THE MILITARY PROFESSION...COMMANDER SELECTION, TRAIN- ING, AND EFFECTIVENESS... REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1965

ANNOUNCEMENT

In response to recent Secretarial and Chief of Staff eneourage- ment to stimulate an ever greater flow of professional thought within the Air Force, Air University Review takes pride in announcing the inception of a program of awards and prizes to authors beginning with the J a n u a r y -F e b r u a r y 1966 issue. In addition to author awards, there will be a prize for the best article in each issue of the Review and an annual award for the out- standing article of the year. Prizes will be announced in the Review.

If your Office does not receive the Review regularly through official USAF distribution, check with your base Publications Distribu- tion Officer. A personal subscrip- tion to the Review will ensure regular receipt. See facing page for subscription inform ation.

THE PROfESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Some Refl ec t ion s on the Mil it a r y Pr o f essio n ...... 2 Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert Sel ec t ion and Training of Comman ders...... 10 Col. Alma R. Flake, usaf A New Assessmen t of Co mma n der Effectiveness? ...... 23 Capt. Lyle D. Kaapke, usaf Lt. Col. Rav VV. Alvord, usaf Military Affairs Abroad T he Devel o pmen t of ROKAF as a M ature Instrument of P ea c e...... 28 Maj. Gen. Chang, Chi Ryang, rokaf Or c a n iz a t io n a l Integration—K ey to the Mil it a r y Appl ic a t io n of Computer Technology...... 37 Col. Harold R. Johnson, usaf O bjec t ives in Future Strategic W ar...... 43 Lt. Col. Harold L. Hitchens, usaf M athematics and Stratecy...... 52 Lt. Col. John E. Mock, usaf 2d Lt. Willard E. Hobbs, Jr., usaf Science Frontier U ltrapurification...... 61 Maj. Guy H. Moates, usaf Dr. Alton F. Armington Dr. Marvin S. Brooks In My Opinion F lexible Respon se vs. D et er mined R et a l iat ion : A C ritique...... 80 lcdr Forrest Forsythe, usn W hat Is Co o r d in a t io n ? ...... 83 Col. Horace W. Lanford, Jr., usaf C ontributory Ret iremen t ? ...... 89 Maj. William D. Clement, usaf Books and Ideas T he Role of the Mil it a r y in Latin America...... 90 Dr. Raymond Estep A Per spec t ive Look at Our A mer ica n Mil it a r y Policy...... 94 Maj. John H. Scrivner, Jr., usaf T he C ontributors...... 98

the cover Address manuscripts to the Editor, Air Uni- One of our sister Services, the Repub- cerrity Revietc, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed by the lic of Korea Air Force, testifies to its Government Printing Office, Washington, concem for professionalism and lead- D.C. Subscriptions are sold by the Air Uni- ership by its new Air Force Academy. versity Book Department, Maxwell Air Force In this issue of Air University Review, Base, Ala.: yearly S4.50, back issues 75 Major General Chang, Chi Ryang, Vice cents. USAF recurbinc pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. Chief of Staff, writes of ROKAF, and Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert dis- Vol. XVII No. 1 November-Dec ember 1965 cusses professionalism in the USAF. H oxorable Eucexk M. Zuckert OR M ORE than ten of the last twenty for themselves. Civilian observers like Samuel years, I have been associated with the Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Walter Mil- F Air Force as Special Assistant to the lis, who have written about the military profes- Assistant Secretary of VVar for Air, as an Assist- sion, can provide very helpful insights and ant Secretary of the Air Force, and most re- historical background. I don’t believe, however, cently as the Secretary. During those years, that any profession can fully understand itself I’ve seen Air Force people as a group become until its members have thought deeply about truly professional in techniques and skills, and their common attitudes, responsibilities, ethi- approach what I would consider a high qual- cal and moral codes, and relationships with ity of professionalism in their attitudes and other elements of society. Outlook. The brief statement that follows is not The contrast between professional stand- intended to be a description or an analysis. I ards of the early postwar years and those of set it down only to establish a basis of under- today probably has been more striking to me standing for my concluding observations. than to most of you, since I was out of the Air You will recall that in The Suldier and the Force from 1952 to 1961. Perhaps I had a basis State, Samuel Huntington described the three for comparison more clear-cut than did those characteristics of professionalism as corporate- who were in the service continuously during ness (the feeling of belonging to an identifiable that criticai period. At any rate, my interest in group with common ideais and purpose), re- professional development led me to speak and sponsibility, and expertise. write rather extensively about the Air Force There are hundreds of different skills—a as a profession when I was Secretary. wide area of expertise—needed in the Air Force. This article is about professionalism—but One could argue that there is no such thing as not in the usual descriptive or analytical sense. a military profession—that it is merely a collec- I propose only to set down some observations tion of different professions and disciplines. that may be useful to Air Force people as they This is not true. There is a binding force that continue to think about their profession. One makes you part of an identifiable profession. characteristic of professionalism, it seems to That force is inade up of a great many elements me, is self-examination. wliich could be grouped under the headings of “corporateness” and “responsibility.” The items that go to make up corporate- What is military professionalism? ness range from such simple things as wearing The military profession cannot be deline- the same uniform, through the time-honored ated by any neat, compact definition. It is too military virtues of courage, loyalty, integrity, big, too heterogeneous in its component func- and self-discipline to more complex ideas like tions, too complex in its relationships, too dif- duty and sense of mission. ferent from any other profession. These last two—duty and mission—estab- It can be described, but that would take lish your responsibilities. They define the job a great deal of space, and anyway you who are you have to do and the spirit in which you professionals can do that better than I. earry out that job. They include a stem impera- It can be analyzed, but that, I sincerely tive which, in itself, sets the military profession believe, is a job the professionals ought to do apart from all others—the total commitment to 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

place your responsibilities and duty to your “Damn it, I joined the Air Force to fly aiqdanes country ahead of personal convenience or gain, —not to do this.” Well, we all would have or life itself. agreed that flying airplanes in combat was the The military profession would not be what payoff, but it was not the sole measure of pro- it is if it lacked any one of Huntington s three fessional standing for a sênior officer. A lot of characteristics: our people found this out the hard way when Without expertisc, corporateness and re- first they sat down at the conference table with sponsibility would be ineffective. Army and Navy officers of equal rank. Without corporateness, expertise and re- Then there were the myths that died hard sponsibility probably would result in a low —especially the myth of Air Force omnipo- order of efficiency. tence. A lot of blue-suiters simply refused to believe that there was any war that couldn’t Without responsibility, corporateness and be won by air power alone. They knew, and expertise could be a threat to society. rightly, that air power was then the supreme deterrent to general war; but for the sake of the earltj years interservice harmony in a professional atmo- Now let me go back for a moment to the sphere, they might have settled for the equally late 1940’s and early 1950’s and trace briefly praiseworthy concept that there was no war the rise of Air Force professionalism. The great which could be won without air power. bulk of our officers and airmen of those years Some also believed there were few if any had come into the Service during World War problems that couldn t be solved with a well- II. They had been trained very rapidly in the placed bomb. Those were the days of the minimum skills and attitudes that were essen- “preventive war” school—a philosophy not in tial to fighting that war. Generally, they be- keeping with national character and probably came seasoned in combat and in the organiza- unrealistic in either military or political tenns. tion of combat operations, and certainly they These are random examples to illustrate were professional in their ability to fly and my point. At any rate, there are exceptions to fight the equipment of that era. But most of everv generalization when we are talking about those trained between 1942 and 1945 were not an organization of half a million men. Obvi- professionals as we conceive of the word today. ously there were exceptions in the Air Force— A great deal of what we now consider the among the small nucleus of professionals who stock-in-trade of a professional force had been had been trained before World War II, and provided by the Army, by experts temporarily among those who carne in during the war. If in uniform, or by civilian specialists—or it didn’t there hadn’t been men like Muir Fairchild, exist at all. For example, much of the Army Air Larry Norstad, Tommy White, Curt LeMay, Forces administrative support was fumished and officers then more junior in responsibili- by Army personnel; our logistic and mainte- ties like J. P. McConnell and Dave Burchinal, nance effort relied heavily on civilian profes- the Air Force would not be the professional sionals who had come in “for the duration”; organization it is today. operations analysis was a civilian-dominated Many of them understood not only the field; and sophisticated, mechanized manage- strength of air power but also its limitations, ment techniques hadn’t been developed. not only the unilateral but also the joint and The difference between the Air Force of combined use of their forces. Above all, they the late 1940’s and today wasn’t only a matter knew that air power is the most flexible of the of skills. It was partly attitude. I remember military instruments of policy when used prop- working on an organizational problem with a erly, that it is most effective when coordinated young Air Force general in 1947 or ’48. He with all the other elements of national power, obviously would rather have been anywhere and that in the age of nuclear weapons the best else than the Pentagon. Finally, in complete victory is one achieved without unnecessarv frustration, he banged the desk and shouted, bloodshed.

6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

early months of 1961 passed. It also became It took time for some of our old attitudes more and more clear that some blue-suiters and outlooks to change; adjusting to new hard- were still approaching top-level problems of ware still seems to be easier than adjusting to national security in terms of the concepts, doc- new ideas and new methods. We had to leam trine, and study methods of the early 1950’s. that we just couldn’t sell justification of a posi- There were too many who took a parochial tion on “pure military requirements” or “mili- view of the big problems of planning, pro- tary judgment” or a mere visceral feeling. A graming, and bndgeting; who refused to be- salable position had to be based on sound, lieve that national policy and strategy were objective analysis. We were forced to take a what the Administration said they were—not hard look at some of our most revered ideas, what an element of the armed forces thought particularly in the strategic area, and I think they ought to be. I suppose this was a hangover we leamed a lot in the process—both substan- from the ten or more years when we had been tively and in terms of methodology. We became the principal guarantor of Free World security more objective, more analytical, and more and in many wavs the favored Service. In those flexible in our view of defense affairs. There years our nuclear monopoly or unquestioned is no doubt in my mind that our staff work nuclear superiority had made the issues of showed greater improvement between 1961 strategy more clear-cut than they were after and 1965 than in any comparable period of Air the U.S.S.R. achieved nuclear parity. Force history. REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY PROFESSION 7

The changes that also took place in the tems, a strong position in st r ic o m, for example. field during those vears were, in retrospect, The Air Force has demonstrated the flexibility astounding: the advent of operational ic bm s, of the manned bomber in Viet Nam and proved the transition from liquid- to solid-fuel missiles, that we are a really dual-capable force with our a new missile-bomber balance, the YF-12A that effective use of conventional weapons in South- could provide tremendouslv iraproved manned east Asia. In summary, I think they have been interceptor capabilities, increased emphasis on very productive years. tactical air power and conventional vveapons, This brief review of Air Force growth and the F-lll which promises a new order of mo- change also illustrates the breadth of Air Force bilitv in the tactical area, a dramatic increase activities. No other military force is equally in airlift capacitv and proficiency, development committed in the scope of its mission—from of special air warfare forces, our work with counterinsurgency through limited war, stra- nasa in space exploration, the introduction of tegic offensive and defensive tasks, to space. operating space systems. Air Force people serve in nearly a hundred .Air Force progress since 1961 in research foreign countries and on combined staffs with and development, management, training, edu- their counterparts from many allied nations. cation, and other supporting areas has been It takes more than $18 billion a year to meet just as great as in our combat forces. I’ll men- these commitments. I can’t think of another tion only a few bench marks in these areas: human activity that matches the Air Force in reorganization of our r &d and logistic func- scope, variety, or complexity. Only the other tions into Air Force Systems Command and Air two military Services come even close. Force Logistics Command; establishment of the Designated Systems Management Group, thoughts on the analysis of professionalistn which provided for incisive Secretarial and top- level Air Staff review of major weapons proj- These three words—scope, variety, and ects; an effective cost-reduction program; wide complexity—are major factors in making the use of programed leaming and other advanced Air Force profession the most difficult and educational tec-hniques; reorientation of the challenging of any I know. It is also one of the Air University programs; development of a most rewarding. I want to discuss each of these relatively large number of people skilled in qualifying adjectives in the hope, which I ex- systems analysis and advanced management pressed earlier, that my observations may be techniques. of use as you think about your profession. I am always impressed by the tremendous Many of the difficulties are obvious: the vitality the Air Force has shown in the past five skills required to handle very complicated ma- years. Three years ago, I used to hear the re- chines, manage vast sums of money, get the mark that we, newest of the three Services, right things at the right place on time, direct were destined to lead the shortest life of any. thousands or hundreds of thousands of people, The prophets of doom pointed to reduction of plan for the uncertain environment that lies our bomber force, the threatened Army take- ten or more years ahead, and develop machines over of tactical air functions, and a slightly that stretch science and technology to their decreased usak share of the Defense budget, limits. These are skills that intelligent, edu- and they predicted that we were not long for cated men can master. this world. I know of no forecast that was ever Then there are the personal and emotional “busted” worse than that. difficulties that not every man can meet or is It is true that we lost—at least temporarily willing to accept: danger, physieal hardship, —some heartbreakers: amsa, a go-ahead on the family separation, discipline, pay that never •Mi, and the cancellation of several programs will match civilian compensation in positions that don t look as good now as they did a few of great responsibility. Those who lack a strong years ago. But we won some good ones too: sense of dedication or a realization of the im- the dod space mission, the mo l , new airlift Sys- portance of their mission or a love of military 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW life may find these difficulties unbearable. and destroy more efficiently than any potential Finally, there is a category of difficulties enemy. This is a hard thing to say in an age tliat 1 would describe as problems of balance. of euphemisms where cemeteries have become Solving these problems, it seems to me, is one “memorial parks” and mortuaries “slumber of the real measures of true professionalism. rooms.” Nevertheless, it is true. You have to Let me describe some of these problems. preserve a toughness of mind and spirit that First, the defense of this nation and of the is almost unique in this day and age. But at Free World is going to depend for many years the same time, you have to maintain a respect on the military stature of the United States. —a reverence—for humanity and for the works W e vvill have to invest billions upon billions of man. Without this reverence, the military of dollars, scarce skills, and valuable materiais professional could be little different from a in our security. These national resources must gangster. be employed responsibly and efficientlv, using Fifth, eorporateness may become increas- the best techniques of business management. ingly hard to maintain. To some extent, it may There will be great emphasis on business prac- have been weakened by our functional organ- tices in the management of defense resources, ization and by a tendency—which I believe is but the military profession must never become disappearing—to think in terms of almost un- a business or be looked upon as one. related strategic or tactical or defensive power. Second, in anv profession govemed by Anvthing which fractionalizes your profession relativelv fixed standards of conduct, there is unnecessarily should be regarded with caution. danger of producing stereotypes. We should Perhaps more acute in all the military strive for diversity within a framework of com- Services—espeeially in the Air Force which has mon understanding. Sometimes the uncon- more than one thousand military occupational ventional thinkers—the “wild birds”—have not specialties—is the possibility that specialization fared very well in the military. But they are of skills can lead to such close identification exactly the people most apt to see new oppor- with a subprofession that a man may lose his tunities in a world that is unstable in nearly identity with the military profession as a whole. every field of endeavor. Keep the best of them This is particularly true in those areas that are and use their special talents of prophecy, imag- similar or identical to civilian skills—scientific ination, and intuition. research, personnel management, some kinds Third, we must maintain a balance between of engineering. Many of these areas require the relative values we attach to operational advanced education in civilian institutions skills and to management skills. They are or duty with civilian organizations. I believe equallv essential to the Air Force, but the fírmly that the military profession should be former has traditionally tended to take prece- closely integrated with the civilian elements dence over the latter. We have had to put of our society. I do not believe that the military increasing emphasis on administrative skills as professional can or should be a mirror image a constantlv greater degree of expertise is of his fellow citizens in civilian life. needed to manage defense resources. I might This brings me to my last problem of bal- add parenthetically that many of our manage- ance. Maintain the military mind but let it ment improvements since 1947 probably were be a balanced military mind. Charles Burton accelerated by the absence of long-standing Marshall stated the case for the military mind tradition in the management area. I add em- better than I can, in extemporaneous remarks phatically that management and command of which he made at the National War College management techniques should not be regard- in March 1965. This is an excerpt from his ed as a separate type of professionalism, but as remarks: an essential of military professionalism. If there is not a military view of things, Fourth, the effectiveness of the Air Force then all the other taxpayers and I are not get- as an instrument for ensuring peace or defend- ting our money’s worth from the array of insti- ing against attack depends on its ability to kill tutions set up to inculcate professional aptitude REFLECTIONS ON TllE MILITARY PROFESSION 9

for the military . . . I think a distinctive set of number of employees, budget, or geographi- attitudes is essential to what the profession has cal dispersion. Finally, the problems that the to contribute, and I am sure we are going to military professional deals with are ultimately have to rely on them for a long time. The pride, concemed with the lives and freedom of mil- the lore, the comprehension associated with the lions of people and the security of untold specialty are right enough. Without them, it treasure. This is the supreme challenge of your would be hard for the rest of us to find much profession. of a future to count on. You will continue to face determined, I agree with Mr. Marshall, and I add this skillful, and imaginative adversaries in the note to his remarks. Today the military mind U.S.S.R. and Communist China. The competi- must be somewhere between an essentially ci- tion will be tough and the stakes high. vilian Outlook and the stereotype of the military I am convinced that we are at one of the mind well known to fiction—dogmatic, inflexi- decisive points of history. Whether all the peo- ble, authoritarian, and narrowly focused on ple of the world will one day be free to choose military affairs. It should recognize not only their own way of life; whether the outcome of military considerations but also the sociologi- this great issue is decided peacefully or by war, cal, political, economic, and technical forces will be determined in large measure by the that influence this complicated world. quality of our military professionals. You have I think there is little need to dwell on the an unparalleled opportunity to serve your second adjective I have used to describe the country, and beyond it the cause of peace and military profession—“challenging.” Today your freedom throughout the world. profession stands constantly at the forefront of The thoughtful man will find his greatest Science and technology. That is one of the great reward in knowledge that he has served well challenges. You also will be challenged by the and constructively not only his own generaticn scale of military affairs. No civilian Corporation but those to come. in this country begins to rival the Air Force in Chevy Chase, Manjland SELECTION AND TRAINING OF COMMANDERS

Colonel Alma R. F lake

O ONE doubts the heavy responsibil- The succession to command by virtue of ity resting upon the unit commander rank is a traditional military concept intended Nto lead, to manage, and to exercise his to ensure the presence of effective authority authority in a competent and Creative manner under all eventualities. The validity of the con- so as to accomplish the mission and achieve the cept in view of possible unforeseen events and policv goals within the bounds of law and reg- emergencies is unquestioned. It has, however, ulation. Yet there are no precise published some undesirable effects. Since the next sênior policies as to how officers vvill be selected for officer will automatically succeed, there may command position or vvho will select them. Any be little urgency in finding and assigning the Air Force commissioned officer, except a chap- officer who is qualified to provide the best lead- lain or medicai officer, is authorized to exercise ership over the unit. It is, in fact, unnecessary command providing he is sênior in rank to for any agency to plan in advance to ensure the other qualified officers in the unit and, if the presence of a commander in each unit. Nor- unit is primarily engaged in flying, a rated pilot mally, realization of the criticai importance of on flying status. If for any reason the com- the position results in a rational selection of mander departs from the unit, the next sênior a qualified officer to assume command on a qualified officer automatically assumes com- permanent basis. Too often, however, the lack mand and inherits all statutory command au- of urgency and necessity results in delay in the thority. In rare instances, as when two officers selection even when loss of a commander has of equal rank are involved or when the sênior long been forecast. The same factors cause most officer assigned is considered unqualified for commands to neglect any advance planning or reasons other than statutory, higher authority effort to have a qualified officer identified to may intervene and designate another officer to replace immediately a commander lost through assume command. unforeseen events. The resulting periods of time between permanent commanders are often This article is based on a thesis prepared by lhe author as a characterized by a lack of command leadership part of his academic work while a student at the Air War College, Air University, Class of 1964. and direction in the unit. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF COM MAN D EUS 11

Air Force Approacli to Leadership This, then, is the basic Air Force system for leadership selection. Since this selection ‘T h e very fact that you are a commissionetl process is based on an “adequacy of natural offieer marks you as a leader of men. This is endowments and special abilities,”'' leadership the first sentence in the leadership manual used qualification is officially assumed to be a com- at the Squadron Offieer School, Air University. mon attribute of all commissioned officers. The Air Forces current approach is well ex- The same assumption is not made con- pressed and explained in a recent publication: ceming management ability. The two qualities Rank indicates preeedence, command, but appear to be completely unrelated in the con- it should indicate more—growth in knowledge text of Air Force policy: leadership, a quality and understanding of man, functions and op- possessed by all officers; management, a quality erations. As the offieer matures in the sense of which must be developed in the same sense as Air Force experience, as indicated bv his rank, a technical skill.7 Since management is an in- he is expected to have a better grasp of the Air herent responsibility of all Air Force personnel Force’s overall mission, better insight into its appointed to leadership positions,* the concept intemational and national aspeets, more flexi- for its development may be considered part of bility (because of his \ vi der knowledge) in adapting to changing philosophies, concepts the approach to leadership. and functions, and a greater understanding of The Air Force manager is developed by what it takes to get the job done right. This three factors. First, through participation in a philosophv backs the military precedent that varietv of activities, he leams through doing rank generally Controls command. and observing. Second, he receives personal Command is implicit in commission: there- attention and help from his commander, who is fore, every offieer .. . must always be preparing always greatly concerned with the develop- for command. ... In this respect, his entire ment of potential managers. Third, he is al- career is a constant challenge. The way he lowed to attend certain academic and profes- meets the challenge will have a significant sional training programs for which the Air effect on his, and the usafs future.1 Force has established requirements. This concept of equal sharing of leader- A review of the directives and other avail- ship responsibility and qualification by all offi- able publications on the subject reveals that cers forms the basis for leadership development Air Force policy on management development in the Air Force. “In leadership training and is general and unspecific. Responsibility is so leadership education, vve seem often to work vvidely dispersed that, in effect, no agency or primarily on the assumption that officers have individual can actually be held responsible. the knowledge thev need and the proper skills Success of the program would appear to be to become leaders and commanders.”- Offieer based on the positive operation of three factors: candidate selection procedures are designed to vaned assignment experience, personal partici- justify this assumption. “We depend upon mea- pation of commanders, and formal manage- surements of potential physical and intellectual ment training. abilities to determine those who are to receive In summary, the Air Force considers lead- offieer training.”' The education that the offi- ership to be a quality possessed by all officers cer candidate receives is heavilv oriented, at as a result of offieer selection and education least verballv, toward leadership. The drill field policies. This concept is in complete harmony is now known as the “Leadership Laboratory”; with the ancient military traditions of leader- four years of “Air Science Leadership” class- ship. Management, on the other hand, is an room “afiFords opportunities for the observation essential quality that officers must develop. and development of leadership”; and extra- These concepts—leadership as a quality pos- curricular activities “should further develop sessed and management as a quality to be de- leadership.”' And finally: “An offieer is granted veloped—comprise the basic elements in the a commission because he has real and poten- Air Force system for selection of leaders and tial leadership qualities.”5 for its management development program. 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

selection process management are Business Administration and The Armv estimate of command assign- Personnel Management.11 My search of Air ment has heen well stated: Force directives has failed to reveal a defini- tion of any specific training or experience as a A command assignment is the most im- mandatory or desirable qualification for selec- portant assignment that an officer can obtain tion as a unit commander. during his career. The proveu ability to com- mand can influence many personnel actions, All this indicates the lack of an official such as selection to certain high levei schools, policy on the selection of unit commanders and special assignments, and promotion for those the absence of an official program intended to not specialists . . . Command positions at the produce qualified candidates for command as- battalion and regimental levei vvill be filled by signment. Since there are no definitive policies those officers whose records have been so out- on the subject, how are unit commanders se- standing as to indicate they are potential divi- lected? sion. corps and army commanders.9 In most cases, the next higher commander The Air Force shares this Army respect for selects the unit commander. Occasionally, when command position, as previously implied in the a unit of relatively greater importance is in- quotation that “every officer . . . must always volved, a higher commander may make the be preparing for command” and that in this selection. Hopefully, the commanders decision respect “his entire career is a constant chal- in the matter is concurred in by his staff and by lenge.” However, this generally accepted re- other headquarters in the chain of command, spect for command is not supplemented by any and a well-known, highly competent officer official policy on how commanders will be se- who possesses all the desirable qualffications lected, who will select them, or precisely what happily receives the appointment. This opti- qualffications are required of the officer se- mum result, however, is unusual because of fac- lected. One regulation states: “Officers will be tors bearing upon the selection. Commands are considered for assignment to positions of in- usuallv too large to enable officers of the middle creasing scope and responsibility when they grades to be well known to the several higher possess above average capabilities and capacity leveis of commanders or their staffs. In most for growth.”1" No point in time is indicated at cases officers are rotating in and out of the vvhich this consideration is to take place; no command on a 3- or 4-year basis. Higher com- testing program or other means is cited by manders move from one assignment to another which “above average capabilities and capacity even more frequently. And further, not all se- for growth” will be determined. Neither is it lected officers desire command assignment. definite that “positions of increasing scope and Therefore, when a requirement exists to select responsibility” actually means a command as- a unit commander, one of the following condi- signment. It may very well mean selection to tions can reasonably be expected to exist: some other assignment considered important • The appointing commander is newly enough that specific qualification is required. assigned and personally knows very' few of the Although officers applving for the grad- officers under his jurisdiction. He must resort uate science and engineering programs are re- to recommendations of his staff and or a review quired to take aptitude tests, no tests of any of effectiveness reports to make his decision. type are designated to assist in the selection of officers to command. Air Force Manual 35-8 • An appointing commander may re- validates the use of personnel testing to deter- strict his consideration to those few eligible mine what career fields people are best suited officers whom he personally knows and has for, but it contains no reference to tests to de- confidence in. This eliminates from considera- termine ability to lead, to manage, or to com- tion other officers who well may be the most mand. In the Air Force Statistical Digest, Fiscal qualified. Year 1962, the only official training programs • An appointing commander who has listed which appear to be possibly related to no officer whom he wishes to appoint may allow SELECTION AND TRAININC. OF COMMANDERS 13 succession bv seniority to take place, even military life. The technical requirement of a though the succeeding oíBcer does not have his flying rating is a relatively modem innovation. confidence. The limitations of rank and rating, how- • The officer who is considered best ever, are not the major limiting factors, and qualified bv the appointing commander may both could be strongly defended as valid re- successfullv decline the appointment for vari- quirements. The selection system could still be pus reasons. broadly based if other less valid limitations did not exist. • An officer will be selected solely be- The major limiting factor restricting the cause his records show that he has previously appointing commander from selecting the best commanded a unit and has “experience.” officer he can find is the absolute lack of priority Thus, the appointing commander selects, accorded the action of commander selection. or allows to succeed, the officer who in his per- No exceptions from any of the normal person- sonal opinion is the best available in vievv of all nel assignment directives are granted. An ap- factors bearing upon the problem. The decisive pointing commander must therefore select from element of the selection is the personal opinion the officers under his jurisdiction. To the com- of the appointing commander. The desire of the mander of a division, wing, group, or squadron appointing commander to see the unit well with deployed detachments, this can often limit managed and therefore the sincerity of his mo- the choice to a very few, or even a single officer. tivation in making the decision are unques- If the appointing commander knows of a well- tioned; however, his ability to select the best- qualified officer, for instance from a command qualified officer is doubtful, since his decision he has just left, he has no legitimate means of is basically a matter of personal opinion, un- requesting his assignment. This policy is, of assisted by any organized system of manage- course, in line with the traditional “rank equals ment development and selection. The problem leadership” philosophy: the personnel system is even further exacerbated by limitations af- will produce an officer of the proper specifica- fecting the selection of unit commanders. tion to fill the line authorization on the manning document; since he has the rank and rating authorized, he automatically has the leadership limitations in selection called for; therefore, all positions, including The size of the Air Force and the large command, will always be adequatelv manned. number of officers in the middle grades would As long as this philosophy exists, it will defeat indicate a tremendous group from which each efforts to select the best management. commander is individuallv selected. In actu- Other restrietions which narrow the selec- alitv, this is not the case. The appointing com- tion base are found in normal personnel assign- mander is faced with several limitations which ment directives. An officer cannot be trans- severely reduce the number of officers from ferred until he has completed 18 months on which the selection must be made. These limi- station since his last transfer. This, in effect, tations tend to parochialize the system, narrow precludes the selection of a sizable percentage the selection base, and therefore degrade to of officers who may otherwise be under the some degree the quality of the officers selected appointing authoritys jurisdiction and ideally One limiting factor is the requirement for qualified. Exceptions to this policy are rare and a specific grade, as authorized for the particular can be approved only at the highest levei. Se- unit command position, and for seniority over lection for a command position is not in itself other assigned personnel of the same grade. an adequate reason to request an exception. In Another is the requirement that a rated officer overseas areas, the prescribed rotation policy on flying status command a flying unit. The is a further restriction. An officer who is within seniority requirement is a traditional military one year of the maximum tour in an area cannot concept, unchanged by modem doctrines and be relocated to take a command. If he has less generally accepted as a necessary reality of than two years of theater retainability, this 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

weighs against his selection because of the Precise answers to these questions are im- generally accepted opinion that a command possible to obtain. Certainly the existing system appointment should be for at least two years’ has produced some excellent unit commanders duration. These restrictions are a serious limita- who have suecessfully met the challenge and tion, especially overseas, on the appointing have contributed significantly to total efcec- commanders authority to select the best quali- tiveness. It might be claimed that the acknowl- fied officer for available command positions. edged overall increase in Air Force efficiency The increasing decline in prestige of the during the past decade is proof of effective unit command position is another factor that de- management at unit levei. Much more plausible grades the selection process. This factor, though would be attribution of this trend to the dra- not the result of official policy nor evident in the matic improvements in management initiated pronouncements of responsible officials, causes at higher leveis of command: the standardiza- many eligible officers to evade command as- tion of procedures; the establishment of stand- signment. This effect has been brought about ards of achievement for all activities; the im- by the well-publicized decline in unit command proved distribution of technical skills and authority, by the recognized absence of an or- vastly improved training programs; more effi- ganized system to select the best officers for cient procurement and supply support; better command positions, and the mediocrity of equipment and higher pay for personnel; and many of the officers selected under the present perhaps most of all, the extremely close super- inefficient process. Many officers in the middle vision which higher headquarters have exer- grades do not consider a unit command assign- cised over unit accomplishment. The available ment as the best, or even a desirable, step indicators and mv personal experience tend to toward promotion. It is looked upon as a posi- support the latter conclusion. tion where responsibility outweighs authority One indicative area is in the duration of and where conditions not under the control of unit command assignments. If it is granted that the commander may result in failure that will stability of command is desirable and that the be recorded on the effectiveness report. Al- duration of an individuais assignment is to though the appointing commander has author- some degree indicative of success or failure, ity to direct the assignment, there is an under- factual information in this area is useful in judg- standable reluctance to appoint an officer who ing the effectiveness of the selection system. A does not have a strong desire to command. survey of the command experience of line-of- the-Air-Force officers in the 1962 class of the Air Command and Staff College revealed some results of present practice interesting statistics. Of 120 officers who had There can be little doubt that the unit held squadron command assignments, 54 (45%) command position is one of the positions for were in command for less than one year, 29 which the selection of the right man is of criti- (24%) between one and two years, and 37 (31%) cai importance to the effectiveness of the Air two or more years.13 Although these figures can- Force. Since few basically important actions not be directly translated into a ratio of success anywhere in the Air Force escape his final or failure, they do seem to strongly indict the touch, and his final touch is considered the most system. A selection system that fails to produce important,12 a strong case could be made to the right man at the right time in 45% of the support the contention that, collectively, unit appointments can hardlv be considered very command is the most criticai of all positions. effective. Does the existing system produce the right The major indictment of the system cannot man for the job? Have the officers selected for be obtained from published information. It is unit command positions met the challenge strongly indicated, however, by the general dis- brought about by technological and social de- satisfaction with the system expressed by prac- velopments? Has management at unit levei in- ticallv all who comment upon it. Among a mul- creased or decreased Air Force effectiveness? titude of studies by military personnel, it is diffi- SELECTION AND TRA1NINC OF COMMANDERS 15 cult to find a defense for any element of the we have been slow to recognize this and even selection system. In my opinion, this dissatisfac- slower to change direction and methods, the tion arises from personal observations of many force of circumstances insistently deinands that we face up to the problem and take steps to tragic or ludicrous results of appointments to solve it.u command which are knowm to the individual officer. These observations from an individual Recommendations contained here are di- viewpoint are limited to the minor portion of rected only toward the selection and training of the large Air Force that any one officer person- Air Force unit commanders. Said another way, allv observes and are to an extent a mixture of these recommendations are aimed at effective fact, rumor, and suspicion. To most, there is a selection and training of those officers who will strong feeling that something is wrong with the be appointed to management positions at the system. To define the “something” is more diffi- lowest executive levei. If the changes suggested cult. Each individual realizes that his observa- will serve to provide better management at unit tions are only a fragment of the whole and well levei, the effort required for implementation is may be nontypical. more than justified. However, any improvement A statement to the effect that the majority in the development of young leaders will have of selections to unit command positions are an upgrading effect on general Air Force lead- malassignments will surprise only the verv jun- ership and important implications extending ior, due to his lack of exposure, and possibly the far bevond the unit command assignment. For, very sênior, because of an understandable ten- as one writer has stated, “weaknesses in higher dency of intermediate commanders to keep management can be traced to weaknesses in corrective action at their own levei. Howe\’er, lower management, its major source of recruit- whether the circumstances are known or un- ment.”13 known outside the local command, invariably Before a new approach can be accepted, the officers and airmen of the unit involved are the old one must be discarded. It is high time acutely aware of them. The cumulative effect the Air Force discarded the outdated, tradi- of such management failures upon morale and tional military concept of leadership. The new efficiency, though not measurable, is significant. concept must acknowledge the value of officers These failures are not eaused by deficiencv who possess a high potential for leadership and or neglect on the part of intermediate com- management; the Air Force must actively seek manders. They are the result of a deficient man- them out early in their careers, develop them agement selection system — a system which through training and experience, and, at the makes the quality of management selection de- right time, appoint them to command positions. pendent upon the appointing authoritvs per- The first step is to abandon the concept sonal knowledge of his people, backed up by that leadership is a responsibilitv shared reference to a group of evaluation reports often equally by all officers. In more recent directives written by strangers. the Air Force has increasingly referred to the need for competent specialists as well as broadly experienced officers qualified for com- New Approacti to mand and managerial positions."5 Is leadership Air Force Leadership equally required of each of these types of offi- cers? In a 1962 presentation of the Officer Writing of military leadership, one well- Career Management Program, USAF officials qualified analyst had this to say: pointed out: “Individuais whose qualificaiions and desires indicate they can best serve as spe- We have not faced up to the fact that our thinking about leadership, as well as our litera- cialists should be utilized and developed as ture on leadership, is out of joint with the times. such.”17 Can these people be utilized and de- We seem to be training and educating on the veloped as specialists while at the same time implicit assumption that past practices are taking part in broadening assignments aimed at sufficient to produce future leaders. Although providing the “largest possible group from 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

