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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

The Senses and Sensory Metaphors in Augustine’s Early Works

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Department of Greek and Latin

School of Arts and Sciences

Of The Catholic University of America

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Benjamin Allan Lewis

Washington, DC

2019 The Senses and Sensory Metaphors in Augustine’s Early Works

Benjamin Allan Lewis, Ph.D.

Director: William McCarthy, Ph.D.

The vast corpus of Augustine of Hippo is full of references to the five senses, and full of sensory metaphors, but little scholarly attention has been given to Augustine’s understanding of the physics of sense-perception, or to his definition and use of sensory metaphors. This dissertation aims, in part, to fill both gaps by examining Augustine’s early writings, from the Cassiciacum

Dialogues to the Confessions, to ascertain first his views on the physiological aspects of sense- perception, and to explore his use of sensory metaphors. The first part of this project is a necessary precursor to the second part, as Augustine’s sensory metaphors are based on the analogy of the bodily senses to certain activities or faculties of the soul. In his early works,

Augustine presents a consistent picture of the senses, their hierarchy, and their association with the Empedoclean four elements (fire, air, water, and earth). In keeping with his broad but nuanced definition of metaphor, Augustine uses sensory metaphors in ways that reflect his larger philosophical and theological preoccupations. Throughout his early works, and especially in the

Confessions, Augustine produces the metaphoric pattern of a voice that leads to vision, which reflects his theme of faith seeking understanding. In the end, metaphor, as Augustine defined and deployed it, is not a mere literary device, but a way of seeing the world. This dissertation by Benjamin Allan Lewis fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Greek and Latin approved by William McCarthy, Ph.D., as Director, and by Kevin White, Ph.D., and William Klingshirn, Ph.D., as Readers.

______William McCarthy, Ph.D., Director

______Kevin White, Ph.D., Reader

______William Klingshirn, Ph.D., Reader

!ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x

INTRODUCTION: IN DEFENSE OF WHAT FOLLOWS 1

CHAPTER ONE: SIGHT AND HEARING IN AUGUSTINE’S EARLY WORKS 16

CHAPTER TWO: SMELL, TASTE, AND TOUCH IN AUGUSTINE’S EARLY WORKS 76

CHAPTER THREE: SENSORY METAPHORS IN AUGUSTINE’S EARLY WORKS 122

CHAPTER FOUR: SENSORY METAPHORS IN THE CONFESSIONS 155

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 234

BIBLIOGRAPHY 243

!iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Below is a list of abbreviations used in this dissertation. For classical Greek authors, I follow the abbreviations in H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek English Lexicon, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For classical Latin authors, I follow the abbreviations in P. G. W. Glare, ed., Oxford Latin Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2012). For patristic Greek authors, I follow the abbreviations in G. W. H.

Lampe, ed., A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). For patristic

Latin authors, including Augustine, I follow the abbreviations in A. Blaise, Dictionnaire latin- francais des auteurs Chretiens (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962).

Abr. De Abrahamo Ac. Academica Acad. Contra Academicos Ad Don. Ad Donatum Ad Quirin. Ad Quirinum testimonia aduersus Iudaeos. Adu. Iud. Aduersus Iudaeos Aen. Aeneid Agon. De agone christiano Ambr. Ambrose An. Tertullian, De anima de An. Aristotle, De Anima Apul. Apuleius Arist. Aristotle !iv Aug. Augustine Beat. De Beata Vita Bon. mort. De bono mortis Bon. pat. De bono patientiae Brut. Brutus sive de Claris Oratoribus C. Max. Contra Maximinum C. mendac. Contra mendacium Calcid. Calcidius Cic. Cicero Ciu. De ciuitate Dei Conf. Augustine, Confessiones Confu. Philo, De Confusione Linguarum Congr. De Congressu eruditionis causa De Or. De Oratore Deus Quod Deus sit immutabilis Dial. De Dialectica DK Diels, H. and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (3 vols.), 6th ed. Berlin: Weidmann, 1951. Doct. chr. De doctrina christiana Duab. De duabus animabus El. Mor. Hierocles, Elementa Moralia [Ἠθικὴ στοιχείωσις] Eleem. De opere et eleemosynis Enchir. Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate Ep(p). Epistula(e) Ep. Hdt. Epicurus, Epistula ad Herodotum Epit. Epitome diuinarum institutionum Eu. Io. In Iohannis euangelium tractatus Ex. Exameron

!v Exc. fr. De excessu fratris sui Satyri Expos. Ps. 118 Expositio Psalmi CXVIII Faust. Contra Faustum Fid. De fide rerum invisibilium Fid. et symb. De fide et symbolo Fin. De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Fug. De fuga et inventione Gen. imp. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber Gen. Man. De Genesi adversus Manichaeos Hab. uirg. De habitu virginum Hept. Quaestionum in heptateuchum libri septem Hierocl. Hierocles Il. Homer, Ilias Imm. De Immortalitate Animae In Tim. Calcidius, In Platonis Timaeum Inst. Diuinae Institutiones (Diuinarum institutionum libri septem) Inst. Od. Galen, De Instrumento Odoratus Ir. De ira Dei Is. De Isaac uel anima Iud. Aduersus Iudaeos Iul. Contra Iulianum Lact. Lactantius Lausberg Lausberg, H. Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study. Transl. by M. T. Bliss. Ed. by D. E. Orton and R. D. Anderson. Leiden: Brill, 1998. Leg. Legum Allegoriae Lewis and Short C. T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin Dictionary. Lib. De libero arbitrio

!vi Litt. De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim Locut. Hept. Locutionum in heptateuchum libri septem Luc. Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam Lucr. Lucretius [De Rerum Natura] M. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos Mag. De magistro Man. Manilius [Astronomica] Mor. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum Mort. De mortalitate Mort. pers. De mortibus persecutorum Mus. De musica Myst. De mysteriis Nat. et or. De natura et origine animae (a.k.a. De anima et eius origine) ND De Natura Deorum Noe De Noe et arca Or. Orator ad M. Brutum Od. Homer, Odyssea Opif. Philo, De Opificio Mundi [Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Μωυσέα κοσµοποιίας] Opif. D. Lactantius, De Opificio Dei Opt. Euclid, Optica Ord. De ordine Paen. De paenitentia Parad. De paradiso Pers. Persius, Saturae Petil. Contra litteras Petiliani Ph. Philo [Judaeus] Ph. Physica Phd. Phaedo

!vii Phlb. Plato, Philebus PHP Galen, de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis PL Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina Pl. Plato Plen. De Plenitudine Plot. Plotinus [Enneads] Po. Aristotle, Poetica Post. De Posteritate Caini Prop. Propertius, Elegiae Psal. Enarrationes in Psalmos QG Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim Quaest. De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus Quant. an. De quantitate animae Qu. eu. Quaestiones euangeliorum Quint. Quintilian R. Respublica RB Revue Bénédictine Retract. Retractationes Rhet. Her. Rhetorica ad Herennium SC Sources Chrétiennes S. E. Sextus Empiricus Sens. De Sensu Sent. Vat. Epicurus, Sententia Vaticana [Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum] Serm. Sermones Serm. Dom. De sermone Domini in monte Smp. Symposium Solil. Soliloquia Spec. De specialibus legibus

!viii Spir. De Spiritu Sancto Tert. Tertullian Theog. Hesiod, Theogonia Thphr. Theophrastus Tht. Plato, Theaetetus Ti. Plato, Timaeus Trin. De trinitate Tusc. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes UP Galen, De Usu Partium Util. cred. De utilitate credendi Ver. rel. De Vera Religione Verg. Virgil Vg. Vulgate Zel. et liu. De zelo et liuore

!ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It would be impossible to acknowledge all who have assisted me in the completion of this project, yet some deserve special mention. My director, Dr. William McCarthy, has been patient, kind, and encouraging, always ready to point me toward valuable resources. The careful attention of my readers, Dr. Kevin White and Prof. William Klingshirn, has improved the dissertation on a number of points. (The faults that remain here are my own.) The other faculty of the Department of Greek and Latin, Prof. Frank Mantello, Dr. John Petruccione, and Dr. Sarah Ferrario, have offered generous advice and assistance of various kinds throughout my doctoral studies. I have been fortunate to receive funding as a Mellon-Helis Fellow in the Center for the Study of Early

Christianity, as a teaching assistant and teaching fellow in the Department of Greek and Latin, as a teaching fellow for the University, and as a translator for the International Commission on

English in the Liturgy, whose Executive Secretary, Msgr. Andrew Wadsworth, has been most generous. I have also been fortunate in a network of graduate student colleagues too many to name, several of whom have become dear friends. My parents, Gregg and Debi Lewis, have been unwavering in their love and support. My uncle and aunt, Drs. Gilbert and Janice Crouse, opened their home to me, enabling me to pursue graduate studies. My undergraduate advisor, Prof.

Randy Richardson, first taught me to love Greek and Latin, and remains a model and guide. To these, and many others, I offer my heartfelt thanks, but most of all I wish to mention my darling wife, Caitlin, without whom no page that follows could have been written. Though it is a trifling thing to give in return for her many sacrifices, I dedicate this dissertation to her. !x INTRODUCTION

IN DEFENSE OF WHAT FOLLOWS

As others have noted, the surviving corpus of Augustine of Hippo is larger than that of any other ancient author.1 In addition, the body of modern scholarship on his life and thought is correspondingly vast.2 So anyone who endeavors to write a dissertation on Augustine must at some point feel acutely the comedy (and tragedy) of his undertaking. Why me? What could I possibly say? With just this sense of confronting insurmountable objections, I offer the following introductory remarks. I am the swordsman with his back against the wall. These are my defensive parries.

1 e.g., P. Kolbet, “Augustine,” in E. Orlin, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Ancient Mediterranean Religions (London: Routledge, 2015): 111.

2 “There are literally thousands of monographs and scholarly articles dealing with every aspect of his life and thought, with more of them coming out each year” (J. Pelikan, “Foreword,” in A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999): xiii). !1 !2 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF AUGUSTINE ON SENSATION

There has never been a thorough, book-length study of Augustine on sense-perception.3

Furthermore, most of the existing treatments focus on the psychological and cognitive, or theological and spiritual, aspects of the sensory process. Little has been written, then, of

Augustine’s views on the physiological aspects of sense-perception. The present work aims, in part, to fill this gap.

There has likewise been no thorough study of the use of sensory metaphors in

Augustine’s works. One journal article offers a helpful, but by no means complete, discussion of

Augustine’s understanding of metaphor among other rhetorical tropes.4 Several other journal

3 For recent treatments in English, see B. D. Dutton, Augustine and Academic Skepticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016): 214-227; M. A. I. Gannon, “The Active Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine,” The New Scholasticism, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1956): 154-180; D. G. Hunter, “Augustine on the Body,” in M. Vessey, ed., A Companion to Augustine (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012): 353-364; P. King, “Augustine on Knowledge,” in D. V. Meconi and E. Stump, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 142-165; T. K. Miethe, “Augustine’s Theory of Sense Knowledge,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 22.3 (1979): 257-64; M. Miles, “Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's De trinitate and Confessions,” The Journal of Religion, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1983): 125-142; R. Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969): 39-59; R. J. O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1968); G. O’Daly, Augustine's Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987): 80-105; and J. M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 45ff.; for a treatment in German, see W. Ott, “Des hl. Augustinus Lehre über die Sinneserkenntniss,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 13 (Fulda, 1900): 45-59, 138-148; for treatments in French, see C. Boyer, L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de Saint Augustin (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1920): 170-174; E. Bermon, Le Cogito dans la pensée de Saint Augustin (Paris, J. Vrin, 2001): 49-58; E. Gilson, Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin, 3rd. ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1949); A. Mandouze, “Saint Augustin et son Dieu: Les sens et la perception mystique,” La Vie Spirituelle, vol. 60 (Paris, 1939): 44-60; E. Pialat, “La théorie de la sensation chez saint Augustin,” L'Année Philosophique 9.3 (1932): 95-127; for Danish, see E. Ostenfeld, “Augustin om Perception,” in Museum Tusculanum 40-43 (1980): 447-463.

4 D. Lau, “Augustins Tropus-Begriff: Umfang und Struktur: Beitrag zu einer tropologischen Hermeneutik,” Wiener Studien 124 (2011): 181-229. !3 articles explore one or more sensory metaphors (or aspects of metaphor) in Augustine.5 A master’s thesis discusses metaphor in Augustine’s Confessions, though the study is limited to the narrative books, and narrows its scope to illustrative examples even within those books.6 There is, in short, no thorough treatment of how Augustine’s sensory metaphors relate to his views on sense-perception, or of the role his sensory metaphors play in his writing. The present work aims, in part, to fill this gap as well.

ON THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

This book is a diptych. It offers two different but complementary pictures. The first part,

Chapters One and Two, presents against their philosophical and religious background

Augustine’s ideas about the physical aspects of sight and hearing (Chapter One), and smell and taste and touch (Chapter Two). This picture might be titled “Augustine on the Physics of Sense-

Perception.” The second part presents against its rhetorical background Augustine’s use of sensory metaphors in his early works (Chapter Three), culminating in his Confessions (Chapter

Four). The reason for juxtaposing these two pictures is simple. Augustine used sensory metaphors in his writings because he perceived an analogy between the sensible and the

5 See, e.g., L. Moncion, “Erotic Food Metaphors in Augustine's Confessions,” Heythrop Journal, 57.4 (2016): 653-8; J. Torchia, “‘Pondus meum amor meus’: The Weight-Metaphor in St. Augustine’s Early Philosophy,” Augustinian Studies 21 (1990): 163-176; W. Zemler-Cizewski, “From Metaphor to Theology: ‘Proprium’ and ‘translatum’ in Cicero, Augustine, Eriugena, and Abelard,” Florilegium 13 (1994): pp. 37-52; L. C. Ferrari, “The ‘Food of Truth’ in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 9 (1978): pp. 1-14; A.-I. Bouton-Touboulic, “Body Language in Augustine’s Confessiones and De doctrina christiana,” Augustinian Studies 49.1 (2018): 1-23; D. Chidester, “The Symmetry of Word and Light: Perceptual Categories in Augustine's Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 17 (1986): 119-133; P. Courcelle, “Les ‘Voix’ dans les Confessions de Saint Augustin,” Hermes 80.1 (1952): 31-46.

6 J. A. Yeld, The Metaphor in Augustine’s Confessions (Books 1-9). M.A. Thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, 1964. !4 intelligible realm, particularly between the physical senses and certain spiritual activities or capacities.7 So the more attentive we are to Augustine’s understanding of the mechanics of sense- perception, the better we will understand and appreciate his use of sensory metaphors.

ON THE SCOPE OF THIS BOOK

This study is limited to the early works of Augustine, from his Cassiciacum Dialogues and correspondence in the mid-380s, up to and including the Confessions in the late 390s.

Occasionally later works of Augustine are referenced, but only insofar as they shed light on his early works. This is true particularly in Chapters One and Two, because the passages in

Augustine where he discusses the physical aspects of sense-perception are so scattered that it is sometimes useful to consult a later sermon or treatise in order to understand something

Augustine says in the Confessions.

Likewise, in the first two chapters, a somewhat broad approach has been taken to the inclusion of “background.” In discussing the philosophical antecedents to Augustine, from the

Presocratics up through Neoplatonism, this study includes authors that Augustine never read directly. The intent is not to suggest any direct or indirect influences, but to present in roughly chronological order the major Greek and Roman philosophical discussions of sense-perception prior to Augustine, in order to show the main lines of discussion and how Augustine’s views compare and contrast.

7 “Let us conjecture the intelligible things of the mind from the sensible things of the body” (de his enim sensibilibus corporis mentis intellegibilia coniciamus, Serm. 28.4). !5 A similarly broad approach has been taken in Chapter Three, when discussing the rhetorical background to Augustine’s views on metaphor. Authors are included in chronological order to show the main lines of discussion leading up to Augustine’s ideas. No argument about

Augustine’s sources is ventured here.

ON INTERPRETING THE CONFESSIONS

There have been frequent and varied attempts to find unity in the structure or theme(s) of

Augustine’s Confessions. There have also been frequent and varied criticisms of these attempts.

No doubt such critics may consider this current work of little or no value. Never mind. Simply put, if one will but attend to the role of the five senses, and the use of sensory metaphors, in

Augustine’s early works, especially the Confessions, one will see definite and intricate patterns.

(Chapters Three and Four are an exercise in just such attentiveness.)

Does this amount to a claim to have discovered the long-sought “solution” to the “riddle” of the Confessions? No, because there is no one “solution” to the Confessions, as Augustine himself tells us. Nor is the Confessions in itself a “riddle.” It is only a mystery in need of solving if we bring to it expectations quite foreign to its author and his stated purpose.

The discussion of sensory metaphors in the Confessions (Chapter Four) is neither an exhaustive catalogue nor a complete synthesis. It falls somewhere between the two. It attempts to discuss from the beginning of the work to its end (and roughly from the beginning of each book to its end) the main patterns of sensory metaphors in the Confessions. Many patterns emerge, and some of the metaphors discussed here do not fit easily into a pattern. !6 ON DISTINGUISHING ‘PHILOSOPHICAL’ AND ‘CHRISTIAN’ TRADITIONS

In the course of discussing the intellectual precedents for Augustine’s sensory views (in

Chapters One and Two), it has been deemed useful, if not strictly necessary, to distinguish between the “philosophical tradition” and the “Christian tradition.” As with most issues of terminology, other writers may prefer alternatives. What follows here is merely an attempt to clarify the present terminology, not an attempt to exclude other possible terminologies.

Insofar as we distinguish the Presocratics from other early Greek writers (Homer and

Hesiod, for example), we are in some way distinguishing what we usually call “philosophy” from what we usually call “myth” or “ epic poetry.” As such, we are distinguishing two (at least) ways of approaching reality: what the 19th century German scholars would describe as the difference between mythos (µῦθος) and logos (λόγος). Homer told stories about heroes, gods, and goddesses. Hesiod gave an account of the origin of the cosmos as a story about divine beings and primarily sexual generation. Thus, Homer and Hesiod thought of the world in terms of mythos.

The Presocratics, however, gave accounts of the origin of the world from natural causes. Though there are some obvious intersections and overlaps,8 the philosophers tended more and more to account for things in terms of rational principles and in the form of scientific formulas. The poets, on the other hand, preferred to present the world in a narrative.

Our present concern is not whether this description of the past offers a complete account of objective reality, but whether it bears any resemblance to how Augustine understood the past.

8 Parmenides, for instance, clothes his philosophy in the form of a mythos in Homeric dactylic hexameters; Xenocrates associated the three Fates with his three classes of substances: Atropos with the intelligible, Clotho with the sensible, Lachesis with the believable (S.E., M 1.149). !7 Whether or not this is the most accurate account we can give of ancient thought, is it one that

Augustine would recognize and accept? There are several reasons for thinking that it is.

First, Augustine distinguishes “philosophy” from a preoccupation with “mythology.” In the Confessions, he laments his boyhood fascination with the “poetical fictions” of Aeneas and

Dido.9 He also describes the effect of reading Cicero’s Hortensius at the age of nineteen:

How I burned, my God, how I burned to fly from earthly things up to you, and I knew not how you would deal with me! For with you there is wisdom. And the love of wisdom the Greeks give the name “philosophy,” with which these books set me on fire. There are those who seduce by means of philosophy, coloring and painting over their own errors with a great and charming and honorable name, and nearly all such men, of both present and past times, are pointed out and shown up in that book. There is also revealed there that warning of your Spirit through your good and devoted servant: “Take care that no one ensnare you through philosophy and empty deceit, according to the tradition of men, according to the elements of the world and not according to Christ. For in him the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily.” [Col. 2:8-9] At that time (you know, O Light of my heart, that these words of the Apostle were not yet known to me) I took delight in that exhortation [of Cicero] for this reason only, that I was stirred up by it and set on fire and so burned to love and seek and pursue and hold and firmly embrace not this or that sect, but wisdom itself, whatever it might be, and this alone checked me in so great an ardor, that the name of Christ was not in it. For this name, O Lord, according to your mercy, this name of my Savior, Your Son, my tender heart fervently drank in with my mother’s milk and held deep down, and whatever lacked this name, however learned and polished and truthful it might be, did not take complete hold of me.10

9 poetica illa figmenta, Conf. 1.13.22.

10 quomodo ardebam, deus meus, quomodo ardebam revolare a terrenis ad te, et nesciebam quid ageres mecum! apud te est enim sapientia. amor autem sapientiae nomen graecum habet philosophiam, quo me accendebant illae litterae. sunt qui seducant per philosophiam magno et blando et honesto nomine colorantes et fucantes errores suos, et prope omnes qui ex illis et supra temporibus tales erant notantur in eo libro et demonstrantur, et manifestatur ibi salutifera illa admonitio spiritus tui per servum tuum bonum et pium: `videte, ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa huius mundi et non secundum Christum, quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter.' et ego illo tempore, scis tu, lumen cordis mei, quoniam nondum mihi haec apostolica nota erant, hoc tamen solo delectabar in illa exhortatione, quod non illam aut illam sectam, sed ipsam quaecumque esset sapientiam ut diligerem et quarererem et adsequerer et tenerem atque amplexarer fortiter, excitabar sermone illo et accendebar et ardebam, et hoc solum me in tanta flagrantia refrangebat, quod nomen Christi non erat ibi, quoniam hoc nomen secundum misericordiam tuam, domine, hoc nomen salvatoris mei, filii tui, in ipso adhuc lacte matris tenerum cor meum pie biberat et alte retinebat, et quidquid sine hoc nomine fuisset, quamvis litteratum et expolitum et veridicum, non me totum rapiebat, Conf. 3.4.8; unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. !8 This passage clarifies several things. First, Augustine encountered “philosophy” as something separate from, and preferable to, the stories of Virgil and other poets. Second, this quest for wisdom was no mere academic discipline, but a way of life.11 Third, this “way” would eventually lead Augustine to Christ. Thus, for Augustine as author of the Confessions, what distinguishes the “Christian” tradition from the “philosophical” is the insight that all things must be seen in the light of Christ. The quest for philosophy is not abandoned, but it is now understood, in light of the Gospel, as leading to Wisdom Itself, who has been revealed as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

What does this have to do with the distinction between mythos and logos? Where does

Christian teaching fall in this schematization? For Augustine the answer lies in the opening verses of the Gospel according to John: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with

God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made though him, and without Him nothing was made. What came to be in Him was life, and life was the light of men. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not comprehended it….And the

Word became flesh and dwelt among us.”12 This “Word” (verbum) is, of course, none other than the Latin translation of the Greek logos (λόγος).13 The prologue of John’s Gospel is adopting the philosophical, and particularly Stoic, use of the term logos as a rational principle pervading the universe and giving shape to matter. The crucial move here is two-fold: first, the Gospel writer

11 For the view that philosophy was a way of life in antiquity, see P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life. Transl. M. Chase. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995; also C. S. Lewis, Surprised By Joy (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 1966): 225.

12 in principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud deum et deus erat verbum. hoc erat in principio apud deum. omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. quod factum est in eo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt….verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, Jn 1:1-5, 14 (as quoted in Conf. 7.9.13-14).

13 Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, etc. Jn 1:1. !9 identifies this Word with a personal God who creates all things, specifically the God of

Genesis;14 second, he indicates that this Word also became a man. Thus, this rational principle is not a something, but a someone. And this someone is part of a story, a mythos. Yet it is not a mythos situated in no-place or no-time, but in a particular place and time. It is not just a story, but history. Thus, for John’s Gospel, and for Augustine, the claim of the Incarnation is that God is not just a truth, and not just someone in a story, but both a truth and someone in a true story, the human story. Philosophy meets myth, and myth becomes fact.

Again, let us be clear that the reader need not accept the foregoing as in any way objectively true. What matters for us here is that it approaches what Augustine considered to be true. Maybe in the final analysis it is all nonsense, but for Augustine it amounted to sense.

WHY REVIEW THE “PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION” ON SENSE PERCEPTION?

One could question the need for a thorough review of the ancient philosophical tradition on the senses. Surely others have thoroughly researched and discussed this material? Yes, but there are still cases where scholars misunderstand basic aspects of ancient theories of sense

14 Jn 1:1 clearly echoes Gn 1:1: ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. !10 perception.15 And, as with studies of Augustine on sense perception, much of the scholarly interest focuses (for good reasons) on questions of epistemology or psychology.

One might also object that the present approach to the philosophical evidence is rather simple. Surely one can find more nuanced ways of approaching ancient authors than by noting similarity and difference or discussing sensory views in terms of likeness and unlikeness, activity and passivity, etc. Such an objection is entirely reasonable, if the purpose of the discussion is an objective assessment of the ancient evidence as such. But the present concern is with the ancient evidence as background to Augustine and, therefore, with how such evidence was understood and discussed by Augustine (and others) in antiquity. It is thus fitting to adopt here the commonplace ancient antitheses of likeness-unlikeness, activity-passivity, etc.

For similar reasons the following discussion is less concerned with challenging ancient views than with understanding which of those views Augustine shared, and how they influenced him. For example, Augustine makes explicit reference to Anaxagoras and Diogenes as students

15 For example, D. Potter, in a recent discussion of “The Social Life of the Senses,” cites “Harvey 2006: 101-3” (the correct citation is 104) for the following generalization: “Both Plato and Aristotle did also try to rank the senses, Plato making sight the most important, while Aristotle claimed that touch and taste were of lesser significance in that all animals made use of them” (D. Potter, “The Social Life of the Senses: Feasts and Funerals,” in J. Toner, A Cultural History of the Senses in Antiquity (London Bloomsbury, 2014): 25). Why not cite the original sources? And why imply a contrast between Aristotle and Plato, when both acknowledge sight as the most important sense? (See below, p. 17, n. 7.) In the following two sentences, Potter is guilty of a serious misreading of Cicero and Augustine (and an inaccurate citation of the latter): “Not everyone would agree. Cicero, for instance, seemingly reflects a tradition, also evident many centuries later in the work of Augustine, in which the senses were on a par (Cic. Or. 3.99; Aug. Mus. 38)” (D. Potter, “The Social Life of the Senses,” 25). Never mind that the citation of Augustine should be “Mus. 6.38.” Neither the Ciceronian passage nor the Augustinian one remotely supports Potter’s claim. Both are discussing the principle of equality (or moderation) within each of the senses, not the equality of the senses to each other. Cicero’s point, which Augustine echoes, is that for each of the senses, the most pleasurable thing is to have a balance (i.e. the most pleasing tastes are neither too sweet nor too sour, etc.). Neither author portrays one sense as equal to another. Potter continues: “In general terms theories of sense perception were essentially tactile.” He fails to mention that Aristotle is the (widely acknowledged) exception to this generalization (Arist. Sens. 442a-b; Blundell, “Introduction,” 16; R. Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 264). I leave aside Potter’s self-contradiction that the “diametrically opposed” views of Stoics and Epicureans “agree” on the tactile nature of all sensation (D. Potter, “The Social Life of the Senses,” 25). If such an esteemed professor of ancient history is this far astray on sense perception in the ancient world, there are surely other scholars in the field who could benefit from a careful discussion of the ancient evidence. !11 of Anaximenes.16 One could question the objective truth of these relations,17 but the current investigation is concerned with this statement only insofar as it might influence Augustine’s own philosophical views.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Given the complexity of ideas involved in sensation, it is perhaps useful to offer here a working definition of some of the key terms and concepts that will appear throughout this study.

Though ancient authors will of course differ in how they understand each of these ideas, most agree on the basic aspects of the sensory process: sense object: the thing being sensed; for example, a ball we see flying through the air; some writers (Aristotle, for instance) will distinguish the color of the ball as the proper object of the sense of sight. agent (of sense): the one who senses (whether human, animal, or plant). sense-impression: the process or product of a sense object affecting the agent or agent’s sense- organ. sensation (or sense-perception): the process or product of an agent perceiving an object through a sense-organ.

16 cur ergo, ut de aliis plurimis taceam, cum commemorasses anaximenem eius que discipulum anaxagoram, tacuisti alterum eius discipulum diogenem, qui et a magistro et a condiscipulo suo in rerum naturae opinione dissensit, proprium que dogma constituit? Aug. Iul. 4.15.75.

17 See, e.g., A. Laks, Diogène d’Apollonie (Paris: Lille, 1983): 258-263. !12 sense-faculty: the agent’s power or capacity that effects sensation; this is closely associated with, sometimes even identified with, the sense-organ. sense-organ (or instrument): the part of the body (or of the soul) where (or through which) the sensation occurs; sometimes the instrument is distinguished as that external part which communicates the sensory information to the internal sense organ. sensory medium: that which stands between the sense object and agent, and through which the sense impression is communicated. common sense: the central power or capacity for sensing (and being aware of the five senses). seat of sensation: the part of the body (or of the soul) where sensory information is collected, or the locus of the common sense, or both.

ON IDENTIFYING METAPHORS IN AUGUSTINE

Following the understanding of metaphor in the Greco-Roman tradition, and Augustine’s own definition and discussion of metaphor, we may divide Augustine’s sensory metaphors into the following overlapping categories:

Metaphors by analogy (“A of D”): these are perhaps the easiest to identify, as they almost always involve a genitive modifier (e.g. “ears of my heart,” aures cordis meae, Conf. 1.5.5;

“bread of the inner mouth of my soul,” panis oris intus animae meae, ibid. 1.13.21). These imply an anology, “A is to B as C is to D” (A:B::C:D). !13 Metaphors with a genitive of apposition (“A of B”= “A, that is B”): for example, in the metaphor “the hand of my tongue” (manu linguae meae, ibid. 5.1.1), the genitive “of my tongue” is in apposition to “hand.” Thus, we could translate as “the hand that is my tongue.” These also usually imply an analogy as in the category above.

Metaphors signaled by quasi, veluti, sicuti, tamquam, ut ita dicam (“as if,” “as it were,” or “so to speak”): following the express advice of Cicero and Quintilian,18 Augustine often “softens” a

“harsh” or far-fetched metaphor by the introduction of a qualifying word or phrase.19

Metaphors more generally understood: given Augustine’s broad definition of metaphor, I have considered those figurative expressions more properly called synecdoche and metonymy, as well as similes and extended metaphors (allegory).

Metaphors identified as such by context: there are cases where Augustine uses a word that could be merely a “dead metaphor” (i.e., where the metaphor has become commonplace and perhaps ceased to function as metaphor), but the immediate context makes it clear that Augustine is awake to the metaphorical nature of the word of phrase.

CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING METAPHORS “SENSORY”

In the course of this study, it became necessary to include not only metaphors explicitly sensory (“light of my eyes”, “bread of the inner mouth of my soul,” etc.), but also those

18 De Or. 3.165, Quint. 8.3.37; see discussion in Lausberg § 558.

19 e.g., quod tibi suauissimum et, ut ita dicam, inductorium fore peto, Acad. 1.1.4. !14 metaphors that involve a clear sensory element. For example, when Augustine says, “I was shaken about and poured out and flowed away and frothed up with my fornications,”20 he is clearly speaking metaphorically (hence the modifying phrase “with my fornications”). Though he does not use any explicit words of touch (e.g. rough, smooth, heavy, light, soft, hard, touch, etc.), the metaphors involve an element of touch. For this reason, such metaphorical expressions have been taken into consideration in the course of this study.

A TALE OF TWO AUGUSTINES

In the course of this present work, it is necessary to distinguish the character of Augustine as portrayed in one of his early dialogues, or in the narrative of the Confessions, from Augustine as the author of that text.21 Without implying a complete discontinuity between the two, it is necessary to keep in mind, for instance, the difference between what Augustine thought and did during the periods of his life related in the Confessions, at least as he chooses to present those periods of his life, and the thoughts and motives in his mind as he composed the work around the year 397. Augustine himself (the author) alternates between his past actions and ideas, and his then-present reflections on those past actions. One way to tell the difference, both in the

Confessions and in this dissertation, is to pay attention to the verb tenses. When Augustine is presenting his past actions and past ideas, he uses past tenses (imperfect, perfect, pluperfect).

20 iactabar et effundebar et diffluebam et ebulliebam per fornicationes meas, Conf. 2.2.2.

21 For the view (not followed here) that one should distinguish in the Confessions Augustine the ignorant narrator from Augustine the omniscient author, see R. McMahon, Augustine's Prayerful Ascent: An Essay on the Literary Form of the Confessions (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989): 41. !15 When he offers his reflections at the time of writing, he uses the present tense. The same method has been employed in this study. Thus “Augustine speaks” refers to the text of the work, and

“Augustine spoke” refers to an event as related in the text.

CONCLUSIONS

This study is not intended to be final, but preliminary. Thus, the conclusions reached here can and should be discussed, debated, supplemented, and critiqued. If the following pages convince the reader that Augustine’s early works present a detailed understanding of the senses, a deliberate and nuanced use of sensory metaphors based on the analogy of the body to the soul, and specific patterns of sensory metaphors that reflect central themes in Augustine’s thought, then this study will be only the beginning. It will open up new avenues of research. For scholars of literature and ancient rhetoric, it will provide an example of Augustine’s literary technique and the layers of meaning in a Late Antique text. For theologians and students of early Christianity, it will show how Augustine’s style relates to his understanding of God and the Christian faith. For philosophers and students of Late Antique thought, it will shed light on the role of the senses in the life of the mind. CHAPTER ONE

SIGHT AND HEARING IN AUGUSTINE’S EARLY WORKS

From his earliest extant correspondence, Augustine shows a preoccupation with the role of the senses in the life of the mind. In a letter to Zenobius in 386, he begins, “We are in full agreement, I think, that everything that a sense of the body attains cannot remain in the same way even for a moment of time, but slips away, flows off, and holds onto nothing actual, that is, to speak Latin, it does not exist.”1 In a letter to Nebridius in 387, Augustine writes, “Certainly the sensible world is said to be the image of an intelligible one.”2 In a second letter to Nebridius in

387, he relates his progress in “distinguishing nature as presented to the senses from nature as presented to the intellect.”3 Thus, Augustine’s early letters show his debt to the classic philosophical distinctions of “being versus becoming”4 and “the sensible versus the intelligible.”5

We even see his debt to Plato in the idea that the sensory world reflects an intelligible realm.6

Though it is not the aim of this study to discuss these philosophical ideas in any comprehensive way, they provide needed context for understanding Augustine’s views on the

1 bene inter nos conuenit, ut opinor, omnia, quae corporeus sensus adtingit, ne puncto quidem temporis eodem modo manere posse, sed labi, effluere et praesens nihil obtinere, id est, ut latine loquar, non esse, Ep. 2.1; transl. by R. Teske.

2 certe sensibilis mundus nescio cuius intellegibilis imago esse dicitur, Ep. 3.3; transl. by R. Teske.

3 quid in sensibilis atque intellegibilis naturae discernentia profecerimus, Ep. 4.1.

4 e.g., Ti. 27d-28a.

5 e.g., Ti. 28b-29a.

6 cf. Ti. 29b ff., 37d. !16 !17 mechanics of sense-perception. Augustine does not elaborate his sensory views in a philosophical vacuum. His understanding of how vision and hearing work is situated within broader discussions of how sense-perception relates to knowledge, what role the senses should have in the life of the Christian, and how the senses are to be understood in light of the

Incarnation and as a reflection of the Trinity in the life of man. Such epistemological, moral, and theological questions are of ultimate concern for him. The physics of sense-perception is of secondary importance, but it still contributes to a fuller picture of Augustinian metaphysics. Let us then begin with the philosophical and scientific background to Augustine’s sensory views, so that we might better understand his physics. Then, armed with this understanding, we shall see what it might tell us about his metaphysics.

For Augustine, as for most ancient thinkers, the senses of sight and hearing were more highly regarded, and more frequently discussed, than the senses of smell, taste, and touch. They are also more closely linked to reason and the life of the mind.7 For this reason, it is worth considering the two senses of sight and hearing together, both in Augustine and in his philosophical and religious background.8

THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

Even before the dawn of Ionian philosophy, we find traces in the earliest Greek literature of a popular tradition with regard to the senses. Homer, for instance, points to a common ancient

7 See, e.g., Aug., Lib. 2.14.38; Ord. 2.11.32; Pl., Ti. 47a; Arist., Met. 980a; Sens. 437a; Ph., Abr. 150; Lact., Div. Inst. 6.22-23.

8 A discussion of smell, taste, and touch follows in Chapter 2. !18 conception that vision occurs by means of rays of light: “Never does the bright sun look down on them with his rays.”9 Here the ambiguity of “visual rays” (ἀκτίνες) is neatly indicated. On the one hand, objects of sight (such as the sun, moon, stars, and fire) send out beams of light; on the other hand, by analogy with the sun “seeing,” a human viewer sends out beams of light that are responsible for producing vision.10 Similarly, the Greek word “sight” (ὄψις) is used from the earliest times to refer either to the visual aspect that an object offers to a viewer,11 or to the viewer’s action of seeing the object.12 Against the background of this more popular tradition of

Greek literature,13 the early Greek philosophers developed their own theories of vision.

The beginnings of Greek philosophy show a certain ambivalence about the material world of the senses. At the most basic level, this can be seen in the Presocratic discussions of the principle or source of all things (ἀρχή). Many of the extant fragments of the Presocratic philosophers involve equating the principle with one of the traditional four elements: fire, air, water, and earth.14 Yet as early as Anaximander, some Presocratics considered the source to be

9 οὐδέ ποτ’ αὐτοὺς / Ἠέλιος φαέθων καταδέρκεται ἀκτίνεσσιν, Homer, Od. 11.15-16; tr. A.T. Murray. The same clause occurs (in a different context) in Hesiod, Theog. 760.

10 Homer, Il. 19.15-17, 19.365-7; O. Darrigol, A History of Optics from Greek Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 2-3; see also “ἀκτίς “ in C. Mugler, Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des Grecs (Paris: C. Kincksieck, 1964): 22-24.

11 So the baby Astyanax is “bewildered at the sight of his dear father,” πατρὸς φίλου ὄψιν ἀτυχθεὶς, Homer, Il. 6.468; see “ὄψις “ in Mugler, Dictionnaire historique, 290-296.

12 So Aeneas tells Achilles that they know each other’s parents by report, “though by sight I have never seen yours nor you mine,” ὄψει δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἄρ πω σὺ ἐµοὺς ἴδες οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐγὼ σούς, Homer, Il. 20.205; see “ὄψις “ in Mugler, Dictionnaire historique, 290-296.

13 For a fuller treatment of vision in the ancient literary tradition, see A. Kampakoglou and A. Novokhatko, eds., Gaze, Vision, and Visuality in Ancient Greek Literature (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2018).

14 Heraclitus proposed fire as the principle, DK 22A5; Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia proposed air, DK 13A6-7, DK 64B3-478-9; Thales proposed water, DK 11A12; according to Aristotle, Anaximander proposed the nature between air and fire, or between air and water, Ibid., DK 12A16; Xenophanes proposed earth, or earth and water, DK 21B27, DK 21B29; Parmenides proposed fire and earth, DK 28B8, DK 28A23. The standard list of four elements comes from Empedocles, DK 31B6, DK 31A33. !19 “the boundless” (τὸ ἄπειρον).15 While it is not entirely clear whether this refers to the boundaries of space or time or both,16 it does open up the possibility of something beyond the limits of the sensible world.17 Similarly, Anaximenes considers the principle or source (ἀρχή) to be, if not beyond the realm of all senses, at least imperceptible to sight.18 Thus, while the Presocratics seem preoccupied with discussions of material first principles for the universe, they also begin to look beyond the realm of the senses for ultimate order and meaning.

A related common feature of Presocratic thought is the close connection of sense- perception with rational thought or cognition. Though a hard distinction between perception and cognition is often thought to be a distinctive contribution of Platonic thought because “it is only

Plato who introduces a clear notion of sense-perception,”19 the development is not without its precedents in Presocratic thought. It is prefigured, for instance, in the frequent Presocratic opposition, sometimes implicit, between experience and reason.20 The development of this opposition, and the resulting emergence of a notion of sense-perception, can be seen when we consider individual Presocratic accounts of the senses.

15 DK 12A9.

16 D. W. Graham, ed. and transl., The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of The Major Presocratics 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 66-7.

17 οὐ διορίζων ἀέρα ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ἄλλο τι, Diogenes Laertius, 2.1-2 (DK 12A1).

18 Anaximenes considered air to be the source, which “when very uniform is imperceptible to sight,” (ὅταν µὲν ὁµαλώτατος ἦι, ὄψει ἄδηλον, DK 13A7); transl. D. W. Graham, Texts, 79.

19 M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987): 3.

20 V. Caston, “Perception in Ancient Greek Philosophy,” in M. Matthen, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 30-31. !20 One such account appears in the physical theories of Anaximenes about the process of condensation or compression that he refers to as “felting.”21 Anaximenes held the source to be boundless air, and all things to be generated from this by either condensation or thinning; fire was formed when air was thinned,22 but earth was formed “when air was felted” (πιλουµένου δὲ

τοῦ ἀέρος).23 According to Anaximenes, the formation of cloud from air is also brought about by

“felting” (κατὰ τὴν πίλησιν),24 and the heavenly bodies rotate around the earth “like a felt cap” (πιλίον).25 This account is traditionally understood, like the accounts of other Presocratics, as a form of Material Monism, the view that all things originated from one single substance, will return to that one single substance, and ultimately are that single substance despite differing appearances.26 Yet the specific reference to “felting” is echoed in a passage of Plato,27 which can be read as an alternative interpretation of Anaximenes, according to which he is not a Material

Monist but, rather, anticipates Plato in seeing the material world of the senses as characterized by impermanence and constant flux.28

21 “Felting is a process of compressing cloth (wool in ancient times) into felt, which produces from a loose and light texture a closely packed and strong fabric. It seems to have served Anaximenes as a kind of technological model of how compression can alter the properties of a thing,” Graham, Texts, 92.

22 Hippolytus, Refutation 1.7.3 (DK 13A7).

23 [Plutarch] Miscellanies 3 (DK 13A6); transl. Graham, Texts, 79.

24 Hippolytus, Refutation 1.7.3 (DK 13A7).

25 Ibid. 1.7.6 (DK 13A7); transl. Graham, Texts, 81.

26 See esp. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Routledge, 1982), 28-34; D. Sedley, Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 7-8.

27 Pl., Ti. 49b-c.

28 Pl., Ti. 49d-e; D. W. Graham, “A Testimony of Anaximenes in Plato,” The Classical Quarterly 53:2 (2003): 328-331. !21 A similar ambivalence about the realm of sense-perception occurs in Heraclitus. For example, he regards fire as the principle.29 At first glance this seems just another example of

Presocratic adherence to Material Monism. Yet “fire is the most insubstantial of substances, and it may be this that attracts him.”30 Rather than an underlying unity of the elements, Heraclitus emphasizes their opposing natures: “It is death for earth to become water, and death for water to become air, and death for air to become fire and contrariwise.”31 This would, like Plato’s reading of Anaximenes, suggest a constant flux and inherent conflict underlying material reality. Perhaps one can already detect the seed that will later take root and sprout in the Platonic discussions of coming to be and passing away.32 Heraclitus provides another example of ambivalence to the sensible realm when he says, “Poor witnesses for men are the eyes and ears of those who have barbarian souls.”33 This implies a connection between sense-perception and one’s soul, the former reflecting the latter. So already in Heraclitus we see the implication that the external world of the senses is somehow a reflection of the internal realm of the mind and soul.34 This both gives the material world meaning and subordinates it to the immaterial. It means that matter matters, but it also means that matter points beyond itself. The senses are messengers, but the mind is the judge.35

29 DK 22A5.

30 Graham, Texts, 188.

31 γῆς θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι καὶ ὕδατος θάνατος ἀέρα γενέσθαι καὶ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ ἔµπαλιν, Marcus Aurelius, 4.46 (DK 22B76); transl. Graham, Texts, 155; cf. DK 22B36.

32 Graham, Texts, 189.

33 DK 22B107; trans. Graham, Texts, 149.

34 See Plato’s idea that Time is the “moving image of eternity,” Ti. 37d.

35 G. Vlastos, “Parmenides’ Theory of Knowledge,” TAPA 77 (1946): 69. !22 Parmenides offers yet another form of this opposition. In the section of his poem dealing with the Truth (ἀληθεία), he offers a view of “what-is” (τὸ ἐόν) as “ungenerated and imperishable, a whole of one kind, unperturbed and complete.”36 Thus, ultimate truth is beyond the realm of the senses.37 Yet in the section of his work dedicated to human Opinion (δόξα), he offers a completely material understanding of the soul as composed of earth and fire,38 and equates sense-perception with thought.39 While many disagree about how to interpret Parmenides and his role in the history of philosophy,40 Aristotle and Plato take him to be a Monist (that is, to propose one principle of nature).41 The distinction inherent in Parmenides’ poem between truth and opinion will inform Plato’s theory of the Forms, and Parmenides’ argument against change will spur Aristotle to develop his hylomorphism, the theory that physical objects consist of matter and form, which in turn underlies his understanding of sense-perception.42

The subordination of body to mind can be seen also in the sensory views of Anaxagoras, who prefers reason to “unreliable” senses,43 and yet thinks “appearances are a vision of the invisible.”44 Moreover, Anaxagoras offers one of the first detailed accounts of how exactly sense-

36 DK 28B8; transl. Graham, Texts, 215-217.

37 DK 28B8.

38 DK 28A45.

39 DK 28A46.

40 For a useful discussion of ancient and modern interpretations of Parmenides, see J. Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 1-45.

41 Pl., Prm. 128a; Arist. Phys. 184b; see J. Palmer, Plato's Reception of Parmenides (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

42 See below, pp. 31-4.

43 DK 59B21.

44 ὄψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόµενα, S. E., M 7.140 (DK 59B21); transl. Graham, Texts, 309. !23 perception works. According to Theophrastus, he posits the view that perception occurs by contraries, on the principle that like is unaffected by like.45 This appears derived from common sense observation: we feel heat because we are cold (by comparison); a sweet taste is more pronounced if we have just eaten something sour.46 This principle of perception by contraries gives rise to the view that all perception is accompanied by pain, “for when any unlike makes contact with an unlike it causes pain.”47 Thus every sense involves a kind of touch.

This understanding of sense-perception by contact (i.e., all sense is a species of touch) is common to many subsequent accounts of sense-perception, including Plato’s. These touch-based accounts can be divided into three broad groups:48 the active (emissionist) theories, which understand perception to result from the perceiving subject’s activity (e.g., emitting rays of light from the eyes); the passive (emanationist) theories, which understand perception to occur by the perceiving subject’s passive reception of emanations from the object of perception; and interactionist theories, which understand perception to result from some combination of the active engagement and passive reception on the part of the perceiver.

On this classification, Anaxagoras appears to have either a passive or an interactionist understanding of sight, since sight works by images in the pupil, which are produced (at least in

45 Theophrastus, Sens. 27 (DK 59A92). For a discussion of how fair Theophrastus’ portrayal is to Anaxagoras, see J. Warren, “Anaxagoras on Perception, Pleasure, and Pain,“ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 33 (2007): 19-54.

46 Theophrastus, Sens. 28 (DK 59A92).

47 Theophrastus, Sens. 29 (DK 59A92); transl. Graham, Texts, 309.

48 S. Blundell, D. Cairns, E. Craik, and N. S. Rabinowitz, “Introduction,” in S. Blundell, D. Cairns, and N. Rabinowitz, eds., Vision and Viewing in Ancient Greece (=Helios 40.1-2, 2013): 15-16. !24 part) by external light.49 His understanding of hearing is straightforwardly passive, since hearing occurs “when sound reaches the brain.”50

Empedocles offers a different understanding of the mechanics of sense-perception.51

According to Theophrastus, Empedocles joins Parmenides and Plato in making sensation result from similarity (i.e., like is affected by like).52 Sensation occurs when the sense objects fit into the pores for each sense: “There are alternating pores for fire and water, of which we perceive white by those for fire, black by those for water, for each fits in the corresponding pore. And colors are conveyed to the sight through effluences.”53 Here the sense-organ contains fire within, yet sight works apparently by receiving the images from outside. The “effluences” that convey color are at least suggestive of, if not a direct influence on,54 the more elaborate view of the

Atomists. As such, the Empedoclean view appears passive (emanationist). For Empedocles, however, the effectiveness of vision depends on both the fire within the eye and the fire outside

49 ὁρᾶν µὲν γάρ τῆι ἐµφάσει τῆς κόρης…ἐµφαίνεσθαι δὲ µεθ’ ἡµέραν, ὅτι τὸ φῶς συναίτιον τῆς ἐµφάσεως, Theophrastus, Sens. 27 (DK 59A92).

50 ἁκούειν…τῶι διικνεῖσθαι τὸν ψόφον ἄχρι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, Ibid. 28 (DK 59A92); transl. Graham, Texts, 309.

51 The chronological relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles is disputed. For the view that Anaxagoras preceded Empedocles, see D. O’Brien, “The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 88 (1968): 93–113. For the view that Empedocles preceded Anxagoras, see J. Mansfeld, “The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial. Part II: The Plot against Pericles and His Associates,” Mnemosyne 33 (1980): 90-95.

52 Theophrastus, Sens. 7 (DK 31A86). For the argument that the attribution of the “like-by-like” principle to Empedocles tells us more about Theophrastus than it does about Empedocles, see D. Sedley, “Empedocles’ Theory of Vision,” in Fortenbaugh and Gutas, eds., Theophrastus (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992), 26-31.

53 Theophrastus, Sens. 7 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, 401. The reference to “colors” in the final sentence is not to be taken in contrast to “white” and “black” in the preceding sentence, as both “white” and “black” were regarded by Empedocles as colors, Theophrastus, Sens. 59 (DK 31A69); Aëtius P. 1.15.3, S. 1.16.1 (DK 31A92); for extensive discussion of ancient color theory, especially Empedocles, see J. L. Benson, Greek Color Theory and the Four Elements (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2000).

54 see M. Garani, Empedocles Redivivus: Poetry and Analogy in Lucretius (London: Routledge, 2007): 197. !25 it.55 This, like the more popular literary tradition,56 would seem to imply an interactionist view, with both an active element (i.e., the internal fire reaching out to the object) and a passive element (i.e., the eye receiving the effluences from the object of sight with the aid of the external fire). “With earth we perceive earth, with water water, with air divine air, with fire destructive fire, with love love, and strife with baneful strife.”57 Thus the perceiver draws in the external element by means of the corresponding element within him, so that “we have control to some extent over our perceptions.”58 Yet it is still not entirely clear how these corresponding elements are brought together.

A more precise description of sight emerges from a fragment quoted by Aristotle, wherein

Empedocles offers an extended simile, likening the eye to a lamp:

And just as when someone planning a journey through the stormy night prepares a lamp, a flame of blazing fire, fitting to it lantern-sides as shields against the various winds, and these scatter the blowing winds’ breath, but the finer part of the light leaps out and shines across the threshold with its unyielding beams; so at that time did she [Aphrodite] bring to birth the round-faced eye, primeval fire wrapped in membranes and in delicate garments. These held back the sea of water that flowed around, but the finer part of the fire penetrated to the outside.”59

55 Theophrastus, Sens. 8 (DK 31A86).

56 See above, pp. 17f.

57 γαίηι µὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαµεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῆι, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῶι, Arist., de An. 404b (DK 31B109); transl. M. R. Wright, “Empedocles,” in C. C. W. Taylor, ed., Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: From the Beginning to Plato (London: Routledge, 1997): 191.

58 M. R. Wright, “Empedocles,” 191.

59 Aristotle, Sens. 437b-438a (DK 31B84); transl. D. Sedley, “Empedocles’ Theory,” 21. See Sedley, “Empedocles’ Theory,” 22-3 for the argument against translating κούρην as “pupil.” Graham, Texts, 397 renders it “pupil,” but his brief comments on the passage appear unaware of Sedley’s interpretation (Graham, Texts, 429). Likewise, Wright favors “pupil,” but makes no mention of Sedley (M. R. Wright, “Empedocles,” 192). !26 In this passage, at least,60 Empedocles offers what appears at first glance to be an active

(emissionist) view, and a precursor to Plato’s “ray theory” of vision, in which the eye sends out a beam of light to the object of sight.61 Yet elsewhere what matters for Empedocles is that there be a balance of contraries: “It is best for the [sense] organ to be blended, and the best blend is a composition of equal parts of both elements [i.e fire and water].”62 In light of this fragment, a closer reading of Empedocles’ lantern simile suggests a process somewhat different from Plato’s

“ray theory”: the water held back by the “membranes and delicate garments” is analogous to the winds held back by the sides of the lantern.63 The “membranes” are best understood as the cornea, rather than internal membranes, and the water is best understood as the lachrymal fluid on the surface of the cornea, rather than internal fluid.64 Thus, the membranes keep water out of the eye, but allow fire to pass through. So the “alternating pores for fire and water” must be located on the surface of the cornea, where there would be the recommended “blending” of fire and water. This reading accounts for both the passive and active nature of sight noted above: the effluences reach the eye’s surface, where the alternating pores allow the mixing of water (i.e., lachrymal fluid) and fire (i.e., the internal fire of the eye and/or the external fire of daylight).

60 Aristotle regards this passage as an example of how Empedocles “sometimes” (ὁτέ) depicts the eye as emitting light: Ἐµπεδοκλῆς δ’ ἔοικε νοµίζοντι ὁτὲ µὲν ἐξιόντος τοῦ φωτός, ὥσ- περ εἴρηται πρότερον, βλέπειν· λέγει γοῦν οὕτως, Sens. 437b (DK 31B84).

61 Aristotle interprets Empedocles thus at Sens. 437b (DK 31B84).

62 Theophrastus, Sens. 8 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, 401.

63 Sedley, “Empedocles’ Theory,” 23-4.

64 Ibid., 22-4. !27 Empedocles also offers an account of the mechanics of hearing. According to him, hearing comes about by air moving and striking the “solid parts”65 or “cartilage”66 hanging inside the ear like a bell, which then produces a sound. Thus, hearing provides some parallel to seeing.

As sight involves effluences from objects, so hearing involves air moving from the object to the perceiver. As the visual effluences make contact with the perceiver on the surface of the eye, so the moving air makes contact with the bell-like part of the ear. But even though “hearing comes about from sounds inside,”67 it is not clear how the perceiver is actively engaging the air set in motion by the sound. The sound is “inside” when it is perceived, but it does not originate from within the perceiver, except in the case of someone hearing his own voice. In the vast majority of cases, hearing would involve perceiving the sound set in motion by someone else’s voice, and would thus involve a movement of air beginning outside the perceiver and entering inside the perceiver where it strikes the bell-like part of the ear and produces the sound. So hearing appears to have, for Empedocles, a more exclusively passive nature than seeing. Regarding sensation in general, Empedocles thinks those who have an equal mixture of elements are both “most intelligent and have the most accurate sense-perceptions,”68 because knowledge, for Empedocles,

“is either the same as or very similar to perception.”69

65 Theophrastus, Sens. 9 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, 403.

66 Aëtius P 4.16.1, S 1.53.1 (DK 31A93); transl. Graham, Texts, 403.

67 Theophrastus, Sens. 9 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, 401.

68 Theophrastus, Sens. 11 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, 403.

69 Theophrastus, Sens. 10 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, 403. !28 Protagoras adds something unique to the discussion of the senses in his famous “Man-

Measure” statement: “Of all things the measure is man, of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not.”70 This seems a general statement of universal relativism, but it is often discussed in terms of sense-perceptions: the same wind seems cold to one man, not-cold to another, so the wind itself is neither cold nor not-cold, but “as it appears to me so it is to me, and as it appears to you, so in turn it is to you.”71 Plato takes this to mean that knowledge is perception, perception is relative, and thus all things are in motion and a state of becoming.72

Plato discusses sense-perception chiefly in the Theaetetus, Philebus, and Timaeus. In the

Theaetetus, Socrates discloses to Theaetetus secret doctrines of unnamed clever men, that all is motion, that motion is of two kinds, active and passive,73 and that from the combination of these two arise both the sense object (τὸ αἰσθητόν) and the sense (αἴσθησις).74 In this view, all sense objects, and all motions of which they are composed, are understood only in relation to each other, the passive understood only in relation to the active (and vice versa), so that none of them partake in “being” but only in “becoming.”75 Thus, the sensible world is one of becoming and

70 πάντων χρηµάτων µέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν µὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, S. E. M 7.60 (DK 80B1); transl. Graham, Texts, 701.

71 ὡς οἷα µὲν ἕκαστα ἐµοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα µὲν ἔστιν ἐµοὶ, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί, Tht. 152a (DK 80B1); transl. Graham, Texts, 703. I leave aside the seemingly related, but difficult to interpret, fragment of Protagoras preserved in Didymus Caecus, Comm. in Ps. 222.20-25 (M. Gronewald, “Ein neues Protagorasfragment,” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 2 (1968):1-2); for discussion, see P. Woodruff, “Didymus on Protagoras and the Protagoreans,” JHP 23.4 (1985): 483-497.

72 Tht. 151e-152e; for discussion of this relativistic interpretation, see M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, “The Sophists,” in P. Curd and D. W. Graham, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008): 375-377.

73 δύναµιν δὲ τὸ µὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, το δὲ πάσχειν, Tht. 156a.

74 Ibid. 156b.

75 Ibid. 157a-b. !29 change, and has no permanence or ultimate reality. Sense-perception is a kind of movement or exchange between the sense and the sense object.76 So when someone healthy drinks wine, it seems pleasant and sweet because the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception; perception arises from the passive element and makes the tongue perceptive; sweetness arises from the wine and passes over to make the wine both to seem and to be sweet.77

Similarly, the Philebus presents perception as “the coming together of body and soul in a common affection and a common movement.”78 Thus, sense-perception involves activity and passivity. In the act of perception, “the soul experiences things together with the body.”79 Plato discusses this further in the Timaeus, presenting sensations as “affections” (παθήµατα) within the soul produced by the collision of a percipient’s body with one of the elements (fire, air, water, or earth) rushing in from without.80 They are affections of external bodies insofar as the eternal bodies produce them.81 They are also described as affections of the percipient’s body insofar as they are received by the percipient and experienced within his body.82 Not all affections result in sense-perception, only those whose movements are such as to reach the organ of intellect and affect the living creature as a whole.83 Thus, in general, Plato’s conception of sense-perception

76 Tht. 156c-e.

77 Ibid. 159c-d.

78 τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶµα κοινῇ γιγνόµενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, Phlb. 34a.

79 ἃ µετὰ τοῦ σώµατος ἔπασχέν ποθ᾽ ἡ ψυχή, Ibid. 34b.

80 Ti. 43b-c.

81 τὰ τῶν προσπιπτόντων παθήµατα ἑκάστοις, Ibid. 43b; this is a subjective genitive; see T. S. Ganson, “The Platonic Approach to Sense-perception,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 22:1 (January 2005): 2.

82 τοῦ σώµατος παντὸς παθήµατα, Ti. 65b; this is an objective genitive; see Ganson, “The Platonic Approach,” 2.

83 Ti. 64b-c. !30 involves the movement of external objects producing an affection within the percipient’s body that impinges on the soul. Plato clearly views the passive sense of touch as the paradigm here.84

Plato presents the active sense of sight within a similar framework. On the one hand,

Plato understands sight to involve the eye sending out a stream of fire that mingles with the light of day, on the principle “like is known by like.”85 This presents sense-perception as resulting from the active movement of the percipient affecting the external object, rather than the movement of the external object affecting the percipient.86 On the other hand, Plato proceeds immediately to say that the mingled composite of the visual stream and the daylight “distributes the motions of what it touches, and what touches it, throughout the body even to the soul and thus produces the sense that we call sight.”87 Thus vision seems to involve both an active

84 Ti. 61c-62c.

85 Ibid. 45b-c.

86 Ibid. 45c.

87 ὅτου τε ἂν αὐτό ποτε ἐφάπτηται καὶ ὃ ἂν ἄλλο ἐκείνου, τούτων τὰς κινήσεις διαδιδὸν εἰς ἅπαν τὸ σῶµα µέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς αἴσθησιν παρέσχετο ταύτην, ᾗ δὴ ὁρᾶν φαµέν, Ibid. 45d; see also Ti. 46a-b, where the sight of one’s face reflected in a mirror is explained as “the coming together, on the smooth and bright surface, of the fire from one’s face and the fire from one’s eye” (τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον πυρὸς τῷ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν πυρὶ περὶ τὸ λεῖον καὶ λαµπρὸν συµπαγοῦς γιγνοµένου); this passage explains what Plato means in Soph. 266c, when he says that a “two-fold light, internal and external, comes together on bright and smooth surfaces, offering a sense-impression the reverse of what is normally presented to our sight, and produces an image” (διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν φῶς οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαµπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἓν συνελθὸν τῆς ἔµπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζηται); in this latter passage, the “internal light” (φῶς οἰκεῖόν) is not to be understood as “the object’s own luminosity” (A. E. Taylor, transl. Plato: The Sophist and The Statesman (London: Thomas Nelson, 1961)), nor as a “luminous principle” belonging to the mirror (H. N. Fowler, transl. Plato: Theaetetus and Sophist, Vol. 12 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921): 450, n. 1), but as the “fire from one’s eye” (τῷ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν πυρὶ, Ti. 46b); see L. M. de Rijk, Plato’s Sophist: A Philosophical Commentary (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1986): 213, and F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and Sophist of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary (London: Routledge, 1935): 327. !31 movement from the percipient to the external object, as well as a movement from the object to the percipient, which latter reaches even to the soul.88

Aristotle distinguishes his views of sense-perception from those of earlier philosophers.

In De Anima, he perhaps has Plato (following Empedocles) in mind when he mentions other philosophers claiming that “like is acted upon by like,”89 but he does not pass judgment on this view; it is incidental to his more general remark that sensation “consists of being moved and acted upon.”90 A little later in the same work, Aristotle rejects the atomism of Democritus.91 In

De Sensu, he specifically mentions Empedocles and Plato’s Timaeus for the view, which he also rejects, that the visual organ consists of fire.92 By contrast, Aristotle maintains that the eye is composed of water and that sight is due to the translucence of the watery eye receiving the external light and allowing it to penetrate to the sense-organ within.93 He distinguishes his view

88 One might reasonably ask to what extent the preceding description of Plato’s views on sense-perception exists only in the mind of the scholar, an artificial systematization that bears no resemblance to anything Plato would have proposed, let alone endorsed. Perhaps in our zeal to make sense of the scraps Plato has left us, we have rearranged them into a composite form unrecognizable to Plato himself. As Chappell has discussed, there are serious questions about what Plato’s purpose is in introducing the “flux theory” of sensation in the Theaetetus (T. Chappell, Reading Plato’ s Theaetetus (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2005)). The aporetic nature of the dialogue itself suggests that anything proposed therein is far from conclusive. Plato has the character Theaetetus himself call into question how serious Socrates is in the proposal of this theory (157c). Similar questions could be raised about the views presented in the Philebus and the Timaeus. This objection, as legitimate as it is, does not directly affect our discussion at present, concerned as it is not with Plato qua Plato, but with Plato as he was understood by later thinkers (especially Middle- and Neoplatonists and, consequently, Augustine). The practice of mining Plato’s dialogues for ideas that could be arranged into a synthetic whole, however objectionable (to modern scholars) as a method of ascertaining what Plato thought or taught, was the modus operandi of those in antiquity who sought to carry on the Platonic tradition. Thus, such an artificial reconstruction is useful for understanding how Middle- and Neoplatonic views of sense-perception compare to the inherited Platonic material.

