Past, Present and Future Logistics of the British Army

Where Do We Go From Here? Past, Present and Future Logistics of the British Army David M Moore and Peter D Antill Introduction The threat that was presented to Western Europe by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact during the Cold War forced NATO countries to concentrate scarce resources on providing combat systems that provided the maximum deterrent value. This unfortunately, was at the expense of combat service support (CSS), forcing the British Army to rely on the secure lines of communication through allied countries and prepositioning of stocks both forward and in the rear areas. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union has caused Western armed forces to focus on force projection, expeditionary operations and manoeuvre warfare, given that there is no longer a direct threat to Western Europe. This necessitates a move from a Just-in-Case (JIC) approach, with large-scale stockpiling at all levels of the logistic chain, to one that is nearer a Just-in-Time (JIT) approach. This will mean a greater emphasis on the ability of commanders to more accurately predict their requirements will be dependent on total asset visibility and guaranteed lines of communication. In working to reduce the risks still inherent in trying to provide such operational logistic support, the military should remain aware of the potential contribution that commercial organisations can provide. In the past, the military have traditionally had a less than enthusiastic attitude about the potential benefits to be gained from industry. Contracts were often characterised by a confrontational attitude but are now moving to a far more positive stance and a co-operative relationship where both risks and benefits can be shared. The Labour Government’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR), published in July 1998, aimed to “remodel Britain’s defence policy and Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the next century. The government’s aim is strong, modern and cost-effective defence, now and for the longer term”. 1 It is very likely that there will be a continuing, if not increased contribution to international peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention operations, some of which may be of considerable duration and logistically very challenging. The size and scope may also vary, although the review outlined the requirement that the Armed Forces should be able to carry out two medium-sized contingency operations at the same time. It also highlighted that the Armed Forces will need to go to the operation rather than have the operation come to them. The areas that they may have to deploy to are unlikely to have the same levels of infrastructure as those of Western Europe and that forces may “have to sustain non- warfighting operations for indefinite periods whilst retaining the ability to respond to other contingencies. This calls for rather different force projection capabilities than we have needed in the past.” 2 Sustainability, which can be defined as “the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives” 3, has grown in importance and necessity now that the Cold War is over. The difficulties involved in achieving the right level of sustainability should not be 1 The Strategic Defence Review , The Stationary Office, London, July 1998, p. 53. 2 Op Cit. The Strategic Defence Review , Supporting Essay 6, p. 4. 3 White, M S. “How Can We Meet the Logistic Requirements of Forces Deployed at Some Distance from the UK?”, RUSI Journal , October 1996, p. 32. 1 underestimated as “setting appropriate levels of logistic sustainability is a difficult task in an environment where there is no apparent adversary, and where the new risks are less clearly defined than before”. 4 With the ‘peace dividend’ bringing a reduction of the defence budget by some 23% in real terms and the British Armed Forces being cut back by a third, new operational imperatives have placed increasing strain on the Armed Forces, particularly in their ability to sustain overseas operations. 5 This paper will focus on the logistics approach as used by the British Armed Forces during the Cold War, what it is today and what future operations may involve. It will also look at certain aspects of commercial logistics practice and see what could be applied to the British Armed Forces. Current British Army Logistics and The Legacy of the Cold War Throughout history, logistics has had an important influence on the conduct of military operations. Indeed, many an operation has owed its success or failure to the logistics preparation or lack of it. “Throughout the struggle, it was in his logistic inability to maintain his armies in the field that the enemy’s fatal weakness lay. Courage his forces had in full measure, but courage was not enough.” 6 It must be remembered that it is not merely the amassing of men and materiel that counts, but also the balanced and timely application of those resources at hand that is as important. If applied correctly, such logistics support can have a force multiplier effect. Logistics are required to sustain operations and provide a link to those forces on active duty from the strategic resources held in the UK. It is “the process whereby organisation, management and direction transforms human and materiel inputs to confer sustainability, is a continuum – an uninterrupted and ordered flow”. 7 Logistics has also been described as “the bridge connecting a nation’s economy to its warfighting forces”. 8 During the Cold War, the UK and NATO countered the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact by adopting a positional defence strategy in Central Europe. A significant proportion of NATO’s combat forces was positioned forward in West Germany (although not necessarily in their wartime deployment areas). Reinforcement plans existed however, to deploy the remainder there as quickly as possible should an emergency arise and were practised from time to time (for example the REFORGER exercises practised by the United States, and Exercise LIONHEART by the UK). The force was configured at a variety of readiness standards (to indicate the amount of time needed to prepare for combat) in order to fight (it assumed) a short, high intensity conventional war. 9 The defensive posture was based upon the ‘layer cake’ principle 10 with a designated Alliance member being responsible for a section of the line. 11 4 Saunders, D J. “UK Logistics Planning – The Way Ahead”, RUSI Journal , December 1992, p. 24. 5 Op Cit. The Strategic Defence Review , p. 6. 6 General Eisenhower, quoted in Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 3, Logistics . DGD&D/18/34/63, Army Code No. 71566, June 1996, p. 1-2. 7 Ibid . p. 1-2. 8 Op Cit. “How Can We Meet the Logistic Requirements of Forces Deployed at Some Distance from the UK?”, p. 31. 9 Op Cit . “UK Logistics Planning – The Way Ahead”, p. 22. 10 Evans, M. “NATO’s Evolving Concept for Armoured Warfare on the Central Front: Implications for the British Army”, British Army Review , Number 98, August 1991, p. 23. 11 Ibid . p. 23. 2 As a result, British logistic philosophy since 1945 has been to concentrate on linear lines of supply to sustain defensive operations in Central Europe. To counter the perceived threat from those Warsaw Pact forces stationed in East Germany, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was stationed around the North German Plain close to its predetermined deployment positions. On mobilisation BAOR would become the 1st British (BR) Corps and its defensive plan had been rehearsed and developed over a number of years to counter the known Warsaw Pact threat. The defensive plan called for NATO forces to attempt to inflict maximum casualties on the numerically superior Warsaw Pact while trying to preserve themselves. In delaying the Warsaw Pact, forward NATO forces would hope to buy time for reinforcements to be flown in from the UK and USA. 12 To sustain this sort of deployment, the scale of logistics support was massive and the accepted NATO stock level was for thirty days worth of supplies. 1 st (BR) Corps stocks were held at successive levels, from the first line in unit stores, through forward storage sites, corps ordnance and ammunition depots and finally in rear combat zone depots such as Bracht and Antwerp. The main problem was in the out-loading of stocks as much of the third line transport was to be provided by the Territorial Army (TA), and there would be a question as to how quickly the TA could be mobilised in the event of an emergency. After battle was joined, NATO would fall back upon its Lines of Communications (LofC) with the logistic burden gradually reducing. What was not fully appreciated was the vast quantities of ammunition that would be required on a day-to-day basis to supply mobile artillery batteries (up to 450 rounds per day per gun) 13 and that logistic units would probably suffer high casualties in that “there will be logistic losses caused by attrition of the logistic chain with some losses perhaps as high as 50 per cent”. 14 The logistic structure of 1 st (BR) Corps was based around both functional and hierarchical divisions of responsibility. As a result, there was little integration of resources or joint planning, and so supplies had to pass through a series of functional ‘stove pipes’. 15 Information flows were thus fragmented and so the tracking of items whilst in transit was virtually impossible as was the gathering of real-time information regarding theatre stock levels. As a counter, a just-in-case logistics system was operated with safety and buffer stocks operated throughout the supply chain.

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