which to select our future leaders as they dem- mander is held by equating his leadership and onstrate the necessarv management skill?”18 management capabilities with those supposedly The contradiction is brought about bv tech- inherent in all other officers of similar rank. nology, which created the requirement for spe- Responsibility for command leadership is not eialization, and by tradition, which still pro- shared equally by all officers; it rests entirely claims each officer to be inherently a leader of on the group who occupy command positions. men. Training and development for command re- Does the Air Force require from all officers sponsibility should be concentrated on those the combination of leadership and management needed for command positions. Other officers abilitv neeessary for command, and therefore should be trained and developed in the areas should all officers be expected to dcvelop and of their competence, according to the needs of be rated upon these qualities? The answer is the Air Force. This will require a new concept certainly negative in view of the command po- of leadership, a concept which will allow for a sitions available versus the number of officers selection proeess to differentiate betvveen of- and in view of past records of officer assign- ficers who will be candidates for command and ment. One study conducted several years ago those whose development will be in other pointed out that there were approximately fields. Leadership of the type required to take 3000 command slots. Of this total, about 2300 over for a short time in an emergency, or to stop called for the grades of captain through lieu- a conflict between two ainnen, will remain a tenant colonel. At the time there were 83,000 responsibility of all officers. But command lead- officers serving on active duty in those grades.19 ership will become a recognized specialty, to be Simple arithmetic shows the odds against anv- highly developed in the group of officers ac- one who aspires to command. Even the most tually suited and needed for command posi- successful rated pilot officers have less than a tions. This concept is not really new. It was 50 percent chance of achieving a command po- recommended in an extremely high-level re- sition at the unit levei, and of course they have port over ten years ago: a decreasing chance thereafter. If an officer is A premium must be placed on command not a rated pilot, his chances of being appointed and leadership abilities. Aceompanying an in- to a command position are negligible. crease in technocracy within the Services, The traditional military philosophy — that there has been an ever-increasing demand for command is implicit in a commission—clashes technical abilities. As a result, many now harshly with the facts of military life today. An aehieve promotion to responsible positions officer no longer needs to command in order to never placing themselves in a situation where become extremely valuable and gain sênior their leadership and command abilities are rank. Any officer, regardless of his proficiency, tested. It must be clearly established that mili- will be well advised not to expect his Service to tary command and technical astuteness are two include a command. If he is other than a rated separate and distinct fields of endeavor. Both pilot, he woidd be wise to concentrate primarily are essential . . .20 on some other more likely career progression If this concept is adopted, if command and only secondarily on preparing himself for leadership and management abilitv are to be command. considered as an art and a science in them- The fact is that command leadership is selves, it then follows that individuais with the required of only a minority of the officers who highest qualifícations should be selected for actively serve the Air Force. To require all of- entry into this important field and that a de- ficers to develop command skills is a wasteful velopment program should be initiated. Again policy. It diffuses the efforts of the many officers this is not a new concept. Industry has long whose value lies rather in specialization; it is placed great emphasis on the selection and inevitably frustrating to many officers who are training of management candidates. The led by the policy to expect to command; and American Management Association states: it tends to degrade the respect in which a com- “American industry is convinced that the dis- SELECTION AND TRAINING OF COM M AN D Eli S 17

coverv and development of managers is its No. to retain no more than administrative respon- 1 administrative task.”-1 sibility. Increasing criticism of the rated pilot Candidates for command should be se- requirement indicates the need for a reeonsid- lected carefullv and given thorough training eration in this area. Since commanders no and experience, just as anv other specialist longer lead massed aircraft in battle, perhaps group, to prepare them for command responsi- this requirement should be restrieted to only bility. This concept, if implemented with effec- the most highly specialized flying units. Some tive selection and development programs, will advocate the placement of military officers pos- signifícantlv improve management at imit levei. sessing scientific competence throughout the Industry has developed certain basic command structure of research and engineer- principies in the recruitment and selection of ing activities, stressing the fact that in this area candidates for management positions. These the scientist must make the decisions, while principies readilv lend themselves to Air Force strictly military officers can act only in an ad- adoption. The discussion below follovvs ac- visorv capacity. cepted industrial practice.2'- These are only a few of the many areas in which decisions are required in order to pro- definition of qualifications desired vide full definition of the qualifications re- quired for future Air Force leadership. Initia- Before an effective selection program can tion of an improved selection program should be designed, it is essential that the qualities not be held up pending these decisions. Defi- desired be thoroughly defined. Many of the nitions should be made in the light of already qualifications, as previously discussed, can known requirements. These will be sufficient easily be defined for selection purposes. How- for initiation of an organized selection pro- ever, some of the definitions can only result gram that will upgrade unit management capa- from top-level Air Force studies and decisions. bility. Refinements can be added as firm deci- In writing of the requirement for some basic sions are made. decisions about leadership, Mr. Oron P. South, formerly of the Air University Aerospace Stud- ies Institute, stated that a better understand- recruitment ing of new military society is required and that In recruiting, the net should be spread as . . . in order to discover what kind of leaders wide as possible to provide a large number of are most likely to function effectively in it, and persons with a variety of qualifications from how men can be prepared for leadership, it is which management candidates can be selected. necessary to: Recruiting should aim for as liighly educated (1) Survey the broad areas in which com- a group as possible, although no specific type petence is required. of education should be particularly stressed. In (2) Develop criteria for the type of eompe- view of the large variety of Air Force manage- tence needed in broad areas, and ment positions, the recruiting effort should be- (3) Outline a training and education system gin with those prospects having a broad, liberal that will best develop the competente needed.23 education. The present officer recruitment In the process of developing criteria for program appears to be adequate to provide a leadership qualifications, the Air Force should group from which qualified candidates of the take a criticai look at many of its present poli- desired educational backgrounds can be se- cies. The size and organization of units vary lected. The Air Force should, of course,attempt greatly, appearing to have evolved bv casual to cast the net even wider and continue in its incrementai modifications to traditional mili- efforts to attract higher-quality graduates. tary structures. The authority of some unit command positions, such as the Strategic Air selection of candidates Command tactical squadrons, has been stripped of all management functions, and they appear With all incoming officers forming the IS AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEXV

group from which candidates will be selected, Tests are also useful in discovering personality and with desired qualifications defined, meth- problems that have to do with a persons ability ods must be devised to select those officers with to gain the cooperation and respect of the the highest potential for leadership. The selec- working group. According to one survey, these tion process should comprise all possible means personality problems are the cause of seven of evaluation. Every eare should be taken to times more management failures than the num- see that no one element of the selection process ber that can be attributed to lack of knowledge becomes decisive. When the program is initi- and proficiency.25 ated, it should be made a matter of importance In view of the preponderance of evidence and given a high prioritv. All officer candidates supporting the use of written tests and their should be made aware of the program. It should widespread use for other purposes by the Air be added to the mandatory briefing responsi- Force, it is difficult to understand why they bilitv charged to the unit personnel officer. And have not been used in the selection of man- finally, it should become a specific responsibility agers. Appropriate tests should be designed of all commanders in their individual and group and given at the latest possible time that will counseling of junior officers. A maximum effort enable their being evaluated and considered should be made to see that every officer is fully in the final decision to select or reject the informed of the program and its purpose during applicant. his first months of military service. Effectiveness Rcpoiis. Throughout the pe- As a first step in constructively reducing riod of duty prior to final selection, the officers the group under consideration and eliminating under consideration should be rated in accord- those not qualified, a statement of minimum ance with current procedures. These ratings qualification should be published. The state- should be considered in the final decision as ment should be designed to eliminate those one of the evaluating devices. Because of the vvhose qualifications are for anv definable rea- well-known and oft-stated deficiencies of the son considered unsatisfactory. If college gradu- rating svstems used by both the military and ation is considered an essential requirement, it industry, it is important that the rating not should be so indicated. Any other qualification become the only deciding factor in selection.'-’6 considered necessarv for success in the military Neither should it be given less weight than management field, above that required of all some other factors considered. officers, should be defined. An officer should be Peer Ratings. At least two personnel studies required to meet these minimum qualifications sponsored by the Air Force and conducted at in order to receive further consideration. the Personnel Laboratorv, Lackland Air Force As the next step in selection, each officer Base, Texas, have reported favorablv on the should be required to indicate whether or not validity of peer ratings in predicting later per- he desires to enter the management field. De- formance. The first study reported that ratings sire for selection is necessarv for a fully effec- by peers had been shown to be more valid than tive program and as a means to further limit either ratings by supervisors or references; that the group to be considered. the validity increased with the number of peer Personnel Tests. As the best means of re- ratings obtained; that they are one of the most ducing the sizable group under consideration consistent predictors of future job success; and and of efficiently eliminating those who do not that they had proved to be applicable at any possess a high degree of the desired qualifica- levei for any tvpe of group.-7 The second study, tions, personnel tests should be developed and completed two years later, used both Air Force administered. Sueh tests are commonly used officer candidates and sênior Air Force officers in management selection programs by industry. as subjects and found that “the pattems of There is general agreement that tests must be relationships between personality traits and designed on the basis of valid criteria and that officer performance were verv similar in both they should be “designed to supplement other groups.” They also found . . peer ratings on screening methods, not to replace them.”24 personality traits to be predictive of later per- SELECTION AND TRAIN1NC OF COMMANDERS 19

fomiance as second lieutenants in the case of At this point the evaluation devices should officer candidates, and to be related to con- be in the hands of the administrative authority, current but independent measures of officer who will make and announce the decisions on performance in the latter group.”28 the basis of an established schedule. During Peer ratings could be easilv and economi- this process the system must be responsive to cally obtained and should provide an additional several factors. The number selected must be useful device in evaluating the individual. based upon anticipated requirements, with a These ratings should also be evaluated and reasonable addition to cover expected attrition given appropriate weight in the final decision during the development phase. The back- to select or reject the applicant. grounds of those selected must be taken into Personal References. Personal references, account, to ensure the availability of the re- specifically related to the applicants qualifica- quired number of commanders of appropriate tions for management, should be provided by technical and professional competence. Follow- his unit commanders and supervisorv officers ing selection, the central authority will be di- who have personal knowledge of the applicants rectlv responsible for scheduling selected of- dutv performance. A form designed for this ficers for academic training and providing them specffic purpose would facilitate the fumishing in adequate numbers and appropriate areas for of these references to the selecting authority assignment to command positions. The author- for consideration. ity should also provide guidance as to the assignment policy to be applied to selected candidates when they are neither attending administration of the selection program schooLs nor occupying a command position. l ’p to now the selection process has been carried out in the field at very little cost or Training and Development trouble. However, in order to achieve its pur- pose, the new program must have a central, At regularly scheduled intervals, probably Air Force-wide authority. Decisions made by annuallv, the selection of a group of manage- this authority vvill affect the entire Air Force ment candidates would be announced. This and an officers total career. Therefore. although group should represent the highest basic man- all subordinate commands should have full agement qualffication available to the Air responsibility for implementing the program, Force. The system must be designed to take no selection authority should be delegated. The maximum advantage of the time available for administrative body should be a full-time or- the training and development of these potential ganization, not a committee or board meeting commanders. The same authorities who agree on occasion. Responsibility for all elements of that leadership and management ability are to the program—selection, training, etc.—should some extent inherent traits which cannot be be charged to the one central authority. The acquired through training or experience also management selection and development offi- agree on the necessity of providing a training cials should have constant access to advice and development process for those who possess from competent professionals of all disciplines the basic qualffications.20 Formal programs are that can contribute to the selection and devel- considered of increasing importance because opment process. And finally, decisions on the of the rapidly growing complexity facing mod- selection or rejection of individual applicants em managers. should result from a balanced consideration of Imagine any projection of recent trends all evaluation devices by a properly constituted you like and you are forced to the conclusion board of the highest qualffication. The deci- that the men who are shortly to exercise au- sions of the board should be considered final, thority in the direction of affairs must have a with reconsideration possible only in the most degree of knowledge, intellectual skill, and of exceptional cases and through an extremely competence exceeding anything we have re- high authority. garded as adequate heretofore.1" 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

That th is quotation is equallv true of future standards should be permanentlv eliminated military leadership is readily apparent.31 To from the program and the successful one con- meet this challenge, the objective of the train- sidered to have passed a significant milestone. ing and development program might well be: To provide a degree of knowledge, intellectual assignment policy skill, and competence adequate to ensure effec- tive Air Force leadership at the unit levei. Firm guidance in the form of a directed policy vvill ensure appropriate assignment and distribution of graduates. They should all re- academic training ceive assignments in vvhich they gain useful An academic program incorporating com- experience related to the type of command they prehensive courses on all elements of the are qualified to assume. The details of the Science of command management and leader- assignment policy vvould probably differ, for ship at unit levei should be provided by Air example, betvveen the officer scientist vvho vvill University. Entrv should be limited to selected eventuallv command a laboratory effort and the management candidates, and successful com- officer preparing for command of a logistic pletion of the course should be a requirement unit. In each instance the areas of authorized for retention in the program. The course should assignment for graduate management candi- include both a general phase, vvhich all man- dates must be firmlv defined. Certain minimum agement candidates vvould attend, and a spe- requirements for broadening experience vvould cialist phase to equip candidates for various probably increase the value of the program; for commands. instance, each candidate to have one year of In addition to the academic instruction to dutv at intermediate headquarters levei and be provided, the school should make fu 11 use a minimum of one year s experience in a posi- of the opportunity to establish the attitude of tion requiring the direct supervision of airmen. the individual toward management. “What is He should become familiar vvith a broad spec- needed is not a brilliant exposition by the trum of military activity, to leam the problems teacher, but a permanent change or at least at least and the ansvvers vvhen possible. The a development in the attitude of the student.”32 details of the assignment policy must be devel- And: “The development of an executive in- oped for each type of command and rigidly volves the changing of attitudes and the culti- complied vvith. Waivers from normal personnel vai ion of habits.”33 policies needed to allovv the officer to be shifted While attending leadership school, the stu- in accordance vvith the command assignment dent should be subjected to continued evalua- policy should be automatically granted. All tion. The school vvould provide the ideal place assignments vvould be to a duty responsibilitv, to conduct those types of evaluation vvhich are not merely for orientation. considered valuable but are too difficult or During this period a eommander vvould be expensive to complete in the field. Evaluation directlv responsible for the continued develop- validitv could be enhanced by both individual ment of those management candidates assigned and group intervievvs, for vvhich industry has to his jurisdiction. They vvill receive primary developed valid techniques.34 Since the inter- consideration on all useful additional duty vievvs are administered by professionals, they assignments, participate on boards and commit- could not easily be accomplished prior to se- tees, be made informed assistants in all man- lection. Additional peer ratings should be ob- agement matters, and be allowed to participate tained during this period and a professional regularly in such activities as commanders call, evaluation report on each student completed staff meetings, unit briefings, and planning by the faculty. councils. These activities vvould be accom- Academic and personal standards estab- plished in addition to normal assigned duties. lished for the commanders’ school should be Management candidates vvould be expected to extremelv high. A student not meeting these be the most willing and aggressive officers in SELECTION AND TRAININC OF COMMANDERS 21 the unit. High priority must be given to the tion policies must be removed and even present candidates’ development, the commander to rank requirements considered for modification. make the allowances necessary to ensure full Long tradition and certain advantages have led development. Since these officers will be regu- to the general requirement that the commander larly engaged in activities that may not be be the sênior officer of the unit. If the manage- within the responsibility of their duty super- ment field becomes a recognized specialtv and visor and their development is a particular only officers of this field are appointed to com- responsibility of command, the unit commander mand, reconsideration of that requirement may would initiate the effectiveness reports and in- be justified. In line with industry policies, it clude a mandatorv comment indicating the does not appear essential that the manager be commanders opinion of their capability to sênior to the technicians, the operators, or the assume command. supervisors. His authority should be based on Each management candidate would be legal appointment to command, not on senior- expected to make aggressive effort to advance ity. If removal of rank restrictions would im- his experience and capability. The Air Force prove management capability at unit levei, should provide an Information program aimed let us not hesitate to change that policy. All at keeping candidates interested and informed problems affecting the program must be re- conceming developments in the management solved by selecting the course of action that field. Any indication of a decline in interest or will best contribute to improved management performance effectiveness should bring an im- of the unit. mediate effort to help the officer overcome the Under this system, selection to command deficiency. If the officer does not react favor- would become an organized, orderly process. ably, a factual report would be made to the Departing commanders would be replaced on central authoritv, which would consider the a timely basis, even in emergencies, and alwavs officer for elimination or direct another action. with a qualified replacement. The intermediate In this manner those officers who successfullv commander will retain the authority to appoint, complete the program will be prepared for but the officer appointed will have been pre- command. viously selected and prepared by a centrally administered management selection system. One of the most vitiating factors of the selection to command current system is the reliance on individuais to As rapidly as officers selected under this select individuais on the basis of personal judg- program have reached a satisfactory levei of ment. Civilian authorities have long considered development, they shoidd be appointed to unit selection by this means to be the most ineffec- command positions. When they are available in tive of all systems. To quote one early writer sufficient numbers to meet requirements, unit on the subject: command positions should be assigned only to Many Corporation executives and others in officers who have successfullv completed all positions of power are irrational in their atti- requirements of the selection system. This will tude toward the selection of men to fill impor- require that production of candidates be pro- tant posts. They operate by their own systems gramed to meet or exceed the total demand. of dead reckoning; they are unobjective, even Distribution must consistently provide the can- careless. They follow dark counsels from the didate to the needing command in advance of depths of their own subconscious, without the the requirement. slightest suspicion they are doing so.35 To allow the system to achieve optimum A military writer, after researching the subject, results will require elimination of the previ- makes this conclusion: “Selection on a purely ously discussed limitations on command ap- personal basis is the worst method for evalu- pointments, including a blanket waiver from ating potential leaders.”3,í Personal selection, normal personnel assignment policies. All re- along with such practices as automatic succes- strictions which interfere with optimum selec- sion and selection by reference to effectiveness 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

reports alone, is ineíficient and cannot be ex- T his AjmcLE has presented an organized ap- pected to provide effective leadership in a proach to the problem of selecting, training, modem military force. and developing leadership. If accepted, scien- With these and all other factors considered, tific selection and organized development a definite timetable of selection actions should systems will replace the current practice of be established. To hasten the availability of personal selection and haphazard development. qualified candidates for command assignment, The direct result would be increased effective- the program should perhaps initially be open ness in the management of Air Force units. to a wider age group than would be desirable I3th Fighter Interceptor Squadron permanently.

Notes 1. “Rank and Command Synonymous with Responsibility,” 20. “Final Report—Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of The Inspector General Brief, XV, 3 (1 February 1963), 3. Military Service as a Career that Will Attract and Retain Capa- 2. Oron P. South, "The Impact of Advanced Science and ble Career Personnel,” Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary Technology on Air Force Command,” Instructors Journal, I, 1 of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) (The Womble Report), (July 1963), 37-38. 30 October 1953, pp. 3-4. 3. “Leadership in the Air Force,” Squadron Officer School 21. Dooher and Marting, p. 17. Residence Course Manual SOS-2 ( Maxwell Air Force Base, 22. Ibid., pp. 18-23. Alabama: Air University, October Í961), 29. Hereafter cited 23. South, “New Dimensions of Leadership,” p. 7. as SOS-2. 24. Dooher and Marting, pp. 430-43. 4. “Leadership Training for Air Force ROTC Cadets,” 25. F. J. Gaudet and A. R. Carli, “Why Executives Fail,” Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps Manual 50-1 ( Maxwell Personnel Psychology, X, 1 (Spring 1957), 13-21. AFB: Air University, 1 November 1963), 1-3. Hereafter cited 26. General Thomas D. White, “General White Calls for as AFROTCM 50-1. Realistic, Honest Appraisal of Officers,” Army, Navy, Air Force 5. SOS-2, p. 4. Journal, 13 August Í960, p. 11. Also see Dooher and Marting, 6. "The Management Process,” Air Force Manual 25-1, p. 36. See also Edwin E. Ghiselli and Clarence W. Brown, 1 September 1954, p. 80. Hereafter cited as AFM 25-1. Personnel and Industrial Psychology (New York: McGraw-HiU 7. “Officer Career Development," Air Force Regulation Book Company, 1955), p. 95. 36-23, 8 May 1963, p. 2. Hereafter cited as AFR 36-23. 27. Robert J. Wherry, Norman E. Stander, and John J. 8. AFM 25-1, p. 3. Hopkins, “Behaviour Trait Ratings by Peers and References,” 9. "Career Planning for Army Officers,” Department of a personnel study conducted at the Personnel Laboratory, Lack- Army Pamphlet No. 600-3, 15 October 1956, p. 7. land Air Force Base, Texas, for the Wright Air Development 10. AFR 36-23, pp. 2-3. Center, December 1959, p. 1. 11. “United States Air Force Statistical Digest,” (Wash- 28. Emest C. Tupes and Raymond E. Christal, “Recurrent ington, D. C., Headquarters United States Air Force, Fiscal Year Personality Factors Based on Trait Ratings,” Lackland Air Force 1962), p. 293. Base, Texas, Personnel Laboratory, Aeronautical Systems Divi- 12. “The Commanders Call—The Leader Talks to His sion, Air Force Systems Command, May 1961, p. 1. Men,” Air Force Pamphlet 190-1-17, 23 August 1962, p. 1. 29. Norman Fisher, “The Making of a Manager,” Per- 13. Major George C. Cannon, Jr., USAF, “One Viewpoint sonnel, American Management Association, XXXVIII, 5 on Command,” Air University Quarterly Reoiew, XIV, 3 (Sum- (September-October 1961), 12-13. Also Emest C. Arbuckle, mer 1963), 30-31. “Tomorrow’s Manager,” Vital Speeches of the Day, XXVII, 1 14. Oron P. South. “New Dimensions of Leadership,” (15 October 1960), 26. prepared for the Office of the Permanent Secretariat, Air Force 30. Arbuckle, p. 26. Educational Requirements Board, Air University, Maxwell AFB, 31. South, “The Impact of Advanced Science and Tech- Ala., p. 6. nology on Air Force Command,” pp. 26-41. 15. M. Joseph Dooher and Elizabeth Marting, editors, 32. Fisher, p. 14. Selection of Management Personnel (New York: American 33. J. J. Corson, “Management in the ’60’s: Training Management Association, 1957), I, 27. Leaders,” Nation’s Business, XLVII, 12 (December 1959), 50. 16. AFR 36-23, p. 2. 34. Dooher and Marting, p. 23 (as a generally accepted 17. Officer Career Management Program presentation at practice); pp. 279-86 (the group, or oral interview and the oral the Officers Career Motivation Congress, Andrews Air Force performance test); and p. 483 (the intensive interview). Base, Maryland, 15-19 January 1962. As reported in Attachment 35. Management News, October 1950, p. 2. 1 to Department of the Air Force letter, subject: "Officer Career 36. Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Schweiger, Jr., “Obli- Management Program,” 19 February 1962, p. 3. gations of Leadership,” Air War College Thesis No. ECS-23, 18. lbid., p. 4. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University Library, 1960, 19. Cannon, p. 29. p. 67. WANTED: College graduates preferably with Science or engineering degrees. Age 19-30. Eager to work a minimum of eight hours per day with frequent overtime (payable in psychic income or job satisfaction). W ill- ing to move a minimum of once every four years (with notice) or more frequent- ly (with little or no notice) anywhere in the U.S. or overseas. Good possibility of defense of nationals of other countries at personal risk. Slow promotions in com- parison to major competitors. Limited choice of job assignment. Unlimited op- portunity for advancement and responsi- bility (subject to fluctuating quotas) with- in a hierarchical structure based on seniority.

J

A NEW ASSESSMENT OF COMMANDER EFFECTIVENESS?

Captain Lyl e D. Kaapke and L ieu t en a n t Colonel Ray W. Alvord

HE AD above is not a very subtle attempt to describe the negative aspects of an Air Force career. Obviously, no one would write such an ad, with its T incongruities and understatements, truths and half-truths. Nor is the appeal for applicants nearly as negative as it could have been. Brigadier General William W. Berg, usaf, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Military Personnel Policy), Department of Defense, has opened a whole new approach to the negative aspects inherent in 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

a military career under the unique title “fringe nothing of a “war” in Viet Nam, where men liabilities." HLs list of liabilities includes: no die the same whether their service is entitled established workday or workweek, high physi- military assistance or not—these things all serve cal standards, job instability and erosion of to degrade the attractiveness of an Air Force family life, restrictions on freedom, hazardous career. Some minor or more mundane (unless occupation, selection up or out, two-career life- you are affected) irritants still exist to stimulate time, marginal living conditions, and duplicate negative attitudes: the requirement for a bac- wardrobe.1 calaureate degree, the struggle (nervous antici- The purpose of this article, however, is pation or anxiety might be more appropriate) not to decry the loss of officer prestige and for a regular commission, and even the per- status as the source of the retention problems ceived impersonal threat of an unfeeling Com- that the Air Force has experienced. The litera- puter selecting one’s next assignment from the ture is becoming saturated vvith articles of Uniform Officer Record. maudlin military self-pity in the stvle of “Pau- The question of retention or career moti- pers in Uniform” and “VVe Treat Our Military vation at this point might seem rhetorical, for Shabbily.” Even respected civilian advisers the negative factors seem convincing. Usually have accepted the “swan song” of a supposedly something meaningless but sounding very in- lackluster profession and accentuated and pub- tellectual, playing up the use of popular key licized it. A recent report of the Air Training words, is interjected at this point. For example: Command Advisory Board asserted: "The escalation of personnel problems in the College undergraduates, and members of last decade has magnified the problem of re- society as a whole, no longer consider military tention to the point where it is a manifestation eareers as significant and challenging profes- of the attitudes of the larger American culture sions. The stature of the officer has diminished, impinging on the military sub-culture.” The the glamour of flying has faded, and the horrors simple uncluttered truth is that 45% of all offi- of modem warfare generate similar reactions cers serving a first tour remain beyond their against anything military. These attitudes are ohligated service date (i.e., beyond the date of strongest on college campuses.2 completion of the originally obligated tour plus Instead of commiserating, we shall pose any additional service commitments because of some vital questions. What factors stimulate training or educational programs). This state- officers to séek a career in the Air Force? What ment does not say that 45% of all ineoming action can a commander take to stimulate his officers ultimately choose a career in the Air best junior officers to seek career status? And, Force but does indicate that 45% are sufficiently ultimately, what is the Air Forces responsibilitv motivated or interested to stav beyond the date to its members to create the type of occupa- upon which they might leave. This is truly tional environment in which positive career amazing considering that what has really esca- stimulus factors really exist? lated is our ability to devise and verbalize an In the attempt to outline the negative ca- apparently unlimited number of negative ca- reer aspects adequately without slighting their reer factors—not that problems do not exist; importanee, one must consider the following we are just becoming more adept at verbalizing factors. Attacks on fringe benefits, adverse them. decisions on overpayments and dislocation al- The question is not vvhy we cannot attract lowances, loss of combat pay resulting from more career officers but how are we able to capture by the enemy, loss of equity in housing attract 45% despite all the negative factors op- because of the closing of bases, low promotion erating in the situation? What could possibly quotas and continuation policies, the persistent account for this unexpected result? Part of the battle for a decent wage (with ochous compari- favorable effect is due to a new approach sons to civil servants), flying requirements and to the entire problem of career motivation— evaluations, budget limitations, certain mission participation. Since World War II, when Lewin, requirements and planning problems, to say a psvchologist, reported the great superiority NEW ASSESSMENT OF COM MAN D Eli EFFECTIVENESS? 25

of discussion over Iecture in changing attitudes, partícipation of junior officers in the study of it has been accepted that involvement or partic- career problems through the use of the advisory ipation has manv favorable effects in changing degree of partícipation. This idea is not entirely attitudes. Junior officers are being encouraged original, as Headquarters usaf has recently to participate in the discussion and solution of changed the mission of one of its units from career motivation problems. Commanders are the statistical chore of keeping track of various stimulating partícipation through such pro- figures on retention to that of a career motiva- grams as Junior Officer Councils, Career Moti- tion group to determine the effect of various vation Congresses, and various surveys and policies and directives upon the motivation and discussion groups. The concept of partícipation status of the officer corps. Headquarters is in is somewhat difficult to incorporate into a mili- effect stimulating partícipation to evaluate the tarv organization where discipline and mission motivational impact of its own policies and accomplishment are primary. However, the directives! concept has been shown to be effective as used Although partícipation appears to be worth- in the area of career motivation. Partícipation, while and effective in its impact upon favorable to be an effective technique, must have action career attitudes, only limited numbers of of- or follow-up so that suggestions are acted upon ficers can take part, and a complete evaluation rather than forgotten. Individuais rapidlv be- of the technique is difficult because of the come disenchanted if thev find that there is multiplicity of influences, both positive and muc-h discussion and suggestion but no action negative, which occur simultaneously. Also, the taken as a result of their partícipation. Any fact that the Air Force is retaining 45% of all commander who introduces and encourages officers bevond their obligated Service date partícipation of junior officers in evaluation of does not mean that those retained are the most the effect of local policies on career motivation highly qualified officers in the total group. Any is obligated to take some action on their sug- evaluation of the retention or career motivation gestions. Commanders who feel threatened by program would necessarily have to contain in- the thought of junior officers’ evaluating their formation regarding the quality as well as the policies and the commanders’ resulting obliga- quantity of the officer group retained. It might tion to act on their suggestions forget that par- appear that the quality question eould be read- ticipation mav have degrees or leveis. Keith ilv answered, but as vet no ultimate criterion Davis writing in Management Reciew points exists to measure it. However, various estimates out that there are three degrees of partícipation: of the future needs of the Air Force for Science and engineering officers exceed the number The first is the mutual-understanding de- presently electing to make the Air Force a gree, and its purpose is to help all members career. understand each other s functions and attitudes so that they will develop better teamwork. There are many changes in various indexes They become more self-involved. more Crea- which seem, overall, to indicate a broad posi- tive, and more responsible members. The ad- tive effect of the total factors operating toward visory degree is built upon the mutual-under- a career (one of which is the 45% figure used standing degree, because members are hardly in the article). One indicator used in the past ready to give sound advice until they under- to estimate positive influence was the total num- stand the situation. In advisory partícipation an ber electing career reserve or regular status. individual can help make decisions and ofFer These changes in status are rapidly losing their Creative suggestions, but he laeks authoritv to predictive nature in vievv of the ease of rever- apply his ideas. The leader finally decides the sal. The number of resignations has increased course of action after giving suitable weight to ideas of partieipants. The authoritative degree as the total number of regular officers has in- of partícipation actually gives the group a de- creased, so that the number electing regular gree of power to effect its decision.4 status cannot be considered as other than an intermediate indication of career intent. The The local commander can easily encourage use of a regular commission as a hedge against 26 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW

future plans is accepted bv many as a fact of Have prestige or social status Air Force life. The question of quality reiriains Keep very busy largely unanswered, although it appears that Achieve leadership in my field. our supply does not match our requirements Conspicuous by its absence was any signif- in certain criticai areas such as Science and icant reference to pay as a major stimulus in engineering. career choice. If pay is basically or minimally The Air Force Systems Command lias re- satisfactory, other incentives such as job ac- cently announced that its retention goal is 45% complishment and career opportunity become of all Science and engineering officers. How much more important. The commander can do can it be done? Evidence suggests that this little to effect immediate changes in pay or in goal is not at all unrealistic; but how can com- rank, but he can and must do much to stimu- mands—and, more correctly, connnanders ex- late those below him to feel a sense of worth ercising commandership rather than just man- and accomplishment in what they do. Although agership—stimulate even greater numbers of there has been much interest and stimulation selected, career-oriented, young officers to seek from the highest levei commanders to increase career status than vve are at present experienc- retention, there is evidence that commanders ing? There are many methods which are, most generally in contact with officers serving unlike participation, beyond the control of the initial tours have not been equally effective in commander. A vital key seems to be through stimulating junior officers to seek careers. Some greater appeal to job opportunity and job of the most highly qualified and desirable accomplishment. junior officers receive little if any career guid- The authors conducted and analyzed a ance by supervisors or commanders at the survey of the career attitudes of 5000 young local levei. Because of the intense high-level officers with limited commissioned Service.-' interest, such as that mentioned regarding The analysis of the survey was exceedingly Science and engineering officers in the Air complex, although it did not bv any means Force Systems Command, methods are being answer all questions of individual career moti- developed for assessing the abilitv of com- vation or intent. One scale that seemed to oífer manders to stimulate and retain key junior valid and meaningful information on career officers. motivation concemed the importance and pos- Industry has long accepted as one of a sibility of achieving certain rewards or incen- supervisor s tasks that of counseling and guid- tives in the Air Force. Career and noncareer ing the careers of subordinates so that they officer groups alike considered many of the are aware of the interest and plans of manage- rewards to be important, but the disparities ment for their future utilization. The great occurred in the perception by thcse groups of numbers of officers commissioned eacii year the possibility of achieving the rewards as part sinee the Korean War have satisfied the Air of an Air Force career. Career officers per- Forces requirements well, despite a great tum- ceived a much greater possibility of achieving over in personnel. The emphasis today, how- the follovving incentives or conditions in the ever, is retention not onlv of a desirable quan- Air Force: titv but also of highly qualified officers, despite Consistent and intelligent personnel all the difficulties involved. One cannot deny policies that the present rate of retention is better Have a feeling of accomplishment than one might reasonably expect, although it Be in a competitive situation is not sufficiently high to allow as wide a choice Be promoted on the basis of abilitv of career officers as is desired. Although com- Advance at a fairlv rapid rate mand efforts have been made and some base- Have competent supervisors level commanders have stimulated career study Be given recognition for work well done participation of junior officers. many junior Do work of which my wife and familv officers still do not receive the career guidance can be proud or stimulation necessarv to initiate positive NEW ASSESSMENT OF COMMANDER EFFECTIVENESSJ 27 career attitudes. Junior officers, if the salarv is puse. It does seem to be within the capacity ol perceived as minimally adequate, are influ- the Air Force, however, to provide for and to enced more bv the possibility of achieving emphasize promotion on the basis of ability, promotion on ability (or job opportunitv) in work of which one’s family can be proud, and arriving at a career choice than bv other factors similar aspects of its officers’ occupation. beyond the scope of the Air Force to supply. Finallv, the Air Force through its com- In the future commanders vvill therefore be manders must work to devise and improve a evaluated more on their ability to retain need- personnel planning system which will provide ed junior officers in career status than they greater opportunitv on the basis of ability and have previously been. personnel policies which will be viewed as The key to retention, from both a qualita- consistent and intelligent by the officer force. tive and quantitative point of view, lies in the Participation without subsequent action must ability of the Air Force and everv career offi- not result; in other words, action to improve cer in the Air Force to convince junior officers personnel planning, not publicity or indoctrina- that the job incentives and rewards they want tion, is needed. The final result of the effort can be found in the Air Force. The objective, described—to provide an occupational environ- then, must be for every officer to develop the ment conducive to choosing the Air Force as a occupational environment which makes these career—will be a selective, strong, responsive, incentives a minimum goal. W e can anticipate and future-oriented Air Force. little outside assistance in achieving this pur- 6570th Personnel Research Lahoratory

