(CUWS) Outreach Journal #1189

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

CUWS Outreach Journal 1189 30 October 2015 Feature Item: “A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reforms Needed To Optimize Efforts”. Study Panel on Biodefense, co-chaired by Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and former Governor and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge (R-PA); Institutional sponsors: Hudson Institute and Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies; published 28 October 2015. http://www.biodefensestudy.org/ The report, A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts, details America’s vulnerability to bioterrorism and deadly outbreaks and emphasizes the need to transform the way our government is organized to confront these threats. Biodefense recommendations include centralizing leadership in the Office of the Vice President; establishing a White House Biodefense Coordination Council; strengthening state, local, territorial, and tribal capabilities; and promoting innovation through sustained biodefense prioritization and funding. The comprehensive report includes specific and pragmatic legislative, programmatic, and policy actions in the form of 33 urgent recommendations and close to 100 action items. The panel scrutinized the status of prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, response, attribution, recovery, and mitigation – the spectrum of activities deemed necessary for biodefense by both Republican and Democratic Administrations, and many policy experts. They identified substantial achievements, but also found serious gaps that continue to leave the homeland vulnerable to biological threats.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1. Expert: U.S. Newly-Developed Submarine Poses Threat to China 2. Sandia Work to Extend Life of Nuclear Warheads

U.S. Counter-WMD 1. New US Missile Defense Radar to be Ready for Testing by 2020

U.S. Arms Control 1. Rough Path Ahead for Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 2. Russia Tests New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile — Defense Ministry 3. Pentagon: Northrop Grumman to Develop US Military’s New Long Range Bomber 4. Russian Armed Forces Carry Out Missile Launches as Part of Scheduled Inspection

Homeland Security/The Americas 1. US Conducts Long-Range Bombing Exercises, ICBM Test 2. US Panel Proposes Executive Biodefence Office

Issue No.1189, 30 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 3. Russian Deputy PM: Strategy of US Prompt Global Strike Illusory

Asia/Pacific 1. North Korea’s Nuclear Status Unacceptable for Russia — Russian Ambassador 2. Heritage Foundation Report Classifies N. Korea as Gravest Threat to U.S. Interests 3. N. Korea Digging New Tunnel at Its Nuke Test Site: Official

Europe/Russia 1. The Cost of Replacing Trident Is Really £167bn, New Figures Suggest 2. Russian Military Spending to Increase by Less Than 1% Next Year 3. Ministers: U.K. Royal Navy Guaranteed 4 New Nuclear Ballistic Missile Subs 4. Russia Modernizing S-300 Missile System for Iran 5. Russia to Complete Destruction of Its Chemical Weapons Stocks by 2020 — OPCW 6. Russian to Spend $34.8 Bln on Armed Forces in 2016 — Draft Budget 7. Scottish Labour Votes for Debate on Opposing Trident Renewal

Middle East 1. Washington’s Jailing of Iranian Citizens Unacceptable: Spokeswoman 2. AEOI Official: Leader’s Mandates to be Fully Met on Uranium Exchange with Russia 3. Arak Reactor Redesigning A Phased Process: Iran’s FM 4. Iran’s Rowhani Expects Sanctions to Be Lifted by End of Year 5. JCPOA Could Raise Military Threats: Iran’s Civil Defense Chief 6. Former Iran President Indirectly Admits Country Sought Nuclear Weapons 7. Iran’s New Missiles Can Destroy Enemy Targets up to 2,000 KM Away 8. Iran, US, EU to Negotiate Acceleration to Implement Agreement 9. IS Has Access to Chemical Warfare Agents Production — Russian Foreign Ministry

India/Pakistan 1. Russia to Lease another Nuclear Sub to India in December

Commentary 1. Get Ready, America: Here Comes China's Ballistic Missile Defenses 2. Putin's World Is Far Removed From Reality (Op-Ed) 3. Why We Still Need a Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missile 4. The New Nuclear War Threat in US-China Ties 5. Nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missiles: They Still Matter 6. The Nuclear Option: Long Range Strike & the Case for Dual-Use 7. America's New LRS-B Stealth Bomber: How Many Does Washington Need?

Return to Top

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

People’s Daily Online – Beijing, China Expert: U.S. Newly-Developed Submarine Poses Threat to China (People’s Daily Online) October 28, 2015 The U.S. Navy is developing a new ballistic missile submarine to replace the current Ohio-class submarines, according to the article China's Greatest Fear: U.S. Navy 'Cruise Missile Carriers' published on the website of the National Interest on Oct. 21. U.S. guided missile submarine targets great powers such as Russia and China, and the submarine poses a huge threat to China, said military expert Yin Zhuo in an interview with CCTV. The newly-developed submarine by the U.S. is not meant to replace aircraft carrier, said military expert Cao Weidong. Yin said ballistic missile submarine is a powerful tool for the U.S. to confront nuclear powers. The U.S. has built 18 Ohio-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines, among which 14 are still in service. Though the submarines have served for dozens of years, they are still world-class nuclear submarines. Yin pointed out that ballistic missile nuclear submarines are mainly used in nuclear wars, and the U.S. refitted its 30 years old ballistic missile nuclear submarines into guided missile submarines mainly for the use in conventional wars. The guided missile nuclear submarines are powerful, and pose huge threat to China, said Yin. The U.S. doesn’t mean to replace aircraft carriers by the submarine, said Cao. Aircraft carrier is a large combat platform on the sea but it’s easy to be found. The U.S. army can use guided missile nuclear submarine to launch accurate attack against other countries. http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1028/c98649-8967854.html Return to Top

The Independent – Livermore, CA Sandia Work to Extend Life of Nuclear Warheads Thursday, October 29, 2015 Sandia National Laboratories is doing what it hasn’t done in decades: extending the life of a nuclear warhead, at the same time the U.S. Air Force develops a replacement cruise missile that will carry the weapon. The goal of the W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) is refurbishing the W80 warhead with replacement components for aging technology and components that have limited lifespans. Sandia’s California site is responsible for development of non-nuclear components and subsystems and for systems integration. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is responsible for the refurbishment of the nuclear explosive package and joint development of detonators with safety features. A life extension program refurbishes aging components that are reaching the end of their service life. Scientists and engineers make decisions to reuse, remanufacture or redesign weapons Issue No.1189, 30 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama components. A reused component is requalified to go back into a weapon without change. A component that’s determined to be past its original life is remanufactured to the original specifications. However, if some components can’t be remade to those specifications because the parts aren’t available anymore, Sandia redesigns them using modern parts. Based on President Obama's budget request, the W80-4 LEP budget would increase in fiscal year 2016. The W80-4 LEP is likely to become the largest weapons system development and integration effort at the Sandia California site in two decades. The W80 was originally developed by Los Alamos and Sandia, with the first units fielded in 1982. “The LEP will update the interface between the warhead and the missile to meet current Air Force standards and requirements, assuring nuclear safety and security,” said Paul Spence, who joined the program in February as manager of the W80-4 Systems Integration department. The W80-4 LEP builds on programs that began more than a decade ago. The feasibility study phase, officially known as Phase 6.2, was approved July 23 by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). “It’s exciting to have the program in the Livermore Valley. It’s important … to collaborate closely with Lawrence Livermore and production agencies like the National Security Campus in Kansas City,” Spence said. “Sandia will also work with Pantex, Savannah River and others. There will be lots of interactions to build on and grow.” http://www.independentnews.com/labs_link/sandia-work-to-extend-life-of-nuclear- warheads/article_a3254504-7df2-11e5-abf6-d787f0b0d29d.html Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency New US Missile Defense Radar to be Ready for Testing by 2020 The new LRDR system will be ready to be analyzed in five years. 26 October 2015 WASHINGTON (Sputnik) — The new US Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) system will be ready to be analyzed in five years, defense contractor Lockheed Martin said in a release on Monday. "Lockheed Martin’s proposed LRDR system will be built on an aggressive timeline ready for operational testing in Clear Air Force Station, Alaska by 2020," Lockheed Martin stated. On Thursday, the US government awarded Lockheed Martin $784 million to create a new missile defense radar computer in Moorestown, New Jersey and at Clear Air Force Station, Alaska. The work is expected to be completed by January 21, 2024 when the contract ends. The radar defense system will have an electronic antenna and a locale to contain and use the antenna. Lockheed Martin Integrated Warfare Systems and Sensors Vice President Carl Bannar said this new system met the needs of the US national defense. "The United States has a limited number of ground-based interceptors to detect threats, yet the number of potential missile threats — and countermeasures used to hide those threats — is growing," Bannar said. "Our offering meets the MDA’s [Missile Defense Agency] vision for LRDR