89 416b; cf. Ti. 45c.

90 ἡ δ’αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συµβαίνει, de An. 416b.

91 de An. 419a.

92 Sens. 437a-b; cf. Ti. 45b-c, 67c.

93 Sens. 438a-b. !32 from that of Democritus, later adopted by Epicurus, that colors are emanations from external objects, because that makes sight produced by means of touch,94 which Aristotle regards as obviously false.95

In this last regard, Aristotle appears to break with earlier philosophers who understand every sense to involve contact between the perceiver and the sensible object.96 Instead, he stresses the role of a perceptual medium. Rather than understanding the eye to reach out to make contact with the object of sight, or the object somehow impinging directly upon the eye, Aristotle maintains that a perceptual medium (between the perceiver and the object of perception) is necessary to the sensory process.97 In the case of vision, the thing seen is color, which lies on the surface of the visible object.98 This color on the surface of the visible object produces movement in the transparent medium (i.e., the air), which in turn produces movement in the sense-organ.99

“Nothing is visible without light, but the color of each and every thing is visible in light.”100

Aristotle defines light as “the activity of the transparency by which it is transparent.”101 Thus, for

Aristotle, light is not a substance transmitted or traveling between object and perceiver (as other

94 Sens. 440a.

95 Ibid. 442a-b.

96 S. Blundell, D. Cairns, E. Craik, and N. S. Rabinowitz, “Introduction,” in S. Blundell, D. Cairns, and N. Rabinowitz, eds., Vision and Viewing in Ancient Greece (=Helios 40.1-2, 2013): 16.

97 de An. 418a-419a.

98 τὸ γάρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶµα. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ, Ibid. 418a.

99 τὸ µὲν χρῶµα κινεῖ το διαφανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος κινεῖται τὸ αἰσθητήριον, Ibid. 419a.

100 οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός , ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου χρῶµα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρατόν, Ibid. 418b.

101 φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές, Ibid. !33 philosophers thought),102 but a state of the medium. So not only is sensation thought to be by movement instead of touch, but even this movement is conceived not as a temporal or spatial movement of light, but rather a non-spatial, atemporal movement from potentiality to actuality in the transparent medium.103

Another distinctive feature of Aristotle’s treatment of sense-perception is his hylomorphism, the theory that bodily objects consist of matter and form. Like Plato, he regards the natural world as a realm of change.104 So he considers earlier philosophers wrong to say that nothing could come to be or pass away because it must come to be from the existent or from the non-existent, both of which are impossible.105 Aristotle responds to this Parmenidean106 argument against change by distinguishing between coming to be (i.e., generation) and coming to be so-and-so (i.e., qualitative change).107 Not every change or “coming to be” implies the logical impossibility of “coming to be from the non-existent”: “We also affirm [i.e., along with these thinkers] that nothing comes to be without qualification from what is not. Nevertheless, we maintain that a thing may come to be from what is not in a certain way, for example,

102 de An. 418b.

103 For a discussion of the complicating passage in Meteorologica 3, wherein Aristotle seems to accept an active (emissionist) view of sight similar (if not identical) to Plato’s, see P. J. van der Eijk, Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 211.

104 ἡµῖν δ’ ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούµενα εἶναι, Arist. Ph. 185a; see C. Shields, Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014): 232.

105 ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καί φασιν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον µὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόµενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ µὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀµφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι, Arist. Ph. 191a.

106 For the view that Aristotle has Parmenides in mind here, see C. Shields, Aristotle, 57-60; but against this view, see J. Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 130-133.

107 Ph. 190a; see C. Shields, Aristotle, 60-61. !34 accidentally.”108 This leads Aristotle to posit an underlying matter (ὕλη) that persists throughout a change, and a form (εἶδος or µορφή) that is gained or lost in the process of change.109 These concepts figure in Aristotle’s understanding of sensation (αἴσθησις), since “sensation consists in being moved and being acted on,”110 and sensation is defined as “the reception of sensible forms without the matter, just as the wax receives the image of the signet-ring without the iron or gold, but receives the image of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze.”111 Thus, in his own way,

Aristotle advocates a kind of passive view of sensation, though not an emanationist one.

Epicureanism offers its own distinctive view of sense-perception. According to Epicurus,

“everything is body and void.”112 Further, all bodies are made up of atoms.113 Thus, in contrast to

Plato, who portrays the material, sensible realm as the lowest level of reality,114 Epicurus views it as the whole of reality. Even soul is understood as a kind of body.115 This leads to the view that sight involves very fine “images” (εἴδωλα/τύποι) emanating from external objects and striking the organ of sight.116 These images preserve the corresponding sequence of qualities from the

108 ἡµεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαµεν γίγνεσθαι µὲν µηθὲν ἁπλῶς ἐκ µὴ ὄντος, πὼς µέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ µὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συµβεβηκός, Ph. 191b; trans. by C. Shields, Aristotle, 63.

109 Ph. 192a-b; see C. Shields, Aristotle, 63-66.

110 ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συµβαίνει, de An. 416b.

111 ἡ µὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σηµεῖον, λαµβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σηµεῖον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός, de An. 424a.

112 τὸ πᾶν ἐστι σώµατα καὶ τόπος, Ep. Hdt. 39.

113 Ibid. 40.

114 R. 509a.

115 ἡ ψυχὴ σῶµά ἐστι, Ep. Hdt. 63.

116 Ep. Hdt. 46-50; Lucr. 4.217ff. !35 external object as a result of the uniform contact with the sense-organ of the recipient, which contact is kept up by the vibration of the atoms deep within the external object.117 The swiftness, uniformity, and continuity of this stream of images guarantees the reliability of the sense- impression, such that falsehood arises not from the sense-impressions themselves, but from the addition of opinion.118 The other senses follow this paradigm of sight.119 Thus, the Epicurean understanding of sense-perception is situated within an epistemological and ethical framework; the goal of life and the point of philosophy is to achieve “peace of mind,”120 which involves rejecting myths and seeking to understand natural causes.121 To this end, one must trust one’s senses, feelings, and intuitions to guide one’s judgment.122 Epicurus, then, shares a principle concern of previous philosophers from Protagoras through Plato and Aristotle: the criterion of truth. Whereas Protagoras, according to Plato,123 sought to resolve the issue of perceptual conflict by proposing global subjectivism, Plato denied sensations any propositional content, thereby relegating perception to the status of raw material for beliefs (and thus neither true nor false),124 whereas Aristotle allowed sensations propositional content but denied that they are all

117 Ep. Hdt. 50; Lucr. 4.42f.

118 Ep. Hdt. 50-51; Lucr. 4.328.

119 Ep. Hdt. 52-3; see A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 76-7.

120 Ep. Hdt. 83.

121 Ibid. 82.

122 Ibid.

123 See above, pp. 27f., esp. n. 72.

124 ἐν µὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήµασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήµη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισµῷ: οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα µέν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον, Tht. 186d; I follow here the interpretation put forward in M. Burnyeat, “Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving,” CQ 26.1 (1976): 29-51; for discussion of alternative interpretations, see V. Caston, “Perception in Ancient Greek Philosophy,” 40-43. !36 true.125 The Epicurean views on sense-perception, then, are perhaps best understood not as a complete rejection of Platonic or Aristotelian approaches to sensation, but as a different response to the issue of perceptual conflict and another attempt to secure a reliable criterion of truth.

Unlike the Epicureans, Euclid employs a Platonic emissionist view as the theoretical basis for his discussion of optics. Though Euclid’s Optics focuses exclusively on the mathematical aspects of vision, his understanding of the physics of vision can be gleaned from his seven fundamental geometrical postulates:

Let us assume that (1) lines extending straight out from the eye encompass a distance of large magnitude. And that (2) the shape of the area enclosed within the lines of vision is a cone having its apex in the eye and its base at the limits of the object of sight. And that (3) the things upon which the lines of vision fall are seen, and the things upon which the lines of vision do not fall, are not seen. And that (4) those things seen within a larger angle appear larger, and those seen within a narrower angle appear smaller, and those seen within equal angles appear the same size. And that (5) those things seen by higher visual rays appear higher, and those seen by lower visual rays appear lower. And likewise that (6) those things seen by visual rays more to the right appear more to the right, and those seen by visual rays more to the left appear more to the left. And that (7) things seen by more angles appear more precisely.126

The first three postulates, taken together, imply a visual-ray that extends from the eye in a cone- shape to reach the object of sight, and that vision happens when (or because) the visual ray falls

125 de An. 418a, 428b; see P. Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 108-9; see also S. Everson, “Epicureanism,” in D. J. Furley, ed. Routledge History of Philosophy: Volume 2, From Aristotle to Augustine (London: Routledge, 1999): 192.

126 Ὑποκείσθω τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄµµατος ἐξαγοµένας εὐθείας γραµµὰς φέρεσθαι διάστηµα µεγεθῶν µεγάλων. καὶ τὸ [µὲν] ὑπὸ τῶν ὄψεων περιεχόµενον σχῆµα εἶναι κῶνον τὴν κορυφὴν µὲν ἔχοντα ἐν τῷ ὄµµατι τὴν δὲ βάσιν πρὸς τοῖς πέρασι τῶν ὁρωµένων. καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι µὲν ταῦτα, πρὸς ἃ ἂν αἱ ὄψεις προσπίπτωσι, µὴ ὁρᾶσθαι δέ, πρὸς ἃ ἂν µὴ προσπίπτωσιν αἱ ὄψεις. καὶ τὰ µὲν ὑπὸ µείζονος γωνίας ὁρώµενα µείζονα φαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἐλάττονος ἐλάττονα, ἴσα δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ ἴσων γωνιῶν ὁρώµενα. καὶ τὰ µὲν ὑπὸ µετεωροτέρων ἀκτίνων ὁρώµενα µετεωρότερα φαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ταπεινοτέρων ταπεινότερα. καὶ ὁµοίως τὰ µὲν ὑπὸ δεξιωτέρων ἀκτίνων ὁρώµενα δεξιώτερα φαίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀριστερωτέρων ἀριστερώτερα. τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ πλειόνων γωνιῶν ὁρώµενα ἀκριβέστερον φαίνεσθαι, Euclid, Opt. 1. !37 upon the object.127 Though he leaves unexplained many aspects of this view of the visual process, his ideas would be picked up and refined by later geometricians, and his conical depiction of visual rays is similar to later Stoic ideas.

Like the Epicureans, the Stoics situate their views of sensation in an epistemological and ethical framework. They understand sense-perception as resulting from a kind of blow from outside which is passively received by the senses.128 But rather than separating this sense- impression from the rational judgment of the mind (as the Epicureans do, trusting the former against the latter), the Stoics regard the sense-impression as inseparably linked with the assent of the mind, which they understand as originating from within us and voluntary.129 Thus, for the

Stoics not all sense-perceptions are utterly reliable (as for the Epirureans), but only “cognitive impressions” are identified with the “criterion of truth.”130 A further distinction of the Stoic view is the description of the five senses as parts of the soul that extend like tentacles from the

“commanding faculty” (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν), the highest part of the soul, situated in the heart.131

Thus, while the Epicureans view sensation as a purely mechanistic and non-rational event, the

Stoics understand the impression of a normal adult as a rational act that takes the form of a

127 See D. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-kindi to Kepler, Rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981): 12-14;

128 Cic. Ac. 1.40-41.

129 Ibid.

130 visa comprehendibilia, Ibid.; φαντασία καταληπτική, Diogenes Laertius 7.54.

131 Aëtius P 4.21.1-4. !38 putative judgment.132 Yet even this rational aspect of the sense-perception is understood in terms of a soul that is material.133

Only traces survive of how the Stoics understood the mechanics of sense-perception, but these traces show similarities to several previous thinkers. First, the Stoics appear to accept some of the sensory views of Aristotle, adapted to fit their “dynamic materialism,”134 yet one of the primary Stoic meanings of αἴσθησις is an activity (ἐνέργεια) of the soul reaching out to touch the external sense object.135 Second, the Stoics use the term “sense” (αἴσθησις ) to indicate the stream of “spirit” (πνεῦµα) sent from the “ruling part” (ἡγεµονικόν) to the sensory organs.136

This clearly implies an active (emissionist) view of sense-perception. Thus, Chrysippus’ view of sight, for instance, involves a cone-shaped projection of light between the eye and the object seen.137 Though it is not entirely clear how this projection functions, it is likened to a walking- stick,138 so that the eye reaches out to the sense object on the analogy of touch. In this way,

Chrysippus’ view appears to have more in common with Plato’s extramission theory than with

132 A. A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 453.

133 Diogenes Laertius 7.156.

134 Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 321.

135 καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια δὲ αἴσθησις καλεῖται, D. L. 7.52; see S. M. Rubarth, The Stoic Theory of Aisthêsis, Ph.D. Dissertation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997): 13.

136 Αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἡγεµονικοῦ πνεῦµα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον, D. L. 7.52.

137 ὁρᾶν δὲ τοῦ µεταξὺ τῆς ὁράσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειµένου φωτὸς ἐντεινοµένου κωνοειδῶς, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. γίνεσθαι µέντοι τὸ κωνοειδὲς τοῦ ἀέρος πρὸς τῇ ὄψει, τὴν δὲ βάσιν πρὸς τῷ ὁρωµένῳ, Diogenes Laertius 7.157; for discussion of whether it is the light (φῶς) or the air (ἀήρ) that is cone- shaped, see S. M. Rubarth, The Stoic Theory of Aisthêsis, pp. 188-9.

138 Ibid. !39 Aristotle’s claim that the eye is merely receptive of light from outside. Third, the Stoics seem to be influenced by the geometrical depiction of the visual-rays in Euclid.139

Cicero offers us a glimpse of how these various philosophical and scientific traditions are received by Roman thinkers in the late Republican period. In a letter to Atticus, he writes:

You criticize my narrow windows. I will have you know that you are criticizing the Education of Cyrus.140 For when I said the very same thing, Cyrus141 told me that views of greenery through wide openings are not so pleasant. For let the eye be A, and the object perceived BC, the rays be AB and AC—you see the rest. For if sight were by means of the impact of images, the images would really struggle in the narrow spaces. But as it is, the emission of rays occurs most pleasantly.142

Cicero is here contrasting two accounts of vision, the Euclidean and the Epicurean. When he says, “Let the eye be A, and the object perceived BC, etc.,” (ἔστω ὄψις µὲν ἡ Α, τὸ δὲ ὁρώµενον

<τὸ> ΒΓ), he is sprinkling his Latin with Greek terms that closely follow Euclid’s diagram for vision in the first section of the Optica.143 In contrast to this Euclidean account, Cicero criticizes the Epicurean idea that sight is “by means of the impact of images” (κατ' εἰδώλων ἐµπτώσεις).144

This kind of offhand allusion to competing Greek visual theories is perhaps characteristic of the philosophical eclecticism of Cicero. Elsewhere, we find him making the commonplace

139 R. Siegel, Galen on Sense-perception (Basel: S. Karger, 1970): 88; see above, pp. 36f.

140 Cicero playfully refers to Xenophon’s work Cyropaideia (The Education of Cyrus), when he really means “the opinion of [my architect] Cyrus.”

141 Cicero’s architect.

142 Fenestrarum angustias quod reprehendis, scito te Κύρου παιδείαν reprehendere. nam cum ego idem istuc dicerem, Cyrus aiebat viridiorum διαφάσεις latis luminibus non tam esse suavis. etenim ἔστω ὄψις µὲν ἡ Α, τὸ δὲ ὁρώµενον <τὸ> ΒΓ, ἀκτῖνες δὲ + ΑΙΤΑ + - vides enim cetera. nam si κατ' εἰδώλων ἐµπτώσεις videremus, valde laborarent εἴδωλα in angustiis; nunc fit lepide illa ἔκχυσις radiorum, Cic. Att. 2.3.2; my translation is based on the emendations and interpretations of P. T. Keyser, “Cicero on Optics (“Att.” 2.3.2),” Phoenix 47, no. 1 (1993): 67-69.

143 Euclid, Opt. 1; see above, p. 36, n. 126.

144 cf. Epicur. Sent. Vat. 24: Ἐνύπνια…γίνεται κατὰ ἔµπτωσιν εἰδώλων. !40 philosophical distinction between external vision and the internal vision of the mind.145 In addition, he echoes Platonic descriptions of sight when he refers to the philosopher’s desire to

“pierce the darkness with his keen sight of his mind.”146 In other passages, however, Cicero’s discussion of sense-perception implies a passive reception of “blows” from without.147 From such traces in Cicero of the philosophical tradition of sensation, we can see that not only the views of Plato and Epicurus, but even those of the Greek mathematicians like Euclid, have made their way to Rome, where they are used (if for no other reason) as a sign of one’s learning.

Yet it would be unfair to dismiss the Ciceronian evidence regarding sensation as mere passing references for the purpose of showing off.148 After all, Cicero does provide one fairly detailed discussion of the visual process in his Tusculan Disputations:

For it is not with the eyes that we now discern the things we see, nor do any of the senses reside in the body, but—as not only the physical scientists but also the medical writers teach, who have seen these things opened up and laid bare—there are as it were certain pathways bored from the seat of the soul to the ears and eyes and nostrils. So it is often the case that, impeded by thought or by some mental affliction, we do not see or hear, even though our eyes and ears are open and sound. From this it may easily be understood that it is the soul that both sees and hears, and not those parts which are, as it were, windows of the soul, but through which the mind can sense nothing unless it is present and active. How is it that with the same mind we comprehend things most dissimilar, such as color, taste, heat, smell, and sound? These things the soul would never learn from the five messengers, unless everything were referred to it and it alone were the judge of all. These things will surely be discerned much more clearly and evidently when the soul has attained the freedom which is its natural end. For now, at least, although those openings which lead from the body to the soul are fashioned by nature with the

145 nihil enim animo videre poterant, ad oculos omnia referebant, Tusc. 1.16.37.

146 cum has terras incolentes circumfusi erant caligine, tamen acie mentis dispicere cupiebant, Ibid. 1.19.45; see also 4.17.38, 5.13.39.

147 See esp. ND 1.26.

148 For a fuller treatment of Cicero as a philosopher in his own right, see G. Striker, “Cicero and Greek Philosophy,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 97 (1995): 53-61. !41 most skillful craft, still they are blocked somehow by solid bodily substances; but when there will be nothing but soul, nothing will stand in the way to prevent it from perceiving what or what-sort something is.149

Thus, for Cicero the senses are faculties not of the body but of the soul. He follows natural scientists and medical writers in asserting that sensation occurs by certain pathways from the seat of the soul to the eyes and ears and nostrils.150 The eyes and ears are “windows of the soul” (fenestrae animi), but without the active attention of the soul, we do not see and hear.151

The senses are the “five messengers” (quinque nuntii) but the soul is the judge (iudex) who alone discerns what is reported to it.152 In a Platonic turn, Cicero looks forward to a time when the soul is free to perceive and judge without the impediment of the body.153 Here, at least, Cicero offers a view of sensation that incorporates elements of Stoic and Platonic thought, not in an offhand way, but combined into a fairly elaborate description of various aspects of the sensory process.

149 nos enim ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea quae videmus; neque est enim ullus sensus in corpore, sed, ut non physici solum docent verum etiam medici, qui ista aperta et patefacta viderunt, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris a sede animi perforatae. itaque saepe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus nec audimus, ut facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis quae quasi fenestrae sint animi, quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit. quid, quod eadem mente res dissimillimas comprendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum? quae numquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur et is omnium iudex solus esset. atque ea profecto tum multo puriora et dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit. nam nunc quidem, quamquam foramina illa, quae patent ad animum a corpore, callidissimo artificio natura fabricata est, tamen terrenis concretis que corporibus sunt intersaepta quodam modo: cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res obiecta impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit, Cic. Tusc. 1.20.46.

150 ut non physici solum docent verum etiam medici, qui ista aperta et patefacta viderunt, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad auris, ad naris a sede animi perforatae, Ibid.

151 itaque saepe aut cogitatione aut aliqua vi morbi impediti apertis atque integris et oculis et auribus nec videmus nec audimus, ut facile intellegi possit animum et videre et audire, non eas partis quae quasi fenestrae sint animi, quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit, Ibid.

152 quid, quod eadem mente res dissimillimas comprendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem, sonum?quae numquam quinque nuntiis animus cognosceret, nisi ad eum omnia referrentur et is omnium iudex solus esset, Ibid.

153 nam nunc quidem, quamquam foramina illa, quae patent ad animum a corpore, callidissimo artificio natura fabricata est, tamen terrenis concretis que corporibus sunt intersaepta quodam modo: cum autem nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res obiecta impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque sit, Ibid. !42 Galen offers us another example of how the Greek philosophical and scientific traditions regarding sensation are received at Rome. Much like Aristotle, Galen tries to categorize earlier theories of vision: “A body that is seen does one of two things: either it sends something from itself to us and thereby gives an indication of its peculiar character, or if it does not itself send something, it waits for some sensory power to come to it from us.”154 Thus, Galen regards earlier accounts as either active (extramissionist) or passive (intromissionist/emanationist). He rejects the latter (Epicurean) view as implying the absurdity that an image (εἴδωλον) the size of a very large mountain could proceed from the mountain into our eyes.155 Galen then proposes his own view that when we look at something, an emission of “spirit” (πνεῦµα) passes through the optic nerves and strikes the surrounding air, causing an instantaneous alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) in the air comparable to the effect of sunlight on the air.156 The proper object of this process of sight is “the class of colors.”157 Whereas the other senses wait for something to come to them from the sense object, sight “reaches out through the intervening air to the colored body.”158 Thus, “sight alone of the senses…uses air as a medium, not as a kind of walking-stick, but as a homogeneous part

154 τὸ βλεπόµενον σῶµα δυοῖν θάτερον· ἢ πέµπον τι πρὸς ἡµᾶς ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ σὺν ἐκείνῳ καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐνδείκνυται διάγνωσιν, ἢ εἴπερ αὐτὸ µηδὲν πέµπει, περιµένει τινὰ παρ’ ἡµῶν ἀφικέσθαι δύναµιν αἰσθητικὴν ἐφ’ ἑαυτό, PHP 7.5.1; transl. from P. de Lacy, ed., Galeni de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, 3 vols, CMG 5.4.1.2 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1978-84); cf. Arist. Sens. 437a-438a.

155 ὅπερ εἰ περιέµενε πρὸς ἑαυτὸ παραγενέσθαι τινὰ µοῖραν ἢ δύναµιν ἢ εἴδωλον ἢ ποιότητα τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑποκειµένων σωµάτων, οὐκ ἂν τοῦ βλεποµένου τὸ µέγεθος ἐγνώκειµεν, οἷον ὄρους εἰ τύχοι µεγίστου. τηλικοῦτον γὰρ εἴδωλον ἐνέπιπτεν <ἂν> ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῖς ὀφθαλµοῖς ἡµῶν ἡλίκον ἐστὶν αὐτό, ὅπερ παντάπασιν ἄλογον, PHP 7.5.2-3.

156 λείπεται οὖν ἔτι τὸν πέριξ ἀέρα τοιοῦτον ὄργανον ἡµῖν γίγνεσθαι καθ’ ὃν ὁρῶµεν χρόνον, ὁποῖον ἐν τῷ σώµατι τὸ νεῦρον ὑπάρχει διὰ παντός. τοιοῦτον γάρ τι πάσχειν ἔοικεν ὁ περιέχων ἡµᾶς ἀὴρ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πνεύµατος ἐκπτώσεως, ὁποῖόν τι καὶ πρὸς τῆς ἡλιακῆς αὐγῆς. ἐκείνη τε γὰρ ψαύουσα τοῦ ἄνω πέρατος αὐτοῦ διαδίδωσιν εἰς ὅλον τὴν δύναµιν, ἥ τε διὰ τῶν ὀπτικῶν νεύρων ὄψις φεροµένη τὴν µὲν οὐσίαν ἔχει πνευµατικήν, ἐµπίπτουσα δὲ τῷ περιέχοντι καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ προσβολῇ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐργαζοµένη διαδίδωσιν ἄχρι πλείστου, Ibid. 7.5.5-7.

157 Ibid. 7.5.33.

158 ἡ δ’ ὄψις ἐκτείνεται διὰ µέσου τοῦ ἀέρος ἐπὶ τὸ κεχρωσµένον, Ibid. 7.5.34. !43 that forms one body with itself.”159 Though sight uses air as a medium, the organ of sight is luminous, whereas the organ of hearing is airy.160 Thus Galen follows both Plato and the Stoics, the former in positing a fiery emission from the eyes, the latter for the description of the emission as a “spirit” (πνεῦµα); yet he rejects the Stoic comparison of the visual “spirit” to a walking- stick, favoring instead the Aristotelian description of the visual process in terms of a instantaneous, qualitative change (ἀλλοίωσις) in the intervening medium of air, rather than any kind of corporeal image proceeding from the object.161 Galen’s view goes beyond mere philosophical eclecticism in synthesizing these views with a fairly developed description of the nervous system based on his medical researches.162

The continuation of the Platonic tradition regarding sense-perception can be seen in the

Didaskalikos, the Middle Platonist handbook attributed to Alcinous.163 The accumulated nature of the handbook makes it a good point of reference for Middle Platonist views on sense- perception. Alcinous defines sensation (αἴσθησις) as “an affection of the soul brought about

159 ἡ ὄψις µόνη τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων αἰσθάνεται τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν αἰσθητοῦ διὰ µέσου τοῦ ἀέρος, οὐχ ὡς βακτηρίας τινός, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁµοειδοῦς τε καὶ συµφυοῦς ἑαυτῇ µορίου, PHP 7.5.41.

160 Δεόντος οὖν ἐροῦµεν αὐγοειδὲς µὲν εῖναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄγανον, ἀεροιεδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, Ibid. 7.5.42.

161 καὶ πολύ γε τούτου κρείττων ’Αριστοτέλης, οὐκ εἴδωλον σωµατικὼν ἀλλὰ ποιότητα δι’ ἀλλοιώσεως τοῦ πέριξ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἄγων ἄχρι τῆς ὄψεως , Ibid. 5.7.22.

162 For discussion of whether Galen’s theory of vision is coherent, see K. Ierodiakonou, “On Galen’s Theory of Vision,” in P. Adamson, R. Hansberger, and J. Wilberding, eds., Philosophical Themes in Galen (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2014): 246-247; for discussion of the more mathematical and anatomical aspects of Galen’s theory of vision, including such issues as depth perception and a detailed descriptions of the eye, see R. Siegel, Galen on Sense-perception, pp. 40-117.

163 Though attributed in the MSS to Alcinous, the work was formerly identified by Dillon, following Freudenthal, as the work of Albinus (J. Dillon, The Middle Plutonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (London: Duckworth, 1977): 268; J. Freudenthal, Der Platoniker Albinos und der falsche Alkinoos (Berlin: S. Calvary & Co., 1879)). Dillon later changed his mind regarding authorship (J. Dillon, ed., Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993): vi, ix-xiii, 125), though his revised edition of The Middle Platonists leaves uncorrected the attribution to Albinus (J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, Rev. Ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996): passim). !44 through the medium of the body, presenting the message primarily of the faculty affected.”164

When a sense-impression endures in the soul, it becomes a memory; a present sensation combines with a memory to form an opinion.165 An opinion is the product of the “conjecturing reason” (δοξαστικός λόγος), which is the lower of two aspects of human reason and is concerned with the sensible world; the other aspect, the “knowing reason” (ἐπιστηµονικός λόγος), apprehends intelligibles and produces “knowledge” (ἐπιστηµή).166 Thus, Alcinous situates sense- perception in a highly structured theory of knowledge based on a Platonic division of the sensible and intelligible realms. He specifically references the Theaetetus and the Philebus in his discussion of senses,167 thus showing his synthesizing approach to Platonic material.

Plotinus, by contrast, shows more originality in his appropriation of Platonic material on sense-perception. In the opening chapter of his Enneads, Plotinus raises the question, “Who or what does sensation belong to?”168 He goes on to define sensation (αἴσθησις) as “the reception of a form or of an affection of a body, and reasoning and opinion are based on sensation.”169 This sounds very similar to Alcinous’ definition of sensation as an “affection of the soul.” Yet Plotinus is careful elsewhere to distinguish sensations from affections; the former are more precisely

“activities and judgments about affections.”170 Affections pertain to the body, but the judgment

164 Alcinous, Did. 154; tr. Dillon.

165 Ibid. 154-155.

166 Ibid. 154; the term “knowing reason” (ἐπιστηµονικός λόγος) appears to date back to Speusippus at least (S. E., M 1.145).

167 Ibid. 155.

168 Καὶ πρότερον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τίνος; En. 1.1.1.

169 αἴσθησις γὰρ παραδοχὴ εἴδους ἢ καὶ πάθους σώµατος, διάνοια δὲ καὶ δόξα ἐπ’ αἴσθησιν, En. 1.1.2.

170 ἐνεργείας δὲ περὶ παθήµατα καὶ κρίσεις, En. 3.6.1. !45 pertains to the soul.171 This distinction serves to show how the soul is unaffected and unmoved.172 In the opening Ennead, written near the end of his life and much later than Ennead

3.6,173 Plotinus offers the (correcting?) view that it is not the soul by itself that perceives, but the compound of body-and-soul.174 Here Plotinus applies the Platonic idea of the impassibility of the soul to an understanding of the body-soul relationship in the activity of sense-perception.

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

All these philosophical discussions and concerns would undergo, for Augustine, a profound transformation in the light of his experience with Christian teaching. This tradition of

Christian teaching is most evident in, and perhaps best represented by, the writings of

Augustine’s great tutor in the Christian faith, Bishop Ambrose of Milan. But the views of

Ambrose are themselves situated in a much broader religious tradition that can be traced back to ancient Jewish traditions regarding the senses.

Though there has traditionally been an attempt to separate ancient Jewish and Christian ways of approaching the senses,175 one can speak of a Judaeo-Christian tradition regarding the senses, in contrast to the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition. In particular, the Scriptures

171 En. 3.6.1.

172 Ibid. 3.6.1-5.

173 See P. Kalligas, The Enneads of Plotinus: A Commentary, Volume 1, transl. by E. K. Fowden and N. Pilavachi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014): 102.

174 En. 1.1.7.

175 See R. Neils, The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 1-3. !46 common to both Jews and Christians, as well as similar approaches to revelation, provide the basis for ways of understanding the senses differently from others in Greco-Roman antiquity.

One of the distinctive features of this Judaeo-Christian approach to the sensory world can be seen in the writings of Philo of Alexandria, especially in his exegetical work On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses.176 According to Philo, “the great Moses considered that what is ungenerated was of a totally different order from that which was visible, for the entire sense- perceptible realm is in a process of becoming and change and never remains in the same state.”177 Thus, at first glance, Philo’s Moses appears a model Platonist, distinguishing the intelligible and sensible realms and assigning the former eternity and the latter a beginning

(γένεσις).178 Yet Philo’s Moses “had not only reached the very summit of philosophy, but had also been instructed in the many and most essential doctrines of nature by means of oracles.”179

Thus, for Philo the teachings of Moses are not merely the result of philosophical speculation, but are also received in obedience as divinely inspired revelation. As such, Philo is not seeking in his exegesis to present a philosophical account as such; rather, he is attempting to use philosophy to justify religious belief.180

176 Περὶ τῆς κατὰ Μωυσέα κοσµοποιίας; abbreviated here according to its standard Latin title, De Opificio Mundi (Opif.); see D. T. Runia, ed., Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Boston: Brill, 2001) 96-7.

177 ὅ γε µέγας Μωυσῆς ἀλλοτριώτατον τοῦ ὁρατοῦ νοµίσας εἶναι τὸ ἀγένητον—πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐν γενέσει καὶ µεταβολαῖς οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, Opif. §12; transl. D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation, 49.

178 Opif. § 12; see also Pl., Tht. 157a-b; Ti. 27e-29a.

179 Μωυσῆς δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπ’ αὐτὴν φθάσας ἀκρότητα καὶ χρησµοῖς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἀναδιδαχθεὶς, Opif. §8; trans. D. T. Runia, p. 48.

180 Opif. §172. !47 This same element of divinely inspired teaching can be seen in Philo’s more specific discussions of sensation, especially sight and hearing. In a passage on the excellence of light,

Philo describes the intellect (νοῦς) as that which “gives leadership to the entire soul” and the eyes as the “sensible sources of information” (τὰ κριτήρια) for the intellect.181 Sense-perception is “the chief difference between living beings with and without soul.”182 Of the five senses,183 sight is the most excellent, the eyes standing in relation to the body as the intellect stands to the soul.184 To each of the senses, God assigned “special materials and its own criterion by which it would judge what falls under its notice.”185 The primary object of sight is color, and that of hearing sound.186 The senses themselves make judgments,187 and without the senses the ruling part of the soul, the reason, is not able to grasp the sensible realities.188 Thus, for Philo, the senses are passive in relation to the intellect,189 yet they serve as necessary tools for the soul to grasp sensible reality. “For, just like in wax, the intellect receives the impressions via the

181 τοσούτῳ γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ λαµπρότερόν τε καὶ αὐγοειδέστερον ὅσῳπερ ἥλιος, οἶµαι, σκότους καὶ ἡµέρα νυκτὸς καὶ [τὰ κριτήρια] νοῦς, ὁ τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς ἡγεµών, ὀφθαλµῶν σώµατος, Opif. §30.

182 διαφέρει γὰρ ἔµψυχα ἀψύχων οὐδενὶ µᾶλλον ἢ αἰσθήσει, Ibid. §62.

183 Ibid.

184 εἰδώς τε ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἄριστον τὸ φῶς ἐστιν, ὄργανον αὐτὸ τῆς ἀρίστης τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁράσεως ἀπέφαινεν· ὅπερ γὰρ νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦτ’ ὀφθαλµὸς ἐν σώµατι, Ibid. §53; see also Abr. 150.

185 ἑκάστῃ µέντοι προσένειµεν ὁ ποιῶν καὶ ἐξαιρέτους ὕλας καὶ κριτήριον ἴδιον, ᾧ δικάσει τὰ ὑποπίπτοντα, Opif. §62.

186 χρώµατα µὲν [ἡ] ὅρασις, φωνὰς δὲ ἀκοή, Ibid. §62.

187 Ibid. §130.

188 τὸν δὲ βασιλέα λογισµὸν ἐνιδρυσάµενος τῷ ἡγεµονικῷ παρέδωκε δορυφορεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς χρωµάτων καὶ φωνῶν χυλῶν τε αὖ καὶ ἀτµῶν καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων ἀντιλήψεις, ἃς ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως δι’ αὑτοῦ µόνου καταλαβεῖν οὐχ οἷός τε ἦν, Ibid. §139.

189 ἐν ἡµῖν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς µὲν ἔχει λόγον ὁ νοῦς, γυναικὸς δ’ αἴσθησις, Ibid. §165. !48 senses.”190 In all of these more specific discussions of the senses and sensation, Philo owes much to the previous philosophical tradition.191 Yet it is difficult to assign Philo to any one philosophical school. Though he echoes Plato and others in portraying sight as more active and hearing as more passive,192 it is unclear whether he ascribed to the Platonic ray theory of vision.

Though he echoes Aristotle’s comparison of sense-impressions to images imprinted in wax, he does not follow Aristotle in describing the process in terms of a qualitative change or the transmission of form without matter. Instead, he couches his description of passive senses in an allegorical reading of Genesis 3.193 Likewise, the discussion of how the senses relate to the ruling part of the soul is presented in the course of explaining how humans were created in the likeness of the divine Logos and had life breathed into them.194 This Scriptural context is a given for

Philo. It is not something argued for or reasoned toward, but a starting point, something received in obedience to a religious tradition.

In a similar way, the prologue to the Gospel of John, a text so important for Augustine,195 adapts ancient philosophical language and ideas to articulate the connection between the

Creation and the Incarnation. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God….All things came into being through Him….What came to be in him was

190 κηρῷ γὰρ ἐοικὼς δέχεται τὰς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαντασίας, Opif. §166; see also Arist. de An. 424a.

191 For further discussion of Philo’s divisions of the soul, and his debt to previous philosophers, see C. Lévy, “Philo’s Ethics,” in A. Kamesar, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Philo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 154-5.

192 βραδύτερα δέ πως καὶ θηλύτερα ὦτα ὀφθαλµῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ὁρατὰ φθανόντων ὑπὸ εὐτολµίας καὶ οὐκ ἀναµενόντων, ἄχρις ἂν ἐκεῖνα κινήσῃ, προϋπαντιαζόντων δὲ καὶ ἀντικινῆσαι γλιχοµένων, Abr. 150.

193 Opif. §165-6.

194 Gn 2:7; Opif. §139.

195 See esp. Conf. 7. !49 life, and the life was the light of men….And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory.”196 The opening phrase of the prologue, “In the beginning” (Ἐν ἀρχῇ), echoes the opening of Genesis 1: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”197 In this way, the fourth evangelist situates his Gospel account in the context of the received scriptural tradition of the Jewish faith. His use of the term “Word” (λόγος) clearly owes something to the

Stoic concept of logos as an active, creative and governing principle of the cosmos identified with God.198 Yet unlike the Stoics, who viewed God and the logos as corporeal realities,199 the fourth evangelist makes a distinction between God and “flesh,”200 placing God beyond the visible realm.201 Further, this Johannine prologue offers, despite its implicit distinction between the corporeal and incorporeal, a distinctive revaluation of the material, sensible world in light of the Incarnation. The God whom no one has seen is now made visible in the incarnate Word: “and we beheld his glory.”202 Thus, for the fourth evangelist, the world of the senses is not only the creation of a good God (as in Genesis), it is also created and governed by a divine reason (λόγος)

(as for the Stoics), and is the means of our encounter with the incarnate Word of God.

196 Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος….πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο….ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων….Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡµῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάµεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, Jn 1:1, 3-4, 14.

197 ᾿Εν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν, Gn 1:1 (LXX).

198 DL 7.88, 134-135, 138; see E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (London: Routledge, 1958): 431-2, esp. n. 149.

199 see discussion in M. J. White, “Stoic Natural Philosophy,” in B. Inwood, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 128-130.

200 οἳ οὐκ ἐξ αἱµάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήµατος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήµατος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν, Jn 1:13.

201 θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακεν πώποτε, Jn 1:18; see also Jn 6:46.

202 For a more detailed discussion of the positive (and crucial) role of senses in the Gospel of John, see D. Lee, “The Gospel of John and the Five Senses,” Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 129, No. 1 (Spring 2010): 115-127. !50 So from the earliest times, Christian doctrine entailed a fundamentally positive view of the sensory realm as the creation of God and the abode of the incarnate Word. One can see in the fourth century a growth in this positive appraisal of sensory experience. In the first three centuries of Christianity, when it was a minority religion in a predominantly pagan Roman empire, one naturally finds an emphasis on the otherworldliness of Christian doctrine and devotion. When Christianity finally receives imperial recognition and then endorsement, the subsequent spread and development of Christian ritual and devotional life would naturally help to make Christians a little more optimistic about this present world of sensory experience.203

Thus, there is an underlying tension in the Christian attitude toward the material, sensible world.

On the one hand, the material world is the work of God. On the other, the Christian is not to place his hope in this world, but in the world to come. The Gospel of John portrays Jesus in the

Garden of Gethsemane praying to the Father on behalf of his disciples: “I do not pray that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from the evil one. They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.”204 Early Christians viewed themselves as in the world, but not of the world.

This tension is evident, for example, in the early Christian attitude toward gladiatorial games and the spectacles of the arena. Though it involves no necessary contradiction, there is a certain irony in the early Christian abhorrence of the spectacle of death in gladiatorial shows,

203 For the view that fourth-century Christianity developed a more positive appraisal of the senses in part as a result of imperial recognition and the subsequent growth and development of the liturgy, see S. A. Harvey, “Locating the Sensing Body: Perception and Religious Identity in Late Antiquity,” in D Brakke, M. L. Satlow, and S. Weitzman, eds., Religion and the Self in Antiquity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005): 140-162.

204 Jn 17:15-16 (RSV). !51 when the spectacle of Christ’s death on the cross, and the subsequent spectacles of early

Christian martyrs dying on the cross or in the arena, are a focal point of Christian devotion and a catalyst for conversion.205 The very visual spectacles that Christians denounce for their evidence of human sinfulness and cruelty, are understood by these same Christians to be transformed by

God into signs of his love and goodness. Thus, the very instruments of human evil, causes of grief and despair, become instruments of divine mercy, sources of hope and faith. In other words,

“Christianity had an implicit iconography before it ever had an extensive material art.”206

Some of this tension can be seen in the occasional hints Ambrose gives of his views on sense-perception. In his Hexameron, he comments on God’s act of speaking at Creation (Gn 1:3):

God spoke not as one would emit a sound of speech by means of the vocal chords, or as the movement of the tongue would produce an exhortation from heaven and the sound of words would strike the air about us, but so that by the effect of his action he might bring about a recognition of his will.207

Like others before him, Ambrose here describes sound as traveling from the external object to the listener. Sounds “strike the air about us.” We passively receive the sounds that reach us from outside through the medium of the struck air.

Though Ambrose gives no clear indication of the activity of sight, his vocabulary suggests it. Discussing what it means for God to see, Ambrose makes it clear, “God does not see

205 J. Heath, “Sight and Christianity: Early Christian Attitudes to Seeing,” in M. Squire, ed., Sight and the Ancient Senses (London: Routledge, 2016): 233-4.

206 J. Heath, “Sight and Christianity,” 233.

207 Dixit deus non ut per uocis organa quidam sonus sermonis exiret nec ut linguae motus caeleste formaret adloquium atque aerem istum quidam uerborum strepitus uerberaret, sed ut uoluntatis suae cognitionem proderet operationis effectu, Ex. 1.9.33; see also 4.1.1, 6.9.62. !52 as man sees; God sees in his heart, but man sees in his gaze.”208 Also, “God saw, and no one beheld the glance of his eyes.”209 The word for “glance” (intentio) means literally a “stretching out” or “extension.” It can be used metaphorically to mean an intention of the mind or heart. Yet it is clear that the literal meaning is intended here, since it follows closely the statement, “God spoke and no one heard the sound of his voice.”210 The point is either to emphasize God’s temporal priority to all else (i.e., no one else existed when God spoke and looked), or to emphasize that God’s speaking and looking were not physical, sensible acts. In either case,

Ambrose uses the language of literal sense-perception, even in denying that God’s voice and gaze were perceived. Thus, the “glance” (intentio) is hypothetical, but literal, not metaphorical.

Ambrose also refers several times to the “sharp gaze” (acies) of the eyes.211 In his

Hexameron, for example, he exhorts the reader: “Cleanse the eyes of the mind, O man, and the inner vision of the soul, lest any speck of sin should blunt the sharp gaze of your thought and the vision of your pure heart.”212 While the “sharp gaze of thought” is metaphorical, it parallels the physical vision noted earlier in the passage, when Ambrose describes one who cleanses his eyes in order to watch the sunrise.213 Thus, the expression implies an active sense of vision wherein

208 Non sic deus uidet quemadmodum homo. Deus in corde, homo in facie, Ex. 2.1.3.

209 uidit, et oculorum eius intentionem nullus aspexit, Ibid. 1.9.34.

210 Dixit, et sonum uocis nullus audiuit, Ibid.

211 Ex. 1.7.26; 4.1.1; 5.18.60; 6.9.58; Exp. ps. cxviii 2.9.24; Exp. sec. Luc. 7.189; De Spiritu Sancto 3.12.87; De Exc. Sat. 1.14; Ep. 27.10, 67.2;

212 Emunda oculos mentis, o homo, animae que interiores optutus, ne qua festuca peccati aciem tui praestringat ingenii et puri cordis turbet aspectum, Ex. 4.1.1.

213 Matutinos quoque solis ortus si quis spectare desiderat, emundat oculos suos, ne quid pulueris, ne quid purgamentorum oculis eius insidat, quo tuentis hebetetur optutus, neue aliqua caligo nebulosa corporeos uisus spectantis obducat, Ibid. !53 the gaze is something that projects outward from the eye. Another example of this active use of

“gaze” (acies) is when Ambrose says, regarding his brother, that he wishes to “embrace in mind him whom I hold with my eyes. For it is a pleasure to fix on him the whole gaze of my eyes.”214

Here the verbs “hold” (teneo) and “fix” (figere) imply the active reaching out of sight.

Ambrose also refers to the inner eye as a lamp in his interpretation of the parable of the lost coin: “Therefore light your lamp. Your lamp is your eye—that inner eye, that is, of your mind.”215 This reference to the eyes as lamps suggests the active (Platonic) theory of vision, and

“the mind’s eye” is a well-known Platonic metaphor.216 Similarly, in his commentary De Noe,

Ambrose refers to the sun and moon as “the eyes of the world,”217 an Ovidian echo.218 It is doubtful that Ambrose has consciously in mind any passages of Plato or Ovid, yet his advice to

“light your lamp” is offered in the context of a metaphorical explanation of a biblical passage; such figurative reading of Scripture depends on a perceived analogy of the sensible and intellectual realms, which is at least unconsciously indebted to Plato.219 Yet in another passage

Ambrose interprets the “basins” of Exodus 24:6 as the “receptables” of the five senses, thereby indicating the passive nature of the senses, including sight.220 Thus, there is no detailed and comprehensive discussion in Ambrose of the physiological process of sensation, but his passing

214 quem oculis teneo, mente conplectar. In illo enim totam oculorum aciem figere libet, Exc. fr. 1.14.

215 Et tu ergo accende lucernam tuam; lucerna tua oculus tuus est, ille interior oculus scilicet mentis, Ep. 1.2

216 Symp. 219a; R. 533d; see S. Blundell et al., “Introduction,” 11-12.

217 ipsi enim sunt quidam mundi oculi, De Noe 7.18.

218 mundi oculus, Met. 4.228; see also Plat. R. 508b.

219 Rep. 509d-510b; see A. A. Long, Greek Models of Mind and Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015): 96-7, 106-7.

220 Crateres igitur sensuum receptacula, crateres oculi sunt duo, Ep. 2.5. !54 references to the senses tend to suggest an active view of sight, though perhaps nothing more than the commonplaces of the literary tradition.

In addition to Ambrose, there are other Christian writers before Augustine whose language implies the general notion of eyes projecting light. For example, Hilary of Poitiers in his De Trinitate, a work Augustine references in his treatise of the same name,221 writes about

“kindling the eyes.”222 In the context, the expression is parallel to “ingrafting the senses,”223 and occurs in a discussion of the origin of the faculties of human perception. The clear implication is that the eyes have some kind of fire, but (as with Ambrose) it is unclear how far to take this passing reference. It may imply nothing more philosophical or Platonic than the literary tradition of likening the eye’s vision to the rays of the sun.

AUGUSTINE’S VOCABULARY

As noted above,224 sense-perception figures prominently in Augustine’s early works. His treatment can be seen to owe much to the previous philosophical tradition, as well as to the

Christian tradition. But before one discusses in detail Augustine’s early views, it is necessary to consider some fundamental issues of his vocabulary.

221 Aug. Trin. 6.10.11; 15.3.5.

222 oculos accendas, Hilary, De Trin. 2.9.

223 sensum inseras, Ibid.

224 pp. 16f. !55 “Sense-knowledge, as Augustine always insists, is, like all knowledge, a work of the soul, not of the bodily organs; it is a work ‘of the soul by means of the body.’”225 Yet this raises the question of what sense-knowledge means for Augustine; or, to put it another way, what term in

Augustine’s Latin correspond to our modern concept of sense-knowledge. The noun sensatio

(“sensation”) does not occur in Augustine. The noun perceptio (“perception”) is used exclusively for cognitive perception.226 Augustine uses the verb sentire for the act of sensing and the noun sensus for the sense-organ or sense-faculty. It is true that Augustine most often depicts the soul

(anima) or mind (animus, mens) as the agent of the act of sensing (sentire),227 but in his early works he sometimes stresses the fact that sensation cannot take place without both body and soul,228 and at least once he makes the bodily organs the agents of sensation.229 He also distinguishes between (on the one hand) the things we perceive by means of bodily sense and call sensible, and (on the other hand) the things we perceive by the mind and call intelligible.230

In any event, one must distinguish the act of sensation (sentire), which Augustine usually depicts

225 R. A. Markus, “Augustine: Sense and Imagination” in A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967): 374 (quoting Aug. Litt. 3.5.7: sentire non est corpus sed animae per corpus); the quotation is misattributed to Augustine Conf. 10.7.11 in H. Baltussen, “Perception, theories of,” in H. Cancik and H. Schneider, eds., Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the Ancient World. Antiquity, vol. 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 745.

226 Acad. 3.9.21, 3.10.22, 3.13.29, 3.14.30; Retr. 1.3; Conf. 8.5.11; Lib. 2.8.22; Litt. 6.6.9; Ep. 1.2; Serm. 71.30; etc.

227 Litt. 3.5.7; Ord. 2.2.6.

228 sunt certe quinquepartiti corporis sensus, qui nec sine corpore nec sine anima esse possunt, Ep. 137.2.5.

229 oculi…nam ubi uident, ibi sentiunt: ipsum enim uidere, sentire est; sentire autem, pati: quare ubi sentiunt, ibi patiuntur, Quant. an. 23.44; see also Lib. 2.5.12: ipsi corporis sensus de corporibus iudicant; see also Fid. et symb. 9.17: rebus, quas corporeis oculis cernimus et corporeo sensu diiudicamus.

230 namque omnia, quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis aut mente percipimus. illa sensibilia, haec intellegibilia, Mag. 12.39. !56 as carried out by the soul through the body, from the sense-organ(s) (sensus), which he consistently depicts as bodily.231

Augustine thus distinguishes the senses from the soul’s activity of perception by means of the senses. To the extent that the senses are bodily, the physiological aspects of sensory experience pertain to the body, but are distinct from (if related to) the perceptual activity of the mind or soul. Inasmuch as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching, then, involve bodily input for Augustine, his sensory metaphors work on the analogy of the bodily activity of the senses to the intellectual activity of the soul. (It makes no sense to distinguish literal vision from the metaphorical “vision” of the mind if literal vision is itself purely an activity of the mind.) So what matters for understanding sensory metaphors in Augustine is his view of the bodily input involved in sense-perception. Therefore, although it is understandable that others should focus on the intellectual and cognitive aspects of Augustine’s sensory views, while ignoring the physiological aspects as less philosophically urgent, both in themselves and in Augustine’s thought more generally, it is nevertheless precisely these physiological aspects that pertain to a discussion of Augustine’s rhetorical use of sensory metaphors in his writings.

AUGUSTINE ON SIGHT

There are several passages from Augustine’s early works where he suggests, mentions, or discusses at length the physiological aspects of sight. The principal discussions are in his

231 sensus corporis, e.g., Ord. 2.2.5, 2.9.27; Mag. 12.39; Epp. 7.2, 137.2.5; Lib. 2.3-8, 2.12. !57 Soliloquies, the Immortality of the Soul, the Magnitude of the Soul, On Music, and On Free Will.

Let us consider each of these in chronological order.

There is one passage of Augustine’s Soliloquies (Soliloquia)232 that discusses the sense of sight in its physiological aspects. It occurs in Book One, when Reason promises to show God to

Augustine’s mind as the sun demonstrates himself to the eyes:

For the senses of the soul are as it were the eyes of the mind; but all the certainties of the sciences are like those things which are brought to light by the sun, that they may be seen, the earth, for instance, and the things upon it: while God is Himself the Illuminator. Now I, Reason, am that in the mind, which the act of looking is in the eyes. For to have eyes is not the same as to look; nor again to look the same as to see. Therefore the soul has need of three distinct things: to have eyes, such as it can use to good advantage, to look, and to see.233

Here Augustine proposes an analogy between reason and the act of seeing. In both cases, three things are necessary: eyes that are properly functioning (ut oculos habeat quibus iam bene uti possit), the act of looking (ut aspiciat), and the act of seeing (ut videat). Thus Augustine draws a distinction between looking (aspectus), which is merely the directing of one’s gaze, and a “right and complete looking that leads to vision” (aspectus rectus atque perfectus, id est quem uisio sequitur).234 Not every glance leads to vision, but only the glance that is attentive. Thus, we see

232 Composed at Cassiciacum c. 386-387; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, vol. 1 (Basel: Schwabe, 1986-1994): xxvi-xlii.

233 nam mentes quasi sui sunt sensus animis; disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut uideri possint, ueluti terra est atque terrena omnia: deus autem est ipse qui illustrat. ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. non enim hoc est habere oculos quod aspicere; aut item hoc est aspicere quod uidere. ergo animae tribus quibusdam rebus opus est ut oculos habeat quibus iam bene uti possit, ut aspiciat, ut uideat, Sol. 1.6.12; transl. by C. C. Starbuck in P. Schaff,ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1888). The translation here follows the Migne text, which offers a different reading of the opening clause: nam mentis quasi sui sunt oculi sensus animae (PL 32, p. 875). A stricter rendering of the CSEL text would be “for minds are, as it were, the senses for souls.” The general meaning is the same, but this reading is much more difficult to understand, as the various emendations of the manuscripts make clear (CSEL 89, p. 19). On either reading, Augustine is drawing an analogy between the senses (particularly the eyes) in their relation to the body, and the mind in its relation to the soul.

234 Sol. 1.6.13. !58 already the distinction in Augustine between the physical gaze and the vision that results from the physical gaze coupled with an attentiveness of the soul. Furthermore, we see in this passage the need for an external light (the sun) in bringing about vision.235

There is also a brief passage in the Immortality of the Soul (De Immortalitate Animae)236 that allows us to draw some inferences about Augustine’s views on sight. In the course of exploring what reason is, Augustine makes some passing remarks on sense objects:

All we contemplate we grasp by cogitation or perceive through sense or intellect. And, all things that are perceived through one of the senses are sensed as existing outside of us and are contained in space, which, we affirm, makes possible their perception. Those things that are comprehended by the intellect, however, are comprehended as existing nowhere else but in the comprehending mind itself and, at the same time, as not contained in space.237

All sense objects are external to the sensing agent and contained in space.238 They can be perceived because they are contained in space. This is suggestive of Aristotle’s discussions of the perceptual medium, as is Augustine’s description of color as something inherent in bodies as in a subject,239 though it is not clear that he follows Aristotle in locating color on the surface of the body.240

235 See also Sol. 1.8.15.

236 Composed at Milan c. 387; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, xxvi-xlii.

237 omne quod contemplamur, siue cogitatione capimus, aut sensu aut intellectu capimus. sed ea quae sensu capiuntur, extra nos etiam esse sentiuntur, et locis continentur, unde ne percipi quidem posse affirmantur. ea uero quae intelliguntur, non quasi alibi posita intelliguntur, quam ipse qui intelligit animus: simul enim etiam intelliguntur non contineri loco, Imm. 6.10; transl. by L. Schopp in The Fathers of the Church, Volume 4 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1947): 27. The translator notes that he reads “unde percipi quidem posse aflirmantur (instead of unde nec . . . , as in Migne). The nec is also lacking in the text used by Tourscher” (Ibid.).

238 See also Lib. 2.7.16.63-4.

239 temperatio autem corporis in subiecto corpore est tanquam color, Imm. 10.17.

240 See above, pp. 31-4. !59 In the Magnitude of the Soul (De Quantitate Animae),241 Augustine discusses sensation, especially the sense of sight, at some length.242 He first proposes to his interlocutor, Evodius, the definition of sense (sensus) as “an experience of the body not escaping the soul’s notice.”243

Augustine then questions how we can be said to experience (pati) what we see (videre), when the object of sight is at a distance from our eyes.244 He resolves the question by clarifying that it is not the eyes themselves that sense, but sight (visus) does:

By means of sight, I say, reaching out to that place where you are, I see you where you are. That I am not there I admit. But, just as though I were to touch you with a rod, I would be the one touching you and I would perceive it; yet I would not be there where I would be touching you. So it is when I say that I see you by means of sight, although I am not there where you are; I am not by this forced to admit that it is not I who see.245

This rod-like projection of sight (visus) is described as “shining” (emicat) out from the eyes and

“illuminating” (lustrare) what we see.246 In this way, Augustine evokes both the Platonic theory of extramission, and the Stoic comparison of the visual ray to a walking-stick.247

241 composed c. 388; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, xxvi-xlii.

242 Quant. an. 23.41-30.60.

243 attende ergo: nam sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod patitur corpus, Quant. an. 23.41.

244 Quant. an. 23.43.

245 uisu, inquam, porrecto in eum locum in quo es, uideo te ubi es: at me ibi non esse confiteor. sed quemadmodum si uirga te tangerem, ego utique tangerem, id que sentirem; neque tamen ego ibi essem, ubi te tangerem: ita quod dico uisu me uidere, quamuis ego ibi non sim, non ex eo cogor fateri non me esse qui uideam, Quant. an. 23.43; transl. by J. J. McMahon.

246 is enim se foras porrigit, et per oculos emicat longius quaquauersum potest lustrare quod cernimus, Quant. an. 23.43; see also Ovid, M. 8.356: emicat ex oculis, spirat quoque pectore flamma.

247 The remainder of Augustine’s discussion of the senses (Quant. an. 24.45-30.60) concerns how sensation relates to knowledge; the discussion is therefore beyond the scope of our present consideration of the physiological aspects of sensation. !60 In his work On Music (De Musica),248 Augustine discusses sight in two key passages. In the first, he clarifies the activity of the soul in sensation:

To sum up, it seems to me that the soul, when it senses in the body, is not affected in any way by it, but it gives more attention to the passions of the body, and these actions [of the soul], whether easy on account of the harmony [of the passions] or difficult on account of the disharmony [of the passions], do not escape the soul’s notice; and this whole process is what is called sensing. But this sense, which even while we are not sensing is nevertheless in the body, is an instrument of the body directed by the soul for its ordering, so that the soul may be more prepared to act attentively toward the passions of the body, in order to join like to like and repel what is harmful. Moreover, in my view, it directs something luminous in the eyes, a most clear and mobile air in the ears, something vaporous in the nose, something moist in the mouth, something earthy and, as it were, muddy in the touch. But whether these are united in this way or by some other distribution, the soul acts quietly if the things within are in unity of health, as if they yielded to some household agreement. But when some things are introduced which, so to say, affect the body with otherness, it exerts more attentive actions accommodated to each of its places and instruments; then it is said to see or hear or smell or taste or sense by touch. By these actions it willingly joins with proper things and with difficulty opposes improper ones. I think that the soul, when it senses, applies these operations to the passions of the body, but does not receive these passions.249

Here Augustine is at pains to distinguish the activity of the soul from the passivity of the body.

The former senses (sentit), gives its attention to the body’s passions (passionibus attentius agere), joins like to like and repels what is harmful (similia similibus ut adiungat repellatque

248 Completed at Thagaste c. 389; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, xxvi-xlii; see also M. Jacobsson, ed., De Musica, CSEL 102 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017): 1-10.

249 Et ne longum faciam, uidetur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere et has actiones siue faciles propter conuenientiam siue difficiles propter inconuenientiam non eam latere, et hoc totum est, quod sentire dicitur. Sed iste sensus, qui etiam dum nihil sentimus, inest tamen, instrumentum est corporis, quod ea temperatione agitur ab anima, ut in eo sit ad passiones corporis cum attentione agendas paratior, similia similibus ut adiungat repellatque quod noxium est. Agit porro, ut opinor, luminosum aliquid in oculis, aerium serenissimum et mobilissimum in auribus, caliginosum in naribus, in ore humidum, in tactu terreum et quasi lutulentum. Sed siue hac siue alia distributione ista coniciantur, agit haec anima cum quiete, si ea, quae insunt, in unitate ualetudinis quasi quadam familiari consensione cesserunt. Cum autem adhibentur ea, quae nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteritate corpus afficiunt, et exerit attentiores actiones suis quibusque locis atque instrumentis accommodatas, tunc uidere uel audire uel olfacere uel gustare uel tangendo sentire dicitur, quibus actionibus congrua libenter associat et moleste obsistit incongruis. Has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere, cum sentit, non easdem passiones recipere, Mus. 6.5.10. !61 quod noxium est), and applies its operations to the passions of the body, but does not receive them (has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum sentit, non easdem passiones recipere); it does not suffer anything, is not affected (anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati). The body, on the other hand, has passions (passiones corporis), is affected

(ea quae…corpus afficiunt). To this extent, Augustine would appear to depart from Plato and the middle Platonic tradition, which understood the soul to be affected in the process of sensation;250 instead, Augustine follows Plotinus in understanding the soul to be unaffected.251

In this passage, Augustine also describes the entire process of sensation as involving both the soul joining the body to an external sense object,252 which affects the body but not the soul, and the soul directing its attention to these bodily affections or passions. As part of this process, the soul directs, or acts on (agit), something luminous in the eyes, a most clear and mobile air in the ears, etc. It is not clear from this passage alone whether the something luminous and something airy are being directed out from the soul, or being received from within. If the former, then Augustine would be representing all five senses here as passive/intromissionist (in their physiological component). If the latter, Augustine is representing all five senses as active/ extramissionist, which seems less likely. A few paragraphs later, he clarifies that the eyes have their own light, while the ears receive sounds from outside.253 Augustine, like Plato and Aristotle before him, clearly associates each sense with one of the traditional four elements (or a

250 See above, pp. 28-31, 43f.

251 See above, pp. 44f.

252 suum corpus conuenienti extrinsecus corpori adiungit, Mus. 6.5.9.

253 ut sunt cum illae oculorum nostrorum lucem formae interpellant, aut in aures influit sonus, Mus. 6.5.12. !62 combination thereof), though his pairing of something luminous with the eyes is more Platonic than Aristotelian.254

This passage of Augustine also depicts the sense (sensus) as inherent in the body even when it is not in use (qui etiam dum nihil sentimus, inest tamen). The sense, even when inactive, is a bodily instrument (instrumentum corporis). This description implies a kind of Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality, though it is not clear that Augustine has Aristotle in mind.

The second key sight passage in On Music occurs a little later in Book Six, when

Augustine discusses the role of memory in comprehending intervals of time in music:

Therefore, as the diffusion of rays, which leap out into the open from our tiny pupils and so belong to our body, help us in comprehending place-spans, so that although the things we see are placed at a distance, they are yet animated by the soul (and we are thus aided by their effusion in comprehending place-spans); in the same way, the memory, which is (as it were) the light of time-spans, comprehends these time-spans, insofar as it can be projected somehow in its own way.255

This passage clarifies, even more than the discussion of sight in the Magnitude of the Soul, that

Augustine follows Plato in understanding the eyes to send out beams of light. By means of these rays, the soul transfers to the distant object of sight something of its own liveliness (ut quanquam in procul positis rebus quas uidemus, a nostra anima uegetentur).256 Since Augustine likewise

254 See above, pp. 28-33.

255 ut igitur nos ad capienda spatia locorum diffusio radiorum iuuat, qui e breuibus pupulis in aperta emicant, et adeo sunt nostri corporis, ut quanquam in procul positis rebus quas uidemus, a nostra anima uegetentur; ut ergo eorum effusione adiuuamur ad capienda spatia locorum: ita memoria, quod quasi lumen est temporalium spatiorum, quantum in suo genere quodammodo extrudi potest, tantum eorumdem spatiorum capit, Mus. 6.8.21.