Notes Leadership 1943, ed. Dr. Robert R. Leeper (Washington, D.C.: 1. "Berg Lists the 'Bad’ of Service Life.” Air Force Times, National Education Association, Vol. I, 1944), pp. 195-200. 17 March 1965. 4. K. Davis, “Management by Participation,” Management 2. Tenth Report of the Air Training Command Advisory Re view, Vol. 46, No. 2 ( Februarv 1907), pp. 69-79. Board, ffq ATC, Randolph AFB, Texas, March 1965, p. 15. 5. L. Kuapke, E. Tupes, and R. Alvord. "A Multiple-Liriear 3. K. Lewin, “The Dynamics of Group Action,” Education Regression Analysis of Officer Career Attitudes,” in press.

The Air University Reriew announces with regrei that M ajor Philip E. Neale, Jr., author of “The VTOL Flipht-Test Challenge” which appeared in the September-October 1965 issue of the Re view, was killed in France on 8 September 1965 while running a USAF evalua- tion of lhe Dassault Balzac V-001 VTOL jet-lift research aircraft. Military Affairs Abroad

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROKAF AS A MATURE INSTRUMENT OF PEACE

M ajor Gen er a l Chanc, C hi Rya n g Vice Chief of Staff, ROKAF

HE Republic of Korea Air Force ( rokaf) On 1 October 1949 the Republic of Korea Air Trecently celebrated its fifteenth anniversary Force was officially created when the Air Base as an independent air force. Since its inception in Command was separated from the Korean Army. 1949, rokaf has grown and developed into a mod- On 14 May 1950, shortly before the outbreak of em and powerful tactical organization, a sophisti- the Korean War, rokaf purchased 10 T-6 trainers cated air arm primarily concerned vvith maintaining from Canada with donations from the Korean popu- a combat-ready capability. Its story is an impres- lace. These aircraft were nicknamed “Keon Kook sive one, highlighted by a eolorful history and Ho,” which means “Founding of the Nation.” meaningful growth and evolution. When the North Korean Communists launched After the conclusion of World War II, seven their attack on 25 June 1950, the fledgling rokaf Korean aviators returned from abroad and without any fighter aircraft was seriouslv handi- prompted the establishment of an air force. As the capped. Through the early days of conflict rokaf initial cadre in the creation of this air arm, these pilots displayed unusual courage in weakening the sênior aviators entered the Korean Army Infantry invasion forces. They flew unarmed aircraft on School on 1 April 1948. They were assigned to the reconnaissance missions and dropped homemade Army Air Corps, which vvas renamed the Army Air bombs by hand on advancing Communist forces. Base Command three months later. The historie It was in the midst of such national crisis that rokaf beginning of flight training began on 15 September was suppüed with 10 F-51 Mustang fighter aircraft 1948 when 10 L-4 and 10 L-5 aircraft were intro- from the United States. duced to the command, which at that time con- In July 1950 these Mustangs were ferried from sisted of a flying training unit and a flying base unit. Japan to Korea. Major Dean E. Hess, now Colonel, MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 29 vvith 4 officers and 100 airmen arrived shortly 30 eombat pilots were sent to the U.S. lor jet tran- thereafter. They formed an organization called the sition training as a first step in the modernization 6146th Air Base Unit, whieh was given the primary program. In late 1954 rokaf personnel were dis- mission of training rokaf pilots in the use of F-51's. patched to the U.S. and Japan for radar operation Many rokaf pilots flew eombat missions with only and jet maintenance training, and in December of three days of famiharization training at Itazuke ab, the same year jet transition training was trans- Japan. During tlie three years of hostilities rokaf ferred to rokaf along with 10 T-33 trainer aircraft. flew more than 8000 sorties, and their distinguished This led to the formation of the 5th Composite record drew numerous praises from other member Wing, followed elosely by activation of the Air nations of the United Nations forces. Thirty-nine Communications Wing, whieh integrated all Com- rokaf pilots were credited with more than 100 munications activities. In 1956 rokaf formed its missions each. By July 1953 the rokaf aircraft first jet fighter wing, the lOth, followed shortly by inventory had grown to 80 F-51's, whieh formed establishment of the Technieal Training Wing. In the lOth Fighter Wing, and over 14,000 personnel. February 1957 all F-51 ’s were released from active On 27 July 1953, after many months of armi- Service when a squadron of F-86F’s arrived and stice negotiations, a trucewas signed at Panmunjom were added to the inventory. In July of the same between the North Korean Communists and the year the aircraft maintenance and supply depots United Nations. Under the armistice agreement were established. In 1958 the usaf transferred \orth and South Korea are separated by a neutral complete control of the aircraft control and warning zone or “no-man’s land” called the Demilitarized ( acwJ system to rokaf, and the 1 lth Fighter Wing Zone (dmz), whieh bisects the Korean peninsula was established as more F-86’s arrived. Finally, on north of the 38th parallel. In the exact center of the 1 September 1964, the lst Fighter Wing was estab- dmz is a demarcation line. Forces of both sides lished. (See rokaf organizational chart of 1 Sep- were withdrawn 114 miles from this line and are tember 1964.) there today. The Communists, in violation of the armistice present ROKAF organization agreement, have continually strengthened their forces with modem weapons and pose a constant Within the govemment framework, rokaf threat from their side of the dmz. T o meet this comes directly under control of the rok Ministry of threat, U.N. forces also equipped themselves with National Defense. Operationally, however, rokaf modem weaponry. The armistice agreement is still is subordinate to the Commander, Air Forces actively debated and enforced by members of the Korea, who is also the Commander, usaf 314th Air United Nations Command Nlilitary Armistice Com- Division. The Commander afk is, in tum, sub- mission (uncmac), whieh has its headquarters in ordinate to the Commander in Chief, United Na- Panmunjom. Nearly 500 armistice meetings have tions Command. been held at Panmunjom between the Commission rokaf is intemally broken down into a head- and Communist representatives of the Korean quarters and subordinate units, whieh are divided Peoples Army (kpa ) and the Chinese Peoples Vol- into tactical and support divisions, the latter in- unteers ( cpv). cluding logistics, training, Communications, and With the war over and the nation divided and medicai organizations. The tactical fighter wings vastly damaged, rokaf tumed its attention to a are struetured almost identieallv along the lines program of expansion, education, and modemiza- used by usaf Tactical Air Command wings. tion. Its major goal was the development of a jet tactical air force. With this high objective, budget- mission and fnnetions ary limitations became a primary consideration. Authorities in the Korean govemment and the Basically, rokaf has a sixfold mission, to pro- United States, under the Military Assistance Pro- vide air defense, tactical operations, reconnaissance, gram ( ma pJ, soon agreed to support rokat's goal airlift for ground and air forces, air rescue, and air of upgraded and modem weaponry and the con- traffic control. The primary mission is air defense. current training required. On 15 September 1954, Within this mission, all bases with jet aircraft 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW maintain a constant 24-hour alert posture. highly dispersed force; and (5) to maintain a highly In order to accomplish its missions, rokaf efBcient and flexible acw complex. must successfully perform five basic functions: (1) to provide command and administration at an air North Korean Air Force force levei; (2) to plan and conduct the operation of a tactieal air force which includes tactical day- Some basic information on the Communist fighter, all-vveather interceptor, reconnaissance, North Korean Air Force may prove beneficiai in transport, and rescue aircraft; (3) to conduct both our later discussion and interpretation of the cur- technical and flying training; (4) to maintain a rent status of the Republic of Korea Air Force. logistical complex which will support a small but The nkaf has a current aircraft strength of

One of ROKAF’s carlij aircraft, the L-5

F-51 Mustangs assembling in formation during the Korean War MILITARY AFFAIRS ARROAD 31

approximately 700, divided into jet fighter divi- Officers are classified into over 20 different career sions, a jet bomber regirnent, a jet reconnaissance fields, including seven direct combat support cate- bomber regirnent, and other support flying units. gories such as aircraft maintenance, Communica- Included are about 500 Mig-15’s and Mig-17’s, a tions and electronics, and radar control and small number of supersonie fighters, less than 100 maintenance. There are approximately 10 miscel- 11-28 t\vin-jet light bombers, and approximately laneous support specialties for officers, including 100 miscellaneous support-mission aircraft inelud- personnel, administrative Services, comptroller, ing jet trainers. and supply. About 20 air bases, including more than 10 Airmen and nco personnel are grouped into capable of eonducting combat operations, several more than 36 afsc’s , which are divided into two reserve bases, and a few civil airports, are main- general functions, technical support and general tained. Of a total manpower strength of roughly Services. Personnel in the tech support function over 30,000 personnel, more than 1000 are combat are assigned as specialists in such fields as aircraft pilots. The xka f air control and waming netvvork maintenance, armament, Communications, radar consists of its master control center, a local control operations and maintenance, weather Service, etc. center, early waming/interceptor control sites, General Services enlisted men are assigned to per- division control centers at fighter division head- sonnel, administrative Services, supply, etc. quarters levei, and surveillance and early-warning The minimum Service commitment for officers sites generally deployed along the North Korean and nco’s is four years; airmen are enlisted for coastline. three-year periods with ample opportunity for re- enlistment. In certain instances officers and nco’s can voluntarily extend their Service commitment ROKAF manpower by ten years, but they must have served a minimum rokaf maintains a total manpower strength of four years and must express career desire before of more than 20,000 active duty personnel, includ- becoming eligible for th is career type of program. ing more than 500 combat pilots and 3000 other rokaf personnel are recompensed under the officers. Of about 20,000 enlisted personnel, the same pay scale used for all rok armed Services. ratio of airmen to nco’s is almost two to one. Compared with military pay scales of the U.S. and

ROKAF Orgcmization Hq ROKAF

Air Command ond Sfaff College

Flying Troining Technical Troining Hq Combat Air Materiel Air Communications School Wing Air Command Depot Wing

tactical miscellaneous Fighter wings support units I------32 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

other Western countries, rok military salaries are and all fighter squadrons maintain a combat-ready exceedingly low, especially in the enlisted ranks. posture. In addition, fighter and flying training All enlisted personnel belovv the rank of stafF ser- squadrons maintain combat-ready capabilities, and geant receive subsistence, quarters, and uniform even the T-28 squadron is prepared for a secondary issue. “mosquito mission” if necessary. Flight pay is divided into three categories: These fighter wings are organized according jet aircraft pilot, propeller aircraft pilot, and light to the same principies as usaf tactieal wings, in- aircraft pilot or other erew member. A captain fly- cluding their strueture and mission. Tactieal squad- ing F-86’s receives $17 flight pay each month; if rons are annually tested in joint usaf/rokaf air he flies a C-46 he veeeives $13, and if he flies an defense exercises. Rapid progress was displayed in L-4 or is a C-46 erew member he is compensated with the equivalent of $6 monthly. A stafF sergeant erew member reeeives $3 flight pay monthly. Mission

ROKAF bases and aircraft

Currently rokaf operates several modem jet bases, and an additional one is nearing completion. A few reserve bases with expansion capabilities and several airfields capable of limited combat opera- tions supplement them. These faeilities are pri- marily maintained for rokafs tactieal forces; how- ever, they will play an important role in the event U.S. air units should have to respond to resumption of hostilities. The bases are also used for combat cargo and troop carrier operations. rokaf is presentlv equipped with the follow- ing types of aircraft, purchased and supported by the Military Assistance Program ( ma p): F-86F’s, F-86D’s, RF-86F’s, T-33’s. C-46D’s, and H-19’s. In the spring of 1965 a new fighter aircraft, the F-5A, was added to the inventory. The F-5 is a versatile, twin-engine, supersonic jet fighter sup- plied through the ma p to Korea and other countries participating with the U.S. in the Mutual Security Program. The present F-86 squadrons, organized into several fighter wings, are outnumbered ap- proximately three to one by the North Korean Air Force. tactieal operations ROKAF controllers at ACW site The rokaf fighter wings, consisting of about three squadrons each, the acw Wing, the Air Transport Group, the Tactieal Reconnaissance Squadron, and a rescue squadron comprise the Combat Air Command located at usaf’s Osan Air Base. This command exercises operational control over all elements in the tactieal complex. rokaf follows the dispersai principie wherever possible, MIL1TARY AFFA1RS ABROAD 33

1964 as rokaf interceptor pilots registered an 81 at times dropped lower than 75 percent because of percent rate of effective neutralization (kill rate) as limited supply of F-86 parts and accessories. Many opposed to a 62 percent rate in 1963. F-86 parts are in limited production in the U.S., and a few are out of production, making necessary in-countrv fabrication of parts. aircraft in-commission and accident rates The aircraft accident rate (number of accidents During 1964 rokaf constantly maintained an per 100,000 flying hours) for rokaf is perhaps the aircraft in-commission rate above 75 percent. This best index to their improved flying proficiency. figure represents an average for all jet and prop air- From the 1958 and 1959 rates of 40 and 46 respec- craft in the inventory. The rate for jet aircraft has tively, the rate was drastically reduced to an all- 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

time low of 8.2 in 1962 and leveled off at 15.2 and subjeet of employment of air power and is responsi- 11.5 during 1963 and 1964. This sharp improve- ble for the rokaf Central Library. ment can be directly attributed to the increased attention devoted to flying safety through intensive logistics and effective implementation of safety policies. rokafs ontstanding record of flying safety im- In 1961 the rokaf aircraft maintenance depot provement is even more notable in that total flying and the supply depot were Consolidated to form the time has steadily increased since 1958. Air Materiel Depot ( amd), located at one of rokaf’s bases in the south. This relocation to a modem and education and training complete facilitv resulted in considerable savings in manpower and overhead. It also provided rokaf The education and training program within with a depot organization paralleling the traditional rokaf is implemented to maintain the highest usaf organization, but on a much smaller scale. degree of combat readiness possible. Within the The amd is one of the most modern and com- organizational framework there are three areas of plete in the Far East and in addition to performing concentration: the Air Technical Training Wing, maintenance on aircraft and equipment is the stor- which also includes basic military training, the age point for over 77,000 hne items. Highly trained Air Force Academy, and the Command and Staff mechanics at this facilitv have the capability of College. Courses are effectively conducted at these completely overhauling a variety of aircraft from institutions vvith the help of usaf manuais and cur- L-19’s and C-46’s to the F-86 series. The repair riculum guides. Most instructors have become capabilities are so complete that U.S. armed forces qualified through instructor courses given within aircraft and helicopters are contracted to the depot the Pacific Air Force or in the U.S. for maintenance. During 1964 the depot reached Perhaps the most Progressive military educa- a major goal in establishing the capability for major tion programs in the Far East are conducted at the aircraft modification. Republic of Korea’s Air Force Academy and Com- Supply activities within rokaf are rapidly ap- marid and Staff College. The mission of the Acade- proaching self-sufficiency. In spite of inadequate my is to provide each cadet with the knowledge, storage facilities at most installations, a well- character, and physical strength essential to his Progressive development as a career officer and future air commander. To accomplish its mission, the Academy’s organizational structure and curric- ulum are patterned very closely after those of the Since introduction of F-5 aircraft into the ROKAF on 30 April 1965, USAF pilots are usaf Academy. Cadets pursue a four-year curricu- assisting in transition training at Suivon lum leading to a B.S. degree and a commission as AB, Korea. The F-5 is replacing the F-86. a second lieutenant in rokaf. There is no flying training in the curriculum; hovvever, each cadet receives ten hours of familiarization flying. Sixty- ROKAF Academy cadets five percent of all Academy courses are academic in parade review formation in nature, featuring the humanities, social Sciences, basic Sciences, and applied Sciences. The airman- ship program makes up the remaining 35 percent, with stress placed upon military studies and physi- cal education. The Command and Staff College, although located on the Academy campus, is a separate en- tity. It consists of the Command and Staff Course, Squadron Officers Course, Air Cround Operations School, and Forward Air Controller School. The college conducts limited research on the general MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 35 organized system is established for requisitioning, mum safety and timelv response to enemy attack. receiving, transporting, and distributing supplies. rokaf is an integral part of Far East air defense. Supply procedures are guided closely by pattems rokaf acw sites are scattered throughout the set forth in usaf manuais and standards of inspec- península and on offshore islands. This radar net- tion. A transceiver system now in operation enables work is capable of early warning and is constantly the amd to requisition via telephone directly to the used in ground-controlled interception exercises. usaf depot in Sacramento, Califórnia. All tactical fighter aircraft are controlled by a mas- ter direction center, and the battle staff of the Air Defense Control Center Controls all air defense aircraft control and warning system units in Korea vvithin the established mies of en- As noted earlier, the first and most important gagement. In addition, an air operations center mission of rokaf is air defense. The rokaf acw directs rokaf counterair and interdiction opera- net must function perfectlv in conjunction with tions and also Controls such missions as close air other defense agencies in the Pacific area for maxi- support, aerial reconnaissance, and air rescue. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Communications logical training building containing a rapid-decom- pression high-altitude chamber. rokafs tactical Communications complex pres- Today rokaf possesses an alert, modern, and ently consists of vh f radio relays operated and maintained by the Eighth U.S. Anny and a few Progressive tactical force—a force which has been troposcatter links and microwave links operated developed despite insufficiencies in budget appro- príations received and scarcity of natural resources; and maintained by hokaf. The first tropo links and a force which is constantly prepared to meet a foe microwave links were completed and tumed over that far outnumbers it both in size and firepower. to hokaf in December 1963, and the last link was rokaf’s success in developing this sophisticated air completed and tumed over in July 1964; however, arm would not have been possible without advice technical advice and assistance in operation and and assistance provided by the 6146th Air Force maintenance are being provided by the usaf Ad- Advisory Group and material and financial support visory Group and ma p. provided by the Militarv Assistance Program of Concurrent with construction and activation the United States. However, rokaf s most stable of new radar sites programed, additional tropo- and cohesive force has been the spirit of its mem- scatter and microwave Communications will be provided in the near future. These additional links bers, intensified by the omnipresent lessons learned from the Korean War. These lessons are rokaf’s will provide a completely integrated acw point-to- point Communications system. It will be operated heritage, but most members view them as an endowment. and maintained by rokaf, and only one small link will remain on the Eighth U.S. Armys microwave system. lessons learned from the Korean War

The Korean War provided rokaf many 1964: a long step forward practical lessons on basic air force doctrine, organ-

During the calendar year 1964 rokaf made ization, combat procedures, and techniques of many notable advancements. Among the most im- management. It also evoked these two emotional, portant were the establislnnent of a new tactical although vital, axioms: fighter wing and the assumption of operational • Patriotism, passion, and honor of airman- responsibility for a complete troposcatter Communi- ship can overcome inadequate equipment, facili- cations system. ties, and salaries. Through an upgraded and more highlv di- • Pride and determination can be the in- versified training program, rokaf developed in- fluencing forces when the call of duty requires a country training in highly sophisticated and twofold mission of flying combat and training technical fields. For example, rokaf now possesses sorties concurrently. the capability to train personnel for positions in its new Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory Finally, there are two principies that have deeply permeated the attitude of all rokaf ( pm e l ). Previous to 1964 all electronics personnel personnel: were trained at usaf bases in Japan. The year 1964 also marked completion of • At all times we must seek to apply basic several long-planned-for facilities: a $4.5-million usaf doctrines, which are bom of experience, to the runway constructed at an air base in the Southern operation and management of rokaf. with appro- part of the country; a $2.3-million runway at an air priate modification as circumstances dictate. base near Seoul which replaced an older facility; • We must continually advocate the and a complete and modem aeromedical center strengthening of rokaf, within the boundaries of costing $323,000. In addition to a large 110-bed economic conditions, in order to match the growth hospital with surgical facilities, an X-ray laboratory, and power of the North Korean Air Force. and dental clinic, the new facility includes a physio- Republic of Korca Air Force ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION

Key to ttie Military Application of Computer Teciinology

Coloxel Harold R. J ohnson

X THE period since 1950 the use of digital Since 1961 there has been increasing con- computers within the Air Force has grown cem at all leveis regarding lhe approach taken from a hazv concept of the potential of to the system planning and programing of mili- the earlv Whirlwind I Computer to a complextary infonnation systems. The Department of I of over 500 modem stored-program ComputerDefense and the military departments have systems. The application of Computer tech- sponsored or encouraged a number of studies nology to the military art within such a short and investigations into the problem. Most of span of time has generated many problems the studies have been carried out by program- and symptoms of problems that have been ex- ing or system-planning organizations that are tremely difficult to isolate and correct. not a part of the military hierarchy. It is diffi- In the initial stages of applying Computer cult if not impossible for such planning groups technology to military problems, the Air Force to appreciate fully the very high degree of relied almost entirely upon outside contractors, communication and control efficiency that has largely nonprofit, to carrv out project manage- been built up over thousands of years of mili- ment, system design, and programing. For tary organizational development. The military reasons of cost, control, development of mili- had a well-established foundation of knowl- tary doctrine, and the growing number of ap- edge in the area of organization and infonna- plications for Computer technology, it is now tion systems long before modem business clear that the Air Force cannot in the future realized the importanee of organization and continue to depend upon outside programing administration to effective internai communi- talent. The application technicpies for this im- cation and control. In the application of Com- portant new element of military command, puter technology to military purposes, we must planning, management, and control must be- conserve and preserve the foundations of or- come a part of the generalized military staff ganizational strength that fonn the base of skills. current military power. Computer technology 38 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW

hopefully will permit us to build from this base Nike; and sensor systems, such as the distant to higher leveis of effieiency. early-waming ( dew) line and long-range con- Let us examine the question of military trol radars. It quickly became apparent that a application of Computer technology from the better system of assessing the surveillance pic- viewpoint of organizational integration. In this ture and managing the air defense resources light, the skills of the data-system designer and would be needed to keep pace with the speed programmer are seen as a necessary adjunct of and complexity of new weapons.2 most military staff and command specialties, The high-speed digital Computer, which and the data-processing area as a tool of mili- has provided the basic new element in military tary management rather than the management information technology, developed as a result system itself. Much more work needs to be of the so-called “Cape Cod” system of semi- done to cast Computer technology finally in its automatic air defense tracking and intercep- proper light vis-à-vis military organization, tra- tor control. The Whirlwind digital Computer ditions, and training. There is, however, enough proved dramatically that high-speed electronic evidence now at hand to point the way towards communication and logic could be applied di- better approaches to the exploitation of Com- rectly to the highly complex problems associ- puter technology. ated with air defense. By 1955, when the pioneering efforts at Computer technology: new element Cape Cod had been completed, there was ^ in military com m and, planning, ground swell of planning activity at all leveis management, and control of the Air Force, directed at finding new Appli- cations for Computer technology. The general During the past ten years there has been an approach during the period that followed is explosive grovvth in Information technology. well described by Ruth M. Davis in a recent During this same decade our military estab- paper on military information systems design. lishment has grown to be a 50 billion-dollar-a- year enterprise. Weapons lethality has been in- The eras can be named so as to be self-explana- creased by orders of magnitude; weapons- tory as: delivery times have been reduced by orders 1. The “Hardware” Era: 1953—57 of magnitude. Our main adversary has devel- 2. The “Damn the User—Full Speed Ahead” oped his military forces to about the same size Era: 1957-60 and degree of proficiency. Weapons Systems 3. The “Don’t Make a Move Without Calling have become more and more diverse, yet we Everyone” Era: 1960—63 still maintain all of the types that were used The first era, as the narne implies, was domi- during World War II. We have added many nated by the engineer and the concept that new types. Weapons systems have become hardware is the key to a successful system. much more complex, automatic, difficult to System-development schedules were synony- understand.1 mous with equipment-delivery schedules, and Beginning about 1950 the U.S. Air Force system reliability was ensured by the duplica- and the military in general began to see dimly tion of equipment. It was the period of nas- the outlines of a new element of military com- cency for the systems analyst, programmer, and systems designer, all of whom suddenly mand, planning, management, and control. The arose around 1957 and started the second era vision grew out of the technical evaluations by simultaneously decrying the hardware ap- and projections that were carried out in the proach and proclaiming the need for study, early 1950’s in connection with the urgent air analysis, programming, and a well-thought-out defense studies that had been launched to find system design. a counter to the Soviet nuclear threat. These During the second era, operational delivery studies generated the development of a whole dates were revised to reflect study, analysis, new family of defensive weapons, encompass- programming, and documentation times. Most ing the new century series of fighters; surface- of these endeavors were carried out under the to-air missile systems, such as Bomarc and auspices of military technical offices utilizing ORGAN1ZATIONAL INTECRATION 39

the Services of industrial system contractors finance, 7.2 percent; personnel, 6.4 percent; or govemment-supervised civilian technical and others, 6.6 percent. The most challenging groups. The most characteristic feature of this application, however, lies in the area ol mili- era was the lack of user participation in the tary command and eontrol. design of his systems. During this three-year Almost without exception the Air Force period, users were occasionally invited to con- has used contraet support to accomplish the tractors’ plants for briefings on the status of their systems; they were inforined of changes system designing, programing, and coding nec- in operational delivery dates and the like. How- essary to place in operation the Computer sys- ever, the reins were firmly in the hands of the tems now in inventorv. This same pattem has system designers—both at the administrative been followed by a large portion of the aero- and at the produetion levei. space and defen.se industry, and to a degree In the third era the user was given more eontrol by the other military departments.0 In the in the svstem-design process. In fact, the re- early days of Computer technology only a very sponsibility for system design was so diffused fevv scientists and engineers were competent during this period and the decision-making or knowledgeable in the programing art. Com- process involved in system design became so puter programing was in a very real sense a complicated that the system designers were research and development undertaking com- unable to develop the verv systems that had parable to hardware development. The not-íor- been requested for aiding the military in its decision-making process. This diffusion of profit corporations created by the Air Force responsibility has been reflected in the estab- originally for sa g e support, and later extended lishment of one organization after another at to most other information systems, have pro- successive administrative leveis, each organiza- vided a valuable bridge into the world of tion biting off a small chunk of responsibility computer-aided military staff and command for system development. Such a trend appears systems. Now, however, with the beachhead to be a natural outgrowth of a situation in well established, it is essential that the Air which a new field has overreached itself in its Force regroup and create a more efficient and implementation and application of an extremely broadly based organizational strueture to guide meager store of accepted and demonstrable future applications. concepts and techniques."