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

by pairing innovative radar discrimination capability with proven ballistic missile defense algorithms." Bannar noted that the new radar system built on previous US missile defense instruments. "Our mature, scalable, GaN [gallium nitride]-based S-Band technology was ideally suited for this high-performance ballistic missile defense application," Bannar concluded. The US Missile Defense Agency in Huntsville, Alabama is handling the LRDR contract with Lockheed Martin. http://sputniknews.com/military/20151026/1029132098/lockheed-lrdr-test-alaska.html Return to Top

Defense News – Tysons Corner, VA Rough Path Ahead for Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty By Aaron Mehta October 24, 2015 WASHINGTON — US Secretary of State John Kerry last week pledged to renew a push for the US to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but the way forward appears rocky. Speaking at an Oct. 21 event organized by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Kerry pledged to spend his last year in office making the case for why the US should sign onto the CTBT. "I am determined that, in the months to come, we're going to reopen and re-energize the conversation about the treaty on Capitol Hill and throughout our nation," Kerry said. "Because there should be no doubt that it is in the best interests of our country to join the treaty and to urge others not to wait, but to go ahead and do so themselves as soon as possible." That may be easier said than done, however. The last major push to ratify the CTBT came in 1999, when it failed in the Senate 51-48. Kerry believes concerns among senators about the US ability to do non-explosive testing and the question of whether the capability exists to make sure others are not violating the treaty are no longer valid, thanks to technological improvements. "The factors that led some senators to oppose the treaty in 1999 have changed, and, so, choices should change as well," Kerry said. Analysts, however, say there is a lot of work that needs to be done before the treaty has a chance. Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association says there is a "pretty clear understanding that there aren't 67 votes in the Senate at the current moment for the agreement," something he and others blame, at least in part, on the lack of institutional knowledge about the issue. Less than a fifth of the Senate remains from the 1999 fight. "Any future Senate vote will require a significant amount of groundwork to be laid, in terms of education and outreach," Reif said. "The administration, at least to this point in its tenure, has not

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama launched the kind of effort necessary to ultimately achieve CTBT ratification. So it's very good to hear they are considering stepping up their engagement." Talking on a panel before Kerry's speech, Brian P. McKeon, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, said the Clinton administration needed to do more groundwork in the Senate before launching the CTBT fight, calling the timing "a little premature." "The lesson is, we need to lay a lot of groundwork, both in the Senate and even in the executive branch," said McKeon, who was chief counsel for the Democrats on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the last CTBT fight. "With any treaty, but particularly with an arms-control treaty or security treaty, there are so many more people paying attention closely in the Senate and in the broader public arena than is the case with most other treaties the Senate works on," McKeon added. "It really takes a major investment both in the executive branch and the Senate of time, energy, will. And, candidly, it was a little bit rushed, and I do not think we had that investment lined up in terms of preparation of the environment." Adding to the challenge is a general sentiment in the Senate against signing large international agreements and treaties, something that was already underway during the Bush administration, which hit roadblocks on treaties such as the Law of the Sea. "There is hostility to the president, but the bigger problem is the hostility to international treaties and agreements writ large," Reif said. Another challenge is whether the Department of Defense would support a push for a new treaty. Franklin Miller, who held a number of top Pentagon roles during the original CTBT fight, said during the event that the Pentagon was "always skeptical about the CTBT." "The fundamental question we will have to wrestle with at some point is, what is the treaty's purpose now?" Miller, now with the Scowcroft Group, said. Developing trust with both DoD and Congress is key for any CTBT push, agreed Charles Curtis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "There is a continuing obligation on the Department [of Energy] and on NNSA to share with the Department of Defense the success of its work," Curtis said. "Trust in the Congress is probably the hardest to achieve of all of the important elements. It confounds the management of the laboratories, the lack of trust, and it confounds the civilian leadership in the department how to restore trust in the Congress in what has happened here." Entry into the CTBT would legally prohibit the US from performing nuclear explosive tests, something the government has been doing on a de facto basis since 1992. Of the 183 states that have signed the treaty, only 164 have ratified it. More important, out of the 44 nations designated as "nuclear-capable states," India, Pakistan and North Korea have refused to sign the agreement, and only 36 have voted to ratify the agreement. For the agreement to go into force, the eight remaining nuclear-capable states — China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States — must ratify the document. Ratifying the agreement would not just be symbolic, argued Reif. Doing so would put pressure on China, India and Pakistan to ratify as well. "That would be a significant step if all those countries ratified, because then you'd have all the P-5 countries on board," he said. "Both India and Pakistan have said they don't intend to resume testing

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

but they haven't ratified the treaty. Doing so would ensure they can't increase the sophistication of their nuclear arsenals via nuclear testing." Reif points to a security argument, as well. The US has a long history of nuclear testing in its back pocket, more than any other nation. Locking other nations out of doing live testing would ensure the US maintains a lead in nuclear knowledge "US ratification would not prevent the US from maintaining or upgrading its warheads without testing, just as we've been doing for the last 20 years, but it would make it harder for other states to conduct nuclear tests and, thereby, improve their arsenals or develop more advanced weapons," Reif said. "And it would be far more difficult for countries to pursue new nuclear advances through evasive or clandestine testing with the CTBT in force." http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/10/24/rough-path-ahead- kerry-nuclear-test-ban-treaty-ctbt/74460820/ Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russia Tests New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile — Defense Ministry The launch was designed to prove the reliability of a series of missiles of the type, made by a missile plant in Votkinsk October 28, 2015 MOSCOW, October 28. /TASS/. A Yars (NATO reporting name: SS-27 Mod. 2) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was launched from Russia's Plesetsk cosmodrome to test the reliability of a batch of missiles in the type, Russian Strategic Missile Force spokesman Col. Igor Yegorov told journalists on Wednesday. "A joint crew of the Strategic Missile Force and Aerospace Forces performed a test launch of an RS- 24 silo-based multiple-warhead ICBM from Plesetsk State Test Cosmodrome at 14.30 Moscow time on October 28," he said. According to Yegorov, the launch was designed to prove the reliability of a series of missiles of the type, made by a missile plant in Votkinsk. "The re-entry vehicles have arrived at the designated area in the Kura Missile Range in the Kamchatka Peninsula. The launch mission has been accomplished in full," the officer emphasized. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the service entry of the RS-24 multiple-warhead ICBM has boosted the ICBM fleet’s missile defense penetration capability. In the future, the RS-24 will be the backbone of the mobile ICBM force "capable - as part of the nation’s strategic missile triad - of upholding the defense of Russia and its allies." The ICBM large unit stationed in Kozelsk has ICBMs of the type in its inventory. http://tass.ru/en/defense/832390 Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Pentagon: Northrop Grumman to Develop US Military’s New Long Range Bomber 28 October 2015 Following months of speculation, the Pentagon has announced that Northrop Grumman has been awarded a contract to develop the US military’s latest Long Range Strike-Bomber. According to Pentagon officials, the LSR-B will incorporate open architecture that will allow the platform to be modified as technology evolves. It will also be designed to carry both conventional and nuclear payloads, and will be able to launch from the continental United States to conduct airstrikes anywhere on the planet. Northrop Grumman had been competing against a joint Boeing-Lockheed Martin team for the contract. According to William LaPlante, assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, independent cost experts estimate that the project will cost $22.4 million for the initial development phase, and $511 million per aircraft for 100 aircraft. Those cost estimates are based on 2010 dollars, however, and not calculated based on fiscal year 2016. While a number of experts had predicted a win for Boeing-Lockheed, others criticized such an arrangement. With Lockheed responsible for the F-35 fighter and Boeing behind the KC-46 tanker, allowing the two to develop the Long Range Strike-Bomber would grant too much control over the US Air Force to those companies. The contract will come in two parts. The first will be for development, while the second will cover the production of the first 21 bombers. Given that a number of scale models have already been built for testing, development could proceed quicker than other military projects. The Air Force hopes to have the first models operational by the mid-2020s. Expressing fears that its current fleet was vulnerable to Chinese and Russian-made air defenses, the Pentagon has been scrambling to replace the aging B-1 and B-52 bombers. Those are set to retire in the mid-2040s. "The US Air Force wants up to 100 new bombers armed with all the latest weaponry and radar- evading stealth technology, able to fly long distances, penetrate even the heaviest defenses and destroy scores of targets in a single bombing run," military analyst David Axe wrote for Reuters last week. But coming on the heels of the exorbitantly expensive F-35 program, many have questioned the need for another costly endeavor. Costing nearly $400 billion, the Joint Strike fighter is still plagued with problems, despite being one of the most expensive military projects every undertaken. "[The F-35 is] arguably too slow, too sluggish and too lightly armed to defeat the latest Russian and Chinese-made fighters," Axe wrote last month. "The F-35 is also prone to breakdowns, engine fires and software failures. It’s years late and – at a total cost of more than $400 billion – way, way over budget." The F-35 was developed by Lockheed Martin. To allay fears about ballooning costs, the Pentagon pledged to be more transparent about development of the new bomber, although it previously opted to keep that information disclosed.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

