OPERATION DARK HEART

SPYCRAFT AND SPECIAL OPS ON THE FRONTLINES OF -AND THE PATH TO VICTORY

LT. COL. ANTHONY SHAFFER

THOMAS DUNNE BOOKS

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS ~ NEW YORK xvi GLOSSARY xiv GLOSSARY

Fort-NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Md. FRAGO-fragmentary order FRAGO-fragmentary order G2-army director of intelligence G2-army director of intelligence HIG-Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin-terrorist group founded by Gulbuddin HESCO-a modem gabion made of wire mesh containers lined with heavy Hekmatyar fabric and filled with dirt and rocks. HOC-HUMINT Operations Center HIG-Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin-terrorist group founded by Gulbuddin HQ-Headquarters Hekmatyar HSD-HUMINT Support Detachment HOC-HUMINT Operations Center HSE-HUMINT Support Element HQ-Headquarters HUMINT-Human Intelligence HSD-HUMINT Support Detachment HVT-High Value Target HSE-HUMINT Support Element ID-identification; identify HUMINT-Human Intelligence IG-Inspector General HVT-High Value Target INSCOM-Army Intelligence and Security Command ID-identification; identify IRGC-Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps IG-Inspector General ISAF-Intemational Security Assistance Force INS COM-Army Intelligence and Security Command lSI-Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence J2-senior intelligence officer, joint staff ISAF-International Security Assistance Force J3-director for operations, joint staff lSI-Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence JDAMs-Joint direct attack munition J2-senior intelligence officer, joint staff JSOC-Joint Special Operations Command J3-director for operations, joint staff JSOTF-Joint Special Operations Task Force JDAMs-Joint direct attack munition JSTAR-airborne surveillance and target attack radar sytem JSOC-Joint Special Operations Command LIWA-Army's Land Information Warfare Activity JSOTF-Joint Special Operations Task Force LTC-Leadership Training Cell JSTAR-airbome surveillance and target attack radar sytem LZ-Landing Zone LIWA-Army's Land Information Warfare Activity MIDB-Military Intelligence Database LTC-Leadership Targeting Cell MP-military police LZ-Landing Zone MRE-meal ready to eat MIDB-Military Intelligence Database NCO-noncommissioned officer MP-military police NFN-National File Number MRE-meal ready to eat NIMA-National Imagery and Mapping Agency NCO-noncommissioned officer NSA-National Security A!!"encv GLOSSARY xvii GLOSSARY xv

NVGs-Night-Vision Goggles NIMA-National Imagery and Mapping Agency OIC-Officer in Charge NSA- ROE-Rules of Engagement NVGs-Night-Vision Goggles RPG-rocket-propelled grenade OIC-Officer in Charge SA-7-Soviet-made SAM (surface to air missile) a.k.a. GRAIL or Strela-2 ROE-Rules of Engagement SAW-Squad Automatic Weapon RPG-rocket-propelled grenade SCIF-Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility SA-7-Soviet-made SAM (surface to air missile) a.k.a. GRAIL or Strela-2 SF-Special Forces SAW-Squad Automatic Weapon SIGINT-Signals Intelligence SelF-Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility SOCOM-U.S. Special Operations Command SF-Special Forces TAREX-TARget EXploitation. Small-unit, up-close, intelligence-gathering operatives. Usually two-to-three-man units SOCOM-U.S. Special Operations Command TOC-Tactical Operations Center Voice-Sail-NSA nickname for intercept of wireless communications signals TOC-Tactical Operations Center VTC-video teleconferencing center in SCIF

VTC-video teleconferencing center in SClF 30 OPERATION DARK HEART 30 OPERATION DARK HEART in their beams. There was a big, V-shaped conference table and various in their beams. There was a big, V-shaped conference table and various openings to other tents/offices off the main area. openings to other tents/offices off the main area. The tents were insulated, air-conditioned, and heated, but still hot The tents were insulated, air-conditioned, and heated, but still hot as hell in the summer and, I was to discover, damned cold in the win­ as hell in the summer and, I was to discover, damned cold in the win­ ter. On windy days-which was most days in Bagram-the wind ter. On windy days-which was most days in Bagram-the wind sucked and blew at the tent walls, flapping them with such force and sucked and blew at the tent walls, flapping them with such force and volume that we often had to pause in meetings and wait for the gales volume that we often had to pause in meetings and wait for the gales to die down before resuming. to die down before resuming. One of the first people we ran into was Lt. Gen. John Vines, com­ One of the first people we ran into was Lt. Gen. John Vines, com­ mander of the V.