In spite of this rather uncoordinated and the problems of cost and context hectic evolution, the usaf inventorv of stored- program Computer systems as of 30 June 1964 Managements growing concern with eeonomic aspects of programming is shared by the De- was 106 Govemment-owned systems and 451 partment of Defense ( ood), the customer for leased systems, exclusive of the sa g e and large Computer programs used in command and autodi.v programs.' With equipment from the eontrol. dod’s Director of Defense Research and latter two systems included, the total inventorv Engineering (ddr&e ) has established a policy runs very close to 600 major Computer systems. of revievving the cost of research and develop- The range of Computer applications within ment efforts. Apparently, Computer programs the Air Force extends into almost every field of have been ideniified specifically by ddr& e as military command and staff activity. Command, a cost element to be monitored in command personnel, intelligence, logistics, Communica- and eontrol system development. Similar inter- tions, meteorology, transportation, research est in eomputer-program costs is being mani- and development plans, war planning, and a fested by the Air Force Systems Command, host of other specialized functions all have which has initiated studies whose goals are to reduce the costs of Computer program found application for Computer systems. Of produetion.■' the various applications, the material field cur- rently represents the major concentration of The problem of Computer programing costs effort, 52.7 percent. The remainder is divided should be viewed from two somewhat diverse among research and development, 13.9 per- °The U.S. Naval Command Systems Support Activity, Washington, D.C., is a notable exception. The staff of this cent; operations and intelligence, 13.2 percent; activity is largely military or career Civil Service. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

aspects. In the first instance it is clear that the reweaving of the plan, the assessment and re- Computer programing and generalized software assessment of the situation, the development costs are significantly out of line with the hard- and testing of alternate courses of action, the ware and installation aspects of Computer tech- assimilation of new evidence, and the resulting nology. The continuing high cost of the initial evolution both of what should be done and what can be done. The result is the command programs and of program maintenance is in context through which the commander co- some ways limiting Computer applications and ordinates his resources in the accomplishment is sharply restricting the flexibility of installed of his mission.8 systems. Some data are now becoming available as a result of work being done by Systems The importance and complexity of the military Development Corporation'1 and others,7 which commander’s context seem much more appar- give promise of improving management and ent in the light of Dr. Thompson’s studies. cost control techniques for Computer program- There have been equally accurate judgments ing organizations. In general, it appears that made on this within the military. In considering the strict application of traditional management the problem, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Rex practices will go a long way in improving both Jackson of norad noted recently: the cost and quality picture. Adequate work It is difficult to visualize a situation where com- planning, strict control of delegated functions, plete and undistorted operational parameters, precise objectives, and control measures are all experiences, judgments, weapons characteris- appearing more frequently as standard man- tics, etc., can be intelligentlv communicated to agement tools in the production of programs. a professional programmer through a few in- Perhaps the most important aspect of con- terviews and review of documents over a short tract program production is the fact that high period of time. This type of cramming can only costs and loose management have drawn the lead to errors of commission, omission, deduc- attention of high ofBcials to a more basic prob- tion, and translation. Remember that the per- fectly obvious to the trained and experienced lem, that of context validity in Computer pro- operator is completely foreign, hidden or ob- grams. By its very nature the Computer program scure to one who is completely naive in the is designed to embody to the maximum degree operations world." possible the policies and operating procedures of the military commander or unit being served. The problem associated with transferring Experience has shown that the most glaring military background and expertise to the Com- deficiency in the eurrent contract solution to puter programmer is not a new one, nor are the the programing problem is the nearly impossi- symptoms unrecognized. The fact is that for ble task of conveying the military context of some time the basic difficulty was misdiagnosed command to a programmer who is externai to and thought to be susceptible to correction the staff. This fact shonld have been apparent through improvements in contractor manage- from the outset, but it has only recently been ment technique and other standard measures. clearly described as a result of studies by Dr. The recommendations quoted below are typical Fred Thompson: of those presented in numerous contract studies. More standardization of vocabulary to enable Neither the various resources available to a eomparison of different programming jobs. with commander nor the detailed actions implied by special emphasis on activities, resources, re- his assigned mission can be provided to liim all quirements, programming tools, program tests, worked out and in place. He must bring his documentation, budgets, and schedules; resources and requirements into a coherent plan; he must develop his context of command. Research to improve definition of activities, Context development, the development of an functions, and products and to qualify the acceptable overall view of the situation and product; a plan of action, involves a number of activities Development of performance measures to help of gathering and organizing information. Pri- management plan during the course of the marily, however, it involves the weaving and work and to permit eomparison with other jobs; ORGANIZATIONAL INTECRATION 41

Collection of detailed activity and product- that will make it possible to use effectively the related costs data to serve for planning and capacities for computatiori, logic, and informa- estimating costs of cnrrent changes and new tion storage/retrieval that Computer technol- work; and ogv can provide. Development of policies and procedures for The initiative and impetus for the integra- applying accumulated knowledge to future tion of Computer technology will have to come programming efforts.1" from within the Air Force. It is our own man- While these remedies are all no doubt agement problem, and it must be faced and worthwhile, they fail to identify the root of the solved internally. problem. The professional skill of the military There are clear indications that the eom- commander and his staff cannot be transferred plexity of the programing task may decrease to a programmer during a brief interview or drastically with a corresponding increase in bv reference to a few so p’s and operational Computer Hexibilitv within the next decade or guides. To attempt to do so is to invite a recur- so. Mr. W. H. Ware, rand Corp., Dr. F. B. rence of the difficulties that have plagued us Thompson, Dr. J. C. R. Licklider, Mr. C. A. sinc-e the early days of the sa c e program, when, Zraket, and many other leaders in the field in Colonel Jacksons words, “professional pro- of military information systems are working grammers programmed intereept tactics and toward a whole new concept of Computer maneuvers which did not consider the flight technology. characteristics of the aircraft__ operations and This effort may well prove to be the real management programs should be written bv key to the integrated staff approach. Dr. Fred operations and management trained people. Thompson outlined the potential in this area as follows: Can t the staff be given the capabilities of the the integrated organization Computer in following the intricate interactions The business manager will have to bring these that they see clearly step bv step bnt that are individual, often diverse, functions into an in- made nnmanageable bv the multitude of these tegrated organized system, with all the parts steps? There already exist general-purpose working toward the common organizational models that were intentionally built to simulate goal. W ith increasing specialization, size, and the context of the staff. However, the staff complexities, the demands for application of itself should be given the capability to build the systems concept to the organizing function and modify such models at will. The notions have increased rapidly over the past few dec- of recursive building of subroutine on sub- ades and will be of even greater importance in routine, of interrogation of computers in the future.1- English syntax, of multiple aceess, of direct Computer control, and of list-processing tech- During the past 10 to 15 years manv abor- niques for easy file organization are all within tive efforts have been made to gain the fruits of our experience. Although there is much work Computer technologv via the contract route. All to be done, the ideas of man-computer sym- have failed. The Air Force must now face the biosis, so lucidly discussed bv Licklider, . . . realization that there is no easy road to the await no technological breakthrough. An inte- Utopia of the total information system. We grated capability built around these lines wonld must fali back, regroup, draw new strength be of inestimable value to the military staff.13 from our own intemal reserves, and proceed to- There are probablv a great number of organiza- wards an integrated Air Force organization that tional innovations that could be applied with will accommodate both our strong foundation succe^ to the problem of integrating Computer of military experience and the new Computer technology into the Air Force. It is perhaps use- technologv. We must continue to remain ex- ful to note some of the more important lessons pert in the human aspects of command, morale, that have been leamed in our experience to leadership, and military organization. In addi- date and let these serve as principies for future tion we must Ieam for ourselves the new skills organizational efforts: 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

• W e must protect and nurture the foun- cussed. The present Air Training Command dations of organizational efficiency upon which produet in the 68000 career field adequately the military hierarchy of today is based. meets this requirement. • We must provide for the direct par- • The military command hierarchy is, ticipation of the commander and the staff in by design, redundant, to provide the great flexi- developing and dynamically maintaining the bility and survivability essential to combat. The context of command. integration of Computer technology into the • These principies effectively preclude organization must take account of this feature.1* depending upon any outside agency for Sys- • Computer technology must reinforee tems design or programing. They likewise pre- the unity and cohesiveness of the military staff clude any staff compartmentalization of pro- rather than fragment and divide it. graming talent within the Air Force. • Finally, we must recognize that the • The skills of the military information integration of Computer technology into the system designer and programmer are a neces- organizational strueture of the Air Force is a sarv adjunct of most Air Force staff and com- major undertaking that will require prioritv mand specialties. Computer technology is a effort over the next several years. Unfortunatelv tool of management rather than a management our many false starts in this field have cost us system in itself. valuable time, and we must now move verv • The function of programmer—codes quiekly if we are to keep reasonable pace with should not be confused with that of the system technology. designer and programmer which we have dis- Industrial College of the Armcd Forces

Notes Computer Programming ( Rochester, New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 1962). 1. H. D. Benington, “Military Information—Recently and 8. F. B. Thompson, “Design Fundamentais of Military Presently,’’ Military Information Systems, ed. Edward Bennett, Information Systems," Military Information Systems, ed. Edward James Degan, Joseph Spiegel (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Bennett, James Degan, Joseph Spiegel (New York: Frederick A. 1964), p. 1. Praeger, 1964), p. 48. 2. Ihid., p. 4. 9. Lt. Col. Rex S. Jackson, USAF, “The Blue Suit Pro- 3. R. M. Davis, “Military Information Systems Design grammer Problem,” Staff Study on Blue Suif Computer Pro- Techniques," Military Information Systems, ed. Edward Bennett, gramming for the Cheyenne Mountain Complex (Ent AFB, James Degan, Joseph Spiegel (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Colorado: North American Air Defense Command, 8 April 1964), pp. 22-23. 1964 ), Atch #1, Annex #3, p. 3. 4. Headquarters U.S. Air Force Staff Briefing, (source Í0. Hienze, et al., p. 37. AFADAi. 1964. 11. Jackson, p. 3. 5. K. Hienze, N. Claussen, V. La Bolle, Management of 12. Richard A. Johnson, Fremont E. Kast, James E. Rosen- Computer Programming for Command and Control Systems weig, The Theory of Management Systems (New York: McGraw- (TM-903/000/02 SDC), 8 May 1963, p. 1. Hill. 1963), p. 313. 6. Ihid., p. 43. 13. Thompson, p. 86. 7. T. A. Holdiman, Management Techniques for Real Time 14. Ihid., p. 68. OBJECTIVES IN FUTURE STRATEGIC W AR

National Military Policy Goals and Controlled Conflict

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Hahold L. Hit c h en s

X HIS statement before the House Armed for the population against the effects of nuclear Services Committee on the future defense detonations. program and the military budget for fiscal The specific nature of the tasks thus year 1966, the Secretary of Defense set forthassigned our strategic forces suggests that it I two strategic objectives of our general nuclearmight be vvise to examine them within the war forces: overall framework of our national military 1) To deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon policy goals. These goals have developed the United States and its allies by maintaining largely because of the catastrophic potential of a clear and convincing capability to inflict un- modem total war. To make it as unlikely as acceptable damage on an attacker, even were possible, those interested in our national secur- that attacker to strike first; 2) In the event such ity have striven to develop all sorts of devices a war should nevertheless occur, to limit dam- and procedures designed to improve the re- age to our populations and industrial capacities. sponsiveness of the military instrument and to The first of these tasks the Secretary desig- enable it to carry out a whole range of national nated as “assured destruction,” and he defined objectives. Among these, deterrence of conflict it as the capability to destroy the aggressor as is probably most important, but if a crisis should a viable society—even after a well planned and develop there will be a great need for ability executed surprise attack on our forces. The to provide “multiple options,” “controlled re- other task, “damage limitation,” was defined as sponses,” “negotiation thresholds,” and many the capability to reduce the weight of the ene- others. my attack by both offensive and defensive These concepts have become the embodi- measures and to provide a degree of protection ment of our military policy goals, and strategy 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

and force posture have no other function than heretofore have not been regarded as possible to contribute to their attainment. Official docu- stopping points. ments, speeches, presentations to Congress, and The basic conelusion to be drawn from individual policy pronouncements and direc- these considerations is that we must have the tives of major figures of tlie Government clearly capability to carry on controlled strategic uar. indicate that the nations militarv resources are All-out nuclear holocaust and conventional war to be utilized only in a manner that will demon- do not suffice as the only options for our na- strate eontrol, selectivity, limitation, and dis- tional survival. Since each side c-an (for the crimination. time being) devastate the other at the counter- The terminology describing our militarv value ( city-destroying levei), there is every in- goals vvas set forth b y Air F o rc e P ro je ct F o re - centive, even in pressing for vital national ob- cast in 1963, and in Januarv 1964 the Secretary jectives, to delimit the target system, hold of the Air Force listed them in terms that stress collateral damage to a minimum, and achieve the concept of eontrol and versatile povver: a satisfactory termination without reaching the levei of population destruetion. The thresholds • deterrence for negotiation and war termination provided • arms eontrol by the capability to carry on controlled stra- • crisis management tegic war can make it possible to achieve great • multiple options savings in life and property over the inevitable • controlled response losses from an all-out war. It is imperative that • damage limitation we provide the means that mav enable us to achieve such savings. • n e g o t i a t i o n thresholds • war termination implications of mutual In spite of the terminology and intent of deterrence of all-out war these national militarv policy goals, there is a common tendency to think about only two The capability of both the United States kinds of conflict—conventional war at the lower and the Soviet Union to destrov the societv of end of the spectrum and all-out nuclear war of the other is probably the most significant factor annihilation at the other end. With respect to in the international power struggle today. This the latter, there are few goals that apply, for, capability is by no means guaranteed for the by definition, such a conflict is essentiallv un- indefinite future, but it seems to be a fact of controlled. Only deterrence and damage limita- life for this decade at least. Barring total nu- tion ean be said to be applicable goals in the clear disarmament, or significant developments all-out war situation. Obviously the full range in antisubmarine warfare, anti-ballistic-missile of national militarv goals cannot be meaning- (ABM) defenses, or possibly even more exotic ful unless we examine more than the extremes means of negating the city-destroying potential of warfare and develop and maintain a force of a major nuclear power. this mutual society- posture capable of operating aeross the spec- killing capability may be a relatively permanent trum of potential conflict. phenomenon of international life. Although the For example, controlled response is de- capability may be mutual in the sense that both sired, even in a strategic conflict, in spite of the sides can generate such destruetion to a rela- fact that traditionally we have provided for and tively high degree, it need not and seldom will envisioned very little real eontrol once a stra- be precisely symmetrical. Should a war of this tegic conflict is initiated. Similarlv, multiple type eventuate, there would be an advantage options apply to the provision for many choices in emerging with a higher percentage of surviv- for the use of nuclear as well as nonnuclear ing population and industrial capacity than weapons, and we would seek to arrive at nego- one’s adversary, particularly with respect to tiating thresholds and war termination even at third powers that might otherwise benefit from intermediate and high leveis of intensity that a power vacuuin resulting from the demise of OBJECT1VES IN FUTURE STRATEC.IC WAli 45

the major nuclear powers. Further, if something military superiority has become an elusive should alter the fact that both sides would incur term in an era when the destruetive potential extreme leveis of damage, \ve would be faced of both sides can be measured in large quanti- with an entirely different sort of problem. ties of deliverable megatons, it is important to For the time being, however, we can con- strive for a better outeome than the enemy can clude that both we and the Soviet Union are achieve in even the worst case: all-out thermo- mutually deterred from being the first to invoke nuclear war. a countervalue strategy. The preservation of a Effective deterrence requires military viable "assured destruction” capabiíity that can superiority at other leveis of confliet also — be held in reserve and employed when neces- counterinsurgency, small and large-scale con- sary in reprisal is the insurance against a break- ventional wars, theater nuclear wars, limited down in the mutuality of this t\pe of deter- strategic wars, and so on. The realities of the rence. intemational balance, however, preclude mili- In addition to mutual deterrence of citv- tary superiority at every levei. In some areas destroxing war, there are several other factors of the world, particularly some that are con- that compel us to examine more closely the tiguous to the Sino-Soviet bloe and in exposed potential advantages and pitfalls of a variety of positions such as Berlin, the Communist powers contingencies less than all-out war and the pos- possess local military advantage. The require- sibilite of developing usable military options ment for military superiority obviously does to cope with them. One of these is the strong not extend to the extreme of being able to de- possibilite that, as the fear of escalation to all- fend against every conceivable military chal- out war recedes, the Soeiets will become less lenge on the precise terms established by the inhibited in challenging the United States mili- enemy. The resources of the Free World are tarily. A second is the potential which interme- limited, and it is not necessary to possess this diate-level military actions have in deterring kind of superiority in order to deter effectively lower-level aggressions against positions which at many points along the confliet speetrum. are locally verv difficult to defend—Berlin, Iran, The key point in designing a strategy and northem Norway. and others. And. third, tech- force posture for deterrence throughout the nological improeements in the military state confliet speetrum is this: At any time and at of the art oeer the next decade or so, particu- any levei of intensity, the enemy must appre- larly in weapon delieere accuracy leading to ciate that he is opposing the U. S. military dramatic- reduetions in required yields, may power in its entirety, that we will employ as make possible eeen fairly high-intensity ac- much of that total power as necessary to achieve tions, such as strategic attacks on homeland the objeetiee for which we are committed. Even military targets, without triggering the all-out when only a small fraction of that power is in war against cities. Because of these factors, it the field, it is backed by the total aggregation is incumbent on the United States to develop a of U. S. military strength. This precludes the strategy and a force posture to proeide both enemy from measuring his risks solely in terms deterrence and dominance in conflicts short of of the amount and kind of force we can put in all-out thermonuclear war, while preserving an the field to fight his choice of war. assured capabiíity to destroy the Soviet Union Military superiority is not measured solely ( and the rest of the Communist bloe if neees- in terms of total megatons or numbers of deliv- saryj as a continuing deterrent to all-out war. ery systems, although these factors can influ- ence the intemational power balance. Military superiority includes many qualitative factors deterrence in the nuclear age as well, such as command and control, intelli- Without military superiority, there would gence, tactics, training, system reliability, re- be little hope of deterring the Communist sponsiveness, accuracy, and versatility. It is moeement from pursuing its objectives with closely keyed to national technological superi- bold and aggressive military action. Although ority.

48 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

a viable society, the precise levei of destruc- would never have to be taken. But if it is taken, tion required is a matter for careful study. The it will likely occur late rather than early in the factors involved include ethnic characteristics, war. Its effectiveness will be directlv related to socioeconomic pattems, geographic and demo- how well the delivery systems have survived graphie relationships, and even historical ex- the intermediate stages of hostilities. periences. Many of these are not susceptible of exact analysis. Further, the problem of damage damage limitation expectancy is complicated bv a lack of knowl- edge of actual weapon effects against people. Damage limitation includes the whole Particularlv significant are the effects and per- range, offensive as well as defensive, of mea- sistence of radiation, factors of overriding im- sures taken to reduce the damage an enemy portance in evaluating the fundamental utility could inflict on the United States. Among the of a shelter program. Finallv, there is always elements of damage limitation are (1) ability the danger that a current assured-destruction to influence the way the enemy emplovs his capability may dissipate; it must therefore be forces; (2) ability to destroy or neutralize forces reassesscd continually. before they are launched; (3) active defense— Geography and demography are especially destruetion of enemy forces after launch; and significant in the problem of assured destruc- (4) passive defense — limiting the effects of tion; the Soviet Union is a case in point. Some enemy strikes. The last three factors are direct 210 Soviet cities contain all of the nation s criti- and visible, and there is a tendencv in evaluat- cai industries, 74 percent of its total industrial ing damage limitation to concentrate on them capacity. but only 27.5 percent of its popula- and overlook others. Actually, the ultimate in tion. Additional increments of population fa- damage limitation is to deter the outbreak of talities and industrial destruetion recpiire ever war; failing that, it is to achieve war termina- increasing megatonnage. The curve tends to tion before high leveis of damage are gen- flatten out and vve are in an area of decreasing erated. If the United States lias forces that can marginal utility after these cities have been fight successfully at intermediate leveis and destroyed. Moreover, the cities contain the in- thus prevent confliet from reaching all-out pro- dustrially skilled population, the educators, portions, the result will be far more significant govemment administrators, Communications, damage limitation than that achieved bv varia- logistics, and criticai industries necessary for tions in the factors normallv considered in an the functioning of a modem society. In other examination of large-scale nuclear war only. words, it is not the percentage of population The other means of limiting damage can, killed and industrial capacity destroyed per se in the aggregate, have a significant impact on that matters in assured destruetion; it is the the tvpe and outeome of future wars. One of percentages of both which represent the levei the most important is to influence the opponent at which the enemy nation would cease to func- to strueture his forces in a way that will mini- tion as a viable society capable of waging war mize their damage-creating potential. The de- or being a world power economicallv. fensive tradition of the Soviet anned forces il- Active and passive defense measures can lustrates the point. The Soviets have always further complicate planning for assured de- devoted a considerably larger portion of their struetion. An effective ABM system for major military budget to defensive forces than we cities, a full urban shelter program, and a work- have. Resources so committed are resources able evacuation plan are examples of measures that might otherwise have gone toward the which an adversary can take to protect his so- development and produetion of offensive ciety'. forces, and from our standpoint these are the Perhaps the most compelling requirement only Soviet forces capable of damaging the of all for assured destruetion is that of surviv- territorv of the United States or its allies. We ability ol the delivery systems. Assured destrue- can continue to influence the Soviets to devote tion is a last-resort measure and preferably a large portion of their resources to defensive OBJECTIVES IN FUTURE STRATECIC WAR 49

forces bv building a variety of offensive Sys- weapon system with both long range and prc- tems, each of which poses a different kind of cision delivery. Limited, discrete escalation of threat to Soviet defenses. This strategy may the conflict to counter continued aggression reduce the resources allocated to the U.S.S.R. s could then take place in the form of careful, damage-creating offensive systems. precise attacks in the territory controlled by the In influencing the way in which the enemy aggressor. The ability to take the war out of employs his force, the ultimate aim, of course, allied territory, e.g., the NATO area, and yet is to influence him not to use it at all. Short of keep it below the levei of general nuclear at- that, the management or control of conflict tack would be invaluable. with discriminating military power and usable Specific criteria for damage limitation options will be a better instrument of influence in these circumstances include discriminating than massive indiscriminate action. Careful at- attack capabilitv, ability to apply discrete tention to the control of collateral damage, the amounts of force with great accuracy, respon- selection of military targets rather than urban siveness to retargeting, an intrawar bomb dam- centers, maintaining communication with en- age assessment capabilitv, adaptability to re- emv leadership, and the avoidance of unneces- connaissance-strike functions, and an intrawar sarilv provocative actions can all be means of capabilitv to gather infonnation bearing on the persuading the opponent that it is in our mutual optimum time for a cessation of hostilities. interest to keep the conflict under control. These requirements point to manned systems Direct military action is the most obvious as being especiallv effective in the arena of nu- method of limiting damage. The spectrum from clear warfare below the levei of all-out holo- offense to defense is essentially continuous, and caust. With the employment of manned systems all measures that contribute to the destruction and nuclear weapons of very low yields, nuclear of enemy military forces, particularlv enemy wars can be fought at intensity leveis lower strategic offensive forces, are damage limiting. than massive conventional wars and with less The chief damage-limiting role of strategic involvement of noncombat population and neu- offensive forces is to deter the enemy from trals. The logistical advantages are obvious. launching an attack on our civilian population In this paper, as in most general treatments and industry. This function has alreadv been of the subject, the term “defense” is taken to described. Although the citv-attack degree of include all active and passive measures of de- violence seems improbable at present, it must fense and protection and their associated com- be reckoned with; the possibilities of accidental mand and control, warning, and communica- or irrational initiation of conflict at this levei tion systems. All these play an important role or of escalation of lesser conflicts to such a levei in damage limiting. cannot be overlooked. The utility of defense in all-out thermonu- The employment of offensive forces for clear war has been questioned, although it is damage limiting in nuclear war below the levei always unwise to think that the technological of general exchanges involves several factors. limitations which apply today are inevitably Damage avoidance, or limitation of collateral going to persist into the distant future. Further, damage in our attacks, is of particular impor- defensive forces, even now, have great utility tance. Unless nuclear warfare is controlled and in conflicts at leveis other than those involving restricted to the specific destruction of military weapons of mass destruction. targets, the use of nuclear weapons might re- Defensive forces must continue »:o have a move anv incentive opponents would have to capabilitv to counter enemy aireraft attacks, as refrain from indiscriminate attacks against our well as missile attacks. This is particularly im- civilian population. portant in view of the present feeling that coun- Damage avoidance capabilitv is partieu- tervalue attacks are mutually unprofitable. The larlv significant where war is being prosecuted likelihood of lower leveis of warfare therefore within the territory of allies and satellites. In exists. Defensive forces for these leveis of con- this situation there may be a great need for a flict, as well as for aireraft attacks in general 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEXV

nuclear war, should have the flexibilitv that an applications of militarv power through exploit- advanced interceptor system can provide. Not ing the potential of militarv technology. Al- only do interceptors provide the capability to though current indications are that the Soviets defend areas as comparecí to the terminal point are developing a force posture emphasizing defense of surface-to-air missiles, but intercep- large-yield weapons and mass destruetion, it is tors, possibly of different types, can provide de- unlikely that thev will pursue this course be- fensive flexibilitv worldwide — an important yond the point of diminishing retums. Ulti- factor in the limited wars that are a signifícant mately, the Soviets must recognize the limited possibility. ° A similar argument applies to mis- utility of such a force when faeed with an as- sile defense developments. It would be impru- sured-destruetion retaliatorv capability by the dent to consider point defense only, ignoring United States. the flexibilitv provided by possible identifica- Recent Soviet literature, such as the re- tion and destruetion of missiles in their boost vised edition of Military Strategy edited by phase. Marshal Sokolovskv, indicates that the Soviets A final means of achieving defensive dam- are aware of the arguments for and against the age limitation is through mitigating the effects controlled conflic-t strategy even though thev of enemy weapons which successfully run the eurrently reject it as a viable strategy for the gauntlet of our ofiFensive and active defensive Soviet Union. Given the relative imbalance in systems. Hardening of facilities and weapon strategic capabilities that exists, it is not sur- systems, mobility, fallout shelters, and location prising that the Soviets do not lend credence of militarv installations remote from popula- to a strategy which they are not vet capable of tion centers are among the many techniques for implementing. To do so would undermine the limiting the effects that the enemy may be try- utility of their current strategy, which is based ing to achieve with his weapons. on the terror aspects of counter-urban weapons. Eventually, however, the Soviets’ usual lag in concepts will disappear, and they will cateh up impact of future technology on strategy and force posture with the times, as they have often done in the past. The eoneept of controlled warfare—con- Among the predicted advances in military flict management at numerous leveis below the technology that are within the reach of both the holocaust extreme—has been made possible by United States and the Soviet Union, improved two principal developments. One is the evolu- accuracy of delivery systems represents per- tion of mutual deterrence of all-out counter- haps the greatest potential for achieving the city war and the effect which this will have practic-al military realitv of controlled response. toward keeping other conflicts from getting Improvements over current accuracies could completely out of hand. The other development result in dramatic reduetions in both the num- concems the unprecedented advances in mili- ber of weapons and the yields required per taiy technology which are possible in the im- target. Ultimately an unambiguous distinction mediate years ahead. These advances could between counter-militarv and counter-urban make it possible for the first time to translate targeting may be possible. the theory of discriminating and precisely con- Another promising area for technological trolled power into militarv realitv. advancement lies in the related fields of intelli- With the choice of initiating all-out war gence gathering and eommand and control sys- essentially foreclosed as a viable national pol- tems. These fields provide the physical ele- icy, both the United States and the Soviet ments for controlling the use of military power Union will be compelled to search for usable and making it fully responsive to specifie polit- ical requirements. High-resolution sensors uti- lizing different phenomena such as radar, infra- “There is another defensive advantage ofíered by area interceptor defense compared to terminal defense by surface- red, low-light-level opties, visual photography. to-air missiles: interceptor kills of attacking enemy bombers can take place well away from population and industrial centers. and electronic emissions will make it possible to OBJECTIVES IN FUTURE STRATEGIC WAR 51

gather a wide range of information at any time FRO M THE PRECEDINC DISCUSSION, it should be of the dav or night and in all tvpes of weather. evident that we cannot adequately measure the High-speed methods of processing sensor data effectiveness of our strategic offensive and de- for dissemination and display and reliable fensive forces if we examine them only from the means of transmitting this information will en- standpoint of their capability to aehieve as- able decision-makers to base their judgments on sured destruction and damage limitation. timelv and accurate knowledge of the situation While these concepts, as currently taken, may as it actuallv is. Survivable and sophisticated be applicable to all-out wars of urban destruc- command and control systems could present tion, neither we nor our opponents can be satis- up-to-the-minute status-of-forces information fied with such a levei of warfare as the only and provide national leadership with a finely altemative to insurgeney and limited conven- scaled system of intraoperation options. tional conflict. As is indicated by our military A comment is in order with respect to the goals — “controlled response," “multiple op- impaet of militarv technology on future strat- tions,” and others—we require strategic forces egv and force posture. Contrary to some pop- that can carry out accurate, discriminating, in- ular belief, the ultimate weapon has not yet crementai attacks as part of the carefullv con- been conceived. It is especially hazardous to trolled response to enemy pressure and aggres- regard any existing weapon system — even sion. hardened or submarine-based missiles—as the Emphasis on these qualities in our strategic ultimate weapon. A sober review of technologi- forces will fumish additional resources for the cal progress leads to the conclusion that, as management of crises, provide controlled re- there always have been in the past, there will be sponse to enemy threats at a variety of leveis, subsequent weapon developments which will and enable us to aehieve war termination at the negate existing systems. More than at any time lowest practicable levei of conflict intensity. in history, militarv dominance or superiority The ability to provide such an array of re- will be contingent on the relative abilities of sources—not assured destruction and damage the contending powers to marshal their tech- limitation only—will constitute the proper mea- nological resources. * sure of a strategic force for the future. Arlington, Virgínia MATHEMATICS AND STRATEGY

L ieu t ex a n t Colonel John E. Mock and Second Lieu t en a n t VVil l a r d E. Hobbs, J r . HE DAY was warm and sunny in Can- Anyone who desires to partieipate in the nae, but iinpending doom lav heavy development and implementation of modem Tover the heads of the Roman legion- theories of strategy must of necessity be well naires as they girded for battle. For on that dav founded in mathematics. To this end, the cur- in 216 b.c . Hannibal skillfully administered one riculum at the U.S. Air Force Academy pro- of the most devastating defeats the world has vides each cadet with a solid foundation in ever witnessed: the Carthaginian force of mathematics and offers optional courses in 42,000 men completely annihilated a Roman game theorv and probability analysis. With an army numbering 72,000. ever increasing number of our officers destined An even more dramatic military victory to partieipate in joint strategy meetings and took place a century earher. On an October with civihan scientists at the Department of moming in 331 b .c ., Alexander the Great with Defense levei, we can no longer afford to neg- 40,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry troops faced lect the vital role mathematics plays in our the powerful armies of Darius III, reported to military operations. As an illustration of the number around 1,000,000. In spite of the great embarrassment which could arise from a lack disparity in numbers, the battle of Arbela of knowledge of basic mathematical concepts. ended at nightfall with Dariuss panic-stricken consider the following apocryphal story cur- troops completely routed. rentlv making the rounds. According to the What were the eommon elements of the story, a high-ranking officer, when informed successful strategies leading to these fantastic that a certain number of missiles would give victories? Doum through the ages military a 50í< probability of destroving certain enemy writers and analvsts suc-h as Sun-Tzu, Jomini. targets, initiated procurement for twice the Clausewitz, and Von SchliefFen have attempted number of missiles in the mistaken belief that —with various degrees of success—to dissect this would guarantee a 100‘i probability of de- the winning strategies in order to develop a set stroying the specified targets. Unfortunately, of principies that would lead invariably to vic- probabilities and life in general (being essen- tory. tially nonlinear in nature) cannot be dealt with Xumerous rules and platitudes have re- so simply. sulted from these studies, all subject in a large measure to personal judgment. The deep- How many missiles? seated hope that perhaps the basic essentials of a winning strategv could be made objective and Let us briefly consider the solution to this placed on a scientihc-mathematical basis has problem along with a sufficient sampling of never been fulfilled. In view of the vagaries of other representative problems to indicate the man, weather, and events, this challenging goal scope of mathematics which pervades our mili- will probably never be achieved. Nevertheless, tary efforts. The missile-procurement problem interesting and signiíicant inroads are being succumbs rather nicely to basic probability made in this problem area today by modem concepts. If the probability of a single missile s scientists and mathematicians as they continue destroving a target is 1/2, then by the use of to develop new fields of research such as opera- two missiles the following equallv likelv events tions analysis and game theorv. may occur:

Missile No. 2 hits case (1) Missile No. 1 hits target Missile No. 2 misses case (2) Missile No. 2 hits case (3) Missile No. 1 misses target Missile No. 2 misses case (4) 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEXV

Only in case (4) do both missiles fail to hit the Message target. The ratio of the number of favorable Received events to the total number of equiprobable GO NO events gives the probability of the occurrence Message GO .998 .002 of the event in question. Thus, by the use of Sent no .001 .999 two missiles the kill probability has been in- creased from 50% to 75%, which is still far short The elements in the first row may be interpreted of the goal of 100% (which theoretically can as follows: if the GO message enters a relay, never be attained). The reader may find it in- the probability is 998/1000 that it will be trans- structive to prove to himself that if 4 missiles mitted correctly, and the probability is 2/1000 are used kill probability vvill rise to 93.8%. that it will be erroneously retransmitted as NO. The elements of the second row can be inter- Markov chains preted in like manner. Markov, a noted Russian mathematician, Quite often the ubiquitous probabilities developed a theory to solve this very type of that shape both destinies and events are not so problem. If we generalize the elements of our clearlv exposed as in the preceding example. matrix thus: Consider the following hvpothetical situation. The world situation has rapidly deterio- V-l V-2 ra ted: the outbreak of hostilities is imminent. At this point it is necessarv for the President to 1 — a a contact all field commanders with respect to b 1 - b implementation of the war plan. In particular, it is necessarv to convey a message to the com- the theory of Markov chains tells us that if state mander of Friji in order to prevent any prema- H -1 is introduced initially the probabilities of ture uprising in that small nation which might V -l and V-2, the final States, are given by prove disastrous to the friendly freedom fight- ers. To reach this last outpost of civilization, the Presidents message must pass through innu- merable relay stations. In our present problem, a = .002, b = .001. The message is to be a simple NO (mean- Therefore, ing do not implement war plan) or GO (mean- ing implement war plan immediately). Now [Pco, P no] = [1/3, 2/ 3], relays being what they are, there is a probabil- ity of 1 chance in 1000 that a NO message while which means that, if the President sends the GO passing through a single relay vvill be errone- message, the probability is 1/3 that the com- ously retransmitted as GO and a probability mander of Friji will receive it correctly, and the of 2 in 1000 that a GO message will be retrans- probability is 2/3 that in passing through the mitted as NO. The question now arises: What innumerable relays it will be delivered at the is the probability that the commander in Friji far end as NO. Paradoxically, Markovs theory will receive correctly the message sent by the shows that if the President sends the NO mes- President? sage the probability is still 1/3 that the GO The solution depends once again on prob- message will be received and 2/3 that the NO abilities, but at a slightly higher levei of sophis- message will get through. Thus the message tication. We must First construct a probability received in that far-off, never-never land of matrix, which is nothing more than a sqüare Friji is completely independent of the Presi- array of numbers in which the elements of the dents decision and is determined solely by the rows (the horizontal elements) are the prob- capriciousness of the relays! abilities of individual events. For our problem The indications from such an analysis are this matrix would be written as follows: crvstal clear: MATHEMATICS AND STRATECY 55