"We intend to provide that information, we’re not trying to hide it, it’s just that I would rather wait," LaPlante told reporters last month, "until after we get the source selection done." Some experts predict the new program could end up costing taxpayers as much as $80 billion. http://sputniknews.com/us/20151028/1029201209/pentagon-awards-bomber-contract.html Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russian Armed Forces Carry Out Missile Launches as Part of Scheduled Inspection The effort embraced the bases and units of the Strategic Missile Troops, the North and Pacific Fleets, the Caspian Flotilla, and the Strategic Aviation October 30, 2015 MOSCOW, October 30. /TASS/. The Russian Armed Forces have had a scheduled drill in testing the system of command and control. The effort embraced the bases and units of the Strategic Missile Troops, the North and Pacific Fleets, the Caspian Flotilla, and the Strategic Aviation. "In the course of the drill, the Armed Forces tested the reliability of passage of the operation orders and signals down the entire vertical of command and control from the National Defence Control Center to the command stations at bases and separate units," the Defence Ministry said in a report on the exercise. Tupolev-160 strategic bombers (known as the White Swans in Russia and the Blackjacks in NATO countries did the launches of ballistic missiles at ground targets on the Pemba and Kura firing ranges. Strategic submarines of the North and Pacific Fleets did the launches of ballistic missiles. "Missiles were launched from the water areas of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk by the submarines Bryansk of the North Fleet and Podolsk of the Pacific Fleet," the report said. Each of the two submarines carries sixteen missiles. The crew of the guided-missile boat Veliky Ustyug of the Caspian Flotilla launched a Kalibr cruise missile at a training target. "A combat crew of the Strategic Missile Troops launched a Topol intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk space center," the ministry said. An Iskander missile complex fired a missile at a target on the Kapustin Yar rocket testing site in the Astrakhan region," it said. http://tass.ru/en/defense/832903 Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Examiner.com US Conducts Long-Range Bombing Exercises, ICBM Test By RJ Larzo, Colorado Springs News Examiner October 25, 2015 The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) announced this week that it conducted joint long- range bombing exercises with the Royal Canadian Air Force. B-52 Stratofortress bombers based at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, along with the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and units from the Canadian Air Force participated in the training which lasted from Oct. 20 through Oct. 23. The exercises were conducted in and around the area of Goose Bay, Canada, according to USSTRATCOM in a statement issued via email. USSTRATCOM said the training gives bomber crews valuable experience in conducting long-range global-strike operations, while working alongside Canadian and NORAD forces. "Integrating U.S. bombers into allied training events supports a strong, credible bomber force that is essential to enhancing regional security while remaining committed to our allies," said Adm. Cecil D. Haney, USSTRATCOM commander, in the statement. "Continuing to train the strategic bomber force in a variety of environments is important to retaining key skill sets and remaining ready to confront a variety of potential threats." The venerable B-52 family of bombers has been a mainstay in the United States strategic arsenal for more than 60 years. The B-52 is a long-range, heavy bomber with global-strike capability, that can deliver massive bomb payloads, including nuclear ordnance, to targets anywhere in the world. USSTRATCOM said it conducts these training missions to ensure that the U.S. has a credible and flexible capability to respond to a variety of potential threats worldwide. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) conducted an unarmed launch of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, equipped with a test reentry vehicle, from Vandenburg Air Force Base on Oct. 21. The AFGSC said that the ICBM's reentry vehicle contained an operational testing package and traveled approximately 4,200 miles to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The tests are designed to verify the accuracy and reliability of the missiles and provide data to ensure a continued safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, according to the AFGSC. Test missiles are randomly selected to be fired from bases, located at F.E. Warren, Malmstrom, and Minot air bases. The U.S. maintains missile fields in locations throughout Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska where the weapons are kept in a continuous state of readiness. "We stand ready, every minute of every day, and we know our jobs well," said 1st Lt. Daniel Uresti Jr., a combat crew commander with the 320th Missile Squadron. "We literally hold the keys to the most powerful weapons ever developed and we ensure the safety and reliability of these weapons." Uresti said ICBM test launches also act as a deterrent by providing an opportunity to show the world that the U.S. has the capability and will to use these weapons should it be necessary. http://www.examiner.com/article/us-conducts-long-range-bombing-exercises-icbm-test Return to Top

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

Nature.com – London, U.K. US Panel Proposes Executive Biodefence Office Centralized approach promoted to streamline response and reduce overlap between government agencies. By Sara Reardon 28 October 2015 A focus on weapons such as bombs and nuclear missiles has left the US government ill-prepared to deal with bioterror attacks and even natural threats such as Ebola, according to a group of former government officials. In a report released on 28 October, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense panel lays out 33 recommendations for the US government to improve its biosecurity policy. Chief among them are the creation of a centralized biosecurity office and a greater emphasis on detecting biological threats through intelligence gathering and surveillance. The six-person panel is sponsored by the Hudson Institute, a think tank in Washington DC, and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies in Arlington, Virginia, and co-chaired by former US secretary of homeland security Thomas Ridge and former US Senator Joseph Lieberman. The group has met four times over the past year with representatives from government agencies that have biosecurity programmes, private consultancies, industry and think tanks. Panel co-director Ellen Carlin says that the panel was conceived before the Ebola outbreak, but that the US response in both West Africa and domestically was a perfect embodiment of their concerns. Hospitals and medical staff in the US were unprepared to deal with patients, and it was sometimes unclear which government agency was in charge of training workers or monitoring travellers who returned from affected areas. Given these gaps, an outbreak of a more transmissible disease such as pandemic influenza could be catastrophic for the United States. The effect of Ebola on the United States was minimal because of the nature of the disease, Carlin says, “but personally for me it didn’t inspire a lot of confidence.” Biosecurity czar Seven months after the first reported cases, the White House appointed an Ebola czar to coordinate efforts domestically and in West Africa, but this was not until after the first US case had highlighted the government’s unpreparedness. “We should have had a biosecurity czar,” says Amesh Adalja, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center in Pennsylvania. The panel proposes that such a position be created in the vice-president's office. Carlin says that this would allow it to have both the ear of the president and the ability to coordinate budgets and plans across agencies. The panel also recommends overhauls of several programmes such as the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, which develops medical countermeasures through private contracts, and the Federal Select Agent Program, which permits researchers to obtain dangerous pathogens for study. Although the panel was not designed to look specifically at lab safety, it did address issues such as the US military's failure to inactivate anthrax before shipping it to hundreds of labs over about a

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama decade. “We view biosafety lapses ultimately as biosecurity lapses,” Carlin says. “If a pathogen can escape the lab and cause an outbreak, it is a biosecurity issue.” Adalja praises the report’s emphasis on improving biothreat detection. Nuclear-weapons facilities are fairly detectable, he says, but it is much harder to determine whether a lab that claims to be making vaccines might be making biological-warfare agents instead. He says that the US government intelligence officials had mostly missed the existence of the Soviet Union’s bioweapons programme until defectors informed them about it. http://www.nature.com/news/us-panel-proposes-executive-biodefence-office-1.18659 Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russian Deputy PM: Strategy of US Prompt Global Strike Illusory October 30, 2015 NOVO-OGAREVO, October 30. /TASS/. The strategy of a Prompt Global Strike (PGS), broadly discussed in the US military, is illusory, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said on Friday upon the end of a meeting of the country's Security Council. "The US strategists are for the first time beginning to have an illusory vision that they may achieve victory over a nuclear power in a non-nuclear war," Rogozin told journalists. "This is nonsense, this will never happen," he said. Russia faces task of recreating civil defense, safety facilities for population According to the official Russia is faced with the task of recreating the system of civil defense and safety facilities for the population. "In essence, civil defence and safety facilities for the population are to be rebuilt anew and, most importantly, this activity should be streamlined properly," he said. http://tass.ru/en/defense/832925 Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia North Korea’s Nuclear Status Unacceptable for Russia — Russian Ambassador According to Russian Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Timonin, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula could only be solved if the entire situation in the sphere of security was changed October 27, 2015 SEOUL, October 27. /TASS/. North Korea’s nuclear status is unacceptable for Russia, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Timonin said on Tuesday at a forum of the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) in Seoul. "Russia’s principled position is that North Korea’s nuclear status is unacceptable for it," he stressed. In his words, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula could only be solved if the entire situation in the sphere of security was changed. "Much has been done in the past ten years but still it was not enough, so no considerable progress can be seen now," he noted.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