256 See also Gn 9:15 (Vg.): anima vivente quæ carnem vegetat. !63 portrays these “rays of the eyes” as bodily in his Literal Commentary on Genesis,257 in Sermons

277 and 362,258 and in Letter 147,259 all composed after Confessions,260 it is safe to assume that his references in Confessions to “rays of the eyes,”261 can be taken in this same bodily sense.262

From at least the time of the Magnitude of the Soul and On Music, and into his later works,

Augustine holds the Platonic view that the soul sends out bodily rays of light from the pupil to touch and enliven the object of sight.263 His understanding of sight is clearly active (emissionist).

Augustine discusses sight in several chapters of Book Two of his treatise On Free Will

(De Libero Arbitrio).264 In an extended discussion of the senses in Chapter 3, Augustine clarifies that while sight senses physical objects, the proper object of sight (in the strict sense) is color.265

Augustine goes on to distinguish a common or “internal” sense (sensus interior) that is distinct

257 iactus enim radiorum ex oculis nostris cuiusdam quidem lucis est iactus, Litt. 1.16.31; see also 7.13.20f., 12.16.32.

258 corporis nostri est, de carne nostra emittitur. radios nos habemus, et non miramur, Serm. 277.11; quid est ictus oculi? non quo palpebris claudimus oculum uel aperimus: sed ictum dicit oculi emissionem radiorum ad aliquid cernendum, Serm. 362.20.

259 de ipsis rebus uisibilibus, quae corporalium oculorum acie quodam modo radiantur, Ep. 147.17.41; see also Ep. 137.2.8.

260 Litt. composed c. 401-414, Serm. 277 and Ep. 147 composed c. 413; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, xxvi-xlii; see also A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999): 869.

261 See, e.g., radios oculorum meorum, Conf. 10.6.9.

262 For the view that Augustine’s “rays of the eyes” is to be taken non-literally as referring to “the phenomenon of intentionality,” see E. TeSelle, Augustine: The Theologian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970): 96; against this view, in addition to the passages cited above, see J. J. O’Donnell, ed., Confessions, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 170.

263 For evidence of this idea in Augustine’s writings in the 390s, see his reference in On Free Will to “the very light that belongs to these eyes” (ipsius lucis, quae ad hos oculos pertinet, Lib.2.13.35.140); see also Psal. 16.8: ut pupillam oculi: quae apparet parva et exigua, per eam tamen dirigitur acies luminis quo lux et tenebrae diiudicantur.

264 Completed at Hippo c. 391-5; see A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages, xlvi.

265 quid ergo proprie ad oculos pertinet, quod per eos sentimus? color, Lib. 2.3.8.25; see also Fid. 1.2: illa color est aut figura, ut oculis ingeratur. !64 from the five bodily senses and responds to the information given by them.266 Augustine thus distinguishes (a) the color that is sensed, (b) the sense in the eye, (c) the internal sense in the soul, and (d) reason, which defines and enumerates these things.267 While (b) and (c) are common to all animals, (d) is the property of man alone.268 Augustine further distinguishes the act of “seeing color” (colorem uidere) from the possession of the sense (habere sensum) by which color could be seen if present, even when color is not present.269 Here, as in his treatise On

Music,270 Augustine points to the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality when he distinguishes the act of sensing from the ability to sense. Also, Augustine’s discussion of a common or “internal sense” responsible for perceptual awareness, certainly owes much to the philosophical tradition on the “common sense” (sensus communis, κοινὴ αἴσθησις), which was first developed by Aristotle, but can be traced back to a suggestion in Plato’s Theaetetus.271

Later in Book Two of On Free Will, Augustine considers what makes this internal sense greater than the five bodily senses. He concludes that it is because just as the five bodily senses judge what they sense, so the internal sense judges the bodily senses.272 “But there is no doubt

266 magis arbitror nos ratione conprehendere esse interiorem quendam sensum ad quem ab istis quinque notissimis cuncta referantur, Lib. 2.3.8.27.

267 num etiam putas eas posse discernere ab inuicem colorem qui sentitur et sensum qui in oculo est et illum interiorem sensum apud animam et rationem qua ista singillatim definiuntur et dinumerantur? Ibid. 2.3.9.31; see also 2.4.10.31.

268 Ibid. 2.3.9.30.

269 nam credo te non negare aliud colorem esse et aliud colorem uidere et item aliud, etiam cum color non subest, habere sensum quo uideri posset si subesset, Ibid. 2.3.9.33.

270 Mus. 6.5.10; see above, pp. 60ff.

271 For a fuller discussion of the history of the “common sense” in philosophy, see P. Gregoric, Aristotle on the Common Sense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 1-16.

272 Lib. 2.5.12.48-50. !65 that the one who judges is greater than the one judged.”273 In the same way, reason is above the internal sense because it judges the internal sense.274 In this passage, Augustine would seem to depart from Cicero,275 Middle Platonism,276 and others in the philosophical tradition,277 insofar as he attributes to the bodily senses themselves the ability to judge (iudicare) based on sensory information. But on closer inspection, Augustine is not granting to the bodily senses the ability to make rational judgments; rather, he is granting to the eyes, for instance, the ability to judge

“what is lacking or what is sufficient in colors.”278 In other words, the bodily sense of sight can judge about the sensory input insofar as it relates to the eye; it cannot make a rational judgment

(e.g., about whether the sensory input is a reliable representation of reality). In this regard,

Augustine’s view is similar to that of Philo, who considers each of the five bodily senses to have

“special materials and its own criterion by which it would judge what falls under its notice.”279

Still later in Book Two of On Free Will, there are three brief mentions of sight that concern the visible object’s relation to the perceiver in space and time. First, Augustine discusses the issue of simultaneous sensation:

Many of us can see one thing simultaneously, even though each of us has his own senses with which we each sense the single thing that we see simultaneously. The upshot is that, although one sense is mine and the other is yours, it can happen that what we see is not

273 nulli autem dubium est eum qui iudicat eo de quo iudicat esse meliorem, Lib. 2.5.12.48.

274 Ibid. 2.6.13.51.

275 See above, pp. 39ff.

276 See the discussion of Alcinous above, pp. 43f.

277 See the discussion of Heraclitus above, p. 21.

278 sensus oculorum quid desit uel satis sit coloribus iudicat, Ibid. 2.5.12.49.

279 Opif. §62; see above, p. 47, n. 185. !66 one thing as mine and another as yours, but instead a single thing in front of each of us, seen simultaneously by each of us.280

A little later, Augustine recalls the discussion of bodily senses and reiterates, “those things that we touch in common with the senses belonging to the eyes or to the ears, such as colors and sounds (which you and I see simultaneously or hear simultaneously), do not pertain to the nature of our eyes or ears but rather are common objects for us to sense.”281 A little later, he mentions another similarity between objects of sight and hearing: just as sounds are extended in time, “any visible sight is elongated (so to speak) in space, and is not a whole in any one place.”282 Taken together, these three passages clarify the position of visible objects in relation to the perceiver.

Many people can view the same object of sight at the same time. The sensing of the object resides in the body of the perceiver, but the sense object does not; it is single and external to the perceiver, common to all for sensing. Yet even though it exists singly apart from the perceiver, the object of sight is still extended in space, so that the whole is not in any one place. For

Augustine, this is one way that the analogy between sensation and rational thought breaks down.

Whereas objects of bodily sight are extended in space, objects of the mind’s “eye” are not.283

280 possumus ergo uidere unum aliquid multi simul, cum sint sensus nostri nobis singulis singuli, quibus omnibus illud unum sentimus quod simul uidemus, ut quamuis alius sensus meus sit et alius tuus, possit tamen fieri ut id quod uidemus non sit aliud meum aliud tuum, sed unum illud praesto sit utrique nostrum et simul ab utroque uideatur, Lib. 2.7.16.63; transl. by P. King.

281 ea scilicet quae oculorum uel aurium sensu communiter tangimus, sicuti sunt colores et soni, quos ego et tu simul uidemus uel simul audimus, non pertinere ad oculorum nostrorum aurium ue naturam, sed ad sentiendum nobis esse communia, Lib. 2.12.33.131; transl. by P. King.

282 species omnis uisibilis tamquam intumescit per locos nec ubique tota est, Lib. 2.14.38.148; transl. by P. King.

283 Ibid. 2.14.37.146. !67 A COHERENT AND CONSISTENT VIEW?

There are at least three obstacles to any attempt to synthesize Augustine’s views on sense- perception. First, he nowhere in his early works discusses thoroughly the physiological aspects.

His references to vision are scattered here and there. Second, one has to make allowances for differences of context. Augustine situates his remarks on sight in discussions with larger, and more philosophical or theological, objectives. For example, when he notes that visible objects are extended in space (as sounds are extended in time), the larger discussion concerns the activity of the mind and how true happiness is found in the secure possession of wisdom and truth.284 This discussion itself is part of Augustine’s larger goal in the work, namely, to prove the existence of

God.285 The third obstacle to synthesis is that the Augustinian discussions of sensation considered above were written over many years, when Augustine was in different stages of life, and arguably changing his mind on any number of things. Given these obstacles, it is unclear that we can construct any certain synthesis of Augustine’s “early views” on sensation.

With this caveat in mind, it may be of use to venture a tentative synthesis of the foregoing discussions on sight, even if only to summarize Augustine’s various accounts. In Soliloquies, seeing (videre) requires sunlight, eyes, the act of looking, and a certain attentiveness. In the

Immortality of the Soul, the objects of sight are contained in space, which makes possible our perception of them. The proper object of sight is color, which resides in the external object. In the Magnitude of the Soul, sensation is presented as an experience of the body that the soul

284 Lib. 2.13.36.141.

285 Lib. 2.15.39.153-5. !68 notices. The eye does not experience the external object directly, but by means of the sense of sight (visus), which is a rod-like ray of light that shines out from the eye to touch the object and illumine it. In On Music, the soul sends out this visual ray and attends to the resulting bodily experience or passions, but the soul itself does not receive the passions. The sense is an instrument that resides in the body even when not in active use. The bodily visual ray leaves the eye through the pupil and helps us to determine place-spans. By means of the visual ray, the soul effects a change in the object of sight, transferring to it something of its own life. In On Free

Will, Augustine distinguishes the bodily sense of sight, which makes sensory judgments concerning what it sees, from an internal sense (in the soul) that is responsible for perceptual awareness. While two or more people may see an object at the same time, their sensing of the object is individual and internal (to the perceivers), while the object itself is one, external, and common to all. Unlike objects of rational thought, objects of sight are extended in space.

AUGUSTINE ON HEARING

Though Augustine gives more attention to the sense of sight, he also considers the sense of hearing to have a place in the life of the mind.286 So it is fitting to consider next Augustine’s understanding of hearing. There are several passages from Augustine’s early works where he suggests, mentions, or discusses at length the physiological aspects of hearing. The principle discussions are in his On the Teacher, On Music, On Free Will, On Christian Teaching, and

Sermon 28. Let us consider each of these in chronological order.

286 See above, p. 17, esp. n. 7; for a discussion of the “hierarchy of the senses” in Augustine, see below, p. 111. !69 In his work On the Teacher (De Magistro),287 Augustine discusses sounds and hearing in numerous passages. Though his concern is primarily with developing a theory of signs, these discussions touch upon the physiological aspects of hearing in several places. First, Augustine defines a “word” (verbum) as “something uttered by articulate sound with some meaning, and sound can be perceived by no other sense than by hearing.”288 In the subsequent discussion of the difference between “noun” (nomen) and “word” (verbum), Augustine distinguishes hearing from understanding: “You are, I think, aware that everything expressed by articulate voice and conveying some meaning must both strike the ear to be heard and be committed to the memory to be known.”289 The process of sensing, then, involves the ear being struck by the sound.290

Augustine goes on to clarify that, although “word” (verbum) and “noun” (nomen) are coextensive terms (in Latin), they are distinct insofar as a “word” (verbum) indicates a

“striking” (uerberando) on the ear, but a “noun” (nomen) indicates a “recalling” (noscendo) of something by the mind.291 The process of hearing differs, then, from the process of understanding. Hearing involves an external word striking the ear of the listener.

Augustine discusses several aspects of the sense of hearing in his discussion of numbers in the beginning of Book Six of his treatise On Music (De Musica). He begins the discussion by

287 Composed at Thagaste c. 389; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, xxvi-xlii.

288 uerbum sit, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce profertur, uox autem nullo alio sensu quam auditu percipi potest, Mag. 4.8.

289 omne, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata uoce prorumpit, animaduertis ut opinor et aurem uerberare, ut sentiri, et memoriae mandari, ut nosci possit, Ibid. 5.12; transl. by R. P. Russell.

290 Ibid. 2.3; 10.34; 12.39.

291 si horum duorum ex uno appellata sunt uerba ex altero nomina, uerba scilicet a uerberando, nomina uero a noscendo, ut illud primum ab auribus, hoc autem secundum ab animo uocari meruerit? Mag. 5.12. !70 positing four kinds of harmonious numbers involved in hearing some verse recited: the numbers in the sound itself; the numbers in the hearer’s bodily sense of hearing; the numbers in the act of the reciter; and (when the verse is known) the numbers in the memory of the hearer.292 (Implicit in this is the idea that what is pleasing in poetry or music is a harmonious numerical order in the sounds.)293 Augustine then clarifies that sounds exist independently of the hearer: “For I am sure you won't deny the possibility of a sound's beating the air by the drop of liquid or the shock of bodies, with pauses, and limits of this sort, and existing where no hearer is present.”294 Sound begins outside the hearer with a movement or collision of bodies that strikes the air and is extended in time or space or both. Augustine next considers whether numbers exist n the hearer’s bodily sense when nothing is sounding.295 In the course of this discussion, he distinguishes the ability to hear from the presence of numbers in the hearing: “For it is one thing to have the number, another to be able to sense the harmonious sound.”296 This leads Augustine to discuss at length the effect of sounds on the bodily sense of the hearer:

For as hearing differs from not hearing, so hearing this tone differs from hearing another. Therefore, this affection is neither prolonged beyond nor restrained to less, since it is the measure of the sound producing it.… And if it is produced by an harmonious sound, it

292 responde, si uidetur, cum istum uersum pronuntiamus, deus creator omnium, istos quatuor iambos quibus constat, et tempora duodecim ubinam esse arbitreris, id est, in sono tantum qui auditur, an etiam in sensu audientis qui ad aures pertinet, an in actu etiam pronuntiantis, an quia notus uersus est, in memoria quoque nostra hos numeros esse fatendum est? in his omnibus puto, Mus. 6.2.2.

293 nullo modo igitur dubium est, quin te in sono quo te delectari dicis, dimensio quaedam numerorum delectet, qua perturbata delectatio illa exhiberi auribus non potest, Ibid. 2.2.2; see also 3.7.16.

294 nam credo non te esse negaturum fieri posse, ut in aliquo loco aliquis sonus existat huiuscemodi morulis et dimensionibus uerberans aerem uel stillicidio uel aliquo alio pulsu corporum, ubi nullus adsit auditor, Mus. 6.2.2; transl. by R. C. Taliaferro.

295 Ibid. 6.2.3.

296 siquidem aliud est habere numeros, aliud posse sentire numerosum sonum, Ibid. !71 must be harmonious. Nor can it be except when its author, the sound, is present; for it is like a trace imprinted in water, not found before your pressing a body into it, and not remaining when you have taken it away. But that natural power, belonging to the judiciary, you might say, present in the ears, is still there during the rest, and the sound does not bring it into us, but is rather received by it to be approved of or disapproved of. And so, if I am not mistaken, these two must be distinguished, and it must be admitted the numbers in the passion of the ears when something is heard are brought in by the sound and taken away by the rest. And it is inferred the numbers in the sound itself can be without those in the hearing, although these last cannot be without the first.297

Several things emerge from this paragraph. First, the affection (affectio) of the sense of hearing lasts only as long as the sound that produces it.298 Second, the sound affects the sense on the analogy of touch, like a trace imprinted in water (uestigio in aqua impresso). Third, even when no sound is present, there is a natural power in the ears that is capable of some kind of judgment

(naturalis uero illa uis quasi iudiciaria, quae auribus adest, non desinit esse in silentio). Fourth, the ears passively receive the sound and the numbers that accompany it (numeros, qui sunt in ipsa passione aurium, cum aliquid auditur, sono inferri). Here the ears are passive and the external sound is active, at least as the instrument if not as the agent.299 Augustine goes on to allow the implication that even the soul is passive,300 but finally corrects this to make quite clear that the soul is actively attentive to (and unaffected by) the body’s passions in the process of

297 ut enim differt audire ab eo quod est non audire, ita differt hanc uocem audire ab eo quod est alteram audire. haec igitur affectio nec ultra porrigitur, nec infra cohibetur; quoniam est mensura eius soni qui facit eam….quae si numerosa uoce fit, etiam ipsa numerosa sit necesse est. neque esse potest, nisi cum adest effector eius sonus: similis est enim uestigio in aqua impresso, quod neque ante formatur quam corpus impresseris, neque remanet cum detraxeris. naturalis uero illa uis quasi iudiciaria, quae auribus adest, non desinit esse in silentio, nec nobis eam sonus infert, sed ab ea potius, siue probandus, siue improbandus excipitur. quare ista duo, nisi fallor, distinguenda sunt; et fatendum numeros, qui sunt in ipsa passione aurium, cum aliquid auditur, sono inferri, auferri silentio. ex quo colligitur numeros qui sunt in ipso sono, posse esse sine istis qui sunt in eo quod est audire, cum hi sine illis esse non possint, Mus. 6.2.3; transl. by R. C. Taliaferro.

298 See also Fid. et symb. 3.3: uerba nostra…quae uoce atque ore prolata uerberato aere transeunt nec diutius manent quam sonant; Doctr. chr. 2.4.5.

299 The clause numeros…sono inferri implies intrumentality, but the clause soni qui facit eam indicates agency.

300 aliud audire, quod in corpore anima de sonis patitur, Mus. 6.4.5; see also 6.4.7. !72 hearing.301 The soul directs “a most clear and mobile air in the ears.” So while the bodily sense of hearing is passive with respect to the sound entering from outside, the soul is still actively attentive in the process and unaffected by the bodily passion.

There are three passages in Book Two of On Free Will (De Libero Arbitrio) that confirm or clarify some of the preceding ideas about the sense of hearing. First, in a passage about the internal sense, Augustine reiterates the idea that the ears are passive with respect to external sounds: “Just as the internal sense judges whether our hearing is attentive enough, so too hearing itself judges which spoken words gently flow in or roughly grate [on our ears].”302 Here, too, the sense of hearing, like the sense of sight,303 makes judgments concerning the sense object, although these judgments are not rational, but sensory (i.e., distinguishing gentle sounds from rough ones). In a second passage, Augustine clarifies that sounds, like colors, exist external to the perceiver: “those things that we touch in common with the senses belonging to the eyes or to the ears, such as colors and sounds (which you and I see simultaneously or hear simultaneously), do not pertain to the nature of our eyes or ears but rather are common objects for us to sense.”304

In a third passage, Augustine explains how, just as objects of sight are extended in space, so “no utterance is spoken as a whole at once, for it is brought forth and extended in time, so that one part of it is pronounced before another.”305 Sounds are temporal and sequential in nature.

301 Mus. 6.5.10; see above, pp. 60ff., esp. p. 60, n. 249.

302 item sicut ille interior de auditu nostro iudicat, utrum minus an sufficienter intentus sit, sic iudicat auditus ipse de uocibus, quid earum leniter influat aut aspere perstrepat, Lib. 2.5.12; transl. by P. King; emphasis added.

303 See above, pp. 64f.

304 Lib. 2.12.33.131; cf. 2.7.16.63 (quoted above, p. 66, n. 280).

305 nec tota enim simul sonat quaelibet uox, quia per tempora tenditur et producitur et aliud eius prius sonat aliud posterius, Lib. 2.14.38. !73 In his work On Christian Teaching, Augustine develops further his theory of signs and applies it to the interpretation of Christian scripture. In the course of this endeavor, he touches on the physiology of hearing in a couple of places. In Book One, he likens the coming of divine wisdom through the incarnate Word to the phenomenon of human speech:

In order for what we have in mind to enter the mind of the hearer through his ears of flesh, the word that we carry in our heart becomes a sound and is called speech. Yet our thought is not changed into this sound, but remaining unchanged in itself it assumes the form of a vocal utterance by which it enters through the ears, without any defect of alteration in itself.306

Similarly, in Book Two, Augustine defines a sign as “a thing that, over and above the appearance it conveys through the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of itself.”307 These passages present the vocal utterance as a vehicle for carrying something from the speaker’s mind to the hearer’s mind. The speaker’s idea takes the “form of a vocal utterance” (formam vocis) and conveys an “appearance” (species) through the ears. This language evokes Aristotle’s description of the sensory process as the transmission of a form without matter.308

306 ut id, quod animo gerimus, in audientis animum per aures carneas inlabatur, fit sonus uerbum quod corde gestamus, et locutio uocatur, nec tamen in eundem sonum cogitatio nostra conuertitur, sed apud se manens integra, formam uocis qua se insinuet auribus, sine aliqua labe suae mutationis adsumit, Doct. chr. 1.13.

307 signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire, Doct. chr. 2.1.

308 See above, pp. 33f. !74 In Sermon 28,309 Augustine considers the scripture: “Let the heart of those who seek the

Lord rejoice.”310 Since his congregation is fasting in the days after Pentecost,311 Augustine takes the occasion to liken sense-objects to food: light is “the food of our eyes”312 and “sound is a kind of food for the ears.”313 This leads him to an extended reflection on the process of hearing:

What sort of thing is this? For let us conjecture the intelligible things of the mind from the sensible things of the body. Here I am speaking to you in your charity. Here are your ears, here are your minds. I have named these two things: ears and minds. And in what I am speaking there are two things: the sound and the meaning. They are carried together, they reach the ear together. The sound remains in the ear, the meaning goes down into the heart. But in relation to the sound itself, let us first notice how much more highly we ought to regard the meaning. The sound is like the body, the meaning like the mind. Yet as soon as the sound strikes the air and touches the ear, it passes away and cannot be called back and no longer sounds. For the syllables precede and follow one another in orderly procession, in such a way that the second does not sound unless the first has passed away.314

There is a clear hierarchy here. The sound is transient and bodily; the meaning pertains to the soul and is more lasting. Yet even the transient sound has something “marvelous”315 about it: unlike food, which is divided so that one person takes one part and another person another part,

309 Preached c. 397; see E. Hill, tr., Sermons II (20-50) on the Old Testament (The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, Pt. III, Vol. II; Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1990): 114, n. 1.

310 laetetur cor quaerentium dominum, Ps 105:3.

311 See E. Hill, tr., Sermons II (20-50) on the Old Testament, 114, n. 1.

312 lux ista cibus est oculorum, Serm. 28.3.

313 aurium quidam cibus sonus est, Ibid. 28.4.

314 et ipse qualis est? de his enim sensibilibus corporis mentis intellegibilia coniciamus. ecce loquor caritati uestrae. adsunt aures, adsunt mentes. duo quaedam nominaui: aures et mentes. et in eo quod loquor, duo quaedam sunt: sonus et intellectus. simul feruntur, simul ad aurem perueniunt. sonus remanet in aure, intellectus descendit in cor. sed de sono ipso prius aduertamus quanto excellentius intellectum amare debemus. sonus est quasi corpus, intellectus est quasi animus. sed sonus mox ut aerem percusserit aurem que tetigerit, transit nec reuocatur nec adhuc sonat. ita enim sibi sillabae praeeundo et sequendo succedunt, ut secunda non sonet nisi prima transierit, Ibid.

315 uerumtamen sic quomodo quoddam transitorium magnum habet miraculum, Ibid. !75 speech remains whole and intact for each of the hearers: “One person hears the whole, two people hear the whole, several people hear the whole, and as many as come hear the whole.”316

Like sights, then, sounds are sensed in common. They remain whole and intact for everyone. In this way, human words are analogous to the Word of God, which is wholly present both in heaven and on earth.317 Words are physical, transient, temporal and sequential, yet they are common to all and undivided even when sensed by different people in different places.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that we can reconstruct a coherent theory of the sense of hearing from these discussions in Augustine’s early works, he shows much the same relation to the previous philosophical and Christian traditions as he does with regard to sight. In keeping with the

Neoplatonic tradition, he emphasizes that the soul actively attends to the bodily passions involved in sensation, without itself being affected. Like others before him, Augustine understands sounds to come from without by means of the air being struck. The eye reaches out a ray of light to the object of sight, but the ear merely receives the impressions caused by the external sound. As objects of sight are extended in space, so sounds are extended in time. Both senses work on the analogy of touch. Also, sights and sounds both remain intact and undivided when sensed by more than one person. Thus, of all the senses, sight and hearing are the most analogous to the activity of the mind, and the most important for conveying truth and wisdom.

316 totum audit unus, totum audiunt duo, totum audiunt plures, et quotquot uenerint totum audiunt, Serm. 28.4.

317 sic cogitate uerbum dei totum in caelis, totum in terris, Ibid. CHAPTER TWO

SMELL, TASTE, AND TOUCH IN AUGUSTINE’S EARLY WORKS

There is a passage in Book Ten of the Confessions that captures Augustine’s general attitude toward the senses. After professing his love for God, he muses on the nature of this love:

But what am I loving when I love you? Not beauty of body nor transient grace, not this fair light which is now so friendly to my eyes, not melodious song in all its lovely harmonies, not the sweet fragrance of flowers or ointments or spices, not manna or honey, not limbs that draw me to carnal embrace: none of these do I love when I love my God. And yet I do love a kind of light, a kind of voice, a certain fragrance, a food and an embrace, when I love my God: a light, voice, fragrance, food and embrace for my inmost self, where something limited to no place shines into my mind, where something not snatched away by passing time sings for me, where something no breath blows away yields to me its scent, where there is savor undiminished by famished eating, and where I am clasped in a union from which no satiety can tear me away. This is what I love, when I love my God.1

Several points emerge from this paragraph. First, and most generally, Augustine consistently presents God as immaterial. Second, Augustine sees in the world of the senses an analogy to the immaterial life of the spirit; there is “a light, voice, fragrance, food and embrace for my inmost self.” Third, Augustine presents the five senses in a conventional order, often called the

1 quid autem amo, cum te amo? non speciem corporis nec decus temporis, non candorem lucis, ecce istis amicum oculis, non dulces melodias cantilenarum omnimodarum, non florum et unguentorum et aromatum suaviolentiam, non manna et mella, non membra acceptabilia carnis amplexibus: non haec amo, cum amo deum meum, et tamen amo quandam lucem et quandam vocem et quendam odorem et quendam cibum et quendam amplexum, cum amo deum meum, lucem, vocem, odorem, cibum, amplexum interioris hominis mei, ubi fulget animae meae quod non capit locus, et ubi sonat quod non rapit tempus, et ubi olet quod non spargit flatus, et ubi sapit quod non minuit edacitas, et ubi haeret quod non divellit satietas. hoc est quod amo, cum deum meum amo, Conf. 10.6.8; transl. by M. Boulding. !76 !77 “hierarchy of the senses”2 or the “sequence of senses.”3 Fourth, sight is associated with space,4 hearing with time,5 smell with breath, taste with food, and touch with bodily embrace or union.

On all these points, Augustine owes much to the previous philosophical and religious traditions. Like others before him, he gives more attention to sight and hearing as the two senses most closely linked with the mind and soul. Yet he still has some things to say about smell, taste, and touch. After examining the traditional background on these three senses, we can better appreciate Augustine’s views regarding them.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

As with the two more prominent senses of sight and hearing, Presocratic philosophers often tried to associate smell, taste, and touch with one of the four elements. They also tended to rank the senses based on their perceived value. These hierarchies and elemental associations sometimes differed, though a substantial agreement and gradual development can be seen from

Anaxagoras and Empedocles through Diogenes of Apollonia and the Atomists.

Anaxagoras offers us one of the earliest accounts of how sense-perception works.

According to him, sense-perception occurs by contraries (i.e., like by unlike).6 After first illustrating this principle with regard to vision, Anaxagoras explains:

2 R. Jütte, A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace (Cambridge: Polity, 2005): 61.

3 O’Donnell, Confessions, Vol. 3, 167f.

4 cf. Lib. 2.14.38; see above, pp. 62-6.

5 Ibid.; see above, pp. 72, 74f.

6 Theophrastus, Sens. 27 (DK 59A92); see above, pp. 22f. !78 In the same way touch and taste discern their objects. What is equally hot or cold neither heats nor cools by its approach, nor is the sweet or the sour recognized through itself, but by the hot we recognize the cold, by the salty the fresh, and by the sour the sweet, according to the lack of each quality…. Similarly with smell and hearing; the former accompanies breathing, the latter occurs when sound reaches the brain.7

Already, we see the canonical five senses, though in the unusual order of sight, touch, taste, smell, and hearing. Anaxagoras concludes from the principle of sensation by contraries that every sensation involves pain, “for when any unlike makes contact with an unlike it causes pain.”8 As noted above,9 this makes all sense-perception a species of touch.

Anaxagoras also offers further discussion of the sense of smell. He not only associates smell with breath, he also explains the process:

Thin air carries smells better, for when it is heated and rarified smells are produced. When it breathes a large animal draws in the dense with the rare, but a small animal only the rare. That is why large animals perceive more. And in fact smell is detected over a short rather than a long distance because it is relatively dense, and as it disperses it diminishes in intensity.10

7 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν κρίνειν· τὸ γὰρ ὁµοίως θερµὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερµαίνειν οὔτε ψύχειν πλησιάζον οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ δι’αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶι µὲν θερµῶι τὸ ψυχρόν, τῶι δ’ ἁλµυρῶι τὸ πότιµον, τῶι δ’ ὀξεῖ τὸ γλυκὺ κατὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τὴν ἑκάστου· πάντα γὰρ ἐνυπάρχειν φησὶν ἐν ἡµῖν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν τὸ µὲν ἅµα τῆι ἀναπνοῆι, τὸ δὲ τῶι διικνεῖσθαι τὸν ψόφον ἄχρι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, Theophrastus, Sens. 28 (DK 59A92); transl. Graham, Texts, 307-9.

8 Theophrastus, Sens. 29 (DK 59A92); transl. Graham, Texts, 309.

9 p. 9.

10 ὄζειν µὲν γὰρ µᾶλλον τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα, θερµαινόµενον µὲν γὰρ καὶ µανούµενον ὄζειν. ἀναπνέον δὲ τὸ µὲν µέγα ζῶιον ἅµα τῶι µανῶι καὶ τὸν πυκνὸν ἕλκειν, τὸ δὲ µικρὸν αὐτὸν τὸν µανόν· διὸ καὶ τὰ µεγάλα µᾶλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὀσµὴν ἐγγὺς εἶναι µᾶλλον ἢ πόρρω διὰ τὸ πυκνοτέραν εἶναι, σκεδαννυµένην δὲ ἀσθενῆ, Theophrastus, Sens. 30 (DK 59A92); transl. Graham, Texts, 309. !79 Thus, for Anaxagoras, smells are produced when air is heated and rarefied and the animal draws in the rarified air when it breathes.11 The nearer the smell, the denser and more easily detected, since smells dissipate with distance.12

Empedocles offers an apparently opposite view of sense-perception.13 For him, as we have seen,14 perception results from similarity. Yet this seemingly opposite view of sensation is due to a similar understanding of the mechanics of sensation:

Smelling results from breathing. That is why those whose breath moves most violently smell most keenly. And the strongest smell is an effluence of fine and light particles. As for taste and touch, [Empedocles] does not define them individually, nor say how or by what means they come about, except to make the general observation that sensation results from particles fitting into pores. Pleasure results from elements that are like in parts and blending, pain from those that are contrary.15

From this passage, Empedocles appears to agree with Anaxagoras on at least four points. First, both associate smell with breathing. Second, both associate strong smell with air or particles that are “fine” or “thin” (λεπτός). Third, both understand pain (λύπη, λυπεῖσθαι) to result from the

11 It is not at all clear what Anaxagoras (on Theophrastus’ report) means by “thin air” (τὸν λεπτὸν ἀέρα). There is evidence that both Anaxagoras and Theophrastus use “thin” (λεπτός) as a synonym for “rare” (µανός, ἀραιός; cf. Theophr. Sens. 35, 59); so P. Curd translates the superlative λεπτοτάτου as “very rare” in Aëtius’ testimony to Anaxagoras (Aëtius 3.16.2 (A90); P. Curd, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae : Fragments and Testimonia: a Text and Translation with Notes and Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007): 117). Against this interpretation, see A.-L. Therme and A. Macé, “L'immanence de la puissance infinie. Le νοῦς d’Anaxagore à la lumière d’Homère,” Methodos [Online] 16 (2016): paragraph 32, n. 66; DOI : 10.4000/methodos.4477. Perhaps we can understand λεπτός and µανός/ἀραιός as distinct but coextensive terms when applied to air, at least as far as Anaxagoras is concerned; see G. M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917): 168, n. 39 (quoting A. E. Taylor).

12 This last point seems at odds with Anaxagoras’ earlier claim that smells are produced by rarefaction, an inconsistency noted by Theophrastus (Theophr. Sens. 35).

13 For the dispute about the relative chronology of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, see above, p. 24, n. 51.

14 pp. 10-15.

15 ὄσφρησιν δὲ γίνεσθαι τῆι ἀναπνοῆι. διὸ καὶ µάλιστα ὀσφραίνεσθαι τούτους, οἷς σφοδροτάτη τοῦ ἄσθµατος ἡ κίνησις· ὀσµὴν δὲ πλείστην ἀπὸ τῶν λεπτῶν καὶ τῶν κούφων ἀπορρεῖν. περὶ δὲ γεύσεως καὶ ἁφῆς οὐ διορίζεται καθ’ ἑκατέραν οὔτε πῶς οὔτε δι’ ἃ γίγνονται, πλὴν τὸ κοινὸν ὅτι τῶι ἐναρµόττειν τοῖς πόροις αἴσθησίς ἐστιν· ἥδεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ὁµοίοις κατά τε <τὰ> µόρια καὶ τὴν κρᾶσιν, λυπεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, Theophr. Sens. 9 (DK 31A86); transl. Graham, Texts, p. 403. !80 interaction of contrary elements.16 Fourth, “in making the correspondence between their objects depend on size, Anaxagoras seems to be speaking after the manner of

Empedocles, who explains sense-perception by the supposition that fit into the passages .”17 These four points suggest that, despite their differences, there is an underlying similarity in the sensory views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles.

The difference lies in Empedocles’ association of sensation with pleasure and, by extension, “elements that are like in parts and blending” (τοῖς ὁµοίοις κατά τε µόρια καὶ τὴν

κρᾶσιν):

Those who have the elements in equal or nearly equal mixture and do not have them too far apart or again too small or excessive in measure are the most intelligent and have the most accurate sense-perceptions, and those who correspond most closely to them are proportionately intelligent, while those who are in the contrary condition are least intelligent.18

Thus, for Empedocles, accurate sensation requires a certain blending of the elements that are neither too dense nor too rare, nor too small nor too large. One is reminded of Aristotle’s definition of virtue as a mean between the extremes of deficiency and excess.19

By contrast, Diogenes of Apollonia considers all sensation to result from air.20 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he begins his explanation of individual senses with smell: “The

16 ἅπασαν δ’ αἴσθησιν µετὰ λύπης, ὅπερ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι τῆι ὑποθέσει· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόµοιον ἁπτόµενον πόνον παρέχει, Theophr. Sens. 29 (DK 59A92).

17 τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰ µεγέθη τὴν συµµετρίαν ἀποδιδόναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔοικεν ὁµοίως λέγειν Ἐµπεδοκλεῖ· τῷ γὰρ ἐναρµόττειν τοῖς πόροις ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, Theophr. Sens. 35; transl. by G. M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle, p. 97.

18 ὅσοις µὲν οὖν ἴσα καὶ παραπλήσια µέµικται καὶ µὴ διὰ πολλοῦ µηδ’ αὖ µικρὰ µηδ’ ὑπερβάλλοντα τῷ µεγέθει, τούτους φρονιµωτάτους εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀκριβεστάτους, κατὰ λόγον δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω τούτων, ὅσοις δ’ ἐναντίως, ἀφρονεστάτους, Theophr. Sens. 11 (DK A86); transl. by D. W. Graham, Texts, p. 403.

19 EN 1109a.

20 Theophr. Sens. 39 (DK 64A19); cf. Arist. de An. 405a (DK 64A20). !81 sense of smell occurs in the air about the brain; for this is compact and commensurate with smell.”21 After a brief account of hearing and sight, he mentions taste (but not touch): “Taste occurs on the tongue because of its fine and soft character.”22 In discussing sensory precision,

Diogenes again begins with smell: “Smell is most sharply discerned by those that have the least amount of air in their heads, for it mingles least. And further those that draw smells through relatively long and narrow passageways discern sharply, for they judge the more quickly.”23 In discussing sensory pleasure and pain, however, Diogenes singles out taste: “The organ most apt to discern pleasure…is the tongue, for it is the softest and fine, and all veins lead to it.”24 Given

Diogenes’ emphasis on air as the principle, this prioritization of taste is unexpected. Yet his reasoning—that the tongue is “the softest and fine (µανὸν), and all veins lead to it”—is both in keeping with his view that other senses, especially hearing and sight, are keenest when the passageways are “fine” or “delicate,”25 and in keeping with the Presocratic tendency to conceive of sensation in terms of movement and passageways.26

21 τὴν µὲν ὄσφρησιν τῶι περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἀέρι· τοῦτον γὰρ ἄθρουν εἶναι καὶ σύµµετρον τῆι ὀσµῆι, Theophr. Sens. 39 (DK 64A19); transl. Graham, Texts, 449.

22 τὴν δὲ γεῦσιν τῆι γλώττηι διὰ τὸ µανὸν καὶ ἁπαλόν, Ibid. 40 (DK 64A19); transl. Graham, Texts, 449.

23 ὄσφρησιν µὲν οὖν ὀξυτάτην οἷς ἐλάχιστος ἀὴρ ἐν τῆι κεφαλῆι· τάχιστα γὰρ µείγνυσθαι· καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐὰν ἕλκηι διὰ µακροτέρου καὶ στενοτέρου· θᾶττον γὰρ οὕτω κρίνεσθαι, Ibid. 41 (DK 64A19); transl. Graham, Texts, 449.

24 κριτικώτατον δὲ ἡδονῆς τὴν γλῶτταν· ἁπαλώτατον γὰρ εἶναι καὶ µανὸν καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἁπάσας ἀνήκειν εἰς αὐτήν, Ibid. 43 (DK 64A19); transl. D. W. Graham, Texts, p. 451; there is some question about whether Diogenes meant ἡδονή in the sense of “taste, smell” or “pleasure” (see G. M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle, p. 186, n. 121).

25 ἀκούειν δ’ ὀξύτατα, ὧν αἵ τε φλέβες λεπταί….ὁρᾶν δ’ ὀξύτατα ὅσα τε τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἔχει λεπτάς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, Ibid. 41-2 (DK 64A19); on the relationship of “fine” (µανόν) and “delicate” (λεπτόν), see above, p. 79, n. 11; for the view that “as regards the others” (ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων) refers to the other senses, see G. M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle, pp. 103, 183 n. 111, 184 n. 114; for the ambiguous reading “as in other cases,” see Graham, Texts, p. 451.

26 See A. Laks, “Soul, sensation, and thought,” in A. A. Long, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 263-5. !82 The Atomists present their own views of smell, taste, and touch.27 According to this school, all reality is reduced to two principles, the full and the empty (or ‘void’),28 the former consisting of indivisible bodies (‘atoms’) of various shapes and sizes.29 This foundational principle determines not only the Atomist understanding of the physiology of sensation, but also their understanding of how sensation relates to knowledge.

The Atomists Leucippus and Democritus explain sensation by recourse to atoms. Just as they understand vision to result from “thin films of atoms,”30 called “images” (εἴδωλα), emanating from external objects and impinging on the eye,31 and just as they understand hearing to involve “particles of sound,”32 so Democritus identifies each taste with a particular size and shape of atom: “for instance he identifies sweet with round and sizable atoms. Sour consists of large, rough atoms with many angles, not rounded.”33 Similarly, he explains touch by recourse to atoms, “for those particles that cause segregation and division produce a sensation of heat; those

27 Since the two principle proponents of Atomism, Leucippus and Democritus, are difficult to distinguish in the ancient sources, it is useful to take their ideas together; see C. C. W. Taylor, “The Atomists,” in A. A. Long, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 181.

28 τό τε πᾶν εἶναι κενὸν καὶ πλῆρες, D. L. 9.30 (DK 67A1).

29 ὁ τοίνυν κόσµος συνέστη περικεκλασµένωι σχήµατι ἐσχηµατισµένος τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· τῶν ἀτόµων σωµάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν συνεχῶς τε καὶ τάχιστα κινουµένων, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πολλὰ σώµατα συνηθροίσθη [καὶ] διὰ τοῦτο ποικιλίαν ἔχοντα καὶ σχηµάτων καὶ µεγεθῶν, Aëtius P 1.4.1 (DK 67A24).

30 Graham, Texts, p. 623.

31 ἡγεῖται δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ Λεύκιππος καὶ ὕστερον δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον εἴδωλά τινα ἀπορρέοντα ὁµοιόµορφα τοῖς ἀφ’ ὧν ἀπορρεῖ (ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ ὁρατά) ἐµπίπτειν τοῖς τῶν ὁρώντων ὀφθαλµοῖς καὶ οὕτως τὸ ὁρᾶν γίνεσθαι, Alex. Sens. 24.14-21 (DK A29); see discussion above, pp. 34ff.

32 τοῖς ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς θραύσµασι, Aëtius P 4.19.3 (DK 68A128); transl. Graham, Texts, p. 581.

33 γλυκὺν µὲν τὸν στρογγύλον καὶ εὐµεγέθη ποιεῖ. στρυφνὸν δὲ τὸν µεγαλόσχηµον τραχύν τε καὶ πολυγώνιον καὶ ἀπεριφερῆ, Theophr. De Caus. Plant. 6.1.6 (DK 68A129); transl. Graham, Texts, p. 581. !83 that cause congregation and compression a sensation of cold.”34 The atoms have no sensible qualities in themselves, but the sensible qualities result from them by “contact, contour, and rotation, of which one is order, the second figure, and the third orientation.”35

This understanding of the physiology of sensation affects how the Atomists understand the relationship between sensation and knowledge. If sensation is due ultimately to atoms, and these atoms have no sensible qualities in themselves, but the sensible qualities arise “by contact, contour, and rotation,” then what we sense is not at the deepest level of reality, but is due to a state of flux and how it affects us: “Of the other sensible qualities there is no nature, but all are effects of the senses being altered, from which the appearance arises. There is not even a natural quality of cold and hot, but the change in shape [of the object] produces an alteration in us.”36

That sensible qualities do not exist in nature is proved by the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures, but “what is sweet to us is sour to others.”37 As a result of this,

“Democritus sometimes rejects what appears to the senses and maintains that none of these appears in truth, but only in opinion, but truth in existent things consists in there being atoms and

34 τὰ µὲν γὰρ διακριτικὰ καὶ διαιρετικὰ θερµότητος συναίσθησιν παρέχεσθαι, τὰ δὲ συγκριτικὰ καὶ πιλητικὰ ψύξεως, Simplicius De Caelo 564.24-29 (DK 68A120); transl. Graham, Texts, p. 581.

35 τὰ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίµατα κεχρῶσθαι διαταγῆι τε καὶ ῥυθµῶι καὶ προτροπῆι, ὧν ἡ µέν ἐστι τάξις ὁ δὲ σχῆµα ἡ δὲ θέσις, Aëtius P. 1.15.8 (DK 68A125): transl. Graham, Texts, p. 583.

36 τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδενὸς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιουµένης, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ θερµοῦ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σχῆµα µεταπῖπτον ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡµετέραν ἀλλοίωσιν, Theophr. Sens. 63 (DK 68A135); transl. Graham, Texts, p. 587.

37 σηµεῖον δ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ µὴ ταὐτὰ πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζώιοις, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἡµῖν γλυκύ, τοῦτ’ ἄλλοις πικρὸν, Ibid. (DK 68A135); transl. G. M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle, p. 123. !84 the void.”38 Hence his maxim, “by convention color, by convention sweet, by convention bitter, but in reality atoms and void.”39 For Democritus, therefore, sense-perception does not by itself constitute certain knowledge of reality, even if such knowledge must begin from sense- perception.40

In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates offers a list of the senses: “The senses, then, have with us names such as these: sights and hearings and smells, and things cold and hot, and pleasures and pains, and desires and fears, and the rest; those without name are innumerable, and those with names are very many.”41 Here we have, in addition to the principle senses of sight and hearing, the senses of smell and touch clearly indicated, but not the sense of taste, unless we take

“pleasures” (ἡδοναί) in the sense of “tastes.”42 In the Timaeus, by contrast, Plato discusses explicitly four senses:43 taste (65c-66c), smell (66d-67a), hearing (67a-c), and vision (67c-68d).

Two points emerge from this comparison of the Theaetetus and the Timaeus. First, the lack of explicit reference to touch as a separate sense reveals something of its ambiguous nature for

38 Δηµόκριτος δὲ ὁτὲ µὲν ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόµενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τούτων λέγει µηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ’ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ µόνον κατὰ δόξαν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόµους εἶναι καὶ κενόν, Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. 7.135 (DK 68B9); transl. Graham, Texts, p. 593.

39 νόµωι χροιή, νόµωι γλυκύ, νόµωι πικρόν, ἐτεῆι δ’ ἄτοµα καὶ κενόν, Galen De Medic. Empir. (DK 68B125); cf. Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. 7.135.

40 For further discussion of this point, see Graham, Texts, p. 624; for the view that Democritus is self-contradictory in his sensory views, see Theophrastus Sens. 68-72.

41 αἱ µὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡµῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόµατα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυµίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκληµέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι µὲν αἱ ἀνώνυµοι, παµπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνοµασµέναι, Tht. 156b

42 See “ἡδονή” A.II in LSJ; also, see above, p. 81, n. 24.

43 For the implication that there are four senses, see Ti. 67c. !85 Plato, as for others in antiquity. Second, there appears a development in Plato’s treatment of the process of sense-perception.

The sense of touch is ambiguous for Plato and others in antiquity. On the one hand, Plato omits it in his discussion of senses in Timaeus 65c-68d. Similarly, Empedocles and Diogenes omit touch in their discussion of the senses.44 This would imply that it is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the senses of sight and sound, which receive the bulk of the attention paid to senses in antiquity.45 As such, touch would appear to be of less interest to Plato and other philosophers. On the other hand, Plato depicts both sensation in general, and the senses of sight, hearing, smell, and taste in particular, in terms of contact, thus making each of these a species of touch.

This tendency to privilege touch is evident especially in Plato’s more detailed discussions in the Timaeus of the senses of taste and smell. Regarding the former, “all the earthy particles which enter in by the small veins—which, extending as far as to the heart, serve as it were for testing-instruments of the tongue—when they strike upon the moist and soft parts of the flesh and are melted down, contract the small veins and dry them up; and these particles when more rough appear to be ‘astringent,’ when less rough ‘harsh.’”46 The earthy particles strike upon the moist and soft parts of the tongue. In other words, taste occurs by contact. Smells, on the other hand, “arise in the intermediate state, when water is changing into air or air into water, and they

44 On Empedocles, see above, pp. 79f., esp. n. 15; on Diogenes, see above, pp. 80f.

45 See Chapter 1 above, especially p. 17, n. 7.

46 ὅσα µὲν γὰρ εἰσιόντα περὶ τὰ φλέβια, οἷόνπερ δοκίµια τῆς γλώττης τεταµένα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, εἰς τὰ νοτερὰ τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἁπαλὰ ἐµπίπτοντα γήϊνα µέρη κατατηκόµενα συνάγει τὰ φλέβια καὶ ἀποξηραίνει, τραχύτερα µὲν ὄντα στρυφνά, ἧττον δὲ τραχύνοντα αὐστηρὰ φαίνεται, Ti. 65c-d; transl. by W. R. M. Lamb. !86 are all smoke or mist; and of these, the passage from air to water is mist, and the passage from water to air is smoke.”47 This association of smell with an intermediate state between water and air appears to avoid the issue of contact, but Plato reaches this conclusion because “our veins in this part are formed too narrow for earth and water, and too wide for fire and air.”48 Only mist and vapor, the intermediate states between air and water, are capable of producing the two kinds of smell, the pleasant and the unpleasant.49 “The latter roughens and irritates all the cavity of the body that is between the head and the navel; the former soothes this same region and restores it with contentment to its own natural condition.”50 Here the verbal ideas all imply touch

(“roughens” and “irritates” and “soothes”), which helps explain what Plato means by the veins being both too narrow and too wide: the particles of earth and water are too large to enter the olfactory veins, but the particles of fire and air are so small that they enter and pass through the olfactory veins without making contact. Only particles of the right size, those between air and water, can both pass through the veins and make contact with the sides, either roughening or

47 ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα ἀέρος τε εἰς ὕδωρ ἐν τῷ µεταξὺ τούτων γεγόνασιν, εἰσίν τε ὀσµαὶ σύµπασαι καπνὸς ἢ ὁµίχλη, τούτων δὲ τὸ µὲν ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ ἰὸν ὁµίχλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα καπνός, Ti. 66e; transl. by W. R. M. Lamb.

48 εἴδει δὲ οὐδενὶ συµβέβηκεν συµµετρία πρὸς τό τινα σχεῖν ὀσµήν· ἀλλ’ ἡµῶν αἱ περὶ ταῦτα φλέβες πρὸς µὲν τὰ γῆς ὕδατός τε γένη στενότεραι συνέστησαν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ πυρὸς ἀέρος τε εὐρύτεραι, Ti. 66d; transl. by R. D. Archer-Hind.

49 τό θ’ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν, Ti. 67a.

50 τὸ µὲν τραχῦνόν τε καὶ βιαζόµενον τὸ κύτος ἅπαν, ὅσον ἡµῶν µεταξὺ κορυφῆς τοῦ τε ὀµφαλοῦ κεῖται, τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο καταπραῧνον καὶ πάλιν ᾗ πέφυκεν ἀγαπητῶς ἀποδιδόν, Ti. 67a; trans. by R. D. Archer-Hind. !87 smoothing them.51 So the sense of smell, too, like the sense of taste, involves a form of contact or touch.

There is also a development of ideas from the Theatetus to the Timaeus. The list of senses in the Theatetus appears haphazard. Plato names three explicitly (“sights and hearings and smells”), before filling out the list with more general phrases (“things cold and hot, and pleasures and pains, and desires and fears, and the rest”). He also qualifies this list with an important caveat: “those [senses] without name are innumerable, and those with names are very many.” In the Timaeus, by contrast, Plato is willing to enumerate four distinct senses: taste, smell, hearing, and sight. Here Plato reverses the typical “sequence of senses” and discusses each of the particular senses (i.e., those which involve affections occurring in particular body parts),52 in the order of their proximity to touch, which he discusses immediately before,53 not as a separate particular sense, but under the heading of “affections which concern the whole body in common.”54 Here Plato not only underscores the ambiguous nature of touch already mentioned; he also organizes the senses into a carefully structured account of the elements (expounded in

51 G. Vlastos offers a different interpretation of this passage, according to which Plato does not have in mind “the ratio of the size of each individual incoming particle to the size of the channel inside the vein, but rather a certain kind of correspondence between the consistency of the fluid that enters the vein and the internal diameter of the vein. The fluid must not be so thick as to clog the passage nor so ultra-fine as to move past the walls of the vein without appreciable friction, thus failing to cause the atomic disturbance which—when communicated to the soul— is experienced as a sensation of taste or smell” (G. Vlastos, “Plato's Supposed Theory of Irregular Atomic Figures,” Isis 58.2 (1967): 208); even on this interpretation, the intermediate fluid causes the sense of smell by means of “appreciable friction,” that is, by touching the inside walls of the veins.

52 τὰ δ’ ἐν ἰδίοις µέρεσιν ἡµῶν γιγνόµενα, Ti. 65b.

53 Ti. 61c-65b.

54 τῶν κοινῶν περὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶµα παθηµάτων, Ti. 64a; trans. by R. D. Archer-Hind. !88 complex geometrical terms)55 and their respective movements and combinations,56 and he explains the senses by means of a detailed description of bodily “veins” (φλέβες/φλέβια).57 This detailed physiological description of the senses, situated in a sweeping cosmological account, goes well beyond the discussion of sensation in the Theaetetus.

It is also this more detailed account in the Timaeus that Aristotle responds to when stating his own views of smell, taste, and touch. This is evident in at least four ways. First, though

Aristotle was the earliest to set the number of human senses at the canonical five (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch),58 his list is already latent in Plato’s Timaeus. Second, Aristotle mentions

Plato’s Timaeus by name when he rejects Plato’s theory of vision.59 Third, Aristotle follows the

Timaeus in pairing each of the senses with one of the four elements. Though he differs from

Plato in thinking the eye to be water rather than fire, and smell to involve fire rather than an intermediate state between air and water, still his reason for this latter association is that smell “is a sort of smoky vapor, and smoky vapor comes from fire.”60 This is not unlike Plato’s idea that

“all smells are smoke or mist.”61 Also, Aristotle follows Plato in associating hearing with air.62

55 Ti. 52d-57d.

56 Ti. 57d-61c.

57 Ti. 65c-d, 70a-b, 77c-d, 80d-e; for a discussion of Plato’s understanding of human anatomy in the Timaeus, particularly as it relates to “veins,” see T. H. Martin, Études sur le Timée de Platon. Volume 2 (New York: Arno Press, 1976): 323-9; see also J. Longrigg, Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians (London: Routledge, 1993): 104-148.

58 Sens. 436b-437a.

59 Sens. 437b; see above, p. 31, n. 92.

60 ἡ δ’ ὀσµὴ καπνώδης τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυµίασις, ἡ δ’ ἀναθυµίασις ἡ καπνώδης ἐκ πυρός, Sens. 438b.

61 εἰσίν τε ὀσµαὶ σύµπασαι καπνὸς ἢ ὁµίχλη, Ti. 66c.

62 ἀέρος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, Sens. 438b. !89 He also, like Plato, associates touch and taste with earth, since “taste is a species of touch.”63 The fourth way Aristotle’s shows his debt to the Timaeus is in the details of his views on taste, smell, and touch.64

Aristotle’s discussion of taste follows Plato in at least three ways. First, it follows Plato in the ordering of senses. Though Aristotle begins his particular discussions with sight and hearing,65 he breaks with the traditional “sequence of senses” to discuss taste next (rather than smell),66 just as Plato discusses taste before smell.67 Second, Aristotle follows Plato in his reason for this order. Smell and taste “are nearly the same affection,”68 yet our classification of tastes “is more distinct than that of smell, because our sense of smell is the worst of all the animals, and the worst of all our senses, but our sense of touch is the most precise of all the animals; and taste is a kind of touch.”69 Thus, putting his discussion of taste first allows Aristotle to discuss the more precise sense before discussing the related, but less precise, sense (i.e., smell).70 Third,

63 τὸ δ’ ἁπτικὸν γῆς. τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν εἶδός τι ἁφῆς εστίν, Sens. 439a.

64 For a discussion of how Aristotle’s views on sensation and its relation to reason and nous are influenced by Platonic ideas about reason and nous, see R. Sorabji, “Aristotle’s Perceptual Functions Permeated by Platonist Reason,” in G. van Riel and C. Macé, eds., Platonic Ideas and Concept Formation in Ancient and Medieval Thought (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004): 99-118.

65 Sens. 439a-440b (on sight); for hearing, Aristotle refers the reader to his discussion at de An. 419b-420a.

66 Aristotle has just given the traditional “sequence of senses” (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) at Sens. 439a6-8.

67 Ti. 65c-67c.

68 σχεδὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, Sens. 440b.

69 ἐναργέστερον δ’ ἡµῖν ἐστι τὸ τῶν χυµῶν γένος ἢ τὸ τῆς ὀσµῆς. τούτου δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι χειρίστην ἔχοµεν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὴν ὄσφρησιν καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡµῖν αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δ’ ἁφὴν ἀκριβεστάτην τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων· ἡ δὲ γεῦσις ἁφή τίς ἐστιν, Ibid. 440b-441a.

70 On Plato’s association of taste and smell, and the lack of distinct categories for smell, see H. Baltussen, “Ancient Philosophers of the Sense of Smell,” in M. Bradley, ed., Smell and the Ancient Senses (London: Routledge, 2015): 39-40. !90 Aristotle follows Plato in understanding taste to involve a combination of elements: earth and water (or “juices”) for Plato,71 earth and water and fire for Aristotle.72

Despite these similarities, Aristotle’s account of taste differs from Plato in several particulars. First, Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea, attributed by him to Democritus but also advanced in the Timaeus, that all sensation is a kind of touch.73 Second, Aristotle differs from

Plato in how he defines flavor:

Just as, therefore, people who wash off colors or flavors in liquid cause the liquid to assume such a quality, so also nature acts on the dry and earthy, filtering liquid through the dry and earthy, and moving it by heat, and causes the liquid to assume such a quality. And this is flavor: the affection, produced by the aforesaid dry in the liquid, that is capable of transforming potential taste into actual taste. For it brings actuality to the perceptive faculty that was previously potential; for the act of sensing is analogous not to acquiring knowledge, but to exercising it.74

Thus Aristotle relates flavor to his distinction between potentiality and actuality. Finally,

Aristotle’s understanding of taste differs from Plato’s in how he understands the sense-organ.

Plato’s description of small veins “extending to the heart and serving as testing-instruments of the tongue”75 sounds similar to Aristotle’s view that “two of the senses, that of touch and that of taste, are clearly connected to the heart,”76 yet Aristotle goes much further than Plato. He

71 Ti. 65c-d.

72 Sens. 441a-442a; cf. de An. 422a.

73 Ibid. 442a-b.

74 ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναποπλύνοντες ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ χρώµατα καὶ τοὺς χυµοὺς τοιοῦτον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι τὸ ὕδωρ, οὕτως καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ γεῶδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερµῷ ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυµός, τὸ γιγνόµενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρηµένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, τῆς γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναµιν ἀλλοιωτικὸν <ὂν> εἰς ἐνέργειαν· ἄγει γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς τοῦτο δυνάµει προϋπάρχον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ µανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, Ibid. 441b.

75 τὰ φλέβια, οἷόνπερ δοκίµια τῆς γλώττης τεταµένα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, Ti. 65c.

76 αἱ µὲν δύο φανερῶς ἠρτηµέναι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν εἰσίν, ἥ τε τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν χυµῶν, Part. An. 656a; cf. Sens. 439a. !91 distinguishes the medium of taste, the tongue, from the primary sense-organ of taste, which he places within, near the heart.77

Aristotle differs from Plato also in his specific views on smell. In particular, Aristotle’s differs from Plato in how he understands our difficulty in classifying smells. For Plato smells are mist and vapor (i.e., intermediate between air and water), and cannot be classified except as

“pleasant” and “unpleasant,” the former roughening, and the latter soothing, the passageways between the head and the navel.78 For Aristotle, however, our inability to distinguish smells more precisely is due not to the intermediate nature of their physical composition (and subsequent geometrical structure); rather it is due to our sense of smell being deficient.79 In other words, it is not that smells cannot be classified per se; it is simply that we humans lack a sufficiently developed olfactory sense to classify them.

Aristotle also differs from Plato in how he defines the sense-faculty of smell. For Plato, the sense of smell is due to an intermediate mixture between air and water (mist or vapor) making contact with the interior walls of the veins leading from the head to the navel.80 For

Aristotle, however, smell is one of the distance senses perceived through a medium (either air or

77 πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν, τῆς γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς, Sens. 439a; for one interpretation of this difficult passage, see A. P. Bos, “The Tongue is not the Soul’s Instrument for Tasting in Aristotle, ‘On the Soul’ II. 10,” Hermes 140.3 (2012): 375-385; cf. Arist. GA 743b; for further discussion on Aristotle’s seemingly contradictory passages concerning the organ of touch and taste, see J. I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition: From Alcmaeon to Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906): 193-225.

78 See above, pp. 85ff.

79 Sens. 440b.

80 See above, pp. 85ff. !92 water) and so the sense-organ is composed of one of these two simple elements, air or water.81

Smell is the “middle sense” standing between touch and taste, on the one hand, and sight and hearing, on the other; like touch and taste, “the object of smell is an affection of substances used for food (for these belong to the class of tangible objects)”82; like sight and hearing, smell occurs through the medium of air or water.83 “It is for this reason that smell may reasonably be likened to a kind of dipping and washing of the dry in the moist and liquid.”84 Just as taste involves the dry being washed in a liquid, with the liquid filtering through the dry and taking on something of its quality,85 so smell involves a similar “washing” of the dry in the moisture present in the medium of air or water.86 This analogy with taste suggests that smell, too, involves a change from potentiality to actuality. Likewise, the description of smell taking place through the medium of air or water opens up the possibility that, like sight and hearing, smell involves a non-spatial, atemporal movement from potentiality to actuality in the perceptual medium.87

81 ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν µεταξὺ καὶ µὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόµενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ’ οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι . . . τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια µόνον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (ἡ µὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δ’ ἀκοὴ ἀέρος, ἡ δ’ ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων), de An. 424b-425a; this would seem to imply that smell and the other distant senses (i.e., sight and hearing) do not operate by touch, yet Aristotle later says they do: καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια ἁφῇ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἑτέρου, Ibid. 435a.

82 διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τῶν θρεπτικῶν ἐστὶ πάθος τι (ταῦτα δ’ ἐν τῷ ἁπτῷ γένει), Sens. 445a; transl. W. S. Hett.

83 καὶ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ὀσµῶνται, Sens. 445a.

84 διὸ καὶ εὐλόγως παρείκασται ξηρότητος ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ χυτῷ οἷον βαφή τις εἶναι καὶ πλύσις; Ibid.; see D. Ross, Aristotle: Parva Naturalia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955): 210.

85 See above, pp. 90f.

86 ὅτι µὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται ἀπολαύειν τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πνεύµατι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, καὶ πάσχειν τι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐγχύµου ξηρότητος, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔτι δ’ εἴπερ ὁµοίως ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς ποιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οἷον ἀποπλυνόµενον τὸ ξηρόν, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ ἀνάλογον εἶναι τὰς ὀσµὰς τοῖς χυµοῖς, Sens. 443b.

87 See above, p. 32f. !93 Aristotle’s account of touch shows similar differences from Plato’s. Though he agrees with Plato in making taste a species of touch, Aristotle explicitly argues against the view that all senses work on the analogy of touch.88 Similarly, though Aristotle’s reference to the “perceptible body” as “tangible”89 appears similar to Plato’s description of touch as the sense which

“concerns the body as a whole,”90 Aristotle means something very different. Plato is classifying touch as a general sense involving the body as a whole, distinguished from the particular senses that each have a particular bodily sense-organ. Aristotle, on the other hand, understands the body

(or flesh)91 to be the sense-organ for the particular sense of touch. The sense of touch, then, works much like the other particular senses. Though Aristotle sometimes distinguishes the contact senses (i.e., touch and taste) from the distant senses (i.e., sight, hearing, and smell), which require a perceptual medium (i.e., air or water), he elsewhere describes even touch and taste as occurring through a medium.92 The difference, then, is that in the distant senses the perceptual medium is outside us, but with the contact senses the medium is the flesh or tongue.93

On this description, the flesh is the medium of touch, but the primary sense-organ resides within, near the heart.94 This leads to perhaps the most obvious difference between Aristotle and Plato in

88 Sens. 442a-b.

89 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ζητοῦµεν αἰσθητοῦ σώµατος ἀρχάς, τοῦτο δ’ἐστὶν ἁπτοῦ, GC 329b.