• The situation is intolerable. that rational, intelligent people are involved • The nuniber of relavs should be re- and that the sensible object of a player is to duced drasticallv. win as much as he can, safely, in the face of • Better relavs should be installed. a skillful opponent who is pursuing a contrary goal. Thus player A wishes to use a strategy • Redundancy should be included in the that will guarantee that the least quantity which messages so that an error of this type can be he can win is as large as possible, irrespective readily detected by the recipient, who then can of the action of B. Player B on the other hand either correct the message based on the wishes to pursue a strategy that will minimize redundant information contained therein or his losses regardless of the way A plays the query the sender for a retransmission. game. If A departs from his optimum strategy, These indications are approximatelv what he does so at the risk of getting less than he one might logicallv derive from a careful re- might have won, and if B departs from his view of the problem, even without a detailed optimum course of action he may lose more mathematical anaiysis. It is doubtful, however, than he would otherwise. that the full impact of the paradoxical situation would become apparent without the insight strictly determined games provided by the Markov chain theory. This, then, is but one of many simple illustrations of To make the abstract ideas of game theory the manner in which mathematics and opera- more concrete, let us consider a simplified prob- tions anaiysis combine to shed light and pro- lem of ballistic missile defense. Countrv A plans vide guidance in militar}' situations. to use ic bm s in an attempt to destroy a target that is protected by Countrv B s anti-ballistic- missile (abm) defense system. Country A has game theory two options available: the missiles can be sent Let us now tum our attention to the new in on either a “high” or a “low” trajectorv. and highly controversial field of game theory Country B has the option of presetting the abm’s that began as one of those fascinating diver- to burst either “high” or “low. The payoffs to sions in which mathematicians so often become A (which are the losses of B) can best be shown absorbed (and that sometimes tum out to have in a pavoff matrix. ver\' practical applications). Much of game B (defense) theory has been derived from or directly in- High______Low fluenced by ideas first expressed b}- the late John Von Neumann in 1927. High 0 50,000 A (offense) In its simplest form, a game deals with Low 210.000 100,000 two sets of opposing interests. It is possible, of course, to have three or more conflicting The elements in the matrix can be interpreted sets of interests involved, as occurred in the as follows. The payoff to A is zero if he uses three-sided war fought by the Chinese, the a “high" trajectorv and the defense has preset Communists, and the Japanese on the Asian its missiles to intercept “high.” However, if A continent during World WTar II. But for the penetrates and detonates “high” while B has more typical situation. the conflicting parties his defenses set to intercept “low,” A will re- can generallv be divided into two groups, which ceive a payoff of 50.000 units (which might be we shall labei A and B. In the conflicts that we thousands of dollars of enemy equipment de- shall consider, the winnings of one group will stroyed, number of enemy casualties, or any be the losses of the opposing group. Such games other physical value representative of the dam- are referred to as zero-sum games inasmueh as age sought). Now if A penetrates “low” while the sum of the pavoffs to all plavers, counting B prepares to intercept “high,” A achieves a winnings positive and losses negative, is zero. payoff of 210,000 units, whereas if he is inter- Basic to game theory are the assumptions cepted “low” his payoff drops to 100,000 units 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

(a rather sizable consolation prize produced by If we examine this matrix for a saddle- destructive force of B's abm nuclear burst). point we find that the larger of the row mini- The probleni to be solved is: What mums is not equal to the smaller of the column are the optimum strategies and the pav- maximums. The game is no longer strictly de- offs for the opposing forces? Note that if A termined, and a new concept enters our analvsis penetrates “high” liis minimum payoff is zero, —the quaint idea of allowing chance to guide whereas if he penetrates “low,” regardless of our ultimate decision! the strategy of B , he is guaranteed a minimum Game theory shows that, if there is no sin- payoff of 100,000 units. Let us now turn our gle optimum strategy for each player, then attention to B. If B attempts to intereept “high” there exists an optimum eombination of pure his maximum loss could be 210,000 units, strategies. For the general payoff matrix whereas if he intercepts “low” his maximum loss vvould be 100,000 units, regardless of the B, B, action taken by A. Thus in this game the larg- a b est minimum in either of A’s pure strategies c d (100,000 units) is the lowest maximum loss in either of B s pure strategies. In such a situation it can be shown that A’s optimum strategy is to we say that a saddle-point exists and the game mix his pure strategies Aa and AL. in the ratio is strictly determined. Each player should util- (d ~ c) ize lús saddle-point strategy, and the value of [A,/A2] the game will be the value of the saddle-point (a-b) (which in our problem is 100,000). Note care- and B s optimum strategy is fully that if either player moves away from his optimum strategy he can be hurt. Thus, if A (d - b) shifts from a “low” to a “high” penetration, his (« - c ) payoff falis from 100,000 to 50,000. If B shifts from “low” to “high” interception, his losses For our abm-ic bm duel, the optimum increase from 100,000 to 210,000 units. Hence mixed strategies are both players (if rational) will sticlc to their [Ai/A,] = [4/1] and [B JB,] = [4/21]. optimum strategy. It is apparent that secrecy (or intelligence) is of no particular value to the Game theory vvould now tell A to use some ran- players. Even if the defense knows the plans of dom device (weighted four times as much for the opposition, there is nothing that can be Ai as for A^) to select his course of action. Like- done (within the framework of the situation wise B in making his decision should use a described) to reduee the payoff below the chance device (weighted in favor of strategy saddle-point value. B . by a factor of 21/4). A’s expeetation, i.e., the value he expects to win by using this mixed strategy, can be found by playing his optimum mixed-strategy games strategy against either of B s pure strategies:

By developing a more accurate abm, B is E , = A’s expe etatio n = able to reduee markedlv the vield of the nuclear (probability of A,) (probability of B,) warhead necessarv to guarantee a kill. This one (payoff A,—B,) + (probability of A2) teclmological advance changes the entire char- (probability of B,) (payoff A_.—B,) acter of the game. The payoff matrix now reads: E, = (4/5)(l)(0) + (1/5)(1)(210,000) = B 42.000 units High______Low If B plavs his pure strategy B... the payoff is High 0 50,000 A E, = (4/5)(l)(50,000) + (1/5)(1)( 10,000) = 210,000 10,000 42.000 units MATHEMATICS AND STRATEGY 57

Thus if A plays his optimum strategy, his e.x- [A„/A,] = [1/1] and [B„/B,] = [1/1]. pectation in this game is independent of B s strategy or combination of strategies. (Gener- Thus A and B should play each of their strate- ally speaking, if either player deviates from his gies equally in this repetitive game. Now ob- optimum mix, he will suffer. In this particular viously if A simply altemates in his choice of 0 game, as long as either player stuck to his opti- and 1, B will quickly spot his strategy and will mum mix the actions of the opponent vvere have no difficulty in guessing each number cor- immaterial to the expected pavoff.) rectly. The rational strategy for A is to make At this stage we have encountered one of his decision on a random basis, giving each of the more subtíe points in elementar}' game his strategies a 50-50 chance of occurring on theorv. In an actual conflict situation the game any single trial. An appropriate chance deviee generally is played onlv once. On this basis, for A vvould be a coin vvhich he could toss, play- why do we choose our course of action as pre- ing 0 if heads tums up or 1 otherwise. (B could viouslv outlined? \Vouldn’t A be better off plav- use the same random deviee.) Thus there is ing his pure strategy A, in view of its greater nothing frivolous or irresponsible in our use weight in the mixed strategy? The answer is of a chance deviee to determine our choice of unequivocally no! If life vvere this simple, B, action. The chance deviee is an instrument reasoning along the same line vvith the same of our will and not our master. information, vvould arrive at the same conclu- sion as to A’s intended course of action. There - fore B vvould plan on intercepting “high,” Whose game vvhich vvould vield A a pav off of exactly zero. are we playing? If A is more devious in his thinking, he will recognize the trap that awaits him and on fur- A’s team of prize scientists has been vvork- ther consideration will use strategy A . (since ing intensively for several vears and has finally he believes that B vvould not anticipate his us- developed a hardened vvarhead that simply ing this unfavorable strategy). But B was not cannot be destroyed by any intercept deviee. bom yesterdav either and realizes that A, being Thinking that he is still playing the same game, an intelligent opponent, vvould not fali into the A fills out his payoff matrix as shovv'n belovv and trap of playing A, . . . etc. Obviouslv, one has realizes that his obvious strategy is A-.., vvhich an extremelv intricate problem in logic to un- completely dominates strategy A,. tangle here, vvhich depends heavilv on the B, B, character, temperament, and existing moods of the protagonists. In such circumstances game 50,000 50,000 theorv- shows that the rational approach is to 210,000 210,000 use a chance mechanism, vveighted appropri- ately, to make the decision. From A s point of view it is immaterial whether The idea of leaving to chance the deter- or not the enemy leams his strategy. There is mination of such an important decision may nothing B can do to stop A’s attack; his strategy seem both frivolous and foolhardv. But before appears to be infallible. we make up our mirid too quickly on this point, B s intelligence received rumors of As consider the following game. Player A is to technological breakthrough in sufficient time vvrite either the number 0 or 1 on a slip of paper, for B to set up an entirely new game strueture. and B is to guess the number. If B guesses cor- Realizing that defeat by A vvould mean the de- rectly he wins $1; if he misses he pays A $1. mise of himself and his top leaders, the ruler of B B had his top scientists devise a true doomsday 0 1 machine to be automatically detonated if B is -1 1 attacked, splitting the earth in tvvo—a rather unhealthv situation for A (as well as B). Thus 1 -1 the game actually being played is 58 AIR UN1VERSITY REV1EW

B, B, To illustrate this situation and to touch briefly upon the subject of non-zero-sum games, let us A, — CO — CO consider the quandary of the wise King Solo- A* — CO — CO mon when he was faced with two women, each claiming to be the natural mother of the same If A believes he is still playing the previous child. Gazing around his magnificent palace for game, whereas B’s new game is actuallv being a moment, he stalled for time while he tried to played, the result will be an utter catastrophe recall those lessons in game theory which the for all. However, unless the leaders of B are grand vizier had just taught him the previous obsessed with the idea of joining their ancestors week. Finally he issued his edict: “Ladies, I prematurely, their rational course of action will will give vou one minute to decide which one be to convince A of the existence of the dooms- is the true mother of this child. If vou both per- day machine and of their unswerving intention sist in claiming this child as vour own, the only to use it. Then A will realize that he has been rational solution is to split the child in two, using the wrong game matrix and will shift to giving half to each of vou. If you can agree as B’s game, with a stalemate the result. A still to the mother of the child, the baby will be has the capability of penetrating B s defenses, returned to its natural mother.” but to what avail if B has the power to destrov During the tension-filled moment of deci- the world immediately thereafter? sion, Solomon ran through his elementarv game theory once more to make sure his solution was Of what value intelligence? foolproof. Solomon realized that the two wom- en were not engaged in a simple zero-sum Each of the games we have considered game, for a loss to one woman was not neces- has a completely different intelligence aspect sarily a gain for the other (for example, if the associated with it. Let us briefly review the child were lost to both women). Rather, each situation. If a game has a saddle-point, intelli- woman is playing an individual game against gence is of no particular value to either side. Solomon in which he can be considered an un- If a saddle-point does not exist, as in the second biased, disinterested banker who gains or loses game, and each side must pick one of several in accordance with the payoff of each woman. possible strategies, then intelligence becomes Thus the payoff matrices would be as follows: extremely valuable. If both sides use a random Solomon Row device to choose tlieir operational strategy at the last possible moment, then intelligence Statement Mine Yours Min agencies are given an extremely difficult job Real Mine a b a to perform. In unusual games of the last type Mother Yours c d c° we diseussed, not only is intelligence desirable, but it is incumbent upon B as a rational act to Column Max c° b inform A of the details of his strategy. Thus we Solomon Row see the various degrees of importance which Statement Mine Yours Min military intelligence plays in our strategic planning. Pretender Mine e f e° Yours

the real mother. he was quicklv able to establish infant. It should be emphasized that we have an order of preference for the payoffs, viz., examined onlv the simpler cases. Many actual b>d>c>a. The reasoning runs as follovvs: If conflic-ts simply do not fali under the province the real mother claims the chi kl and the pre- of game theorv. As we climb ever higher up the tender admits the truth, she interprets Solo- scale of complexitv, from games in which each mons edict to mean that she will receive her player has many strategies to games in which child (payoff b) and all ends well. She undoubt- coalitions are fonned, the Solutions become in- edly noted that Solomon made no mention of creasinglv more diflBcult and may not exist. what would happen if both women stated the Let us retum brieflv to the abm-ic bm duel baby belonged to the other and assigned a problem (which has been examined in some de- zero payoff value to d, assuming that Solomon tail by one of the authors, Lieutenant Hobbs, in his infinite wisdom would set up a new game as an undergraduate thesis problem). This con- matrix with different rules if this unlikelv even- Hict is so eomplex that it is impossible for either tualitv occurred. Both a and c would represent offense or defense to optimize simultaneously negative pavoffs. sinee she interprets Solomon’s all the strategies available. The scientific ap- decree as meaning she will lose the child in proach is to subdivide the problem into simpler both cases. Of the two payoffs, the former ones with fewer variables. By optimizing the would be her last preference, considering the Solutions to each of the subproblems, one can grisly finality of the decision. reach qualitative conclusions with respect to Solomon quicldy scans the payoff matrix the various trade-offs involved. Thus we may for a saddle-point. and fortunatelv for his peace choose to optimize the altitude of intercept, of mind finds one, viz., payoff c. (Xote that it neglecting for the moment the fact that the is the maximum of the row minimums and subsequent optimization of the warhead yield simultaneously the minimum of the column will have a significant effect on the choice of maximums.) Therefore, the optimum strategy the optimum altitude. for the real mother is always to say that the In our previous games we dealt onlv with baby belongs to the other woman! discrete strategies, e.g., B could intercept either The reader can supply Solomon s reason- “high" or “low.” B could just as well have in- ing as he quicklv assigns the pretenderá payoffs eluded a third, intermediate strategy that would in the order />/i>e>g. Once again he notes lead to a 3 x 3 game. To give a wider selection that a saddle-point exists and that the pre- of strategies, whv not subdivide the intercept tender s optimum strategy is always to State, range into n regions, thus giving an n \ n g a m e ? “The baby is mine.” And whv stop there? Whv not consider the Thus Solomon is not surprised when the game in the limit as n becomes increasingly moment of decision arrives and one woman large and we have a continuum of strategies States, “It is hers,” and the second woman from which to choose? At this point we go from States, “It is mine.” Knowing that each woman a finite number of payoffs that can be plac-ed in is playing her optimum strategy, he has no dif- a matrix array to the concept of distributions ficulty in returning the child to its rightful and integral equations which require for solu- mother. The moral of this story is that all is tion such techniques as Lebesgue-Stieltjes in- not lost in game theorv, even though we can- tegration. This brings us to the frontiers of not assign absolute values to our payoffs, as game theorv; moreover, we have reaehed the long as we can list the payoffs in an order of point where the basic mathematics background preference. we have assumed the reader to possess will no longer suffice. Let us merely state that in prin- the future cipie many problems of this nature can be solved by the use of some of the basic concepts We have barely scratched the surface of we have discussed. However, the complexities the theorv of games. Hopefully, we have not of simultaneously optimizing many parameters led the reader to expect too much of this brash have not vet been satisfactorily resolved. 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

In conclusion, mathematics, strategv, and Napoleon, and MacArthur will never be elimi- game theorv are all being brought together to nated, but new techniques such as these will Help provide the militarv commander with a enable a larger pereentage of eapable com- logical and rational approach to making com- manders to make better decisions, be it in peace plex decisions. The need for great strategists or in war. such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, United States Air Force Academij

Bibliography Campaign Summaries, Pnrt 1. Department of Militarv Art and Finite Mathematics. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Engineering, United States Militarv Academv, West Point, 1957. X. Y., 1945. Kitchen. J. W., Jr. Optimal Altitude for Antimissile Detonations; Dresher, M. Games of Stratcgij: Theory and Applications. Santa A Game Theory Analysis. Santa Monica: The RAXD Corpora- Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-360, 1961. tion. RM-3328-PR, 1962. Great Captains Beforc Napoleon. Department of Militarv Art and McKinsey, J. C. C. Introduction to the Theory of Games. Xew Engineering, United States Militarv Acaderny, West Point. York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. X. Y.. 1915. Williams. J. D. The Camplcat Strategyst. Xew York: McGraw- Kemeny, J. E.. Snell, J. L., Thompson, C. L. Introduction to Hill, 1954. The Science Frontier

ULTRAPURIFICATION

Major Gi v H. Moates, D r . Alton F. Armincton. and D r . Marvin S. Brooks

N A classical sense. purification is the removal mav vary from those of a geologist, who merely re- of extraneous materiais from a specifie matrix. quires sufficient separation to identifv an ore, to I The term novv includes the elimination of physicalthose of a nuclear chemist, who requires separation imperfeetions from a crvstal. Before defining ultra- not only of elements but even of specific isotopes. purification, vve should eonsider four questions. Between these extremes there are the requirements First, for what purpose is piiritv sought? Here one of inorganic chemists, ceramicists, metallurgists, usuallv indieates the degree of removal required. organic chemists, pharmaceutical chemists, elec- Second, what are the methods of purification avail- tronic engineers, analytical chemists, solid State able to attain the desired degree of puritv? The scientists, and a multitude of others. Material is difficultv, complexity, and expense of purification prepared for the use of these groups in such a way hinge on this consideration. Third. how well can as to satisfy their ordinarv requirements for puritv one analyze the purified product? There can be no by normal processing and purification techniques. assurance of puritv without accurate, dependable Ultrapurity results from an extraordinary re- analysis. Finally, what are the consequences of quirement for puritv in which extra purification is attaining ultrapurity? The effects of trace irnpurities mandatory to attain a levei beyond that resultant can best be confirmed by their removal. from normal processing and purification. The normal limits of puritv range from about 99.9 per- What is ultrapurification? cent puritv for most inorganic reagents. Many pharmaceutical reagents must have irnpurities re- Requirements for purification vary from group moved to the range of one part of impurity per to group in the scientific community. The standards million parts of matrix. which is expressed as 1 ppm. 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Metallurgists, too, often have purity requirements O oooooo o o o in the ppm range. Analytical chemists require standards with impurity leveis as low as one part oooooooooo per billion (1 ppb). Designers employing semi- oooooo o o.o o conducting materiais such as Silicon and germa- A nium normally have requirements for purities in o 0 o ooooooo the parts-per-billion range. Furthermore, crystal- line perfection is often even more important than ooo oooo "oo Chemical perfection for these materiais. Study of the electronic structure of metais by cyclotron res- ooo oooo o o o onance measurements often requires single crystals o oooooo ooo having a resistance ratio, R273K/4 2K, of at least ooo oo 5000. This is a demand vvhich extends even beyond o ooc the parts-per-billion range. It is obvious, then, that ultrapurification is a relative term inasmuch as o o o o o o o ooo normal standards for one group may exceed the o o ultrapure requirements of another group. Because ooo o o o o o of this relative nature of ultrapurity, it is necessary [~Ã] Substitutionol impurity /&\ Interstitial impurity to designate both the material and the purpose for C Lattice vacancy which it is wanted in order to define the limits of Figltre 1 D Lattice dislocation ultrapurity. Besides being relative in nature, ultra- purity is also a dynamic term. Ultrapurification is a term the limits of vvhich vvill undoubtedly diminish by orders of magnitude as advances are made in techniques for separation stacking faults play a role comparable to that of of microquantities of impurities from different ma- impurities. These imperfections are treated in solid trices. The epitome of ultrapurification is prepara- State chemistry and physics as solutes in a solvent tion of single-crystal, intrinsic material containing (the crystal matrix) until thermodvnamics requires no defects. Essentially the task of ultrapurification that the increased concentrations of imperfections is to free a material from the effects of imperfections be treated as nevv phases. It is possible to predict in its structure. These imperfections may be foreign reactions betvveen various imperfections and be- atoms or they may be deviations in the crystal tvveen the imperfections and the matrix itself. This structure. Any deviation of the crystal structure, extension of chemical treatment has been carried for example an atom absent from its regular posi- to the point of vvriting equilibrium constants for the tion, can change the properties as significantly as various reactions and seeking desired effects by an impurity atom could. applying the Lavv of Mass Action to these equilib- Four specific types of “defects” or “imperfec- riiuns. Under ordinarv conditions thermodvnamics tions” are identifiable and must be considered in imposes certain limitations by demanding the pres- evaluation of puiity: (1) an impurity substituted ente of defects. These limitations may be mini- for a host atom in the lattice, (2) an impurity con- mized by growing single crystals at high pressures taíned in interstitial space, (3) the movement of and then studying these crystals at reduced pres- an atom from its proper position in the lattice, sures. It is apparent that the atomic arrangement thereby leaving a vacancy, and (4) a misplaced must be considered as vv’ell as the presence of for- row of host atoms vvithin the lattice, vvhich is called eign atoms. a dislocation. (See Figure 1.) Such primary imper- Although requirements vary with different fections occur in crystals because the ordering groups, ultrapurity requires parts per million, or forces are not strong enough to exclude them en- less, of foreign atoms and a minimum of physical tirely during crystal grovvth or during subsequent imperfections in the matrix. Often, 101 lines per Processing. In ultrapure material, any structural square centimeter is given as the upper limit of imperfections such as vacancies, dislocations, and tolerable dislocations in a metallic matrix. Material Table I. Relationship of Number of Steps to Purification Achieved 99% A (Starting Purity) 1% B % A Step # % B 99 0 1 99.5 1 0.5 99.75 2 0.25 99.875 3 0.125 99.938 4 0.062 99.964 5 0.031 99.984 6 0.016 99.992 7 0.008 99.996 8 0.004 99.998 9 0.002 99.999 10 0.001 99.9995 11 0.0005 99.99975 12 0.00025 99.99988 13 0.00012 99.99994 14 0.00006

Figure 2. There may be 700,000 hiliion such sites in a volume of 1 cubic centimeter for a sijstem witli a concentration of 1 ppb of phosphorus in Silicon. of such purity rarely is found in nature and must pressed in grams. For an element, division of the usually be prepared in the laboratory. weight of one cubic cendmeter of the element by The difficulty of obtaining such limits of purity the atomic weight and muldplication by Avogadro’s inay be appreciated from an inspection of Table I. number gives the number of atoms present in one This table illustrates the number of theoretical steps cubic centimeter (1 cc). For example, for Silicon, required to proceed from 997 A containing 17 B to the density is 2.4 g/cc and the atomic weight is a purity of one part per million of B in A. Each step 28.06. involves the removal of one-half of all the impurity To compute the number of atoms in one cubic species B from the matrix A. centimeter of Silicon: It is seen that fourteen separate theoretical steps are required to achieve this degree of removal noíL x 6-02 x 10-3 atoms — .52 x 1023 = of impurity. If each of these steps should involve 28.Ub one stage in a continuous process, condi dons are 5.2 x 10-- atoms/cc ~ 1023 atoms/cc favorable for the attainment of this purity. But if So, for a concentration of 1 ppb of phosphorus this removal is dependent upon several processes, in Silicon, there are approximately which might involve transfer or handling of the material, the achievement of success is quite doubt- IO23 ful and at best is extremely painstaking. y^T = 10 '4 phosphorus atoms/cc of Silicon. A feel for the meaning of ultrapurity mav re- sult from a glimpse into the microregion of a crystal That is to say, there is one phosphorus atom for lattice to reveal the macroconcentration of atoms. every billion Silicon atoms, or there could be Avogadros number defines the number of mole- 100,000 billion (IO'4) sites at which there are one cules in 1 mole of a substance, or the number of billion (10!l) Silicon atoms accompanied by one atoms in one atomic vveight. The value of this eon- phosphorus atom—all of this contained in a volume stant is 6.02 x 1O-’3. T h e density of a material is the of 1 cc. (See Figure 2.) weight of one cubic cendmeter of the material ex- Now, if the concentration is reduced by two 64 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

orders ot magnitude to IO-11 parts of phosphorus in we develop an understanding of the properties, the the Silicon, one may say there can not be 1000 bil- structure, and the interactions of materiais. lion sites at which there are 100 billion Silicon atoms Most materiais are capable of better perform- and one phosphorus atom. This is an oversimplified ance than that attributed to them. The first step picture of the arrangement within the crystal, but needed to make performance equal to theoretical it serves to exemplify the orders of magnitude vvith capability is to make these materiais in ultrapure which ultrapurity is concerned. Such stringent re- form. In their purest State, many materiais displav quirements demand extremely expensive and pains- inarked improvement in physical and Chemical taking efforts. A real need for ultrapurification properties. The need for materiais in ultrapure form must be established in order to justify such efforts. is shared by industry and research, each for its own reasons. Obviously the interests of the Department of Defense are involved in both needs. Why ultrapurity? Industrial needs for ultrapurity are based on The common sequence of development for the knowledge that eertain impurities have harm- most technological advances has been the growth ful effects on mechanical, electrical, magnetic, or of a technologv following the enunciation of a sci- chemical characteristics of materiais. For example, entific principie. As significant scientific advances removal of tin, cadmium, and lead from zinc used ha ve occurred, related technologies have evolved for die casting has greatly reduced the embrittling and have been nurtured by elaboration of these characteristics of the dies. Another example is the scientific principies. Technology has even served to discrepancy between theoretical limits of plastic stimulate more active research designed to exploit deformation and actual limits as experienced in these various fundamental laws. In the field of ma- metais. Calculations show that slippage of whole teriais, we are faced vvith an enigma. crystal planes in metais should not occur until Growth of technology is today advancing more energy equivalent to that resulting from several rapidly than contemporary basic knowledge of ma- percent of deformation is applied. However, dislo- teriais should allow. A. D. Franklin in an article in cations of rows of atoms cause centers of vveakness International Science and Technology States, . . in the metais, and at these points the uniformitv of this is a dangerous condition which demands that the lattice is clisturbed. Apparent vveakness results we acquire vvith dispatch a high order of control from the movement of these dislocations through over the resources of nature. Rather than lagging the slip plane at much less than the theoreticallv behind the demands of technology, we should be tolerable stress. The creation of these dislocations producing materiais wdiose purity is above the levei was previously considered inevitable because of desired. Moreover, we must be able to maintain accidents of growth during solidification. Recently that standard, even as demands of technology “vvhiskers,” or very small filamentary crystals, grovv.” The basis of this gap between technological which have practically perfect crystal structures, requirements and scientific knowledge undoubt- have been developed by maintaining extremely edly stems from the fact that materiais have been vvell-controlled growth conditions. These “vvhisk- used pragmatically for centuries, and a very com- ers" approach the theoretical strength of metais. petent technology has developed as a result. How- Thus, both foreign atoms and crystal imperfections ever, this was a technology lacking a scientific foun- have been recognized as hindranees to materiais dation from which to acquire sophistication. Only performance, and the deletion of these imperfec- in the last quarter of a century has the philosophy tions has been undertaken by industry. \Yhen a developed that we should be able to create mate- specific industrial need for higher purity is antici- riais consisting of predetermined properties and pated or uncovered, this need is usually satisfied, characteristics. There are two forces striving to ad- and undoubtedly most money spent in the search vance the standards of materiais performance to for ultrapurity falis in this categorv. such extreme limits. These forces are the military The importante of ultrapurity to research is demand for uncompromising reliabiiitv and indus- more difficult to comprehend because it is impos- try s search for new materiais of unprecedented sible to anticipate the benefits to be derived from capabilities. Realization of these goals requires that fundamental studies. However, there are eertain SCIENCE FRONTIER 65

relationships between purity and basic research and analytical techniques for confínnation of this that warrant pursuit. A common and valid reason purity. The Science of erystal growth, which seeks for researchers’ emphasis on purity is “to find out to minimize structural defects, will not be dis- what the true properties of a material are.” Deple- cussed, but it must be remembered that attainment tion of imperfections, as previouslv described, of true ultrapurity hinges on the treatment and allows more accurate measurements of a given preparation of the refined material. matrix for melting points, lattice paraineters. elec- tronic behavior. thermal conductivity, etc. Novel purification techniques and previously undetected qualities have been dis- covered when materiais were sufficiently pure. In recent years several new techniques for Elimination of impurities that caused brittle films purification have been proposed and have been of a second phase in the grain boundaries led to applied to a variety of materiais. However, there unexpected ductility in chromium. Reduction of the has been a tendency to underestimate the effective- impurity levei in iron resulted in a corresponding ness of older methods, such as distillation. Most reduction of the solubility of oxygen and hydrogen general purification methods employ variations in this metal. Recognition of research needs for in physical characteristics rather than chemical ultrapurity requires an appreciation of the fact that changes, although speeific chemical reactions are trace amounts of imperfections can cause faulty useful in certain instances. In the ultrapurification conclusions in experiments designed for the study of elemental materiais such as boron and Silicon, of the solid state. it is usuallv necessary to convert the element into The observable properties of a solid are deter- a compound (intermediate) in order that a puri- mined by the arrangement of the electrons about fication technique or series of techniques can be the nuclei and the resultant binding energies. The applied to it. At least four intermediates were used tools employed to study this nuclear-electronic in the ultrapurification of Silicon for semiconductor framework include measurements of magnet- use: SiH,, SiCl4, Sil4, and HSiCl,. Most organic thermal oscillations, cyclotron resonance. Hall ef- materiais having a relatively low molecular weight fect, and magnetoresonanee. Each of these proces- can be purified directly, as can most metal salts ses is involved with the motion of electrons in the and oxides. The highly complicated organic materi- erystal lattice. The paths of these electrons are ais, such as those of interest in biological and phar- described as “random diffusion” because of their maceutical applications, represent a much more erratic directions resulting from imperfections and difficult problem, and in many instances ultrapuri- from thermal imbalanees. The random effect of fication has not been achieved. Much more work these paths is reduced as the imperfections are is needed in this area, partieularly for the produc- depleted. Thus, as the erystal becomes more and tion of materiais for research uses. more perfect. the paths of the electrons become A variety of the methods presently used in more controlled by the effects of the crystalline purification procedures will be described, as well fields. It is precisely these effects upon the elec- as some of the more promising methods that have trons which are measured by the solid state scien- had only limited application. The methods are tists, and any contribution by random motion divided into groups depending on the physical decreases the accuracy of their data. The three state or characterization in which the purification types of imperfections which interfere with these is achieved. measurements are structural defects, thermal vi- Vapor Phase Methods. These techniques rely brations, and impurities. The structural defects are on differences in vapor pressure between the major reduced by growing nearlv perfect single crestais; components and the impurities. The most useful the thermal vibrations, by conducting the investi- of these is distillation, in which the equilibrium is gations at temperatures near absolute zero; and between liquid and vapor. This is probably the the impurities are eliminated by removing them most effieient and useful of all purification tech- bodilv from the solid matrix. niques in that it is simple, inexpensive, and effec- This discussion will be restricted to the re- tive. Many different types of distillation assemblies moval of extraneous materiais from a given matrix are available, from straight unpacked tubes to Experimental continuous chromatograph for the purification of high-puritij intermediates

exceedingly eomplicated assemblies, such as the The main disadvantage of distillation is that the Oldershaw eolumn, which allovv for better contact material to be purified must be a liquid wliieh is between the liquid and vapor. Since better purifi- stable to its boiling point. Since most efficient dis- cation is attained for near-equilibrium conditions, tillation equipment is made of glass (Pyrex), a a high reflux ratio (ratio of material retuming to the fairly low boiling point is desirable. Distillation, eolumn to that taken off) is desirable. Many auto- naturallv, can be applied even to high-temperature matic distilling heads are available for this pur- materiais (vttrium, for example), but for them a pose. An additional advantage of distillation is much less complex and efficient system must be that the efficiency of the process can be improved used. (up to a limit) merely by increasing the height or A second purification method involving the number of plates in the eolumn, thus eliminating vapor phase is sublimation. In this process the start- the need to transfer the purified material before ing material and produet are solids which are trans- additional purification ean be applied—a procedure formed through the vapor, generallv without pass- that is required in almost all other purification tech- ing through a liquid phase. A solid with a fairly niques. In addition, distillation can be easily sealed high vapor pressure is needed for this process. The up to produce large amounts of purified materiais. apparatus for this technique is usually quite simple, SCIENCE FRONTIER 67

often consisting only of a heated portion of a tube ganic solvent, is a purification method that often where the starting material is placed and a cooled has the advantage of producing crystalline mate- portion of the tube where the vaporized product rial, when this is desired. In order to apply this is condensed. Sublimation may be earried out either method, the material must be significantly more in vacuuin or in an inert gas stream. The purifica- soluble in the solvent at elevated temperatures tion, as in distillation, is a function of the difference than at lower temperatures. The material to be between the vapor pressure of the principal con- purified is dissolved in the solvent at an elevated stituent and that of the impurities; here the matrix temperature and slowly allowed to cool. On cool- material has a higher vapor pressure than the im- ing, the product precipitates out of the super- purities. More refined and eflScient sublimers have saturated solution, while the impurities remain in been constructed. However, since sublimers in gen- the solution. For crystal growth, slow cooling is eral are not as efficient as distillation stills, a wider necessary. Slow cooling is also advantageous for variation of vapor pressures is necessary in order purification, since this allows the crystallization to to achieve a satisfactory degree of purity. The fact occur slowly, thus minimizing, but probably not that the final product is a solid makes this method eliminating, the danger of solvent ocdusion. Selec- generally inapplicable to flow Systems. Also, sub- tion of the proper solvent is important here because limation is usually a single-stage process because if the material is soluble in the eold solvent a large of the difficulty of transferring a solid product. In percentage of the product will not be recovered. general, this process is applied only where distilla- Zone refining is the most widely used of the tion cannot be used. liquid phase techniques where high purity is de- The vacuum melting method is similar in sired. This fairly recent development has been theory to both of the preceding methods, with the widely described in the literature of ultrapurifica- exception that the principal component has a lower tion. The technique can be applied to any material vapor pressure than the impurities; hence the lat- which has a definite melting point, stability at the ter are pulled from the melt into the vapor phase melting point, and a fairly low vapor pressure. The to a greater extent, thus improving the purity of the principie involved is the difference between the melt. Of the three vapor methods discussed, it is solubility of the impurities in the matrix material significant that only distillation is effective in re- when it is in the solid State and when it is in the moving impurities with either lower or higher liquid State. The procedure is quite simple in that vapor pressure than the major component. a molten zone, or series of molten zones, passes Liquid Phase Methods. Three methods used through a solid ingot. Ideally, in most cases, the fali in this category, solvent extraction being prob- impurity is more soluble in the liquid phase, which ably the least important of the three. In this proc- is swept along to the end of the ingot. The oppor- ess a material is dissolved in one liquid phase and tunity of running any number of molten zones agitated in the presente of a second phase, in which through the ingot is obvious. The procedure is also the impurities are more soluble than in the first automated quite simply. Many zone refiners are liquid. The major constituent should have a mini- available, using anything from resistance heaters to mum solubility in the second phase. The degree electron beams. Float zoning, done in the vertical of purity is the ratio of solubilities in the two phases. position, allows zoning to be performed without the Several types of continuous countercurrent extrac- use of a Container; this is a definite advantage tors are available. In spite of this, solvent extraction where ultrapurity is desired. Zoning has the dis- is of limited use as an ultrapurification procedure advantage of being a batch process, although there for several reasons. To use this method, large have been some efforts to produce a continuous amounts of highlv purified solvents must be em- system. Also the pure material is often limited to a ployed because of the limited solubility of many small portion of the rod, which again limits the materiais. Final separation of the purified material useful yield. The process is effective only where from an occluded solvent can also be a major prob- impurity solubility in the liquid is about twice that lem. Selection of the proper solvents adds to the in the solid. As this last factor applies to a majority difficulty of the process. of impurities, zone refining is applicable to a large Recrystallization, usually done from an or- number of materiais. ooooooo