He said NAPCI could reach no progress unless it involved North Korea. "North Korea is a major part of Northeast Asia, so, it is vitally important to involve Pyongyang into this cooperation. Moscow is trying to do that and plans to continue its participation in the six-party talks," the Russian diplomat said. Timonin said "soft" and "tough" solutions to regional problems should be realized concurrently. "Much is being said now about "soft" cooperation but we should bear in mind that further success will depend on settling serious security problems. We can reach no breakthrough in other sphere without them," he underscored. The Russian diplomat called on all parties concerned to spare no effort to involve North Korea into dialogue through expanded economic cooperation. He cited Russia as a positive example in this respect. "We are doing it, in particular, in the sphere of railway transport, and we expect other parties to be more active too. This way, we will be able to make the NAPCI a serious movement covering the entire regional agenda," he said. NAPCI is South Korean President Park Guen-hye’s initiative. According to the South Korean leader, Asia is suffering from a gap between the growing economic interdependence on the one hand and inferior political and security cooperation, on the other hand. This initiative was advanced as a tool to deal with these challenges. http://tass.ru/en/politics/832183 Return to Top

The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea Heritage Foundation Report Classifies N. Korea as Gravest Threat to U.S. Interests October 29, 2015 North Korea poses the greatest threat to the United States, an annual Heritage Foundation report said Wednesday, warning that the communist nation likely has already mastered the technology to put a nuclear warhead on a missile. The 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength classified North Korea as a "severe" threat to vital U.S. interests, the highest in the five-level threat assessment scale, while putting Russia, China and Afghanistan-Pakistan terrorism in the second-highest "high" threat category. The North was the only country in the severe-threat category. "The nation garnered the rating after boosting its military capability, to include development of a likely nuclear-capable missile able to reach the U.S., and ramping up its hostile behavior -- such as the November 2014 cyberattack on Sony and opening fire on South Korea this August during the South's annual joint military exercises with U.S. forces," the foundation said in a release. The report by the conservative think tank said that the North warrants sustained attention not because it has any substantial ability to deploy conventional combat power against the U.S. directly "but because it possesses nuclear weapons capable of reaching U.S. facilities and America's critical security and economic partners in the region."

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Furthermore, a conventional war between North Korea and South Korea would have profound consequences for the global economy, it said. Though the North has used its missile and nuclear tests to enhance its prestige and importance domestically, regionally, and globally and to extract concessions from the U.S., such developments also improve North Korea's military posture, the report said. "North Korea likely has already achieved warhead miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its medium-range missiles, and an ability to reach the continental United States with a missile," it said. The report also classified the North's behavior as "hostile," the highest in a five-step behavioral assessment scale, and its capability as "gathering," the second-highest after "formidable" in a five- level capability assessment ladder. (Yonhap) http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20151029000215 Return to Top

Yonhap News – Seoul, South Korea N. Korea Digging New Tunnel at Its Nuke Test Site: Official October 30, 2015 SEOUL, Oct. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has been excavating a new tunnel at its nuclear test site in the country's northeastern tip, an official said Friday, in what may be a show of its nuclear capability. The North has so far conducted three nuclear tests in tunnels at Punggye-ri, in 2006, 2009 and 2013. "An increased movement of people and cars has been spotted at the nuclear site," said the official, asking not to be named. "North Korea appears to be in the process of digging another tunnel." Another source said that the North's move indicates its intention to conduct a fourth nuclear test although more analysis is needed to access whether the test is imminent. The detection came more than a month after the North hinted that it may conduct a nuclear test in response to what it claims is the hostile policy of the United States and its allies. It also came ahead of a planned trilateral summit among South Korea, China and Japan slated for Sunday. The leaders from the three nations plan to hold their first three-way summit in more than three years, during which North Korea's nuclear weapons program is likely to be one of the main agenda items. The Unification Ministry said it is closely monitoring the North's move, though it declined to provide its own analysis. "South Korea and the United States are closely watching North Korea's nuclear activity," ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee told a regular press briefing. Experts said that North Korea seems to want to demonstrate its nuclear capability ahead of a series of summits involving the three nations.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

"North Korea likely doesn't think it is a good time to conduct a nuke test," said Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University. "But Pyongyang seems to want to politicize its nuclear program in a calculated move." http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2015/10/30/64/0401000000AEN2015103000285 1315F.html Return to Top

The Independent – London, U.K. The Cost of Replacing Trident Is Really £167bn, New Figures Suggest The new estimate is double previous calculations By Jon Stone Sunday 25 October 2015 The overall cost of replacing Britain’s Trident nuclear weapons system would be £167bn, double previous credible estimates, according to new calculations based on official figures. The Reuters news agency reports that a replacement would cost nearly double the proportion the defence budget as its predecessor. The revelation comes shortly after the anti-Trident SNP swept nearly every Scottish seat at the Scottish general election and Labour elected anti-Trident leader Jeremy Corbyn as Leader of the Opposition. The figures, released by the Ministry of Defence following parliamentary questions by Conservative MP Crispin Blunt, show ministers believe the cost of four new submarines would be £25bn. But the Government also says maintenance of the system over its lifetime would cost six per cent of the annual defence budget – which ministers have pledged to hold at two per cent of GDP. According to IMF GDP growth forecasts for the UK, the total figure would therefore be £167bn, Reuters says. “The successor Trident program is going to consume more than double the proportion of the defence budget of its predecessor,” Mr Blunt told the news agency. “The price required, both from the UK taxpayer and our conventional forces, is now too high to be rational or sensible.” Previous estimates of the cost of the system have been significantly lower. The Royal United Services Institute estimated in 2013 that a new system would cost between £70bn and £80bn for its lifetime. Ministers have previously suggested the cost could be as low as £20bn, but this calculation is widely believed to exclude various other factors. The independent Trident Commission said in 2014 that the cost of replacement would be around £100bn. The new figures relate to the lifetime cost of the system between 2028 and 2060. Issue No.1189, 30 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama A decision on whether to replace the system is due next year. Labour has suggested that its MPs could be given a free vote in Parliament, meaning many of its MPs will back it. Parliamentary arithmetic means the vote is likely to pass, barring a surprise last-minute rebellion by Conservative MPs and a three-line whipped vote by Labour. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence said: "At around six per cent of the annual defense budget, the in-service costs of the UK's national deterrent are affordable and represent an investment in a capability which plays an important role in ensuring the UK's national security." http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cost-of-replacing-trident-is-167bn-double- previous-estimates-calculations-suggest-a6708126.html Return to Top

The Moscow Times – Moscow, Russia Russian Military Spending to Increase by Less Than 1% Next Year By Matthew Bodner October 26, 2015 Russia's defense spending is set to increase by a modest 0.8 percent next year, falling far short of the estimated 10 percent annual budget increases required over the next five years to hit equipment modernization targets mandated by President Vladimir Putin. Russian military expenditure has been rising since 2011, when the government launched a massive 20 trillion ruble ($700 billion at the time) rearmament drive aimed at modernizing some 70 percent of the Russian armed forces by 2020. But amid an economic crisis that began last year, planned spending on the program has hit an apparent snag. Going into this year, the State Duma budgeted around 3.3 trillion rubles ($52 billion) for defense. This figure was later curtailed by 5 percent, resulting in an actual 2015 military budget of just over 3.1 trillion rubles — despite the cut, a 26 percent increase in spending over 2014. In 2016, the increase will be smaller. According to a draft of the 2016 federal budget, “the 2016 budget allocation for national defense is planned at 3.145 trillion rubles ($50 billion),” or about 4 percent of Russia's projected gross domestic product, news agency TASS reported Saturday. Though this will put Russian military spending ahead of the United States' as a percentage of GDP, the 2016 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act is expected to stand at around $600 billion when approved. Russia's 2016 budget marks the first time since 2011 that military spending will not drastically increase year-on-year. If the draft budget is approved, defense expenditure will rise by just 25.5 billion rubles ($400 million), or less than 1 percent, according to TASS. Allocations for investment in infrastructure “for special and military purposes” will be reduced by 48.85 billion rubles ($775 million), but money for military salaries will increase by 40 billion ($640 million), the report said. It was not clear how the changes will impact military operations such as the massive snap exercises and maneuvers seen since the start of the Ukraine crisis last year, or Russia's ongoing air campaign in Syria.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

However, flat military spending is not likely to curtail Russia's intervention in Syria, which Moscow has presented as an anti-Islamic State campaign, but Western officials say is meant to prop up embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad. That campaign, which features daily bombings by around 30 aircraft and military supply runs to Assad, has cost Russia anywhere from $95 to $140 million since bombing began on Sept. 30, according to data provided to The Moscow Times by defense consultancy IHS last week. The TASS report did not specify how much of the proposed military budget would be dedicated to buying new military equipment, as mandated by Putin's 2020 rearmament and modernization program, but spending on new equipment is usually two-thirds of the budget. This year, almost 2 trillion rubles ($32 billion) from the annual defense budget was allocated to military procurement, and IHS analyst Craig Caffrey told The Moscow Times in June that Russia would need to increase these expenditures by 10 percent every year in order to meet Putin's spending targets on new weapons. If the overall defense budget is not raised, Russian spending on procurements of new weapons will likely remain flat — calling into question the government's ability to complete its 2020 program on time or in full. However, the defense budget is one of the few items on the 2016 draft that have not been subjected to funding cuts, while funding for education, health care, and other social expenses are expected to be reduced. "This signals that the Russian authorities are determined to keep the defense industry a priority, and possibly to rely on military leverage in Russian foreign policy in 2016," said Vadim Kozyulin, a military expert at the Moscow-based PIR Center think tank. "The defense industry will be the last to feel the shortages of the shrinking budget," he said. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-military-spending-to-increase-by-less- than-1-next-year/540362.html Return to Top