90 τῶν κοινῶν περὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶµα παθηµάτων, Ti. 64a;

91 καὶ τὸ τούτων αἰσθητήριον, ἡ σάρξ, καὶ τὸ ταύτῃ ἀνάλογον σωµατωδέστατόν ἐστι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, PA 647a.

92 τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ µαλακὸν δι’ ἑτέρων αἰσθανόµεθα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν, de An. 423b.

93 ὅλως δ’ ἔοικεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, Ibid.

94 πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν, τῆς γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς, Sens. 439a; see above, p. 91f. !94 their respective views of sensation: the location of the “seat of sensation.” Unlike Plato, Aristotle understands the heart to be the “seat of sensation.”95 Each of the sense-organs (i.e., eyes, ears, nostrils, tongue, flesh) is connected to the heart by means of “passageways” (πόροι),96 whereby the sensory movements are conveyed from these outer sense-organs to the central sense-organ

(i.e., the heart) by means of “innate breath” (σύµφυτον πνεῦµα).97 These “passageways” (πόροι) and the “innate breath” they contain are different from the “veins” (φλέβες/φλέβια) of Plato and other earlier philosophers. For Aristotle, these passageways “do not function as conduits that allow particles to travel from the sense-organs to the seat of perception. They function instead as a continuous medium between the sense-organs and the seat of perception that allows the sense- quality that affects the sense-organ also to affect the seat of perception.”98 Thus, the passageways from the outer sense-organs to the heart underscore the idea that sense-perception involves a qualitative (non-spatial) movement from potentiality to actuality in the perceptual medium.

In contrast to Aristotle, Epicureanism offers a much more spatial understanding of the movement involved in smell, taste, and touch. As with sight and hearing, the Epicureans follow the Atomists in their understanding of the other three senses. “We must suppose that smell too,

95 τὴν δ’ αἴσθησιν ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας, PA 656b; cf. ἀρχὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος, Ibid. 656a; for discussion on this, see T. K. Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 78-81, 202-4; also C. G. Gross, “Aristotle on the Brain,” The Neuroscientist 1.4 (1995): 245-250; on the lack of a clear “seat of sensation” in Plato, see J. I. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Perception: From Alcmaeon to Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906): 274-276.

96 οἱ γὰρ πόροι τῶν αἰσθητηρίων πάντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ αἰσθήσεως, τείνουσι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν, τοῖς δὲ µὴ ἔχουσι καρδίαν πρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον, GA 781a.

97 ἡ δ’ ὄσφρησις καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ πόροι συνάπτοντες πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα τὸν θύραθεν, πλήρεις συµφύτου πνεύµατος, περαίνοντες δὲ πρὸς τὰ φλέβια τὰ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον τείνοντα ἀπὸ τῆς καρδίας, Ibid. 744a; for discussion of the difficult concept of “innate breath” in Aristotle, see Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, 91-2; also M. C. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978): 143-164.

98 Johansen, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, 93-4. !95 just like hearing, would never cause any feeling if there were not certain particles travelling away from the object and with the right dimensions to stimulate this sense, some kinds being disharmonious and unwelcome, others harmonious and welcome.”99 These odors are either

“unwelcome” or “welcome” on account of the fitness of the shapes to the sense-organ.100

Likewise “we perceive taste in our mouth, when we press it out in chewing our food” and “what we press out is all spread abroad through the pores of the palate, and through the winding passages of the loose-meshed tongue.”101 To the extent that “sweet” and “sour” are due to the differing shapes of the seeds of food producing either a rough texture or a smooth one on the insides of the passageways,102 the Epicurean view appears to harken back to Plato. Furthermore,

Epicureans join Plato in making all sensation occur by contact, thus making all the senses a form of touch. Yet unlike Plato they do not subordinate the material world of the senses to the immaterial world of the intellect; for the Epicureans all reality is material and reducible to atoms, and the senses are an utterly reliable basis of knowledge.103

The Stoics incorporate into their sensory views elements of Plato, Aristotle, and the

Epicureans. With Plato they distinguish the affection (πάθος) produced by a sense object from the activity of the soul in (1) forming a perceptual impression (φαντασία αἰσθητική), and (2)

99 καὶ µὴν καὶ τὴν ὀσµὴν νοµιστέον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὐθὲν πάθος ἐργάσασθαι, εἰ µὴ ὄγκοι τινὲς ἦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγµατος ἀποφερόµενοι σύµµετροι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ αἰσθητήριον κινεῖν, οἱ µὲν τοῖοι τεταραγµένως καὶ ἀλλοτρίως, οἱ δὲ τοῖοι ἀταράχως καὶ οἰκείως ἔχοντες, Ep. Hdt. 53; transl. from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, 74.

100 Lucr. 4. 673-8.

101 sucum sentimus in ore, cibum cum mandendo exprimimus . . . . quod exprimimus per caulas omne palati diditur et rarae per flexa foramina linguae, Lucr. 4.617-21; transl. by C. Bailey.

102 Lucr. 4.649-62.

103 See above, pp. 34ff. !96 assenting to the perceptual impression.104 With Aristotle, they understand the process of sensation to involve pneuma (πνεῦµα) connecting the outer sense-organs to the seat of sensation, which they call the hēgemonikon (ἡγεµονικόν) and locate in the heart.105 With the Epicureans, they understand the process of sense-perception in purely material terms.106

Where the Stoics differ from these earlier philosophers is in their synthesis and development of terminology. Despite the slim evidence for the mechanics, we can piece together from our sources the outline of the Stoic view of sense-perception as it applies to all five senses, following the paradigm of sight.107 In the course of this outline, several Stoic uses of the term

“sense” (αἰσθήσις) emerge.108 First, each of the five senses is identified as a pneuma extending from the hēgemonikon to the individual sense-organ (i.e., the eyes for sight, the ears for hearing, the nostrils for smell, the tongue for taste, and the surface of the skin for touch);109 this initiating pneuma is one of the meanings of “sense” (αἰσθήσις). The organ (or faculty) is also called a

104 Diogenes Laertius 7.52; see H. Løkke, Knowledge and Virtue in Early Stoicism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015): 26-7.

105 Aëtius P 4.21.1-4; cf. Plotinus 4.7.7; for the Stoic location of the hēgemonikon, see Diog. Laert. 7.159.

106 See above, p. 38, n. 133.

107 Aëtius P 4.12.1.

108 I am indebted in what follows to the discussion of the multivocality of Stoic αἰσθήσις, in S. Rubarth, The Stoic Theory of Aisthesis (1997): 32-60, as well as S. Rubarth, “The Meaning(s) of αἰσθήσις in Ancient Stoicism,” Phoenix 58.3-4 (2004): 319-344.

109 Οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον µέρος τὸ ἡγεµονικόν, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰς φαντασίας καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁρµάς· καὶ τοῦτο λογισµὸν καλοῦσιν. Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ ἑπτὰ µέρη ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόµενα εἰς τὸ σῶµα καθάπερ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ πολύποδος πλεκτάναι· τῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ µερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε µέν εἰσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια, ὅρασις ὄσφρησις ἀκοὴ γεῦσις καὶ ἁφή. Ὧν ἡ µὲν ὅρασις ἐστὶ πνεῦµα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ ἡγεµονικοῦ µέχρις ὀφθαλµῶν, ἀκοὴ δὲ πνεῦµα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ µέχρις ὤτων, ὄσφρησις δὲ πνεῦµα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ µέχρι µυκτήρων [λεπτῦνον], γεῦσις δὲ πνεῦµα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ µέχρι γλώττης, ἁφὴ δὲ πνεῦµα διατεῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ µέχρις ἐπιφανείας εἰς θίξιν εὐαίσθητον τῶν προσπιπτόντων, Aëtius P 4.21.1-4; SVF 2.836; tr. by B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.52. !97 “sense” (αἰσθήσις) or “sense-organ” (αἰσθητήριον).110 Next, it is through the sense-organ (or faculty) that we receive from the external sense object a “perceptual impression” (φαντασία

αἰσθητική).111 This impression is an “imprinting in a soul” (τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ),112 the term deriving from “imprints in wax made by a signet-ring,”113 though Chrysippus rejects the comparison and prefers to call the impression an “alteration” (ἀλλοίωσις).114 This impression is an “affection” (πάθος) passively received in the soul,115 resulting from the “affection” (πάθος) of the sense-organ being transmitted to the hēgemonikon by means of the pneuma.116 The pneuma not only stretches from the hēgemonikon to the sense-organs, but back again in a kind of double

110 Αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τ’ ἀφ’ ἡγεµονικοῦ πνεῦµα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διῆκον καὶ ἡ δι’ αὐτῶν κατάληψις καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἥν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται, Diog. Laert. 7.52; cf. Aëtius P 4.21.1-4.

111 Τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἱ µέν εἰσιν αἰσθητικαί, αἱ δ’ οὔ· αἰσθητικαὶ µὲν αἱ δι’ αἰσθητηρίου ἢ αἰσθητηρίων λαµβανόµεναι, Diog. Laert. 7.51; cf. Cic. Ac. 1.40; for the translation “perceptual impression,” I follow H. Løkke, Knowledge and Virtue in early Stoicism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015): 27. There is some debate about whether the related term φαντασία καταληπτική should be translated as “graspable impression” (visum comprehensibilis, Cic. Ac. 1.40), since it is not the impression which is sensed or grasped, but the sense object is sensed or grasped through the impression; see R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in B. Inwood, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 60, n. 1.

112 φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, Diog. Laert. 7.50.

113 τοῦ ὀνόµατος οἰκείως µετενηνεγµένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινοµένων, Diog. Laert. 7.45.

114 φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ψυχῆς ὑφίσταται. οὐ γὰρ δεκτέον τὴν τύπωσιν οἱονεὶ τύπον σφραγιστῆρος, ἐπεὶ ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι πολλοὺς τύπους κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι, Diog. Laert. 7.50.

115 φαντασία µὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόµενον, Aët. 4.12.1; οὕτως ὅταν λέγωµεν, φασί, τὴν φαντασίαν ἑτεροίωσιν ἡγεµονικοῦ, συνεµφαίνοµεν τὸ κατὰ πεῖσιν ἀλλὰ µὴ τὸ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἑτεροίωσιν, S. E. M 7.239.

116 Ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ µὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δήπουθεν, ἡ δ’αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁµολογήσουσιν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἡγεµονοῦν γίγνεται. Ἄλλου δὴ ὄντος τοῦ πονοῦντος µέρους τοῦ πνεύµατος τὸ ἡγεµονοῦν αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχει. Πῶς οὖν τοῦτο συµβαίνει; Διαδόσει, φήσουσι, παθόντος µὲν πρώτως τοῦ περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ψυχικοῦ πνεύµατος, µεταδόντος δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τούτου ἄλλῳ, ἕως πρὸς τὸ ἡγεµονοῦν ἀφίκοιτο, Plot. 4.7.7. !98 motion,117 producing a “perceptual tension” (αἰσθητικὸς τόνος),118 much like the taut strands of a spider’s web alert the spider to the movement of a fly on the edge of his web.119 As is clear from this outline, sense-perception in the Stoic view is passive, insofar as the external object is the cause of the affection of the sense-organ that gets transmitted (via the pneuma) to the hēgemonikon; it is active, insofar as the sense-organs actively convey information to the hēgemonikon, and the hēgemonikon is responsible both for maintaining the perceptual tension of the pneuma, and for the mental “grasp” (κατάληψις) of the impression received, which is another meaning of “sense” (αἰσθήσις).120

As with sight and hearing, Cicero offers one example of how these various philosophical traditions regarding smell, taste, and touch are received at Rome in the late Republican period.121

Like previous thinkers, Cicero discusses sight and hearing in more detail, but indicates that smell, taste, and touch possess similar powers of judgment.122 Likewise, in discussing the providential arrangement of man’s sense-organs, “the intermediaries and messengers of the outer world,” Cicero follows the standard “sequence of senses”: the eyes as “lookouts” (speculatores)

117 ἡ δέ ἐστι πνεῦµα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτό· ἄρχεται µὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν µέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τείνεσθαι, ψαῦσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνακάµπτει πάλιν, ἄχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὡρµήθη, Ph. Deus 35.

118 τὸν δὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκλυοµένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεµονικόν, Diog. Laert. 7.158.

119 ait idem Chrysippus: sicut aranea in medietate cassis omnia filorum tenet pedibus exordia, ut, cum quid ex bestiolis plagas incurrerit ex quacumque parte, de proximo sentiat, sic animae principale positum in media sede cordis sensuum exordia retinere, ut, cum quid nuntiabunt, de proximo recognoscat, Chalcid. In Tim. 2.220.

120 Diog. Laert. 7.52; (ἐστιν) ὅτι φαντασίας τινὸς ἑαυτοῦ γενοµ(έν)ης αὐτῷ [τὸ] π[ι]θ[αν]ὸν ἴσχει—πῶς γ(ὰρ) ἂν ἄλλως δύν(αι)το; —π(ερὶ) [τ(ῆς) φα]ντασίας κ(αὶ) τούτῳ[σ(υγ)κ(ατα)τ]ίθετ(αι), Hierocl. El. Mor. 6.25-27.

121 For a discussion of the personal, social, and political context of Cicero’s philosophical projects, see H. Baltussen,“Cicero’s Translation of Greek Philosophy: Personal Mission or Public Service?” In S. McElduff and E. Sciarrino, eds., Complicating the History of Western Translation: The Ancient Mediterranean in Perspective (Manchester, UK: St. Jerome Publishing, 2011): 37-47.

122 Cic. ND 2.58.146. !99 are given the highest position; the ears are also in the upper part of the body because sounds rise; likewise, the nostrils are placed high because smells travel upwards, and placed near the mouth because of their association with food and drink; taste is located in the mouth because that is the opening for food and drink; touch is diffused over the whole body.123 As the “messenger” imagery implies, the senses are not located in the body, but in the soul.124 The bodily sense- organs are “windows of the soul, through which the mind can sense nothing unless it is present and active.”125 While there is thus understandably little discussion in Cicero of the physiological aspects of smell, taste, and touch, he does speak of “certain pathways bored from the seat of the soul to the ears and eyes and nostrils.” It is clear from this that Cicero places the soul’s “ruling part” (principatum, his translation of the Greek ἡγεµονικόν)126 in the head, not the heart.127 This placement is almost certainly based on Plato.128 Though on one occasion Cicero explicitly rejects

123 Sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice ad usus necessarios et facti et conlocati sunt. nam oculi tamquam speculatores altissimum locum optinent, ex quo plurima conspicientes fungantur suo munere; et aures, cum sonum percipere debeant qui natura in sublime fertur, recte in altis corporum partibus collocatae sunt; item que nares et, quod omnis odor ad supera fertur, recte sursum sunt et, quod cibi et potionis iudicium magnum earum est, non sine causa vicinitatem oris secutae sunt. iam gustatus, qui sentire eorum quibus vescimur genera deberet, habitat in ea parte oris qua esculentis et posculentis iter natura patefecit. tactus autem toto corpore aequabiliter fusus est, Cic. ND 2.56.140f; the same order of senses appears in 2.57.142; cf. Xen. Mem. 1.4.6; Arist. PA 658b.

124 neque est enim ullus sensus in corpore, Cic. Tusc. 1.20.46.

125quasi fenestrae sint animi, quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat et adsit, Ibid.

126 principatum autem id dico quod Graeci ἡγεµονικὸν vocant, quo nihil in quoque genere nec potest nec debet esse praestantius, ND. 2.10.29.

127 sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut deum non vides, tamen, ut deum adgnoscis ex operibus eius, sic ex memoria rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omni que pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis adgnoscito. In quo igitur loco est? credo equidem in capite et cur credam adferre possum. sed alias, ubi sit animus; certe quidem in te est, Tusc. 1.28.70f.

128 Compare Cicero’s placement of the senses (sensus autem interpretes ac nuntii rerum in capite tamquam in arce mirifice, ND 2.56.140; emphasis added) with his description of the Platonic tripartite soul (eius doctor Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem, in capite sicut in arce posuit, Tusc. 1.10.20; emphasis added). !100 the Stoic definition of perception in favor of the Aristotelian view,129 his sensory views as a whole indicate a continuation of the Platonic tradition.

Galen offers us another example of how the previous philosophical traditions regarding smell, taste, and touch are received at Rome. As with sight and hearing,130 his views on the other three senses reflect his debt to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. His debt to Plato can be seen in his tripartite division of the soul into the rational part (i.e., the hēgemonikon, which he locates in the brain),131 the spirited part (situated in the heart),132 and the desiderative part (located in the liver).133 He also follows Plato in his pairing of senses with elements based on the principle of

“like is perceptible by like”:134 sight is associated with light, hearing with air, smell with vapors, taste with moisture, and touch with earth.135 He even adopts Plato’s view that the senses are distinguished by the fineness of their respective particles, the objects of sight being the most

129 De Fin. 5.26.76.

130 See above, pp. 42f.

131 ἔνθα τῶν νεύρων ἡ ἀρχή, ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἡγεµονικόν· ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ τῶν νεύρων ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ [ἐστίν]· ἐνταῦθα ἄρα τὸ ἡγεµονικόν, PHP 8.1.22.

132 ἔνθα τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιφανέστερον κινεῖ τὰ µόρια τοῦ σώµατος, ἐνταῦθα τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ µὴν ἡ καρδία φαίνεται µεγάλην ἐξαλλαγὴν ἴσχουσα τῆς κινήσεως ἐν θυµοῖς καὶ φόβοις· ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρα τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν, Ibid. 8.1.23.

133 αὕτη µὲν ἀπόδειξις µία τοῦ τὸ ἧπαρ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῆς ἐπιθυµητικῆς δυνάµεως καὶ τῶν φλεβῶν, Ibid. 8.1.30.

134 τὸ ὅµοιον τῷ ὁµοίῳ γνώριµον, UP 8.6, I 464.

135 τὸ µὲν γὰρ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον αὐγοειδές ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀερῶδες, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τὸ µὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὄργανον ὑγρὸν καὶ σπογγοειδές, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς σκληρὸν καὶ γεῶδες, προπαρασκευασθέντος ἑκάστου τῶν ὀργάνων ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως εἰς ὁµοιότητα τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ἐχρῆν οὖν καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀσµῶν αἰσθητήριον ἀτµοειδὲς ὑπάρχειν, Inst. Od. 3.4-5; Galen even cites Plato’s Timaeus for his association of smell with vapor at PHP 7.6.1, and quotes Ti. 66e on smell being impeded by the obstruction of the nose (UP 8.6, I 470). !101 fine-particled,136 the objects of hearing denser, and the objects of smell denser yet.137 Galen’s debt to Aristotle can be seen in the Peripatetic theory of the elements that underlies his sensory views,138 his understanding that smell involves air, water, and fire,139 and his description of sensation as the discernment of an “alteration” (ἀλλοίωσις).140 Though even this use of

“alteration” shows some Stoic influence, as Galen says the discernment “arises through a single power common to all sense-organs which flows to them from the ruling part.”141 Galen’s understanding of sight as active and emissionist, while the other four senses are passive with respect to the sense objects,142 is heavily influenced by Plato. As these examples show, Galen incorporates into his medical views elements of various schools in the philosophical tradition.

But beyond mere eclecticism or an adept synthesis of traditional ideas, Galen offers something distinctive in his views on smell, taste, and touch. Three examples will suffice. First, and most importantly, Galen made much use of the Hellenistic discovery of the nervous system and the consequent distinction between nerves and veins. Where earlier philosophers write

136 τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητὸν ἀκριβέστερόν τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ λεπτοµερέστερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις, PHP 7.5.29.

137 ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἔµελλε µὴ κωλύειν, ἀραιότερον ἐχρῆν αὐτὸ γενέσθαι τοσούτῳ τοῦ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ὅσῳ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐκείνης αἰσθητοῦ παχυµερέστερον ἦν. σχεδὸν γάρ, ὅσῳ λείπεται πρὸς λεπτοµέρειαν ὁ ἀὴρ αὐγῆς, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἀτµὸς ἀέρος, UP 8.6, I 647f.

138 For a discussion of Aristotelian influence in Galen’s elemental theory, see I. Kupreeva, “Galen’s Theory of Elements,” in P. Adamson, R. Hansberger, and J. Wilberding, eds., Philosophical Themes in Galen (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2014): 153-196.

139 µεταξὺ δὲ ἀέρος τε καὶ ὑγροῦ [καὶ πυρὸς] τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεώς ἐστιν αἰσθητὸν, Inst. Od. 2.11; for discussion of this passage, and the inclusion of the bracketed phrase καὶ πυρὸς, see B. S. Eastwood, “Galen on the Elements of Olfactory Sensation,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Neue Folge, 124.3/4 (1981): 271-4.

140 PHP 7.8.1-2.

141 ἡ διάγνωσις δ’ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως γίγνεται ἐκ µιᾶς δυνάµεως κοινῆς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιρρεούσης, PHP 7.8.2; transl. P. de Lacy.

142 PHP 7.5.34; see above, p. 42, n. 158. !102 vaguely of “passageways”, or inaccurately of “veins”, as conduits of sensory information, Galen more precisely identifies “nerves”,143 describing them in a level of detail that shows his medical expertise and experience in dissection. Second, and as a result of the first, Galen departs from the philosophical tradition in regarding smell as taking place not in the nasal passages, but “in the tips of the anterior ventricles of the brain, to which the nasal passages ascend.”144 Thus, for

Galen, the other four senses have outer sense-organs, but smell is sensed directly by a part of the brain. A third distinctive feature of his sensory views concerns the organ of touch. Unlike

Aristotle,145 Galen considers skin the organ of touch, specifically the skin on the palm of the hand, which he describes as occupying a middle position “not just with regard to all the parts of the human being, but with regard to the whole of existence—of all bodies which are subject to generation and decay,” insofar as this skin has “preserved its natural state,” and that by virtue of this natural/mean position of the skin “its sense of touch is made especially precise.”146 He thus situates touch, and skin as the organ of touch, within the framework of his discussion of the

“well-mixed” human being as the one whose body is in the middle of all physical extremes, and whose soul is likewise between the ethical extremes of deficiency and excess.147 This application

143 See, e.g., PHP 6.3.3.

144 λοιπὸν δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ὄργανον, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ῥῖνα πόροις, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νοµίζουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν προσθίων ἐγκεφάλου κοιλιῶν, εἰς ἅπερ ἀνήκουσιν οἱ κατὰ τὴν ῥῖνα πόροι, PHP 7.5.45; transl. P. de Lacy.

145 See above, p. 93, n. 94.

146 Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ δέρµα τὸ µέσον οὐ µόνον ἁπάντων τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου µορίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας ἁπάντων τῶν ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ σωµάτων οὐ τὸ τετυλωµένον ἐστὶ καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ λιθῶδες, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον, ᾧ δὴ καὶ µάλιστά φαµεν ἀκριβοῦσθαι τὴν ἁφήν, Temp. I 567-8; transl. by P. van der Eijk.

147 Ibid. !103 of Aristotelian ethics to the sense-organ of touch, in an elaborate theory of mixtures and their relation to human nature, goes far beyond previous sensory accounts, Aristotelian or otherwise.

The Didaskalikos, the second-century handbook by Alcinous,148 provides one example of

Middle Platonist views regarding the senses, especially smell, taste, and touch. In addition to a systematic definition of sense-perception,149 it presents the senses in the traditional order: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.150 Though he echoes Plato’s depiction of “light-bearing eyes” and their association with fire,151 as well as Plato’s depiction of smells as intermediate between air and water,152 Alcinous does not pair each sense with an element.153 Like Plato, he describes the senses other than sight as passive. In particular, “smell is a sensation which comes down from the veins in the nostrils as a far as the region of the navel,”154 while taste involves “veins from [the tongue] as far as the heart, to be the tests and criteria of flavours.”155 These similar accounts of sensory input show the lack of a clear seat of sensation in Plato.156 Though his

148 On the authorship of this work, see above, p. 43, n. 163.

149 See above, p. 43f.

150 Did 19 (sight) and 20 (hearing, smell, taste, and touch).

151 Ἱδρύσαντες δὲ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον τὰ φωσφόρα ὄµµατα καθεῖρξαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ φωτοειδές, Ibid. 18.1; cf. Ti. 45b.

152 Did. 19.2; cf. Ti. 66e, discussed above, p. 85ff.

153 His account of hearing (Did. 19.1) makes no mention of air, his account of touch (Ibid. 19.5) no mention of earth, and his account of flavors (Ibid. 19.4) only a passing mention of moisture.

154 ἔστι δὲ ἡ ὀσµή τι κατιὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς µυκτῆρσι φλεβίων πάθος µέχρι τῶν περὶ τὸν ὀµφαλὸν τόπων, Ibid. 19.2; transl. J. Dillon.

155 φλεβία διατείναντες ἀπὸ γλώττης µέχρι καρδίας, δοκίµια ἐσόµενα καὶ κριτήρια τῶν χυµῶν, Ibid. 19.3; transl J. Dillon.

156 Alcinous similarly describes sound as a movement in the head that terminates in the liver (Ἀκοὴ δὲ γέγονε πρὸς φωνῆς γνῶσιν, ἀρχοµένη µὲν ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν κινήσεως, τελευτῶσα δὲ περὶ ἥπατος ἕδραν, Did. 19.1; cf. Ti. 67b); for Plato on the seat of sensation, see above, p. 94, n. 95. !104 understanding of the mechanics of sensation are based entirely on Plato, the ordering of his discussion, and his treatment of touch as a separate, individual sense, show signs of Aristotelian influence.157

Plotinus shows similarly varied influences in his understanding of the senses, especially smell, taste, and touch, though with more originality in his adherence to the Platonic tradition.

Like Plato, Plotinus understands sensation to be an activity of the soul, not the body: “The perception of sense objects is for the soul or the living being an act of apprehension, in which the soul understands the quality attaching to bodies and takes the impression of their forms.”158

Plotinus is here in agreement with the Stoics insofar as they both describe sensation as an act of apprehension (ἀντίληψις). He also accepts with the Stoics the common view that the affection occurs in one place (i.e., the organ of sense), the sense-perception in another (i.e., the hēgemonikon).159 But Plotinus disagrees with the Stoic view that the soul is extended in space; he introduces the particulars of the Stoic understanding of sensation in order to show the absurdity of their view, arguing instead for the immateriality of the soul.160 Instead of a material transmission of the impression or “affection” from the object to the sense-organ, and from the sense-organ to the soul (situated in the heart or elsewhere), Plotinus understands the process to

157 For further discussion on this point, see J. Dillon, ed., Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993): 143-145.

158 τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ ἀντίληψις τὴν προσοῦσαν τοῖς σώµασι ποιότητα συνιείσης καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτῶν ἀποµαττοµένης, Plot. 4.4.23; transl. A. H. Armstrong.

159 Ὅταν δάκτυλον λέγηται ἀλγεῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἡ µὲν ὀδύνη περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον δήπουθεν, ἡ δ’αἴσθησις τοῦ ἀλγεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ὁµολογήσουσιν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἡγεµονοῦν γίγνεται, Ibid. 4.7.7.

160 Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ νοεῖν οἷόν τε, εἰ σῶµα ἡ ψυχὴ ὁτιοῦν εἴη, δεικτέον ἐκ τῶνδε, Ibid. 4.7.8. !105 begin with the external object imparting its image (εἴδωλον)161 to the sense; the soul then apprehends this impression by means of “assimilation.”162 But since the soul is immaterial, it cannot itself be assimilated to the material sense object, so there must be an intermediary, the sense-organ, to bridge the ontological gap between the sensible and intelligible in the act of sense-perception. In this way, Plotinus agrees with Aristotle in describing sensation as the reception of the form, but he differs from Aristotle in stressing not the need for a material medium between object and sense-organ, but a sense-organ intermediate between the material object and the immaterial soul. Plotinus concludes his discussion at 4.4.23 with the observation that sense-perception “belongs to the soul in the body and working through the body.” Thus, sense-perception is active insofar as the soul is working through the body, but passive insofar as the external object imparts an impression to the sense-organ which, by way of assimilation, allows the soul to grasp the form.

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION

This philosophical tradition regarding sense-perception reaches Augustine often by means of, and always in interaction with, a received tradition of Christian teaching. Since aspects of this Christian tradition are part of a broader Judeo-Christian approach to divine revelation, as

161 ἐπεὶ καὶ συγκεχωρηµένου ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειµένοις εἶναι αἰσθητοῖς, ὧν ἀντίληψιν ἡ αἴσθησις ποιήσεται, τό τε γινωσκόµενον δι’αἰσθήσεως τοῦ πράγµατος εἴδωλόν ἐστι καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγµα ἡ αἴσθησις λαµβάνει· µένει γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω, Plot. 5.5.1.

162 εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, δεῖ πρότερον καὶ ταῦτα ἐσχηκέναι ἤτοι ὁµοιωθεῖσαν ἢ τῷ ὁµοιωθέντι συνοῦσαν, Ibid. 4.4.23. !106 exemplified in the exegesis of their common Scriptures, perhaps the best place to see this intersection of philosophical and religious traditions is in the writings of Philo of Alexandria.

Despite being generally a Platonist with regard to the senses, Philo shows evidence of influence from other schools of philosophy. The Stoic views of sense-perception, in particular, find echoes in his writings. For example, in an allegorical interpretation of Gn 2:6, Philo uses the

Stoic spring imagery to describe the hēgemonikon sending “powers” (δυνάµεις) to the organs of sense, described as a pneuma extending to the eyes, ears, nostrils, mouth, and the whole surface of the body.163 Here Philo also associates the hēgemonikon of the soul with the “dominant part of the body” (τὸ σώµατος ἡγεµονικὸν), the face.164 The mind is likened to man, characterized by activity; the senses are likened to woman, characterized by passivity: “the faculties of perception are all dormant, until there draws near to each of them from outside that which is to set them in motion.”165 From the perspective of the external object, passions reach the soul through the

163 τὸ ἡγεµονικὸν ἡµῶν ἐοικὸς πηγῇ δυνάµεις πολλὰς οἷα διὰ γῆς φλεβῶν ἀνοµβροῦν, τὰς δυνάµεις ταύτας ἄχρι τῶν αἰσθήσεων [ὀργάνων], ὀφθαλµῶν, ὤτων, ῥινῶν, τῶν ἄλλων, ἀποστέλλει· αἱ δ’ εἰσὶ παντὸς ζῴου περὶ κεφαλὴν καὶ πρόσωπον. ποτίζεται οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡγεµονικοῦ τὸ σώµατος ἡγεµονικὸν πρόσωπον, τὸ µὲν ὁρατικὸν πνεῦµα τείνοντος εἰς ὄµµατα, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστικὸν εἰς οὖς, εἰς δὲ µυκτῆρας τὸ ὀσφρήσεως, τὸ δ’ αὖ γεύσεως εἰς στόµα καὶ τὸ ἁφῆς εἰς σύµπασαν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, Fug. 182.

164 Though Philo elsewhere compares the hēgemonikon of the soul to the heart, which “the best physicians and natural philosophers…thought to be formed before the whole body” (ὥσπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν ἰατρῶν καὶ φυσικῶν δοκεῖ τοῦ ὅλου σώµατος προπλάττεσθαι ἡ καρδία, Leg. 2.6; tr. Colson and Whitaker), he often locates the hēgemonikon in the head: πάλιν δ’ αὖ τὸ ἡγεµονικώτατον ἐν ζῴῳ κεφαλὴ, Opif. 119; for further passages indicating Philo’s indecisiveness on this point, see G. Reydams-Schils, “The Socratic Higher Ground,” in F. Alesse, ed., Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2008): 184.

165 ἠρεµοῦσί γε αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἅπασαι, µέχρις ἂν προσέλθῃ ἑκάστῃ τὸ κινῆσον ἔξωθεν, Leg. 2.39; tr. Colson and Whitaker. !107 medium of the external senses.166 The senses are affected by the object; the mind is affected by the senses.167 Philo even echoes the Stoic view of sleep as a slackening of perceptual tension.168

In other passages, however, Philo’s discussion is less easy to associate with a particular philosophical school. For example, when interpreting Lev. 20:18, he likens a soul without a protector to a city without walls, and explains that a soul is without protection when its outward senses are “uncovered.”169 In the course of his allegorical interpretation, Philo describes sight as

“spread abroad amid objects of sight” (ὅρασις κεχυµένη πρὸς τὰ ὁρατά), but hearing is “flooded by every kind of sound” (ἀκοὴ φωναῖς ἁπάσαις ἐπαντλουµένη), and the other senses are “full ready for any experience to which marauding foes may wish to subject them.”170 This implies that sight is active/emissionist in some sense,171 but the other four senses are more passive,

“being affected” (παθεῖν) by the incoming sense objects. This sounds more Platonic than anything else, but it is no clear proof that Philo accepted the ray theory of vision. When Philo declares the sense objects to be “bodies,”172 he appears to side with Stoics or Epicureans against

Aristotle, but Philo is here contrasting ideas (incorporeal) and bodies (corporeal),173 not bodies

166 Congr. 81.

167 QG 37.

168 Ὁ ὕπνος, κατὰ τὸν προφήτην, ἔκστασίς ἐστιν, οὐχ ἡ κατὰ µανίαν ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὕφεσιν καὶ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῦ λογισµοῦ, QG 24; cf. D. L. 7.158; for further discussion of Philo’s Stoic terminology, see D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the “Timaeus” of Plato (Leiden: Brill, 1986): 270.

169 Fug. 190f; cf. Philo’s description of the sense as “bodyguards of the soul,” δορυφόροι ψυχῆς, Confu. 19.

170 αἱ συγγενεῖς δυνάµεις καταλειφθῶσι, πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν οἱ κατατρέχοντες βούλωνται διαθεῖναι παθεῖν ἑτοιµόταται, Fug. 191; tr. Colson and Whitaker.

171 Despite the middle/passive form (κεχυµένη), the idea is that sight moves (or is moved) out toward the object of sight; see above, p. 48, n. 192 (on Abr. 150).

172 τὰ ἐπὶ µέρους αἰσθητά, ἃ δὴ σώµατά ἐστιν, Leg. 1.26.

173 ἰδέα δὲ σωµάτων ἀλλότριον, Ibid. !108 and qualities of bodies. And in any case, he elsewhere clearly rejects the Epicurean and Stoic corporeal soul in favor of a Platonic immaterial soul.174 Passages like these prevent one from making too much of Philo’s sometimes Stoic language.

Other passages on sense-perception show Philo more clearly in debt to Plato. The mind does the sensing;175 and the sense is the instrument, the mind’s “helper” (βοηθός) or

“ally” (συµµάχος).176 The senses are ministers in a court of justice; the mind pronounces the judgments.177 Philo follows the traditional order of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch,178 and considers sight and hearing the two senses most connected with the mind’s activity, sight being the preeminent sense.179 The senses of smell, taste, and touch, by contrast, are shared with the beasts.180 Yet a little later in the same work, Philo divides the five senses differently: taste and touch are most deeply connected to the body, concerned as they are with food and digestion; “but eyes and ears and smell for the most part pass outside and escape enslavement by the body.”181

This emphasis on escape from the world of the senses occurs in a lengthy passage of Philo’s work On Creation,182 a passage which clearly echoes Diotima’s “Ladder of Love” in

174 Opif. 69.

175 οὐδεὶς γοῦν εὖ φρονῶν εἴποι ἂν ὀφθαλµοὺς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν δι’ ὀφθαλµῶν, οὐδ’ ὦτα ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ὤτων ἐκεῖνον, οὐδὲ µυκτῆρας ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ µυκτήρων τὸ ἡγεµονικόν, Post. 126.

176 Leg. 2.7.

177 Congr. 143.

178 Abr. 236, 238; sometimes Philo places taste before smell; see Abr. 148, Opif. 62, 165.

179 Abr. 150.

180 Ibid. 149.

181 ὀφθαλµοὶ δὲ καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὄσφρησις ἔξω τὰ πολλὰ βαίνουσαι ἀποδιδράσκουσι τὴν δουλείαν τοῦ σώµατος, Abr. 241; tr. F. H. Colson.

182 Opif. 7f. !109 Symposium.183 In these passages, and in others, Philo is clearly a Platonist when it comes to the senses.

But above all else, Philo is a biblical exegete. He is not concerned with philosophy for its own sake. In his use of Stoic terminology, he is “somewhat of an opportunist.”184 Even his

Platonism is not absolute. He adopts whatever philosophical language or ideas are best suited to his exegetical purpose. Philosophical schools of thought are for Philo tools to be picked up and set down as needed in the work of interpreting the Scriptures, which are the given and received oracles of a divinely inspired religion.

In his homilies on Genesis, Ambrose shows a similar familiarity with the philosophical tradition, combined with a similar tendency to subordinate philosophical ideas to his exegetical and theological purposes. Like Cicero and Galen, he clearly regards the brain as the seat of sensation,185 and shows some familiarity with the nervous system.186 Ambrose also follows the traditional “sequence of senses” in his discussion of the human body in his final homily on creation, except that he places touch before taste: sight (6.9.59-61), hearing (6.9.62), smell

183 Smp. 210a-211d.

184 D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the “Timaeus” of Plato, p. 370.

185 cerebrum nostrum, hoc est sedem originem que nostrorum sensum, Ex. 6.9.56.

186 Ibid. 6.9.61; Ambrose’s discussion here clearly owes much to Galen, UP 8.4, I 453f.; 8.5, I 458f. Indeed, when Ambrose says, “Those skilled in the art of medicine maintain, in fact, that the brain is placed in a man's head for the sake of the eyes and that the other senses of our bodies are housed close together on account of the brain” (Itaque propter oculos ferunt medendi periti cerebrum hominis in capite locatum, alios autem nostri corporis sensus propter cerebrum finitimo quodam esse domicilio constitutos, Ex. 6.9.6), he is quoting Galen almost word for word (φαίνεται γὰρ ὁ µὲν ἐγκέφαλος ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τετάχθαι διὰ τοὺς ὀφθαλµούς, ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων διὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, UP 8.5, I 460). !110 (6.9.63), touch (6.9.64), and “the functions of the mouth and tongue” (6.9.65).187 This discussion of the providential placement of the organs of sense is reminiscent of several earlier authors,188 except that Ambrose is much briefer and departs somewhat from earlier accounts. For example, in his final section of this passage, Ambrose does not discuss taste per se, but merely the consumption of food and its benefit to the other senses. Also, the section on touch does not mention an organ (skin or otherwise), but the later section mentions “hand” as an organ of touch.189 As other authors before him, Ambrose introduces the senses here as examples of the usefulness of the body’s arrangement, a sign of God’s providential ordering of nature. He is not concerned to elaborate on the mechanism of sensation, except to indicate that the nerves report to the brain “what the eye sees and what the ear hears, what odor has been perceived, and what sound the tongue has given forth or what taste the mouth has experienced.”190 Ambrose’s purpose is not philosophical so much as exegetical, theological, and rhetorical. He ends his homilies on creation by praising the Creator.191

187 There is considerable variation in Ambrose’s ordering of the senses: sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste (as above) at Bon. mort. 9.41; sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch (the traditional order) at De Abr. 2.8.57, 211.82, De Noe 15.52; sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell, Luc. 7.140; sight, smell, taste, touch, and hearing, Abr. 2.7.41; touch, smell, taste, sight, and hearing, Luc. 7.113; smell, touch, taste, sight, and hearing, Luc. 7.140.

188 See above, p. 99, n. 123; see also Galen, UP 10.6, II 77; Lact. Opif. D. 8.6.

189 Ex. 6.9.65; this should not be taken to mean that the hand is the only organ of touch.

190 Vnde et nerui, qui referunt uniuersa quae uel oculus uiderit uel auris audierit uel odor inalauerit uel lingua increpuerit uel os saporis acceperit, Ibid. 6.9.61; transl. R. J. Deferrari.

191 Ipse enim requieuit qui fecit. Cui est honor gloria perpetuitas a saeculis et nunc et semper et in omnia saecula saeculorum amen, Ex. 6.10.76. !111 AUGUSTINE’S SEQUENCE OF SENSES

As noted above in the passage from Book Ten of the Confessions,192 Augustine usually presents the five senses in a conventional sequence from highest to lowest: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.193 There are a few cases where he presents the senses in the reverse order

(touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight),194 but the context always involves a reference to the life of the mind, so that the order suggests something of the soul’s ascent to the contemplation of truth.195 Augustine is thus clearly more consistent in his ordering of senses than Ambrose,196 so that deviations from the expected order in Augustine are more likely purposeful and significant of something.

AUGUSTINE ON PHANTASIA AND PHANTASMA

Augustine shows some familiarity with Stoic sensory terminology in his use of the terms phantasia (φαντασία) and phantasma (φαντάσµα). For example, in his Soliloquies, Augustine distinguishes the “impression” (phantasia) as the true figure contained in the intelligence, from

192 See p. 76.

193 e.g, Sol. 2.11f; Mus. 6.5.12; Quant. an. 23.41, 24.45, 29.57; Gen. Man. 1.24.42, 2.14.21; Lib. 1.8.18, 2.3.8, 2.3.9; Quaest. 58, 59.3, 64.7; Duab. 2; Serm. Dom. 1.12.34; Agon. 20.22; Epp. 92.5, 147.4, 187.13; Psal. 41.7; Eu. Io. 99.3; Serm. 43.4, 93.2, 112.3, 159B.5f., 374A.6; but the order is sight, touch, hearing, taste, and smell at Gen. Man. 2.14.21.

194 e.g., Quant. an. 33.71; Lib. 2.6.14, 2.13.35, 2.14.38; Psal. 9.3.

195 minus ergo ea quae tangimus uel quae gustamus uel quae olfacimus huic sunt ueritati similia, sed magis ea quae audimus et cernimus, Lib. 2.14.38; cf. Psal. 9.3.

196 See above, p. 110, n. 187. !112 the “phantasm” (phantasma), which the thought frames to itself.197 In his work On Music, he explains further the distinction: whereas a phantasia is the image produced in the mind from an affection of the body by means of the senses,198 a phantasma is merely the image of an image.199

“For my father I have often seen I know, in one way, and my grandfather I have never seen, another way. The first of these is a phantasia, the other a phantasm.”200 In his Confessions,

Augustine explains that “impressions” (phantasiae) derive from real bodies, and are thus more certain than “phantasms” (phantasmata) of bodies that do not exist.201 In a letter to Nebridius from 389, Augustine equates the Greek term phantasia (φαντασία) with the Latin

“image” (imago).202 This clear distinction in Augustine, consistent from the 380s until the

Confessions, owes something to the Stoic definitions of these terms.203

197 sed illud saltem impetrem, antequam terminum uolumini statuas, ut quid intersit inter ueram figuram, quae intelligentia continetur, et eam quam sibi fingit cogitatio, quae graece siue phantasia siue phantasma dicitur, breuiter exponas, Sol. 2.34; A. Cullhed misreads this text, thinking that it “contains an outright translation of the Greek phantasia or phantasma into the Latin cogitatio” (The Shadow of Creusa, p. 195, n.1). The relative pronoun quae in the final clause looks back to veram figuram and eam quam sibi fingit cogitatio as the antecedents.

198 haec igitur memoria quaecumque de motibus animi tenet, qui aduersus passiones corporis acti sunt, φαντασίαι graece uocantur, Mus. 6.11.32; cf. ex occursionibus passionum corporis impressi de sensibus, Ibid.; cf. memoria tibi uidetur nulla esse posse sine imaginibus uel imaginariis uisis, quae phantasiarum nomine appellare uoluisti, Ep. 7.1.

199 similes tamen tanquam imaginum imagines, quae phantasmata dici placuit, Mus. 6.11.32.

200 aliter enim cogito patrem meum quem saepe uidi, aliter auum quem nunquam uidi. horum primum phantasia est, alterum phantasma, Mus. 6.11.32; transl. by R. C. Taliaferro.

201 quanto ergo longe es a phantasmatis illis meis, phantasmatis corporum quae omnino non sunt! quibus certiores sunt phantasiae corporum eorum quae sunt, et eis certiora corpora, quae tamen non es, Conf. 3.6.10.

202 omnes has imagines, quas phantasias cum multis uocas, Ep. 7.2; cf. phantasia corporalium imaginum, quas per carnis sensus percipimus, Ep. 166.2.

203 See above, p. 96ff.; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.50. !113 AUGUSTINE ON PAIRING SENSES WITH ELEMENTS

Augustine follows philosophical precedent in associating each of the five senses with one of the four elements. In his Literal Commentary on Genesis,204 he specifically relates the views of some unnamed thinkers:

And so it is that there are some people who make a very nicely thought-out distinction between the five manifest senses of the body with reference to the four familiar elements, as follows: they say that the eyes go along with fire and the ears with air, while they attribute the senses both of smell and of taste to the humid element. The sense of smell they ally to these humid exhalations that give density to this space in which the birds fly around, while they join taste to this element in its more substantial and liquid form. Everything, you see, that is tasted in the mouth is mixed with the fluid of the mouth in order to yield a taste, even if it seemed to be dry when it was taken. Fire, however, penetrates all things, to produce movement in them . . . . Touch, however, which is the fifth among the senses, is more closely allied to the element of earth; that is why you feel anything that touches any part of the body, which consists above all of earth.205

This passage shows that at least by 414, Augustine was familiar with the standard Platonic elemental associations of the senses. That he endorses these associations is clear from a passage later in the same work: “Light is first poured out alone through the eyes, and flashes out in the rays of the eyes to touch visible objects; then it is mixed first with pure air, second with misty and cloudy air, third with thicker moisture, and fourth with dense earth, to bring about the five

204 Composed c. 401-414; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, xxvi-xlii; see also, A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999): 376.

205 ideo que sunt etiam, qui subtilissima consideratione quinque istos manifestissimos corporis sensus secundum quattuor usitata elementa ita distinguant, ut oculos ad ignem, aures ad aerem dicant pertinere. olfaciendi autem gustandi que sensum naturae humidae adtribuunt: et olfactum quidem istis exhalationibus humidis, quibus crassatur hoc spatium, in quo aues uolitant, gustatum uero istis fluxibilibus et corpulentis humoribus. nam quaecumque in ore sapiunt, ipsius oris humori commiscentur, ut sapiant, etiamsi arida cum acciperentur fuisse uideantur. ignis tamen omnia penetrat, ut motum in eis faciat….tactus autem, qui est quintus in sensibus, terreno elemento magis congruit; proinde per totum corpus animantis, quod maxime ex terra est, quaeque tacta sentiuntur, Litt. 3.4.6; transl. E. Hill. !114 senses, including the sense of the eyes, whereby it excels alone.”206 Though this text is later than the early works that form the core of this present study, we see ample evidence that Augustine accepted these associations since his early works. We have already seen his early acceptance of the Platonic “ray theory” of vision,207 and his understanding of sound to involve the reception of reverberating air.208 His Platonic association of smell with “humid exhalations” can be seen as early as De Musica, where in a list of the senses and their objects, he mentions “exhalations” for the nostrils.209 In his early work On Genesis Against the Manichees, he equates “exhalations” with “vapors,”210 a further indication of their intermediate nature between air and water.

Similarly, Augustine demonstrates in his early Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis,211 a clear association of taste with the humid element “in its more substantial and liquid form.”212 His reference to fire being necessary for movement, a reference that comes immediately after he mentions smell and taste, is clearly reminiscent of Aristotle and Galen.213 Finally, Augustine

206 lux primum per oculos sola diffunditur emicat que in radiis oculorum ad uisibilia contuenda, deinde mixtura quadam primo cum aere puro, secundo cum aere caliginoso atque nebuloso, tertio cum corpulentiore humore, quarto cum terrena crassitudine quinque sensus cum ipso, ubi sola excellit, oculorum sensu efficit, Litt. 12.16.32.

207 See above, pp. 62f.

208 See above, pp. 68-75.

209 aut naribus exhalationes, Mus. 6.5.12; cf. caliginosum in naribus, Ibid. 6.5.10.

210 exhalationibus et quasi uaporibus maris et terrae, Gen. Man. 1.15.24.

211 Composed c. 393; see A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages, p. 377.

212 cuius rei documenta esse uolunt, quod marinarum aquarum decoctarum uapor sinuato cooperculo exceptus humorem dulcem gustantibus exhibet, Gen. imp. 14.47; the connection between this passage and the later Litt. 3.4.6 is strengthened when one considers that the former occurs in the midst of Augustine’s discussion of the different combinations of elements, especially the difference between the watery air in which the birds fly and the denser water of the seas (coactionem itaque in densitatem congregationem aquae fortasse appellauit, ut mare fieret; ut id, quod non congregatum, id est non spissatum superfertur aqua sit, quae aues uolantes possit sustinere, utrique nomini adcommodata, ut uocari possit et aqua subtilior et aer crassior, Gen. imp. 14.46).

213 See above, pp. 90, 101. !115 explicitly associates touch with earth since at least the time of his On Music.214 Thus, Augustine gives ample evidence in his early works of his own adherence to the “nicely thought-out distinction” of some unnamed thinkers he discusses in his Literal Commentary on Genesis, with all the Platonic and Aristotelian details that this distinction includes.

AUGUSTINE ON SMELL

Augustine offers a consistent, if general, account of the sense of smell, its organ, and its association with the elements. From his early works through his more mature writings, Augustine identifies the nostrils (nares) as the organ of smell.215 He sometimes speaks of smells passing by and affecting the sense,216 thereby implying the passive reception of smell, and sometimes speaks of us drawing them in actively.217 This ambiguity about whether smell is active or passive is altogether fitting, since, as we have seen, smells involve “humid exhalations,” the intermediate state between air and water, and Augustine considered air and fire to be more active, water and earth more passive.218 Following Plato and others, Augustine indicates the ability of the nose to distinguish two kinds of scents, “sweet-smelling and foul-smelling.”219

214 in tactu terrenum et quasi lutulentum, Mus. 6.5.10; completed at Thagaste c. 389; see C. Mayer, ed., Augustinus- Lexikon, xxvi-xlii; see also M. Jacobsson, ed., De Musica, CSEL 102 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017): 1-10.

215 Ord. 2.11.32; Mor. 2.16.39, 43, 44; Conf. 10.8.13; Eu. Io. 8.2, 40.5; Qu. Hept. 2.127.

216 sicut odor dum transit et uanescit in uentos, olfactum afficit, Conf. 10.9.16.

217 non enim sicut nos odorem corporeis naribus ducit, Qu. Hept. 2.127.

218 magis enim haec elementa uim creduntur habere faciendi, terra uero et aqua patiendi, Gen. imp. 4.14; cf. Litt. 7.19.25.

219 suaueolentia et graueolentia, Gen. imp. 5.24; cf. Serm. 159B.6. !116 AUGUSTINE ON TASTE

Augustine is not as consistent in his identification of the organ of taste. In his works On

Order and On Free Will, the organ of taste is the “gullet.”220 In his work On the Customs of the

Manichees, it is the palate.221 In one of his early Expositions on the Psalms, Augustine refers to the “flavors of palate and tongue.”222 When he reviews the senses in Book Ten of the

Confessions, Augustine mentions eyes as organs of sight, ears as organs of hearing, and nostrils as organs of smell, but does not mention a specific orifice or body part for taste and touch, referring instead to “the sense of taste” and “touch.”223 Similarly, in his Tractates on the Gospel of John, Augustine enumerates the sense-organs but refers generally to “the judgment of the mouth” for taste.224 In a late sermon, he regards both tongue and palate as required for tasting.225

It is tempting to read this last text as indicating a development of thought, a resolution to his

220 gulae stimulo, Ord. 2.11.32; cf. gula enim cum aliquid iucunde sapit, Lib. 2.7.19; though the “gullet” (gula) is used by transference for the “palate” (ingenua . . . gula, Mart.6.11.6); see Lewis and Short, “gula”.

221 ex ipso coloris nitore, inquiunt, et odoris iucunditate, et saporis suauitate manifestum est: quae dum non habent putria, eodem bono sese deserta esse significant. non pudet deum naso et palato inuentum putare? Mor. 2.16.39; cf. also Ibid. 2.16.41, 43, 44; Mus. 6.5.12; Psal. 48.2.11.

222 palati et linguae saporibus, Psal.9.3; cf. non per palatum et linguam, quasi saporem, Psal. 41.7; the first series of Expositions (1-32), was completed c. 392; see A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages, p. 291.

223 quippe oculi dicunt: "si coloratae sunt, nos eas nuntiauimus"; aures dicunt: "si sonuerunt, a nobis indicatae sunt"; nares dicunt: "si oluerunt, per nos transierunt"; dicit etiam sensus gustandi: "si sapor non est, nihil me interroges"; tactus dicit: "si corpulentum non est, non contrectaui; si non contrectaui, non indicaui”, Conf. 10.10.17; cf. renuntiat gustus eidem cordi amara et dulcia, Eu. Io. 18.10.

224 oculos ad uidendum, aures ad audiendum, nares ad percipiendum odorem, oris iudicium ad sapores discernendos, membra denique ipsa ad peragenda officia sua, Eu. Io. 8.2; cf. omnes sapores per oris aditum, Conf. 10.8.13.

225 in faucibus uero, id est, sensu gustandi, geminatio quaedam inuenitur, quia nihil gustando sapit, nisi lingua et palato tangatur, Serm. 112.3, variously dated from 411-420 (see WSA III.4, p. 147. , n.1); notice here the general reference to “gullet” (fauces, synonym of gula) for the sense of taste. !117 earlier uncertainty or ambiguity. But given the difficulty in dating the sermons,226 and given earlier references to “palate and tongue” being involved in taste,227 there is no clear evidence for a development on this point. One can venture no further than to note the ambiguity, or rhetorical dexterity, in Augustine’s references (or lack thereof) to the organ of taste.

Augustine is similarly varied in identifying the kinds of flavors distinguished by taste. In the Magnitude of the Soul, he speaks of the soul distinguishing “unnumbered differences of taste and smell and sound and shapes,”228 though it is unclear whether the differences of taste alone are innumerable. In his Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine notes taste can distinguish “sweet and bitter,”229 though there is no reason to think this exhausts the possibilities for taste.230 He does not mention salt directly in connection with taste, but Augustine does differentiate between salty and sweet bodies of water.231 Likewise, his early works do not contain any unambiguous mention of “sour” (acerbus, acerbitas) in connection with taste, though in an undated, probably late, exposition of Psalm 48, Augustine cites Proverbs 10:26 (LXX): “As sour grapes hurt the teeth and smoke the eyes, so does iniquity hurt those who practice it.”232 So it is

226 See H. R. Drobner, “The Chronology of Augustine’s Sermones ad populum III: On Christmas Day,” Augustinian Studies 35.1 (2004): 43-53.

227 See above, p. 116, n. 222.

228 deinde innumerabiles differentias saporum, odorum, sonorum, formarum, gustando, olfaciendo, audiendo uidendo que diiudicat, Quant. An. 33.71; transl. J. J. McMahon.

229 dulcia et amara, Gen. imp. 5.24; cf. Ord. 2.11.32, Acad. 3.11.26.

230 The two tastes are included in a list of sensory opposites, so the emphasis is on distinguishing differences, not on the range of possible flavors (alba et nigra canora et rauca suaueolentia et graueolentia dulcia et amara calida et frigida et cetera huius modi, Ibid.).

231 aquarum congregationem, siue salsarum siue dulcium, Gen. Man. 1.12.18.

232 sicut uua acerba dentibus uexatio est et fumus oculis, sic iniquitas utentibus ea, Psal. 48(2).8; this exposition is variously dated to 410 or 412 (see reff. in Mayer, C., ed. Augustinus-Lexikon, v. 2, p. 813). !118 at least possible, if by no means certain, that Augustine could employ the term “sour” as a kind of taste in his early works. Thus, of the four kinds of taste known to antiquity, only two (sweet and bitter) are unambiguously discussed in Augustine, though there is some evidence that the other two (salty and sour) were also recognized as such.

AUGUSTINE ON TOUCH

In his work On the Magnitude of the Soul, Augustine says the soul actively “stretches itself” (intendit se) to the sense of touch, and senses and discerns through touch.233 This evokes the Stoic description of the sensory “tension” (τόνος, intentio), though the fact that it is the soul stretching itself implies a metaphorical, immaterial stretching, not a literal, physical stretching.

As with taste, Augustine is often vague about the organ of touch. He will often begin a list of sense-organs, only to end by mentioning “touch.”234 In one place he mentions “hands and feet” for touch.235 This vagueness is not surprising, since touch, as Augustine indicates in several texts, is distributed all over the body.236 Augustine follows standard precedent in assigning to touch the sensation of “hot, cold, rough, smooth, hard, soft, light, and heavy.”237

233 intendit se anima in tactum, et eo . . . sentit atque discernit, Quant. an. 33.71; cf. utimur autem hoc uerbo etiam in ceteris sensibus, cum eos ad cognoscendum intendimus, Conf. 10.35.54.

234 See above, p. 116, n. 223.

235 non est in auribus istis quas uidetis, et oculis, et naribus, et palato, et manibus, et pedibus, Psal. 48.2.11.

236 Quaest. 64.7; Conf. 10.8.13; Psal. 41.7; Serm. 43.3, 159B.6, 374A.6.

237 intendit se anima in tactum, et eo calida, frigida, aspera, lenia, dura, mollia, leuia, grauia sentit atque discernit, Quant. an. 33.71; cf. Gen. imp. 5.24, Quaest. 64.7; Conf. 10.8.13, Psal. 41.7; Serm. 43.3, 112.3, 159B.5f., 277.5, 374A.6. !119 AUGUSTINE ON THE SEAT OF SENSATION

Augustine is ambiguous in his identification of the seat of sensation. In his Tractates on the Gospel of John, Augustine depicts the heart as the seat of sensation: “The eyes report to the heart things black and white; the ears report to the same heart pleasant and harsh sounds; to the same heart the nostrils announce sweet odors and stenches; to the same heart the taste announces things bitter and sweet; to the same heart the touch announces things smooth and rough; and the heart declares to itself things just and unjust. Your heart sees and hears and judges all other things perceived by the senses; and, what the senses do not aspire to, discerns things just and unjust, things evil and good.”238 In his work On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Augustine identifies “the front part of the brain” as the location “from which all the senses are distributed,”239 and then goes on to clarify that the senses originate from the front “ventricle” of the brain,240 though he later refers to “the seat of the brain, from which sensory attention itself is directed.”241 Elsewhere he refers to the “center of the brain” as the point from which the senses

238 Eu. Io. 18.10; transl. J. Gibb.

239 pars cerebri anterior, unde sensus omnes distribuuntur, Litt. 7.17.23; transl. E. Hill; cf. also Ep. 137.2.8: qui ex puncto et quasi centro cerebri sensus omnes quinaria distributione diffundit.

240 ideo tres tamquam uentriculi cerebri demonstrantur: unus anterior ad faciem, a quo sensus omnis, Litt. 7.18.24; for more on Augustine’s ventricular theory, its similarities to Nemesius and Posidonius, and its influence on Medieval medical ideas, see A. P. Wickens, A History of the Brain: From Stone Age Surgery to Modern Neuroscience (London: Psychology Press, 2015): 48-82.

241 sede cerebri, unde ipsa dirigitur intentio sentiendi, Litt. 12.20.42; cf. Ibid. 12.20.43; it is most plausible to read this and similar phrases in Augustine as instances of a partitive genitive (“the base [part] of the brain [whole]”), though one could read it as an epexegetical (i.e., appositional) genitive (“the seat, that is, the brain”); the former interpretation puts this passage at odds with Litt. 7.17.23 (see note 239 above); the latter interpretation could also be applied to Ep. 137.2.8 (see note 239 above). Yet the former interpretation accords with Litt 7.13.20 and 7.20.26 (see following note), as well as the use of cerebri sede in Calcid. In Tim. 2.246. !120 are distributed.242 In his later work On the Nature and Origin of the Soul,243 Augustine shows familiarity with various theories of the location of the hēgemonikon.244 One could argue that his earlier references to the five senses residing in the head can be understood as an indication of which theory he endorses,245 but there is nothing to prevent the senses in the head reporting to the heart instead of the brain. In the Confessions, Augustine says the bodily senses report to the

“inward faculty” of the soul,246 which is identified with “reason.”247 In his early treatise On True

Religion, Augustine speaks of the bodily senses reporting to “the presiding spirit.”248 In his work on The Magnitude of the Soul, Augustine’s discussion of nerves and the effect of sleep seem influenced by Galenic ideas,249 but even if we could point to a particular work of Galen as a definite source for Augustine’s ideas on nerves, it would not necessarily follow that Augustine must accept that source’s ideas on the location of the hēgemonikon. On the whole, it is difficult, based on a reading of his early works, to pin Augustine down on the precise physical location of the hēgemonikon. The main reason for this is probably his insistence that “the soul is acting in

242 qui ex puncto et quasi centro cerebri sensus omnes quinaria distributione diffundit, Ep. 137.2.8; cf. de cuius medio uelut centro quodam non solum ad oculos, sed etiam ad sensus ceteros tenues fistulae deducuntur, Litt. 7.13.20; cf. ut partem illam cerebri mediam nuntiantem corporis motus non uacet aduertere, Litt. 7.20.26.

243 Composed toward the end of his life, c. 419/421 (A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages, p. 22); this work is also known by the title On the Soul and its Origin (De animae et eius origine).

244 Nat. et or., 4.5.6.

245 Mor. 2.10.19; Agon. 20.22.

246 interiorem uim, cui sensus corporis exteriora nuntiaret, Conf. 7.17.23.

247 praeposita est in eis nuntiantibus sensibus iudex ratio, Conf. 10.6.10.

248 sensibus fallentibus, qui pro natura sui corporis affecti non aliud quam suas affectiones praesidenti animo nuntiant, Ver. rel. 36.67.

249 itaque somno, quia eum frigidum et humidum dicunt medici et probant, membra languescunt, Quant. an. 22.38; cf. Galen, Plen.1.1 (576f. K); see M. A. A. Hulskamp, Sleep and Dreams in Ancient Medical Diagnosis and Prognosis, Ph.D. Dissertation (Newcastle: Newcastle University, 2008): 100-103. !121 these parts [i.e., the ventricles of the brain] as in, or on, its instruments; it is not itself any of these, but it is quickening, animating and controlling them all, and through them looking after the interests of the body and of this life, in which ‘the man was made into a live soul.’”250 The soul is one thing, its bodily instruments or organs are another.251 “The soul is not a body or any bodily thing.”252

This point brings us back to the Augustinian passage from which this chapter began. Just as the soul or spirit (with all its powers of reason and sensation) is not to be identified with any body part because it is in fact incorporeal, so also the God that Augustine seeks to know and love is not any physical thing to be grasped by any of the bodily senses. And yet he is a “a kind of light, a kind of voice, a certain fragrance, a food and an embrace” for Augustine’s “inmost self.”

