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THE GLOVES COME OFF, PART II Book Title: American Pluto Press Chapter Title: THE GLOVES COME OFF, PART II Book Title: American Torture Book Subtitle: From the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond Book Author(s): MICHAEL OTTERMAN Published by: Pluto Press. (2007) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183q5n6.14 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Pluto Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Torture This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Mon, 11 May 2020 00:46:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 10 THE GLOVES COME OFF, PART II n 1 May 2003, President Bush strode triumphantly across Othe tarmac of the USS Lincoln and declared under a banner that read ‘Mission Accomplished’ that major combat operations in Iraq were offi cially over. ‘The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th 2001—and still goes on’, said Bush. Three months later, US forces were engaged in an increasingly deadly ground war. Since Bush’s triumphant speech, the insurgency in Iraq had grown stronger and better organised. In turn, the Pentagon demanded better intelligence from the fi eld. On 14 August 2002, Captain William Ponce, an Army military intelligence (MI) offi cer, wrote an e-mail to interrogators stationed throughout Iraq soliciting a ‘wish list’ of techniques they’d like to use on detainees. In the e-mail, Ponce introduced the concept of unlawful combatants, a term originally used only to describe al Qaeda and Taliban fi ghters captured in Afghanistan. Iraq, in contrast, is a theatre of war where the Geneva Conventions explicitly apply. While lawful combatants, said Ponce, ‘receive protections of the Geneva Conventions and gain combat immunity for their warlike acts, as well as become prisoners of war if captured’, unlawful combatants ‘may be treated as criminals under the domestic law of the captor … [and] may include spies, saboteurs, or civilians who are participating in the hostilities’. Ponce wrote: ‘The gloves are coming off gentlemen regarding these detainees, Col. [Steven] Boltz has made it clear that we want these individuals broken. Casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from further attacks … MI ALWAYS OUT FRONT!’ This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Mon, 11 May 2020 00:46:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms OOttermantterman - AAmericanmerican TTortureorture PPAGE161AGE161 116161 115/12/065/12/06 110:22:480:22:48 AAMM 162 American Torture Four days later, an interrogator from the 4th Infantry Division, stationed in Tikrit, requested authorisation for techniques above and beyond the limits of the 1992 Army interrogation fi eld manual. According to the interrogator, ‘There are a number of “coercive” tech- niques that may be employed that cause no permanent harm to the subject’. These include striking the subject with a telephone book, low-voltage electrocution, closed-fi st blows, and inducing muscle fatigue—techniques that ‘often call for medical personnel to be on call for unforeseen complications’. A veteran interrogator with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, based in Qaim in western Iraq, also responded to Ponce’s request. ‘Our intelligence doctrine is based on former Cold War and WWII enemies’, he complained, adding that ‘today’s enemy’ understands ‘force, not psychological mind games or incentives’. The interrogator suggested a range of techniques used by ‘SERE instructors’ including ‘close confi nement quarters, sleep depri- vation, white noise, and … harsher fear-up approaches’. In particular, ‘fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely’. He added: ‘I fi rmly agree that the gloves need to come off.’ These discussions were used in part to develop a new list of interrogation techniques that would be permissible in Iraq. On 10 September and 14 September 2003, Lieutenant General Ricardo A. Sanchez, then top Army commander in Iraq, authorised a coercive interrogation program for military interrogators that he said was ‘modelled’ on the one implemented at Guantánamo Bay. The fact that Iraqi detainees were subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions did not appear to limit the range of techniques approved. Among others, Sanchez authorised stress positions (‘sitting, standing, kneeling, prone, etc.’), sleep management (‘not to exceed 72 contin- uous hours’), isolation (subject to ‘medical and psychological review’), yelling, loud music and/or light control (‘used to create fear, disorient detainee, and prolong capture shock’), a harsh ‘fear-up’ approach (‘signifi cantly increasing the fear level in a detainee’), ‘futility’ (‘invoking the feeling of futility in a detainee’) and fi nally, the presence of military working dogs (‘exploits Arab fear of dogs’). Sanchez noted that these techniques should be used if ‘the detainee is medically and operationally evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques to be used in combination)’ and that they are performed in ‘the presence or availability of qualifi ed medical personnel’. This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Mon, 11 May 2020 00:46:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms OOttermantterman - AAmericanmerican TTortureorture PPAGE162AGE162 116262 115/12/065/12/06 110:22:480:22:48 AAMM The Gloves Come Off, Part II 163 The September memos are rife with contradictions. Sanchez himself notes that these techniques were to be used in ‘a theatre of war in which the Geneva Conventions apply’, but one technique listed, called ‘Incentive/Removal of Incentive’, consists of ‘providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those that are required by the Geneva Convention, from detainees’. In brackets, Sanchez adds: Caution: Other nations that believe detainees are entitled to EPW [Enemy Prisoner of War] protections may consider that provision and retention of religious items (e.g. Koran) are pro- tected under international law … Although the provisions of the Geneva Convention are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to application of the technique. Another example of this confl ict appears after the description of ‘environmental manipulation’. Here, Sanchez adds: ‘Caution: Based on court cases in other countries, some nations may view application of this technique in certain circumstances to be inhumane. Consideration of these views should be given prior to use of this technique.’ The muddled directives ‘have caused a great deal of confusion as to the status of detainees’, said a staff sergeant with the 104th Military Battalion. One interrogator who requested guidance from superiors was required to attend a presentation by two military lawyers. According to the interrogator, fi rst the lawyers showed slides. He recalled: Some of the slides were about the laws of war, the Geneva Convention, but it was kind of a starting-off point for them to kind of spout off, you know: why we don’t have to follow these Geneva Convention articles and so forth. Like, you know, inhumane and degrading treatment, well, this specifi cally relates to POWs, so we don’t have to do this. So basically, we can do inhumane and degrading treatment. And then they went on to the actual treatment itself, what we were doing, what we’d signed off on and those types of things: cold water and nudity, strobe lights, loud music—that’s not inhumane because they’re able to rebound from it. And they claim no lasting mental effects or physical marks or anything, or permanent damage of any kind, so it’s not inhumane ... I was very annoyed with them because This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Mon, 11 May 2020 00:46:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms OOttermantterman - AAmericanmerican TTortureorture PPAGE163AGE163 116363 115/12/065/12/06 110:22:480:22:48 AAMM 164 American Torture they were saying things like we didn’t have to abide by the Geneva Conventions, because these people weren’t POWs … It just went against everything we learned … According to Tony Lagouranis, another Army interrogator stationed in Iraq: ‘Early on, it seemed like as long as you didn’t seriously injure or kill a prisoner, you were within the guidelines … Death crosses the line, but you know, torture doesn’t.’ A sergeant with the 82nd Airborne Division agreed. He said: ‘Leadership failed to provide clear guidance so we just developed it. They wanted intel. As long as no PUCs [Persons Under Control] came up dead it happened. We heard rumors of PUCs dying so we were careful. We kept it to broken arms and legs and shit.’ On 12 October, Sanchez issued a new directive rolling back some of the SERE techniques authorised in the September memos. The October memo did not ban the use of coercive techniques, but directed that approval should fi rst be sought before the techniques are employed. The October directive includes the following advice: In employing each of the authorized approaches, the interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation. The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the inter- rogation, to include the lighting, heating, and confi guration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security detainee. This familiar passage was lifted nearly word-for-word from the superseded 1987 version of the Intelligence Interrogation fi eld manual.
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