U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) News – Annapolis, MD Ministers: U.K. Royal Navy Guaranteed 4 New Nuclear Ballistic Missile Subs By Jon Rosamond October 26, 2015 LONDON — The British government has decided to replace the Royal Navy’s four Vanguard-class ballistic nuclear missile submarines (SSBN) with new boats on a one-for-one basis. After years of indecision, caused largely by global economic crash-induced fiscal austerity, ministers have effectively acknowledged that reducing the SSBN force to three submarines would signal the end of a half century of continuous U.K. sea-based deterrence. Prime minister David Cameron is expected to seek parliamentary approval next year to start building the four Vanguard replacement or “Successor” submarines, with the first of the 16,000-ton boats due to enter service in 2028. Issue No.1189, 30 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Although the opposition Labour Party’s new hard left leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is a vociferous opponent of nuclear weapons, the ruling Conservatives enjoy a 12-strong majority in the House of Commons and a ‘yes’ vote is almost guaranteed. Both Cameron and his defense secretary, Michael Fallon, have now spoken publicly about the decision to retain four SSBNs, with the latter setting out the government’s position most explicitly at an industry briefing last week. “Cold War certainties have been replaced by an unpredictable new nuclear age defined by weapons proliferation, more nuclear states, and rogue nations wanting nuclear weapons and the technology to develop them,” Fallon said. He pointed out that an “expansionist” and “revanchist” Russia was commissioning a new class of eight SSBNs, and that North Korea was conducting its own nuclear and ballistic missile tests. “When there are 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world we can’t wish away threats that may emerge in the 2030s, 2040s and 2050s”, he said. While a nuclear deterrent “with a Union Jack on the top of it” would not prevent another 9/11-type tragedy, it would fulfil the need “to deter state-sponsored terror and to counter nuclear blackmail,” he told shipbuilders. And Fallon aimed a direct blow at Corbyn, who was recently named vice-president of the London- based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, an organization that wants the U.K. to give up its nuclear weapons unilaterally as a step towards global disarmament. “Despite taking our nuclear non-proliferation obligations seriously; despite reducing our stockpile by over half from the height of the Cold War; and despite reducing the number of deployed warheads on each submarine from 48 to 40, emerging states have not stopped seeking nuclear capability”, Fallon said. The Successor program is nearing the end of a five-year assessment phase which began in 2011. Work this year has focused on maturing the design of the platform and nuclear power plant, and collaboration with the US on a Common Missile Compartment (to be shared with the Ohio-class Replacement Program (ORP_) is also continuing. The Ministry of Defence has estimated that procuring the Successor submarines will cost $19.82 to 25.2 billion (at 2013/14 prices), with total program costs of $26.89 to 35.95 billion if warhead and infrastructure costs are included. “Spread across the 30-year life of the new boats, this represents an annual insurance premium of around 0.13 per cent of total government spending”, Fallon said. http://news.usni.org/2015/10/26/ministers-u-k-royal-navy-guaranteed-4-new-nuclear-ballistic- missile-subs Return to Top

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Russia Modernizing S-300 Missile System for Iran Russia is currently modernizing the S-300 missile defense system for Iran and hopes it will able to deliver the system to Tehran, the head of Russia’s largest arms exporters said Tuesday. 27 October 2015 MOSCOW (Sputnik) – In 2007, Russia and Iran signed a $800-million deal for the delivery of five S- 300 battalions. In 2011, Iran sued Rosoboronexport in the Geneva Arbitration Court after Moscow suspended the contract, citing the UN Security Council-imposed arms embargo against Tehran. In April 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing the contract to proceed shortly after the P5+1 group of international negotiators and Iran had reached a framework nuclear agreement to remove all economic sanctions against Tehran in exchange for its pledge to cut back on uranium enrichment and the number of centrifuges in the country. “The completion of the contract on the S-300 missile system for Iran was suspended and we’ve been given the order to renew work and as the executors, we are doing this, but much time has gone by and the S-300 system has changed so we’re working on the modernization of the system,” Rosoboronexport General Director Anatoly Isaikin told journalists. Isaikin said that he was sure the contract would now be honored. “The result will be positive, there are currently no conditions that would hamper the contract from being fulfilled,” Isaikin said. He emphasized that Russia delivers weapons only to the government of Iraq and the contract also stipulates the prohibition of transferring arms to other parties. “We have delivered and will deliver arms to only the central government of Iraq. The contract stipulates a ban on transferring weaponry into other hands or to other countries. We are completely sure that the Iranian and Syrian governments are holding to the conditions in the contracts,” Isaikin added. Iran will retract its $4-billion suit against Russia over S-300 missile systems that were not delivered earlier. “We have agreed with Iran on retracting the suit,” Isaikin added. http://sputniknews.com/military/20151027/1029160581/russia-modernizing-s300-missile- system-iran.html Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russia to Complete Destruction of Its Chemical Weapons Stocks by 2020 — OPCW Initially, all countries that possessed chemical weapons were supposed to dispose of their stocks of toxic agents by April 29, 2012 October 29, 2015 THE HAGUE, October 28 /TASS/. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has no doubts that Russia will complete the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks by 2020, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Uzumcu told TASS on Wednesday. He said that initially all countries that possessed chemical weapons were supposed to dispose of their stocks of toxic agents by April 29, 2012. But that did not happen due to technical and financial problems. After consultations with the OPCW member states, the OPCW decided to prolong the deadline until 2020. Russia pledged to dispose of all chemical warfare agents by 2020. This year, Russia has finished work at four chemical weapons disposal plants: Leonidovka (the Penza region); Pochep (the Bryansk region); Maradykovsky (the Kirov region) and Shchuchye (the Kurgan region). Russia has shut down the first two plants. Mr. Ahmet Uzumcu, who is paying a visit to Russia, will attend a ceremony of closing the Maradykovsky facility on October 30, while a facility in the Kurgan region will shut down on November 20. After that, a facility in Kizner will remain the only chemical weapons disposal plant in Russia that will be operational after 2015. Uzumcu is sure that Russia which has already destroyed more than 91% of its chemical weapons stocks will complete the process successfully by 2020. He is going to meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on October 29. http://tass.ru/en/defense/832527 Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russian to Spend $34.8 Bln on Armed Forces in 2016 — Draft Budget Russia will spend over $750 mln on nuclear weapons in 2016 October 30, 2015 MOSCOW, October 30. /TASS/. A total of 2.233 trillion rubles ($34.8 billion) is planned to be allocated from the budget for the Russian Armed Forces in 2016, according to a report from the Defense Committee of the State Duma published on Friday. The announced sum is lower by 176.674 million rubles ($2.8 million) against the one allocated for the same purposes this year. The report also said that a total of 3.145 trillion rubles ($49 billion) was planned to be allocated on the "national defense" next year. Russia to spend over $750 mln on nuclear weapons in 2016

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

The federal budget spending on nuclear weapons will grow by almost 4 billion rubles ($62 million) in 2016 as part of national defense expenditures. According to the document, the funding set aside in accordance with the budget item is more than 44.5 billion rubles ($693 million) in 2015, while over 48.3 billion rubles ($754 million) has been earmarked for 2016. http://tass.ru/en/defense/832892 Return to Top

The Guardian (U.S. Edition) – New York, NY Scottish Labour Votes for Debate on Opposing Trident Renewal Conference makes nuclear deterrent a priority issue for policy vote, potentially opening up major split within UK party By Severin Carrell, Scotland editor Friday, 30 October 2015 Scottish Labour has voted heavily in favour of debating proposals to oppose the renewal of Trident, opening up the prospect of a major split on defence policy within the UK party. Party activists and trade union delegates at Scottish Labour’s annual conference in Perth made the nuclear weapons system a priority issue for a policy vote on Sunday, alongside the trade union reform bill, housing and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In a marked contrast with the vote of delegates at Labour’s UK conference, who decided not to prioritise Trident for debate, the issue came top of a Scottish constituency party vote and second in a trade union poll, with 17 topics up for debate. The wording of the motion will not be finalised until Saturday and it remains unclear whether conference delegates will vote to abolish the UK deterrent; powerful trade unions such as GMB are vigorously backing Trident, but party leaders are bracing themselves for a heavy vote against renewal. A Scottish Labour vote in favour of scrapping the system would reveal the deep divisions with the UK party. Its policy is to support the government’s decision to commission another generation of nuclear submarines and US-built missiles. Senior shadow cabinet members have openly resisted and criticised attempts by the Labour party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, to review that stance. He told the Guardian on Thursday that he believed an anti-Trident vote by Scottish Labour could empower the unilateralist cause within the UK party. Speaking before his first address to Scottish Labour as leader, Corbyn said: “I think it might be an encouragement to many people in the rest of the UK to listen very carefully to what’s being said at the Scottish conference. There are similar debates going on all across the party in Britain. I was only elected myself some 60 days ago, and I have done my best to open up the possibility of that kind of open debate within the party.”