To understand what this means for Augustine, we must now consider the role and use of metaphor in his early writings.

250 sed anima in istis tamquam in organis agit, nihil horum est ipsa; sed uiuificat et regit omnia et per haec corpori consulit et huic uitae, in qua factus est homo in animam uiuam, Litt. 7.18.24; transl. E. Hill.

251 namque aliud esse ipsam, aliud haec eius corporalia ministeria, uel uasa uel organa uel si quid aptius dici possunt, hinc euidenter elucet, Litt. 7.20.26.

252 iam concedo corpus non esse animum uel quidquam corporeum, Quant. an. 13.22. CHAPTER THREE

SENSORY METAPHORS IN AUGUSTINE’S EARLY WORKS

In order to understand Augustine’s use of sensory metaphors in his early works, one must first investigate how metaphor came to be defined and employed, as both a rhetorical and a poetic device, in the literary traditions of the Greeks and the Romans. Such an investigation will reach back to Aristotle, and proceed through the rhetorical tradition at Rome as exemplified by

Cicero and Quintilian, but will also include more immediate predecessors to Augustine in the figures of Cyprian, Lactantius, and Ambrose. Such a survey will necessarily trace the use of metaphor across many fields, including philosophy, poetry, rhetoric, homiletics, and biblical exegesis.

THE DEFINITION OF METAPHOR IN GRECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY

Though examples of metaphor exist in Homer and other early Greek writers, the first known use of the Greek term metaphor (µεταφορά) occurs in the writings of Aristotle.1 In his

Poetics, Aristotle defines metaphor as “the application of a foreign word either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or according to analogy.”2 This more general use of metaphor to refer to any figure of speech, is later termed a trope (τρόπος,

1 Poet.1457b; Rhet. 1405a; cf. Lausberg §554.

2 µεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόµατος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, Poet. 1457b. A122 A123 Latin tropus),3 whereas the term metaphor comes to be restricted to the species of trope we now associate with the word.4 But Aristotle himself uses the term metaphor in this more specific sense in his Rhetoric: “The simile is also a metaphor. Indeed the difference is small. For when he says that Achilles ‘rushed forth like a lion,’ it is a simile; but when he says of him, ‘the lion rushed forth,’ it is a metaphor.”5 This more specific use of the term metaphor, with its comparison to simile and its literary example, is echoed in the Roman writers Cicero and Quintilian. There is, then, a more or less continuous tradition in ancient Greek and Roman treatment of metaphor as a rhetorical and poetic device. A closer look at this tradition, starting with Aristotle but including subsequent treatments of metaphor in later philosophers (such as Philodemus) and rhetoricians

(especially Cicero and Quintilian), will demonstrate the potential for metaphor to bridge the worlds of philosophy, poetry, and rhetoric in antiquity.

But it is first necessary to consider the context of Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in the

Poetics. The definition comes in a long, technical discussion of diction (λέξις), specifically as it pertains to the art of poetry, and excluding aspects of diction that are more the concern of the rhetorician.6 This emphasis on poetry is further strengthened by the examples Aristotle offers for each type of metaphor. As an example of metaphor from genus to species, Aristotle quotes a half- line from Homer: “My ship stands here.”7 His example of metaphor from species to genus,

3 Philodemus Rhet. I, 164, col. III; Quint. 8.6.1.

4 Lausberg §558; Quint. 8.6.8.

5 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν µεταφορά. διαφέρει γὰρ µικρόν. ὅταν µὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα “ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν”, εἰκών ἐστιν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε”, µεταφορά, Rhet. 1406b.

6 Poet. 1456b.

7 νηῦς δέ µοι ἥδ᾽ ἕστηκεν, Ibid. 1457b; Od. 1.185; the verb “stands” is an exchange for the more proper term “is moored,” mooring being a species of standing. A124 “Odysseus did ten thousand noble deeds,” is also a Homeric reference.8 The example of an exchange of species for species, “drawing away life with bronze,” is a fragment of the philosophical poetry of Empedocles.9 Finally, the example of an exchange by analogy, referring to the shield as the “winecup of Ares,” appears to be a reference to the 4th century comedian

Antiphanes.10 In all these examples, as well as in the general context of the discussion of metaphor, it is clear Aristotle has in mind the art of poetry and the general features of diction as it relates to that art.

The treatment of metaphor (µεταφορά) in the Rhetoric differs from that in the Poetics.

When Aristotle compares simile and metaphor, and distinguishes them by the example of

Achilles as a lion,11 he is using metaphor in a more specific sense, corresponding to the current use of the term. Also, this usage occurs in a discussion of the four causes of frigidity in style.12

Metaphors are a cause for frigidity in style only when they are inappropriate (ἀπρεπεῖς) to the

(rhetorical) situation, which they can be when they are either too ridiculous, and therefore too much like comedy, or too dignified, and therefore too much like tragedy.13 These are inappropriate to rhetoric because they are unclear (ἀσαφεῖς) and thereby make the speech unpersuasive.14 This emphasis on clarity in the area of rhetoric is evident also from Aristotle’s

8 ἦ δὴ µυρί᾽ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν, Il. 2.272.

9 χαλκῶι ἀπὸ ψυχὴν ἀρύσας, DK31 B138.

10 φιάλην Ἄρεος, Antiph. Fr. 112.

11 See above, p. 123, n. 5.

12 τὰ ψυχρά…κατὰ τὴν λέχιν, Rhet. 1405b.

13 Ibid. 1406b.

14 ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα, Ibid. 1406b. A125 praise of metaphor earlier in the discussion: “That metaphors have the greatest influence in both poetry and prose, was discussed, as we said, in the Poetics. One must pay more attention to these

[i.e., metaphors] in prose, inasmuch as prose has fewer resources than poetry.”15 The metaphor gives prose clarity, a pleasant quality, and an exotic feel,16 but a primary concern is to achieve what is fitting and avoid what is inappropriate to the situation.17 Thus, metaphor is one of the ways that a speaker connects with his audience and attempts to persuade them. It is a tool in the kit of the rhetorical artist who seeks to execute his art with virtue, which is conceived as a kind of balance between the extremes of deficiency and excess.18

Thus even at the beginning of the ancient tradition of theorizing about metaphor, Aristotle shows both how the worlds of poetry, rhetoric, and philosophy overlap, and also how they are distinct and (at times) in conflict. On the one hand, the mere fact that Aristotle, known primarily as a philosopher, wrote a work on Poetics and a work on Rhetoric, is enough to suggest the overlap. Further, his discussion of metaphor emphasizes its importance for both poetry and rhetoric, and his presentation of metaphor as a tool for executing an art with virtue is enough to situate both poetry and rhetoric within the sphere of ethics and therefore of philosophy. On the other hand, Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor shows clearly that virtue in poetry and virtue in

15 ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, [αἱ µεταφοραί,] εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐλέγοµεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τοσούτῳ δ’ ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ µᾶλλον φιλοπονεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων βοηθηµάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν µέτρων, Rhet. 1405a.

16 τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν, Ibid.; this description of metaphor as both “clear” and “exotic” suggests a tension or balance between being too lowly and too lofty in style, a tension evident also in Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor and enigma in Poet. 1458a; for a different reading of this latter passage, and for the view that Aristotle is fundamentally opposed to enigma, see P. T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004): 64f.

17 ἁρµοττούσας…ἀπρεπὲς, Rhet. 1405a.

18 Nich. Eth. 1106b; Lausberg §8. A126 rhetoric are not always the same thing. A metaphor that is fitting in a poem may be out of place in a courtroom speech.

This discussion of metaphor is further advanced by the 1st-century BC Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. In the surviving fragments of his work on Rhetoric, he makes the first known technical literary use of the term trope: “They [the sophists] divide it [artificial speech] into three parts: τρόπος, σχῆµα, πλάσµα. Τρόπος includes metaphor, allegory, etc.”19 This classification furthers the work of Aristotle by distinguishing more clearly between metaphor in the more general sense of any figure of speech, now called a trope, and metaphor in the more specific sense, or metaphor properly so-called. This passage of Philodemus also draws further attention to the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric. Philodemus is unusual for being an

Epicurean who is willing to discuss rhetoric as an art,20 yet even his treatment cannot hide the tension between Epicureanism and the work of the sophists, who are regarded as mere critics who lack constructive teaching and who lure young men away from philosophy.21

It is clear that Cicero’s treatment of metaphor owes much to the tradition set out by

Aristotle and developed in Philodemus. In his Brutus, Cicero renders the Greek “trope” (τρόπος) into Latin as “interchange of words” (verborum immutatio) and mentions also the second term of

Philodemus’ trio, “figure” (σχῆµα).22 In his work On the Orator, Cicero renders “trope” (τρόπος)

19 διαιροῦνται δὲ αὐτην εἰς εἴδη τρία τρόπον σχῆµα πλάσµα· τρόπον µὲν οἷον µεταφορὰν ἀλληγορίαν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτο, Rhet. I, 164, col. III.

20 Rhet. I, 4, col. VII; G. A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 84.

21 Rhet. I, 173, col. XIV.

22 ornari orationem Graeci putant, si verborum immutationibus utantur, quos appellant τρόπους, et sententiarum orationisque formis, quae vocant σχήµατα, Brut. 69. A127 as “transferred word” (verbum translatum) and echoes the praise of Aristotle for this most distinguished aspect of oratorical skill.23 Though he states his preference for following Aristotle in treating “metaphor” (tralatio) as the general term that encompasses all kinds of transfers

(including metonomy, catachresis, and allegory),24 Cicero uses “transferred word” (verbum translatum) in its more specific sense of “metaphor” in a passage, reminiscent of Aristotle, likening it to a shorter form of the simile.25 This treatment of metaphor in Cicero shows his debt to the previous philosophic tradition in two further ways. First, in the opening of On the Orator,

Cicero reminds his brother that the most learned men call philosophy the “mother” of all other arts.26 He also puts into the mouth of Crassus the praise of the ideal orator as one trained not only in rhetoric but also in philosophy,27 even if this description is as much a defense of oratory against the criticisms of certain philosophical schools.28 Second, and more specifically, Cicero shows the relationship of metaphor to philosophy in his explanation of why so many of the best metaphors are sensory, especially relying on the sense of sight: “Every metaphor, at least if it is employed with reason, appeals to the senses themselves, especially sight, which is the most penetrating sense…. Metaphors of sight are much more penetrating, which nearly place before

23 modus autem nullus est florentior in singulis verbis neque qui plus luminis adferat orationi, Cic. De Or. 3.166; cf. Ar. Poet. 1459a.

24 hanc ὑπαλλαγὴν rhetores, quia quasi summutantur verba pro verbis, µετωνυµίαν grammatici vocant, quod nomina transferuntur. Aristoteles autem tralationi et haec ipsa subiungit et abusionem quam κατάχρησιν vocant, ut cum minutum dicimus animum pro parvo; et abutimur verbis propinquis, si opus est vel quod delectat vel quod decet. iam cum fluxerunt continuae plures tralationes, alia plane fit oratio; itaque genus hoc Graeci appellant ἀλληγορίαν: nomine recte, genere melius ille qui ista omnia tralationes vocat, Cic. Or. 27.92ff.

25 Cic. De Or. 3. 157; cf. Ar. Rhet. 1406b.

26 De Or. 1.9.

27 Ibid. 3.142-143.

28 G. A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, pp. 8f. A128 the eyes of the mind things that we cannot see or understand.”29 Thus, metaphor is not merely an ornament of speech or a tool to persuade an audience, but a way for language to transcend the limits of ordinary experience and grasp at ultimate truths. Or, as Kennedy puts it, “Tropes, especially metaphor and allegory, are necessary devices for coping intellectually/linguistically

(and so also philosophically) with reality beyond the effective world.”30 Thus, metaphor is not only related to ethics, insofar as it is situated, as previously mentioned, in the scope of an art performed with virtue. Metaphor is also where poetry and rhetoric meet metaphysics.

The treatment of metaphor in Quintilian shows much the same debt to the previous tradition, but with developments that reveal an obvious preference for oratory over philosophy.

He specifically praises Cicero’s work on the subject of rhetoric,31 but not without taking the opportunity to imply that the split between oratory and philosophy was much to the detriment of philosophy.32 Like Cicero, Quintilian distinguishes trope as the more general term,33 and metaphor as “the most beautiful” species of trope.34 He uses Aristotle’s example of Achilles to illustrate the difference between metaphor and simile.35 He even goes so far as to praise metaphor for, among other things, its success in “the most difficult task of making sure

29 illa vero oculorum multo acriora, quae paene ponunt in conspectu animi, quae cernere et videre non possumus, De Orat. 3.161.

30 Lausberg, p. 255, n. 2.

31 Quint. 1.pr.13.

32 Ibid. 1.pr.14; cf. Cic. De Orat. 3.60-61.

33 Quint. 8.6.1.

34 Ibid. 8.6.4

35 Ibid. 8.6.9. A129 everything has a name.”36 While this is no open declaration of the metaphysical possibilities of metaphor, it is perhaps suggestive of such possibilities, which is no more than we can expect, given the expressed anti-philosophy views of Quintilian and his close ties to Domitian, the emperor who expelled the philosophers from Rome near the end of the 1st century.37 For all of

Quintilian’s opposition to philosophy, it is but a small mental step from his idea of metaphors providing a name for everything to Cicero’s fuller explanation that visual metaphors “nearly place before the eyes of the mind things that we cannot see or understand.” The idea may not be fully developed, but the possibility is certainly there for metaphor to be understood as a bridge between these sometimes conflicting worlds of the poet, the rhetorician, and the philosopher.

THE DEFINITION OF METAPHOR IN AUGUSTINE

Though explicit references to metaphor occur only a handful of times in Augustine’s writings, the composite picture we can discern from these references was no doubt the product of his rhetorical education and profession. We may thus assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that this understanding of metaphor was operative in Augustine’s early works.

In his work Against Lying (Contra Mendacium), Augustine defines metaphor as “the so- called ‘transfer’ of some word from its proper object to an object not proper to it.”38 Similarly, in

36 quodque est difficillimum, praestat ne ulli rei nomen deesse videatur, Quint. 8.6.5.

37 G. A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, p. 9.

38 ipsa quae appellatur metaphora, hoc est de re propria ad rem non propriam uerbi alicuius usurpata translatio, C. mend. 10.24; in the following summary of Augustine’s conformity to the rhetorical tradition regarding metaphor, I am indebted to D. Lau, “Augustins Tropus-Begriff: Umfang und Struktur: Beitrag zu einer tropologischen Hermeneutik,” Wiener Studien 124 (2011): 211f., though I frequently supplement his references, and I discuss ways Augustine differs from the rhetorical tradition. A130 Book Two of his Retractations (Retractationes), Augustine calls attention to a figurative passage in his work Against Faustus (Contra Faustum):

In the fourteenth book, some things were said of the sun and moon as though they sensed and so tolerated their vain adorers, although the words could be taken here as transferred from animate to inanimate being, in the manner of speaking which is called metaphor in Greek; just as it is written of the sea that it “murmurs in its mother’s womb, wishing to come forth,” though it certainly has no will.39

Here again Augustine equates metaphor with “transferred words” (verba . . . translata). He also follows Quintilian in identifying one type of metaphor as the transfer “from animate to inanimate” (ab animali ad inanimale).40 Similarly, in his Questions on the Heptateuch

(Quaestiones in Heptatechum),41 Augustine raises the possibility of a metaphor “from the rational to the irrational.”42 In his early work On the Magnitude of the Soul, Augustine notes that such metaphors (verba translata) can work in both directions, from the body to the soul, and from the soul to the body.43 In his treatise On Christian Doctrine, Augustine classifies metaphor

(metaphora) as a species of trope (tropus) and distinguishes it from catachresis (catachresis,

39 in quarto decimo de sole et luna talia dicta sunt, tamquam sentiant et ideo tolerent uanos adoratores suos, quamuis uerba ibi accipi possint ab animali ad inanimale translata, modo locutionis qui uocatur grece metaphora; sicut de mari scriptum est: quod fremat in utero matris suae uolens progredi, cum utique non habeat uoluntatem, Retract. 2.7.3; cf. Locut. Hept. 7.54; Hept. 3.74.

40 Quint. 8.6.10.

41 Composed c. 419; cf. A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999): 692.

42 an quemadmodum transferuntur uerba modo locutionis, quae graece appellatur µεταφορά, ab animali ad inanimale sicut dicitur inprobus uentus uel iratum mare ita et hic translatum est a rationali ad inrationale? Hept. 3.74; cf. Quint. 8.6.13.

43 a corpore ad animum multa uerba transferri, sicut ab animo ad corpus, Quant an. 17.30; cf. Ep. 55.7.13; Trin. 10.7.9; Litt. 4.18.34; C. Max. 2.18.1; Ciu. 21.9. A131 abusio).44 In his work On the Trinity (De Trinitate), Augustine also distinguishes “tropes” (tropi, modi) from “figures” (schemata, figurae).45 In a letter composed in 416, Augustine insists that metaphor is not lying, but a common trope, verbal examples of which include vines “budding”, fields “waving”, and youth “flowering”.46 In explaining the use of the term

“symbol” (symbolum) to refer to the baptismal creed, Augustine even indicates that

“likeness” (similitudo) is the basis of metaphor.47 In all these examples, we see how Augustine’s definition of metaphor agrees with Cicero and Quintilian.

Augustine’s understanding of metaphor, however, differs from the previous tradition in two ways. The first way is indicated by Augustine’s definition of metaphor in his early work On

Dialectic (De Dialectica):

I call it “metaphor” either when one name occurs for many things by similarity (as “Tullius” refers both to that man of great eloquence and to his statue), or when a part is indicated by the whole (as when his corpse can be called “Tullius”), or when the whole is indicated by the part (as when we say “roofs” for the whole houses), or the species from

44 quis enim non dicit "sic floreas"? qui tropus metaphora uocatur. quis non dicit piscinam etiam quae non habet pisces nec facta est propter pisces? et tamen a piscibus nomen accepit, qui tropus catachresis dicitur, Doct. chr. 3.29.40; cf. Dial. 6, Hept. 2.158; cf. Quint. 8.6.34; for further discussion of catachresis and other tropes in Augustine, see D. Lau, “Augustins Tropus-Begriff: Umfang und Struktur: Beitrag zu einer tropologischen Hermeneutik.” Wiener Studien 124 (2011): 181-229.

45 quia uero addidit in aenigmate, multis hoc incognitum est qui eas litteras nesciunt in quibus est doctrina quaedam de locutionum modis quos graeci 'tropos' uocant eo que graeco uocabulo etiam nos utimur pro latino. sicut enim 'schemata' usitatius dicimus quam 'figuras' ita usitatius 'tropos' quam 'modos', Trin. 15.9.15; this shows his debt to the rhetorical distinction between τρόπος and σχῆµα in Philodemus and Cicero; see above, pp. 126ff.; despite this distinction, Augustine uses “figurative” and “metaphorical” as synonyms (huic autem obseruationi, qua cauemus figuratam locutionem, id est, translatam quasi propriam sequi, adiungenda etiam illa est, ne propriam quasi figuratam uelimus accipere, Doct. chr. 3.10.14; cf. 3.5.9, 3.11.17; Retract. 1.21.2).

46 sed mendacium non esse monstrauit non solum in his usitatioribus tropis uerum in illa etiam quae appellatur metaphora, quae loquendi consuetudine omnibus nota est. nam gemmare uites, fluctuare segetes, florere iuuenes contendet quispiam esse mendacium, quod in his rebus nec undas nec lapides nec herbas uel arbores uidet, ubi proprie ista uerba dicuntur? Ep. 180.3; cf. C. mendac. 10.24, 13.28.

47 symbolum autem nuncupatur a similitudine quadam, translato uocabulo; quia symbolum inter se faciunt mercatores, quo eorum societas pacto fidei teneatur, Serm. 212.1; cf. Dial. 6, 10; Ep. 149.2; Trin. 5.8.9, 5.10.11; Eu. Io. 53.3, 80.1. A132 the genus (for verba mean principally everything with which we speak, but yet they are more properly termed verba which we inflect by moods and tenses), or the genus from the species (for although “scholastics” indicate not only properly but also originally those who are still in school, nevertheless this name has been taken over by all those who make their living by letters), or the effect from the cause (as “Cicero” is the book of Cicero), or the cause from the effect (as “terror” means someone who causes terror), or the thing contained from that which contains it (as “home” indicates those who are in the home), or vice versa (as “chestnut” indicates also the tree), or anything else that can be found named from the same cause by a kind of transfer.48

Here Augustine includes examples of “metaphor” that work by relationships other than mere

“likeness” (similitudo). As such, his examples of “cause from effect” and “effect from cause” are more properly examples of metonymy (metonymia, ὑπαλλαγή).49 His examples of “part for whole” (and vice versa) and “genus for species” (and vice versa) are more precisely examples of synecdoche (synecdoche, intellectio).50 Metaphor, then, is for Augustine a general figure of speech that embraces not only similarity, but correspondence and participation as well.51

The second way Augustine’s understanding of metaphor differs from the previous tradition is related to the first way. In On Christian Doctrine, he explains how metaphor works:

48 translationem uoco cum uel similitudine unum nomen fit multis rebus, ut tullius et ille in quo magna eloquentia fuit et statua eius dicitur - uel ex toto cum pars cognominatur ut cum cadauer eius tullius dici potest - uel ex parte totum ut cum tecta dicimus totas domos - aut a genere species: uerba enim principaliter omnia dicuntur quibus loquimur, sed tamen uerba proprie nominata sunt quae per modos et per tempora declinamus - aut a specie genus: nam cum scholastici non solum proprie sed et primitus dicantur hi, qui adhuc in scholis sunt, in omnes tamen qui in litteris uiuunt nomen hoc usurpatum est - aut ab efficiente effectum ut cicero est liber ciceronis - aut ab effecto efficiens ut terror qui terrorem facit - aut a continente quod continetur, ut domus etiam qui in domo sunt dicuntur - aut conuersa uice ut castanea etiam arbor dicitur - uel si quid aliud inueniri potest, quod ex eadem origine quasi transferendo cognominetur, Dial. 10.

49 cf. Quint. 8.6.23; Cic. Or. 27.93.

50 cf. Doct. chr. 3.35.50; Quint. 8.6.19; Rhet. Her. 4.44.

51 For discussion of these three relations (“resemblance, correspondence, and connection”) in ancient thought and literature, see M. Edwards, “Christ, Tropology and Exegesis,” in G. R. Boys-Stones, ed., Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 237-240. A133 Signs, for their part, can be either proper or metaphorical. They are said to be proper when they are introduced to signify the things they were originally intended for, as when we say "ox" to signify the animal which everyone who shares the English language with us calls by this name. They are metaphorical when the very things which we signify with their proper words are made use of to signify something else, as when we say "ox," and by this syllable understand the animal which is usually so called, but again by that animal understand the evangelist, whom scripture itself signified, according to the apostle's interpretation of You shall not muzzle the ox that threshes the corn (1 Cor 9:9; Dt 25:4).52

Augustine does not say metaphor replaces the original meaning of the word with a different meaning. Rather, the metaphorical word still carries its original meaning, but the thing the word symbolizes becomes itself a symbol for something else: “as when we say "ox," and by this syllable understand the animal which is usually so called, but again by that animal understand the evangelist.” Augustine here describes metaphor not in terms of an “artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another“ (per Quintilian’s definition of “trope”);53 rather,

Augustine considers metaphor in terms of a two-step process of signification. The word (i.e.,

“ox”) is a sign of a thing (i.e., the animal), which in turn becomes a sign of another thing (i.e., the evangelist). It appears to be the first time in Greco-Roman antiquity that someone has related metaphor to a fully developed theory of signification.

This affects how Augustine conceives of metaphor. Rather than thinking in terms of an exchange of words, here at least Augustine thinks in terms of an extension of meaning. It is not

52 sunt autem signa uel propria uel translata. propria dicuntur, cum his rebus significandis adhibentur, propter quas sunt instituta, sicut dicimus bouem, cum intellegimus pecus, quod omnes nobis cum latinae linguae homines hoc nomine uocant. translata sunt, cum et ipsae res, quas propriis uerbis significamus, ad aliquid aliud significandum usurpantur, sicut dicimus bouem et per has duas syllabas intellegimus pecus, quod isto nomine appellari solet, sed rursus per illud pecus intellegimus euangelistam, quem significauit scriptura interpretante apostolo dicens: bouem triturantem non infrenabis, Doct. chr. 2.10.15; transl. E. Hill; Lau references this passage as an example of how Augustine relates metaphor to his theory of signs, but without any discussion on the point (D. Lau, “Augustins Tropus-Begriff,” 221, n. 236).

53 tropus est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione id aliam cum virtute mutatio, Quint. 8.6.1; transl. H. E. Butler. A134 that, “instead of being used for their original purpose, [transposed signs] are redirected toward a second function.”54 Rather, the word used metaphorically points to the thing it normally means, but that thing itself points to another thing. “We see through the literal sense, and seeing through it, we understand the figure.”55 For Augustine, then, it is not “obvious that when someone creates metaphors, he is, literally speaking, lying.”56 Because, for Augustine, it is not the case that the metaphor-maker “pretends to make assertions.”57 He does in fact make assertions; he does in fact use the word with its literal meaning, but he does not stop there. He goes through the literal sense to the metaphorical. He uses the word to point to the thing, and the thing in turn to point to another thing. In other words, we “look not at signs, but along them, at what they point to.”58 We look along the word and at the thing it points to, then along that thing and at the new thing it points to. So it is not a question of whether words are used for their original purpose or not, but of whether they are used only for their original purpose. While it is possible to conceive of this extension in horizontal terms, Augustine tends to represent it in vertical terms, either as depth or height. In order to show this, it is necessary to consider the reasons Augustine gives for the use of metaphorical language. But in order to understand these reasons, it is necessary to look at the use of “transfer” (translatio, translatus) and “likeness” (similitudo) in some of his immediate predecessors of the Christian tradition.

54 T. Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, transl. by C. Porter (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984): 51.

55 A. K. Clark, “Metaphor and Literal Language,” Thought 52.207 (1977): 378; emphasis mine.

56 U. Eco and C. Paci, “The Scandal of Metaphor,” Poetics Today 4.2 (1983): 219; emphasis in the original.

57 Ibid.; emphasis in the original.

58 P. Kreeft, I Burned for your Peace: Augustine’s Confessions Unpacked (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2016): 7. A135 EARLY CHRISTIAN USES OF “TRANSFER” AND “LIKENESS”

Many early Christian writers had recourse to the terms “transfer” (translatio, translatus) and “likeness” (similitudo). In particular, we see examples in Latin writers that Augustine knew, such as Cyprian, Lactantius, and Ambrose. A look at these three figures will suffice to suggest a broad tradition that informed Augustine’s own uses of the terms.

Although Cyprian of Carthage does not use the word “metaphor” (metaphora, verbum translatum) in his extant writings, he does use the word “transfer” (translatio, translatus) four times. In one instance, Cyprian says that the person who “is to come to the abode of Christ . . . should rejoice in his departure and transfer.”59 In another instance, Cyprian refers to those who have “transferred” earthly wealth into heavenly riches.60 In these two uses, the “transfer” involves a clear upward movement, either from earthly to heavenly life, or from earthly to heavenly riches. In two final instances, Cyprian quotes Sirach 44:16 (cf. Gn 5:24) on Enoch being “transferred” (translatus) by God.61 Here one might be tempted to understand an upward movement from earth to heaven, but Cyprian does not specify this. As will become clear in what follows,62 this “transfer” may have been conceived in purely (or predominately) temporal terms, as a removal to the end of time, and therefore as horizontal, not vertical.63

59 Venturus ad christi sedem . . . in profectione hac sua et translatione gaudere, Mort. 22.

60 obpigneratis uel distractis rebus suis, immo ad caelestes thensauros mutata in melius possessione translatis, Eleem. 22.

61 enoch qui deo placuit et translatus est, Ad Quirin. 1.8; enoch translatum esse qui deo placuit, Mort. 23.

62 See discussion of Lactantius below, p. 136f.

63 On the ancient concept of time (χρόνος, tempus) as having a spatial dimension conceived in terms of “length,” see the references in D. van Dusen, The Space of Time : A Sensualist Interpretation of Time in Augustine, Confessions X to XII (Leiden: Brill, 2014): 3, nn. 14ff. A136 Cyprian also does not use the term “likeness” (similitudo) in its grammatical sense of

“simile” or the “likeness” that forms the basis of metaphor, yet his uses of the word suggest an overlap in the concepts of likeness and participation. Cyprian twice quotes Philippians 2:7 on

Christ “being made in the likeness of man,”64 and once quotes Genesis 1:26, where God says,

“Let us make man to our image and likeness.”65 Thus, the likeness that man bears to God is not happenstance, but a direct result of God’s creative act. The divine likeness is something Adam lost, but it can “be manifest and shine forth in our actions.”66 More specifically, Isaac was

“prefigured to the likeness of the Lord’s sacrifice.”67 For Cyprian, God is the agent of this prefiguring. It is no accident that Isaac bears a “likeness” to Christ’s sacrifice. For the Son of

God “implants the likeness of God the Father.”68 God places this likeness within our breast, within our inmost being, and it calls forth a response in us.69 For Cyprian, then, the divine

“likeness” that all humans bear in general, and that figures like Isaac bear in particular, is nothing short of a divinely ordered participation in the life of God.

Lactantius, like Cyprian, does not use the term “transfer” (translatio, translatus) in the grammatical sense of “metaphor,” yet his uses of the word show a certain ambiguity about whether the “transfer” is horizontal or vertical. On the one hand, when Lactantius refers to a

64 in similitudine hominis factus, Ad. Quirin. 2.13, 3.39.

65 Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Hab. uirg. 15.

66 si similitudo diuina quam peccato adam perdiderat manifestetur et luceat in actibus nostris, Bon. pat. 5.

67 isaac ad hostiae dominicae similitudinem praefiguratus, Bon. pat. 10.

68 filius dei similitudinem dei patris insinuans, Zel. et liu. 15.

69 ad similitudinem dei patris et christi respondeant, Zel. et liu. 18. A137 “transfer” of temporal power,70 or a “transfer” from human to animal nature,71 or people

“changing their mind,”72 or the act of compiling in writing “things gathered and transferred from all,” the “transfer” could easily be thought of as horizontal, or not thought about in spatial terms at all. Similarly, when Lactantius refers to the belief of some madmen that Nero “was transferred and kept alive,”73 it must refer to a literal (though unreal) journey to a distant land, and is therefore a horizontal “transfer.” But in the comparison that immediately follows, Lactantius mentions “two prophets” (Enoch and Elijah) being “transferred alive to the end, in anticipation of the holy and everlasting reign of Christ.”74 Here the phrase “to the end” (in ultima) suggests a temporal element,75 and therefore a horizontal movement, though (as with Cyprian) the reference is ambiguous and open to a possible vertical interpretation.76 That vertical interpretation becomes more plausible when one considers that Lactantius here mentions “two prophets” (Enoch and

Elijah), and Elijah was said to be “carried up to heaven by a whirlwind.”77

Lactantius, like Cyprian, does not use the word “likeness” (similitudo) in its grammatical sense, but he does show an extension of Cyprian’s ideas about our “likeness” to God. For

70 imperii sede translata, Inst. 7.16.4, where negative consequences follow (confusio ac perturbatio humani generis consequetur, Ibid.); cf. translatis signis imperium reliquerunt, Mort. pers. 27.3, where the consequences, though negative for Galerius, are yet welcome to Lactantius.

71 translato in pecudem, Epit. 31.10.

72 animum translaturos, Inst. 5.13.8.

73 Unde illum quidam deliri credunt esse translatum ac vivum reservatum, Mort. pers. 2.8.

74 sicut duos prophetas vivos esse translatos in ultima ante imperium Christi sanctum ac sempiternum, Ibid.

75 cf. Tert. An. 50.

76 See ref. to Cyprian above, p. 135, n. 61; cf. Tert. Adu. Iud. 2.

77 ascendit Elias per turbinem in cælum, 2 Kings 2:11 (Vg.); emphasis my own. A138 instance, Lactantius often criticizes pagan worship on the grounds that their gods have been fashioned (by humans) “in the likeness of human weakness.”78 For Lactantius, the “likeness” we bear to God is the result of God’s creative act,79 and the spirit he breathes into us.80 We can rise by stages of justice to arrive at the “likeness of God,”81 but even this attained “likeness” in virtue is the result of God’s activity, for “no one is just and wise unless God teaches him with heavenly precepts.”82 In this much Lactantius and Cyprian are in agreement. But Lactantius goes further:

If God exists and is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal, then it is credible that the soul, though it is not seen, does not perish after its departure from the body, since it is clear that there exists something that senses and is lively, though it does not come under our sight. Yet it is difficult, indeed, to comprehend with the mind how the soul can retain sense- perception without those parts of the body in which the function of sense-perception resides. What about God? Is it easy to comprehend how he is lively without a body? Yet if [pagans] believe that there are gods who, if they exist, are certainly souls without bodies, it is necessary that human souls exist for the same reason, for by reason itself and prudence there is understood to be a certain likeness in man and God.83

Here Lactantius considers the “likeness in man and God” as the basis for arguing that souls are immortal and survive the body, just as even the pagans believe in gods that must live apart from bodies. He thus connects our “likeness to God” with the philosophical problem of how we are to

78 traducta ad similitudinem imbecillitatis humanae, Inst. 1.17.2; cf. Ibid. 2.2.3, 2.2.10

79 ergo marem primum ad similitudinem suam finxisset, Ibid. 2.12.1; cf. Ibid. 7.4.3, Ir. 8.14.

80 inspirauit ei animam de uitali fonte spiritus sui qui est perennis, ut ipsius mundi ex contrariis constantis elementis similitudinem gereret, Inst. 2.12.3; cf. Ir. 24.13.

81 qui primum gradum ascenderit, satis iustus est, qui secundum, iam perfectae uirtutis, siquidem neque factis neque sermone delinquat, qui tertium, is uero similitudinem dei adsecutus uidetur, Inst. 6.13.7.

82 iustus autem ac sapiens nemo est nisi quem deus praeceptis caelestibus erudiuit, Ibid. 6.6.28; cf. Ibid. 1.1.6.

83 quodsi est deus et incorporalis et inuisibilis et aeternus, ergo non idcirco interire animam credibile est, quia non uidetur, postquam recessit a corpore, quoniam constat esse aliquid sentiens ac uigens quod non ueniat sub aspectum. at enim difficile est animo comprehendere quemadmodum possit anima retinere sensum sine iis partibus corporis in quibus inest officium sentiendi. quid de deo? num facile est comprehendere quemadmodum uigeat sine corpore? quodsi deos esse credunt, qui si sunt, utique animae sunt expertes corporum, necesse est humanas animas eadem ratione subsistere, quoniam ex ipsa ratione ac prudentia intellegitur esse quaedam in homine ac deo similitudo, Ibid. 7.9.9. A139 conceive of God’s immateriality (“Is it easy to comprehend how he is lively without a body?”).

But Lactantius does not merely point out the difficulty of understanding, and therefore of relating to, a God who is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal. He also thinks God addressed the problem:

Before all things, since God cannot be seen by man, lest anyone should imagine for this reason that God does not exist, that he was not seen by mortal eyes, among other marvelous arrangements [God] made also many things whose power is manifest, though their substance is not seen, such as voice, smell, and wind, so that by the evidence and example of these things we might discern even God from his power and performance and works, even though he did not come before our eyes. What is clearer than a voice, or stronger than the wind, or more vehement than smell? Yet when these are carried through the air, and come to our senses, and strike them with their potency, they are not perceived by the gaze of the eyes, but sensed by other parts of the body. In the same way, God is grasped not by our sight or any fragile sense, but he is to be observed with the eyes of the mind, since we see his magnificent and marvelous works.84

God made voice and wind and smell, invisible in themselves but evident in their effects, so we might understand God to exist, whose invisible being is manifest by his marvelous works.

Ambrose reflects a further development in the use of the term “transfer,” at least as regards the example of Enoch. For Ambrose says, like Cyprian and Lactantius before him, that

Enoch was “transferred and did not see death.”85 But Ambrose further clarifies that Enoch was

“taken up to heaven.”86 This use of “transfer,” then, involves a clear upward movement.

84 ante omnia, quoniam deus ab homine uideri non potest, ne quis tamen ex eo ipso putaret deum non esse, quia mortalibus oculis non uidetur, inter cetera institutorum suorum miracula fecit etiam multa quorum uis quidem apparet, substantia tamen non uidetur, sicut est uox odor uentus, ut harum rerum argumento et exemplo etiam deum, licet sub oculos non ueniret, de sua tamen ui et effectu et operibus cerneremus. quid uoce clarius aut uento fortius aut odore uiolentius? haec tamen cum per aerem feruntur ad sensus que nostros ueniunt et eos potentia sua inpellunt, non cernuntur acie luminum, sed aliis corporis partibus sentiuntur. similiter deus non aspectu nobis alio ue fragili sensu conprehendendus est, sed mentis oculis intuendus, cum opera eius praeclara et miranda uideamus, Inst. 7.9.2ff.; cf. 7.14.12; cf. quid est tandem cur nobis inuidiosum quisquam putet, si rationem corporis nostri dispicere et contemplari uelimus? quae plane obscura non est, quia ex ipsis membrorum officiis et usibus partium singularum quanta ui prouidentiae quidque factum sit, intellegere nobis licet, Opif. D. 1.16; cf. Inst. 1.2.5.

85 Enoch autem, qui translatus est et mortem non uidit, Parad. 3.23.

86 Enoch, qui dicitur latine 'dei gratia', raptus ad caelum, Ibid. 3.19; cf. Is. 1.1, 8.77, De fide 4.1.8. A140 Ambrose does not discuss “likeness” (similitudo) in grammatical terms, but his uses of the word show a continuation of ideas from Cyprian and Lactantius. For, like Lactantius,

Ambrose considers God’s purpose in creation:

Heaven and earth, in fact, are the sum of the invisible things which appear not only as the adornment of this world, but also as a testimony of invisible things and as ‘an evidence of things that are not seen,’ according to the prophecy: ‘The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of his hands.’ The Apostle, inspired by the above, expresses in other words the same thought when he says: ‘For his invisible attributes are understood from the things that are made.’87

Ambrose thus connects Romans 1:20 (“For the invisible attributes are understood from the things that are made”) with both Psalm 18:1 (“The heavens show forth the glory of God…”) and the reference in Hebrews 11:1 to faith as the “substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things that are not seen.” For Ambrose, “This world is an example of the workings of God, because, while we observe the work, the Worker is brought before us.”88 In other words, God gives us the visible creation that we might, by faith, come to an understanding of God.

Yet creation is not for Ambrose the only thing that manifests God’s glory. For he discusses at length Genesis 1:26: “Let us make man according to our image and likeness.”89

Mankind bears the “likeness” of God on account of God’s activity at creation. But Ambrose also thinks that our likeness to God’s nature and unity is something God “poured into us by the

87 quia rerum uisibilium summa caelum et terra est, quae non solum ad mundi huius spectare uidentur ornatum, sed etiam ad indicium rerum inuisibilium et quoddam argumentum eorum quae non uidentur, ut est illud propheticum: Caeli enarrant gloriam dei et opera manuum eius adnuntiat firmamentum. Quod secutus apostolus aliis uerbis in eandem conclusit sententiam dicens: Quia inuisibilia eius per ea quae facta sunt intelleguntur, Ex. 1.4.16; transl. J. J. Savage; cf. Spir. 3.3.13, Myst. 3.8.

88 Est enim hic mundus diuinae specimen operationis, quia dum opus uidetur, praefertur operator, Ex. 1.5.17; transl. J. J. Savage.

89 Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Gn 1:26 (Vg.). A141 adoption of his grace.”90 And what exactly is the “image” of God, according to which we are made? “The ‘image’ of God is He alone who has said: ‘I and the Father are one,’ thus possessing the likeness of the Father so as to have a unity of divinity and of plenitude.”91 Thus, for

Ambrose, the “image” of God the Father according to which we are made, is the supreme example of “likeness” to God the Father, and this “likeness” involves unity with Father. It is no arbitrary similarity, but a participation in God’s very life, his divinity and fullness.

One may object to the foregoing discussion of Cyprian, Lactantius, and Ambrose as both too cursory to be of value in itself, and irrelevant to the topic of Augustine’s approach to sensory metaphors in his early works. But even in its cursoriness it suggests something of an early

Christian tradition with regard to sensible things, as well as a development in the early Christian use of the Latin term “transfer” (translatio, translatus). That Augustine had access to this tradition and this development through precisely such writers as Cyprian, Lactantius, and

Ambrose, is beyond dispute.92 That such theological and exegetical considerations are relevant here will become apparent in what follows.

90 suae naturae unitatis que similitudinem in nos gratiae adoptione transfudit, Parad. 5.26.

91 Imago dei est solus ille qui dixit: Ego et pater unum sumus, ita habens similitudinem patris, ut diuinitatis et plenitudinis habeat unitatem, Ex. 6.7.41; transl. J. J. Savage.

92 cf. Doct. chr. 2.40.61; for further discussion on this point, see G. Madec, “Christian Influences on Augustine,” in A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999): 151-6.

A142 AUGUSTINE’S REASONS FOR USING METAPHORS

There are a number of passages in his writings where Augustine explains the purpose of metaphors in general, the purpose of specific metaphors in Scripture, and his own specific purpose in using metaphors. The relationship of these three purposes can be put into a syllogism:

1) Metaphors can appeal to our senses and so move our hearts to contemplate divine things; 2)

God uses sensible things (in Creation) and metaphors (in Scripture) to lead us back to him; therefore, 3) we should imitate God and use metaphors to help lead others back to God.

Augustine expresses the purpose of metaphors in the very ordering of the liberal disciplines of dialectic and rhetoric in his work On Order (De Ordine):

When, therefore, would [Reason] pass on to fashion other things, unless it could itself distinguish, document, and set in order its own machinery and instruments, so to speak, and so transmit the very discipline of disciplines, which they call dialectic? This teaches what it is to teach, and what it is to learn. In this Reason itself shows itself and reveals what it is, what it desires, and what it can achieve. It knows what it is to know. It alone not only wishes to make us knowledgeable, but also is able to do so.

But since often men are foolish in regard to the things that are urged as right, useful, and honorable, and rather than following the most genuine truth itself which the rare mind sees, they follow their own senses and habit instead, it is necessary not only that they be taught, insofar as they can be, but often and especially that they be moved.

The part of it that would achieve this—a part more full of need than of purity, its lap overflowing with delights that it scatters to the people, so that they would see fit to be led to what would benefit them—this part it called rhetoric. So that part which is called reasonable in speaking, has been advanced by the liberal studies and disciplines.

Hence Reason wished to snatch itself away to the most blessed contemplation of divine things themselves. But lest it fall from that height, it sought steps and itself set in place for itself a path and an order by means of what it already possessed. For it was longing for a beauty which it could behold alone and directly, without these eyes [of the body]; but it was impeded by the senses. A143 And so it turned its gaze but a little to the very senses themselves, which were shouting that they themselves possessed the truth, and with rude clamoring kept calling back the gaze that was hastening to pass on to other things.93

Notice the sensory imagery describing rhetoric (“its lap overflowing with delights that it scatters to the people”) and the reason for this activity (“so that they would see fit to be led to what would benefit them”). Notice also the ambiguous position of the senses. On the one hand, they

“impede” the upward movement of Reason. On the other hand, Reason did not turn away from created things entirely; rather, “it turned its gaze but a little to the very senses themselves.” In themselves, the things of sense are insufficient, but in their very insufficiency they can lead us— by steps that perhaps remind us of Lactantius’ “stages of justice”94—beyond the world of sense to “the most blessed contemplation of divine things themselves.”95 We must not look directly at sensible things, nor must we look away from them; we must turn our gaze toward them “but a little.” If we look at them, they hinder. If we look along them, through them, we can see God.

93 Quando ergo transiret ad alia fabricanda, nisi ipsa sua prius quasi quaedam machinamenta et instrumenta distingueret notaret digereret proderetque ipsam disciplinam disciplinarum, quam dialecticam vocant? Haec docet docere, haec docet discere; in hac se ipsa ratio demonstrat atque aperit, quae sit, quid velit, quid valeat. scit scire, sola scientes facere non solum vult, sed etiam potest. Verum quoniam plerumque stulti homines ad ea, quae suadentur recte utiliter et honeste, non ipsam sincerissimam, quam rarus animus videt, veritatem sed proprios sensus consuetudinemque sectantur, oportebat eos non doceri solum, quantum queunt, sed saepe et maxime commoveri. Hanc suam partem, quae id ageret, necessitatis pleniorem quam puritatis refertissimo gremio deliciarum, quas populo spargat, ut ad utilitatem suam dignetur adduci, vocavit rhetoricam. Hactenus pars illa, quae in significando rationabilis dicitur, studiis liberalibus disciplinisque promota est. Hinc se illa ratio ad ipsarum divinarum rerum beatissimam contemplationem rapere voluit. Sed ne de alto caderet, quaesivit gradus atque ipsa sibi viam per suas possessiones ordinemque molita est. Desiderabat enim pulchritudinem, quam sola et simplex posset sine istis oculis intueri. Impediebatur a sensibus. Itaque in eos ipsos paululum aciem torsit, qui veritatem sese habere clamantes festinantem ad alia pergere importuno strepitu revocabant, Ord. 2.13.38-14.39.

94 See above, p. 138, n. 81.

95 cf. also Ver. rel. 29.52. A144 In his early work On True Religion,96 Augustine explains that God himself stoops to the level of sensible realities (in creation) and sensory metaphors (in the Scriptures) in order to lead us beyond them to an understanding of spiritual realities:

But because we have come down to the things of time and are being restrained by love of them from reaching the things of eternity, a certain time-bound method of healing, which is calling believers, not knowers, to salvation, comes first in the order of time, though not in natural excellence. After all, in the spot where a person has fallen, there one has to stoop down to him, so that he may get up again. So then, we have to try and make use of the flesh-bound shapes, by which we are being held back, to come to a knowledge of those which the flesh does not present us with. The ones, I mean, which I am calling flesh-bound are those which can be perceived through the flesh, that is through the eyes, the ears and the rest of the body's senses.97

An example of such divine condescension to a “time-bound method of healing” is the resurrected

Christ appearing to his disciples in Luke 24: “Because he was seeking the inner sense of faith, he presented himself also to their outer senses.”98 Augustine even describes these presentations in the language of the theater: “God has put on for you in Christ's name entertainments that have gripped your imagination and held you spellbound, not only kindling your desire for certain things but warning you to avoid others. Shows like this are useful, salutary, and designed to build up, not destroy.”99

96 composed c. 390; cf. A. D. Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999): 864.

97 sed quia in temporalia deuenimus et eorum amore ab aeternis impedimur, quaedam temporalis medicina, quae non scientes, sed credentes ad salutem uocat, non naturae excellentia, sed ipsius temporis ordine prior est. nam in quem locum quisque ceciderit, ibi debet incumbere, ut surgat. ergo ipsis carnalibus formis, quibus detinemur, nitendum est ad eas cognoscendas, quas caro non nuntiat. eas enim carnales uoco, quae per carnem sentiri queunt, id est per oculos, per aures ceteros que corporis sensus, Ver. rel. 24.45; trans. E. Hill.

98 quia interiorem fidei sensum quaerebat, exterioribus etiam sensibus adiacebat, Serm. 112.7; trans. E. Hill.

99 non parum uestras mentes in nomine christi diuina spectacula tenuerunt, et suspenderunt uos, non solum ad appetenda quaedam, sed ad quaedam etiam fugienda. ista sunt spectacula utilia, salubria, aedificantia, non destruentia, Psal. 80.22; transl. M. Boulding; cf. Ibid. 80.1, Util. cred. 15.33. A145 In a letter around the year 400, Augustine distinguishes this from idolatry: “We do not adore the sun or the moon, although, in order to convey instruction in holy mysteries, figures of sacred things are borrowed from these celestial works of the Creator, as they are also from many of the things which He has made on earth.”100 He also distinguishes it from astrology:

We do not forecast the issues of our enterprises by studying the sun and moon . . . but with the most pious devoutness of spirit, we accept similitudes adapted to the illustration of holy things, which these heavenly bodies furnish, just as from all other works of creation, the winds, the sea, the land, birds, fishes, cattle, trees, men, etc., we borrow in our discourses manifold figures.101

This approach to the Scriptures is not an arbitrary choice. It is, after all, the Holy Spirit who draws “a comparison from things visible to things invisible, from things corporeal to spiritual mysteries.”102 The Holy Spirit not only accomplishes this in creation, but also in the Scriptures, for “all those things which are figuratively set forth in Scripture, are powerful in stimulating that love by which we tend towards rest.”103 Why does God do this? Augustine explains at length:

All these things, however, that are presented to us in figures pertain somehow to nourishing and fanning the fire of love by which we are carried upward or inward to rest as if by a weight. For they arouse and kindle love more than if they were set forth bare without any likenesses of the sacraments. The reason for this fact is difficult to state. But it is, nonetheless, a fact that something presented in an allegorical meaning arouses more, delights more, and is appreciated more than if it were said in full openness with the proper terms. I believe that, as long as it is still involved with the things of earth, the

100 sicut enim non adoramus . . . nec solem aut lunam, quamuis ex ea caelesti creatura sicut ex multa terrestri sacramentorum figurae ad informationes mysticas adsumuntur, Ep. 55.6.11; transl. J.G. Cunningham.

101 non igitur nos de sole et luna . . . actionum nostrarum euenta conicimus . . . sed ad rem sacrate significandam similitudines habitas religiosissima deuotione suscipimus sicut de cetera creatura de uentis, de mari, de terra, de uolatilibus, de piscibus, de pecoribus, de arboribus, de hominibus ad sermonem quidem multipliciter, Ibid. 55.7.13; transl. J.G. Cunningham.

102 spiritus sanctus de uisibilibus ad inuisibilia et de corporalibus ad spiritalia sacramenta similitudinem ducens, Ibid. 55.5.9; transl. J.G. Cunningham.

103 unde non inconuenienter intellegimus ad amorem excitandum, quo ad requiem tendimus, ualere omnia, quae figurate in scripturis dicuntur, Ibid. 55.12.22; transl. J.G. Cunningham. A146 feeling of the soul is set afire rather slowly, but if it is confronted with bodily likenesses and brought from there to spiritual realities that are symbolized by those likenesses, it is strengthened by this passage, and is set aflame like the fire in a coal when stirred up, and is carried with a more ardent love toward rest.104

Just as Reason establishes the art of rhetoric to “move” (movere) the hearts of men who are not able to be taught by dialectic, so God uses rhetorical figures that delight, in order to

“arouse” (movere) and kindle our love and carry us “with a more ardent love toward rest.”

Augustine’s own writing and preaching, grounded as it is in his reading of the Scriptures, follows suit in regard to metaphor:

Whenever illustrative symbols are borrowed, for the declaration of spiritual mysteries, from created things, not only from the heaven and its orbs, but also from meaner creatures, this is done to give to the doctrine of salvation an eloquence adapted to raise the affections of those who receive it from things seen, corporeal and temporal, to things unseen, spiritual and eternal.105

As this immediately follows a quotation from Genesis, Augustine is probably talking about the use of “illustrative symbols” in Scripture, but he might also be describing his own writing.106

This is for Augustine, in the final analysis, an approach to the universe. It is a way of looking at the natural world, the effective world, the world of everyday experience. Augustine uses metaphors because, he believes, God uses metaphors. He believes the created world is not

104 ad ipsum autem ignem amoris nutriendum et flatandum quodam modo, quo tamquam pondere sursum uel introrsum referamur ad requiem, omnia ista pertinent, quae figurate nobis insinuantur; plus enim mouent et accendunt amorem, quam si nuda sine ullis sacramentorum similitudinibus ponerentur. cuius rei causam difficile est dicere; sed tamen ita se habet, ut aliquid per allegoricam significationem intimatum plus moueat, plus delectet et plus honoretur, quam si uerbis propriis apertissime diceretur. credo, quod ipse animae motus, quam diu rebus adhuc terrenis implicatur, pigrius inflammatur; si feratur ad similitudines corporales et inde referatur ad spiritalia, quae illis similitudinibus figurantur, ipso quasi transitu uegetatur et tamquam in facula ignis agitatus accenditur et ardentiore dilectione rapitur ad quietem, Ep. 55.11.21; transl. R. Teske.

105 si quae autem figurae similitudinum non tantum de caelo et sideribus sed etiam de creatura inferiore ducuntur ad dispensationem sacramentorum, eloquentia quaedam est doctrinae salutaris mouendo affectui discentium accommodata a uisibilibus ad inuisibilia, a corporalibus ad spiritalia, a temporalibus ad aeterna, Ibid. 55.7.13; transl. J. G. Cunningham.

106 cf. Serm. 52.5.15. A147 just a thing, but also a sign pointing to something else, to Someone else. This vision is grounded in numerous passages of Scripture that Augustine returns to again and again in his early writings:

“We see through a glass darkly.”107 “From the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are seen, being made known by the things which are made.”108 The truth is deeper (or higher, or both) than the surface of things. Our metaphorical use of language is itself a reflection, a sign, of that deeper truth about God. “In the beginning was the Word.”109 Language is primary. Every created thing is spoken by the Word and is thus a little “word.”110 Creation is God’s first

“book”.111 Every thing tells.

AUGUSTINE’S USE OF SENSORY METAPHORS IN HIS EARLY WORKS

As we have seen from Augustine’s understanding of sense-perception, sight and hearing are of paramount importance. This is no less true for the sensory metaphors in his early works.

While it is beyond the scope of this work to conduct a thorough examination of sensory metaphors in Augustine’s writings prior to the Confessions, several passages of his early philosophic dialogues provide useful parallels to the Confessions, and illustrate some of his main uses of sensory metaphors.

107 videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate, 1 Cor 13:12 (Vg.); cf. Conf. 8.1.1, 10.5.7, 12.13.16, 13.15.18; Doct. chr. 1.30.31, 2.7.11.

108 invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, Rom 1:20 (Vg.); cf. Ver. rel. 52.101; Conf. 7.10.16, 7.17.23 (2x), 7.20.26, 10.6.10, 13.21.31, Doct. chr. 1.4.4.

109 Jn 1:1.

110 cf. Jn 1:3.

111 Serm. 68.6; cf. Serm. 141.2. A148 In the philosophical dialogues composed at Cassiciacum,112 Augustine’s metaphors often combine more than one sense, resulting in a kind of spiritual synaesthesia. For example, in the introductory address of Against the Academics, Augustine describes his relationship to philosophy with a series of tactile metaphors: he flees to her “bosom”;113 she “nourishes and caresses” him.114 Then the metaphors become visual: philosophy “promises to give a clear demonstration of the most true and most hidden God, and even now deigns to reveal him, as it were, through transparent clouds.”115 The presentation of philosophy as a nursing mother is more explicit when Augustine tells Romanianus, “Indeed it is a philosophy from whose breasts no stage of life will complain that it is excluded.”116 Augustine continues with metaphors that combine touch and taste: he knows of Romanianus’ “thirst” for philosophy, and promises to send him a “foretaste” so that he might “hold fast,” “drink of it,” and find it “most sweet” and enticing.117 He thus presents the ensuing philosophical dialogue as something to be tasted and touched, to entice Romanianus to a life of philosophy, so that he might end with a “clear demonstration of the most true and most hidden God.” The ambiguity inherent in the phrase

“transparent clouds” (lucidas nubes) is compounded by the fact that in the immediately

112 The Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, and De Ordine, all composed in 386-7; see T. Fuhrer and S. Adam, eds., Aurelius Augustinus: Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine, Bibliotheca Teubneriana (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017): VIII.

113 in philosophiae gremium confugere, Acad. 1.1.3; cf. Ibid. 2.3.7, Beat. 1.4.

114 ipsa me nunc in otio, quod vehementer optavimus, nutrit ac fouet, Acad. 1.1.3.

115 ipsa uerissimum et secretissimum deum perspicue se demonstraturam promittit et iam iam que quasi per lucidas nubes ostentare dignatur, Ibid.

116 philosophia est enim, a cuius uberibus se nulla aetas queretur excludi, Ibid. 1.1.4; cf. Ep. 1.3.

117 ad quam avidius retinendam et hauriendam quo te incitarem, quamvis tuam sitim bene noverim, gustum tamen mittere uolui. quod tibi suavissimum et, ut ita dicam, inductorium fore peto, ne frustra sperauerim, Acad. 1.1.4. A149 preceding sentence, Augustine has advised Romanianus “not to have any concern for, and in fact to disdain, whatever is discerned by mortal eyes, or attained by any of the senses.”118 The senses can get in the way of seeing God, but things that entice us by their sweet “taste” and pleasurable

“touch” can lead us on to that very vision.119

When Augustine addresses Romanianus again at the beginning of the second book of

Against the Academics, he similarly combines visual and auditory metaphor. He describes

Romanianus’ “natural loftiness of mind” as a combination of thunder and lightning:

It is enveloped like a thunderbolt in those clouds of domestic affairs, and hidden from many, indeed almost everyone. But it cannot escape the notice of your closest friends, myself and one or two others, who often not only attentively listened to your murmurings, but also saw your flashes of light that were more like thunderbolts. For what man ever so suddenly let loose such thunder and flashed with such brilliance of mind that, with one roar of reason and a certain flash of temperance, the lust that was so savage the day before should be dead within him in a single day?120

Despite the temporal priority of literal lightning to literal thunder, Augustine here presents the metaphor in the order of sound, then sight: Romanianus’ friends first listen, then see;

Romanianus let loose such thunder, then flashed with brilliance of mind; there was a roar of reason, and a flash of temperance. That order is present again a little later, when Augustine asks

118 ipsa enim docet et uere docet nihil omnino colendum esse totum que contemni oportere, quicquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quicquid ullus sensus attingit, Acad. 1.1.3; Augustine, in later life, wishes to clarify that he should have said “any of the senses of the mortal body” (addenda erant uerba ut diceretur: quidquid mortalis corporis ullus sensus attingit, Retr. 1.1.2).

119 This order of senses is reversed later in the work, when gazing upon true beauty leads to “enfolding oneself in the bosom of philosophy” (ergo ille, si veram pulchritudinem, cuius falsae amator est, sanatis renudatis que paululum oculis posset intueri, quanta voluptate philosophiae gremio se inuolueret? Acad. 2.3.7); on the “bosom” as a place of rest, see Beat. 1.4 (in illum sinum raperem ibi que conquiescerem), Serm. 355K.6 (et finito certamine, in gremio quietis sanctae requiescimus).

120 illis rerum domesticarum nubibus quasi fulmen inuoluitur et multos ac paene omnes latet, me autem et alium uel tertium familiarissimos tuos latere non potest, qui saepe non solum attente audiuimus murmura tua sed etiam nonnulla fulgora fulminibus propiora conspeximus. quis enim . . . tam subito umquam tantum intonuit tantum que lumine mentis emicuit, ut sub uno fremitu rationis et quodam coruscamine temperantiae uno die illa pridie saeuissima penitus libido moreretur? Acad. 2.1.2. A150 Romanianus: “What if at least the voice of philosophy could be heard, even if her face cannot yet be seen by you?”121 In a pattern that will be repeated elsewhere, especially in the Confessions, sounds lead to sights, hearing leads to seeing. This pattern emerges in the extended seafaring metaphor at the beginning of The Happy Life (De Beata Vita), where the voyage “to the port of philosophy”122 is not merely the result of reason and the will itself,123 but involves an “apparently adverse tempest” that blows us back to our welcome homeland,124 a homeland Augustine has reached by coming to know the “North Star” through hearing the sermons of Ambrose.125 The happy life is a “gift of God,”126 wisdom a word which we receive by divine authority,127 from a

God who is “truth-speaking” and whose prophets are wise,128 who comes to us as Word, a “voice

121 quid, si saltem vox, si adhuc facies videri a te non potest, ipsius philosophiae posset audiri? Acad. 2.3.7; Augustine elsewhere speaks of philosophy as revealing her “face” (Ibid. 2.2.6) or shedding “light” (Ibid. 2.4.10); cf. Ibid. 3.18.41, where it is Plato’s “face” that is revealed, especially in Plotinus, when the “clouds” of obstinate error disperse (adeo post illa tempora non longo interuallo omni peruicacia pertinacia que demortua os illud platonis, quod in philosophia purgatissimum est et lucidissimum, dimotis nubibus erroris emicuit maxime in plotino).

122 philosophiae portum, Beat. 1.1; cf. Ibid. 1.2f., Acad. 2.1.1, ; cf. sapientiae portum, Acad. 3.2.3; cf. portum religionis, Mor. 1.34.74; cf. portum illum uerae certae que securitatis, Ep. 131.

123 The opening conditional sentence contains a present contrafactual protasis, “If it were the course laid out by reason and the will itself that should lead to the port of philosophy…” (si ad philosophiae portum . . . ratione institutus cursus et uoluntas ipsa perduceret, Beat. 1.1).

124 aliquando et inuitos contra que obnitentes aliqua tempestas, quae stultis uidetur aduersa, in optatissimam terram nescientes errantes que conpingeret, Ibid.; cf. Ibid. 1.2; cf. domini, qui sciens dare auxilium de tribulatione eum turbulentissima tempestate misit in portum, Ep. 149.3.

125 hic septentrionem cui me crederem didici. animaduerti enim et saepe in sacerdotis nostri et aliquando in sermonibus tuis, Ibid. 1.4; for the view that this “North Star” is to be identified with Ambrose himself, or with his neoplatonist-Christian teaching on the incorporeality of God, see Augustine, Trilogy on Faith and Happiness, ed. B. Ramsey (New York: New City Press, 2010): 128, n. 15; E. Kenyon, Augustine and the Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 126.

126 nam de beata uita quaesiuimus inter nos nihil que aliud uideo, quod magis dei donum uocandum sit? Beat. 1.5. This is an obvious play on the name of his addressee, Theodorus (“gift of God” in Greek); cf. E. Kenyon, Augustine and the Dialogue, p. 126.

127 quae est autem dicenda sapientia nisi quae dei sapientia est? accepimus autem etiam auctoritate diuina dei filium nihil esse aliud quam dei sapientiam, et est dei filius profecto deus, Beat. 4.34.

128 alius ille altus veridicus atque ipsa – quid enim verbis ambiam? – veritas, cuius uates sunt, quicumque possunt esse sapientes, Ord. 1.1.4. A151 that illumines.”129 Similarly, in his dialogue On Order (De Ordine), Augustine likens the hidden providence of God to an intricate floor mosaic whose overall beauty and order may not be visible to one who sees only a single tile.130 For achieving the vision of this hidden order, Augustine recommends the study of the liberal arts,131 which “begin with the ears,”132 then “advance to the realm of the eyes,”133 so that “when the soul has composed and ordered itself, and so rendered itself harmonious and beautiful, then it will dare to see God, the very font from which all truth flows, the very Father of Truth.”134 This pattern of hearing-leading-to-seeing is reflected even in the very dialogue format, where conversation and extended orations lead to glimpses of truth and wisdom. As Alypius exclaims to Augustine at the end of an extended speech, “You have all but placed before our eyes today a venerable and nearly divine teaching.”135

Even particular features of the dialogue setting illustrate the pattern of hearing-leading- to-seeing. For example, the dialogue setting of On Order begins with Augustine lying awake,

129 D. Chidester, “The Symmetry of Word and Light: Perceptual Categories in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies, Vol. 17 (1986): 130; I am indebted to Chidester for first calling my attention to this pattern in the Confessions; see Chapter Four below.