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Vines had mander of the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Vines had assumed command of the Afghanistan operation in May, although he assumed command of the Afghanistan operation in May, although he had been in country for nine months as commander of the 82nd Air­ had been in country for nine months as commander of the 82nd Air­ borne Division. He was leaving the SCIF after his daily morning borne Division. He was leaving the SCIF after his daily morning situation brief when Rich introduced us. Vines grabbed my hand for situation brief when Bill introduced us. Vines grabbed my hand for a swift, firm shake. a swift, firm shake. "Good to meet you, Major Stryker," he said. "Glad to have you "Good to meet you, he said. "Glad to have you here." My first impression was of a direct, no-nonsense leader. here." My first impression was of a direct, no-nonsense leader. Inside the SCIF, I started to meet members of the team I would be Inside the SCIF, I started to meet members of the team I would be fighting this war with, starting with Navy Lt. Cmdr. David Weiding, fighting this war with, starting with Navy Lt. Cmdr. David Christen­ chief of the National Security Agency's activities in Afghanistan. son, a Senior Naval Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan. "Welcome aboard, shipmate," he said, extending a hand. With sat­ "Welcome aboard, shipmate," he said, extending a hand. With sat­ ellites, bugs, receivers, antennas, and a bunch of other very classified ellites, bugs, receivers, antennas, and a bunch of other equipment signals intelligence (or SIGINT), Dave and his people kept an ear out Dave and his people kept an ear out for the bad guys from the air and from the ground. Lean and com­ for the bad guys from the air and from the ground. Lean and com­ pact, blond and blue-eyed, Dave was the resident "lib" who became­ pact, blond and blue-eyed, Dave was the resident "lib" who became­ despite his politics-one of my closest allies. despite his politics-one of my closest allies. Because Dave had the appropriate clearances and background, I Because Dave had the appropriate clearances and background, I was able to tell him I'd worked with NSA on previous assignments, was able to tell him I'd worked with • on previous assignments, including a recent one in which an NSA guy was embedded in my including a recent one in which _ was embedded in my unit to run cyber projects. Dave looked impressed and said he wanted unit to Dave looked impressed and said he wanted to learn more about that operation. to learn more about that operation. The human intelligence tent where I would be working had a kind The human intelligence tent where I would be working had a kind of a submarine feel to it-long and narrow, with a plywood floor and of a submarine feel to it-long and narrow, with a plywood floor and computers slapped down on long tables along the perimeter. Dust was computers slapped down on long tables along the perimeter. Dust was 'WE WILL KILL THE INFIDELS" 55 'WE WILL KILL THE INFIDELS' 55 under agreements with the Paks, we couldn't pursue them into Paki­ under agreements with the Paks, we couldn't pursue them into Paki­ stan. We had to be smarter, quicker, more cunning. stan. We had to be smarter, quicker, more cunning. Dave leaned forward again. Clearly, he'd been thinking about this Dave leaned forward again. Clearly, he'd been thinking about this for a while. "I understand that we're focusing on leadership targeting, for a while. "I understand that we're focusing on leadership targeting, but I'd like us to work together to provide actionable intelligence to but I'd like us to work together to provide actionable intelligence to the 10th Mountain so they can more effectively counter the offensive." the 10th Mountain so they can more effectively counter the offen­ "What do you have in mind?" I asked, now sitting with all four sive." chair legs on the floor and paying close attention. "What do you have in mind?" I asked, now sitting with all four "I'd like us to combine intel for the effort," said Dave. chair legs on the floor and paying close attention. Whoa. This was radical. There are huge ownership issues over "I'd like us to combine inte! for the effort," said Dave. intel. Intelligence agencies like to keep their info in silos, send it in Whoa. This was radical. There are huge ownership issues over for analysis, and treat it as proprietary. At the Fort (the NSA head­ inte!' Intelligence agencies like to keep their info in silos, send it in quarters at Fort Meade, Maryland,) analysts normally do triage and for analysis, and treat it as proprietary. In Washington _ give you back what they think