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama A Scottish Labour vote against Trident could see it going into the Holyrood elections next May with a formal manifesto policy of opposing renewal, even though the issue is controlled by Westminster and is a policy for the UK government. Kezia Dugdale, the Scottish Labour leader, who favours retaining Trident until global nuclear disarmament takes place, told BBC Scotland on Friday she was “very open-minded” about the debate on Sunday and insisted the political risks to Labour were being overstated. “Everybody in the Labour party is against nuclear weapons,” she said. Labour wanted to see nuclear weapons scrapped worldwide, Dugdale added, but “the question is the best way to do that”. Dugdale said she agreed with Corbyn that the only meaningful alternative policy was to invest all the money saved by not renewing Trident on creating jobs in the communities affected by the loss of the multibillion-pound contract. She accused the Scottish National party of fooling voters into believing the savings would see significant additional spending on public services. “It can’t be spent 12 ways, like the SNP argue,” she said. “It has to go back into the communities with further investment. That’s Jeremy’s position and I actually think that’s the most honest position of any of the advocates of the case against nuclear systems.” Arthur West, the chairman of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, said: “Scottish CND welcome the decision by [the] Scottish Labour conference to hold a debate on Trident. This is a significant move. We would encourage all delegates to vote against spending £167bn renewing these weapons of mass destruction. We also support efforts to develop ways of providing alternative employment for the workers that would be affected.” http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/30/scottish-labour-conference-votes-debate- trident-nuclear-deterrent-renewal Return to Top

Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran Washington’s Jailing of Iranian Citizens Unacceptable: Spokeswoman October, 25, 2015 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham on Sunday slammed the United States for detaining and jailing Iranian nationals on baseless charges. She said Washington’s recent move to sentence an Iranian citizen to over 8 years in prison is “completely unjust”, describing the US government’s detention and imprisonment of Iranians on “groundless and unfounded” charges as “unacceptable”. On Friday, a court in the US State of Connecticut sentenced Mozaffar Khazaee, an Iranian-American engineer, to eight years and one month in prison and ordered him to pay a $50,000 fine for allegedly breaching anti-Iran sanctions. Afkham said the Islamic Republic of Iran has always stressed that it considers the detention of its citizens for “breaching sanctions” to be illegal and in violation of international laws. “Unfortunately, a number of our country’s citizens are in jails in the US and some other countries for unjustified reasons and on charge of violating the illegal and illegitimate (anti-Iran) sanctions,” she said, adding that efforts have been and will continue to be made through legal and political channels to prove these individuals’ innocence and secure their freedom.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

Stressing that these Iranian nationals are innocent, Afkham called for their “immediate and unconditional release”. Back in August, the Iranian foreign ministry spokeswoman had noted that 19 Iranians are in custody in the US on unfounded charge of violation of US-imposed sanctions http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/10/25/897895/washington-s-jailing-of-iranian- citizens-unacceptable-spokeswoman Return to Top

Mehr News Agency – Tehran, Iran AEOI Official: Leader’s Mandates to be Fully Met on Uranium Exchange with Russia Sunday, 25 October 2015 TEHRAN, Oct. 25 (MNA) – AEOI Spokesman Kamalvandi said Iran will exercise tremendous care in setting the uranium transaction deal with Russia according to the conditions outlined by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution . Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi stressed that the Leader’s statements on uranium transaction with Russia will be fully heeded, adding “we will practice utmost care in drafting the contract with Russia on selling our enriched uranium in exchange for supplies of natural uranium”. Kamalvandi further added that Russia has no problem with Iran in this regard, saying “relations between Iran and Russia are good and the two sides have adequate trust in each other ”. “We will make every effort to make sure all contracts and commitments between Iran and Russia are signed in a way that no problem would rise and no misunderstandings would be formed,” he said. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said, in part of a letter to President Hassan Rouhani ,that the deal with a foreign government for swapping enriched uranium with yellow cake will start only after a secure agreement has been clinched to that effect, along with sufficient guarantees [for its implementation]. The aforesaid deal and exchange must be done on a gradual basis and on numerous occasions". In a letter addressed to the Leader on Thursday, Rouhani highlighted that the directives issued by Leader on the implementation of the agreement reached by Iran and the 5+1 over Tehran’s nuclear program will be fully observed . http://en.mehrnews.com/news/111337/Leader-s-mandates-to-be-fully-met-on-uranium- exchange-with-Russia Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran Arak Reactor Redesigning A Phased Process: Iran’s FM October, 27, 2015 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said redesigning of the country’s heavy-water reactor in Arak takes place under a 3-staged process, noting that the official document on the second step has been drafted and is going to be finalized soon. Arrangements for redesigning the Arak heavy-water reactor are made under a three-phased document, whose first stage came in the shape of a statement among Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi, the US secretary of energy and the Chinese energy minister, Zarif told ICANA. Iran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany) on July 14 reached a conclusion on a lasting nuclear agreement that would terminate all sanctions imposed on Tehran over its nuclear energy program after coming into force. According to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), “Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design.” The JCPOA stipulates that, “Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran… This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined.” Elsewhere in his comments, Zarif said the document on the second stage of redesigning has been drafted and will be signed by Iran and all G5+1 members at the level of ministers or any other appropriate level. The third and final stage will also involve the documents and details of each of the projects on the Arak reactor, he noted. The top Iranian diplomat made it clear that the redesigning process will be performed under multiple projects, all of which will be overseen by Iran. http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/10/27/899614/arak-reactor-redesigning-a-phased- process-iran-s-fm Return to Top

Al Arabiya – Dubai, U.A.E. Iran’s Rowhani Expects Sanctions to Be Lifted by End of Year Reuters 27 October 2015 Dubai -- Iranian President Hassan Rowhani said on Tuesday he expected nuclear sanctions against Tehran to be lifted by the end of the year, state news agency IRNA reported. “According to our plans, the oppressive sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran will be lifted by the end of 2015,”

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

IRNA quoted Rowhani as saying during a ceremony to welcome the new Spanish ambassador to Tehran. In accordance with the historic nuclear deal struck between six world powers and Tehran, Iran will dramatically reduce its uranium enrichment program, surrender or dilute most of its highly enriched fuel and open its nuclear sites to inspectors from the IAEA, the U.N. nuclear watchdog. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/10/27/Iran-s-Rouhani-says-expects- sanctions-lift-by-end-2015.html Return to Top

Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran JCPOA Could Raise Military Threats: Iran’s Civil Defense Chief October, 28, 2015 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Head of Iran’s Civil Defense Organization said a final nuclear deal with world powers could have negative implications for the country given the concentration of the uranium enrichment facilities in a single site under the JCPOA. Addressing a conference on civil defense, held in Tehran on Wednesday, Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali warned of may emerge in the post-JCPOA era. There are both pluses and minuses about the nuclear deal between Iran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France and Germany), as it could reduce military threats against Iran or increase them in some cases, the general noted. “When we accept that our country’s only nuclear base will be the Natanz (site), it might increase the military threats,” he explained. Iran and the Group 5+1 (also known as the P5+1 or E3+3) on July 14 reached a conclusion on a lasting nuclear agreement that would terminate all sanctions imposed on Tehran over its nuclear energy program after coming into force. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) stipulates that, “Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.” http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/10/28/900856/jcpoa-could-raise-military-threats- iran-s-civil-defense-chief Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The Jerusalem Post – Jerusalem, Israel Former Iran President Indirectly Admits Country Sought Nuclear Weapons Rafsanjani: At the time that we started, we were at war and we were looking to have this capability [the nuclear bomb] for the day that our enemy would want to resort to the nuclear bomb. By ARIEL BEN SOLOMON October 28, 2015 Former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani indirectly admitted that his country started a nuclear weapons program during the Iran-Iraq War, according to interviews he gave to Iranian media in recent days. “As I have said, when we started the [nuclear] work, we were at war, and we wanted to have such an option for the day our enemies wanted to use nuclear weapons. This was [our] state of mind, but things never become serious,” Rafsanjani, the head of Iran’s Expediency Council and the political rival of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in an interview to the Iranians’ Nuclear Hope website, according to a report by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). “However, we took seriously the nonmilitary uses [of the nuclear project], and so we invested money and did a great deal of work. We worked in various areas and also taught a great deal. We dispatched students and invited scientists and many other things of this sort.” Rafsanjani continued, “The principle of our doctrine was the use of nuclear [energy] for peaceful purposes, even though we never abandoned [the idea] that if we were some day to face a certain threat, and if it became necessary, then we would have the option of going to the other side [to develop nuclear weapons]. But we did not have a plan to do this, and we never deviated [from civilian use]...” As MEMRI reports, “Rafsanjani reveals that, during his presidency, he sought to develop the Arak heavy water facility, in the plutonium track, and invested resources in it.” However, later in the interview, Rafsanjani stated that the main use of the plutonium track is “for military purposes,” confirming suspicions that Iran tried to establish a military nuclear project. Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Washington- based think tank, said the Iranian government’s “long-term strategic objective remains unchanged: developing a nuclear bomb.” Alfoneh told The Jerusalem Post on Wednesday, “Ayatollah Rafsanjani supports President Hassan Rouhani’s attempt at reaching a negotiated solution to the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. However, both gentlemen consider the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action a tactical maneuver in the face of the sanctions regime. “Rafsanjani believes that goal will be reached sooner or later,” asserted Alfoneh, adding, “His revelations are delivered at a time when they no longer risk disturbing the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], which is a done deal, and secure him the prestige of being the father of the Iranian bomb.” The Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, in an article posted on its website Tuesday said, “The regime was looking to acquire [a] nuclear bomb when it initiated its nuclear program and has never abandoned the idea.” The article discussed key points from the interview Rafsanjani gave state news agency IRNA on Monday, including the former Iranian president’s acknowledgement that from the beginning there