130 Sed hoc pacto, si quis tam minutum cerneret, ut in vermiculato pavimento nihil ultra unius tessellae modulum acies eius valeret ambire, vituperaret artificem uelut ordinationis et compositionis ignarum eo, quod varietatem lapillorum perturbatam putaret, a quo illa emblemata in unius pulchritudinis faciem congruentia simul cerni conlustrarique non possent, Ord. 1.1.2.

131 quod hi tantum adsecuntur, qui plagas quasdam opinionum, quas uitae cotidianae cursus infligit, aut solitudine inurunt aut liberalibus medicant disciplinis, Ord. 1.1.3.

132 et primo ab auribus coepit, quia dicebant ipsa uerba sua esse, quibus iam et grammaticam et dialecticam et rhetoricam fecerat, Ord. 2.14.39.

133 hinc profecta est in oculorum opes, Ibid. 2.15.42.

134 cum autem se conposuerit et ordinarit atque concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audebit iam deum uidere atque ipsum fontem, unde manat omne uerum, ipsum que patrem ueritatis, Ord. 2.19.51; emphasis my own.

135 uenerabilis ac prope diuina . . . disciplina abs te hodie nostris etiam paene oculis reserata est, Ord. 2.20.53. A152 listening to the sound of flowing water and puzzling over the cause of its changing sound.136

Both this sound and Augustine’s search for its cause lead to his reflection on order and wonder, and these silent reflections give way to dialogue when Augustine hears Licentius “strike his bed with a nearby piece of wood to scare away some bothersome shrews, thereby showing himself awake.”137 This leads to immediate seeing, as Augustine tells Licentius, “I see your muse has kindled a light for you to work at night.”138 It also leads to seeing insofar as the ensuing dialogue concerns the ability to see a hidden order in the cosmos. The running water and struck bed are not merely fortuitous examples of this pattern, for Licentius mentions them as evidence of order:

For, the fact that we were awakened, that you noticed this sound, that you asked yourself about its cause, that you did not find the cause of such a trifling thing—whence all this, unless it flows from the order of things and is derived from it? Even the field mouse comes out, so that I may be revealed as awake. Finally, your own spoken word is—and perhaps without forethought on your part, for no one can wholly predetermine what should come into his mind—somehow or other so framed that it tells me what answer to make to you.139

These instances of hearing-leading-to-seeing are analogous to the “two-fold path”140 of reason and authority: “With regard to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a twofold

136 ergo, ut dixi, vigilabam, cum ecce aquae sonus pone balneas, quae praeterfluebat, eduxit me in aures et animadversus est solito adtentius. mirum admodum mihi videbatur, quod nunc clarius nunc pressius eadem aqua strepebat silicibus inruens. coepi a me quaerere, quaenam causa esset, Ord. 1.3.6.

137 fateor, nihil occurrebat, cum licentius lecto suo importunos percusso iuxta ligno sorices terruit sese que vigilantem hoc modo indicavit, Ibid.

138 video tibi musam tuam lumen ad lucubrandum accendisse, Ibid.

139 unde enim hoc ipsum nisi ex rerum ordine manat et ducitur, quod evigilauimus, quod illum sonum advertisti, quod quaesisti te cum causam, quod tu causam tantillae rei non invenisti? sorex etiam prodit, ut ego vigilans prodar. postremo tuus etiam ipse sermo te fortasse id non agente - non enim cuiquam in potestate est, quid veniat in mentem - sic nescio quo modo circumagitur, ut me ipse doceat, quid tibi debeam respondere, Ibid. 1.5.14; transl. R. P. Russell.

140 duplex enim est via, quam sequimur, cum rerum nos obscuritas movet, aut rationem aut certe auctoritatem, Ibid. 2.5.16. A153 manner: by authority and by reason. In point of time, authority is first; in the order of reality, reason is prior. What takes precedence in operation is one thing; what is more highly prized as an object of desire is something else.”141 For Augustine, hearing comes from outside and strikes our ear, but seeing comes from within, with a beam of light that stretches out to the object of sight.

Likewise, authority is something outside us; it “opens the door” to hidden truths.142 We must accept authority in order to do the work of reason. But some authority is misleading:

We must, therefore accept as divine that Authority which not only exceeds human power in its outward manifestations, but also, in the very act of leading a man onward, shows him to what extent It has debased Itself for his sake, and bids him not to be confined to the senses, to which indeed those things seem wondrous, but to soar upward to the intellect. And at the same time It shows him what great things It is able to do, and why It does them, and how little importance It attaches to them. For, it is fitting that by deeds It show Its power; by humility, Its clemency; by commandment, Its nature. And all this is being delivered to us so distinctly and steadily by the sacred rites in which we are now being initiated: therein the life of good men is most easily purified, not indeed by the circumlocution of disputation, but by the authority of the mysteries.143

Notice the parallels to Augustine’s language in On True Religious.144 Here God, the true divine authority, has “debased” himself (se . . . depresserit) and bids us soar upward to the intellect (ad intellectum iubet evolare); there he is said to “stoop” (incumbere) to where one has fallen, so that he might “rise up” (ut surgat). God bids us not to be confined to the senses, but at the same time

141 ad discendum item necessario dupliciter ducimur, auctoritate atque ratione. tempore auctoritas, re autem ratio prior est. aliud est enim, quod in agendo anteponitur, aliud, quod pluris in appetendo aestimatur, Ord. 2.9.26; transl. R. P. Russell; cf. Quant. an. 7.12, Util. cred. 15.33f.

142 occulta discere cupientibus non aperiat nisi auctoritas ianuam, Ord. 2.9.26; cf. Ep. 137.4.15.

143 illa ergo auctoritas divina dicenda est, quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem sed et ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei, quo usque se propter ipsum depresserit, et non teneri sensibus, quibus videntur illa miranda, sed ad intellectum iubet evolare simul demonstrans, et quanta hic possit et cur haec faciat et quam parvi pendat. doceat enim oportet et factis potestatem suam et humilitate clementiam et praeceptione naturam, quae omnia sacris, quibus initiamur, secretius firmius que traduntur, in quibus bonorum vita facillime non disputationum ambagibus sed mysteriorum auctoritate purgatur, Ord. 2.9.27; transl. R. P. Russell.

144 See above, p. 144, n. 97. A154 he shows us “what great things He is able to do, and why He does them, and how little importance He attaches to them”; there “we have to try and make use of the flesh-bound shapes, by which we are being held back, to come to a knowledge of those which the flesh does not present us with.” In both places, the very sensible things that hold us back are the means by which we soar upward to the intellect. This “time-bound method of healing . . . comes first in the order of time, though not in natural excellence.” It calls “hearers, not knowers, to salvation.”

Authority first, then reason.145 Faith seeks understanding.146 Hearing leads to seeing.

This spiritual synaesthesia is evident in Augustine’s earliest uses of sensory metaphor at

Cassiciacum. Through On True Religion and beyond, it is connected with central themes of his thought (e.g., the ascent of the soul, divine humility, the importance of the sacraments). We will see it emerge more clearly in the Confessions.

145 “Human reason would never lead such souls to that intelligible world if the most high God had not vouchsafed— through clemency toward the whole human race—to send the authority of the divine intellect down even to a human body, and caused it to dwell therein, so that souls would be roused not only by divine precepts but also by divine acts, and would thus be enabled to reflect on themselves and gaze upon their fatherland, without any disputatious wranglings” (numquam ista ratio subtilissima reuocaret, nisi summus deus populari quadam clementia diuini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque summitteret, cuius non solum praeceptis sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semet ipsas et resipiscere patriam etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent, Acad. 3.19.42; trans. D. J. Kavanaugh).

146 Augustine makes explicit the association between authority and faith, on the one hand, and reason and understanding, on the other: “What he understand we owe to reason, what we believe we owe to authority” (quod intellegimus igitur, debemus rationi, quod credimus, auctoritati, Util. cred. 11.25); cf. Sol. 1.6.12; for discussion of the theme “faith seeking understanding” in Augustine, see F. Van Fleteren, “Authority and Reason, Faith and Understanding in the Thought of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 4 (1973): 33-71. CHAPTER FOUR

SENSORY METAPHORS IN AUGUSTINE’S CONFESSIONS

The preceding discussion of Augustine’s understanding of sense-perception (Chapters

One and Two), and of his understanding and use of sensory metaphors in his early writings

(Chapter Three), provide the basis for examining in this chapter the use of sensory metaphors in the Confessions. What follows here is one angle from which to read the Confessions. It is not the only angle, nor even the most important. It is meant to complement, not preclude, other ways of reading the text. Some may question whether the metaphors identified here are all intended as such by Augustine. Yet the plausibility of individual identifications is surely strengthened by the accumulation of metaphors taken collectively.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK ONE

There is a metaphor in the very first word of the Confessions: “Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise.”1 The Latin magnus means primarily “large” or “vast” in terms of physical size or quantity,2 and it is precisely this literal meaning of spatial extension that

Augustine questions in the opening paragraphs: “How shall I call upon my God, my God and my

Lord, when by the very act of calling upon him I would be calling him into myself?”3 God must

1 magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde, Conf. 1.1.1; transl. M. Boulding.

2 Lewis and Short, “magnus,” I.

3 et quomodo invocabo deum meum, deum et dominum meum, quoniam utique in me ipsum eum vocabo, cum invocabo eum? Conf. 1.2.2; transl. M. Boulding. !155 !156 be understood as “great” (magnus) not in a literal, physical sense, but in a metaphorical, spiritual sense, and the metaphor is primarily visual: where can I find God? “Do not hide your face from me: let me die so that I may see it, for not to see it would be death to me indeed.”4 But the word magnus also introduces a metaphor of touch: something can be physically “great” in terms of having weight,5 and Augustine longs not only to see God, but also to “embrace” and “catch hold of” him.6

Thus we see, even at the very beginning of the work, two characteristic features of

Augustine’s use of sensory metaphors in the Confessions. First, his sensory metaphors set up the essential contrast between the material and the immaterial. As we will see throughout, the narrative of the Confessions works on two levels, human and divine. It is the story of Augustine’s life in natural terms: his interactions, deliberations, decisions, and their consequences. But it is also simultaneously the story of God’s actions in and through the events of Augustine’s life.7

This interconnectedness of the human and divine dramas is signaled by the metaphors, which (on

Augustine’s view) convey deeper spiritual meaning by means of their literal meaning.8 The second characteristic feature of Augustine’s sensory metaphors is their tendency to cluster and combine senses. Just as the word “great” can suggest both a visible reality (i.e., spatial extension) and a tangible reality (i.e., weight), so also Augustine frequently combines visual and auditory

4 noli abscondere a me faciem tuam: moriar, ne moriar, ut eam videam, Conf. 1.5.5; transl. M. Boulding.

5 Lewis and Short, “magnus,” I.B.1; for Augustine, weight is a matter of lightness and heaviness (pondus . . . leuitate et grauitate, Litt. 4.5.12), which are objects of touch (see above, p. 118, esp. n. 237).

6 unum bonum meum amplectar, te….apprehendam te, Conf. 1.5.5.

7 e.g., nec faciebam ego bene . . . . tu vero, Ibid. 1.12.19.

8 See above, pp. 132ff. !157 metaphors in the pattern of hearing-leading-to-seeing,9 or “a voice that illumines.”10 In these examples, and others we will discuss, there is often a kind of spiritual synaesthesia at work.

A vivid example of this spiritual synaesthesia is found in Conf. 1.13.21: “God, Light of my heart, and Bread of the inner mouth of my soul, and Manly Strength taking to wife my mind and the bosom of my thought.”11 This cluster of sensory metaphors is an obvious tricolon crescens,12 each image more elaborate than the last. There is also a progression through the senses from top to bottom, from sight (“Light,” lumen) to taste (“Bread,” panis) to touch

(“Manly Strength taking to wife,” virtus maritans). The final metaphor of touch is bolstered by the pun on “strength” (virtus) and “man” (vir), an association familiar to Augustine.13 It is God as virtus who is the active agent of the participle maritans, which literally means “taking to wife,” or “wedding” in the sense that a husband (subject) weds a wife (object).14 The verb is also used

9 See above, pp. 149-154.

10 D. Chidester, “The Symmetry of Word and Light: Perceptual Categories in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies, Vol. 17 (1986): 130; I am indebted to Chidester for first calling my attention to this pattern in the Confessions.

11 deus, lumen cordis mei et panis oris intus meae et virtus maritans mentem meam et sinum cogitationis meae, Conf. 1.13.21.

12 On this rhetorical device in Augustine, see E. Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa, v. 2 (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958): 621-4; also C. I. Balmus, Étude sur le style de saint Augustin dans les Confessions et la Cité de Dieu (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1930): 164-170; the device is recommended by Cicero at De Or. 3.186; for discussion of the underlying “Gesetz der wachsenden Glieder,” see O. Behaghel, “Beziehung zwischen Umfang und Reihenfolge von Satzgliedern,” Indogermanische Forschungen 52 (1909): 138-9; also E. Lindholm, Stilistische Studien zur Erweiterung der Satzglieder im Lateinischen (Lund: Gleerup, 1931): 18-19; cf. T. N. Habinek, The Colometry of Latin Prose (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985) 175-200; on the poetic and musical basis of this “law,” see A. Todesco, “Periodi Oratorii,” Athenaeum n.s. 9 (1931): 22-34 (esp. 27, n. 2).

13 Serm. 332.4.

14 Lewis and Short, “marito,” I; several English translations (esp. Outler, Pilkington, Ryan, and Watts) mistake the two objects here (mentem meam et sinum cogitationis meae) as being joined to each other, rather than both joined to God; Hammonds’ punctuation (“courage wedded to my mind, and the bosom of my thoughts”) mistakenly implies that sinum is nominative and thus a reference to God. !158 from the 4th century onwards to mean “impregnate,”15 an implication all the more suggestive given the fact that sinus can mean not only “breast” but also “inner hollow” or “inmost depth,”16 which might suggest the womb.17 One should not press too hard on this touch metaphor since the sexual imagery is probably more implicit than explicit here, but it is not far from the surface of

Augustine’s mind for at least three reasons: first, because he often discusses touch in terms of

“carnal embrace;”18 second, because the “fold” (sinus) of the land is where the seed is sown;19 third, because in this passage Augustine goes on immediately to say, “I committed fornication against you.”20

A more particular example of spiritual synaesthesia appears in the frequent auditory metaphors in the opening paragraphs of the Confessions. Faith comes by hearing a preacher.21

Augustine calls upon God,22 wonders how he should call upon God,23 and asks God to speak to him.24 “Behold, the ears of my heart are before you, Lord. Open them, and say to my soul, ‘I am

15 Lewis and Short, “marito,” II.A.2.

16 Lewis and Short, “sinus,” II.A.2.b.

17 On sinus as a synonym for gremium, see Lewis and Short, “sinus,” II.A; on the relationship between sinus/ gremium and the Greek κόλπος, see Marius Victorinus, Adv. Arium 4.33; on κόλπος as “womb,” see LSJ, “κόλπος,” A.2.c.

18 E.g., Conf. 10.6.8 (quoted above, p. 76).

19 ut iaciendis seminibus terra mollescat et blandiore sinu, clementiore gremio semina missa suscipiat, Ambrose, De Noe 14.48; on the (commonplace) human sexual sense of “seed” (semen), see Lewis and Short, “semen,” I.2.

20 fornicabar abs te, Conf. 1.13.21.

21 aut quomodo credent sine praedicante? Ibid. 1.1.1.

22 invocat te, domine, Ibid.

23 et quomodo invocabo deum meum . . . ? Ibid. 1.2.2.

24 sic dic ut audiam, Ibid. 1.5.5. !159 your salvation.’ Let me run after your voice.”25 Augustine asks God to listen,26 to be merciful so that Augustine may speak.27 Though some of Augustine’s “speaking” can be understood as more literal than metaphorical, God’s “speaking” is nevertheless more often metaphorical: God’s laws

“mix wholesome bitter draughts that call us back to you from the destructive pleasure by which we withdrew from you.”28 In other words, God “speaks” to Augustine through something that is not only an object of metaphorical hearing but also an object of metaphorical taste. Even “tastes” have a “voice.” As noted before, every thing tells.29

Augustine frequently employs taste metaphors in the first book of the Confessions. Not only does he call God “Bread of the inner mouth of my soul;”30 he also addresses God as “my holy sweetness,”31 and speaks of God “inebriating” his heart.32 God is the “sweet father” who gives the prodigal son his inheritance, and an even “sweeter father” when the son returns in need.33 But God is not the only object of metaphorical taste; Augustine also refers to the “poetic

25 ecce aures cordis mei ante te, domine. aperi eas et dic animae meae, ‘salus tua ego sum.’ curram post vocem tuam, Conf. 1.5.5.

26 exaudi, deus, Ibid. 1.7.11; cf. 1.15.24.

27 miserere ut loquar, Ibid. 1.5.5.

28 valentibus legibus tuis miscere salubres amaritudines revocantes nos ad te a iucunditate pestifera qua recessimus a te, Ibid. 1.14.23; emphasis my own.

29 See above, pp. 146f.

30 See above, pp. 157f.

31 dulcedo mea sancta, Conf. 1.4.4; cf. 1.6.9, 1.20.3, 2.1.1; on the lack of Biblical precedent for this direct address, see O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 39.

32 quis dabit mihi ut venias in cor meum et inebries illud…? Conf. 1.5.5; the close sequence (in 1.4.4f.) of sweetness (dulcedo), inebriation (inebries illud), forgetfulness of ills (ut obliviscar mala mea) and sight (ut eam videam) is present also in Mus. 6.16.52, where Augustine quotes Ps 35:10 (Vg.).

33 dulcis pater quia dederas, et egeno redeunti dulcior, Conf. 1.18.28. !160 fictions” of Virgil34—”the wooden horse full of armed men, the burning of Troy, and the shade of

Creusa”35—as “the sweetest spectacle of vanity” to him in his boyhood.36 Homer, too, is “most sweetly vain,” though Augustine as a schoolboy found him “bitter.”37 These metaphors of taste reveal an essential conflict for Augustine: the empty sweetness of outward, passing things can lead us away from God, the true, inward sweetness that lasts.38 “You have snatched me from all my most wicked ways, that you might grow sweet to me beyond all the seductions I used to pursue.”39 “Even now you snatch from this enormous deep the soul that seeks you and thirsts after your delights, and whose heart says to you, ‘I have sought your face.’”40 God is not only the ultimate object of metaphorical taste, but also someone to whom our heart “speaks,” and a “face” we seek. Thirst leads to dialogue and ends in vision.

Here again we have the clustering of senses, and the interconnectedness of human and divine dramas. The “sweetness” of Virgil and the “bitterness” of Homer are not without a natural and supernatural cause for Augustine. The natural cause is obvious enough: “the difficulty of mastering a foreign tongue sprinkled with gall, as it were, all the Greek sweetness of those

34 poetica illa figmenta, Conf. 1.13.22.

35 equus ligneus plenus armatis et Troiae incendium atque ipsius umbra Creusae, Ibid.

36 dulcissimum spectaculum vanitatis, Ibid.; notice the synaesthesia of taste and sight here.

37 nam et Homerus peritus texere tales fabellas et dulcissime vanus est, mihi tamen amarus erat puero, Ibid. 1.14.23.

38 dulcedo non fallax, dulcedo felix et secura, Ibid. 2.1.1.

39 eruisti me ab omnibus viis meis pessimis, ut dulcescas mihi super omnes seductiones quas sequebar, Ibid. 1.15.24.

40 et nunc eruis de hoc immanissimo profundo quarerentem te animam et sitientem delectationes tuas, et cuius cor dicit tibi, ‘quaesivi vultum tuum,’ Ibid. 1.18.28; emphasis my own. !161 fabulous stories.”41 Latin, unlike Greek, was learned “amid the charming speech of nurses, the teasing of those who smiled on me, and the delight of those who played with me.”42 Thus, Virgil was “sweet” and Homer “bitter” for Augustine because the former was in a language learned with “free curiosity” and the latter in a language learned with “frightful compulsion.”43 And yet there is a deeper, supernatural explanation: “But this compulsion restricts the flow of that curiosity by your laws, O God—from the rods of teachers to the trials of the martyrs—your laws able to mix wholesome bitter draughts that call us back to you.”44 Ultimately, Virgil was “sweet” and Homer “bitter” because God’s laws ordained the bitterness in order to call Augustine back to him, though just as these metaphors work by means of the literal meaning, so also for Augustine the supernatural cause of the “sweet” and the “bitter” works by means of the natural cause.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK TWO

The opening paragraph of Book Two contains a dense cluster of sensory metaphors, including taste, sight, touch, and smell:

For the love of your love I do this, revisiting my most wicked ways, in the bitterness of my recollection, that you may grow sweeter to me, O sweetness without deception, sweetness blessed and sure, and gathering myself from the dissipation in which I was vainly torn to pieces when I turned from you, the One, and vanished in pursuit of the

41 difficultas omnino ediscendae linguae peregrinae, quasi felle aspergebat omnes suavitates graecas fabulosarum narrationum, Conf. 1.14.23; emphasis my own; this image appears to be without any close parallel in previous (extant) Latin literature (cf. Cyprian, Ad Don. 11, Zel. et liu. 17), though Aug. uses a similar image at Conf. 2.2.4 and 3.1.1.

42 inter etiam blandimenta nutricum et ioca adridentium et laetitias adludentium, Conf. 1.14.23.

43 hinc satis elucet maiorem habere vim ad discenda ista liberam curiositatem quam meticulosam necessitatem, Ibid.

44 sed illius fluxum haec restringit legibus tuis, deus, legibus tuis a magistrorum ferulis usque ad temptationes martyrum, valentibus legibus tuis miscere salubres amaritudines revocantes nos ad te, Ibid. 1.14.23; emphasis mine. !162 many. For then in my adolescence I burned to be filled with lower things, and I dared to run wild in various shady loves, and my beauty wasted away, and I grew rotten in your eyes, pleasing to myself and wishing to be pleasing in the eyes of men.45

Metaphors of taste (“bitterness . . . grow sweeter . . . sweetness”) give way to those of sight

(“dissipation . . . torn to pieces . . . vanished”). The verb “I burned” (exarsi) presents a metaphor of touch, followed by another of taste (“to be filled”).46 The verb “to run wild” (silvescere) introduces a plant metaphor,47 with possible elements of touch (“to harden, grow more woody”) and sight (“to grow more abundant, thick”), the latter being strengthened by the metaphor of

“shady loves” (umbrosis amoribus).48 The paragraph closes with visual and olfactory metaphors:

“my beauty wasted away, and I grew rotten in your eyes….”49 This cluster of sensory metaphors involves six inchoative verbs in two sentences: dulcescere, evanescere, exardescere, silvescere, contabescere, and computrescere.50 This cannot be coincidence, especially since the noun adulescentia appears exactly in the middle of these six verbs.51 Book Two concerns Augustine’s

“growing to maturity” (adulescentia), and in this programmatic opening paragraph Augustine

45 amore amoris tui facio istuc, recolens vias meas nequissimas in amaritudine recogitationis meae, ut tu dulcescas mihi, dulcedo non fallax, dulcedo felix et secura, et conligens me a dispersione, in qua frustatim discissus sum dum ab uno te aversus in multa evanui. exarsi enim aliquando satiari inferis in adulescentia, et silvescere ausus sum variis et umbrosis amoribus, et contabuit species mea, et computrui coram oculis tuis placens mihi et placere cupiens oculis hominum, Conf. 2.1.1.

46 On satiare as “to be filled with food/drink”, see Lewis and Short, “satio,” I.

47 cf. palmitem cordis mei, Conf. 1.17.27.

48 cf. habet enim et ille, quod confitendum est, quoddam decus animi uel potius decoris quasi sementem, quod erumpere in ueram pulchritudinem nitens tortuose ac deformiter inter scabra uitiorum et inter opinionum fallacium dumeta frondescit; tamen non cessat frondescere et paucis acute ac diligenter in densa intuentibus, quantum sinitur, eminere, Acad. 2.2.6.

49 For Augustine, computrescere is a matter or smell (Psal. 37.9).

50 Balmus notes five, overlooking exardescere (Balmus, Étude sur le style de saint Augustin, 62-4).

51 Adulescentia derives from the inchoative verb adolescere, “to grow up.” !163 introduces several kinds of growing or becoming: the wish that God would grow sweeter, and the recollection of Augustine’s adolescent vanishing, burning, growing wild, wasting away, and rotting. This sets up both the contrast between past sin and present confession, as well as the contrast between moving toward the one God and moving away from him toward “lesser things” and “the many.” In other words, these inchoative verbs, and the sensory metaphors they contain, indicate the main lines of Augustine’s narrative in Book Two.

The following paragraph of Book Two contains extended metaphors of sight, touch, and hearing. As Augustine considers his past delight in “loving and being loved” (amare et amari), he criticizes it because “it did not hold the proper measure from mind to mind, where lies the luminous boundary of friendship, but vapors were breathed forth from the muddy lust of the flesh and the eruption of puberty, and they clouded over and darkened my heart, so that it could not separate the clearness of love from the fog of sexual desire.”52 Although the adjective

“muddy” (limosa) could also be translated as “slimy” and thereby indicate a metaphor of touch

(or possibly taste),53 here the emphasis is clearly on the visual effects of the “vapors” that

“clouded over and darkened” Augustine’s heart.

The rest of the paragraph is a torrent of touch metaphors, with one or two metaphors of hearing:

52 non tenebatur modus ab animo usque ad animum quatenus est luminosus limes amicitiae, sed exhalabantur nebulae de limosa concupiscentia carnis et scatebra pubertatis, et obnubilabant atque obfuscabant cor meum, ut non discerneretur serenitas dilectionis a caligine libidinis, Conf. 2.2.2.

53 On limosus as opposite to “dry” (siccus), and so an indication of touch, cf. sicco limosum praeferemus, Columella, Res Rustica 7.9; on the connection between limosus and taste, cf. ea erit limosa et insuavis, Vitr. 8.1.2; Augustine considers “slime” to be a mixture of water and earth (limus enim aquae et terrae commixtio est, Gen. Man. 2.7.8), two elements associated with taste and touch (see above, pp. 116ff.). !164 Both [love and sexual desire] boiled up in confusion and swept my feeble youth over the rocky cliffs of carnal desire and plunged me in a whirlpool of passionate disgraces. Your wrath overpowered me, and I knew it not. I was being deafened by the clanking chain of my mortality, the punishment for the pride of my soul, and I went farther from you, and you let me go; I was shaken about and poured out and flowed away and frothed up with my fornications, and you were silent. O late-come joy of mine! You were silent then, and I went yet farther from you, into more and more sterile seeds of sorrow, with a haughty despondency and a restless exhaustion.54

There is nothing haphazard about this stream of touch metaphors. It is deliberately constructed to suggest the violence and upheaval of his prior emotional state.55 One aspect of that deliberate construction is the clear sequence of action: “shaken about and poured out and flowed away and frothed up” is exactly how one could describe a wave crashing on the seashore, down to the detail of the foam left behind to fizzle out as the wave recedes (ebulliebam).56 Another aspect of deliberate construction is evident in the two levels of Augustine’s narrative. On the one hand,

Augustine's own love and sexual desire “boiled up” and “swept” him away and “plunged [him] in the whirlpool of passionate disgraces.” On the other hand, God’s wrath “overpowered” him.

Similarly, Augustine was deafened by the “clanking chain of . . . mortality,” a natural cause, but that chain is described as a “punishment,” presumably from God. Augustine does not blame God for his past waywardness: “I went farther from you and you let me go.” God’s action here is more

54 utrumque in confuso aestuabat et rapiebat inbecillam aetatem per abrupta cupiditatum atque mersabat gurgite flagitiorum. invaluerat super me ira tua, et nesciebam. obsurdueram stridore catenae mortalitatis meae, poena superbiae animae meae, et ibam longius a te et sinebas, et iactabar et effundebar et diffluebam et ebulliebam per fornicationes meas, et tacebas. o tardum gaudium meum! tacebas tunc, et ego ibam porro longe a te in plura et plura sterilia semina dolorum superba deiectione et inquieta lassitudine, Conf. 2.2.2.

55 See above, pp. 14f., on the distinction between Augustine the author and Augustine the character within the Confessions.

56 For the use of ebullio, with or without animam, to mean “expire, give up the ghost,” see OLD, “ebullio,” 1.b; one could argue that Augustine has is mind here waves crashing out at sea in a storm, far from shore (cf. Ovid Trist. 1.11.13, 3.2.15; Mt 14:24 Vg.). In either case, the sequence of images has slender literary or biblical precedent, but appears to be taken from direct observation of nature. !165 permissive than perfective; it does not override ordinary human agency, but works through it.57

Likewise, there is a certain ambiguity of agency in Augustine’s final string of intense metaphors of touch: he shifts from passive voice (“I was shaken about and poured out”) to active voice (“[I] flowed away and frothed up with my fornications”); yet God’s role is still permissive here (“and you were silent”). This final verb presents a metaphor of hearing, as does the earlier mention of

Augustine “being deafened by the clanking chain of . . . mortality.” God was not speaking literally, directly to Augustine, but metaphorically, indirectly through human agents and natural causes: “Were you then keeping silent to me? Whose words were they if not yours, those words you sounded in my ears through my mother, your faithful one? . . . They were yours and I knew it not, and I thought that you kept silent and that it was she who spoke, she through whom you were not silent to me.”58 So God was not silent, but spoke to Augustine through Monica’s words when she warned him against sexual immorality.59 Yet Augustine did not hear because he was

“being deafened by the clanking chain of . . . mortality.” Here is another example of interwoven human and divine agency: God speaks through Monica speaking, so God’s perceived “silence” is really Augustine’s “deafness” caused by “the clanking chain of [his] mortality,” which in turn is a punishment from God. This “chain of mortality” also recalls the opening paragraph of the

57 cf. potius enim, si id nolumus, quod ille uult, nos culpandi sumus, quam ille non recte aliquid uel facere uel sinere existimandus est, Ep. 38.1; cf. et ideo deus bipertito prouidentiae suae opere praeest uniuersae creaturae suae, naturis, ut fiant, uoluntatibus autem, ut sine suo iussu uel permissu nihil faciant, Litt. 8.24.45; Enchir. 24.95; Civ. Dei 20.2; for more on Augustine’s distinction between God’s perfective and permissive will, see J. M. Rist, “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” Journal of Theological Studies (N. S.) 20:2 (1969): 427f.

58 itane tu tacebas tunc mihi? et cuius erant nisi tua verba illa per matrem meam, fidelem tuam, quae cantasti in aures meas? . . . illi autem tui erant et nesciebam, et te tacere putabam atque illam loqui per quam mihi tu non tacebas, Conf. 2.3.7.

59 volebat enim illa, et secreto memini ut monuerit cum sollicitudine ingenti, ne fornicarer maximeque ne adulterarem cuiusquam uxorem. qui mihi monitus muliebres videbantur, quibus obtemperare erubescerem, Ibid. !166 Confessions, where man is said to be “bearing about his mortality,”60 as a kind of weight. The

“clanking chain” is a weight that deafens, a metaphor of touch and hearing, another case of spiritual synaesthesia.

The following paragraph contains yet another instance of spiritual synaesthesia, and ends with a visual metaphor that recurs in later books. Speaking of his youthful companions in iniquity, Augustine says, “With such companions I walked the streets of Babylon, and wallowed in its filth, as though in cinnamon and precious ointments.”61 This metaphor includes visual, tactile, and olfactory elements (“wallowed in its filth, as though in cinnamon and precious ointments”).62 It implies a certain deception, as Augustine mistook “filth” for “cinnamon and precious ointments.” He returns to the idea of deception in a pair of visual metaphors at the end of the paragraph: “and in all this there was a fog cutting me off, my God, from the clearness of your truth, and my wickedness proceeded as it were from fatness.”63 The first metaphor recalls the second chapter of Book Two, with its “fog of sexual desire” (caligo libidinis) that Augustine was unable to distinguish from “the clearness of love” (serenitas dilectionis).64 The second metaphor comes from the Psalms: “Their iniquity has proceeded as it were from fatness; they

60 homo circumferens mortalitatem suam, Conf. 1.1.1; cf. O’Donnell, Confessions, v. 2, 111.

61 Ecce cum quibus comitibus iter agebam platearum Babyloniae, et volutabar in caeno eius tamquam in cinnamis et unguentis pretiosis, Conf. 2.3.8.

62 On the use of cinnamon for its scent (and not taste) in antiquity, see Prop. 3.13.8: cinnamon et multi pistor odoris Arabs (on reading pistor for pastor, see J. B. Bury, “Notes on Propertius,” Hermathena 9:22 (1896): 316); also Ov. Met. 10. 308, 15.399f.; Pers. 6.35; on cinnamon as burned for sacrifice (and thus for scent), see Ov. Ep. 16.335, Fast. 3.731; on the identification of cinnamum/cinnamomum with “cinnamon,” see S. G. Haw, “Cinnamon, Cassia, and Ancient Trade,” Journal of Ancient History and Archaeology 4.1 (2017): 5-18.

63 et in omnibus erat caligo intercludens mihi, deus meus, serenitatem veritatis tuae, et prodiebat tamquam ex adipe iniquitas mea, Conf. 2.3.8.

64 See above, p. 163, esp. n. 52. !167 have gone beyond in the desire of their heart.”65 This biblical allusion suggests Augustine’s pride and transgression of proper boundaries,66 which also recalls the second chapter of Book Two, especially the “luminous boundary of friendship.”67 The juxtaposition of these two metaphors of fog and fatness suggests a connection between Augustine’s blindness and his excess. This connection is brought out more clearly in Book Three.68

Augustine also frequently resorts to metaphors of taste in the discussion of his youthful theft of pears.69 For example, he refers to his past “distaste for justice and glut of iniquity.”70 He further declares, “The friendship of men in a close bond is sweet on account of the union of many minds.”71 The theft of pears becomes, then, an opportunity to meditate on what was

“sweet” about his sin, what exactly he “feasted on” in his evil acts: “For I threw away what had been plucked; hence I feasted on the iniquity alone, which I took delight in enjoying. For even if a bit of that fruit entered my mouth, it was the criminal deed that was its seasoning.”72 This meditation on false sweetness leads to a reflection on God’s true sweetness: “Luxury wishes to

65 prodiit quasi ex adipe iniquitas eorum; transierunt in affectum cordis, Ps 73 [72]:7 (Vg.).

66 On the association with pride, see Ps 73 [72]:6 (Vg.): ideo tenuit eos superbia; operti sunt iniquitate et impietate sua; cf. Psal. 72.12; on the sense of transgression in “they have gone beyond” (transierunt), see Lewis and Short, “transeo,” II.A.2.

67 See above, p. 163, esp. n. 52.

68 See below, pp. 173ff.

69 Conf. 2.4.9-2.9.17.

70 fastidio iustitiae et sagina iniquitatis, Conf. 2.4.9; though fastidium can mean “distaste” in a more general sense, its coupling with sagina suggests the sense of taste in particular (cf. an et fletus res amara est et, prae fastidio rerum quibus prius fruebamur et tunc ab eis abhorremus, delectat? Conf. 4.5.10), as does its occurrence in this passage recounting Augustine’s theft of pears despite their lack of appeal to taste (pomis . . . nec forma nec sapore inlecebrosis, Ibid.).

71 amicitia quoque hominum caro nodo dulcis est propter unitatem de multis animis, Ibid. 2.5.10.

72 nam decerpta proieci, epulatus inde solam iniquitatem qua laetabar fruens. nam et si quid illorum pomorum intravit in os meum, condimentum ibi facinus erat, Conf. 2.6.12. !168 be called satisfaction and abundance, but You are fullness and the inexhaustible supply of imperishable sweetness.”73 Thus we see again the contrast between the temporal and the eternal, the mortal and the immortal, the false “sweetness” of lower things and the true “sweetness” of

God.

These metaphors of taste are frequently linked with metaphors of sight. For example,

Augustine describes himself in the act of stealing pears as “a soul unsightly and falling from the summit of your support down into destruction, seeking nothing by means of the unseemliness except the unseemliness itself.”74 That Augustine has in mind the visual aspects of

“unsightly” (turpis) and “unseemliness” (dedecus) is made certain by his immediately following discussion of (literal) “shapeliness in beautiful bodies,”75 and the (metaphorical)

“splendor” (decus) of “worldly honor and the power to rule and conquer.”76 This is followed by

Augustine pronouncing his theft “not beautiful,”77 though “the fruit that we stole was beautiful, since it was your creation, O most beautiful of all, creator of all, God the good, the greatest good,

73 luxuria satietatem atque abundantiam se cupit vocari: tu es autem plenitudo et indeficiens copia incorruptibilis suavitatis, Ibid. 2.6.13.

74 turpis anima et dissiliens a firmamento tuo in exterminium, non dedecore aliquid, sed dedecus appetens, Ibid. 2.4.9; the word firmamentum here means both “firm support” (cf. firmamenta beatitudinis tuae, Ibid. 4.16.29; fecisti nobis firmamentum auctoritatis super nos in scriptura tua diuina, Ibid. 13.15.16; laudes tuae, domine, laudes tuae per scripturas tuas suspenderent palmitem cordis mei, et non raperetur per inania nugarum turpis praeda volatilibus, Ibid. 1.17.27), as well as the scriptural “firmament” that Augustine identifies with “the corporeal heaven” (quod firmamentum uocasti caelum, sed caelum terrae huius et maris, quae fecisti tertio die dando speciem uisibilem informi materiae, quam fecisti ante omnem diem, Ibid. 12.8.8).

75 etenim species est pulchris corporibus, Ibid. 2.5.10; on species as an object of sight for Augustine, see Ibid. 2.1.1, 12.6.6, 12.8.8; Lib. 2.14.38; Mus. 6.11.32, 6.17.58; Quaest. 46.2; on this point I am indebted to K. White for access to an unpublished revision of his 2006 lecture, “Augustine on Number and Species.”

76 habet etiam honor temporalis et imperitandi atque superandi potentia suum decus, Conf. 2.5.10; cf. pulchra sunt enim et decora, Ibid. 2.5.11.

77 non enim pulchrum eras, cum furtum esses, Conf. 2.6.12; cf. ecce species nulla est, Ibid. !169 and my true good.”78 There is no “splendor” (species) in the theft of pears, “not as there is in justice and prudence, nor as there is in man’s mind and memory and senses and quickening life, nor as the stars are splendid and glorious in their fixed courses, and the earth and sea teeming with new life that replaces by birth that which dies—nor even as there is a certain imperfect and shadowy splendor in the vices that lead astray.”79 The juxtaposition of visual and gustatory metaphors occurs also in the final paragraph of Book Two: “Who will untie this most twisted and tangled knot? It is filthy. I do not want to think on it, I do not want to look on it. It is you I want,

O justice and innocence, beautiful and glorious—with upright eyes and unquenchable satisfaction.”80 These linkings of metaphorical sight and taste are fitting, since Augustine begins his discussion of the pears by noting that they were “attractive neither in form nor in taste.”81

These visual and gustatory metaphors, then, are occasioned by Augustine’s reflection on the literal look and taste of the fruit. This is yet another, albeit different, example of how Augustine’s metaphors work by means of the literal meaning.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK THREE

78 pulchra erant poma illa quae furati sumus, quoniam creatura tua erat, pulcherrime omnium, creator omnium, deus bone, deus summum bonum et bonum verum meum, Ibid. 2.6.12; cf. formosa et luminosa veritas tua, Ibid. 2.6.13.

79 ecce species nulla est: non dico sicut in aequitate atque prudentia, sed neque sicut in mente hominis atque memoria et sensibus et vegetante vita, neque sicut speciosa sunt sidera et decora locis suis et terra et mare plena fetibus, qui succedunt nascendo decedentibus—non saltem ut est quaedam defectiva species et umbratica vitiis fallentibus, Ibid.

80 quis exaperit istam tortuosissimam et implicatissimam nodositatem? foeda est; nolo in eam intendere, nolo eam videre. te volo, iustitia et innocentia pulchra et decora, honestis luminibus et insatiabili satietate, Ibid. 2.10.18; cf. O’Donnell, Confessions, v. 2, 143.

81 pomis onusta nec forma nec sapore inlecebrosis, Conf. 2.4.9. !170 The opening paragraph of Book Three, like that of Book Two, contains metaphors of four of the five senses: in this case, sight, hearing, taste, and touch. First comes hearing: “I came to

Carthage, and the frying pan of disgraceful loves sizzled all around me.”82 Then comes taste: “I hated security and the path free from snares, for there was a hunger inside me for interior food, for you yourself, my God, and it was not this hunger that I sought to satisfy, but I was without the desire for imperishable food, not because I was full of it, but because the more empty I was, the more distaste I had for it.”83 Then comes touch: “So my soul was not in good health, but broke out in sores, miserably itching to be scratched against the things of sense.”84 Then comes taste again: “To love and be loved was sweet to me, especially if I also enjoyed my lover’s body.”85 Then comes sight: “I thus polluted the stream of friendship with the dregs of lust, and

82 veni Carthaginem, et circumstrepebat me undique sartago flagitiosorum amorum, Conf. 3.1.1; the oft-noted play on Carthago-sartago is evidence of Augustine’s attention to language as such, especially to its sound; notice also the abundance of sibilants in circumstrepebat . . . sartago flagitiosorum; see L. P. Wilkinson, Golden Latin Artistry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970): 13-15.

83 oderam securitatem et viam sine muscipulis, quoniam fames mihi erat intus ab interiore cibo, te ipso, deus meus, et ea fame non esuriebam, sed eram sine desiderio alimentorum incorruptibilium, non quia plenus eis eram, sed quo inanior, fastidiosior, Conf. 3.1.1.

84 et ideo non bene valebat anima mea et ulcerosa proiciebat se foras, miserabiliter scalpi avida contactu sensibilium, Ibid.

85 amare et amari dulce mihi erat, magis si et amantis corpore fruerer, Ibid. !171 clouded over its clearness with the hell of impure desire.”86 Then comes taste again: “My God, my mercy, with how much gall did you sprinkle for me that sweetness, and how good you were to sprinkle it.”87 Augustine ends the paragraph with metaphors of touch: “I was loved and came in secret to the bond of enjoyment, and in my happiness was bound up in wretched chains, so that I might be struck with burning iron rods of jealousy and suspicions and fears and fits of anger and quarrels.”88 These sensory metaphors not only portray vividly Augustine’s spiritual state; they also suggest by their transference of meaning the idea of a hidden providence at work behind the outward appearances of Augustine’s life.

In Book Three, Augustine frequently uses metaphors that combine metaphorical sight and touch. For example, Augustine reintroduces the image of “the stream of friendship,”89 and wonders, “Why does it flow into a torrent of boiling pitch, the vast swells of hideous lusts, into which it is changed and turned by its own consent from heavenly clearness to something

86 venam igitur amicitiae coinquinabam sordibus concupiscentiae candoremque eius obnubilabam de tartaro libidinis, Conf. 3.1.1; cf. Ibid. 2.2.2; on the question of whether this passage implies homoerotic tendencies in Augustine’s youth, see A. G. Soble, “Correcting Some Misconceptions about St. Augustine's Sex Life,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 11:4 (2002): 545-569; M. Kuefler argues that Augustine had homosexual tendencies, but his reference to Soble is dismissive and misleading, and his arguments do not engage those of Soble (M. Kuefler, “Homosexuality: Augustine and the Christian Closet” in C. Chazelle et al., eds., Why the Middle Ages Matter: Medieval Light on Modern Injustice (London: Routledge, 2012): 77-89); for confirmation of Soble’s view, see E. Anagnostou-Laoutides, “Sexual Ethics and Unnatural Vice: From Zeno and Musonius Rufus to Augustine and Aquinas,” in W. Mayer and I. J. Elmer, eds., Men and Women in the Early Christian Centuries (Strathfield, Australia: St. Paul’s, 2014): 272-3, n. 5; also, V. Burrus, “2010 NAPS Presidential Address: ‘Fleeing the Uxorious Kingdom’: Augustine’s Queer Theology of Marriage” JECS 19:1 (2011): 16; M. Miles examines this passage and concludes that there is “some evidence that the young Augustine had male as well as female lovers. The evidence should be acknowledged, but I consider it inconclusive” (M. M. Miles, “To Die For: Bodies, Pleasures, and the Young Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 48:1–2 (2017): 96).

87 deus meus, misericordia mea, quanto felle mihi suavitatem illam et quam bonus aspersisti, Conf. 3.1.1; cf. 1.14.23, 2.2.4 (see above, pp. 160f., n. 41).

88 amatus sum, et perveni occulte ad vinculum fruendi, et conligabar laetus aerumnosis nexibus, ut caederer virgis ferreis ardentibus zeli et suspicionum et timorum et irarum atque rixarum, Conf. 3.1.1.

89 vena amicitiae, Ibid. 3.2.3; cf. 3.1.1. !172 distorted and sunken?” The “hideous lusts” (taetrarum libidinum) could also mean more generally “loathsome lusts,” but here the metaphor is clearly visual.90 Likewise, the metaphor of a “torrent of boiling pitch” (torrentem picis bullientis) not only recalls the “torrent” turned to

“burning pitch” of Isaiah 34:9;91 it also recalls Augustine’s tactile metaphor of “frothing up with fornications.”92 Thus, Augustine’s lust is both seen (“hideous”) and felt (“torrent of boiling pitch”). Similarly, the “vast swells” (aestus immanes) here could be taken to refer to the glowing heat of a fire,93 or the motion of waves on the sea,94 or both.95

In the following paragraph of Book Three, Augustine introduces another, related metaphor that combines visual and tactile elements. In discussing his past love of theatrical spectacles, and his enjoyment of seeing the suffering of others acted out on stage, Augustine poses a rhetorical question:

Yet what wonder was it that I, an unfortunate sheep wandering from your fold and unable to endure your watchful care, was disfigured with filthy scabs? And from this came my love of griefs, not with the kind that penetrated too deeply (for I did not love to endure myself the things I loved to watch), but when I heard these things performed I was lightly

90 There are three reasons to regard this as a visual metaphor: 1) Augustine usually presents lusts as “dark” or “cloudy” (cf. in affectu ergo libidinoso, id enim est tenebroso, Conf. 1.18.28; cf. also 2.2.2, 3.1.1.); 2) he elsewhere uses “hideous” (taeter) in a visual sense (Ciu. 6.10, 11.19, 21.4, 21.7; Faust. 20.3.); and 3) lusts are here connected with what is “distorted and sunken” (detorta atque deiecta), in contrast with “clearness” (serenitate).

91 et convertentur torrentes ejus in picem, et humus ejus in sulphur; et erit terra ejus in picem ardentem, Is 34:9 (Vg.); cf. O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 155.

92 ebulliebam per fornicationes meas, Conf. 2.2.2 (quoted and discussed above, pp. 163-6, esp. n. 54); Augustine’s own adolescent struggles with lust are mirrored in the account of Monica’s youthful temptation to drink (non enim ulla temulenta cupidine faciebat hoc, sed quibusdam superfluentibus aetatis excessibus, qui ludicris motibus ebulliunt et in puerilibus animis maiorum pondere premi solent, Ibid. 9.8.18); cf. O’Donnell, v. 3, pp. 117-118.

93 Lewis and Short, “aestus,” IA.

94 Ibid. IB.

95 Metaphorical “swelling/burning” with desire also has a positive sense in Augustine, as when he reads Cicero’s Hortensius (et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu cordis incredibili, Conf. 3.4.7). !173 scratched, as it were. There followed upon these [griefs], as upon the scratchings of nails, a red-hot swollenness and decay and foul discharge.96

Here the tactile and visual elements are inextricable: the scabs (scabies) are something that itches, yet they are also “filthy” (turpis) to look at; the scratching nails lead to a “swollenness” that is “redhot” (fervidus tumor)—both visible and tangible. The connection between touch and sight, especially the image of a “swollenness”, picks up on the connection between Augustine’s blindness and fatness noted in Book Two.97

Augustine returns to this image of a “swollenness” later in Book Three, when recounting his disappointment in reading the Christian Scriptures after reading Cicero’s Hortensius: “For my swollenness spurned its style, and my sight would not penetrate its more inward parts.”98

Augustine himself tells us how to interpret this metaphorical “swollenness,” when he says immediately afterward that he was “inflated with pride.”99 This is an image Augustine will return to in Book Seven, and only in Book Seven.

Metaphors of sight are by far the most prevalent sensory metaphors in Book Three. In addition to those already mentioned, Augustine frequently refers to spiritual “blindness,” whether

96 quid autem mirum, cum infelix pecus aberrans a grege tuo et impatiens custodiae tuae turpi scabie foedarer? et inde erant dolorum amores, non quibus altius penetrarer (non enim amabam talia perpeti qualia spectare), sed quibus auditis et fictis tamquam in superficie raderer. quos tamen quasi ungues scalpentium fervidus tumor et tabes et sanies horrida consequebatur, Conf. 3.2.4; the phrase “scratchings of nails” (ungues scalpentium; literally, “nails of scratchings”) is an example of “lexematic inversion”, which is not uncommon in metaphor (B. M. Dupriez, A Dictionary of Literary Devices: Gradus, A-Z, transl. by A. W. Halsall (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991): 208).

97 See above, pp. 166f.

98 tumor enim meus refugiebat modum eius, et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius, Conf. 3.5.9.

99 turgidus fastu, Ibid.; cf. et gaudebam superbe et tumebam typho, Ibid. 3.3.6. !174 that of humanity in general,100 or his own in particular.101 Augustine also addresses God as

“Light of my heart,”102 as “Beauty of all beautiful things,”103 and as “Truth, in whom there is no change or shadow of alteration.”104 By contrast, Augustine warns against “those who lead others astray through philosophy, coloring and painting over their errors with that great and charming and upright name.”105 He describes his Manichean period as nine years of “wallowing in deep mud and in the darkness of falsehood.”106 At the same time, Monica’s prayers for Augustine entered into God’s “sight,” but God allowed Augustine “to be rolled about and enveloped in darkness.”107 These metaphors of sight are accompanied by extended reflection on literal sights, whether theatrical spectacles,108 or the celestial bodies,109 and on the relationship between seeing physical objects, picturing physical objects in our mind, and conjecturing things that do not

100 tanta est caecitas hominum de caecitate etiam gloriantium, Conf. 3.3.6.

101 et reprehendebam caecus pios patres non solum, sicut deus iuberet atque inspiraret, utentes praesentibus verum quoque, sicut deus revelaret, futura praenuntiantes, Ibid. 3.7.14.

102 lumen cordis mei, Ibid. 3.4.8; cf. 1.13.21 (above, p. 157, n. 11).

103 pulchritudo pulchrorum omnium, Conf. 3.6.10.

104 te veritas, in qua non est commutatio nec momenti obumbratio, Ibid.; cf. Js 1:17.

105 sunt qui seducant per philosophiam magno et blando et honesto nomine colorantes et fucantes errores suos, Conf. 3.4.8.

106 nam novem ferme anni secuti sunt quibus ego in illo limo profundi ac tenebris falsitatis, Ibid. 3.11.20.

107 intrabant in conspectum tuum preces eius, et me tamen dimittebas adhuc volvi et involvi illa caligine, Ibid.

108 spectacula theatrica, Ibid. 3.2.2.

109 sol et luna, pulchra opera tua, Ibid. 3.6.10. !175 exist.110 As such, the metaphors of sight are occasioned by the reflections on literal sights. The literal is, yet again, the means to the metaphorical.

These metaphors of sight in Book Three are also an illustration of Augustine’s use of 1

John 2:16 to structure the narrative of the Confessions. As many commentators have noted,111 the three worldly temptations of “lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and pride of life,”112 are depicted in Books Two through Four, as Augustine suffers from them, and in reverse order in Books Six through Eight, as Augustine is given examples to overcome them. So Book Two focuses on

Augustine’s “lust of the flesh,” both in his sexual exploits and in his theft of pears, the former being noted for its metaphorical sweetness,113 and the latter for its (lack of) literal sweetness.114

Similarly, Book Three focuses on Augustine’s “lust of the eyes,” both in his love of literal spectacles, and in his metaphorical “blindness” and seeking after the false “visions” of the

Manichees.115

Augustine’s metaphorical “visions” and “phantasies” and “blindness” in Book Three are often linked with metaphors of taste. Augustine speaks of how the sun and moon, God’s

110 corporalia phantasmata, falsa corpora, quibus certiora sunt vera corpora ista quae videmus visu carneo, sive caelestia sive terrestria, cum pecudibus et volatilibus. videmus haec, et certiora sunt quam cum imaginamur ea. et rursus certius imaginamur ea quam ex eis suspicamur alia grandiora et infinita, quae omnino nulla sunt, Conf. 3.6.10.

111 esp. O’Donnell, Confessions, v. 1, xxxv-xxxvi; v. 2, pp. 65f., 102, 131, 152f., 170, 173, 179, 189, 191f.; cf. F. J. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1989): 87-89.

112 concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitae, 1 Jn 2:16 (Vg.).

113 amare et amari dulce mihi erat, Conf. 3.1.1; cf. amarissimis aspergens offensionibus omnes inlicitas iucunditates meas, Ibid. 2.2.4.

114 See above, pp. 168f., esp. n. 81.

115 cf. esp. Conf. 3.6.10. !176 “beautiful works” were brought to him on “platters” while he “hungered” for God.116 Augustine confesses to God, “I fed upon them, but not voraciously, for you did not taste in my mouth as you are (for you are not these empty imaginings), nor was I nourished by them, but rather emptied.”117 In the following discussion of literal and metaphorical sight, Augustine describes his former self as “held back from the husks of the pigs whom he fed with husks,”118 a clear reference to himself as the Prodigal Son.119 At the end of this paragraph, Augustine relates, “I met with that bold woman, void of prudence, the allegory of Solomon, sitting on a chair in the gates and saying, ‘Eat hidden bread with pleasure, and drink sweet stolen water.’120 She led me astray, for she found me dwelling outside in the eye of my flesh and chewing within on the things I had devoured through it.”121 Thus both literal and metaphorical sights can also be the objects of metaphorical taste. Visions can be offered on “platters” and “devoured” and “chewed.”

Here is yet another example of Augustine’s spiritual synaesthesia, and one that connects the sins of Book Three with those of Book Two. Just as the “sweet” sexual sins and the “sweet” theft of

116 et illa erant fercula in quibus mihi esurienti te inferebatur pro te sol et luna, pulchra opera tua, Conf. 3.6.10; cf. apponebantur adhuc mihi in illis ferculis phantasmata splendida, Ibid.

117 manducabam, non avide quidem, quia nec sapiebas in ore meo sicuti es (neque enim tu eras illa figmenta inania) nec nutriebar eis, sed exhauriebar magis, Ibid.; cf. qualibus ego tunc pascebar inanibus, et non pascebar, Ibid.

118 exclusus et a siliquis porcorum quos de siliquis pascebam, Ibid. 3.6.11.

119 et cupiebat implere ventrem suum de siliquis, quas porci manducabant: et nemo illi dabat, Lk 15:16 (Vg.); cf. O’Donnell, v. 2, pp. 181f.; Augustine invokes the image of the Prodigal Son throughout the Confessions, esp. at 1.18.28, 2.4.9, 4.16.30, 8.3.6, 8.3.8, 10.31.45; cf. O’Donnell, v. 2, pp. 95-98.

120 cf. Prv 9:13-17 (Vg.); for further discussion of this passage, see D. Shanzer, “Latent Narrative Patterns, Allegorical Choices, and Literary Unity in Augustine’s Confessions,” Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1992): 44f.

121 offendi illam mulierem audacem, inopem prudentiae, aenigma Salomonis, sedentem super sellam in foribus et dicentem, `panes occultos libenter edite, et aquam dulcem furtivam bibite.' quae me seduxit, quia invenit foris habitantem in oculo carnis meae et talia ruminantem apud me qualia per illum vorassem, Conf. 3.6.11. !177 (unsweet) pears were fleeting and false compared to the true “sweetness” of God,122 so in Book

Three the “sweetness” of the visions Augustine “devours,” whether literal spectacles in the theater, or the fantasies of the Manichees, are empty and unfulfilling in contrast to God, who is the true food that nourishes, the one for whom Augustine was truly hungering even when he fed on empty imaginings. Thus, the synaesthetic metaphors of sight and taste emphasize the contrast between the human and the divine, the temporal and the eternal, the lower things of sense, and the God who truly satisfies our deepest senses.

Furthermore, these metaphors of sight and taste are often related to metaphorical hearing.

Augustine says the Manichees, who offered up the sun and moon on “platters,” also “sounded forth your name to me, frequently and in many ways, with the voice alone and in books many and large.”123 Similarly, the bold woman of Solomon’s proverb is also presented as speaking to

Augustine when she entices him with “hidden bread” and “sweet stolen water.” These “voices” leading Augustine astray are in contrast with the “voice” at the close of Book Three, where the bishop’s words of comfort to Augustine’s mother—“It is not possible that the son of these tears of yours should perish”124—are taken by Monica “as if they sounded from heaven.”125 Here we have, again, the interconnectedness of human and divine dramas in the Confessions, the suggestion that God speaks in and through humans speaking.

122 dulcedo non fallax, dulcedo felix et secura, Conf. 2.1.1; see above, pp. 167ff.

123 cum te illi sonarent mihi frequenter et multipliciter voce sola et libris multis et ingentibus, Conf. 3.6.10; here the reference to “voice alone” and “books many and large” encompasses both literal and metaphorical speaking.

124 fieri non potest, ut filius istarum lacrimarum pereat, Ibid. 3.12.21.

125 ac si de caelo sonuisset, Ibid. !178 SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK FOUR

Augustine begins Book Four by confessing that from his nineteenth to his twenty-eighth year, he was himself “seduced and seduced others, deceived and deceiving in various desires, both openly by what they call the liberal arts, and secretly in the false name of religion.”126 He is thus concerned, at the outset of this book, with ideas of deception, hiddenness, and openness— what is “seen” and “unseen.” In recounting his pride and pursuit of worldly ambition, he mentions “trifling spectacles,”127 though in the period of Augustine’s life here recounted, he did not seek the theater as a leisurely escape from studies, but as a means to furthering his career.

Augustine wishes to confess to God his “unseemliness,”128 and says to him, “You saw from afar that I was sliding away on slippery ground and that my faith was still flickering in the midst of much smoke.”129 Thus Augustine is concerned also with what God sees and does not see.

This concern for what is seen and unseen, both by God and by Augustine, appears elsewhere in Book Four. When Augustine persuaded his unnamed friend to turn away from God, still God was “closing in on the back of those fleeing” from him.130 When his friend died,

Augustine’s “heart was overshadowed by the grief,”131 and “everything was horrible to look

126 per idem tempus annorum novem, ab undevicensimo anno aetatis meae usque ad duodetricensimum, seducebamur et seducebamus, falsi atque fallentes in variis cupiditatibus, et palam per doctrinas quas liberales vocant, occulte autem falso nomine religionis, Conf. 4.1.1.

127 spectaculorum nugas, Ibid.

128 ego tamen confitear tibi dedecora mea in laude tua, Ibid.

129 vidisti de longinquo lapsantem in lubrico et in multo fumo scintillantem fidem meam, Ibid. 4.2.2.

130 et ecce tu imminens dorso fugitivorum tuorum, Ibid. 4.4.7.

131 quo dolore contenebratum est cor meum, Ibid. 4.4.9; cf. tenebrae dolorum, Ibid. 4.9.14. !179 upon, even the light itself.”132 Similarly, Augustine tells of how, in this period of his life, he wrote his first work, On the Beautiful and the Fitting (De Pulchro et Apto),133 though he was still unable to grasp God by the efforts of his own understanding:

So was it then in me. I did not know that the mind must be illumined with another light to be a partaker of the truth, since it is not itself the nature of truth, ‘for you will light my lamp, O Lord,’ my God, ‘you will bring light to my darkness’134…. ‘for you are the true light that enlightens every man coming into this world,’135 since ‘in you there is no change or shadow of alteration.’136

Augustine sums up this stage of his life with a similar image: “I had my back to the light, and my face toward the things illumined by the light, hence my face, by which I discerned the things illumined, was not itself illumined.” This recurring image of Augustine in the dark, unable to see

God, signals again the idea of God’s hidden providence in and through the events of Augustine’s life: “I wandered in my pride and was carried about on every wind, and in a most hidden manner

I was being guided by you.”137

The metaphors of blindness and darkness are also a fitting way to represent Augustine’s failed attempts to attain the truth by his own efforts. As we have noted, Augustine draws an

132 horrebant omnia et ipsa lux, Conf. 4.7.12.

133 Ibid. 4.13.20.

134 cf. 2 Sm 22:29.

135 cf. Jn 1:9.

136 qualis in me tunc erat nesciente alio lumine illam inlustrandam esse, ut sit particeps veritatis, quia non est ipsa natura veritatis, quoniam tu inluminabis lucernam meam, domine. deus meus, inluminabis tenebras meas, et de plenitudine tua omnes nos accepimus. es enim tu lumen verum quod inluminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, quia in te non est transmutatio nec momenti obumbratio, Conf. 4.15.25; cf. Jas 1:17.

137 et errabam typho et circumferebar omni vento, et nimis occulte gubernabar abs te, Conf. 4.14.23. !180 analogy between reason and physical sight.138 Just as reason is an activity of the mind,139 so sight is for Augustine an active sense: the eye sends out rays of light to touch the object of vision.140

Thus visual metaphors are appropriate for representing Augustine’s past attempts to seek the truth on his own, especially in the context of Manicheanism. These attempts failed, thinks

Augustine, because God alone is the true source of enlightenment: “All the certainties of the sciences are like those things which are brought to light by the sun, that they may be seen, the earth, for instance, and the things upon it: while God is Himself the Illuminator.”141 These visual metaphors illustrate for Augustine the folly of pride and the need for humility: true enlightenment comes not from our own efforts, the activity of our sight, but from God bestowing his light upon us, and our willingness to receive it.

Augustine frequently uses auditory metaphors to indicate this need for God’s initiative to lead us to understanding. He not only depicts God illumining us from within; he also speaks of

God’s voice calling us back to himself: “Am I able to hear from you, who are truth, and to place the ear of my heart to your mouth, so that you may tell me why weeping is sweet to those who are wretched?”142 “Do not be vain, my soul, nor become deaf in the ear of your heart on account

138 Sol. 1.6.12; see above, pp. 57f., esp. n. 233.

139 ratio est mentis motio, Ord. 2.11.30.

140 See above, esp. pp. 62f.

141 disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut uideri possint, ueluti terra est atque terrena omnia: deus autem est ipse qui illustrat, Sol. 1.6.12; transl. by C. C. Starbuck in P. Schaff, ed., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing, 1888); see above, p. 57, n. 233.