Adsorption Techniques. The term “adsorption” water as the water passes through the column. In an- may be somewhat too inclusive in this context, other application, for rare earths, a copper-loaded since in some of the techniques discussed other resin column is used. Different equilibriums are set criteria, such as trapping or Chemical reaction, are up between the copper and the various rare eartli also significant. Ion exchange, the first technique of ions in the solution, causing the rare earths to travei this class, depends on the exchange betvveen ions in at different rates through the column. This pro- a solution to be purified, vvith different ions con- duces relatively pure bands of individual rare tained as part of a resin in a column. Thus, in water earth ions, which can be separated or eluted out purification a resin containing some hydrogen ex- from the column. The method is quite effeetive but changes the hydrogen for the metallic ions in the requires the use of large amounts of high-purity SCIENCE FRONT1ER 69 solvent and related Chemicals, besides being a tive crystallization, which embodies the additiou of fairly slow process. a compound to a melt or solution, forming an ad- Vapor phase chromatographv relies on differ- duct with certain compounds in the solution and ential solubilitv of a major constituent and its im- causing them to preeipitate out. Foain fractionation purities in a solvent supported on a large area or separation is a technique in which bubbles are substrate withln a column. Although developed as passed through a solution, forming a foarn. Since an analytical tool, it can be a useful preparative some impurities tend to accumulate at a gas-liquid tool, particularly for organic materiais. Present interface, the impurities are swept upward into the chromatographs are useful for processing only sinall foam. Also being investigated is microbiological amounts of materiais, but efforts are being made to separation, a technique based on the tendency of scale up the process. certain microbes to react with specific Chemicals. Molecular sieves are applicable to gas puri- There are certain general considerations in- fication only. Here a gas is passed through a bed volved when any purification technique is to be or tube of a solid adsorbent having a large number applied. First, the Container presents serious prob- of very fine micropores in the structure, which lems wherever ultrapurification is desired. Consid- allows only gases of small-molecular diameter to eration must be given to the possible reactivity and pass through, holding back the large-diameter leaching of both major and minor constituent mate- gases. This is quite useful for the purification of riais from the Container into the purified product. hydrogen and helium. This problem is important because high-purity Eléctrical Methods. Electrolvsis, either in Container materiais are almost nonexistent. There aqueous or fused salt solution, is the most important is a tendency to attempt to predict the theoretical of these purification techniques, but even this efficiency of purification procedures by use of avail- method has not gained significant popularity as an able thermodynamic and experimental data. This ultrapurification procedure. Probably the expense is a very risky procedure, since often the equi- of the process is a factor, although the necessity for librium conditions required for thermodynamic pure, unreactive electrodes and Solutions may be calculations are not present in the experimental an additional factor. Fused salts are even more procedures. An additional factor, the possible in- difficult to obtain in a high degree of purity, which teraction between impurities, can complicate the iimits their application. Electrophoresis, based on calculations. the movement of colloidal particles in an eleetrical A final general problem is that of analysis, field, and electrodialvsis, depending partly on dif- which is discussed in the following section. fusion through a membrane under an eleetric field, are methods which at present are only in the de- velopment stage. However, electrodialvsis has been analytical techniques used for saline water conversion. As has been pointed out, the characterization Other Methods. This section deals briefly with of impuritv leveis in materiais has two aspects: one certain methods which, although old in principie, is the more familiar Chemical approach, and the have not yet reached the stage where they are other is the concept of physical perfection. In for- widely acceptable. Thermal diffusion methods rely mulating a definition of purity of a material, one on the difference in diffusivity of materiais through must first specify its use. This discussiòn of analyti- a temperature gradient. Either a gas or a liquid cal methods will be limited to the qualitative and solution can be purified by this method. While this quantitative estimation of trace amounts of Chemi- method has been somewhat utilized, it is very slow cal impurities in solid materiais. and produces only small amounts of materiais. In general, the levei of impurities that falis Clathration involves the use of cage-like Chem- within the realm of trace analysis is the part-per- ical compounds (clathrates) to selectively trap cer- million range or less. A large number of techniques tain compounds but not others. The lack of selec- are useful in trace analysis; however, no single tivity, as well as the cost of the reagent, Iimits the method has been developed at the present time usefulness of this technique. Clathration can be which can provide a complete analysis of all pos- considered a part of the larger technique of adduc- sible impurities. The techniques finally emploved

SCIENCE FRONTIER 7!

for analysis are based upon a number of considera- and comparison of the intensity of the lines with tions. such as sensitivitv, speed. eoverage, sample known standards enables a quantitative analysis size, destruetive versus nondestructive methods, to be inade. bulk versus surface impurities, instrumentatíon and Because of its relative simplieity, sensitivity, manpovver required, and prerequisite Chemical han- and ability to provide qualitative information dlmg. Since a trace is defined in the present con- quickly, emission spectroscopy is used widely in text as one part per million or less, it is clear that both industrial and acadeinic problems. Indeed, for the single most important quantity is sensitivitv. a number of years the sensitivity of the emission Let us summarize a number of the more important spectrograph was considered to be greater than that techniques for the analysis of traces of elements in required bv almost any of the technical fields in solids. which it was applied, and the term “spectroscopi- Emission Spectroscopy. One of the oldest and callv pure” was a superlative to indicate near per- most universally used methods of impurity detec- fection in the achievement of purity. Developments tion is emission spectroscopy. A sample is placed in semiconductor technology have brought about in an arc or spark discharge between two elec- purity requirements that have tempered this view. trodes, the atoms are excited, and characteristic Depending on the particular impurity and the radiation of the unknown elements is emitted. This matrix material, the limit of the concentration sen- radiation is resolved into its component wave- sitivity is about 0.1 ppm. lengths, either bv passage through a quartz prism Emission spectroscopy has a number of ad- or bv refraction from a ruled grating. These wave- vantages. As compared to classical wet analysis, it lengths are usually recorded as lines on a photo- is more sensitive to trace analysis, nearly free of graphic plate; each atom is thus associated with a interferences, more rapid, and, in general, provides characteristic group of lines. Usually, two lines are additional qualitative information even when used sufficient for a positive qualitative identification; for specific quantitative determinations.

Apparatu.s used for the decomposition of high- purity intermediates

Analysis bty emission spectroscopy 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A disadvantage of this method is the require- through combined electrostatic and magnetic fields. inent for standard emission spectra of all the ele- The relative deflections of the ions are determined ments being investigated for eomparison purposes, by their respective e/m ratios, where e is the charge and sometimes these are difficult to obtain. Further- and m the mass of the ions. The ions having the more the complexity of the spectra produced, when same e/m ratio can then be focused and detected several impurity elements having similar eoncen- either by electrical means or on a photographic trations and atomic numbers are present, makes tlie plate. Since the ion beam is inhomogeneous in analysis somevvhat difficult. energy, a spark source can be used only vvith a For the detection of trace quantities, 10 ppm double focusing type of spectrometer. or less, using existing equipment and techniques, Samples of convenient size for analysis weigh the elements amenable to emission spectrochemical about 1 mg. Nonconducting solids may be analyzed analysis are given in Table II. vvith sensitivity equal to that of conducting mate- As can be seen, some 70 elements can be de- riais by paeking them in a conducting tube or by tected and estimated, the notable exceptions being mounting them in thin sections against a conductor. the halogens, sulfur, selenium, and the inert gases. Surface impurities of as little as 0.1 monolayer may Some improvement in the sensitivity can be detected by studying the spectrum as a function be obtained by the Chemical preconcentration of time. of the sample, but this usually involves a risk of The spark method is quite analogous to emis- contamination. sion spectroseopy in that it is a general method of Mass Spectroseopy. Another important tool in analysis; that is, it determines almost all elements the idtra trace analysis of solids is the mass spec- in a single experiment. It has the advantage over trograph. There are four distinct mass spectroscopic emission spectra in that, within a factor of about methods of impurity detection: (1) vacuum spark, ten, most elements liave the same sensitivity. If (2) bombardment, (3) isotropic dilution, and (4) chemical preconcentration is not used, the sensi- total vaporization. tivity of mass spectrometry is usually superior to The vacuum spark method has a broad range emission spectrometry. of general applicabilitv for solids. In this method, The sensitivity of the method for those sub* ions are produced by a pulsed high-frequency stances not normally gaseous is about 0.1 ppm. spark between electrodes of the material to be (See Table III.) Because of the difficulty of ensur- investigated. After acceleration in an ion gun, the ing a sufficiently good vacuum and the resulting ions produced are separated by passing them presence of H20, C„H,n, N2, O,, etc., in the vacuum

Table II. Applicability of Emission Spectroseopy to Trace Analysis Applicable Marginal Not Applicable Li, N a, K, Rb, Cs F, lanthanides* H, He, Ne, Ar, Kr, (atomic numbers 51-71) Xe

Be, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba Actinides Cl, Br, I, At, Rn (atomic numbers 89-102) B, Al, Ga, In, TI O, S, Se, N C, Si, Ge, Sn, Pb P, As, Sb, Bi, Te Cu, Ag, Au, Zn, Cd, Hg Sc, Y, Ti, Zr, Hf V, Nb, Ta, Cr, Mo, Mn, W Re, Fe, Mo, Ru, Rh Pd, Os, Ir, Pt •Note: Recent work indicates that lhe lower lim it ot sensitivity for lhe rare carths is not as poor as oncc believed. SCIENCE FRONTIER 73 systein. the concentrational sensitivities are poor There is no interference from the matrix; thus sam- for such impurities as H_., C. N«, and O,. It lias ple preparation and handling are greatly simplified. the additional disadvantage that, for quantitative It has a sensitivity range of 0.1 ppm, is essentially evaluations. prepared standards must be employed. a nondestruetive technique, and can be very selec- Radioactivation Analysis. Impurities or trace tive, especially when a variety of subatomic parti- elements in solid samples may also be determined cles and detection devices is available. It also can by activation analysis. Basicaily, this is a method be quite general in its applicability. Thus far, it of making qualitative and quantitative elementary has been used in determinations for 72 elements analyses by means of nuclear transmutation. When with thermal nêutron bombardment. a material is irradiated by nuclear particles pro- Unfortunately, the determination of an iso- duced in a nuclear reactor. particle accelerator, or tope concentration is complicated by uncertainties some other source, some of the atoms in the mate- connected with the irradiation and also by a num- rial internet with the bombarding particles and are ber of corrections which have to be applied to the converted into different isotopes of the same ele- counting rate measurements. The situation may be ment or into isotopes of different elements; the further confused by the activation of different im- conversion depends on the nature of the bombarded purity elements, which may necessitate a chemical material and the bombarding particles. The radio- separation of the stable isotopes. By concentrating acthities so produced can be characterized ac- a particular element after irradiation, however, we cording to the radiation emitted (a, /?, y) as well can remove the interfering activities and efficiently as by the energies and halflives of these radiations. count the desired impurity.

Table III. Typical Detection Sensitivities— Solid Spark Source Mass Spectrography Grapliite Matrix Of 71 detectable elements:

41 are detected at 1 ppb or less (e.g., U, Bi, Eu, Sb) 21 ore detected at 2 to 10 ppb (e.g., Ta, Hf, Sn, Mo) 3 are detected at 20 to 100 ppb (e.g., Ge, Ti, Mg)

Thus, from a knowledge of the nuclear character- isties, a quantitative assessment of the impurity content is possible. m In practice, the sample is exposed to a flux of activating particles, which may be nêutrons, protons, deuterons, tritons, helions, or even high- energy gamma photons. If the particle is of the proper type and energy, some of the atoms will undergo transmutation and become radioactive. Analysis by mass spectroscopy The quantity of impurity that is present can then be determined from the decay curves recorded from measurements of the activity. This technique has a number of advantages. Table IV. Comparison of Analytical Techniques Method Médium Accuracy Elements A nalysis Sensitivity (percent) Determinable Time (days) Radioactivation 0.1 ppm 10 50-70 2-5 Emission spectroscopy 1.0 ppm 25 70 1-3 Mass spectrography 0.01 ppm 100 70-90 1-3

The time required to isolate individual radio- tials, this technique provides a reasonably specific elements, in order to achieve maximum sensitivity method for the determination of very small quan- with the technique, limits its usefulness to the tities of trace materiais. determination of only a few elements in a given Chromatography is an important tool in many analysis. Also, the dependence on a nuclear re- applications of trace analysis. It is useful with all actor for maximum sensitivity somewhat restricts kinds of soluble and volatile substances. Essentially its use to that of a research tool. it is a differential-migration method of analysis in Table IV gives a comparison of the attainable which flow of solvent or gas causes the components results with activation analysis, mass spectrography, of a mixture to migrate differentially from a narrow and emission spectroscopy. initial zone in a porous, sorptive médium. It has a A number of other techniques are useful in number of modifications. In spite of its usefulness trace analysis, but they do not have a wide range in trace analysis, this method does not serve directly of applicability. Flame photometry has been useful for the deteetion or estimation of substances. Its in the trace analysis of the alkali and alkaline earth principal Service is the resolution of complex elements, and it has been extended to others. One mixtures. disadvantage is that the impurities must be present In this brief survey of trace-element analysis in solution. Also, conventional instruments limit the of solids, only a few of the large number of analyti- technique to the determination of one element at cal techniques have been mentioned. Those dis- a time. cussed have demonstrated a general applicability. Colorimetry and, in particular, spectropho- However, it must be emphasized that no one tech- tometry have been valuable in trace-element analy- nique will solve all problems. By the proper use of sis. However, the methods are generally time combinations of techniques, it is possible to ad- consuming, and the material is subject to contami- vance our knowledge of the properties of high- nation and loss when very low concentrations are purity materiais and their preparation. involved. X-ray methods are important in trace analysis uses of ultrapurity because they supply information that often camiot be obtained by other methods. X-ray fluorescence We shall present now a brief account of some is particularly useful, and, where applicable, it is specific examples of ultrapurity so as to draw atten- selective and fairly sensitive, with limits for many tion to the kinds of useful results which may be elements down to 10 to 20 ppm. obtained. Examples will be cited to show the role Polarography is also a useful method. It de- of ultrapurity in biochemistry, elemental metais, pends upon the measurement of the diffusion cur- alloys, refractories, semiconduetors, and research rent corresponding to the deposition of reducible materiais. ions from solution at a suitable cathode, such as In Biochemistry. Selenium is directly under the dropping mercury electrode. With modem in- sulfur in the periodic table of elements, and as struments such as the cathode-ray Polarograph would be expected the physieal and chemical prop- and the square wave Polarograph, very small cur- erties of the two elements are strikinglv similar. rents can be measured. Since the ions of different Despite this chemical similaritv, sulfur and sele- elements are reduced at different cathodic poten- nium often show a pronounced biological antago- Computerized monitoring of a purification System

nism to each other. The deleterious effect of es with sulfur in its metabolic channels, evidence selenium has been emphasized in the past; in faet, shows that it follows its own metabolic route when the laws of several nations requlre that foods con- provided in small, physiological leveis. The com- tain “no” selenium. bination of spectroscopy, radiography, and paper It has been discovered, however, that seleni- chromatography as analytical tools has enabled in- um does exist in trace amounts in almost all bene- vestigators to determine that, for normal sheep, ficiai foods. The aforesaid laws had been enacted selenium is present in kidney and liver tissues at prior to the development of analytical techniques concentrations of 0.25 to 2.25 ppm. In sheep sensitive enough to detect such trace amounts. This afHicted with a nutritional deficiency, this concen- lack of technique rnay have been fortunate because tration is reduced by approximately one-half. in the past 25 years it has been determined that se- The problem resolved itself into determining lenium is needed to prevent nutritional deficiencies. what end product contained the small amount of Although selenium in large amounts progress- selenium. This determination hinged upon the 76 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEXV

ability of researchers to remove the selenium spe- cold-working as aluminum of 99.996% (40 ppm cies from the organic matrix, the selenium com- impurity). pound being present at a levei of less than 1 ppm. Chromium has not been used for high-tem- Separation of this assimilated selenium presented perature work because of its apparently inherent a real ehallenge for ultrapurification. The physical brittleness. Chromium, purified by the National and Chemical propeities of selenium compounds Bureau of Standards, was further purified by mak- did not lend themselves easily to general techniques ing and decomposing an iodide-intennediate. This for purification. These compounds were usually highly purified sample exhibited a low nitrogen volatile, and they reacted readily vvith sulfhydryl content which had not been originally achieved. groups. The resultant material exhibited a markedly im- Over a period of years several tons of brewer’s proved ductility; consequently the exploitation of yeast, kidney, and casein digest were digested by chromium as a useful high-temperature structural sulfuric acid hydrolysis. More than four thousand material now depends upon developing an indus- fractions were prepared in the laboratory. These trial process for preparing the metal in an extremely thousands of fractions, when combined, were high purity, espeeially so far as nitrogen is refractionated, and a selenium compound was concerned. extracted. In Alloijs. The effect of impurities on the phys- An ingredient, a selenium organic compound, ical, chemical, electrical, and magnetic properties was separated and identified, but it still has not of alloys is very difficult to treat in a quantitative been isolated from the remainder of the matrix. The manner. One reason for this is that stoichiometry is compound, ealled Factor 3, was so named because not assured, and the phase diagrams of some two- it became the third known agent required for and three-eomponent Systems are very complicated. proper nutrition. The other two factors are vitamin However, it has been reported recently that E and L-cystine. Without these three agents a superconductivity characteristics are affeeted by dietary liver necrosis develops. introducing small amounts of zirconium into highly As a result of these studies on the removal of purified niobium stannide. The niobium stannide a trace amount of a specifíe compound of selenium, in a highly purified form has a transition tempera- the principies of nutrition are today better under- ture (that is, it changes from a superconductor to stood, and nutritional diseases can be more intel- a conductor) at 17.82°K. whereas the introduction ligently treated. of 0.73 atomic percent of zirconium enhances the Zn Elementary Metals. As mentioned previ- material to the point that the transition temperature ously, advances in purification of true metais have is at 17.88° K. Although this is an example of add- not kept pace with those in semiconductor mate- ing a material, it illustrates the effect of an im- riais. Purities in the range of a part per million are purity on the electrical and magnetic properties just now being achieved, and the obvious proper- of an alloy. In this example it was desired to find ties being investigated are those which affeet the a composition which would produce superconduc- structural worth of these materiais. Numerous tivity at higher temperatures. contradictory data have been published regarding In Refractories. Undoubtedly among the most these properties. Without a detailed analvsis of difficult substances to obtain in a highly purified these studies, it may be said that the results must State are certain kinds of ceramic materiais. These be accepted with some reservation. The principal materiais are stringentlv defined as inorganic. non- reason for this inconsistency is that one investigator metallic substances. However, semiconducting ele- may find the effects of the earbon content on the ments such as Silicon and germanium are often con- mechanical properties of a metal while another sidered separately, even though they fali into this finds the effects of the hydrogen content, but very elass by strict definition. Refractory materiais are likely the other impurity contents are vastly differ- usually ceramic in nature and are categorized by ent in the two samples. their difficulty to fuze, reduce, and cold-work, and It has been found that at 100°C aluminum often by their high heat resistance. Occasionally a has a deformation recovery rate of 99.9986? (14 nonceramic material apparently displays these ppm impurity), at least 2000 times as rapid after traits, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of SCIENCE ERONTIER 77

chromium. As happens with chromium, ultra- the progress achieved through zone melting. By purification often alters the properties of these passing molteri zones (caused by slowly moving exceptions. heaters) through the length of an irigot of germa* Few ceramic materiais are available with nium many times, it is possible to obtain the mate- foreign atom concentrations less than 100 to 1000 rial in a purity that defies detection of any foreign ppm. The successful operation of a laser or maser atoms. This purity range is less than a part per depends upon exeitation of impurity ions by elec- billion ol all impurities. tromagnetic radiation in a single erystal whieh Such purity is approached but not quite serves as a resonant cavity. In the ruby (Al O ,:Cr+1) achieved in Silicon. Because Silicon melts at a con- laser, it is necessary to prevent an excess of Cr+ 1 siderably higher temperature than gennanium ions, whieh would inake it difficult to get the cor- (1420°C versus 958°C), there is a tendency to reet organization of excited ions to produce laser leach impurities from the Container (usually quartz). transition. Hence, laser operation depends upon Furthermore, certain impurities, chief among whieh preparation of single crystals of host materiais with is boron, do not separate from the Silicon nearly as controlled purity and structural perfection. efficientlv as from the gennanium. These problems By a water extraction technique, ammonium have been solved by using a technique known as alum, the starting material for grovvth of ruby “float zone melting” in whieh no Container is re- crystals, was purified to a levei of about 50 ppm, quired. At the same time a reagent is introduced in boron, calcium, chromium, iron, and manganese smaU concentrations to react with the trace boron in being the principal impurities. The use of a pre- the rnolten zone and convert it into a volatile com- purified starting material and methvl alcohol as pound whieh is immediately boiled off. By such the solvent allowed for the reduction of impurities techniques it has been possible to prepare Silicon to about 10 ppm. With this technique all chromium with impurity leveis below the part-per-billion and copper was reduced to less than a-part-per- range, and these concentrations have been con- million concentration, but the yield was only about firmed by nêutron activation analysís and by elec- one-third as high as in water extraction. trical measurements on the bulk material. With prepurífíed starting material there is a In Research Materiais. In some respects “re- better possibility of growing ruby crystals doped search material” is an ill-chosen term because these with ions at the required concentration and with materiais cannot be categorized by characteristic the specifíed distribution in the host ruby lattice. intrinsie properties as can metais, alloys, biochemi- Such a erystal is needed to provide an effieient cal agents, semieonductors, etc. In fact, research laser with minimum line spreading in its spectrum. materiais inelude representatives from each of these In Semiconductor Materials. The storv of the categories, and the term specifically refers to a growth of the electronics industry from the time material prepared in such a way as to render it of the discoverv of the transistor is common knowl- partieularly susceptible to measurements for the edge. Certainly the primary impetus for the devel- interpretation of the fundamental strueture of opment of ultrapurification techniques has been the matter. need for semiconductor materiais of near intrinsie The synergism of materiais research is tvpified purity. The manufacture of the multitude of de- by the study of gennanium for structural imperfec- vices by the electronics industry during the past tions, such as atomic dislocations. These defects two decades has hinged upon provision of such have been revealed in the form of etch pits and materiais. interpreted by their eífects on the electrical prop- Development of the technique of zone melt- erties of the material. Properties such as ductilitv, ing has been an outstanding advance in the Science yield strength, plastic deformation, etc., are not of and technology of materiais. This process assured particular signifícance so far as the use of germa- the provision of ultrapure materiais and provided nium is concerned, but they are extremelv important for a technique of introdueing controlled amounts in structural metais. As mentioned previously, it is of impurities into the purified matrices. impossible to prepare metais with chemical purity The purification of germariium and Silicon for suffieient to attribute changes in properties ex- use in the semiconductor industry is an example of clusively to physical defects. Germanium can be 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

prepared with such puritv bv the zone melting As explained earlier, it is necessary to have technique. Furthermore the movements, interac- material as near to intrinsic purity as possible for tions, and changes of the lattice defects in germa- these studies so as to minimize the “random diffu- nium can be detected and traced by the unusual sion” of electrons in the crystal field. Copper for effect of causing large changes in electrical mea- these experiments has been prepared by pulling surements. These measurements are made on the single crystals from a melt while permitting a small germanium when it is being subjected to controlled amount of oxygen to remain in the ambient atmo- externai physical stresses. These experiments pro- sphere. The oxygen evidently reacted with trace vide an excellent means for studying the influence amounts of iron and chromium impurities in the of defects on the properties of solids in general. melt, thereby preventing their accommodation in Germanium purified to a levei of 1 ppb or the copper crystal as it grew, much as ultrapure less was subjected to plastic deformation, and the Silicon is prepared by oxidizing the trace boron. crystals began to yield at stresses less than one- By this technique, copper crystals with resistance thousandth the theoretical strength of the perfect ratios of between 4000 and 10,000 have been pre- crystal. The actual dislocation defects in the crys- pared, as compared to the maximum ratio of 2000 tal were made visible by careful etching tech- for previous efforts. niques. Three types of defects noted were surface, With such crystals it has been possible to edge, and screvv dislocations. The motion of dis- describe the path and energy of a free electron in locations through the crystals was followed both solid copper. by etching techniques and by the changes in the Another example of the effect of impurities on electrical properties of the germanium. Such elec- a research material is in the effect of radioactive trical properties as Hall effect, lifetime measure- bombardment on solid materiais. Relatively low- ments, and mobility of carriers were found to be energy radiation is employed to determine the sensitive to the formation and slippage of the dis- displacement of atoms from their sites in a lattice locations. It was possible to deduce a theory to or to investigate the effect of radiation on defects explain the source of dislocations, their interac- in the lattice. Certain impurities, such as carbon in tions with other defects, and their effect on the a platinum matrix, lead to faulty interpretation properties of the material. Although these observa- resulting from absorption of the emitted radiation tions were carried out on semiconductor materiais, by carbon atoms and their subsequent movement, their interpretations can also be applied to metais thereby leaving vacancies behind, or even their and other classes of solids. On this basis a theory colliding with platinum atoms and causing dis- can be offered to explain the improvement of the array of the crystal lattice. These effects cause a properties of metal resulting from metallurgical misinterpretation of threshold energies for the spe- operations such as cold-working, alloying, anneal- cific radiation. The two possible Solutions for this ing, and growth of whiskers. Although these tech- problem are to work with higher-energy radiation niques have been a part of materiais technology or to remove the impurities from the matrix. In for a long time, they can now be explained studies made on platinum foils, the carbon content quantitatively, and an intelligent estimate of the has been reduced bv a factor of about six as a re- necessary treatment of new materiais can be made. sult of vacuum baking. Several other examples of ultrapurity require- Work on the semiconducting properties of the ments and effects in research materiais follow. organic material phenanthrene has led to the ob- High-purity copper in single crystal form is servation of a break in the plot of resistivity against needed for the study of the fundamental electronic temperature. This discontinuitv in resistivity is not properties of metais. Copper has been used in observed in the crude material, but as the purity magneto-resistance studies to determine Fermi sur- is enhanced by zone refining the discontinuitv be- face shapes because the band structure of copper comes more apparent. Thermal analysis has demon- was one of the first to be satisfactorily interpreted strated that the break is not due to a phase change, and because copper was the first metal for which so it may be attributed to some impurity not re- these measurements offered satisfactory interpreta- moved by the zone melting. The next question to tion of the Fermi surface. be answered is what the semiconducting tendencv SCIENCE FRONTIER 79

of phenanthrene will be when and if this impurity Techniques for achievement of this purity usually is isolated and removed. Work is progressing on depend upon one of a few basic principies, and this problem at the present. refinements in these classical approaches are still the most dependable and superior methods of separation. Analysis and purification are interde- T he pu r po se of this paper has been to emphasize pendent; thus advances in the sensitivity and reli- the significance of ultrapurity in materiais research ability of analytical techniques are required to and the criticai role of materiais research in the confirm corresponding advances in the range of technical development of this nation. purity. The significance of ultrapurity is illustrated The meaning of ultrapurity has been seen to by the newly diseovered properties of highly re- vary with the purpose for which the material is to fined materiais and by the fundamental information be used. Requirements run the gamut from inor- pertaining to the structure of materiais which has ganic reagents to pharmaceuticals, to structural been acquired from the study of ultrapure samples. materiais, to electronic materiais, and on to re- search materiais. Concentrations of parts per mil- Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories lion, or less, are generallv indicative of ultrapurity.