(CUWS) Outreach Journal was a comprehensive clandestine nuclear plan, as well as Khamenei’s reported fatwa banning nuclear weapons, saying that it is for “foreign consumption.” NCRI wrote, “This fatwa has never been put in writing by the regime and it deceives no fool but those who are looking for a pretext to justify trade with this bloodthirsty tyranny.” US Secretary of State John Kerry said last year at an interview with the Voice of America’s Persian service, that he and President Barack Obama were “grateful” that Iran’s leader had issued a fatwa banning nuclear weapons. According to MEMRI, Khamenei never issued an official fatwa against nuclear weapons, at least not one for which there is any official record. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies Iran Project said that Rafsanjani gave a separate interview to the Etemad newspaper, in which he also discussed the history of the country’s nuclear program. “At some point, we lost faith in the Germans and began thinking of alternative approaches. We had talks with the Pakistanis, a scientist called Mr. Abdul Qadeer Khan.... It was agreed that they should help us a bit – for example, by delivering second-hand first-generation centrifuges, along with some designs – so that we could build it ourselves.” Rafsanjani also said that at the beginning of their enrichment work, they used Pakistani equipment and placed “a workshop next to it in order to build the components ourselves.” Asked if anyone had told him to try to build a nuclear bomb, Rafsanjani answered, “All those [who] loved Iran were engaged in nuclear activities [and] engaged in the work because of the nonmilitary advantages of the project. Because of their Islamic ethics, they were opposed to building of the nuclear bomb and we knew that it had no other results but mass destruction.” “Apart from this, the International Atomic Energy Agency was engaged in inspections,” he continued. Rafsanjani has had a tense relationship with Ayatollah Khamenei and political hard-liners since two of his children expressed support for the opposition after a disputed presidential election in 2009. Despite the setback, Rafsanjani has not been shut out of the Iranian political landscape. He is the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, a body that advises the supreme leader and also resolves disputes between the Guardian Council and the parliament. Reuters contributed to this report. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran/Former-Iran-president-indirectly-admits-country- sought-nuclear-weapons-430302 Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Tehran Times – Tehran, Iran Iran’s New Missiles Can Destroy Enemy Targets up to 2,000 KM Away Source: Sputnik International Thursday, October 29, 2015 Iran’s Brigadier General Hossein Salami has announced that Iran’s new high-precision missiles are capable of destroying enemy targets up to 2,000 km away. “When our defense industries build missiles with a range of 2,000 km and a zero margin of error, this means that we can target any fixed and mobile base in this operational radius with 100% precision and a zero margin of error,” Salami said in an interview with the state TV. He highlighted that Iran will continue fortifying its defensive power, and said, “We don’t study the resolutions (approved to curb Iran's missile power) since we are responsible for developing the power and no one can dictate anything to us,” Salami noted according to Fars news agency. On October 11, Iran successfully test-fired the country’s new precision-guided long-range ballistic missile that can be controlled until the moment of impact. The missile is called ‘Emad’ and it carries a conventional warhead. The Iranian defense minister repeated that the mass production and delivery of Emad missiles to the country’s Armed Forces will considerably increase their power and tactical capabilities. The Iranian Armed Forces have recently test-fired different types of newly-developed missiles and torpedoes and tested a large number of home-made weapons, tools and equipment, including submarines, military ships, artillery, choppers, aircrafts, UAVs and air defense and electronic systems, during massive military drills. http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=250436 Return to Top

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) – Tehran, Iran 29 October 2015 Iran, US, EU to Negotiate Acceleration to Implement Agreement Vienna, Oct 29, IRNA – Negotiators of Iran, the US and EU, that have implementation of the JCPOA in their agenda, are to discuss in Vienna ways to accelerate implementation of the agreement. The negotiation is to be held on Thursday and Friday on the sidelines of Vienna Peace Talks on Syria. Head of headquarter to follow up implementation of the JCPOA Seyed Abbas Araqchi, Head of expert team Hamid Ba'eidinejad and Davoud Mohammadnia accompany Mohammad Javad Zarif as the Iranian negotiation team.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

The US nuclear negotiation team and those responsible to implement the JCPOA in the US are accompanying John Kerry in Vienna. Deputy Chief of the EU foreign policy Helga Schmidt is to attend the negotiation with Iran and the US teams. http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81817402/ Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia IS Has Access to Chemical Warfare Agents Production — Russian Foreign Ministry The director of Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for non-proliferation and arms control called to investigate the use of chemical warfare agents in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State terrorists October 29, 2015 MOSCOW, October 29. /TASS/. The Islamic State terrorist group has taken possession of production of chemical warfare agents, Director of Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for nonproliferation and arms control Mikhail Ulyanov told TASS on Thursday. Ulyanov called to investigate the use of chemical warfare agents in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State terrorists. "In the IS case, this is already not only the use of chlorine for military purposes, what Damascus is usually accused of, although there has been no proof yet," Mikhail Ulyanov said. "There are facts against the IS on the use of real chemical weapons - mustard agent, and possibly, lewisite the production of which demands use of rather complex technologies," the diplomat said. All data show that the IS group has indeed gained access to technologies of manufacturing chemical weapons, Ulyanov said. "A lot of facts of use of chemical weapons on the territory of Syria and Iraq by the IS gunmen have been already registered," he said. The diplomat said he regrets that the UN Security Council has not so far condemned these facts "first of all due to the position of our Western partners." Russia has repeatedly insisted on the respective response. The mandate of the joint activity of the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on investigating the cases of the suspected use of chemical weapons in Syria could be extended for the territory of Iraq, he said. "There has been no decision in this regard yet, but we have already prepared and put the draft resolution on the UN Security Council’s table several weeks ago," he said. Process of Syria’s chemical demilitarization almost completed The official also noted that Moscow considers the process of chemical demilitarization of Syria almost completed. "All chemical weapons have been transported out of Syria. Only one percent from the total volume is left to destroy. An American firm dealing with this encountered technological difficulties and

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama suspended work for now. However, the Syrian territory has been cleared from chemical weapons," Ulyanov said. "At the same time, our Western partners make claims against Damascus on whether the initial declaration about chemical weapons in their possession was comprehensive. Such declaration is provided when a country joins the [Chemical Weapons] Convention. So, Western countries think that the declaration is not complete. In this connection, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons set up a special commission to check the comprehensiveness of the declaration," the diplomat explained. Ulyanov noted that "Damascus agreed to this as a gesture of good will, though it did not have to do this in accordance with the Convention." "Syria is rather actively cooperation with this mission but its work has not been completed yet, and final conclusions have not been made," he stressed. The diplomat reminded that the mission on establishing instances of possible chemical weapons us "is again operating on the Syrian territory but, in our opinion, its activities should be expanded to the territory of Iraq" since instances of chemical weapons use by the Islamic State terrorist organization were registered there. "The work of this mission has not been completed there as well," he stressed. Over 90% of Russia's chemical weapons destroyed According to Ulyanov Russia has by now destroyed more than 90% of its chemical weapons stockpiles accumulated since the Soviet era and intends to fully eliminate the remaining arsenals over the next five years. "Russia is steadily approaching the fulfillment of its obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction," he said. "Russia has already destroyed nearly 92% of the arsenals that have remained since the Soviet era, when they were just beginning to develop the Convention. We are to completely destroy our chemical arsenals no later than in 2020." Ulyanov noted though that the total elimination could occur earlier. "Tremendous work has been done, especially by Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, which is our national agency overseeing the compliance with the obligation under the Convention," he noted. "We reached the stage where six of seven facilities to destroy chemical weapons built earlier have performed their tasks and are to be redesigned." One of them is the Maradykovsky facility in the town of Mirny [in the Volga Federal District], the diplomat noted. On Friday, October 30, a solemn ceremony on the occasion of completion of its work will take place at the facility with the participation of the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the ambassadors of several countries to the organization in the Hague who will come to Russia too. US lags behind in implementing convention on destroying chemical weapons The diplomat pointed out that the United States may be among the last signatories of the Convention on destroying chemical weapons in meeting its commitments under the document. "The US has also made significant progress in implementing the Convention, but most likely, it will probably be the last country that will fulfill the respective commitments," Mikhail Ulyanov said. The United States plans to complete the works in 2023 and is now building additional facilities to destroy the remaining chemical weapons, the Russian diplomat said. The US has the largest stockpile of chemical weapons, he reminded.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

