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Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance

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Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance Policy Briefing Asia Briefing N°96 Kabul/Brussels, 25 November 2009 Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance the United Nations Development Programme’s Enhanc- I. OVERVIEW ing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) program was heavily involved in planning, preparations President Hamid Karzai’s re-election on 2 November and logistics. The international community was thus 2009, following widespread fraud in the 20 August presi- perceived by Afghans as an active participant in the dential and provincial polls, has delivered a critical blow flawed process. When the U.S., European Union and to his government’s legitimacy. The deeply flawed polls UNAMA representatives quickly declared the elections have eroded public confidence in the electoral process a qualified success, these early endorsements may have and in the international community’s commitment to the cost them what little currency they had left with the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Concentration Afghan public. The head of UNAMA’s failure to take of power in the executive to the exclusion of the legis- decisive corrective action when evidence of fraud sur- lature and judiciary has also resulted in a fundamental faced has badly damaged the UN’s standing in the coun- breakdown in governance while strengthening the hand try. Most Afghans believe that the political expedience of the insurgency. To restore stability, vigorous consti- of the rubber stamp was preferred to an honest assess- tutional reform under the aegis of a loya jirga must be ment of systemic flaws in a process the international undertaken; an impartial commission of inquiry into the community had helped put in place and then failed to flawed elections should be formed; the UN Mission in remedy. Afghanistan (UNAMA) should be restructured to restore credibility; and prompt steps must be taken to strengthen Preliminary results released on 16 September 2009 in- institutions. dicated Karzai as the winner over Abdullah by 54.6 to 27.7 percent. A protracted investigation into claims of The presidential and provincial polls, the second set of electoral fraud eventually led the Electoral Complaints elections since the ouster of the Taliban eight years Commission (ECC) on 18 October 2009 to disqualify ago, were held at a time of escalating insurgency and nearly a quarter of the overall votes cast, necessitating a severe economic stagnation. Insecurity hampered candi- run-off between the two top candidates. Following in- dates’ mobility and drove down voter turnout. An under- tense pressure primarily from the U.S., Karzai agreed to resourced security sector, combined with Taliban military face Abdullah in a second round of polls. However, gains, severely limited the ability of Afghan and inter- Abdullah ultimately withdrew from the contest, citing national forces to protect candidates and voters. Violence concerns about electoral fraud, given the government’s during the campaign and on election day and vote rigging failure to enact any meaningful reform of the electoral brought into clear focus the challenges that lie ahead in institutions. planning for the 2010 parliamentary and district coun- cil elections. Karzai’s retention of power under these circumstances has bolstered the impression that the international com- Allegations of systemic fraud emerged even before Kar- munity is disinterested in or incapable of checking the zai and his chief challenger, former Foreign Minister corruption that has metastasised under his watch. To Abdullah Abdullah, each declared victory. Reports of ensure against a further decline in public confidence, intimidation, ballot stuffing, ghost polling stations and the international community must press harder for anti- interference by staff of the Independent Election Commis- corruption measures and for the appointment of respected sion (IEC) and candidate agents surfaced countrywide, individuals to the cabinet and provincial governorships. but especially where insecurity led to an absence of female electoral staff, candidate agents and election The electoral fraud was a direct consequence of failure observers. to build the capacity of government institutions. Since the 2004 presidential vote, the international community Although the elections were held for the first time osten- – UNAMA in particular – repeatedly turned a blind eye sibly under sole Afghan stewardship, UNAMA through to the looming crisis of credibility rooted in an unsound Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°96, 25 November 2009 Page 2 process. The August vote laid bare disagreements be- judiciary and legislature; and the strengthening of pro- tween different international actors and within the new vincial and district level governance through a mean- American administration, whose lack of clear policy in ingful devolution of authority and resources; and Kabul undermined their ability to press for necessary changes ahead of the elections. The polls severely dam- resignation of UNAMA chief and SRSG Eide, since aged UNAMA’s ability to function effectively, weaken- he has lost the confidence of many on his staff and ing its internal morale and sharply eroding Afghan con- the necessary trust of many parts of the Afghan pol- fidence in Kai Eide, the Special Representative of Sec- ity, accompanied by a thorough re-evaluation of UN retary-General Ban Ki-moon (SRSG). The UN’s mission ELECT’s advisory role with the view to ensuring to bring stability to the country has been severely jeop- more robust support for Afghanistan’s electoral in- ardised. His effectiveness as head of mission will always stitutions and processes. remain in doubt. If UNAMA’s credibility is to be re- stored, Eide must step down. II. THE CAMPAIGN The international community has too often acted as if the election cycle was merely a box to check off. It A. THE CANDIDATES needs to recognise that impending decisions about mili- tary strategies, troop levels and state-building concepts The post-nomination campaign opened on 16 June 2009 may matter little if it does not cauterise the damage. in the shadow of a sharply deteriorating security envi- The measures that should be urgently put in place and ronment, declining public confidence in President Kar- vigorously supported specifically by the U.S. and the zai’s government and growing scepticism about the UN include: electoral process.1 With the Taliban dominating most of the south east and expanding their presence to the north restrictions on the size of the cabinet, and thorough and west, Interior Minister Hanif Atmar estimated, two vetting of cabinet and provincial governor appointees, months ahead of the elections, that eleven of some 390 barring nominees with demonstrated links to armed districts were under complete Taliban control and an- groups or criminal activities from joining the govern- other 120 faced serious threats.2 ment; By the end of the challenge period, 41 presidential and the formation of an impartial commission of inquiry 3,178 provincial council contenders remained in con- composed of respected Afghan and international tests that emphasised personal style over political sub- experts to conduct a thorough public review of the stance and exacerbated ethnic divisions.3 Among the 20 August 2009 elections; the National Assembly’s presidential candidates, two were women, as were 10 use of its full sanctioning powers against those sus- per cent of the provincial council candidates. With vio- pected of abusing their offices to influence the polls; lence, intimidation and aggressive political bargaining and vigorous criminal prosecution by the attorney general and courts of those involved in flagrant vio- lations of the law, whether candidates, IEC staff or government officials; 1 For an analysis of the security and political situation preced- consultations among relevant Afghan and international ing the 20 August polls, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°171, actors to achieve consensus on immediate steps to Afghanistan’s Election Challenges, 4 June 2009, and Asia Brief- strengthen the machinery for the 2010 elections, in- ing N°89, Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, New Direc- cluding the timely delineation of district boundaries tions, 13 March 2009. for district council elections; enhanced penalties for 2 Nikola Krastev, “Afghan election environment improving, misuse of state resources during the campaign; clari- but obstacles remain, panel says”, Radio Free Europe/Radio fication of the shape and scope of the IEC and ECC Liberty (RFE/RL), 4 July 2009. 3 to build sustainable mechanisms to enforce electoral During the challenge period, 90 provincial council candidates, including thirteen women, and one presidential candidate standards and arbitrate disputes; and reconstitution withdrew. Another 56 candidates – two presidential, one vice of the IEC Secretariat and IEC Board with the in- presidential and 53 provincial council – were disqualified for volvement of parliament and other stakeholders in the links to illegal armed groups. The Electoral Complaints Com- appointment process; mission (ECC) additionally disqualified two candidates – one from Kunar, another from Nimroz – for failing to resign gov- convocation of a loya jirga with the express purpose ernment positions. One initially disqualified provincial candi- of undertaking constitutional reform, including con- date was restored after investigation. See “Final List of Presi- sultations on the role of the Supreme Court; separa- dential and Provincial Council
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