you need-and you never get every­ analysts normally do triage and give you thing. back what they think you need-and you never get everything. "You want our raw source info?" I wanted to make sure I knew "You want our raw source info?" I wanted to make sure I knew what he was requesting. what he was requesting. "Well," Dave said carefully, "it would be useful. We could infuse the "Well," Dave said carefully, "it would be useful. We could infuse the data for any known terrorist, warlord, or enabler-anything you have." data for any known terrorist, warlord, or enabler-anything you have." I thought hard, putting my hand to my forehead. "I don't think I thought hard, putting my hand to my forehead. "I don't think the people in my organization are gonna like that very much." No kid­ the people in my organization are gonna like that very much." No kid­ ding, I thought. They'll go ballistic. ding, I thought. They'll go ballistic. Our reports were written without the exact source of the info to Our reports were written without the exact source of the info to protect that source. We separated out the chaff and gave out just the protect that source. We separated out the chaff and gave out just the kernel. However, the details related to sourcing were hugely impor­ kernel. However, the details related to sourcing were hugely impor­ tant to understanding the big picture. tant to understanding the big picture. "It would have to stay within the holdings of the LTC. No Kiwis," "It would have to stay within the holdings of the LTC. No for­ I said. New Zealand Defence Force troops were providing intelli­ eigners" I said. Foreign troops were providing _ as well as gence, as well as combat support, as part of the International Security combat support, as part of the International Security Assistance Force Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in the country. (ISAF) troops in the country. Dave nodded. "In exchange, I will make sure you get immediate Dave nodded. "In exchange, I will make sure you get immedi­ coverage or answers we can pull directly from our access to raw SIG­ ate coverage or answers we can pull directly from our data _. INT. We would use the combined data to put together a package on We would use the combined data to put together a package on each guy. Then decisions could be made jointly." For Dave, that each guy. Then decisions could be made jointly." For Dave, that 56 OPERATION DARK HEART 56 OPERATION DARK HEART meant details of when the bad guys were talking to each other, how meant details of what the bad guys were doing often, and where they were talking from, a kinda "friends and family" network for terrorists. The phone numbers they were using, when combined with our HUMINT data, were hugely important to un­ were hugely important to understanding the opera­ derstanding the operational environment-the "spiderweb" of the ter­ tional environment-the "spiderweb" of the terrorist infrastructure rorist infrastructure that we had to understand so we could act in a that we had to understand so we could act in a smart, cohesive smart, cohesive fashion. fashion. For Dave to offer to distribute raw data outside the NSA system, For Dave to offer to distribute raw data intelligence even though it even though it would remain within the top secret security network, would remain within the top secret security network, was also a radi­ was also a radical move. Normally, the Fort got the raw, unanalyzed cal move. Normally, Washington gave intercepts first and then they gave people like Dave what they thought people like pave what they thought he needed in the form of finished he needed in the form of finished or near finished reports, but Dave or near finished reports, but Dave had cut a deal with them. He was had cut a deal with them. He was getting everything so that his hybrid getting everything so that his hybrid team of team of New Zealand and U.S. SIGINT specialists could parse it and _ specialists could parse it and review it to establish their own review it to establish their own intel. In promising me access to their intel. In promising me access to their data, Dave was stepping way, intercepts, Dave was stepping way, way, way out on a limb. way, way out on a limb. In my mind, I could just hear the screaming in Clarendon (DIA In my mind, I could just hear the screaming in Washington Operations Support Center) and at the Fort (Fort Meade, Maryland, NSA HQ) if they knew about this level of information exchange. if they knew about this level of information exchange. "Where do you propose to keep it?" I asked. The fact was, our "Where do you propose to keep it?" I asked. The fact was, our computer systems were incompatible, so we had no way to create