142 possumne audire abs te, qui veritas es, et admovere aurem cordis mei ori tuo, ut dicas mihi cur fletus dulcis sit miseris? Conf. 4.5.10. !181 of the tumult of your vanity. Hear you: the Word itself cries aloud for you to return.”143 Similarly

Augustine indicates the role of words in the work of the Incarnation:

This our very life descended to this world, and bore our death and killed it out of the abundance of his life, and he sounded forth, crying aloud for us to return from this world to him, to that secret place from which he came to us, at first in the very womb of the virgin, where human nature, our mortal flesh, was wedded to him, that it might not be forever mortal. From there he proceeded, ‘a bridegroom from his bridal chamber, rejoicing as a great man to run his course.’ For he did not delay, but ran forth, crying aloud by words, by deeds, by death, by life, by his descent, by his ascent, crying aloud for us to return to him: he departed from our eyes, that we might return to him; he departed from our eyes, that we might return to the heart and find him there.144

As in Augustine’s early dialogues, words have a kind of priority. Words and deeds, death and life, descending and ascending, are all ways that the Word cries aloud to us. All these things sound to us from outside, and are received by us so that, though he has departed from our eyes, we might turn within and see him. Hearing leads to seeing.

Augustine also discerns an analogy between words and the splendors of the created order of the universe:

For wherever the soul of man turns itself, it is fixed on sorrows anywhere else than in you, even if it is fixed on beautiful things apart from you and apart from itself. Yet these things would not be, if they were not from you. They rise and fall, and in their rising, as it were, they begin to be; they grow to reach their completion, and having reached their completion, they grow old and die: not all things grow old, but all things die. So when they rise and endeavor to be, the more quickly they grow toward being, the more they hasten toward not being: such is the way of these things. This much you have granted them, since they are parts of things that do not exist all at once, but by departing and

143 noli esse vana, anima mea, et obsurdescere in aure cordis tumultu vanitatis tuae. audi et tu: verbum ipsum clamat ut redeas, Conf. 4.11.16.

144 et descendit huc ipsa vita nostra, et tulit mortem nostram et occidit eam de abundantia vitae suae, et tonuit, clamans ut redeamus hinc ad eum in illud secretum unde processit ad nos, in ipsum primum virginalem uterum ubi ei nupsit humana creatura, caro mortalis, ne semper mortalis. et inde velut sponsus procedens de thalamo suo exultavit ut gigans ad currendam viam. non enim tardavit, sed cucurrit clamans dictis, factis, morte, vita, descensu, ascensu, clamans ut redeamus ad eum: et discessit ab oculis, ut redeamus ad eum. et discessit ab oculis, ut redeamus ad cor et inveniamus eum, Ibid. 4.12.19. !182 following in turn they all give rise to the universe, of which they are parts. (For in this way also our speech is accomplished by sounds that signify. For there will be no complete speech, if one word does not depart, when its parts are sounded, so that another word may follow in turn.)145

Just as all created things are coming to be and passing away, and by this temporality make up the created universe, so also our speech involves coming to be and passing away, and depends on this temporal and sequential nature in order to communicate.146 Yet it is precisely on account of their sequential nature that created things fail to satisfy us when we make them the ultimate object of our love. “They go where they are going, so that they cease to be, and tear the soul apart with deadly desires, for the soul wishes to be and loves to rest in the things that it loves. Yet in these things there is no such place, since they do not last.”147 We must instead, Augustine insists, make God our ultimate object of love: “But far better than these things is he who made all things, and he is our God, and he does not pass away, since there is none to follow after him.”148

Yet the contrast between God’s eternal immutability and the temporal mutability of created things does not, for Augustine, mean that the world of sense is to be abandoned completely. “If bodies please you, praise God for them and turn back your love to their maker,

145 nam quoquoversum se verterit anima hominis, ad dolores figitur alibi praeterquam in te, tametsi figitur in pulchris extra te et extra se. quae tamen nulla essent, nisi essent abs te. quae oriuntur et occidunt et oriendo quasi esse incipiunt, et crescunt ut perficiantur, et perfecta senescunt et intereunt: et non omnia senescunt, et omnia intereunt. ergo cum oriuntur et tendunt esse, quo magis celeriter crescunt ut sint, eo magis festinant ut non sint: sic est modus eorum. tantum dedisti eis, quia partes sunt rerum, quae non sunt omnes simul, sed decedendo ac succedendo agunt omnes universum, cuius partes sunt. (ecce sic peragitur et sermo noster per signa sonantia. non enim erit totus sermo, si unum verbum non decedat, cum sonuerit partes suas, ut succedat aliud.), Conf. 4.10.15.

146 nam et quod loquimur per eundem sensum carnis audis, et non vis utique stare syllabas sed transvolare, ut aliae veniant et totum audias, Ibid. 4.11.17.

147 eunt enim quo ibant, ut non sint, et conscindunt eam desideriis pestilentiosis, quoniam ipsa esse vult et requiescere amat in eis quae amat. in illis autem non est ubi, quia non stant, Ibid. 4.10.15.

148 sed longe his melior qui fecit omnia, et ipse est deus noster, et non discedit, quia nec succeditur ei, Ibid. 4.11.17. !183 lest in these things that please you, you become displeasing. If souls please you, let them be loved in God, since in themselves they are mutable, but in him they find their fixed place.”149

Just as Augustine’s metaphors work by means of the literal meaning, so also, for Augustine, God is loved by means of our love for bodies and souls. As we have already seen in Augustine’s early works,150 the proper response is not to turn away from created things, but to look through them to

God, to see them and love them in God. Then they become fixed and find their true place. In God they find their true sweetness.151

This image of standing fast in God introduces a metaphor of touch. For when Augustine speaks of his loves as involving “weight,” he understands “weight” as something felt;152 it pulls us in one direction or another, it propels us to a resting place.153 Thus Augustine says of his grief over the death of his friend, “I was weeping most bitterly and resting in my bitterness.”154 Here

“resting” involves the sense of “coming to rest,” and implies that his love was pulling him in this direction. Yet he was also beginning to experience another kind of pull, another weight: “But in me there had arisen some feeling very much the opposite of this, and the weariness of living was

149 si placent corpora, deum ex illis lauda et in artificem eorum retorque amorem, ne in his quae tibi placent tu displiceas. si placent animae, in deo amentur, quia et ipsae mutabiles sunt et in illo fixae stabiliuntur, Conf. 4.12.18; cf. Ibid. 13.31.46.

150 See above, pp. 142f., 146f.

151 sed quantum est ad illum, bonum est et suave; sed amarum erit iuste, quia iniuste amatur deserto illo quidquid ab illo est, Conf. 4.12.18.

152 See above, p. 156, n. 5.

153 quo tamquam pondere sursum uel introrsum referamur ad requiem, Ep. 55.11.21; cf. pondus omnem rem ad quietem ac stabilitatem trahit, Lib. 4.3.7; cf. in suae pacis ordinem tendit et locum quo requiescat quodam modo uoce ponderis poscit, Ciu. 19.12; cf. Ep. 55.10.18; cf. Plot. 4.3.13.

154 flebam amarissime et requiescebam in amaritudine, Conf. 4.6.11. !184 most heavy upon me, and the fear of dying.”155 Here we have the negative sense of “weight,” something “most heavy” (gravissimum) dragging Augustine down. Augustine returns to this metaphor of a wretched weight in the following paragraph: “I was carrying about my pierced and bleeding soul, which could not bear being carried by me, and I could find nowhere I might put it down. Not in lovely groves, not in games and songs, not in sweet-smelling places, not in sumptuous banquets, not in the enjoyment of couch and bed, and not, at last, in books and poetry could it find rest.”156 Note here the ordered list of (literal) senses: sight (“lovely groves”), hearing (“games and songs”), smell (“sweet-smelling places”), taste (“sumptuous banquets”) and touch (“enjoyment of couch and bed”).157 Augustine’s point is that none of the things of (literal) sense could provide a proper “resting place” for the (metaphorical) heaviness of his soul.

Groaning and tears provided him “a little rest” (aliquantula requies),158 but “when my soul was carried away from these, it weighed me down with a great burden of misery.”159 The real place of rest is with God.

This point is brought out more clearly in Augustine’s immediately following discussion:

To you, Lord, [my soul] should have been lifted up and healed, I knew, but I was neither willing nor able, especially because you were not to me something solid and firm, when I thought about you. For you were not, but an empty phantasm and my error was my god. If I tried to place my soul there that it might rest, it would slip through the empty space

155 sed in me nescio quis affectus nimis huic contrarius ortus erat, et taedium vivendi erat in me gravissimum et moriendi metus, Conf. 4.6.11.

156 non in amoenis nemoribus, non in ludis atque cantibus, nec in suave olentibus locis, nec in conviviis apparatis, neque in voluptate cubilis et lecti, non denique in libris atque carminibus adquiescebat, Ibid. 4.7.12.

157 cf. C. Starnes, Augustine’s Conversion: A Guide to the Argument of Confessions I-IX. (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University, 1990): 97.

158 Conf. 4.7.12.

159 ubi autem inde auferebatur anima mea, onerabat me grandi sarcina miseriae, Ibid. !185 and rush back upon me, and I remained for myself a place of misfortune, where I could not live, yet which I could not leave.160

Here we have the image of youthful Augustine as a “wasteland,”161 which recalls the wanderings of the Prodigal Son.162 Thus we have Augustine’s failure to attain rest by having his love’s

“weight” lifted up and placed in God.

The solution to this restless wandering is proposed in Augustine’s extended apostrophe to his soul,163 which begins, “Do not be vain, my soul, nor become deaf in the ear of your heart on account of the tumult of your vanity. Hear you: the Word itself cries aloud for you to return.”164

Augustine then proposes, within this extended apostrophe, that his soul address other souls:

“Take with you to [God] whatever souls you can and say to them, ‘Let us love him: he made these things and is not far off…. Stand with him and you shall stand, rest in him and you shall be at rest.’”165 So in contrast to the image of his wandering, which Augustine described with metaphors of touch, he presents the solution to this wandering as a verbal admonition, a kind of

160 non enim tu eras, sed vanum phantasma et error meus erat deus meus. si conabar eam ibi ponere ut requiesceret, per inane labebatur et iterum ruebat super me, et ego mihi remanseram infelix locus, ubi nec esse possem nec inde recedere, Conf. 4.7.12.

161 cf. et factus sum mihi regio egestatis, Ibid. 2.10.18; cf. et ego ibam porro longe a te in plura et plura sterilia semina dolorum, Ibid. 2.2.2.

162 On implicit and explicit references to the Prodigal Son in Augustine, see above, p. 177, n. 119.

163 Conf. 4.11.16-4.12.19.

164 noli esse vana, anima mea, et obsurdescere in aure cordis tumultu vanitatis tuae. audi et tu: verbum ipsum clamat ut redeas, Ibid. 4.11.16; see above, pp. 181f., esp. n. 143.

165 rape ad eum tecum quas potes et dic eis: `hunc amemus: ipse fecit haec et non est longe….state cum eo et stabitis, requiescite in eo et quieti eritis, Conf. 4.12.18; the represented discourse of the soul to other souls extends from 4.12.18 (‘hunc amemus . . . .’) to the end of 4.12.19 (‘ . . . ascendendo contra deum’); see O’Donnell, v. 2., p. 241. !186 word—even a word within a word. Moreover, this word, as noted above,166 is another example of hearing-leading-to-seeing.

Similarly, Augustine shows how touch leads to taste, when he describes his friend whose early death caused him so much grief.167 This friendship was “too sweet, ripened by the warmth of our shared interests.”168 Just as hanging fruit is touched by the sun and so brought to full sweetness, so Augustine’s friendship was touched by the warmth of shared pursuits, and so brought to full enjoyment. This kind of spiritual synaesthesia differs, however, from the examples we have seen of hearing that leads to seeing. For here the warmth that leads to sweetness is a fleshly warmth and a fleeting sweetness, but the hearing that leads to seeing is, for

Augustine, a divine Word calling us to a vision that is ultimately beatific.

Augustine returns at the end of Book Four to the metaphor of being carried and standing firm in God:

You will carry us when we are little, and you will carry us even in our old age, for when you are our strength, then it is strength, but when our strength is our own, it is weakness. Our good lives always with you, and since we are turned away from it, we are turned awry. Let us return now, Lord, lest we be overturned, for with you lives our good without any failing; you yourself are this good, and we do not fear that there should be no place to which we might return, just because we fell away from it. Though we were away, our house, your eternity, did not fall away.169

166 pp. 181f.

167 Conf. 4.4.7-4.9.14.

168 sed tamen dulcis erat nimis, cocta fervore parilium studiorum, Ibid. 4.4.7; transl. C. Hammond.

169 tu portabis et parvulos et usque ad canos tu portabis, quoniam firmitas nostra quando tu es, tunc est firmitas, cum autem nostra est, infirmitas est. vivit apud te semper bonum nostrum, et quia inde aversi sumus, perversi sumus. revertamur iam, domine, ut non evertamur, quia vivit apud te sine ullo defectu bonum nostrum, quod tu ipse es, et non timemus ne non sit quo redeamus, quia nos inde ruimus. nobis autem absentibus non ruit domus nostra, aeternitas tua, Ibid. 4.16.31. !187 Augustine closes Book Four, then, with the contrast between human frailty and divine strength, between our futile attempts to find rest in earthly things, and the ultimate rest that is found only in God. These metaphors of touch, like the metaphors of sight discussed above,170 illustrate

Augustine’s characteristic struggle in the narrative of Book Four with “the pride of life” (ambitio saeculi).171

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK FIVE

As has often been noted, Book Five marks a turning point in the narrative (Books One through Nine) of the Confessions.172 In the middle of Book Five, Augustine sails from Carthage to Rome. “The result is that the story as a whole falls into two parts, the first half in Africa and the second half in Italy.”173 The “African half” involves Augustine wandering far from God and from himself, suffering from “lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and pride of life.” By contrast, the “Italian half” shows Augustine’s gradual return to God and self, a kind of spiritual homecoming. The text thus presents obvious parallels to the wanderings of Aeneas: readers of

Augustine’s Confessions “could be expected to hear Virgil when the story’s hero, at the harbor of

Carthage, lies to a woman who loves him and sails off in secret to Rome, on a journey directed

170 pp. 180f.

171 cf. 1 Jn 2:16 (Vg.); see O’Donnell, v. 2, pp. 204, 231; see also F. J. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 63 (1989): 87-89.

172 See esp. O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 281; also F. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning,” 87-89.

173 F. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning,” 87. !188 by God.”174 These parallels, and the specific nature of Book Five as a hinge in the narrative, are underscored by Augustine’s sensory metaphors.

For example, Augustine opens Book Five with one of his most striking metaphors:

“Accept the sacrifice of my confessions from the hand of my tongue.”175 Augustine’s confessions

(i.e., his book, the Confessions) are spoken by his tongue, which is a metaphorical hand offering a metaphorical sacrifice. We have here the reminder that the Confessions operates on two levels: it is intended to be read by other men, but it is ultimately directed to God.176 We also see here that Augustine regards this text as something spoken and heard, a product of his tongue—in short, a word. Finally, we have here the suggestion of synaesthesia in the fact that Augustine’s tongue is a hand. Similarly, Augustine combines metaphors of sight and touch when he appropriates the words of the Psalmist: “there is no one who can hide from your heat.”177 He goes on to include metaphors of hearing, touch, and taste:

Your whole creation neither ceases nor keeps silent from your praises, nor does every spirit through a mouth turned back to you, nor do animals or bodily creatures through the mouth of those who contemplate them, that our soul might rise up to you out of its

174 G. Clark, “City of Books: Augustine and the World as Text,” in W. Klingshirn and L. Safran, eds., The Early Christian Book (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007): 127.

175 accipe sacrificium confessionum mearum de manu linguae meae, Conf. 5.1.1; O’Donnell notes, “Cf. perhaps Prov. 18.21, `mors et vita in manibus linguae' (Knauer 151 says without evidence that manu is VL, but the half- dozen citations at La Bonnardière Biblia Augustiniana: Proverbes 218-219 all show the plural)” (O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 282); yet the Vulgate reading is the singular (mors et vita in manu linguae), as are the references to this biblical passage in Paulinus Ep. 13.17 and Aug. Speculum 7; for the plural (in manibus linguae), cf. Qu. Eu. 2.38, Psal. 72.30, 120.11, Serm. 16A, Petil. 2.92.202, Nat. et or. 4.16.23.

176 cf. hic est fructus confessionum mearum, non qualis fuerim sed qualis sim, ut hoc confitear non tantum coram te, secreta exultatione cum tremore et secreto maerore cum spe, sed etiam in auribus credentium filiorum hominum, Conf. 10.4.6.

177 non est qui se abscondat a calore tuo, Conf. 5.1.1; cf. 9.4.8; cf. also Ps 18:7 (Vg.). !189 weariness, leaning on the things you have made and passing on to you, who have made them in a marvelous way. There, indeed, is refreshment and true strength.178

Everything in creation offers a word of praise, rational creatures directly when turned to God, animals and other bodily creatures indirectly through the contemplation of rational men. These creatures are, then, a word, yet they are also something the soul can lean on, rest on, as it rises upward to God. These objects of hearing and touch lead ultimately to refreshment (refectio), which is for Augustine something tasted.179 Notice, too, that the soul rising up to God does not shun the created things entirely, but is leaning on them (innitens), as it passes on to its final resting place. As in the early dialogues,180 so here too the ascent to God is by means of the created order.181

Similarly, Augustine presents the two pivotal figures of Book Five in terms of taste. On the one hand, the Manichean bishop Faustus was a “great snare of the Devil” entangling many

“by the enticement of his sweet speech.”182 On the other hand, Ambrose gave Augustine delight

“by the sweetness of his expression,”183 and (more importantly) “his eloquence in those days actively served your people the richness of your grain, the gladness of your oil, and the sober

178 non cessat nec tacet laudes tuas universa creatura tua, nec spiritus omnis per os conversum ad te, nec animalia nec corporalia per os considerantium ea, ut exsurgat in te a lassitudine anima nostra, innitens eis quae fecisti et transiens ad te, qui fecisti haec mirabiliter. et ibi refectio et vera fortitudo, Conf. 5.1.1.

179 Augustine consistently uses refectio in the context of eating and drinking (Mor. 2.13.30; Epp. 36.5.12, 36.12.27, 36.13.31, 54.5.7, 262.8; Litt. 3.16.25, 4.2.6, 12.17.34; Hept. 1.34, 1.41; Serm. Dom. 1.4.12, 1.23.79; Psal. 84.10, et al.); cf. Mk 14:14 (Vg.).

180 See above, pp. 142f., esp. n. 93.

181 See also above, pp. 183f.

182 magnus laqueus diaboli, et multi implicabantur in eo per inlecebram suaviloquentiae, Conf. 5.3.3.

183 et delectabar suavitate sermonis, Ibid. 5.13.23. !190 intoxication of your wine.”184 Thus Augustine exploits the ambiguity of “sweetness” to signal both the difference between Faustus and Ambrose, and his own resulting change of course in

Book Five. He approached Faustus with great hopes, but was disappointed to find his sweet speech empty of wisdom; he attended to Ambrose purely for his sweetness of discourse, but was surprised to find wisdom in his words. Furthermore, Augustine emphasizes that it was his openness to the manner of Ambrose’s speech that allowed him to receive the truths it contained.185 The words (verba) were the vehicle for the things themselves (res). 186

Augustine likewise exploits the ambiguity of “sight” to indicate his movement in Book

Five away from the Manichees. For when he relates his plan at the time to compare the teachings of the Manichees with the doctrines of the philosophers,187 he depicts the latter as concerned with literal sights (“they predicted many years beforehand eclipses of the great luminaries, the sun and moon”188), and characterized by metaphorical blindness (“through impious pride they fell away and were eclipsed from your light”189). Augustine thus emphasizes the pridefulness of relying too much on the activity of metaphorical “sight.”190 Yet even these philosophers spoke truths

184 cuius tunc eloquia strenue ministrabant adipem frumenti tui et laetitiam olei et sobriam vini ebrietatem populo tuo, Conf. 5.13.23; cf. Ambrose, Ep. 14 (63).30.

185 et dum cor aperirem ad excipiendum quam diserte diceret, pariter intrabat et quam vere diceret, gradatim quidem, Conf. 5.14.24.

186 veniebant in animum meum simul cum verbis quae diligebam res etiam quas neglegebam, Ibid.

187et quoniam multa philosophorum legeram memoriaeque mandata retinebam, ex eis quaedam comparabam illis manichaeorum longis fabulis, et mihi probabiliora ista videbantur quae dixerunt illi qui tantum potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum, quamquam eius dominum minime invenerint, Ibid. 5.3.3.

188 praenuntiaverunt ante multos annos defectus luminarium solis et lunae, Ibid. 5.3.4.

189 per impiam superbiam recedentes et deficientes a lumine tuo, Ibid.; cf. obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum, Ibid. 5.3.5; cf. student perversissima caecitate etiam tibi tribuere quae sua sunt, Ibid.

190 See above, pp. 179-81. !191 corroborated by “the visible testimonies of the stars.”191 By contrast, the Manichees commanded belief in things that contradicted “the calculations proven by mathematics and my own eyes.”192

So even if the cleverness of the philosophers in predicting eclipses does not preclude their own eclipse from the light of true wisdom, still their appeal to visible testimony, however incomplete, is enough to expose the falseness of the Manichean demand for blind obedience.

Augustine makes it clear these philosophers are not themselves the source of ultimate light and truth; they merely shed enough light to help him see the darkness of Manichean teaching: “But since these philosophers lacked the saving name of Christ, I altogether refused to commit to them the cure of my soul’s weariness. I therefore decided to remain a catechumen in the Catholic Church commended to me by my parents, until something certain might shine forth, by which I could direct my course.”193 Book Five thus ends with a metaphor of (anticipated) sight to underline the fact that, for all his deliberate and decisive change of course, Augustine has not reached the end of his journey. In fact, his journey back has only just begun.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK SIX

Just as Book Five ends with a metaphor of sight, so Book Six begins with one: “I walked through shadows and along a slippery path, and I sought you outside of myself, and I did not find

191 visibiles attestationes siderum, Conf. 5.3.6.

192 ibi autem credere iubebar, et ad illas rationes numeris et oculis meis exploratas non occurrebat, et longe diversum erat, Ibid.

193 quibus tamen philosophis, quod sine salutari nomine Christi essent, curationem languoris animae meae committere omnino recusabam. statui ergo tamdiu esse catechumenus in catholica ecclesia mihi a parentibus commendata, donec aliquid certi eluceret quo cursum dirigerem, Ibid. 5.14.25. !192 the God of my heart. I had gone down into the depth of the sea, and I was unsure, and despaired of finding the truth.”194 Book Six thus presents Augustine as still seeking God in the darkness of doubt, and Monica praying that God would “enlighten my darkness.”195As this darkness is connected with the pride of Augustine’s worldly ambitions,196 Book Six is parallel to Book Four, concerned as it is with Augustine’s “pride of life” (ambitio saeculi).197 Another example of this parallelism is the reference to “a slippery path” (lubricum), which recalls the passage in Book

Four where Augustine speaks of “sliding away on slippery ground” (lapsantem in lubrico).198

The metaphors of touch in Book Six offer further specific parallels with Book Four. First, just as in Book Four Augustine speaks of being “weighed down with a great burden of misery,”199 so here in Book Six he speaks of “dragging along the burden of misfortune, and magnifying it by dragging it along.”200 Second, in Book Four Augustine says, “I wandered in my pride and was carried about on every wind, and in a most hidden manner I was being guided by you;” in Book Six he says, “While I was saying this and the winds were altering and driving my heart to and fro, time passed and I delayed converting to the Lord.”201 Third, Augustine says in

194 et ambulabam per tenebras et lubricum et quaerebam te foris a me, et non inveniebam deum cordis mei. et veneram in profundum maris, et diffidebam et desperabam de inventione veri, Conf. 6.1.1.

195 inluminares tenebras meas, Ibid.; cf. 2 Sm. 22:29, Ps 17:29 (Vg.), quoted at Conf. 4.15.25 (see above, p. 180, n. 136).

196 non enim verum gaudium habebat, sed et ego illis ambitionibus multo falsius quaerebam, Conf. 6.6.9.

197 See above, pp. 187ff., esp. n. 171.

198 See above, p. 179, esp. n. 129; these are the only two instances of lubricum in Conf.

199 onerabat me grandi sarcina miseriae, Conf. 4.7.12; see above, p. 185, n. 159.

200 trahens infelicitatis meae sarcinam et trahendo exaggerans, Conf. 6.6.9; cf. a quorum ego quidem granditate animi longe aberam et deligatus morbo carnis mortifera suavitate trahebam catenam meam, Conf. 6.12.21.

201 cum haec dicebam et alternabant hi venti et impellebant huc atque illuc cor meum, transibant tempora et tardabam converti ad dominum, Ibid. 6.11.20. !193 Book Six, “This wound of mine was not yet healed which had been made by the cutting away of my former partner, but after a fever and most intense suffering, it festered.”202 This recalls both

Augustine’s extended apostrophe to his soul in Book Four, with the promise “your every rottenness will grow to flower again, and your every weariness will be healed,”203 and

Augustine’s unnamed friend who died of a “fever,”204 whose friendship with Augustine was

“ripened by the warmth of shared interests.”205 These parallels show multiple kinds of synaesthesia, as Augustine’s wound is accompanied by fever (i.e., touch) and decay (i.e., smell),206 and he drags along his chains “bound by a disease of the flesh with deadly sweetness.”207

Book Six provides several other metaphors of taste. For example, Augustine suffered

“most bitter difficulties” in the midst of his desires for wealth and honor,208 and God “did not let anything become sweet” to Augustine apart from God himself.209 Thus Augustine proposes again the contrast between earthly “tastes” (seemingly sweet,210 but ultimately bitter)211 and the “true

202 nec sanabatur vulnus illud meum quod prioris praecisione factum erat, sed post fervorem doloremque acerrimum putrescebat, Conf. 6.15.25.

203 reflorescent putria tua, et sanabuntur omnes languores tui, Ibid. 4.11.16.

204 Ibid. 4.4.8.

205 cocta fervore parilium studiorum, Ibid. 4.4.7; see above, p. 187, n. 168.

206 See above, p. 163, n. 49.

207 deligatus morbo carnis mortifera suavitate trahebam catenam meam, Conf. 6.12.21.

208 patiebar in eis cupiditatibus amarissimas difficultates, Ibid. 6.6.9.

209 sinebas mihi dulcescere quod non eras tu, Ibid.

210 iucunda sunt etiam ista, habent non parvam dulcedinem suam, Ibid. 6.11.19; cf. nec considerabam miser ex qua vena mihi manaret quod ista ipsa foeda tamen cum amicis dulciter conferebam, Ibid. 6.16.26.

211 cf. et in omni amaritudine quae nostros saeculares actus de misericordia tua sequebatur, intuentibus nobis finem cur ea pateremur, occurrebant tenebrae, Ibid. 6.10.17. !194 sweetness” of God. The earthly “taste” is portrayed also in Alypius, who “drank in the cruelty” of the gladiatorial combat and “became drunk with bloody enjoyment.”212 The divine “taste” is found both in Ambrose, whose “secret mouth, within his heart, savored such delicious joys from

[God’s] bread,”213 and in Monica, who “said she could discern by a kind of savor, which she could not explain in words, the difference between [God’s] revealing and her own soul’s dreaming.”214

The “bitter difficulties” Augustine faced in his earthly desires are connected to sight and touch: “In every bitterness that from your mercy followed upon our worldly deeds, when we considered the reason why we should suffer these things, we were met with darkness . . . for nothing certain shone forth which we, leaving these things behind, might grasp.”215 Bitterness brought darkness, leaving Augustine to await a light that could be touched. These examples of synaesthesia provide another parallel with Book Four, where Augustine combines taste and touch: “I was weeping most bitterly and resting in my bitterness.”216 They also recall the very end of Book Five, with Augustine waiting “until something certain might shine forth, by which I could direct my course.”217

212 immanitatem simul ebibit . . . et cruenta voluptate inebriabatur, Conf. 6.8.13.

213 occultum os eius, quod erat in corde eius, quam sapida gaudia de pane tuo ruminaret, Ibid. 6.3.3.

214 dicebat enim discernere se nescio quo sapore, quem verbis explicare non poterat, quid interesset inter revelantem te et animam suam somniantem, Ibid. 6.13.23.

215 et in omni amaritudine quae nostros saeculares actus de misericordia tua sequebatur, intuentibus nobis finem cur ea pateremur, occurrebant tenebrae . . . quia non elucebat certum aliquid quod illis relictis apprehenderemus, Ibid. 6.10.17.

216 flebam amarissime et requiescebam in amaritudine, Ibid. 4.6.11; see above, p. 184, n. 154.

217 See above, p. 192, n. 193. !195 Augustine provides many other examples in Book Six of synaesthesia with metaphors of touch. For example, Augustine speaks of how God used him unwittingly to rebuke Alypius:

“from my heart and tongue you fashioned burning coals, by which you might cauterize and heal a promising mind that was wasting away.”218 Augustine’s literal words led to metaphorical touch.

In addition, Augustine combines literal sight and metaphorical touch in his description of the amphitheater when Alypius was dragged there by his friends: “the whole place burned with the most savage passions.”219 This scene also shows the contrast between the activity of sight and the passivity of hearing: Alypius “closed his eyes and forbade his mind to enter into such great evils.

If only he had closed his ears as well! For at some downfall in the fight, when a mighty roar from the whole crowd struck him violently, he was overcome by curiosity and . . . opened his eyes.”220

Here we have an instance of literal hearing leading to literal seeing: “The shout entered through his ears and opened his eyes.”221

The synaesthesia of hearing leading to sight appears elsewhere in Book Six. For

Augustine took delight in hearing Ambrose preaching to the people,222 “since he would draw aside the veil of mystery and lay open in a spiritual manner the things which seemed to teach falsehood when taken literally.”223 Augustine further connects this hearing to believing: “I was

218 de corde et lingua mea carbones ardentes operatus es, quibus mentem spei bonae adureres tabescentem ac sanares, Conf. 6.7.12.

219 fervebant omnia immanissimis voluptatibus, Ibid. 6.8.13.

220 ille clausis foribus oculorum interdixit animo ne in tanta mala procederet. atque utinam et aures obturavisset! nam quodam pugnae casu, cum clamor ingens totius populi vehementer eum pulsasset, curiositate victus . . . aperuit oculos, Ibid.

221 per eius aures intravit et reseravit eius lumina, Ibid.

222 saepe in popularibus sermonibus suis dicentem Ambrosium laetus audiebam, Ibid. 6.4.6.

223 cum ea quae ad litteram perversitatem docere videbantur, remoto mystico velamento, spiritaliter aperiret, Ibid. !196 able to be healed through believing, so that the more purified gaze of my mind might be directed in some way to your truth, which remains forever and is deficient in nothing.”224 Augustine thus presents here the same pattern we saw in the early dialogues,225 of hearing leading to seeing, authority preceding reason, faith giving way to understanding: “I would never have been able to know this unless I had believed it through hearing.”226 “We were too weak to find the truth by clear reason, and on account of this we needed the authority of the Holy Scriptures.”227

This emphasis on the authority of Scripture leads Augustine immediately to a reflection on its style, a reflection that is surely not without implications for how we understand

Augustine’s own style, both here in the Confessions and elsewhere:

It was both easy for all to read, and preserved the dignity of its mystery in a deeper meaning, by the clearest words and the most lowly style of expression making itself available to all, and engaging the attention of those who are not light of heart, so that it might receive everyone into its all-embracing bosom, and by narrow openings lead a few on to you.228

The text could be read on different levels. It spoke plainly to all, and so required a certain humility to approach. But it also led a few on to discover deeper meanings hidden from the many.

224 sanari credendo poteram, ut purgatior acies mentis meae dirigeretur aliquo modo in veritatem tuam semper manentem et ex nullo deficientem, Conf. 6.4.6.

225 See above, esp. pp. 149-54.

226 quod scire non possem nisi audiendo credidissem, Conf. 6.5.7; cf. Serm. 88.4.

227 essemus infirmi ad inveniendam liquida ratione veritatem et ob hoc nobis opus esset auctoritate sanctarum litterarum, Conf. 6.5.8.

228 et omnibus ad legendum esset in promptu et secreti sui dignitatem in intellectu profundiore servaret, verbis apertissimis et humillimo genere loquendi se cunctis praebens et exercens intentionem eorum qui non sunt leves corde, ut exciperet omnes populari sinu et per angusta foramina paucos ad te traiceret, Ibid.; cf. Ibid. 12.31.41. !197 This emphasis on humility appears in the final paragraph of Book Six, which offers multiple parallels to the final paragraph of Book Four:

Woe to my proud soul, which hoped that if it slipped away from you, it might have something better! It turned and turned again, onto its back and sides and belly, and everything is hard, and you alone are rest. See, here you are, and you free us from our wretched errors, and set us up on your path, and you offer us consolation, and say, “Run on, I will carry you, and I will lead you to the end, and even there I will carry you.”229

Here we find, as in the final paragraph of Book Four,230 the wordplay on “turning,” the image of the soul falling away from God, the need to return to God in order to find true rest, and the promise that God will carry us to the end. This not only involves a metaphor of touch, it also involves a metaphor of hearing. Here in Book Six, unlike in Book Four, the promise is put in the form of a direct quotation from God: “Run on, I will carry you.” It comes as a word. Augustine hears God’s voice calling him on to his ultimate rest.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK SEVEN

The opening chapter of Book Seven contains a flurry of visual metaphors. “Though I knew not whence or how, I nevertheless saw clearly and was certain that what can be corrupted is worse than what cannot be corrupted, and what cannot be violated I unhesitatingly preferred to the violable, and what suffers no change I held to be better than what can be changed.”231 That

229 vae animae audaci quae speravit, si a te recessisset, se aliquid melius habituram! versa et reversa in tergum et in latera et in ventrem, et dura sunt omnia, et tu solus requies. et ecce ades et liberas a miserabilibus erroribus et constituis nos in via tua et consolaris et dicis, ‘currite, ego feram et ego perducam et ibi ego feram,’ Conf. 6.16.26.

230 See above, pp. 187f., esp. n. 169.

231 nesciens unde et quomodo, plane tamen videbam et certus eram id quod corrumpi potest deterius esse quam id quod non potest, et quod violari non potest incunctanter praeponebam violabili, et quod nullam patitur mutationem melius esse quam id quod mutari potest, Conf. 7.1.1. !198 this use of “I saw” is no accidental or dead metaphor is clear from what immediately follows:

“My heart shouted violently against all my phantasms, and with one blow I tried to beat back the encircling crowd of unclean images from the gaze of my mind, and they had scarcely dispersed when, in the twinkling of an eye, behold they were gathered together again and rushed upon my sight and clouded it over.”232 He returns to this metaphor of blindness later in the paragraph: “I was gross of heart, and could neither see myself clearly, nor did I consider to exist at all whatever was not extended over some space, or diffused or gathered together or swollen or receiving some such thing, or capable of receiving it.”233 Here the phrase “gross of heart” (incrassatus corde) is literally “grown fat of heart,” and so introduces a metaphor of touch and sight.234 With an image used before,235 Augustine presents himself as so swollen (and therefore heavy) of heart that he could not see. As in Book Three,236 these metaphors of sight are occasioned by reflections on literal sight: here Augustine reflects on his past inability to conceive of substance except in terms

232 clamabat violenter cor meum adversus omnia phantasmata mea, et hoc uno ictu conabar abigere circumvolantem turbam immunditiae ab acie mentis meae, et vix dimota in ictu oculi, ecce conglobata rursus aderat et inruebat in aspectum meum et obnubilabat eum, Conf. 7.1.1.

233 ego itaque incrassatus corde nec mihimet ipsi vel ipse conspicuus, quidquid non per aliquanta spatia tenderetur vel diffunderetur vel conglobaretur vel tumeret vel tale aliquid caperet aut capere posset, nihil prorsus esse arbitrabar, Ibid.

234 cf. Mt 13:15, Acts 28:27, both derived from Is 6:10, which in Augustine’s Latin Bible includes the same verb (de illis enim dixerat isaias: incrassa cor populi huius, et oculos eius graua, Psal. 138.8); cf. O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 397; for discussion of the variant readings of Is 6:10, see C. A. Evans, To See and Not Perceive: Isaiah 6.9-10 in Early Jewish and Christian Interpretation, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series 64 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989): 149f.

235 See above, pp. 167f., 173f.

236 See above, pp. 174ff. !199 of what he could see with his own eyes.237 He thought of God as somehow extended in space:

“Yet it is not so, but you had not yet then illumined my darkness.”238

This visual imagery gives way in the second chapter of Book Seven to language that is auditory. Augustine describes the Manichees as “talkative, yet saying nothing, since your Word did not sound from them.”239 Augustine recounts an anti-Manichean argument that Nebridius

“was in the habit of proposing, and all of us who heard it were struck by it.”240 Thus the blindness Augustine recounts in the first chapter is followed by the hearing he recounts in the second.

In the third chapter of Book Seven, Augustine combines visual and auditory language in the same passage:

I strove to understand what I had heard, that the free choice of the will is the cause of our doing evil, and that your right judgment is the cause of our suffering evil, and I could not see this clearly. When I tried to draw my mind’s gaze out of the depths, I was plunged back down again; I tried often, and was again and again plunged back down. I knew that I had a will just a surely as I knew that I was alive, and this, indeed, raised me up to your light . . . . And then I began to see that there was the cause of my sin.241

In other words, hearing about the free decision of the will lifted Augustine up to God’s light and led him to see the cause of his sin. Hearing led to seeing.

237 cogitare aliquid substantiae nisi tale non poteram, quale per hos oculos videri solet, Conf. 7.1.1

238 non est autem ita, sed nondum inluminaveras tenebras meas, Ibid. 7.1.2; cf. 2 Sm. 22:29, Ps 17:29 (Vg.), quoted at Conf. 4.15.25, 6.1.1 (see above, p. 180, n. 136, and p. 193, n. 195).

239 loquaces mutos, quoniam non ex eis sonabat verbum tuum, Conf. 7.2.3.

240 a Nebridio proponi solebat et omnes qui audieramus concussi sumus, Ibid.

241 et intendebam ut cernerem quod audiebam, liberum voluntatis arbitrium causam esse ut male faceremus et rectum iudicium tuum ut pateremur, et eam liquidam cernere non valebam. itaque aciem mentis de profundo educere conatus mergebar iterum, et saepe conatus mergebar iterum atque iterum. sublevabat enim me in lucem tuam quod tam sciebam me habere voluntatem quam me vivere….et ibi esse causam peccati mei iam iamque animadvertebam, Ibid. 7.3.5. !200 This pattern emerges also in the frequent image of a swollenness impeding Augustine’s sight: “By my swollenness I was separated from you, and my extremely bloated face blocked up my eyes.”242 Earlier in this paragraph, he connects this swollenness to pride: “I rose up in pride against you, and ran against my Lord with the fattened neck of my shield.”243 In the following paragraph, he depicts his restoration: “By the secret hand of your medicine my swollenness subsided, and the troubled and clouded sight of my mind was healed from day to day by the stinging salve of wholesome sufferings.”244 This is an exact parallel, and reversal, of the image in

Book Three, where Augustine describes his reaction to reading Scripture: “For my swollenness spurned its style, and my sight would not penetrate its more inward parts.”245 This image first appears in the paragraph after Augustine recounts his reading of Cicero’s Hortensius,246 and is repeated and reversed in the paragraph before Augustine recalls his reading of the “books of the

Platonists.”247 Thus, the swelling and receding of the tumor is an example of the reverse parallelism between Book Three (in which Augustine suffered from “lust of the eyes”) and Book

Seven (in which he overcame this “lust of the eyes”).248

242 tumore meo separabar abs te et nimis inflata facies claudebat oculos meos, Conf. 7.7.11.

243 superbe contra te surgerem et currerem adversus dominum in cervice crassa scuti mei, Ibid.; the phrase “fattened neck of my shield” is a metaphor by analogy: Augustine’s shield (a metonymy for his violence against God) is analogous to a neck “fattened” or “made stiff” by pride (Job 15:27 (VL)); see O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 411.

244 et residebat tumor meus ex occulta manu medicinae tuae aciesque conturbata et contenebrata mentis meae acri collyrio salubrium dolorum de die in diem sanabatur, Conf. 7.8.12.

245 tumor enim meus refugiebat modum eius, et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius, Ibid. 3.5.9; see above, p. 174, n. 98.

246 Conf. 3.4.8.

247 platonicorum libros, Ibid. 7.9.13.

248 See above, p. 176, esp. n. 111. !201 These parallels are evident in further metaphors of sight in Book Seven. For example,

Augustine’s reading of the “books of the Platonists” prompts an immediate reflection on what he found there: “I read in them, not indeed in the same words but certainly the same thought, urged with many and various reasons, that ‘In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with

God, and the Word was God….What came to be in him was life, and the life was the light of men.’”249 He thus presents the contents of the Platonic books as conveying the idea (from the prologue to John’s Gospel) of the Word that is also a light. Yet Augustine makes clear that he failed to find in the Platonists the idea that the Word became Incarnate: “But that ‘the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,’ I did not read there.”250 Augustine frames this Platonic shortcoming in terms of seeing and hearing, humility and pride: “Indeed, you have hidden this from the wise and revealed it to little ones, so that they might come to him who labor and are heavy-laden, and he might give them refreshment, for he is meek and humble of heart.”251 Yet

“those who are lifted up, as it were, on the majestic height of a loftier teaching, and do not hear him speaking . . . vanish away in their thoughts, and their foolish heart is darkened.”252 Notice, too, that the vision granted to the humble also brings rest to those who carry heavy burdens, a

249 ibi legi, non quidem his verbis sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud deum et deus erat verbum….quod factum est in eo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum, Conf. 7.9.13 (quoting Jn 1:1-4).

250 sed quia verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi, Conf. 7.9.14 (quoting Jn 1:14); cf. quaerebam viam comparandi roboris quod esset idoneum ad fruendum te, nec inveniebam donec amplecterer mediatorem dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum, Conf. 7.18.24 (quoting 1 Tm 2:5); for the view that the Incarnation (not the Holy Spirit) is the issue in Conf. 7, see M. Gorman, “Augustine’s Use of Neoplatonism in Confessions VII: A Response to Peter King.” The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 82 (2005): 228-231.

251 abscondisti enim haec a sapientibus et revelasti ea parvulis, ut venirent ad eum laborantes et onerati et reficeret eos, quoniam mitis est et humilis corde, Conf. 7.9.14.

252 qui autem cothurno tamquam doctrinae sublimioris elati non audiunt dicentem . . . evanescunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratur insipiens cor eorum, Ibid. !202 metaphor of sight leading to a metaphor of touch. This becomes, in Book Seven, the chief difference between Platonism and Christianity, “the difference between those who see where they must travel, but do not see the way, and those who see the way that leads not only to beholding our blessed fatherland but also to dwelling therein.”253 Augustine thus frames the difference between Platonism and Christianity as the difference between seeing one’s home from afar, and finding one’s way there.254

This metaphor of frustrated vision is also how Augustine presents his various attempts at

“Plotinian ascent”255 after reading the Platonists: “When I first knew you, you took me up so that

I might see that there was something to see, and that I was not yet one who could see it. You beat back the weakness of my gaze, shining down powerfully upon me, and I trembled greatly with love and awe. I found that I was far from you in a region of unlikeness,256 as if I heard your voice from the height, ‘I am the food of grown men. Grow, and you will feed on me.”257 Notice, too,

253 inter videntes quo eundum sit nec videntes qua, et viam ducentem ad beatificam patriam non tantum cernendam sed et habitandam, Conf. 7.20.26.

254 On the parallels here with Moses, who saw the Promised Land but did not reach it (Dt. 32:48-52), see D. Shanzer, “Latent Narrative Patterns, Allegorical Choices, and Literary Unity in Augustine’s Confessions.” Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Mar., 1992): 42, 49.

255 On the question of how many, and how successful, were Augustine’s attempts, see the discussion and bibliography at O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 434-437; see also the more recent discussion and bibliography in D. A. Napier, En Route to the Confessions: The Roots and Development of Augustine’s Philosophical Anthropology (Leuven: Peeters, 2013): 213-237; for the view that the “ascents” of Book Seven represent Augustine’s intellectual development from c. 386 to 395, see B. Dobell, Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 111, 130-137, and the convincing rebuttal in T. Williams, “Review of B. Dobell, Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews: An Electronic Journal (2011), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/augustine-s-intellectual- conversion-the- journey- from-platonism-to-christianity/.

256 cf. ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀνοµοιότητος τόπῳ, Plot. 1.8.16f.; cf. τὸν τῆς ἀνοµοιότητος ἄπειρον ὄντα πόντον, Plato, Plt. 273d6- e1; see discussion in O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 443, esp. n. 42.

257 et cum te primum cognovi, tu adsumpsisti me ut viderem esse quod viderem, et nondum me esse qui viderem. et reverberasti infirmitatem aspectus mei, radians in me vehementer, et contremui amore et horrore. et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis, tamquam audirem vocem tuam de excelso: `cibus sum grandium: cresce et manducabis me, Conf. 7.10.16. !203 that in the midst of thwarted vision, there is a voice that offers itself as food.258 Similarly,

Augustine says, “You cried out from afar, ‘Nay, I am who am.’259 And I heard, as one hears in the heart, and there was no further ground for doubt, and it was easier to doubt that I was alive than that truth did not exist, ‘which is seen, being made known by the things which are made.’”260 Here we have the idea that the vision of truth comes by means of created things, prompted by a voice. One reaches an understanding of truth by means of the created things of earth,261 and hearing leads to seeing. So also in his second attempt at “Plotinian ascent,”262

Augustine describes a gradual ascent from contemplating bodies to contemplating the soul, then the interior power of the soul, then the reason, then the intellect, then the light by which the intellect is enlightened:

In the flash of a trembling glance, I arrived at that which is. Then, indeed, I saw your invisible things that are made known by the things which are made, but I lacked the strength to fix my gaze there. My weakness was driven back, I returned to my customary ways, and I carried with me nothing but a memory, loving and longing for the things I had, as it were, smelled, but which I could not yet feed on.263

258 cf. Conf. 3.1.1, 4.1.1; the image here recalls the Eucharistic discourse of John 6 (esp. 6:27, 56f.) and the “meat” withheld from the “little ones” in 1 Cor 3:1-2, as well as the manna provided to the Israelites in the desert at Ex 16:14f. (hence another parallel between Moses and Augustine here in Book Seven; cf. D. Shanzer, “Latent Narrative Patterns,” 42, 49).

259 quoting Ex. 3:14; cf. Shanzer, “Latent Narrative Patterns,” 42.

260 clamasti de longinquo, `immo vero ego sum qui sum.' et audivi, sicut auditur in corde, et non erat prorsus unde dubitarem, faciliusque dubitarem vivere me quam non esse veritatem, quae per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicitur, Conf. 7.10.16 (quoting Rom 1:20); cf. Ver. rel. 52.101.

261 See above, pp. 142f.

262 Conf. 7.17.23.

263 et pervenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus. tunc vero invisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi, sed aciem figere non evalui, et repercussa infirmitate redditus solitis non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem quae comedere nondum possem, Ibid. !204 Here Augustine deftly exploits the difference between smell (a distance sense) and taste (a contact sense),264 to convey his frustration at being able to perceive something from afar, yet unable to enjoy it close at hand.265 He also quotes again Romans 1:20 on attaining vision “by the things which are made.” So also later in Book Seven, Augustine describes again his state after reading the books of the Platonists: “I saw your invisible things that are made known by the things which are made, and driven back I sensed what, through the darkness of my soul, I was not allowed to contemplate.”266 Augustine associates this inability to see with his former pride:

“When later on I had been made gentle by your books, and my wounds had been touched with your healing fingers, I would be able to discern and distinguish the difference between presumption and confession.”267 He also associate the Scriptures with God’s “becoming sweet” to him.268

Augustine closes Book Seven with this contrast between the Platonist books and the scriptures. The Platonists lack the promise of salvation from death offered by God’s grace in

Jesus Christ.269 “Those pages lack the face of such tender love, the tears of confession, your

264 See above, p. 93; cf. Aug. Ep. 137.3.

265 This food metaphor is further evidence against the view that Augustine is here describing his intellectual development from c. 386 to 395 (cf. B. Dobell, Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion, 111, 130-137), since already in 390 Augustine contrasts the true “food” and “drink” of studying Scripture, and the “simulated feasts” of vain phantasms and theatrical trifles (omissis igitur et repudiatis nugis theatricis et poeticis diuinarum scripturarum consideratione et tractatione pascamus animum atque potemus uanae curiositatis fame ac siti fessum et aestuantem et inanibus phantasmatibus tamquam pictis epulis frustra refici satiari que cupientem, Ver. rel. 51.100).

266 invisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi et repulsus sensi quid per tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer, Conf. 7.20.26.

267 cum postea in libris tuis mansuefactus essem et curantibus digitis tuis contrectarentur vulnera mea, discernerem atque distinguerem quid interesset inter praesumptionem et confessionem, Ibid.

268 nam si primo sanctis tuis litteris informatus essem et in earum familiaritate obdulcuisses mihi, Ibid.

269 quis eum liberabit de corpore mortis huius, nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum . . . ? Ibid. 7.21.27. !205 sacrifice, a troubled spirit, a heart contrite and humbled, the salvation of the people, the city as a bride, the pledge of the Holy Spirit, the cup of our ransom.”270 The Platonists do not have these scriptural “sights” and “sounds” and “tastes.” “No one hears there the one calling, ‘Come to me, you who labor.’”271 It is the difference between “seeing the land of peace and not finding a way to it,”272 and “holding fast to the way that leads there, defended by the care of the heavenly commander.”273 In other words, we do not hear in the Platonists the voice of the one who call us along the way that leads to rest. “In marvelous ways these things penetrated deep within me, when I read the words of the least of your apostles, and considered your works, and trembled with fear.”274 Augustine thus passively received these things as a touch deep within him.

Augustine ends Book Seven, then, much as he did Book Six,275 with a voice calling him along a road leading to rest. Yet this passage differs from the end of Book Six insofar as Augustine has had a fleeting glimpse of the destination, with perhaps a heightened fear at the choice that confronted him.276

270 non habent illae paginae vultum pietatis huius, lacrimas confessionis, sacrificium tuum, spiritum contribulatum, cor contritum et humilatum, populi salutem, sponsam civitatem, arram spiritus sancti, poculum pretii nostri, Conf. 7.21.27.

271 nemo ibi audit vocantem: ‘venite ad me, qui laboratis,’ Ibid. (quoting Mt 11:28).

272 videre patriam pacis et iter ad eam non invenire, Conf. 7.21.27.

273 tenere viam illuc ducentem cura caelestis imperatoris munitam, Ibid.

274 haec mihi inviscerabantur miris modis, cum minimum apostolorum tuorum legerem, et consideraveram opera tua et expaveram, Ibid.

275 Ibid. 6.16.26.

276 cf. O’Donnell, v. 2, pp. 483f. !206 SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK EIGHT

The first paragraph of Book Eight contains several metaphors of touch. First, there is an image almost without precedent in Augustine: “Let my bones be bathed in your love, and let them say, ‘Lord, who is like you?’”277 Then follows a recurrent metaphor: “You have broken my chains: May I offer you a sacrifice of praise. I will tell how you broke them, and all who worship you will say when they hear it, ‘Blessed be the Lord in heaven and on earth; great and wonderful is his name.’”278 This is followed immediately by another recurrent image and a military metaphor: “Your words clung fast in my heart, and I was everywhere surrounded by you.”279 In all these metaphors of touch, we have as well an element of hearing. The bones bathed in love also speak. The broken chains lead to a sacrifice of praise, the telling of how they were broken, and the declaration, “Blessed be the Lord.” It is God’s words that clung fast to Augustine’s heart.

There is thus a synaesthesia of touch and hearing. Touch leads to hearing; hearing leads to touch.

Synaesthesia with touch appears also in the second paragraph of Book Eight. Augustine refers to his worldly career as “such a heavy bondage to bear. For these things no longer delighted when compared to your sweetness and the beauty of your house, which I loved, but

277 perfundantur ossa mea dilectione tua et dicant: ‘domine, quis similis tibi?’ Conf. 8.1.1; cf. Rom 5:5; cf. Aen. 7.458f; elsewhere in Conf., Augustine speaks of the drunkard being “soaked” in his cheer (hilaritate perfundebatur, Conf. 6.6.10), and of the (literal) light that “bathes” all things (lux ista perfundens cuncta quae cernimus, Conf. 10.34.51).

278 dirupisti vincula mea: sacrificem tibi sacrificium laudis. quomodo dirupisti ea narrabo, et dicent omnes qui adorant te, cum audiunt haec, `benedictus dominus in caelo et in terra; magnum et mirabile nomen eius,' Conf. 8.1.1; cf. Ps 115:7 (Vg.); on the image of “chains,” see Conf. 3.1.1, 3.8.16, 6.12.21, 7.7.11, and above, pp. 171f., 194, 207f., 211.

279 inhaeserant praecordiis meis verba tua, et undique circumvallabar abs te, Conf. 8.1.1; Augustine speaks both of people “clinging” to God (Conf. 4.12.18, 5.4.7, 6.6.9, 7.11.17, 10.17.26, 10.28.39, 12.11.12, 13.8.9), and of God or his truth “piercing” people deep inside (Conf. 6.6.9, 7.5.7, 7.8.12, 7.21.27, 10.6.8); for other uses of the military metaphor of “encompassing” or “surrounding,” see Psal. 3.9, 10; Ep. 118.1. !207 still I was tightly bound by a woman.”280 God’s beauty and sweetness gave Augustine delight, but the opposing delights were a chain that bound him tightly. Augustine was “weaker and selected the softer place,” and so he “wasted away with withered cares.” Augustine’s choice, framed in a metaphor of touch, leads to his wasting away and withering, metaphors of sight.

Augustine further describes how he had “fallen” into a state of knowing but not glorifying God,

“and your right hand took me up, carried me away, and placed me where I might regain my strength, for you have said to man, ‘See, piety is wisdom.’”281 The hearing of God’s voice is causally related (quia) to the touch of his right hand. Hearing led to touch.

In the second chapter, Augustine recounts his conversation with Simplicianus, who narrated the conversion story of Victorinus.282 In considering this story as an example of accepting “the humility of Christ,”283 Augustine asks God, “By what means did you wind your way into his breast?”284 Augustine answers his own question immediately, “He was reading sacred scripture . . . and was most eagerly searching and scrutinizing all of Christian literature.”285 “By reading and standing open-mouthed he drank in firm resolve.”286 The words of sacred scripture, and other Christian literature, were a strengthening drink to Victorinus. Hearing

280 ad tolerandam illam servitutem tam gravem. iam enim me illa non delectabant prae dulcedine tua et decore domus tuae, quam dilexi, sed adhuc tenaciter conligabar ex femina, Conf. 8.1.2.

281 in hoc quoque incideram, et dextera tua suscepit me et inde ablatum posuisti ubi convalescerem, quia dixisti homini, ‘ecce pietas est sapientia,’ Ibid.

282 Ibid. 8.2.3ff.

283 humilitatem Christi, Ibid. 8.2.3.

284 quibus modis te insinuasti illi pectori? Ibid. 8.2.4.

285 legebat, sicut ait Simplicianus, sanctam scripturam omnesque christianas litteras investigabat studiosissime et perscrutabatur, Ibid.

286 legendo et inhiando hausit firmitatem, Ibid.; cf. caliculos inhianter hauriret, Ibid. 9.8.18. !208 (and taste?) led to touch. Similarly, when Victorinus made his public profession of faith in church, the mere sight of him prompted audible expressions of joy and praise among all gathered,287 as well as silence “so that they might hear him.”288 When he made his profession of faith boldly, “they all wanted to clasp him inwardly to their hearts. And they did clasp him by loving and rejoicing: these were the hands of those who clasped him.”289 Here a literal sight led to literal hearing, and the love and rejoicing occasioned by seeing and hearing Victorinus were metaphorical hands to touch and embrace him. Thus, words are not only the means by which

Victorinus was touched and strengthened by God, but also the means by which he was touched and embraced by the Christian community.

There is also a dense cluster of sensory metaphors in the opening sentence of chapter four: “Move, O Lord, work, stir up and call us back, kindle and seize us, be fragrant and grow sweet: let us love you, let us run to you.”290 Most of these involve touch (“move . . . stir up . . . kindle . . . seize”), but there is also hearing (“call us back”), smell (“be fragrant”),291 and taste

287 cito sonuerunt exultatione, quia videbant eum, Conf. 8.2.5.

288 ut audirent eum, Ibid.

289 volebant eum omnes rapere intro in cor suum. et rapiebant amando et gaudendo: hae rapientium manus erant, Ibid.

290 age, domine, fac, excita et revoca nos, accende et rape, fragra, dulcesce: amemus, curramus, Conf. 8.4.9; I follow here the text of Knöll, who prints fragra, but cites three MSS (O1, S, and V) for the form fragla, and six MSS (B,G,H,M,V, and W) for the form flagra; Skutella prints flagra, citing seven MSS (O2, γ, B, D, F, H, !) for this form, but three MSS (S, V, and Z) for the form fragla, and noting that Knöll is “perhaps right” in his emendation (Skutella, App., p. 391); O’Donnell prints flagra and thinks “the reading of O1 here is questionable, either flagra or fragra,” but this assessment is based on consulting the microfilm (O’Donnell, v. 1, p. lvi, n. 108)—the digital scan of O shows clearly the underlying fragra (O1), which the later hand (O2) emended to flagra—and the very fact that there is a later hand (O2) makes it highly unlikely, even on the face of it, that the original hand (O1) had the same reading; as Skutella points out (p. 391), the reading fragra more clearly echoes Song 1:3, a text which Augustine quotes in Conf. 9.7.16 and Psal. 90(2).13); cf. Jerome Ep. 22.7.

291 See preceding note on the textual reading fragra. !209 (“grow sweet”). This passage recalls the dense cluster of sensory metaphors at the beginning of

Book Two,292 and is thus an example of the parallels between these two books. This passage also emphasizes closeness, since touch and taste are contact senses, and smell requires proximity.

Likewise, Augustine asks, “Are there not many who from a deeper hell of blindness than

Victorinus return to you, come near, and are illumined by receiving your light?”293 Here again it is not only closeness to God, but also closeness to one’s fellow men: “For when there is rejoicing among many, the joy is more nourishing in each of them, since they warm themselves and are set on fire by one another.”294 Just as Victorinus was touched by God and embraced by the Christian community, so any return to God is not only a matter of approaching God’s light, but drawing close enough to others to receive both the heat (i.e., touch) and light (i.e., sight) of their fire.

Augustine uses the same image of fire to describe his reaction to the story of Victorinus’ conversion: “But when your man Simplicianus related to me these things about Victorinus, I burned to imitate him: and indeed it was for this reason he had related them.”295 The story of

Victorinus’ conversion is thus an example for Augustine to follow, as Augustine himself is set on fire, and Simplicianus, God’s “man,” is a stand-in for God, who intentionally uses signs to draw us back to him. This image of fire is also another parallel between Book Eight and Book Two:296

292 See above, pp. 183ff., esp. n. 45.

293 nonne multi ex profundiore tartaro caecitatis quam Victorinus redeunt ad te et accedunt et inluminantur recipientes lumen? Conf. 8.4.9.

294 quando enim cum multis gaudetur, et in singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervefaciunt se et inflammantur ex alterutro, Ibid.

295 sed ubi mihi homo tuus Simplicianus de Victorino ista narravit, exarsi ad imitandum: ad hoc enim et ille narraverat, Ibid. 8.5.10.

296 On the reverse parallelism of Books One through Nine, see above, pp. 176 (esp. n. 111), 188f. (esp. n. 172), 192ff., 198. !210 whereas in his adolescence Augustine had “burned to be filled with lower things,”297 here he

“burned to imitate” Victorinus in his conversion to God.

Another parallel to Book Two occurs in the image of a chain: “For this thing I sighed, bound not by the iron of another, but by my own iron will. For the enemy held my will, and from it he had made a chain for me and bound me.”298 Augustine returns to this image in the next paragraph: “Still held fast to the earth, I refused to become a soldier in your army, and I was afraid to be disentangled from all my entanglements, just as I should have feared to be entangled.”299 He also begins the story of Ponticianus by promising to confess to God, “how you bought my release from the chain of sexual desire, by which I was most tightly bound, and from the enslavement of worldly occupations.”300 Augustine likewise describes the divided will he experienced moments before his conversion: “I twisted and turned about in my chain, until it might be broken completely, by which I was now barely held, but yet still held.”301 This “chain” recalls Augustine’s “clanking chain of mortality” in Book Two.302 His adolescent sexual passions bound him and kept him far from God, but here God finally freed him from those fetters.

297 exarsi enim aliquando satiari inferis in adulescentia, Conf. 2.1.1; see above, p. 162f., n. 45; cf. O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 107.

298 cui rei ego suspirabam, ligatus non ferro alieno sed mea ferrea voluntate. velle meum tenebat inimicus et inde mihi catenam fecerat et constrinxerat me, Conf. 8.5.10; cf. quibus quasi ansulis sibimet innexis (unde catenam appellavi) tenebat me obstrictum dura servitus, Ibid.

299 ego autem adhuc terra obligatus militare tibi recusabam et impedimentis omnibus sic timebam expediri, quemadmodum impediri timendum est, Ibid. 8.5.11.

300 et de vinculo quidem desiderii concubitus, quo artissimo tenebar, et saecularium negotiorum servitute quemadmodum me exemeris, Ibid. 8.6.13.

301 volvens et versans me in vinculo meo, donec abrumperetur totum, quo iam exiguo tenebar, sed tenebar tamen, Ibid. 8.11.25.

302 stridore catenae mortalitatis, Conf. 2.2.2; see above, pp. 164-7, esp. n. 54. !211 Augustine foreshadows this deliverance by relating a series of conversations and stories, each containing parallels to his own situation. First, Augustine relates the conversation with

Simplicianus, who narrated the conversion of Victorinus.303 Second, Augustine tells of a parallel conversation with Ponticianus, who narrated the conversion of Anthony of Egypt and his friends’ reaction to it.304 In this story, the “flocks of the monasteries, and their customs smelling sweetly of you, and the fruitful deserts of the wilderness”305 form both a paradoxical contrast to

Augustine’s isolation,306 rottenness,307 and sterility,308 and a parallel to his prayer for God to “be fragrant and grow sweet.”309 The “fruitful deserts” also anticipate Augustine’s assessment that through his conversion God transformed Monica’s “grief into a joy much more fruitful than she had desired.”310 Furthermore, the story of Anthony’s conversion is followed by Ponticianus’ account of his friends’ conversion as a result of reading about Anthony.311 This account contains

303 Conf. 8.2.3-5; see above, pp. 207-10.

304 Conf. 8.6.14f.

305 monasteriorum greges et mores suaveolentiae tuae et ubera deserta heremi, Conf. 8.6.15; the paradox of the last phrase is perhaps heightened if we read ubera deserta heremi as “deserted breasts of the desert” (taking ubera as the substantive and deserta as the modifier); cf. Challoner’s translation.

306 inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis, Ibid. 7.10.16; see above, p. 202, n. 257; for further discussion of Augustine’s isolation (from God and from men) prior to his conversion, see F. Crosson, “Structure and Meaning,” 87-88.

307 computrui coram oculis tuis, Conf. 2.1.1 (discussed above, pp. 162f., esp. nn. 45, 49); cf. Conf. 4.11.16 (discussed above, p. 192f., esp. n. 203), 6.15.25 (discussed above, p. 192f., esp. n. 202).