References Brooks, M. S., and Kennedy, J. K. (ed.). Ultrapurification of Symposium on Major Effects of Minor Constituents on the Prop- Semiconductor Materials. New York: Macmillan, 1962. erties of Materials. American Society for Testing and Materials. Lawson, W. D., and Nielsen, S. Preparation of Single Crystals. 1962. Butterworth Scientific Publications, 1958. Ultra-High Purity Metals. American Society for Metals. 1962. In My Opinion

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE vs. DETERMINED RETALIATION: A CRITIQUE

Lieu t en a .xt Commander Forrest Forsythe, USX

X THE January-February issue of the Rcvictc that. in order to avoid the bias associated with the I there appeared an article by Major General words “massive retaliation, the phrase “determined Dale O. Smith titled “Flexible Response vs. Deter- retaliation” might be used instead. The meaning of mined Retaliation.” In it General Smith outlined a “determined retaliation” he illustrated by using a “philosophy of persuasion” which he called “deter- parable concerning two ranches, the Lazy C and mined retaliation.” This, he suggested, could profit- the Bar E. The Lazy G represented a state that we ably be substituted for what he called the philoso- would normally think of as an aggressor, since it phy of “flexible response” or “graduated had begun, without justification, to run cattle on deterrence. The ideas presented in the article Bar E pastureland and pollute the Bar E water merit attention and, it seems to me, some criticism. supply. The question he posed concerned the action Since there may be some who do not have which should be taken by the Bar E to ensure the access to the issue in which the pieee vvas contained, integrity of its territory. To answer it he examined I feel it necessary to attempt a summary of the the consequences of two alternative courses of ac- Generais position. Appreciating the risk in doing tion by the Bar E. The first course was to follow a this, I can only ask his indulgence and invite his policy of determined retaliation; the second was to correction if I misstate his point of view. follow a policy of flexible response. General Smith s first point was that “massive In following a policy of determined retaliation retaliation” has become a discredited phrase; the the Bar E would take over the Lazy C reservoir terms “graduated deterrence” and “flexible re- with a force large enough to convince the Lazy C sponse” have been substituted for it. He suggested that it had both the strength and will to remain IN MY OPINION 8!

until the Lazv C vacated Bar E pastureland. which his arguments are presented as he thinks best. The resiüt of this, the General argues, would The first point to be made is that the General be that . . if the Lazy C people are well uware of seems to have eonfused the issue by supposing our superior strength and wealth, and if our de- massive retaliation and flexible response to be con- mands do not threaten their existence or prestige, tradictory strategies. By doing this he has given to then only madness would lead the Lazy C to pursue the term “flexible response” a connotation which is the fight.” not justified. Since he argues that flexible response If, however, we (the Bar E) followed a policy is not good strategy, it is necessary to sort out the of flexible response, the action would go something confusion and also to ascribe the proper meaning like this: “. . . we send an unarmed cowhand out to to the phrase “flexible response.” the disputed pastureland and instruct him to drive To advocate a capability for flexible response off the Lazy C cattle.” The Lazy C, says the Gen- means simplv to advocate the proposition that there eral, will probably then send a man with a gun to are some types of military actions which could be drive off our cowhand. We, the next time, send a taken against us to which the proper response man with a gun, and the Lazy C responds bv send- would not be massive retaliation against the ene- ing two gunslingers. We retaliate with three and my’s homeland and military forces. Specifically, to order them to shoot. The Lazy C brings up four. believe in the need for a capability for flexible re- “We have,” argues General Smith, “encour- sponse is to believe that should Chinese-inspired aged escalation to limited war.” The flexible re- and -supplied guerrillas infiltrate South Yiet Nam, sponse taetic could bring victory, but the process the proper response is not to vaporize China. Those would have been painful and unnecessarily pro- who advocate a flexible response capability rightly longed. argue that vaporization of China is a serious step The General argues that if u'e have superior and that anv U.S. decision-maker might have some strength either strategv—determined retaliation or reservations about ordering it. These reservations flexible response—ean bring victory. The former is could, in fact, be grave enough to dictate that it not the one recommended by him because it serves be so ordered; in which case a prudent man would “to persuade the Lazy C owners as soon as possible wish for some other military alternative for com- with as little confiict as possible.” bating the infiltration. The existence of alternatives The General then posits “three criteria for ef- is what constitutes a capability for flexible response. fective persuasion." The first is that the initial move Although the General implies a eontradiction, by us must be in force in order to demonstrate “our there is none in a situation in which one possesses superior strength and our confidence in that superi- a capability both for massive retaliation and for ority." The second is that we must not threaten the flexible response. The two capabilities, rather than “existence” of the enemv but only make it clear that being mutually exclusive, are complementary. In he must vacate our land. Third, we must not developing a capability for flexible response the “threaten his prestige.” United States has been rather careful to retain its In the Generai s view a policy of determined capability for massive retaliation, lest that response retaliation meets these criteria better than one of in some eventuaÜty become the appropriate one. flexible response. He suggests, therefore, that our It should be noted that sa c ’s capability at present national strategy be re-examined on the basis of the is greater than it has ever been. As far as I know, three, asking “which strategy leaves us in the most no responsible official has ever suggested that we favorable military disposition should our effort at have no need for our massive retaliation capability. persuasion fail?” If, as the General suggests, the terms “graduated This seems to me a fair statement of General deterrence” and “flexible response” have been sub- Smith's point of view. He has, of eourse, advanced stituted for “massive retaliation,” it is only in recog- arguments to support this view, but I do not be- nition of the fact that massive retaliation should lieve it to be ineumbent upon me to summarize all constitute only one of a number of possible of them and therebv reargue his case for him. I responses. should hope that my criticism of his position will The General, furthermore, seems to equate stimulate readers to retum to the original article, in flexible response with lack of determination when 82 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

he argues that “the ‘flexible response’ strategy worst that might happen is that the Lazy C would inevitably results in using ‘too little too late.’ ” change owners and the new ones, being not so In point of fact, it is not at all necessary that experienced, might have to be taught the lesson flexibility should lead to lack of detemiination. again from the same text. Given the capability for flexibility, the response The extreme desirability of this State of affairs ehosen can be as determined as is wished. In actu- is precisely the thing which should engender sus- ality, the converse of his statement is probably true: pieion of the logic which would supposedly make Only when options are lacking need there be a lack it possible. It is necessary to ask why, if the prob- of determination. The wife who owns only an even- lem of aggression can be dealt with so simply, the ing gown may hesitate about vvearing it to luncheon strategy of determined response has not been engagements. adopted long ago. From this it seems reasonable to think that The reason can be found in the assumptions what General Smith is arguing for is only deter- upon which the logic is based. Many of them are mination in responses. It seems unreasonable that probably valid, but some are not. he would wish to sacrifice flexibility and so be The first of those which are not valid is that forced to unleash sa c ’s massive retaliation in re- we, the victims of aggression, are able to decide sponse to any border Crossing. eorrectly upon the levei of response which is re- Assuming this to be the case, it should prove quired. We must objectively and dispassionately worthwhile to examine his position simply as an appraise the seriousness of the aggressor’s move, argument for determined military response at vvhat- unerringly appraise the strength of his resolve, de- ever levei is appropriate. cide how much force is required to persuade him If the logic of his argument is carried to its to yield, and then apply precisely that levei of conclusion, it appears that the General has offered force. This must be done while we at the same time an attractive altemative to the apprehension, anxie- take care that our response does not appear to him ty, fear, risk, and burden of international relations. to be so great as to threaten his prestige or existence. His alteniative is. in fact, so attractive that it merits The second is that the aggressor must appraise close scrutiny. Its attractiveness becomes apparent the situation eorrectly. It must be assumed that he if his argument is carried a step or two further than will have the correct facts as a basis for action and, he has ehosen to carry it. furthermore, that he will then eorrectly evaluate He argues, in the Lazy C parable, that if these facts, reeognizing our strength and wealth “determined retaliation” is used, “only madness and reeognizing also that our intent is not to threat- would lead [the aggressors] to pursue the fight.” en his prestige or existence. That is, if they are “well aware of our superior Third, it must be assumed that, having correct strength and wealth, and if our demands do not and sufficient knowledge. he will then act rationallv threaten their existence or prestige,” they would on that knowledge. have to be mad to pursue the fight. All three of these assumptions are manifestly Presuming that this is true, it must result that unjustified. This is the root of the difficulty. States no further aggression will take place from the Lazy are not able to judge what levei of response is C. This follows because we must think that the necessary. Aggressors do not judge situations cor- Lazy C people, having eorrectly appraised the rectly. Rational action is not the strong suit of a present situation and having acted rationallv, rather state bent on increasing its territory. than as madmen, would also do the same the next It is quite easv to argue that the Allied Powers time a thirst for aggression arose. Being able to should have responded with determination to Hit- appraise situations eorrectly and being rational, the ler s first moves or to the Japanese thrust into Man- Lazy C would recognize that our response would churia in 1931. Nevertheless, they did not. It ap- again be determined and would, therefore, desist pears undeniable that they “ought to have done from any further adventures. By our first deter- as General Smith suggests. For better or for worse. mined response we would have aehieved, in respect however, the game of international polities is not to the Lazy C at least, a condition in which aggres- plaved with black and white chessmen. Any num- sive war was no longer a serious possibility. The ber of examples should come easily to mind. IN MY OPINION 83

Moreover, at least two conditions are neces- ready divisions and aircraft carriers and measure sary for the success of General Smiths strategy. them against our other commitments. The French The first is that \ve must actually have the capa- leamed a painful lesson regarding the effort which bility to make a determined response. While the is required. General sets as a condition the requirement that we The second condition necessary for the suc- possess superior strength and wealth, this is not in cess of General Smith’s strategy can be set forth all cases the same as possessing a capabilitv for quite succinctly. It is merely that the aggressor determined retabation. must refrain from also employing the strategy of While it is obvious that in respect to certain determined retabation. elements of national power the United States is The sum of these criticisms of the strategy supreme in the world, it is equally obvious that in of detennined retabation is, simply, that political respect to other elements it is not. It is readily ap- man does not act in the way which is necessary for parent. for example, that the United States is not the strategy to succeed. Nations do not demonstrate as well prepared to fight a guerrilla war in Viet the constancy of purpose, insight, rationality, and Nam as is the Viet Cong. It is not a suffieient answer vision upon which the success of the strategy is to say that vve could, if we desired. mount a great contingent. If they did, we might not have to con- enough effort of a more conventional sort to defeat cern ourselves with strategies by which to ensure decisivelv the North Vietnamese. I would suggest to our survival. whoever makes this answer that he count combat- Oberammergau, Bavaria

WHAT IS COOHDINATION?

Colonel Horace W. Lanford, J r .

HE PURPOSE of this article is to invite veals two schools of thought conceming coordina- attention to the laek of accepted definitions tion. The greater number of contemporary theorists and terminology encountered in the study of theorv regard coordination as a vital function of control, and practice of management, with particular em- to be imposed hierarchically. The other school of phasis upon the concepts of coordination and the thought considers coordination a lateral operation resulting impact upon the mibtary manager. I shall implying agreement or meeting of the minds. highbght some diffieulties encountered in systems R. C. Davis, one of the foremost contemporary management in the past because of diffieulties en- management theorists, identifies two types of co- countered in the coordination cycle and point out ordination—the coordination of thought and the improvements to be expected through implementa- coordination of action. Davis further indicates that tion of the Air Force Regulation 375 series. Manv the coordination of thought is an element of the system programs were in effect prior to the imple- planning function and the coordination of action mentation of the AFR 375 series, so these programs is an element of the control function.11 shall further do not operate under its provisions. All new pro- define coordination and control and show that grams initiated since the publication of the 375 coordination considered as an element of control series follow these provisions, of course. offers improved management effectiveness for the Not the least among the problems facing Air Air Force. Force managers is the concept of coordination. A An important ingredient in effective manage- review of contemporary management bterature re- ment is self-analysis. Therefore, one of my objec- 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tíves is to invite attention to areas of Air Force of coordination of thought in the planning function management philosophy and concepts that are not and coordination of action in the control function in agreement vvith the philosophy and concepts of serves to clarify much of the confusion surrounding contemporary management theorists. the word coordination. Koontz and 0 ’Donnell ob- Henri Fayol, one of the earliest management serve that, though some management analysts (in- theorists to put his philosophy in writing, specifies cluding the Air Force) separate coordination as an the major management actions as forecasting and essential function of the manager, it vvould seem planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, more appropriate to regard coordination as the and controlling.2 essence of managership, for the achievement of The Air Force concept of management actions harmony of individual effort toward the accom- seems to be based on Fayol s philosophy, as the Air plishment of group goals is the purpose of manage- Force specifies five major management actions: ment. They say that each of the functions of the planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and manager is aimed toward the accomplishment of controlling.1 Most readers will concede that “com- the objectives of the group.4 manding” (Fayol) and “directing” (Air Force) mean This last statement cannot be questioned. The the same thing. important consideration is how best to implement Of particular interest in this artiele is the con- it. As has been suggested, each managerial function cept of coordination. Fayol considered coordina- is aimed toward the accomplishment of group ob- tion as the binding together, unification, and har- jectives. The Air Force s five major functions of the monization of all activitv and effort. To him, control manager—planning, organizing, directing, coordi- meant seeing that everything occürred in conform- nating, and controlling—are also intended to ensure ity vvith established rule and expressed command. accomplishment of the group objectives. The ma- The theoretical management philosophy of the jority of contemporary theorists tend to reduce Air Force is expressed in Air Force Manual 25-1 the number of major management functions, hovv- dated 15 October 1964. This manual superseded ever. J. R. Beishline combines coordinating with afm 25-1, 1 September 1954, and afr 25-1, 13 controlling and specifies planning, organizing, July 1954. The sijstems management philosophy of commanding, and controlling.5 R. C. Davis com- the Air Force is expressed in the afr 375 series. bines commanding vvith controlling and specifies An attempt is made here to show that Air planning, organizing, and controlling. The School Force management philosophy appears to be based of Systems and Logistics, Wright-Patterson afb, on the philosophy of early management theorists Ohio, although having no official position, appears and appears not to have kept pace vvith the vvidely to support the Davis philosophy, and certain course accepted doctrines that have evolved through handouts even reduce the number of major man- the philosophies of intervening and contemporary agement functions to two, planning and controlling, theorists. Harold Koontz and Cyril ODonnell, organizing having been combined vvith the plan- well-knovvn contemporary management theorists, ning function. The present author concurs in the propose that the method of achieving coordination reduction of major management actions to two: is largely horizontal rather than vertical and that planning and controlling. Table I depicts the con- people cooperate as a result of understanding each temporary trend toward streamlining management others tasks. These theorists further State that the actions. line officeris dictum, “coordinate,” is both unrealistic Coordination has thus come to be recognized and unenforceable. Although they subscribe to the and accepted by contemporary theorists as a func- philosophy that coordination is best achieved lat- tion of control. The Ohio State Universitv manage- erally, they State that control of things is achieved ment philosophy is making a great impact on the through control of people and that the necessity for thinking of individual Air Force officers and Civil synchronizing individual actions arises out of dif- Service employees through the Ohio State Univer- ferences in opinion as to how group goals can be sity Extension Center (until September 1964 lo- reached or conflicts betvveen individual motives cated on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and now and group objectives can be harmonized. It ap- located close to that base on the new \\ right State pears that here acceptance of the Davis philosophy Universitv campus) and through the School of Table I. Streamlining Management Actions

Fayol Air Force Beishline Davis La nford Forecasting and Planning Planning Planning Planning Planning organizing Organizing Organizing Organizing Organizing Commanding Directing Commanding Controlling Controlling commanding coordinating directing commanding Coordinating Coordinating Controlling coordinating Controlling Controlling

Systems and Logistics operated bv Ohio State Uni- Contemporary theorists have eondueted studies versity for the Air Force Institute of Technology. which point out the relatively long time and high R. C. Davis, head of the Management Department cost to develop modem military systems and the of the Ohio State Universitv College of Commeree, relatively short life expectancy of the system in the has darified the relationship of control and coordi- inventory." This situation is, of course, brought nation by defining control as the function of con- about by the rapid technological progress that is straining and regulating action in accordance with characteristie of the present time period. Thus, it the requirements of the plan and has stated that is of paramount interest that Air Force managers coordination of action in accordance with the re- reduce the time and cost of systems development quirements of the plan is a vital phase of control and increase the length of useful Life of systems. and is the function of relating activities with respect Still another contemporary author focuses at- to time and order of performance.''’ tention on the importance of control by stating that The reader may now ask, why the emphasis the more abstract and dynamic the problems an on control—and on coordination regarded as an ele- organization absorbs, the greater part autocratic ment of control? Control is one of the unquestioned decisions (by the manager) must play.10 major management actions. The manager, particu- The example of the system program director larly the military manager, must exert control. The as a military manager highlights the difficulties importance of control can be clearly shown by the encountered in any philosophy that regards coordi- example of one of our military managers, the Sys- nation as anything but a vital element of the control tem program director. The mission of the system function. The system program director is responsi- program director is to manage (plan, organize, co- ble for the major management actions (planning ordinate, control, and direct) the collective actions and controlling) to achieve the system program of participating organizations in planning and exe- objectives. Consider for a moment the situation cuting the system program.7 A program is the portrayed by Table II, which indicates the number integrated, time-phased tasks necessary to accom- of agencies with which the military manager, the plish a particular purpose. A system program is the system program director, must coordinate. At this accumulation of those portions of Air Force and point attention is again invited to the fact that command programs required to create, deliver, preponderance of agreement by contemporary and sustain an operable and supportable system management theorists regards coordination as a or product.s These definitions are cited to show function of control, whereas Air Force doetrine that systems management must plan and control a regards coordination as one of five major manage- program—an integrated, time-phased series of tasks ment actions, coequal with control. My view is that, to implement a purpose for which the planning under the presently aecepted Air Force doetrine, function (and coordination of thought in the plan- control is lost (or at least considerably diluted) ning stage) has already been accomplished. when the military manager, the system program Table II. Coordination Elements

Functions of Functional Management Organizations Objectives

planning . USAF proposed system- -AFSC ASD" package plan system organizing Contractor program system program Using command objectives office cadre (SAÇ. TAC, MATS, ADC) controlling 'AFLC system program Training Command director director, attempts to secure agreement in the meth- the manager’s jurisdiction and that the manager ods or timing of actions to achieve the program is to carry out his coordinating function as follows: objectives. Fadure to secure agreement results in a compromise, or a continuing series of compro- (1) Determine whether and to what extent his operations influence or are influenced by mises, to salvage as much of the program objectives externai activities. as possible. In the past the system program director (2) When externai activities are affected, vvas therefore placed in the position of the quarter- communicate with them to: back vvho was alvvays on the defensive. However, (a) Inform or get information. afr 375-1 now clarifies the apparent paradox: (b) Secure understanding of common purpose. Representatives of participating organiza- (c) Obtain required agreements. tions, as members of the spo team, are directed (d) Get active aid when required. by the spd, even though they are not in the (3) Establish ways to resolve conflicts. same chain of command. The “team” represents (4) Facilitate future coordinative require- organizational capabilities, together with the ments by maintaining satisfactory relations. resources, made available throughout the func- tional structure of the Air Force. A similar, An objective of this article is to advance the though not as direct, relationship exists between suggestion that these activities should properly be the ssm [system support manager] and indi- planning activities. Lets go back to the example of viduais within participating organizations once the military manager, the system program director, the transition agreement is fulfilled.11 to demonstrate how other commands—activities Only time will tell whether the objectives of afr outside the inanageris jurisdiction—are brought 375-1 will be aehieved. into the planning process. An examination of afm 25-1 points up pos- afsc Manual 375-4 States that the definition sible reasons for the difficulty that some af manag- phase (the second phase of the life cycle of an af ers have experienced as a consequence of the af system: conceptual, definition, acquisition, opera- definition of coordination. afm 25-1 States that the tional) is designed to produce the detailed plans coordinative activity concemed only with elements for the acquisition phase. The responsibilitv of under the manager’s control—i.e., arranging for and managing and conducting the definition phase is getting the right people to do the right things, in assigned to the system program office, headed by the right places, at the right times, and in the right the system program director. As the managing amount to achieve unity of effort within the man- agency, the spo must ensure the development and ager’s activity—is inherent in other managerial integration of all af functional planning needed to functions. However, this is the definition accorded effect the definition process. afscm 375-4 States coordination by contemporary theorists. afm 25-1 that normally the agencies supporting the spo in States that references to “coordinating” in the man- accomplishing the definition phase are the using ual mean communicating with activities outside command or organization, to provide the plans for IN MY OPINION 87

use of the system; aflc, to provide the piau for the tems Command ( afsc) and Air Force Logistics maintenance and logistic support; atc, to provide Command ( aflc).14 the plan for the training of af personnel; and gen- The intent of this discussion is not to get lost eral system engineering/teehnical direction con- in mechanistic approaches to effective management tractor or the Air Force in-house Research and but rather to suggest that some functions of man- Technology Division, to provide the system engi- agement be relegated to the position of elements neering and technical support. of certain major unchallenged functions. There is Very plainly, then, all participating agencies not a one of us to challenge the importance of contribute to the planning process. Attention is planning and controlling as major functions of our invited to the fact that these plans are subject to everyday management activities. My purpose is to the concurrence of the system program director and suggest, however, that improvements in Air Force are, in fact, prepared under his guidance. The management effectiveness can be achieved by re- point I am emphasizing is that the planning has laxation of the present requirement (expressed in been fullv coordinated and approved bv all con- afm 25-1) that agreement on a proposed course of cemed; the timing of the implementation is the action be obtained from organizational elements area where diíficulty has been experienced in the which are outside the manager’s jurisdiction but past. which influence or are influenced by his operation. afscm 375-3 States that the system program The planning activities have ensured eoordination director is the officer responsible for managing all of thought. The suggestion offered for consideration activities concemed with planning and executing is that eoordination of action be considered by the the system program.1'- I have pointed out that each Air Force as an element of the very vital function participating command provides the planning nec- of control. essary in its functional area. Fayol’s principie of An objective of this article is to point out a unity of management States: condition that adds to the difficulties of the system program director’s duties. Attention has been in- There must be one manager and one plan for all operations which have the same object in vited to the basic theory of Air Force management view. It is an essential condition for unity of philosophy as expressed in afm 25-1 dated 15 action, for eoordination of all one’s resources, October 1964. It is suggested that consideration and for seeing that all efforts are directed to- be given to these alternatives: (a) bring afm 25-1 wards the same end.13 (Italics added.) dated 15 October 1964 into full agreement with afr 375-1 dated 25 November 1963 or (b) bring afr 375-1 establishes the broad policy, afm 25-1 into full agreement with contemporary explains the Air Force principies of system man- management theory, making eoordination a sub- agement, and identifies responsibilities and rela- function of control, which will then provide the tionships for conducting system programs of the conceptual background (theory) for implementa- Air Force. This regulation States: tion of the afr 375 series. The point is that these The character of the management task two guidance documents are contradictory. I do not and the degree to which participating organiza- believe that it is Air Force policy to attempt to tions exercise their assigned responsibilities deny or hide contradictions but rather, when such change with successive phases in each system a situation is exposed, to research the problem life cycle. However, there is only one individual and, if the allegations are proven true, correct the in the field at any one time who assures integra- situation. tion of effort by these participating organiza- The Air Force manager, like any other man- tions in achieving system program goals as ager, is responsible for planning the course of approved by Hq usaf. This individual is the action to achieve the objectives of the organization System Program Director ( spd) until the Ac- quisition Pbase ends, and then the System or group. This group has been organized around Support Manager (ssm) until disposition of the an area of expected results—in our example, the system from the inventory. Formal transfer is development and acquisition of an Air Force accomplished in accordance with transition system. The definition phase of the system life agreements effected between Air Force Sys- cycle is designed to produce a plan, including 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the organization necessary to fulfill the plan, and invited to the varying and different areas of interest appointment of a manager responsible for its im- —vested interest—of each of the numerous func- plementation. The system program director in the tional agencies. The amount of time the system past has had insufficient control to ensure com- program director must take away from his man- pliance with the previously coordinated plan of agement action of controlling to attempt to secure action. The 375 regulations are designed to give agreement on the wisdom of action from all the the director more control than he has been able to funetional partieipants is readily apparent. Fayols exert in the past. principie of unity of management, previously I believe that serious thought should be given quoted, offers some relief from this problem. to modifying present Air Force doctrine as ex- The Air Force doctrine expressed by afm 25-1 pressed in afm 25-1 to embody the teachings of concerning control and coordination does not ap- contemporary theorists. Fayol vvas the fírst to vvrite pear to subscribe to Fayols principie of unity of about management doctrine, and he did the man- management. afr 375-1 States that “system man- agement world a tremendous Service when he set agement integrates pertinent portions of funetional forth this early management philosophy. His writ- management into a unified approach to achieve ings served as a departure point for subsequent the objectives of the system program.” Experience theorists to confirm or improve upon. The major has shown that the military manager, the system differences in contemporary philosophy are the program director, not covered by 375 series is emphases placed upon coordination primarily and forced to rely on eommittees, boards, advisory organization secondarily. Contemporary vvriters groups, and acceptance of his recommendations have shown that the control function is certainly by many leveis of superior authoritv. A survey of a major management action and that coordination, system program directors in 1964 showed that at when considered a function of control, adds to the least half of these Air Force managers found a effectiveness of the manager. major part of management control was exerted Beishline points out that the generally ac- through coordinative methods.16 cepted militar)' philosophy of effective coordination An example of such an advisory committee is requires agreement on the part of the parties sub- the Executive Council Management Meeting es- ject to the coordination, and he recognizes that tablished by superior authority to consider system sometimes one party to the coordination may real- program problems that either involve coordination ize what he should do in a given coordination with other system program partieipants (e.g., the situation, though he may not want to do it. He contractor, the using command) or lie outside the must be convinced of the wisdom of the questioned system program director s authority. Personal ex- action. Beishline emphasizes that for effective mili- perience of the author and contacts with other tary coordination, a complete meeting of minds system program directors indicate that lack of con- is necessary. Beishline further States that the recog- trol by the program director or military manager is nition and development of the function of con- a major contributing factor in the application of trolling in military organization and management Executive Council Management Meetings. are not abreast of the progress in business and The Air Force continues to make significant industry.15 technological progress. The objective of this article The dependence of the military manager upon will be met if the reader has his attention focused coordination and coordinative methods is readily on the problem area discussed and after serious apparent, as was shown in Table II. Attention is contemplation takes remedial action. Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC

Notes 1. Ralph C. Davis, The Fundamentais of Top Management 3. Air Force Manual 25-1, USAF Management Process, 15 ( New York: Harper, 1951), p. 405. October 196 4 , p. 2. . . . _. . 2. Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management, trans. 4. Harold Koontz and Cyril 0*Donnell, Principies of Man- Constance Storrs (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd., agement (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 38. 1949), p. 103. 5. John Robert Beishline, Military Management for National IN MY OPINION 89

Defense (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1 9 50), p. 259. 11. AFR 375-1, p. 5. 6. Dnvis, pp. 19-23. 12. Air Force Systems Command Manual 375-3, System 7. Air Force Regulation 375-3, System Program Director, Program Office Manual (Washington: Headquarters AFSC, 25 November 1963, p. 1. . „ . June 1964), p. 11. 8. Air Force Regulation 375-1, Management of System 13. Fayol, p. 79. Programs, 25 November 1963, p. 2. 14. AFR 375-1, p. 4. 9. Richard A. Johnson, Fremont E. Kast, James E. Rosen- 15. Beishline, pp. 262-74. zweig, The Theory and Management of Systems (New York: 16. Col. Horace W. Laníord, An Anulysis of Coordinative McGràw-HiU, 1963), Figure 10, p. 115. Methods in Air Force Systems Management, Acronautical Sys- 10. Adrian M. McDonough, Information Economics and tems Division, 1965. Management Systems (New York: McGraw-Hül, 1963), p. 265.

CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT?

M ajor Wuxiam D. C lement

HE PRESENT practice of many military and others could be transferred to the Corps of Tofficers, particularlv nonregulars, in retiring Engineers, Civil Service-operated depots, Bureau and then taking employment vvith the Government of Ships, etc. in a Civil Service capacity was probably never the c. Flight controllers and operations personnel intention of Congress in establishing a retirement might profitablv be transferred to the Federal scheme. It should be stopped immediately. In my Aviation Agency. opinion, if a person’s qualifications and Services d. Professional career officers might be trans- are required in another branch of the Government, ferred to the foreign service of the State Depart- he should be transferred to that branch and even- ment or related diplomatic posts. tually retired from Government service from the Obviously there are many other possibilities. last branch served in. In order to make this prac- The criterion should be an actual need for the mili- tical, it vvill probably be necessary to have a con- tary man’s skill, knowledge, or talents in the job. tributory retirement system for the military as well Some people vvill object to the military and as all other branches of the Government. Civil Service being so closely similar, since Civil Using a Civil Service type of contributory re- Service personnel do not get transferred involun- tirement system would also solve the problem of tarily or so often, nor do they get shot at or sta- separation pay for the armed Services. At the pres- tioned on remote duty as do the military. This ent time separation pay (a gratuity) is computed by objection can be aceommodated by giving the an arbitrary formula based on length of service. Of military “overseas pay” for remote duty and by course, Civil Service retirement is not completely eliminating the present Civil Service overseas pay. actuarially funded, but at least it is based on a Many detailed questions and problems vvill contributory factor. Under a contributory retire- arise, depending on an individual’s parochial view. ment system a member of the armed Services being However, I sincerely believe that the principie I separated before achieving retirement would be am expounding is fundamentally right and any able to withdraw his contribution to the retirement details can be negotiated. I realize that the con- fund in lieu of the gratuity he now receives. If he tributory retirement idea has been proposed for goes to work for another Covemment agency his the military before, but I have never heard of it in contribution could remain in the fund and be used connection with a transfer to other Government in an appropriate retirement at a later time. duty. A great advantage to the military is that it To give several examples of the types of per- would come closer to a guarantee of a pension on sonnel who could Iogically be transferred from retirement. The present near assurance might van- military service to other Government agencies: ish because of all the talk about “cost of retire- a. Doctors could be transferred to the Public ments,” unless some form of contributory arrange- Health Service or the Veterans Administration. ment is worked out and put into effect. b. Electrical, mechanical, and civil engineers Arnold Air Force Station Books and Ideas

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA

Dr . R aymond Est ep

FTEN unnoticed among the many revolu- of studies that go beyond the “who,” “what,” and O tionary developments in Latin America since “when” in an earnest search for an explanation of World War II has been the new approach by U.S. the “how” and “why.” Economists have analyzed seholars to study of the areas many economic, po- every aspect of the unfortunate influences of one- litical, and social manifestations. Where pre-1945 crop economies. Demographers have painted a study, outside the fields of the Spanish and Por- gloomy picture of the present and future effects of tuguese languages, was largely limited to a small the population explosion. Cultural and social an- number of professors of history, political Science, thropologists have delved into the mores of Indian, and geography and their graduate students, the mestizo, mulatto, and Negro villagers from the Rio postwar era has seen the descent on every corner Grande to Cape Horn. Political scientists have of Latin America of an army of analysts, writers, traced the influences at work on public institutions students, and others. Sustained by grants of pri- and the administration of govemment. And sociolo- vate and public funds and loaded down with cam- gists have studied peoples caught up in a world of eras, tape recorders, and notebooks, they have changing values marked by the rise of new social introdueed a new dimension into research that is classes, the rapid increase in urban populations, a far cry from the time-honored activities of their and the proliferation of peoples newly dependent predecessors who confined their efforts to an ex- on a money economy. amination of the dusty archives in México City, Associated with these analysts taking a new Lima, or Seville. From the pens or typewriters of look at Latin-American affairs have been a number this new generation of writers has flowed a torrent of historians who have re-examined many facets BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

of the history of the area in their desire to look and Ecuador. (In the last country named, a junta behind the bare facts of political history as pre- rules.) This picture contrasts with the beginning of viouslv written and provide a sound foundation on the present decade (1955), when the military ruled whieh to build an evaluation of what the future thirteen nations, represented by such notorious dic- holds for the region. Among these historians a num- tators as Perón, Somoza, Rojas Pinilla, Pérez Jimé- ber have found a fertile field in the worldngs of the nez, and Batista. Assassins’ bullets and revolutions so-ealled military mind and the role of the military reduced the number of govemments under the rule in the national life of the several countries. Fore- of military dictators to four by 1959. From that low most among this group is Professor John J. Johnson point, heralded by many as the eve of the milleni- of Stanford Universitv, whose first important study um, the pendulum once again has swung toward of the subject, “The Latin-Ameriean Military as a the other extreme, with seven nations under mili- Politically Competing Group in Transitional So- tary rule and two others (Cuba and Haiti) in the eiety,” appeared as a chapter in his edited volume, hands of dictators supported by their personal The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Coun- military-like creations (civil militias or constabu- tries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University laries), plus the Dominican Republic in the hands Press, 1962). From this analysis he enlarged his of a U.S.—OAS peaee-keeping force. scope to encompass a book-length review of the In preparation for writing this interpretation subject in 1964.+ (he specifically forewams that it is not a “narrative Historians and members of all echelons of gov- history”) of military-civilian relations in Latin emment responsible for the making and execution America, Professor Johnson visited six Latin- of foreign policy welcome all efforts to shed nevv Ainerican nations, interviewed some 500 individu- light on a region in whieh revolution and rule by ais, both military and civilian, and combed the junta and dictator have been commonplace in the archives both in the United States and abroad. century and a half since independence. During Throughout his study there runs the dominant this period Bolivia has experienced some 180 revo- theme of “change” in all its manifestations as an lutions, and not one of the nations has escaped the influence on society and on the military as he con- elevation of at least one ruler by means other than veys the message that “the attitude of officers to- the ballot box. Throughout this century and a half ward change and toward emerging groups, rather of independence marked by disorder, revolution, than toward force and violence and the size of and the substitution of the bullet for the ballot, the military budgets, will ultimately have the greater military has been the chief determining influence effect upon Latin America’s position in the world.” in the institutional life of most of the nations, if not Dividing his presentation into three parts, the in all. The armed forces whieh enthroned rulers author devotes the first two to the nineteenth and could also dethrone them, as happened to Iturbide twentieth century aspects of developments in in México in the bright moming of independence Spanish America and the third to the political role and to Rojas Pinilla in Colombia and Perón in and public image of the military in Brazil. Argentina in the more recent past. In every decade Pursuing the central theme of change, the since the casting off of Spanish rule, military offi- author reveals the effects of professionalization and cers or individuais installed by the armed forces modemization in the late nineteenth and early have held the reins of govemment either by elec- twentieth centuries: how compulsory military Serv- tion or by seizure of the capitol. The phenomenon ice (of a sort) became in many countries the alter- of militarism, Johnson says, “has been and is a fact native to regular standing armies; how the rising of life in Latin America”; it is with us today and cost of new weapons placed the independent cau- to all appearances will long endure, with military dillo at an enormous disadvantage in contests with rulers holding forth in El Salvador and Paraguay the national govemment and thus led to the decline (by election), Guatemala, Honduras, Brazil, Bolivia, of the caudillo as an upsetting political influence