a computer systems were incompatible, so we had no way to create a shared database. We would literally have to print out everything. shared database. We would literally have to print out everything. "I'm going to put them on my door," Dave said. "I'm going to put them on my door," Dave said. I rolled my eyes. "Oh, that's secure." I rolled my eyes. "Oh, that's secure." "We're in a SCIF. We're fine," Dave said, "and we need to have "We're in a SCIF. We're fine," Dave said, "and we need to have one central location that has one hard copy of all the information on one central location that has one hard copy of all the information on any single target. When we decide to take action, we pull the target any single target. When we decide to take action, we pull the target package down and we start looking at it as a team. Together, we make package down and we start looking at it as a team. Together, we make a decision on a course of action: kill, capture, or do nothing." a decision on a course of action: kill, capture, or do nothing." Kill, capture, or spy: that was the accepted equation of the new Kill, capture, or spy: that was the accepted equation of the new math that we dealt with every day. The temptation was always to math that we dealt with every day. The temptation was always to kill, but actually it's better first to spy. Guys on phones were always kill, but actually it's better first to spy. great sources of intel, so you had to perform a gain-loss evaluation of so you had to perform a gain-loss evaluation of potentially losing that intel. If you spy on a bad guy and he gives you potentially losing that intel. If you spy on a bad guy and he gives you THE 'DEATH STAR' 195 THE 'DEATH STAR' 195 from US, I'll do everything within my power to support the opera­ from us, I'll do everything within my power to support the opera­ tion," I told Colonel Keller. tion," I told Colonel Keller. Task Force 121 began arriving in Afghanistan with a vengeance. Task Force 1099 hegan arriving in Afghanistan with a vengeance. It had the best technology, the best weapons, the best people-and It had the best technology, the best weapons, the best people-and plenty of money to burn. I had worked with 121's parent element for plenty of money to burn. I had worked with 1099's parent element for years, the Joint Special Operations Command aSOC). As the cutting years. As the cutting edge of SOCOM and, in reality, the whole Department of Defense, edge of SOCOM and, in reality, the whole Department of Defense. JSOC was always ready to jump in and perform the nation's most They were _ always ready to jump in and perform the nation's sensitive, high-risk missions-and had generally done them well. most sensitive, high-risk missions-and had generally done them well. JSOC grew out of the screwups of the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis This capability grew out of the screwups of the 1980 Iranian hos­ and the failures at "Desert One"-the staging area that was supposed tage crisis and the failures at "Desert One"-the staging area that was to be used for an assault into Tehran to liberate the American hostages supposed to be used for an assault into Tehran to liberate the American held there. The debacle at Desert One was attributed to our lack of a hostages held there. The debacle at Desert One was attributed to our standing, well-funded, well-trained, mission-ready, cutting-edge Spe­ lack of a standing, well-funded, well-trained, mission-ready, cutting­ cial Forces unit ready to jump into any crisis anywhere on the planet. edge Special Forces unit ready to jump into any crisis anywhere on the JSOC and its "task forces" were the answer to that need. planet. were the answer to that need. As 121 started to roll into Bagram, the very fabric of the base As 1099 started to roll into Bagram, the very fabric of the base changed. It brought almost a surreal energy. At one point, fully loaded changed. It brought almost a surreal energy. At one point, fully loaded C-17 transport aircraft were landing at Bagram every thirty to forty­ C-17 transport aircraft were landing at Bagram every thirty to forty­ five minutes, spending about an hour off-loading and screaming rap­ five minutes, spending about an hour off-loading and screaming rap­ idly back into the sky again. I could see pallet after pallet of material idly back into the sky again. I could see pallet after pallet of material coming off the C-17s, neatly lined up and filled with enough high-tech coming off the C-17s, neatly lined up and filled with enough high-tech gear to run a country. gear to run a country. The number of personnel swelled. While its predecessor unit, Task The number of personnel swelled. While its