308 et ego ibam porro longe a te in plura et plura sterilia semina dolorum, Conf. 2.2.2 (quoted above, pp. 163f., esp. n. 54); for further discussion of Augustine’s “sterility” in the Confessions, see O’Donnell, v. 2, p. 111f, where he notes an exact parallel to “sterile seeds of sorrow” (sterilia semina dolorum) in the image of Continence as a “fruitful mother of children, joys from You, her Spouse” (continentia . . . fecunda mater filiorum gaudiorum de marito te, Conf. 8.11.27).

309 fragra, dulcesce, Conf. 8.4.9; see above, p. 208, n. 290.

310 convertisti luctum eius in gaudium multo uberius quam voluerat, Conf. 8.12.30.

311 Ibid. 8.6.15. !212 a densely symbolic antithesis of metaphors to describe those who did not convert and those who did: “Dragging their hearts on the earth, they went away into the palace, but the others, fixing their hearts in heaven, remained in the house.”312 There are four contrasts here, each paralleled in

Augustine’s life: between dragging (a weight)313 and fixing (i.e., making firm);314 between earth and heaven;315 between going away and remaining;316 and between the (lofty) palace and the

(humble) house.317 Further parallels emerge in Augustine’s account of how he responded to this story: his conscience rebuked him for not “throwing off the burden of vanity,”318 and Augustine describes his indecision as a “great strife in my inner house.”319 Each of these metaphorical parallels is presented in a story (such as Simplicianus relating the conversion of Victorinus), or even a story within a story (such as the conversion of Anthony within Ponticianus’ account of his own friends’ resulting conversion), imbedded in turn within Augustine’s own narrative of his life.

This in itself indicates layers of signification comparable to Augustine’s definition of metaphor,320 the conversion events becoming conversion accounts (i.e., words) that prompt further conversion events, which then become conversion accounts. This verbal element is

312 trahentes cor in terra abierunt in palatium, illi autem affigentes cor caelo manserunt in casa, Conf. 8.6.15.

313 cf. trahens infelicitatis meae sarcinam et trahendo exaggerans, Ibid. 6.6.9 (discussed above, p. 192, n. 200).

314 cf. quia et ipsae mutabiles sunt et in illo fixae stabiliuntur, Conf. 4.12.18.

315 cf. ego autem adhuc terra obligatus, Ibid. 8.5.11 (discussed above, p. 210, n. 299).

316 cf. quia inde aversi sumus, perversi sumus. revertamur iam, domine, ut non evertamur, quia vivit apud te sine ullo defectu bonum nostrum, quod tu ipse es, et non timemus ne non sit quo redeamus, quia nos inde ruimus. nobis autem absentibus non ruit domus nostra, aeternitas tua, Conf. 4.16.31 (discussed above, pp. 186f., n. 169).

317 cf. domus nostra, Ibid. 4.16.31 (see previous note); cf. angusta est domus animae meae, Conf. 1.5.6.

318 abicere sarcinam vanitatis, Ibid. 8.7.18.

319 grandi rixa interioris domus meae, Ibid. 8.8.19.

320 See above, p. 132ff., esp. n. 52. !213 present even in Augustine’s climactic emotional struggle before his conversion: “Brow, cheeks, eyes, color, and tone of voice bespoke my mind more than the words I uttered.” Again, seeing is hearing, and every thing tells.

This synaesthesia of sight and hearing appears again in two further conversations in Book

Eight. First, Augustine recounts how he heard within himself a debate between the now feeble voices of “old loves,”321 tempting him to “look back,” and “the chaste dignity of Continence,” urging him to cast himself upon God,322 and “become deaf to those unclean members of yours upon earth.”323 This silent internal dialogue results in Augustine’s misery being “gathered together in the sight of [his] heart.”324 The second conversation is the culmination of the first: in his storm of emotion, Augustine threw himself down under the fig tree in the garden,325 and there heard the child’s voice from nearby, saying, “Take up and read! Take up and read!”326 He interpreted it “as nothing other than a divine command for me to open the book and read the first chapter I should find.” Thus, the voice of a child is taken as the voice of God speaking directly to

Augustine. Augustine describes the result of his reading as “a peaceful light streaming into my heart.”327 Hearing led to seeing.

321 antiquae amicae meae, Conf. 8.11.26; cf. O’Donnell, v. 3, pp. 52f.

322 proice te in eum, Conf. 8.11.27.

323 obsurdesce adversus immunda illa membra tua super terram, Ibid.

324 congessit totam miseriam meam in conspectu cordis mei, Ibid. 8.12.28.

325 On the symbolism of the fig tree, see J. F. Patterson, “Augustine’s Fig Tree (Confessiones 8.12.28),” Augustinian Studies 47.2 (2016): 181-200.

326 tolle lege, tolle lege, Conf. 8.12.29.

327 quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo, Ibid. 8.12.29. !214 SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK NINE

The opening paragraph of Book Nine contains metaphors of four of the five senses. First,

Augustine returns to common touch metaphors: his chains broken;328 his neck bent to God’s

“mild yoke” and his shoulders lowered to the “light burden” of Christ;329 his freedom from

“scratching the scabs of lust.”330 Second, Augustine returns to a common taste metaphor, comparing the “sweetness of trifles” to God, “the true and highest sweetness . . . sweeter than every delight.”331 Third, when Augustine says, “I was chattering to you, my light and my wealth and my salvation, O Lord, my God,”332 his “chattering” (whether literal or metaphorical) recalls both Faustus, who could “chatter much more sweetly the things they were accustomed to say,”333 and Augustine’s own past “chattering in childish error and impetuosity so many uncertain things as though they were certain.”334 Fourth, Augustine addresses God as “my light” and “clearer than every light,”335 which recalls many previous passages of the Confessions.336 In all these

328 dirupisti vincula mea, Conf. 9.1.1.; cf., e.g., Ibid. 8.5.10 (discussed above, p. 210, n. 298).

329 subderem cervicem leni iugo tuo et umeros levi sarcinae tuae, Conf. 9.1.1.; cf. 8.2.3, 8.4.9.

330 liber erat animus meus a curis . . . scalpendi scabiem libidinum, Ibid. 9.1.1; cf. 3.1.1, 3.2.4.

331 quam suave mihi subito factum est carere suavitatibus nugarum, et quas amittere metus fuerat iam dimittere gaudium erat. eiciebas enim eas a me, vera tu et summa suavitas, eiciebas et intrabas pro eis omni voluptate dulcior, Conf. 9.1.1.; cf., e.g., 1.4.4, 1.6.9, 1.13.21, 1.15.24, 1.18.28, 1.20.31, 2.1.1; that it became “suddenly” (subito) sweet for Augustine to be deprived of the “sweetness of trifles,” recalls both the suddenness of Victorinus’ resolve to become a Christian (subitoque et inopinatus ait Simpliciano, ut ipse narrabat, ‘eamus in ecclesiam: christianus volo fieri,’ Ibid. 8.2.4) and the suddenness of Ponticianus’ friend’s conversion (tum subito repletus amore sancto et sobrio pudore, Ibid. 8.6.15).

332 garriebam tibi, claritati meae et divitiis meis et saluti meae, domino deo meo, Ibid. 9.1.1.

333 ipsa quae illi solent dicere multo suavius garrientem, Ibid. 5.6.10.

334 puerili errore et animositate tam multa incerta quasi certa garrisse, Conf. 6.4.5; cf. garriebam plane quasi peritus, Ibid. 7.20.26.

335 omni luce clarior, Ibid. 9.1.1.

336 cf., e.g., Ibid. 1.13.21, 3.4.8, 4.15.25, 6.16.26, 7.10.16, 8.4.9, 8.10.22. !215 metaphors, Augustine reintroduces previous images and provides a summary of the preceding narrative, complete with a return to childhood (Book One) in his childlike “chattering” to God.

Further parallels between Books One and Nine appear in the metaphors of taste. Just as

Augustine’s address to God as “the true and highest sweetness”337 recalls his address to God as

“my holy sweetness,”338 so also his statement “you began to grow sweet to me,”339 directly answers his prayer from Book One, that God “may grow sweet to me beyond all the seductions I used to pursue.”340 Further, when Augustine speaks of those who “in their famished thought lick the images of temporal things,”341 in contrast to Augustine, who has “tasted” the “inner eternal” light,342 he is deploying a recurrent contrast between metaphorical hunger for true food and hunger for false food,343 a contrast that first appears in Book One.344

These taste metaphors also recall those in other books of the Confessions. For example,

Augustine refers to the Christian scriptures as “honey-sweet with the honey of heaven,” which not only contrasts with the (false) “sweetness” of Virgil and (boyhood) “bitterness” of Homer,345

337 vera tu et summa suavitas, Conf. 9.1.1.

338 dulcedo mea sancta, Ibid. 1.4.4; cf. 1.6.9, 1.20.31.

339 mihi dulcescere coeperas, Ibid. 9.4.10; cf. dulce mihi fit, domine, confiteri, Ibid. 9.4.7.

340 ut dulcescas mihi super omnes seductiones quas sequebar, Ibid. 1.15.24 (discussed above, pp. 159f., esp. n. 39).

341 imagines eorum famelica cogitatione lambiunt, Conf. 9.4.10; this image is without clear parallel in Augustine or clear precedent elsewhere (cf. simul eam me cum lambet, Beat. 2.14; cf. also, Ep. 73.3.8).

342 o si viderent internum aeternum, quod ego quia gustaveram, Conf. 9.4.10.

343 cf. esp. Ibid. 3.1.1.

344 cf. sitientem delectationes tuas, Ibid. 1.18.28.

345 On Virgil: dulcissimum spectaculum vanitatis, Conf. 1.13.22 (discussed above, pp. 159f.); on Homer: dulcissime vanus est, mihi tamen amarus erat puero, Conf. 1.14.23 (discussed above, pp. 159ff.). !216 but also recalls the “sweetly speaking books” he read with friends in his youth,346 and his reflection on why God allowed him to encounter the Platonists before properly understanding the

Christian scriptures: “For if at first I had been shaped by your Scriptures and through familiarity with them you had become sweet to me, and then afterward I had come upon those other books, perhaps they would have snatched me away from a solid foundation of devotion.”347 Thus, the reference to the scriptures as “honey-sweet with the honey of heaven,” especially as Augustine refers to his pre-conversion state as a “blind and bitter barker” against these scriptures,348 indicates something of how far he has come in his reading of books in general, and his understanding of the Christian scriptures in particular. As such, the metaphor illustrates at least one aspect of the transformation brought about by his conversion in Book Eight.

Augustine uses sensory metaphors similarly in the miniature “life of Monica” in Book

Nine.349 In this account, Monica’s youthful love of wine,350 much like Augustine’s own past sinfulness, is described as a “hidden disease”351 that is healed by God’s “medicine,”352 brought

346 simul legere libros dulciloquos, Conf. 4.8.13.

347 nam si primo sanctis tuis litteris informatus essem et in earum familiaritate obdulcuisses mihi, et post in illa volumina incidissem, fortasse aut abripuissent me a solidamento pietatis, Ibid. 7.20.26.

348 latrator amarus et caecus adversus litteras, Ibid. 9.4.11.

349 Conf. 9.8.17-9.9.22.

350 Compare to the “drunkenness” of sexual immorality Augustine learned in school (non accuso verba quasi vasa electa atque pretiosa, sed vinum erroris quod in eis nobis propinabatur ab ebriis doctoribus, et nisi biberemus caedebamur, nec appellare ad aliquem iudicem sobrium licebat, Ibid. 1.16.26), and the men “drunk” on Manichean teaching at Rome (ipsos manichaeis vanitatibus ebrios, Ibid. 5.13.23), contrasted with the “sober intoxication” of God’s wine (sobriam vini ebrietatem, Ibid.; discussed above, p. 189f.).

351 latentem morbum, Conf. 9.8.18; on Augustine’s “disease,” cf. Ibid. 4.3.5, 6.4.6, 6.12.21, 6.15.25, 8.7.16.

352 tua medicina, domine, Ibid. 9.8.18; on Augustine’s own experience with this “medicine,” cf. Ibid. 5.9.16, 6.4.6, 6.11.20, 7.8.12 (discussed above, p. 200, esp. n. 244), 9.4.8; on the parallel experience of Alypius with this “medicine,” cf. verum tamen iam hoc ad medicinam futuram in eius memoria reponebatur, Conf. 6.9.14. !217 about by the “chance words of another,”353 the “most bitter insult” of a servant calling her “wine- bibber,”354 which acted “like a surgeon’s blade” to “cut away the rottenness” of her disease.355 In

Monica’s response, hearing leads to seeing: “Wounded by this barb, she beheld her foulness, and at once condemned it and flung it off.”356 Additionally, this episode is an example of the hidden providence of God, who “from the disease of one soul brings healing to another, so that no one who notices this should ascribe it to his own power, if by his word another is corrected whom he wishes to correct.”357 In all these ways, Monica’s life mirrors Augustine’s own, as God secretly heals her “rottenness” (i.e., smell) by means of “bitter” words (i.e., taste and hearing), which “cut away” (i.e., touch) her disease and help her “see” her foulness (i.e., sight).

In a similar way, the senses appear metaphorically in Augustine’s account of his and

Monica’s shared “vision” at Ostia: “It happened, as I believe, by your arrangement of things in your hidden ways, that she and I stood alone, leaning on a certain window through which could

353 O’Donnell, v. 3, p. 117, comparing this scene to Augustine’s conversion, occasioned by a child’s voice (Conf. 8.12.29).

354 obiecit hoc crimen amarissima insultatione vocans ‘meribibulam,’ Conf. 9.8.18; on the salutary effects of “bitterness” in Augustine’s life, cf. Ibid. 1.14.23 (discussed above, pp. 159ff.), 2.1.1, 2.2.4, 3.1.1 (discussed above, pp. 170ff.), 6.6.9 (discussed above, pp. 193f.), 6.10.17, 7.3.5, and 8.12.29.

355 tamquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis provisionibus tuis et uno ictu putredinem illam praecidisti, Conf. 9.8.18; on Augustine’s “rottenness,” cf. Ibid. 2.1.1 (discussed above, pp. 161ff.), 2.6.14, 4.11.16 (above, p. 192f.), and 6.15.25 (above, p. 192f.).

356 quo illa stimulo percussa respexit foeditatem suam confestimque damnavit atque exuit, Conf. 9.8.18; on God “wounding” to heal, cf. percutis ut sanes, Ibid. 2.2.4; on salutary “barbs” in Augustine’s life, cf. Ibid. 5.8.14, 7.8.12, and 9.4.7.

357 de alterius animae insania sanasti alteram, ne quisquam cum hoc advertit, potentiae suae tribuat, si verbo eius alius corrigatur quem vult corrigi, Conf. 9.8.18; on the parallel case of Alypius being providentially “cured” through Augustine’s unwitting criticism, cf. ut aperte tibi tribueretur eius correctio, per me quidem illam sed nescientem operatus es, Ibid. 6.7.12. !218 be seen the garden inside the house where we were staying, at Ostia on the Tiber.”358 By introducing the scene as an example of God’s hidden providence, Augustine is already inviting the reader to think of this experience as metaphorical in the broad sense (i.e., as a thing that is also a sign of something else). He then proceeds to relate their conversation in terms of metaphorical taste:

We were thus conversing together alone very sweetly and, “forgetting the things behind and stretching out to the things that are ahead,”359 we were seeking between us in the present truth, which you are, what the eternal life of the saints would be like, “which no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it arisen in the heart of man.”360 But we stood with the mouth of our heart wide open to the celestial streams of your fountain, “the fountain of life,” which is “with you,”361 so that sprinkled from it according to our capacity, we might in some way consider such a thing.362

Notice the synaesthesia inherent in “conversing . . . sweetly.” The metaphors of taste (i.e., a contact sense) imply a certain closeness between Augustine and Monica,363 and the desire for closeness to the “fountain of life,” even as the understanding sought in conversation is beyond the reach of sight and hearing.

358 provenerat, ut credo, procurante te occultis tuis modis, ut ego et ipsa soli staremus, incumbentes ad quandam fenestram unde hortus intra domum quae nos habebat prospectabatur, illic apud Ostia Tiberina, Conf. 9.10.23; on “windows” as a source of metaphorical light, see O’Donnell, v. 3, pp. 124f.; on the garden as symbolic of the soul, see P. Kreeft, I Burned For Your Peace, pp. 197f.

359 Phil 3:13.

360 1 Cor 2:9.

361 cf. quoniam apud te est fons vitæ, et in lumine tuo videbimus lumen, Ps 35:10 (Vg.); on the synaesthesia of taste and sight in God implied by this verse, cf. quis est fons uitae, nisi christus? uenit ad te in carne, ut irroraret fauces tuas sitientes; satiabit sperantem, qui irrorauit sitientem. quoniam apud te fons uitae, in lumine tuo uidebimus lumen. hic aliud est fons, aliud lumen; ibi non ita. quod enim est fons, hoc est et lumen, Psal. 35.15; cf. O’Donnell, v. 3, p. 126.

362 conloquebamur ergo soli valde dulciter et, praeterita obliviscentes in ea quae ante sunt extenti, quaerebamus inter nos apud praesentem veritatem, quod tu es, qualis futura esset vita aeterna sanctorum, quam nec oculus vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor hominis ascendit. sed inhiabamus ore cordis in superna fluenta fontis tui, fontis vitae, qui est apud te, ut inde pro captu nostro aspersi quoquo modo rem tantam cogitaremus, Conf. 9.10.23.

363 cf. dulcissima et carissima, Ibid. 9.12.30. !219 The conversation of Augustine and Monica proceeds from earthly things to the contemplation of God himself:

Lifting ourselves up with a more ardent affection to the Selfsame, we traversed step by step all bodily things and heaven itself, from which the sun and moon and stars shine upon the earth. And still we ascended inwardly by pondering and discussing and marveling at your works. And we came to our minds and passed beyond them, that we might attain the region of unfailing fruitfulness, where you feed Israel forever with the food of truth, and where life is Wisdom.364

Though the image has changed from drink (“fountain of life”) to food,365 it is still a metaphor of taste, and still indicates the desire for closeness, with an added element of touch here in being moved by “more ardent affection” (ardentiore affectu),366 and striving to “attain” (attingeremus) the “region of unfailing fruitfulness.”367 This combination of touch and taste is evident in the fleeting success of the experience: “And while we are speaking and opening our mouths to it, we touch it just barely with the whole thrust of our heart. And we sighed and left behind, bound

364 erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in idipsum, perambulavimus gradatim cuncta corporalia et ipsum caelum, unde sol et luna et stellae lucent super terram. et adhuc ascendebamus interius cogitando et loquendo et mirando opera tua. et venimus in mentes nostras et transcendimus eas, ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis Israhel in aeternum veritate pabulo, et ibi vita sapientia est, Conf. 9.10.24; on the connection between “taste” (sapor) and “wisdom” (sapientia) in Roman writers during the Republic, cf. Cic. Fin. 2.8.24; for the connection in early Christian writers, cf. ad spiritalem sapientiam redigat, ut a sapore isto saeculari ad intellectum dei unusquisque resipiscat, Cypr. Ep. 63.11.3; tamquam sapientia cum saporis mercibus fuerit inuecta, Lact. Inst. 3.16.15; for the connection in Augustine, cf. sapientiae dulcissimo et sanctissimo nomine, Acad. 3.9.19; nihil enim dulcius est immortalitate sapientiae, Psal. 30(2).3.6; mel sapientia est, primatum dulcoris tenens in escis cordis, Psal. 80.22; melli est autem similis aperta doctrina sapientiae, Psal. 118.22.7; dulcedinem suauitatemque sapientiae, Serm. 343.9 (preached c. 397); for further discussion (with references), see E. Gowers, “Tasting the Roman World,” pp. 92, 97f.

365 cf. O’Donnell, v. 3, p. 130.

366 cf. tamquam in facula ignis agitatus accenditur et ardentiore dilectione rapitur ad quietem, Ep. 55.11.21 (quoted above, p. 145f., n. 104).

367 On the parallel use of “fatherland,” see Conf. 7.20.26f. (discussed above, p. 201f., n. 253); on the opposite image of a “region of unlikeness,” see Conf. 7.10.16 (discussed above, pp. 202f., esp. nn. 256f.), with further parallels discussed in O’Donnell, v. 2, pp. 95-8, 144, 268f. !220 there, ‘the first fruits of the Spirit.’”368 The mouths are open in conversation (i.e., hearing) and anticipation of nourishment (i.e., taste),369 and the “thrust” (ictus) of the heart combines both touch and sight.370 Further, the “firstfruits” (i.e., taste) are “bound” (i.e., touch) to Wisdom. All of these examples of synaesthesia suggest God’s transcendence of the categories of sense.371

Yet the whole episode is couched in terms of literal and metaphorical hearing. Augustine and Monica were “conversing together” (conloquebamur). After their brush with the divine, they quickly become aware of their own talking: “We returned to the harsh sound of our voice, where a word both begins and ends. Indeed, what is like your Word, our Lord, remaining in Himself without aging, and making all things new?”372 Thus, the mystical experience begins and ends with words spoken. Further, the literal sound of their voices provides a comparison with the

Word of God.

Augustine likewise presents the content of the “vision” at Ostia in terms of metaphorical hearing:

Thus we were saying, “If for anyone the tumult of the flesh fell silent, silent the images of earth and waters and air, silent the heavens, and even the very soul fell silent to itself and passed beyond itself by not thinking about itself, silent dreams and the disclosures of the imagination, every tongue and every sign, and if whatever comes to be by passing away should fall completely silent to him (for if anyone could hear, all these things are

368 et dum loquimur et inhiamus illi, attingimus eam modice toto ictu cordis. et suspiravimus et reliquimus ibi religatas primitias spiritus, Conf. 9.10.24.; cf. primitias spiritus, Rom 8:28.

369 cf. inhiabamus ore cordis in superna fluenta fontis tui, Conf. 9.10.23 (discussed above, pp. 217f.).

370 cf. pervenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus, Conf. 7.17.23; this synaesthesia of touch and sight is made possible, in part, by Augustine’s extramissionist understanding of sight (see above, pp. 61f.).

371 cf. quoniam apud te fons uitae, in lumine tuo uidebimus lumen. hic aliud est fons, aliud lumen; ibi non ita. quod enim est fons, hoc est et lumen, Psal. 35.15.

372 remeavimus ad strepitum oris nostri, ubi verbum et incipitur et finitur. et quid simile verbo tuo, domino nostro, in se permanenti sine vetustate atque innovanti omnia? Conf. 9.10.24. !221 saying, ‘We did not make ourselves, but he made us who remains forever’)—if having said this they should presently fall silent, for they have raised the ear to him who made them, and He alone should speak, not through them but through Himself, so that we might hear His word, not through a tongue of flesh, nor through the voice of an angel, nor through the sound of thunder, nor through the obscurity of a likeness, but Himself whom we love in these things, himself we should hear without these things (just as we are now reaching out and by swift thought attain the eternal wisdom that remains over all things), if this should continue and all other visions of a far inferior sort were removed, and this one should carry off and swallow up and hide away in its inner joys the one who beholds it, so that everlasting life should be just like that moment of understanding was for which we sighed, would it not be this, ‘Enter into the joy of your Lord’?”373

First, this is not so much a “vision” as an “audition.”374 The images of created things, the heavens, the soul itself—they are not seen, but heard. They speak.375 God speaks. Second, God’s voice is a “vision” that can “carry away” (rapiat) and “swallow up” (absorbeat) the one who beholds it. Hearing leads to sight and touch and taste. Third, there are intermediary voices: “so that we might hear His word, not through a tongue of flesh, nor through the voice of an angel, nor through the sound of thunder, nor through the obscurity of a likeness, but Himself whom we love in these things, himself we should hear without these things.” Augustine implies that all of

373 dicebamus ergo, `si cui sileat tumultus carnis, sileant phantasiae terrae et aquarum et aeris, sileant et poli, et ipsa sibi anima sileat et transeat se non se cogitando, sileant somnia et imaginariae revelationes, omnis lingua et omne signum, et quidquid transeundo fit si cui sileat omnino (quoniam si quis audiat, dicunt haec omnia, ``non ipsa nos fecimus, sed fecit nos qui manet in aeternum''), his dictis si iam taceant, quoniam erexerunt aurem in eum qui fecit ea, et loquatur ipse solus non per ea sed per se ipsum, ut audiamus verbum eius, non per linguam carnis neque per vocem angeli nec per sonitum nubis nec per aenigma similitudinis, sed ipsum quem in his amamus, ipsum sine his audiamus (sicut nunc extendimus nos et rapida cogitatione attingimus aeternam sapientiam super omnia manentem), si continuetur hoc et subtrahantur aliae visiones longe imparis generis et haec una rapiat et absorbeat et recondat in interiora gaudia spectatorem suum, ut talis sit sempiterna vita quale fuit hoc momentum intellegentiae cui suspiravimus, nonne hoc est: ``intra in gaudium domini tui''? Conf. 9.10.25.

374 O’Donnell, v. 3, p. 133.

375 The overall structure of this paragraph-long quotation is a mixed condition with a (compound) future-less-vivid protasis (si cui sileat . . . sileant . . . sileat et transeat . . . si cui sileat . . . si continuetur . . . et subtrahantur . . . et . . . rapiat et absorbeat et recondat) and a present general apodosis (nonne hoc est); the same conditional structure is exhibited by the parenthetical remark, “for if anyone could hear, all these things are saying, ‘We did not make ourselves, but he made us who remains forever’” (quoniam si quis audiat, dicunt haec omnia, ‘non ipsa nos fecimus, sed fecit nos qui manet in aeternum’). Whether we hear or not, these things are speaking, just as, whether we hear Him or not, God’s voice is there. !222 these things can be means by which God speaks: human tongues, angels, thunder, and “the obscurity of a likeness” (aenigma similitudinis). The fact that these created things are presented here as speaking (“for if anyone could hear, all these things are saying, ‘We did not make ourselves,’”), even in the midst of this mystical experience that looks forward to their silence and the unmediated voice of God, reinforces the idea that although they are not our proper end, these created things can be a means to that end, which is God himself.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOK TEN

Augustine begins Book Ten with a metaphor combining touch and sight. “Let me know you, my knower, let me know you, ‘even as I am known.’ O manly strength of my soul, enter it and join it to you, so that you may have it and possess it ‘without blemish or wrinkle.’”376 The imagery here is marital, as indicated by “manly strength” (virtus),377 and the verb “join it to you”

(coapta tibi),378 and the marital context of the scriptural phrase “without blemish or wrinkle” (sine macula et ruga).379 The verbs “enter” and “join” and “have” and “possess” imply metaphorical touch. The description “without blemish or wrinkle” is a visual metaphor, which serves to identify Augustine as now a part of the Church, the Bride of Christ.380 This signals the shift from past narrative (Books One through Nine) to present confession (Book Ten).

376 cognoscam te, cognitor meus, cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum. virtus animae meae, intra in eam et coapta tibi, ut habeas et possideas sine macula et ruga, Conf. 10.1.1.

377 cf. virtus maritans mentem meam, Ibid. 1.13.21 (discussed above, pp. 156f.).

378 cf. matrimonium forte coaptantes, Apul., Met. 9.8.3.

379 cf. non habentem maculam, aut rugam, Eph 5:27 (Vg.).

380 cf. Eph 5:22-32. !223 In the opening paragraphs of Book Ten, Augustine repeatedly portrays this present confession by means of metaphors that combine the visual and the auditory. For example, he ends the first paragraph of Book Ten, “‘He who does the truth comes into the light.’ I wish to do it in my heart before you in confession, and in my writing before many witnesses.”381 He begins the second paragraph with a similar combination of visual and auditory: “But now, because my groaning is a witness that I am displeasing to myself, you shine out your light.”382 Further on he says, “So my confession, my God, in your sight is made silently to you and yet not silently.”383

By these metaphors combining sight and hearing, Augustine underscores the point that his confessions are both a speaking and a revealing of what lies hidden.384 Speaking, and hearing, leads to seeing.

The synaesthesia of sight and hearing emerges again when Augustine considers the reason for his love of God.385 “You have pierced my heart with your Word, and I have loved you.

But even heaven and earth and all things in them, behold, everywhere they tell me I should love you.”386 Heaven and earth even “speak your praises to the deaf.”387 Augustine in his search for

381 qui facit eam venit ad lucem. volo eam facere in corde meo coram te in confessione, in stilo autem meo coram multis testibus, Conf. 10.1.1.

382 nunc autem quod gemitus meus testis est displicere me mihi, tu refulges, Ibid. 10.2.2.

383 confessio itaque mea, deus meus, in conspectu tuo tibi tacite fit et non tacite, Ibid.

384 cf. et tibi quidem, domine, cuius oculis nuda est abyssus humanae conscientiae, quid occultum esset in me, etiamsi nollem confiteri tibi? Conf. 10.2.2.

385 Ibid. 10.6.8.

386 percussisti cor meum verbo tuo, et amavi te. sed et caelum et terra et omnia quae in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt ut te amem, Ibid.

387 caelum et terra surdis loquuntur laudes tuas, Ibid.; this leads immediately into the long passage discussing the love of God in terms of literal and metaphorical senses (quoted above, at the beginning of Chapter 2, p. 76). !224 God “questioned”388 the earth, the sea, the sky, the heavens, and everything presented to the senses, “and they shouted with a great voice, ‘He made us.’ My question was my gaze, and their response was their beauty.”389 Everything in the sensible world, everything we can see, is also a word, a sign pointing us to God. Again, every thing tells.

This emphasis on the priority of hearing is evident also in the most densely metaphorical passage of Book Ten. In the chapters leading up to the passage in question, Augustine repeatedly reinforces the standard hierarchy or “sequence of senses”: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.390 Then he offers the following prayer to God:

Late have I loved you, O Beauty so ancient and so new, late have I loved you! Behold, you were within, and I was without, and there I sought you, and upon those beautiful things, which you have made, I rushed headlong in my ugliness. You were with me, and I was not with you. These things held me far from you, these things which would not even be if they were not in you. You called me, and cried out, and shattered my deafness; you flashed, and shone, and chased away my blindness; you gave forth fragrance, and I drew breath, and I pant for you; I have tasted, and I hunger and thirst; you touched me, and I burned for your peace.391

Many have noted the priority of hearing in this passage and offered a tentative explanation.392

Certainly there is in the progression of sensory metaphors a movement from violence

388 interrogavi, Conf. 10.6.9.

389 exclamaverunt voce magna, `ipse fecit nos.' interrogatio mea intentio mea et responsio eorum species eorum, Ibid.

390 Ibid. 10.6.8, 10.8.13 (2x), 10.12.19, 10.21.30; see above, pp. 76, 111.

391 sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova, sero te amavi! et ecce intus eras et ego foris, et ibi te quaerebam, et in ista formosa quae fecisti deformis inruebam. mecum eras, et tecum non eram. ea me tenebant longe a te, quae si in te non essent, non essent. vocasti et clamasti et rupisti surditatem meam; coruscasti, splenduisti et fugasti caecitatem meam; fragrasti, et duxi spiritum et anhelo tibi; gustavi et esurio et sitio; tetigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam, Conf. 10.27.38.

392 O’Donnell, v. 3, p. 198; M. Boulding, transl., Confessions, p. 262, n. 82; G. Bouissou, “Sero Te Amavi (Confessions X, xxvii, 38),” Revue d'Etudes Augustiniennes et Patristiques 7.3 (1961): 247-9. !225 (“shattered . . . chased away”) to “peace.”393 There is also a movement from separation to unity,

“from a call that is more distant and diffuse to a vision that is direct, then to a scent that announces a presence quite close, then to a taste that is already beginning a process of union, then finally to a complete touch that ignites the whole being.”394 There is also, and more fundamentally, an emphasis throughout the paragraph on the priority of God’s activity. This is evident from the very first word of the passage, the adverb “late” (sero), which raises at once the concern of relative time: Augustine’s response comes after God’s initiative. God is both before

Augustine and ahead of him (“so ancient and so new”); Augustine is late. God was already present to Augustine before Augustine was present to God. Because of this emphasis on relative time, it is entirely fitting that in the following sensory metaphors, Augustine breaks with the traditional “sequence of tenses” to present hearing first, the sense that is inherently temporal and sequential.395 “You called, and cried out, and shattered my deafness.” God acts, then Augustine responds.396 This pattern is evident in the other four senses as well: “you flashed, and shone, and chased away my blindness.” God is the agent, Augustine the object. God sent out smell, then

Augustine sensed it and responded with longing. Augustine receives food and responds with hunger and thirst. God touched him, and Augustine was one fire. This concern of relative time is not only brought out most clearly by the sense of hearing, where time and sequence are most

393 G. Bouissou, “Sero Te Amavi,” p. 249.

394 “nous passons de l’appel plus lointain et diffus à la vision directe, puis au parfum qui témoigne d'une présence très proche, à la saveur opérant déjà un commencement d'union, enfin au contact parfait qui embrase l'être tout entier” (G. Bouissou, Ibid.).

395 See above, pp. 72-5.

396 On hearing as passive in Augustine, see above, pp. 68-75. !226 essential; it also recalls the “time-bound method of healing”397 that God accomplishes by means of his incarnate Word. Hearing leads to seeing. God acted, calling out to Augustine, then

Augustine responded with burning love. This priority of hearing is further distinguished by

Augustine’s return to the traditional “sequence of senses” in the remainder of Book Ten.398

The emphasis on hearing is evident in many other examples of spiritual synaesthesia in

Book Ten. For example, in discussing the temptation of literal taste, and the metaphorical

“sweetness” of hunger,399 Augustine speaks repeatedly of “hearing the voice of God,”400 and praises God, “my teacher, who knocks upon my ears, and enlightens my heart.”401 God comes as a noise from without, and leads to seeing. Likewise, regarding the temptation of literal hearing,

Augustine speaks of being “entangled” and “brought under the yoke”402 of “sweet”403 voices that stir him “to the flame of piety.”404 He concludes this chapter with the prayer, “But you, my Lord

God, graciously listen: look upon me, and see me; have mercy, and heal me, in whose eyes I have become a riddle to myself, and that is my weariness.”405 God’s hearing leads to his seeing,

397 See above, pp. 144, esp. n. 97.

398 Conf. 10.35.55; the traditional order is exactly reversed in the sequence of 10.30.41f. (touch), 10.31.43-7 (taste), 10.32.48 (smell), 10.33.49f. (hearing), and 10.34.51ff. (sight).

399 nunc autem suavis est mihi necessitas, Conf. 10.31.43.

400 audio vocem iubentis dei mei, Ibid. 10.31.45; audivi aliam vocem tuam, Ibid.; audivi et illam ex munere tuo, Ibid.; audivi et alteram, Ibid.; audivi alium rogantem ut accipiat, Ibid.

401 magistro meo, pulsatori aurium mearum, inlustratori cordis mei, Ibid. 10.31.46.

402 voluptates aurium tenacius me implicaverant et subiugaverant, Conf. 10.33.49.

403 suavi et artificiosa voce, Ibid.; cf. cantilenarum suavium, Ibid. 10.33.50.

404 ardentius sentio moveri animos nostros in flammam pietatis, Ibid. 10.33.49.

405 tu autem, domine deus meus, exaudi: respice et vide et miserere et sana me, in cuius oculis mihi quaestio factus sum, et ipse est languor meus, Ibid. 10.33.50. !227 which leads to the healing of Augustine’s weariness (i.e., a touch), a weariness that results from being “entangled” (i.e., touched) by the “sweet” taste of literal sounds. Another example occurs in Augustine’s review of his attempt to rise up to God through his memory, where the senses are

“messengers,”406 and God is both a “steadfast light”407 and a “voice”408 that calls us to a

“sweetness” that savors of the life to come.409 In all these examples of synaesthesia, Augustine emphasizes his dependence on God, a recurrent theme of Book Ten,410 and one he returns to in the final chapter, where he reflects on the “true mediator,”411 the incarnate Word, who is both the

“medicine”412 through whom God “heals” all Augustine’s diseases,413 and the “ransom” that he

“eats” and “drinks” and “shares with others.”414

SENSORY METAPHORS IN BOOKS ELEVEN, TWELVE, AND THIRTEEN

In addition to the other metaphorical images and patterns noted in previous books of the

Confessions, the final three books of the work provide several examples of the priority of hearing, or the pattern of hearing leading to seeing. First, Augustine frequently asks God to

406 nuntiantibus sensibus, Conf. 10.40.65.

407 lux es tu permanens, Ibid.

408 audiebam docentem ac iubentem, Ibid.

409 ad nescio quam dulcedinem, quae si perficiatur in me, nescio quid erit quod vita ista non erit, Ibid.

410 da quod iubes et iube quod vis, Ibid. 10.29.40 (2x), 10.31.45, 10.37.60.

411 verax . . . mediator, Ibid. 10.43.68.

412 medicina tua, Conf. 10.43.69.

413 sanabis omnes languores meos, Ibid.

414 cogito pretium meum, et manduco et bibo et erogo, Ibid. 10.43.70. !228 listen, or listen graciously, to his confession, his prayer, his desire, his “knocking” on God’s door.415 Second, the language of “confession” occurs throughout the last three books.416 Third, both created things “cry out” and “praise” God,417 and the Scriptures “speak” and are “heard.”418

Indeed, in both it is the voice of Truth, of Wisdom, of God himself who speaks.419 Fourth, this voice of God comes to us in our darkness,420 strikes us,421 is passively received,422 and brings us to vision.423 It is thus a sign of God’s condescension to us.424 “The reason for all these words being proclaimed in a bodily manner is the abyss of the world and the blindness of the flesh, on

415 domine deus meus, intende orationi meae et misericordia tua exaudiat desiderium meum, Conf. 11.2.3; cf. 11.2.4, 12.26.36; for the biblical image of “knocking” (and the door being “opened”; Mt 7:7f.), cf. neque adversus pulsantes claudas eam, 11.2.3; ut aperiantur pulsanti mihi interiora sermonum tuorum, 11.2.4; si hebraea voce loqueretur, frustra pulsaret sensum meum nec inde mentem meam quicquam tangeret, 11.3.5; 12.1.1; 12.12.15; a te petatur, in te quaeratur, ad te pulsetur, 13.38.53.

416 For instances of the verb “confess” (confiteri) and the noun “confession” (confessio) in the final three books: 11.1.1 (2x), 11.2.2, 11.2.3, 11.7.9, 11.18.23, 11.22.28, 11.25.32 (2x), 11.26.33 (2x), 11.31.41 (2x); 12.2.2, 12.3.3, 12.6.6 (2x), 12.16.23, 12.18.27, 12.23.32, 12.24.33, 12.26.36, 12.30.41 (2x), 12.32.43 (2x); 13.12.13, 13.14.15 (2x), 13.15.17, 13.24.36 (2x).

417 ecce sunt caelum et terra! clamant quod facta sint, Ibid. 11.4.6; cf. in voce cataractarum tuarum, Ibid. 13.13.14; cf. dies sole candens eructet diei verbum sapientiae et nox luna lucens annuntiet nocti verbum scientiae, Ibid. 13.19.25; cf. hoc dicunt etiam quaeque pulchra corpora, Ibid. 13.28.43; cf. laudant te opera tua, Ibid. 13.33.48.

418 audiam et intellegam quomodo in principio fecisti caelum et terram, Ibid. 11.3.5; audio loquentem scripturam tuam, Ibid. 12.13.16; ista scriptura tua mihi dicit, Ibid. 13.29.44; vox libri tui, Ibid. 13.36.51.

419 veritas ait, ‘novit pater vester quid vobis opus sit, priusquam petatis ab eo,’ Conf. 11.1.1; Moyses de illo scripsit; hoc ipse ait, hoc veritas ait, Ibid. 11.2.4; veritas . . . diceret, 11.3.5; o veritas, lumen cordis mei, non tenebrae meae loquantur mihi, Ibid. 12.10.10; tu loquere in corde meo veraciter, Ibid. 12.16.23; respicit sapientiam, principium, quia et loquitur ipsa nobis, Ibid. 12.28.39; quod mihi per eius verba tua veritas dicere voluerit, Ibid. 12.32.43; o homo, nempe quod scriptura mea dicit, ego dico, Ibid. 13.29.44.

420 veritas ait, ‘novit pater vester quid vobis opus sit, priusquam petatis ab eo,’ Ibid. 11.1.1; o veritas, lumen cordis mei, non tenebrae meae loquantur mihi, Ibid. 12.10.10; aversi a te, nostro lumine, in ea vita fuimus aliquando tenebrae et in reliquiis obscuritatis nostrae laboramus, Ibid. 13.2.3.

421 praeberem aures corporis mei sonis erumpentibus ex ore eius, Ibid. 11.3.5; frustra pulsaret sensum meum, Ibid.; pulsatum verbis sanctae scripturae tuae, Ibid. 12.1.1; ore erumpentibus atque sonantibus signis, Ibid. 13.23.34.

422 ut quiescant et viam praebeant ad se verbo tuo, Ibid. 12.16.23.

423 vident haec et gaudent in luce veritatis tuae, Ibid. 12.28.38; nisi per idem verbum converteretur ad idem a quo facta est atque ab eo inluminata lux fieret, Ibid. 13.2.3; lucerna pedibus tuis verbum eius, Ibid. 13.14.15.

424 priusquam invocarem praevenisti et institisti crebrescens multimodis vocibus, ut audirem de longinquo et converterer et vocantem me invocarem te, Ibid. 13.1.1. !229 account of which thoughts are not able to be seen, so there is need for them to strike upon our ears.”425 God calls to us, his voice coming to us from outside and received passively within us, because we are unable to reach out to him ourselves in the activity of sight, unless he first enlightens us.

Despite this consistent emphasis on hearing throughout the last three book of the

Confessions, or perhaps in addition to this emphasis, there is a greater concentration of visual metaphor in Book Eleven than in Books Twelve and Thirteen. For example, Augustine directly addresses God as “light” (lux, lumen) six times in Book Eleven,426 but only three times in Book

Twelve,427 and four times in Book Thirteen.428 Similarly, Book Eleven is the only one of the last three books where Augustine asks God to “heal” his eyes.429 Finally, there is greater emphasis in

Book Eleven on how God “shines” and “enlightens,”430 a greater emphasis on the “splendor” of his “ever-abiding eternity.”431 Thus, the visual metaphors of Book Eleven emphasize God’s

425 quibus omnibus vocibus corporaliter enuntiandis causa est abyssus saeculi et caecitas carnis, qua cogitata non possunt videri, ut opus sit instrepere in auribus, Conf. 13.23.34.

426 lux caecorum, Conf. 11.2.3; lux videntium, Ibid.; lux mentium, Ibid. 11.11.13; lux mea, Ibid. 11.15.18; dulce lumen occultorum oculorum meorum, Ibid. 11.19.25; lux, veritas, Ibid. 11.23.30.

427 lumen cordis mei, Ibid. 12.10.10; lumen oculorum meorum in occulto, Ibid. 12.18.27; lux omnium veridicarum mentium, Ibid.

428 te, nostro lumine, Ibid. 13.2.3; o lumen veridicum, Ibid. 13.6.7; vos enim estis lumen mundi, Ibid. 13.19.25; lumen meum, veritas, Ibid. 12.24.36; the third reference here is not technically direct address (i.e., vocative), but is clearly identifying God as light (i.e., predication).

429 sana oculos meos, Ibid. 11.31.41.

430 primordia inluminationis tuae et reliquias tenebrarum mearum, Ibid. 11.2.2; quid est illud quod interlucet mihi et percutit cor meum sine laesione? . . . sapientia, sapientia ipsa est quae interlucet mihi, discindens nubilum meum, Ibid. 11.9.11; dilucescant allucente misericordia tua, domine, Ibid. 11.22.28; tu inluminabis lucernam meam, domine, deus meus, inluminabis tenebras meas, Ibid. 11.25.32.

431 splendorem semper stantis aeternitatis, Ibid. 11.11.13. !230 timelessness, his permanence, and his being, in contrast to his creation, which is time-bound, impermanent, and in a state of flux. The visual metaphors reflect God as Father and Creator.

By comparison, there is a greater concentration of auditory metaphors in Book Twelve.

Perhaps the most obvious example is the repetition of the refrain, “You have said to me with a strong voice in my inner ear…. This is clear to me in your sight, and let it grow more and more clear.”432 But it is evident also in Augustine’s argument taking the form of a debate with his imagined objectors.433 The auditory metaphors are, then, one way that Augustine focuses in Book

Twelve on the Second Person of the Trinity, the Word by whom all things are made,434 the Word who comes to us in time.435

Book Thirteen, by contrast, shows a greater concentration of metaphors of taste and touch. For example, the word “sweet” (dulcis, dulcedo) appears metaphorically once each in

Books Eleven and Twelve,436 but three times in Book Thirteen.437 Similarly, the word

“bitter” (amarus, amaritudo, etc.) is entirely absent from Books Eleven and Twelve, but occurs

432 dixisti mihi, domine, voce forti in aurem interiorem….hoc in conspectu tuo claret mihi et magis magisque clarescat, Conf. 12.11.11 (2x); cf. dixisti mihi voce forti in aurem interiorem, Ibid. 12.22.12; cf. mihi veritas voce forti in aurem interiorem dicit, Ibid. 12.15.18; quod mihi dicit in aurem interiorem, Ibid.; tu es deus meus et dicis voce forti in aure interiore servo tuo, Ibid. 13.29.44.

433 quid ergo dicetis, contradictores? Conf. 12.15.19; cf. quid dicitis mihi, quos alloquebar contradictores…? Ibid. 12.15.22; cf. qui haec negant, Ibid. 12.16.23; tu esto, deus noster, arbiter inter confessiones meas et contradictiones eorum, Ibid.; for further references and discussion, see O’Donnell, v. 3, pp. 316-20., 324, 327, 329.

434 in verbo suo sibi coaeterno fecit deus, Conf. 12.20.29; ecce ego quam fidenter dico in tuo verbo incommutabili omnia te fecisse, invisibilia et visibilia, Ibid. 12.24.33.

435 For further discussion of the focus on the Second Person in Book Twelve, see O’Donnell, v. 3, pp. 251, 300.

436 dulce lumen occultorum oculorum meorum, Conf. 11.19.25 (NB: a metaphor of taste and sight); dulcedine felicissimae contemplationis tuae, Ibid. 12.9.9.

437 dulci fonte, Ibid. 13.17.21; in dulcedinem gratiae tuae, Ibid. 13.23.33; elinxi stillam dulcedinis ex tua veritate, Ibid. 13.30.45. !231 metaphorically nine times in Book Thirteen.438 As regards touch, the words “weight” (pondus) and “heavy” (gravis, gravo) are absent from Books Eleven and Twelve, but occur eight times in

Book Thirteen.439 Similarly, words for “fire” (ardor, flamma, ignis, etc.) occur five times in Book

Eleven,440 once in Book Twelve,441 and nine times in Book Thirteen.442 Finally, the words

“rest” (requies, quiesco, etc.) and “peace” (pax, etc.) occur once in Book Eleven,443 seven times in Book Twelve,444 and thirty times in Book Thirteen.445 These metaphors of taste and touch in

Book Thirteen help emphasize the importance of the Third Person, the Holy Spirit who appears in tongues of fire,446 who causes us to “rest in him,”447 who raises our hearts in burning love to

438 quis congregavit amaricantes in societatem unam? Conf. 13.17.20; amaritudo voluntatum, Ibid.; amaritudinem malitiae atque nequitiae, Ibid. 13.19.24; amarus languor, Ibid. 13.20.27; ab aquarum amaritudine, Ibid. 13.21.29; ab aquis maris infidelitate amaris, Ibid.; in perpetua impietatis amaritudine, Ibid. 13.23.33; in societate amaricantium populorum, Ibid. 13.24.37; ab amaritudine marinorum fluctuum, Ibid. 13.27.42; one could argue that the fifth and ninth references here are not strictly metaphorical, but each occurs within a passage that allegorizes the Biblical text, and thus makes that text metaphorical in the broad sense (according to Augustine).

439 de pondere cupiditatis, Ibid. 13.7.8; pondere, 13.9.10 (5x); gravatus, Ibid. 13.13.14; has quae in terris graves fluitant, Ibid. 13.32.47; again, not all of these references are strictly metaphorical, but they all occur in the context of an interpretation of Scripture which is metaphorical, at least in the broad sense as Augustine understands metaphor.

440 inardesco, Conf. 11.2.2, 11.9.11 (2x); flammantia, Ibid. 11.22.28; igne amoris tui, Ibid. 11.29.39.

441 ardenter, Ibid. 12.18.27.

442 inardescimus, Ibid. 13.9.10 (2x); inflammavit, Ibid. 13.15.18; ignis, Ibid. 13.9.10 (3x); ignis, Ibid. 13.19.25 (3x).

443 pacifici, Ibid. 11.1.1.

444 impacatorum, Ibid. 12.10.10; pacis sanctorum, Ibid. 12.11.12; requiescat, Ibid. 12.15.19; quiescant, Ibid. 12.16.23; in eius pacem, Ibid.; pacificam, Ibid. 12.25.35; requies, Ibid. 12.26.36.

445 Ibid. 13.4.5 (3x); 13.7.8; 13.8.9 (3x); 13.9.10 (6x); 13.11.12; 13.35.50 (5x); 13.36.51 (3x); 13.37.52 (5x); 13.38.53 (3x).

446 Acts 2:3.

447 in quibus enim requiescere dicitur spiritus tuus, hos in se requiescere facit, Conf. 13.4.5; cf. requiesceret in spiritu tuo, Ibid. 13.8.9. !232 find their proper place of rest and peace,448 and whose communion of love is characterized by

“the sweetness of grace,”449 nourished by a “sweet spring,”450 and fed by the Fish.451

The emphasis on metaphors of sight (in Book Eleven), hearing (in Book Twelve), and taste and touch (in Book Thirteen), are another instance of the “sequence of the senses” and thus suggest a movement from distant senses (sight and hearing) toward contact (taste and touch). The

God who precedes all time,452 and who called us by means of his Word in time, is moving us by his Spirit to return to him and embrace him, so that we might have complete union with him in

“the rest after time.”453

448 cf. in dono tuo requiescimus: ibi te fruimur. requies nostra locus noster. amor illuc attollit nos et spiritus tuus bonus exaltat humilitatem nostram de portis mortis….dono tuo accendimur et sursum ferimur; inardescimus et imus, Conf. 13.9.10.

449 dulcedinem gratiae, Ibid. 13.23.33.

450 dulci fonte, Ibid. 13.17.20;

451 piscem manducet, Ibid. 13.21.29; on the Eucharistic reading of this reference, see O’Donnell, v. 3, pp. 389f.

452 cf. Conf. 11.13.16.

453 quietem ex tempore, Ibid. 13.37.52. CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The physiological aspects of sense-perception are frequently discussed in the writings of ancient philosophers from the Presocratics up to the time of Augustine. The examination of these discussions (in Chapters One and Two) places the sensory views of Augustine in their philosophical context. Insofar as he sees an analogy between the physical process of sensation and the spiritual activity of the soul, Augustine’s sensory views provide necessary background to his use of sensory metaphors. The rhetorical tradition regarding metaphor, and Augustine’s own definition and discussion of metaphor, provide further background to his use of sensory metaphors in his early works (Chapter Three). The patterns suggested by Augustine’s use of sensory metaphors in these early works, especially the Cassiciacum Dialogues, are more clearly evident in the Confessions (Chapter Four). His use of sensory metaphors, especially in the

Confessions, is both deliberate and deliberately indicative of central aspects of his thought.

AUGUSTINE’S SENSORY VIEWS IN CONTEXT

Augustine did not, like Aristotle (and others), write a work On Sense-perception. He nowhere undertakes a comprehensive discussion of the physics of sense-perception for its own sake. Yet he does write about the senses, and even discusses particular aspects of the sensory process, albeit here and there across his vast corpus, and in the context of discussions that are

!233 !234 primarily epistemological, theological, or exegetical. From these disparate discussions one can reconstruct Augustine’s understanding of sense-perception in his early works.

Augustine defines sensation generally as “an experience of the body not escaping the soul’s notice.”1 There is, then, a clear distinction in Augustine between the “senses” (sensus) as capacities or instruments, which are bodily, and the “act of sensing” (sentire), which is an activity of the soul by means of the body. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching involve bodily input for Augustine, so that there is an analogy between the bodily activity of the senses and the intellectual activity of the soul. The details of Augustine’s sensory views are worth considering insofar as this analogy provides the basis for Augustine’s sensory metaphors.

Augustine accepts in general the Platonic “ray theory” of vision. From at least the 380s and well into his later work, Augustine portrays sight as actively projected out from the eyes to touch, illumine, and enliven the object of sight.2 As such, Augustine’s understanding of sight is clearly active (i.e., emissionist). Like Aristotle, Augustine considers color the primary object of sight. He also associates sight with objects extended in space.

Hearing, by contrast, is the result of a process that begins with the movement of an external object. Like sight, it is a distant sense, but unlike sight it involves struck air, not rays of light (i.e., fire). The vibrations transmitted through the air are passively received by the hearer.

Also, hearing involves extension in time, not space, and is thus sequential in nature, not

1 nam sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod patitur corpus, Quant. an. 23.41; see above, p. 59.

2 See above, pp. 62f. !235 immediate (as sight is). For Augustine, then, the two principal senses are characterized by a series of contrasts: active and passive, fire and air, space and time, immediate and sequential.

The sense of smell is intermediate between the distant senses and the contact senses. Like sight and hearing, smell involves travel through the medium of the air. But smell requires a closer proximity than either hearing or sight. Another sign of its intermediate nature is its association with humid exhalations. Whereas sight involves the element of fire and hearing the element of air, smell involves a mixture of air and water entering the nostril as the organ of smell. The principal smells mentioned by Augustine are sweet and foul.

The sense of taste is more like touch. Whereas smell involves humid exhalations (i.e., a mixture of air and water), taste involves the element of water in its more substantial form, whether water in liquid drink or the moisture in solid food. Taste also involves direct contact between the organ (i.e., the tongue or palate) and the object tasted, and so is a species of touch.

Sweet and bitter are the principal tastes mentioned by Augustine.

Touch is the lowest of the senses. It involves the element of earth, the densest of the four traditional elements. There is no specific organ for touch, but the sense is diffused over the whole body. Touch involves direct contact, and is associated with embrace. The sense of touch can distinguish hot, cold, rough, smooth, hard, soft, light, and heavy.

AUGUSTINE’S UNDERSTANDING OF METAPHOR IN CONTEXT

Augustine largely follows the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition regarding the definition and use of metaphor. Like Cicero and Quintilian, he accepts the identification of metaphor as one !236 species of trope. He also defines it as “the so-called ‘transfer’ of some word from its proper object to an object not proper to it.”3 He even follows Quintilian in enumerating some of the types of metaphor, including “from animate to inanimate,” and “from body to soul” (and vice versa). Like Cicero and Quintilian, he equates metaphor (metaphora) with “transferred words” (verba translata), and understands “likeness” (similitudo) as the basis of this transfer.

Yet Augustine differs from the received rhetorical tradition in both the breadth and the linguistic sophistication of his understanding of metaphor. In his early work On Dialectic (De

Dialectica), he presents metaphor as a general rhetorical trope, citing examples that include metonymy and synecdoche. On this presentation, metaphor embraces not only relationships based on similarity, but those based on correspondence and participation as well. Further, in his work On Christian Doctrine, Augustine presents metaphor in terms of a two-step process of signification by which the word used metaphorically is a sign pointing to the thing it normally indicates, and that thing itself becomes a sign pointing to another thing.

This breadth and linguistic sophistication affects how Augustine conceives of metaphor.

It is not merely a specialized rhetorical device, but a much more pervasive feature of language. It involves not an exchange of words, but an extension of meaning. Metaphor proceeds by means of the literal sense. Words point to things, and those things themselves becomes words pointing to other things. This is a way of looking at the world. Things can both be and mean something.

Augustine himself demonstrates this way of looking at the world, when he discusses the purpose of metaphors in general, in Scripture, and in his own writing. In general, metaphors

3 ipsa quae appellatur metaphora, hoc est de re propria ad rem non propriam uerbi alicuius usurpata translatio, C. mendac. 10.24; see above, pp 129f., n. 38. !237 appeal to our senses and so move the heart to contemplate divine things. As such, metaphors are a way of stooping down to the level of ordinary men when reason alone is not enough to lead them to the truth. Similarly, God himself descends to the level of sensible things (in creation) and sensory metaphors (in Scripture) so that he might raise us up to an understanding of immaterial truth. In a “time-bound method of healing,” God uses rhetorical figures that delight, in order to

“arouse” (movere) and inflame our hearts and carry us “with a more ardent love toward rest.” In his own works, Augustine expressly advocates writing in the manner of the Scriptures, in such a way as to speak on multiple levels, “so that my words might echo back whatever portion of truth each person was able to receive.”4 He demonstrates this in how he uses sensory metaphors.

AUGUSTINE’S USE OF SENSORY METAPHORS

Augustine’s early works provide numerous examples of sensory metaphors. Especially in the Cassiciacum Dialogues, these metaphors often combine more than one sense and thereby exhibit a kind of spiritual synaesthesia. One prevalent example of this is when hearing leads to seeing (“a voice that illumines”). For instance, Augustine describes Romanianus’ “loftiness of mind” in terms of thunder and lightning, “murmurings” that lead to “flashes of light,” a “roar of reason” followed by a “flash of temperance.”5 Similarly, Augustine recommends the study of the liberal arts for discerning the hidden order of God’s providence, because these arts “begin with the ears” and “advance to the realm of the eyes.”6 Likewise, at the beginning of On Order there

4 sic mallem scribere ut quod veri quisque de his rebus capere posset mea verba resonarent, Conf. 12.31.42.

5 Acad. 2.1.2 (discussed above, pp. 149ff.).

6 Ord. 2.14.39-2.15.42 (quoted and discussed above, p. 151). !238 are numerous sounds (running water, a struck bed, noisy shrews) that prompt reflection and drive the discussion toward an understanding of how to see God’s hidden order in the nature of things, and Licentius even calls attention to these sounds as evidence of that order.7

Such instances of sounds leading to sight are analogous to the “two-fold path” of authority and reason. Sounds, like authority, are passively received; sight, like reason, actively reaches out to its object. Hearing and authority are temporally prior, but sight and reason are prior “in the order of reality.”8 We first accept authority in order to do the more important work of reason. This is none other than the “time-bound method of healing” that “comes first in the order of time, though not in natural excellence,” and calls “hearers, not knowers, to salvation.”

Authority comes first, then reason. Faith seeks understanding. Hearing leads to seeing.

SENSORY METAPHORS IN THE CONFESSIONS

This synaesthetic pattern of voice-activated vision figures more prominently in the

Confessions. From its first word (magnus) to its last (aperietur), the Confessions is full of sensory metaphors concerning God’s nature and our understanding of it. As Augustine describes it later in life, “The thirteen books of my Confessions praise the just and good God both for my evil deeds and for my good deeds, and stir up the human intellect and affection to him….The first ten books were written about me, the last three about the Sacred Scriptures.”9 In light of the

7 See above, pp. 151f.

8 See above, p. 152ff.

9 Confessionum mearum libri tredecim, et de malis et de bonis meis Deum laudant iustum et bonum, atque in eum excitant humanum intellectum et affectum….a primo usque ad decimum de me scripti sunt, in tribus ceteris de Scripturis sanctis, Retr. 2.6.1. !239 foregoing discussion of sensory metaphors, the antitheses of this description are telling. First, both the good and the evil deeds of Augustine are grounds for praising God, showing forth his goodness and justice. In other words, everything declares God’s glory. Every thing tells. Second, the Confessions aim to “stir up” (excitant) both the intellect and the affection to God. In other words, they appeal to both head and heart, and do so, like metaphors, by stirring or exciting.

Third, the focus of the Confessions is twofold: the providential actions of God in Augustine’s own life, and the proclamation of God in the opening verses of the creation account in Genesis.

In other words, God can speak in and through creation (especially our own lives), and in and through the Scriptures (especially the creation account). Given this authorial description of the work, the whole of the Confessions, as the title itself suggests, is an instance of speaking and hearing that lead to seeing. Further, the Confessions illustrate this pattern precisely by their metaphorical nature. The words of the Confessions point to the events of Augustine’s life (Books

One through Ten) and the creation account in Genesis (Books Eleven through Thirteen), which both in turn become words pointing to realities about God and his providence. In other words, the Confessions are one long, multifaceted sensory metaphor. The words evoke any number of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and feelings, and these all in turn mean something. They point beyond themselves to eternal truths about God.

But how does one know this is the way Augustine intended the work to be read? He tells us as much: “I, at any rate—and I proclaim this without hesitation from my heart—if I were to write something that had the highest authority, I would prefer to write it in such a way that my words would resound with whatever portion of truth each was capable of grasping concerning !240 these things, rather than in such a way that I should set forth more clearly one true opinion, so as to exclude all others that have no falsehood in them that could offend me.”10 Just as with

Scripture there will be layers of signification, with some grasping only the surface meaning, and others able to perceive meaning below the surface. The difference between these two classes, the

“souls given to matters of the mind” and the “souls given to matters of sense,”11 is not the difference between looking at sensible realities and not looking at sensible realities. The difference is between (on the one hand) those “little ones” who form opinions “based on their familiarity with the flesh,”12 and for whom the words of Scripture are a nest to guard them and allow them to grow to maturity,13 and (on the other hand) those “for whom these words [of

Scripture] are no longer a nest but are dense thickets where they see hidden fruit and they fly about rejoicing and chattering as they search it out and pluck it.”14 In other words, the difference is between those who approach the words of Scripture as a solid thing to support them, and those who see the words of Scripture as so many leaves of foliage, and look through them to find the hidden fruit within.

10 ego certe, quod intrepidus de meo corde pronuntio, si ad culmen auctoritatis aliquid scriberem, sic mallem scribere ut quod veri quisque de his rebus capere posset mea verba resonarent, quam ut unam veram sententiam ad hoc apertius ponerem, ut excluderem ceteras quarum falsitas me non posset offendere, Conf. 12.31.42; I am indebted to F. Crosson for calling my attention to this passage (and the passages in the following two footnotes) in connection with Augustine’s authorial intent in the Confessions (“Structure and Meaning,” p. 90).

11 animas alias intellegibilibus, alias sensibilibus deditas, Conf. 13.18.22.

12 ex familiaritate carnis opinantur. in quibus adhuc parvulis animalibus, Ibid. 12.27.37.

13 mitte angelum tuum, qui eum reponat in nido, ut vivat donec volet, Ibid.; cf. Serm. 51.5.6.

14 alii vero, quibus haec verba non iam nidus sed opaca frutecta sunt, vident in eis latentes fructus et volitant laetantes et garriunt scrutantes et carpunt eos, Conf. 12.28.38. !241 In sum, the early works of Augustine, from the Cassiciacum Dialogues to the

Confessions, show a detailed and fairly consistent understanding of the physiological aspects of sense-perception (including the hierarchy of the senses and their association with the elements), and a deliberate and nuanced use of sensory metaphors based on the analogy of the bodily senses to certain activities or faculties of the soul. One distinctive use of sensory metaphors in

Augustine’s early works involves a deliberate departure from the traditional sequence of senses to present hearing first, then seeing, in a pattern of voice-activated vision. This pattern reflects

Augustine’s theological emphasis on faith seeking understanding, and the need for authority to precede reason. As such, sensory metaphors are for Augustine no mere ornament to language; they reflect his deeper philosophical and theological preoccupations. They are not just a literary device; they represent a way of seeing the world. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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