IJohn J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Califórnia: Stanford University Press, 1964, $7.00), x and 308 pp. 92 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

and in tum to the increasing power of the central the diplomatic Service, or in state-owned or -man- govemment; how the introduction of new equip- aged enterprises. ment, with its attendant requirements for more Where do the modern armed forces stand on highly trained personnel, influenced sons of the such key and often controversial issues as educa- middle sector to enter the armed Services and thus tion, industrialization, foreign capital penetration, effected a change in the social composition of the State intervention in economic development, na- officer corps; and how these new officers were tionalism, communism, and agrarian reform? Over “better prepared to accommodate themselves to the the last several decades, during which most of the social-political consequences of economic change officers have been products of middle-sector eco- than were the landholding elements”—a develop- nomic groups, the military has tended to endorse ment which the autlior declares to have been the the same programs as the middle-sector political most important “in the evolution of the armed parties rather than those of the landed elite. This forces between 1850 and 1915.” position is expected to change as the new officers In the period since 1915, an era “of continuing from the lower sectors gain in numbers and achieve agitational politics” marked by “the continuing positions of influence. This group is expected to willingness of civilians to resort to force, or at least become more and more receptive to the platforms to see violence employed, and their persisting un- and programs of the urban left. willingness to commit themselves to a fixed political How does Spanish America view the military way of life,” the author avers that the “role of the in the modern age? Here the question is answered armed forces has not changed, [but] the attitude of with many tongues, with the general public more the officers has. . . .” This change in attitude, espe- favorably impressed and less criticai of the armed cially in recent years, reflects in part the social forces and their roles in national development than origins of the officers, many of whom at the pres- the intelligentsia. By and large, however, the vast ent time are from the lower sectors; but it is also majority of Spanish Americans accept the existence influenced by the glamor appeal, social prestige, of the armed forces and their functioning as a fact salaries, promotions, retirement plans, and educa- of life. tional opportunities offered by a career in the armed The military officer in Brazil has played a role forces. so different from that of his Spanish-American The oft-condemned intervention by military cousin that the author has chosen to treat him sep- officers in civilian governmental affairs, which John- arately in Part III of his study. He devotes consider- son calls “civil-militarism in politics,” is a fact of able space to analyzing “the reasons why the Bra- life today in one form or another in all Spanish- zilian armed forces have been able to maintain American nations (except Uruguay and Costa Rica), decisive political influence while avoiding the kind and civilians are equally as responsible for it as the of diffieult military-civilian relations [prior to 1964] military officers. It will likely continue so long as that have long plagued Braziks neighbors.” Many (1) the military acts as an agent for removing an reasons are advanced to explain why the Brazilian undesired individual from power (for instance, a military played a secondarv role to the monarchy Perón or a Rojas Pinilla), (2) violence exists as a until 1889 and why, even in the period 1889-1930 “definite feature of the political process,” or (3) when military officers twice ruled the nation, the the armed forces are divided by either interservice armed forces, unlike their Spanish-American con- or intraservice rivalries. temporaries, “avoided any serious confrontation One of the more significant trends noted in with the civilian leadership” and “managed to recent years in the evolution of the armed forces create and preserve a relatively favorable iinage of has been the tendency on the part of officers to themselves. . . .” With the revolution of 1930 that control governments through the exercise of in- brought Getulio Vargas to the presidency in what direct influence rather than through the seizure of was to be a 15-year dictatorship, the military, by direct control. Making this indirect role attractive accident or design, emerged as the “kingmaker in are the numerous opportunities for serving, usually national politics. Since the termination of the with added salary, in executive and legislative Vargas dictatorship in 1945, the presidents of positions in federal, State, or city governments, in Brazil have had to depend for their political lives BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

on the support of a group of officers, a dispositivo ever, he foresees that forces now at work will tend militar. In playing this role, the military has often to reduce the military’s role in the field of civihan in recent years abandoned its earlier traditional political affairs but that in spite of this limitation position of arbitrating disputes in the civihan body the military will always exert an important influ- pohtic and chosen instead “to take public positions ence in civilian affairs. Recognizing that the mili- on policy conflicts. . . In the process the military tary will continue to exist, he suggests a many- has become a national agency for destroying the sided program of civic action for converting the regionalism that historieally has divided Brazil; it armed forces into “more socially constructive insti- has become an apostle advocating State interven- tutions.” tion in economic development; and it has become Pursuing the emphasis on change in his Intro- the chief agent of nationalism. While the military duetion to another appraisal of Latin America,! has traditionally been aligned on the side of con- Johnson discusses at lerigth the various economic, servative elements in national pohtics, the changing political, and social implications of such forces as complexion of the officer corps, whose members are the transformation of traditional value systems, increasingly the products of the lower sectors, fore- emergence of new power groups, the increasing tells that a new generation of officers will be more influence of technology, proliferation of political sympathetic to the “demands of the historieally op- parties, mass emigration from rural areas, indus- pressed masses.” As of the moment, however, the trialization, demands for agrarian reform, the pop- military establishment continues to align itself on ulation explosion, urban growth, and nationalism. the side of the conservatives. He points out, in introducing this volume of essays In summing up, Johnson re-emphasizes how on social groups, that people rather than institu- the armed forces generally were able to adapt tions will determine, either individually or collec- themselves to the shift of power from the traditional tively, whether such forces “will retard or promote landed elite to the urban middle sectors as the social development.” latter became the dominant political element. This In examining the roles of the peasant, rural leads him to conclude that the military will aeeept laborer, writer, artist, military officer, industrialist, the working classes “within a decade or two” and urban worker, and university student, the several that there is “absolutely nothing in the evolution writers look at two questions: (1) What are the of the Latin American armed forces to suggest that main problems and aspirations of each group? (2) they can any longer be trusted to be the stronghold To what extent are each group’s goals realistic in of tradition or that they will for much longer ‘hold terms of its own capabilities and the national in- off the mob power of the left.’ ” He continues, terest? “Those persons in and out of Latin America who Of most interest to Air Force personnel and fail to appreciate this face a rude awakening, as do the essay most closely linking this volume with the those abroad who fail to understand that no group preceding one is that titled “The Military,” which from which potential officers currently are being traces the roles of the armed forces as a nation- recruited has close ties with any foreign power.” building force, as an instrument of social integra- Johnson believes that because of the “force and tion, and as a force in education. Of especial inter- corruption” that “remain parts of the political proc- est are the sections that describe past and present ess in Latin America” there is a definite place for civic-action accomplishments and projects of the the armed forces, which have been more respon- armed forces and examine the role of the military sible than “either the police or the armies raised by in political affairs. The authors conciusion is ideological parties,” and that the military officers significant: who direct govemmental agencies “are less corrupt . . . the view of the military as the primary ob- than the civilians” who would otherwise fill the stacle to political stability and democratic evo- positions they occupy. Over the longer term, how- lution is simplistic. Instability in Latin America

tjohn J. Johnson (ed.), Continuity and Change in Latin America ( Stanford, Califórnia: Stanford University Press, 1964, $6.75), xiii and 282 pp. 94 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

has been something more basic than transfers 000 people; rural labor as an institution and its of power among the elite by means of cuarte- influence on the economy and soeiety; the role of lazos and pronunciamientos.... In a substantial the writer in shaping Latin-American thinking— number of cases, it has been the failure of an a fact of tremendous importance in view of the incipient demoeratic system that brought the pronounced tendency of writers to adopt or support military into politics. Sometimes civilian leaders left-of-center ideologies and causes since World have deliberately encouraged or even invited War II; the role of the artist (composer, painter, intervention; sometimes political choices have been forced on the military by irreconcilable sculptor, architect) in influencing ideological atti- divisions between civilian factions or the dubi- tudes, with particular emphasis given to Mexican ous legitimacy of the executive. It can be muralists after 1921 and to Brazilian architects argued that if regular mihtary forces had been since the 1930’s; the industrialist in terms of origin abolished, contending parties and factions and opportunity, sense of public responsibility, fear would have devised altemative forms of vio- of risk, participation in politics, attitude toward lence to prosecute their interests. labor, and of family control of industrial empires; The role and influence of Latin-American and the urban worker in terms of origin, concentra- university students in national politics, understood tion in large cities, proportion of the industrial labor by few in the United States, are revealed in an force, influence of his needs on city administrators, essay that traces the steps by which students ac- participation in labor unions, and political influ- quired their present dominance in university ad- ence. ministration. In accomplishing this the author A novel feature of the volume is the compari- describes curriculums (past and present, and pos- son of Latin America with Japan in terms of think- sible future trends), students (as to numbers and ing, scholarship, and institutions and in response family background), campus politics, the “career” to nineteenth and twentieth century political and student leader, the position of the university grad- economic influences, presented in the final essay uate in national affairs, and the ideological orienta- by a British sociologist. tion of students and faculty. He refutes the notion This volume is the best available study of such that “students in Latin America engage in political a wide cross section of thought on so many seg- agitation because they see no hope of acquiring ments of life in Latin America. Professor Johnson wealth or position so long as the present system and the other authors reveal the depth of their years of research in pinpointing the significant and obtains,” pointing out that the “university student is the child of his parents” and that there is some in refuting previously accepted truisms. It merits reason for thinking that “the student is at least the study of everyone interested in or concemed temporarily a better Citizen than his elders.” with things Latin-American. Other essays examine the rural peasant, who Aerospace Studies Institute constitutes over half of Latin America^ 200,000,-

A PERSPECTI VE LOOK AT OUR AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

Major John H. Scrivner, J r .

MONG the young nations of the world, the or saw the fury of the fighting directed elsewhere. A American colonies were singularly fortu- This opportune deliverance from foreign conquest nate. Geographically, politically, and—not the least was due to a combination of many circumstances, —militarily, American settlers found this to be one of the most important of which was the titanic true. It was most advantageous that, time after struggle for European and colonial dominance in time, the colonists had their battles fought for them which England and France were engaged. No one BOOKS AND IDEAS 95

countr>' dared to challenge either of these world In these early days of political disorganization powers without being allied with the other. As a there was little or no way in which to organize, result. the American colonies, even though under traiu, and equip a truly effective fighting force em- the British flag, were able to watch from the side- bracing all the colonies. Militia calls were laid upon lines as the two spent their efforts in ahnost con- the colonists and generally were met, but there tinuai struggle for North American empire. When existed no reliable, overall defensive force. Not- the colonists did become involved, they often found withstanding this fact, and even because of it, the themselves fighting a poorly led, inadequately colonists persisted in their belief that father and equipped force that had been siphoned off from the brother could do the job when the time carne to more important European conflict only to keep the take down the musket. American situation in hand, not to force a quick The desperate straits of the military leaders decision. As a result of this disinterest and proeras- during the Revolutionary War did little to shake tination on the part of the mother countries, the the belief in the growing traditions of isolation, colonial militia often defeated a foreign force peace, and a let-the-militia-do-it policy of defense. which, given reasonable equahty of numbers, With the victorious conclusion of that war and its equipment, and leaders, would have been vastly aftermath of growing political unity, beliefs grew superior to their own. Such a fortunate situation, into accepted custom. They existed in 1812 when a however, was not ail to the good for the developing pitifully weak nation, hardly out of swaddling nation. clothes, challenged the most powerful nation on Gradually the belief grew among the colonists earth. The buming of the White House failed to that they were capable of defending themselves shock the American people into the realization that and that they could, when necessary, take the offen- the few regulais available were not enough and sive with every expectation of success. Taking down that the “ever faithful” militia was, at best, a very the trusty musket from over the fireplace, slinging unreliable backup. It was the victory that counted, the powder hom on the shoulder, and marching if, indeed, a victory it was. To have wrested a status off to the scene of trouble was sufRcient action in quo ante bellunx from Great Britain was considered the eyes of most colonists to repel any aggression. to be a triumph; deserved or undeserved made no Most importantly, American colonists were difference. Nothing succeeds like success, and the peace-loving people. Seldom was a thought given new nation was successful. to provoking a fight with the mother country. For Even a superficial analysis of American mili- over a hundred and fifty years after the founding tary strength in the early years of the nineteenth of Plymouth colony, the wars fought by the colo- century reveals no practical reason for a single nists were wars begun and ended in Europe—and military success. Our Navy had been relegated to fought principally over Enropean affairs. Life was Coastal patrol duty, and its vessels were fast be- prosperous and happy under England. The mother coming inadequate for that task, thanks in many country fumished all the protection needed, except respects to that stalwart forefather Thomas Jeffer- on the Indian frontjer, and fumished it nearly cost- son. Our Army was a small handful of regulars free as well. Oceans formed an isolating if not com- authorized by Congress and then promptly ignored pletely protective barrier, and the British fleet held by that parsimonious body when it carne to appro- off all but a few powers. The forests and mountains priations. Notwithstanding the individual gallantry added their natural obstacles to foreign invasion. of these regulars, they were almost completely in- Small wonder, then, that a nonmilitary, peace- effective in resisting attack, by the Indians or any- loving tradition grew up in the American colonies. one else. Right or wrong, the settlers began to believe that The nation had subscribed wholeheartedly to so long as they minded their own business they the militia system, with calls for men levied by a could look forward to peace and a profit. In the respectful Congress upon powerful and jealous event that they did not mind so well, their fathers State legislatures. If the men of a state chose not and sons, always willing, able, and trained, would to serve outside the confines of that state, more spring to their defense and protect their homes from often than not they did not! As unsatisfactory as tyrants. this system was, the citizens preferred by far this 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW method of defending their homeland. The altema- saved the United States from abject humiliation. tive, a sizable standing army, vvas not in the tradi- Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt tion of the Founding Fathers and had been proven had done what little he could for the Navy. As it unnecessary in order to obtain victory over other- turned out, the Navy had an admirai in command wise superior povvers. who was willing to fight. The Army suffered from As late as the Civil War, President Lincoln, in politieal inertia plus leadership inefficiency and embarking upon a war to preserve the Union, was had no general who knew how to fight a full-scale forced to flesh out the scant nudeus of regular war. troops by calling for volunteers. By this time State After the Spanish-American fracas was over, boundaries were no longer an obstacle, and in this there appeared in Washington a growing awareness sense our defense policv was more national in scope. of the necessity for overhauling our traditional mili- However, short periods of enlistment and militarily tary policy. It was to be a slow, frustrating process inept leaders destroyed much of the effeetiveness involving such dignitaries as Theodore Roosevelt of brave men. Our military policy at the beginning and Elihu Root, plus the writings of experienced of the Civil War remained very nearly the same as military men like General Emory Upton and Colo- in the early colonial days. Reasons for change carne nel Matthew F. Steele. Despite some remarkable hard in the face of having nearly doubled our terri- successes in reorganizing the structure of the Army, tory at the expense of México less than 13 years little headway was made against the real problem, before. México had been defeated by a few regulars public apathy. The Dick Act of 1903 finally re- of fine quality and some individually superior lead- placed the Militia Act of 1792 and gave us an ership, in spite of the policy of short enlistments Army reserve separated into two classes: the poorly of inadequately trained volunteers. If Americans trained National Guard in one and the remainder could do all that, then why change a winning of the able-bodied males, in various stages of train- formula? A few military people saw that a changing ing, in the other. It was a step in the right direction, world was to require a change in American military but barely that, and the nemesis of State control policies, but they were too few to prevail in high remained to haunt military leaders right up to councils of indifference. World War I. The end of the Civil War brought a prompt Lack of preparedness for World War I on the return to peaceful pursuits in which a military es- part of the United States is an embarrassing but tablishment had no place. After a brief military well-known fact. Like an adolescent who craves occupation of the South, barely enough soldiers importance but shuns the responsibility that ac- were maintained to man the frontier posts against companies it, America declared the “war to end the Indians. The threat of French intervention all wars” and then went about the work of getting from México in 1865 dissipated when Napoleon III ready to fight it. We were on the winning side, but deserted Maximilian. With it went any reasonable it was an Allied effort and the major share of any possibility of foreign invasion. glory goes to Britain and France. In 1919, after a When our “yellow joumalism” whipped up a short period of military occupation, the United need for armed forces in 1898, there existed in the States reverted to its usual indifference toward the entire military establishment no more than a hand- military. The interval between the two World Wars ful of officers who had ever commanded anything saw a steady decline in American military posture. bigger than a battalion of men at one time. What We sank our fleet in a fit of righteous disarmament equipment was available was totally unsuitable for fever, ignored the potential of the airplane, and fighting a tropical war. The existent staff organiza- made no effort to modernize our trench-oriented tion charged with procuring new materiais, food, weapons and tactics. and supplies was woefully inefficient and, in a few The farsightedness of a few of our between- cases, corrupt. Our weapons were antiquated be- the-wars military leaders did achieve some techno- cause the Congress had failed to appropriate money logical breakthroughs. These led to the wartime for research. Thus well prepared, the United States availability of such splendid weapons as the B-l /, embarked upon its policy of “jingoist” world ex- the aircraft carrier, and the Sherman tank, along pansion. Only the decadence of imperial Spain with well-developed amphibious warfare tactics. fíOOKS AND IDEAS 97

At the same time planners neglected the need for General Uptons famous deseription of the a long-range fighter plane until heavy casualties trials of George Washington during the Revolution forced its development. With the attack on Pearl is familiar to ali students of military history. That Harbor, Congress bought time and material with same familiarity is lost to the general public—the a vast expenditure of dollars so long denied the people w'ho most need to beeome acquainted with military forces in peacetime. Millions were spent it. Colonel Steeles vivid deseription of the meager in haste that could have been better allocated for American efforts in the War of 1812 evokes amaze- research and procurement years earlier. ment now that even the status quo ante hellum World War II and the chilly atmosphere of in- w'as achieved. complete peace that followed did seem to avvaken For each military crisis in our history, one or the American people to the necessitv of adequate two writings have been selected that best deseribe standing forces. It took the Korean “police action,” how our policy w'as formulated and how it was however, to drive home the pragmatie facts. After carried out. Only when more current times are the Japanese surrender, America had demobilized reached does the authors choice of writings grow so fast that our leaders found themselves at the a bit weak. In discussing the overall effects of our diplomatic bargaining tables with no force ade- World War II policies, he does not, for instance, quate to back up their words. Into this vacuum point up the near failure of our strategic bombing crept the Soviet menace and the condition of “no policy as brought out in the Strategic Bombing war—no peace” vvhich is still with us. Survey. A review of our military policy reveals very The selections do show the w'ay in which the little for Americans to “view' with pride.” It is a relatively new concept of “limited warfare” has policy of weakness, inept planning, indifference, changed military thinking in recent years. It would and callous abandonment of the responsibility of appear that the United States has leamed its lessons leadership. Yet it is a policy that, until the age of from the past. President Johnson, in his message to “limited war,” has consistently brought victory. Congress on the defense budget in January 1965, This dichotomy is the substance of a new book, closed his remarks by saying, “But all our experi- American Defense Policy in Perspective: From ence of two centuries reminds us that: ‘To be pre- Colonial Times to the Present.i Professor Raymond pared for w'ar is one of the most effectual means G. 0 ’Connor has edited a splendid series of articles of preserving peace.’ ” and excerpts from elassical military writings, past Hopefully the lesson is learned. This truism and present, that drives home with the consistency should have been the basis of American military of a jackhammer the theme of lack of preparedness. policy over a century and a half ago. The fact that The lessons of the past are inescapable, and it w'as not makes the study of America’s defense Professor 0 ’Connor does not sugarcoat the pill. He policy a continuing requirement in the quest for admirably resists the opportunity to moralize to his American survival in today’s uncertain situations. reader. He prefers instead to let his selections, plus his brief chapter introductions, do this for him. United States Air Force Academy They do the job magnificently.

fRaymond G. 0 ’Connor (ed.), American Defense Policy in Per- spective: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965, $7.50), 377 pp. The Contributors

H onorable Eucene M. Z uckert was Secretary o£ the Air Force from 24 January 1961 until his recent resignation. A 1937 graduate of Yale University law school and of the combined law-business course at Harvard and Yale, and a member of the Bar in Connecticut, New York, and the District of Columbia, Mr. Zuckert has practiced law only during breaks in a career devoted almost entirely to public Service. He was attomey for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington and New York, 1937-40, then was with the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1940-44, as instructor in Govemment/business rela- tions, later as Assistant Professor and Assistant Dean. During this period he was also administrative head of the first advanced management course at Harvard Graduate School, special consultant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in developing statistical Controls, instructor in the AAF Statistical Control School at Harvard. and on special assignments at various Air Force bases for the Com- manding General. In September 1945, after military Service as a LtJG in the Office of the CNO, he became Exeeutive Assistant to the Administrator of the Surplus Property Administration, Stuart Symington. When Mr. Symington became Assistant Secretary of War for Air in February 1946, Mr. Zuckert remained as his Special Assistant; and in September 1947 when Mr. Symington was named the first Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Zuckert was named Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. Appointed to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in January 1952, he served until June 1954, when he retired to work as an atomic energy consultant and attor- ney. He is the author, with Amold Kramish, of Atomic Energy for Your Business.

C olonel Alma R. F lake is Commander, 13th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Air Defense Command, Glasgow AFB, Montana. During World War II he served as a flight instructor in the Air Training Command. After four years in Statistical Services, he retumed to the cockpit to fly 100 F-51 missions with the 18th Fighter Group in the Korean War. Subsequent assignments have included command of four fighter squadrons; Director of Operations and Training, 29th Air Division (ADC); Exeeutive Officer, AF Section, MAAG, Netherlands; and Commander, 32d Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Soesterberg, Holland. Colonel Flake is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Ray W. A lvord (M.A., Stanford Uni- versity) was Chief, Personnel Evaluation Branch, 6570th Per- sonnel Research Laboratory, AMD, Air Force Systems Command, Lackland AFB, Texas, until his recent assignment to the USAFIT Ph.D. program at Stanford University. Commissioned from AFROTC, he entered active duty in 1950 as a student, Air Tactical School. After graduation he served as an intelligence officer with the 22d Bombardment Wing (SAC) in England, then was assigned to Hq Far East Air Forces in 1952. He com- pleted a USAFIT student tour at Stanford in 1955. Subsequent assignments have been at the Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, until 1958; as Assistant Professor of Air Science, Brigham Young University, to 1961; and as student, Air Com- C aptain Lyl e D. K aapke (M.A., Baylor University) was a Task mand and Staff College, 1962. Scientist, Personnel Research Laboratory, Lackland AFB, Texas, until his recent assignment to Personnel Plans and Training. Hq Air Force Systems Command, Andrews AFB, Maryland. After completing instruetor-navigation training in 1956, he served as an instructor in the FTAF Instructor Training School, James Connally AFB, Texas. In 1956-57 he attended Baylor University under Bootstrap, then retumed to Connally as Director, Instruc- tor Training School (FTAF). From 1958 to 1963 at the Air Force Academy he was successively Instructor, Department of Navi- gation; Instructor, Department of Leadership Studies; and Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology. He was Chief, Testing and Processing Division, Personnel Research Laboratory, 1963-64. Captain Kaapke is a 1958 graduate of the Squadron Officer School.

M ajor Gen er a l Chang, C hi Rya n c , is Vice Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Air Force. After graduating from the Japanese Military Academy and Japanese Army Aviation School in 1945 and from the ROK Army Academy in 1948, he became Acting Director of Operations, Hq ROKAF, in 1949. Other assignments have been as Deputv Com- mander, then Commander, lOth Fighter Group, 1953; Air Attaché, Korean Embassy, Washington, D. C., 1954; Director of Personnel, then Director of Operations, Hq ROKAF, 1956; Commander, llth Fighter Wing, ROKAF. 1958; President, Korea Tungsten Mining Company, 1961; Deputy Chief of Staff, ROKAF, 1962; Vice Chief of Staff, ROKAF, 1963; and Superintendent, Air Force Academy. ROKAF. from 1963 until his present assignment on 1 August 1964. General Chang is a 1949 graduate of the Army Staff College; a 1952 graduate of the Field Officers Course, Air University, USAF; and a 1961 graduate of the ROK National War College. C olonel Harold R. J ohnson (M.S., George Washington University) is assígned to duty with the Director of Telecommunications Management, Executive Office of the President. During World War II he served as a combat bombardicr with the Eighth Air Force. In 1946 he completed pilot training and then specialized in the research and development and advanced technology of telecommunications. He was with Air- ways and Air Communications Service, 1946-54. Since that time he has been associated with microwave and tropospheric forward scatter wideband Communications. At SHAPE from 1955 to 1958, he participated in the NATO ACE HIGH troposcatter project. As Chief, Plans Branch, Directorate of Telecommunications, Hq USAF, 1958-62, he worked on Dew East, White Alice, BMEWS, most of the Air Force’* wideband Communications Systems, and Telstar. Assígned to the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering, 1962-64, he was Assistant Director of Technical Support for the National Military Command System. Colonel Johnson, a 1965 graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, has published numerous technical papers in his field.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Harold L. H it c h e n s (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is a member of the Long Range Planning Division, Hq USAF. During World War II he was an instruetor pilot and a B-29 aircraft commander. Recalled to active duty in 1951, he served in the Korean War as pilot and flight commander in a B-26 night intruder squadron until 1953. Subsequent assignments have been as test pilot and project officer, Air Proving Ground; Assistant Professor of Air Science, Virgínia Military Institute, 1953-55; on the faculty of the Air Force Academy 1955-58 and faculty secretary 1959-63; and as a member of the policy panei, Project FORECAST, 1963. Colonel Hitchens has edited several books and written articles for several professional joumals.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel John E. M ock (Ph.D., Purdue Univer- sity) has been an Associate Professor of Mathematics at the George Washington University and at the U.S. Air Force Acade- my. He has been associated with research and development in propulsion at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, with air techni- cal intelligence in Germany, and with high-altitude nuclear weapons effects and testing in the Defense Atomic Support Agency. He has published numerous scientific articles and was the recipient of the American Nuclear Society’s annual Mark Mills Award in 1960. He has been a consultant in the field of space Science to the National Science Foundation, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and several other Government agencies.

S ec o n d L ie u t e n a n t W il l a r d E. H obbs, J r . ( B.S., USAFA) was as- signed as a mathematician, Data Sys- tems Division, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, Califórnia, upon graduation from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1965. As a mathe- matics major at the Academy, he was active in the Mathematics Club.

L ie u t e n a n t Co mma n der Forrest Forsythe, USN (M.A., Tulane University) is a member of the staff of the NATO Weapon Systems Department, United States Army School, Europe, located at Oberammergau, Germany. Commander Forsythe has served in Fighter Squadrons 14 and 173 and in Light Photographic Squadron 61. From 1957 to 1959 he was assígned as Assistant Operations Olficer and Weapons Employment Officer of USS Shangri-La. He has spent considerable time with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. He has been in his present post since April 1964. M ajor Guy H. M oates (B.S., William and Mary College) is a Research Chemist, I Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, Massachusetts. He served as a navi- | gator in the Eighth Air Force during World War II and retumed to active duty in ,| the Korean War. His assignments have included troop carrier, tactical reconnais- 1 sanee, and Military Air Transport Service. During an assignment at AFCRL in i 1955-59 he worked in the preparation of high-purity materiais, and since his retum | in 1963 he has worked principally with synthesis and purification of semiconductor i compounds. Major Moates is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College. . . . D r . M arvin S. B rooks (Ph.D., Baylor University) is a Physical Chemist, Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories. Prior to joining AFCRL he was with the | Naval Research Laboratories, Washington, D.C. His areas of research interest are in I synthesis, purification, and property measurements of optical and electronic mate- j riais. . . . Dr . A lton F. A rmincton (Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University) is a Research Chemist in the Solid State Sciences Laboratory, Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories. He was previously employed at the Naval Research Labora- tory and the Pennsylvania State University. At AFCRL he is involved in the synthe- sis and purification of new materiais and has published or presented approximately thirty papers on these subjects.

C olonel Hohace W. L anford, J r . (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is As- sistant for Management, Deputy for Systems Management, Aeronáutica] Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, W right-Patterson AFB, Ohio. After completing flying training in 1940 he served as a flying instruc- tor. During World War II he was commander of a B-24 squadron in Italy and later executive officer of an ail-weather fighter wing in Japan with the Army of Occupation. Subsequent assignments have been in Systems M ajor Wil l ia m D. C lement (M.S., Uni- management of both aircraft and mis- versity of New Hampshire; M.B.A., Univer- siles, the most recent as System Pro- sity of Chicago) is Air Force Representative, gram Director, V/STOL Transport Aerospace Environmental Facility, Amold System Program Office, ASD, AFSC. Engineering Development Center. During World War II he served as Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer, Oklahoma City Air De- pot, 1942-43; Chief, Production Control, First Base Air Depot, Burtonwood, England, 1943-45; and Transportation Officer, Third Base Air Depot, Taunton, England, 1945-46. While teaching mechanical engineering at the University of New Hampshire 1946-57, he was active in the Air Force Reserve. Recalled to active duty in June 1957, he taught in the Dn. R aymond E st ep (Ph.D., Univer- Mechanics Department, Air Force Institute of sity of Texas) is a historian in the Technology, until September 1960. Since Documentary Research Division, 1961 he has been with AEDC, first with the Aerospace Studies Institute, Air Uni- headquarters, then with the Rocket Test Fa- versity. As a member of the Air cility, 1962-64, when he assumed his present University faculty since 1946, he has duty. written some dozen book-length studies on intemational affairs, trans- portation, and air power. An authority on Latin America, Dr. Estep has vis- ited and studied in 17 Latin-American nations since 1958 and is the auihur of The Latin American Nations Today: A Study of Political Developments since World War II (Documentary Research Division, 1964).

M ajor John H. S crivner, J r . (M.A., University of Oklahoma) is an instructor in History and chairman of the American History course, U.S. Air Force Academy. He served in the U.S. Army 1944-46 and was commissioned in the Air Force from AFROTC upon graduation from the University of Kansas, 1950. His assignments have heen in supply and property accounting at Langley AFB, Virginia, 1951-53; at Spangdahlem, Germany, 1953-56; at McGhee-Tyson AFB, Tennessee, 1956-58; at VVright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1958; at Dobbins AFB, Geórgia, 1958-60; at Thule, Greenland. 1960-61; and at University of Oklahoma from 1961 until his assignment to the Air Force Academy in July 1963. He was Executive Officer of the History Department until his present duty in July 1965. EDITORIAL STAFF

Lieu t en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Dou ns, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Major R obert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition fíranch E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrativo Manager John A. W est c o t t , J r „ Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Ph.D., Associaic Editor, Spanish Languagv Edition L. Mido si May Patterson, Assista nt Editor, Portuguesc Languagv Edition

ADV1SERS

C olonel G len W. C lark. Hq Air Defense Command C olunei. W il l ia m J. Mc G in rv. //i/ Air Force Systems Command C olonel Joseph A. S tuaht, J r ., //

C olonel Kenneth F. G antz, USAF ( Ret), Historícal Adviser

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel J ack R ose, Hq United States Strike Command

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel J umes F. S unuerman, II q Pacific Air Forces

Harry A. H abemeh, //(/ Air Fura Logistics Command

L a V ekn e E. W oods. IIq Air Force Cunibriclge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION Air Umversity Review is pubtished to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, stralegy, tactics, and reloted techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or tbe investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of lhe Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sharpIII edge of analysis II STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS . . . NEW AIR WAR COLLEGE . . . DIRIGIBLES RECONSIDERED. . . NORTH COUNTRY RESUPPLY

JANUARY- FEBRUARY 1966