predecessor unit, • Force 5, had been a tight unit of some 200, Task Force 121 was going _ had been a tight unit of some 200, Task Force 1099 was going to have more than 2,000. to have several hundred more _ They set up their initial headquarters in the old Task Force 5 They set up their initial headquarters in the old command center, but only temporarily. As their folks arrived, they command center, but only temporarily. As their folks arrived, they tripled the size of the old TF 5 compound and built row after row of tripled the size of the old _ compound and built row after row of "B-Huts"-plywood buildings that could serve as anything from of­ "B-Huts"-plywood buildings that could serve as anything from of­ fices to sleeping quarters. Massive tents went up. As they unpacked fices to sleeping quarters. Massive tents went up. As they unpacked and set up, tent after tent was filling with equipment and technology. Task Force 121 had brought its A game. and set up, tent after tent was filling with equipment and technology. Task Force 1099 had brought its A game. SECOND VOYAGE 257 SECOND VOYAGE 257 jeered at the aid workers for "living in luxury while our friends are in jeered at the aid workers for "living in luxury while our friends are in prison in Cuba." prison in Cuba." Then Rumsfeld showed up in Kabul and appeared to be seriously Then Rumsfeld showed up in Kabul and appeared to be seriously delusional. He and Karzai claimed that the Taliban were no danger to delusional. He and Karzai claimed that the Taliban were no danger to the country. the country. " "I've not seen any indication that the Taliban pose any military "I've not seen any indication that the Taliban pose any military threat to the security of Afghanistan," Rumsfeld told reporters. threat to the security of Afghanistan," Rumsfeld told reporters. Wow, I remember thinking. We must have just spent the last eight Wow, I remember thinking. We must have just spent the last eight months chasing ghosts . ... months chasing ghosts . ... Karzai had drunk the Kool-Aid, too. Karzai had drunk the Kool-Aid, too. "The Taliban doesn't exist anymore," he claimed. "They're de- "The Taliban doesn't exist anymore," he claimed. "They're de­ feated. They're gone." feated. They're gone." Yeah, right. Yeah, right. It was clear that the was conducting foreign policy by It was clear that the United States was conducting foreign policy by wishful thinking. Wish it and it would happen. Our intelligence was wishful thinking. Wish it and it would happen. Our intelligence was telling us they were coming back. We knew they were going to come telling us they were coming back. We knew they were going to come again, but U.S. and Afghan officials were trying to wish them away. again, but U.S. and Afghan officials were trying to wish them away. Good freakin' luck. Good freakin' luck. At another level, though, the U.S. military was involved in some At another level, though, the U.S. military was involved in some bad stuff. For weeks, Jack Foster had been bugging me to come over bad stuff. For weeks, Jack Foster had been"bugging me to come over and see 121's "special holding facility." He wanted to show me how to show me how they'd converted the former 5's HQ into this prison, they'd converted the former clearly set up for the "enhanced interrogation" program, and offered clearly set up for the "enhanced interrogation" program, and offered me a tour. me a tour. I knew what he was trying to do, and so I kept putting him off. I I knew what he was trying to do, and so I kept putting him off. I had known that there was a "special" system for handling HVT pris­ had known that there was a "special" system for handling HVT pris­ oners that leadership didn't want going to the BCP. oners that the Pentagon leadership didn't want going to the BCP. They also had to be kept from the FBI since the agents who weren't They also had to be kept from the FBI since the agents who weren't told that an "enhanced interrogation" program had been authorized told that an "enhanced interrogation" program had been authorized at the highest level of the U.S. government were legally required to at the highest level of the U.S. government were legally required to report any prison abuses they witnessed. The interrogation program, report any prison abuses they witnessed. The interrogation program, called , was authorized, but a lot of us felt it wasn't ap­ was authorized, but a lot of us felt it wasn't ap­ propriate and just wasn't right. We also all knew that the CIA had a propriate and just wasn't right. We also all knew that the CIA had a separate secret prison at Bagram. We just stayed away from it. separate secret prison at Bagram. We just stayed away from it.