those on the right. In 1. Extremely liberal other words, some people sympathize 2. Liberal more with the left and others with the 3. Slightly liberal right. According to the meaning that 4. Moderate (middle of the road) the terms "left" and "right" have for 5. Slightly conservative you, and thinking of your own 6. Conservative political leanings, where would you 7. Extremely conservative place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number. (1-10 scale) V161158x PRE: SUMMARY - Party ID 1. Strong Democrat 2. Not very strong Democrat 3. Independent-Democrat 4. Independent 5. Independent-Republican 6. Not very strong Republican 7. Strong Republican

Ethnicity/race ETID Do you consider yourself V161310x PRE: SUMMARY - R white, mestizo, indigenous, black, self-identified race mulatto, or of another race? 1. White, non-Hispanic (Indigenous respondents were coded 2. Black, non-Hispanic as one, all others as zero). 3. Asian, native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, non- Hispanic 4. Native American or Alaska Native, non-Hispanic 5. Hispanic 6. Other non-Hispanic including multiple races [WEB: blank 'Other' counted as a race]

Dummy variables were created for the following ethnic groups: Black Asian Native Latino Other

Income R1-R26. To conclude, could you tell V161361x PRE FTF CASI/WEB: me if you have the following in your Income summary house? 01. Under$5,000 TV, computer, cell phone, washing 02. $5,000-$9,999 machine, etc. 03. $10,000-$12,499 Responses were tabulated to measure 04. $12,500-$14,999 the number of consumer items 05. $15,000-$17,499 respondents owned, and then these 06. $17,500-$19,999 responses were grouped into 07. $20,000-$22,499 quintiles. For a thorough discussion 08. $22,500-$24,999 of this methodology, see Córdova 09. $25,000-$27,499 (2009). 10. $27,500-$29,999 11. $30,000-$34,999 12. $35,000-$39,999 13. $40,000-$44,999 14. $45,000-$49,999 15. $50,000-$54,999 16. $55,000-$59,999 17. $60,000-$64,999 18. $65,000-$69,999 19. $70,000-$74,999 20. $75,000-$79,999 21. $80,000-$89,999 22. $90,000-$99,999 23. $100,000-$109,999 24. $110,000-$124,999 25. $125,000-$149,999 26. $150,000-$174,999 27. $175,000-$249,999 28. $250,000 or more Gender Q1. Interview records if respondent V161342 PRE FTF CASI / WEB: is R self-identified gender (1) Male (0) Female 0. Male A dummy variable was created. 1. Female

Marital status Q11. What is your marital status? V161268v PRE: R marital status [Read options] 1. Never Married (1) Single [Go to Q12C] (2) Married 2. Has been married [CONTINUE] (divorced, widowed, separated) (3) Common law marriage 3. Married [CONTINUE] (4) Divorced [Go to Q12C] (5) Separated [Go to Q12C] (6) Widowed [Go to Q12C] (88) DK [Go to Q12C] (98) DA [Go to Q12C] A dummy variable for “married” was created Religiosity Q5B. Please, could you tell me how V161241 PRE: Is religion important is religion in your life? important part of R life [Read options] 1. Important (1) Very important (2) Rather 2. Not important important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important (88) DK (98) DA

Education ED. How many years of schooling V161270 PRE: Highest level of have you completed? Education 1. Less than 1st grade From none to highest number 2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th grad reported 3. 5th or 6th grade 4. 7th or 8th grade 5. 9th grade 6. 10th grade 7. 11th grade 8. 12th grade no diploma 9. High school graduate- high school diploma 10. Some college but no degree 11. Associate degree in college - occupational 12. Associate degree in college -- academic 13. Bachelor's degree (for example: BA,BS) 14. Master's degree (for example: MA, MS) 15. Professional school degree 16. Doctorate degree (for example: PHD, JD)

Other control variables V162320 POST: FTF CASI/WEB: Police treat blacks or whites better 1. Treat whites better 2. Treat both the same 3. Treat blacks better

V162318 POST: FTF CASI/WEB: Federal government treats blacks or whites better 1. Treat whites better 2. Treat both the same 3. Treat blacks better

V162210 POST: Agree/disagree: more emphasis on traditional family values 1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree somewhat 5. Agree strongly

V162209 POST: Agree/disagree: be more tolerant of other moral standards 1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree somewhat 5. Agree strongly

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