"Originally, April 2007 was set as the deadline, but this timeframe turned out to be unrealistic," Ulyanov said. "That’s why it was extended for another five years, and then new adjustments were made." "We have defined for ourselves and the remaining participants of the Convention agreed with this that 2020 is the final deadline," the diplomat said. http://tass.ru/en/politics/832554 Return to Top

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Russia to Lease another Nuclear Sub to India in December If the contract is signed, it will be the third Russia-built submarine handed over to the Indian Navy October 26, 2015 NEW DELHI, October 26. /TASS/. An agreement on leasing another Russian nuclear-powered submarine to India is to be signed at the Russian-Indian summit in December, a source at India’s Defense Ministry told TASS. The possibility of leasing a second submarine from Russia will be studied when India’s Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar will visit Moscow next week," the source said. "Parrikar will hold talks on this strategic project with his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu. After the ten-year contract is signed another two or three years will be required for upgrading the submarine in keeping with India’s requirements," he said. Over the past 45 years Russia and India have established reliable, time-tested strategic ties in the field of defence. India’s armed forces are equipped with Soviet and Russian military hardware 70%, the source said, adding that Russia had always provided its best military hardware to India. A Russian military source at the Russian embassy in New Delhi has confirmed to TASS the negotiations on leasing the Kashalot K-322 nuclear power submarine of project 971 Shchuka had entered the final phase. "If the contract is signed, it will be the third Russia-built submarine handed over to the Indian Navy," he said. "For the first time India leased a Russian nuclear submarine for ten years back in the early 1980s. In 2012 the Indian Navy leased Russia’s K-152 Nerpa submarine of project 971. This is a customary and well-tested way of cooperation by our countries in the military-technical sphere." According to the Russian source, the submarine will undergo fundamental upgrade in line with the customer’s requirements at the Amur shipyards, where it is at the moment. The repair, upgrade and testing work and the Indian crew’s training are to be completed by 2018. http://tass.ru/en/defense/831746 Return to Top

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The National Interest – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Feature Get Ready, America: Here Comes China's Ballistic Missile Defenses "There is little doubt today that China is developing a strategic BMD capability; their flight tests alone make that clear." By Michael Peck October 25, 2015 It's time for America to worry about Chinese ballistic missile defenses (BMD). That's the conclusion of a new study by the Federation of American Scientists, which found that while Beijing has not yet decided to build strategic missile defenses, Chinese leaders are seriously thinking about it. "Unlike some years ago, there is little doubt today that China is developing a strategic BMD capability; their flight tests alone make that clear," said authors Bruce MacDonald and Charles Ferguson, who spoke with more than 50 Chinese and American experts, including Chinese officials, military officers and academics. While Chinese BMD is in the development stage, it does give Beijing the option of deploying a missile defense capability – or not – depending on its assessment of the international situation. "At a minimum, it appears that a Chinese deployment of strategic BMD is probably less unlikely than most U.S. defense analysts have in the past assessed," the study said. "Given the extended duration of China’s strategic BMD development program, going back two to three decades, it is safe to say that China is not on any crash course to develop, much less to deploy, a strategic BMD system. Nonetheless, China’s program has reached a stage of maturity that gives it a viable option to deploy if it so chooses." The report, titled "Understanding the Dragon Shield: Likelihood and Implications of Chinese Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense," was spurred by what the authors say is a lack of public analysis of just what Chinese ballistic missile defense would mean for the United States. The answer is that it could have serious – or minor – implications depending on what China chooses to do. MacDonald and Ferguson believe that if China opts to build missile defenses, the most likely scenario would be a limited deployment. A "thin BMD" would pose little threat to the ability of U.S. nuclear forces to strike China, as even Chinese experts conceded to the authors: "There was broad agreement that it would make little sense for China to seek to defend against U.S. nuclear warheads given the potentially several hundred warheads the United States could launch within minutes." Yet in what will probably be a blow to American self-importance, the United States would probably not be the main target of Chinese missile defense, but rather China's neighbors. "The prime impact will be on Indian confidence in its ability to deter China with nuclear weapons," the study says, as well as sending a signal to Japan. The RAND report lays out a variety of incentives and disincentives for China to deploy missile defense, many of which suggest that actually stopping nuclear attack is the least of China's reasons for building BMD. It would boost China's prestige in Asia and the Chinese government's prestige among its own people, as well as generate leverage in any future arms control negotiations. Even a limited employment would allow China to better understand BMD technology as well as the weaknesses of a Chinese – or American – defense system. BMD could also deter (theoretical)

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

American Prompt Global Strike non-nuclear ICBM attacks and provide political cover for China to test anti-satellite weapons under the guise of missile defense. On the other hand, BMD would be expensive, undercut China's long-standing protests against American deployment of missile defenses and trigger responses such as greater Japanese defense spending. Either way, deployment of the Chinese missile defense system would likely create a furor in Congress. What's most interesting about this new analysis is its old tropes. In 1972, this sort of strategic nuclear war thinking would have been as familiar as gasoline that cost $.36 per gallon. But it's been awhile since we've dealt with the issue of nuclear weapons wielded by major powers, rather than pretenders like Iran and North Korea. Even more significant is the fact that strategic missile defense has largely been seen as an American initiative. Now, other countries are joining the game. Michael Peck, a frequent contributor to TNI, is a defense and historical writer based in Oregon. His work has appeared in Foreign Policy, WarIsBoring and many other fine publications. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/get-ready-america-here-comes-chinas-ballistic-missile-14162 Return to Top

The Moscow Times – Moscow, Russia OPINION/Op-Ed Putin's World Is Far Removed From Reality (Op-Ed) By Alexander Golts October 26, 2015 Once a year, the Kremlin organizes a very interesting "tour" for a select group of foreigners whom it brings together under the banner of the Valdai International Discussion Club. It is an excursion into another world, one that, according to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Vladimir Putin inhabits all alone. The latest "Valdai odyssey" took place recently. What did participants learn? They learned that, first and foremost, Putin continues to profess a very primitive version of Realpolitik. "Periods of peace in both European and world history have always been based on securing and maintaining the existing balance of powers," he said. He is convinced that the same thing is happening now. And, of course, he believes that the United States is the main source of problems in the world and that nobody has been able to restrain Washington since the collapse of the Soviet Union. That is why Putin still uses every opportunity to harp on the fact that the U.S. withdrew from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty 15 years ago. This time he recalled when U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock risked recommending that Moscow and Washington continue their talks on strategic arms. At the same time, Putin continually complained that U.S. actions were "devaluing" nuclear deterrence. In making these comments, Putin shows a certain disregard for elementary logic. At some point, he seems to have completely forgotten that Washington's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty did not

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama prevent Russia and the U.S. from signing not one, but even two treaties on reducing strategic nuclear weapons — and not on Moscow's terms, but on Washington's. In particular, Moscow's chief negotiator and now Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov — a true-blue Russian patriot — agreed to count each aircraft in Washington's far superior force of strategic bombers as if it were a single nuclear warhead, when in fact each carries multiple cruise missiles. That alone greatly strengthened U.S. dominance which, if to believe Putin, Washington is already reinforcing with its missile defense program. Of course, Putin's complaint is not with the nuclear balance per se. Putin probably does not seriously believe that the U.S. would take advantage of its military superiority to deliver a swift first strike against Russia. No, he seems to think that Washington created its missile defense system in order to diminish the threat posed by Russia's nuclear arsenal — the only thing that enables Russia to maintain at least a semblance of superpower status. Moscow also uses regional wars as a means for inflating its importance in international affairs. Not long ago, Putin proved his right to sit at a modern-day "Yalta conference" by waging a hybrid war in Ukraine. Today he is waging a war in Syria. In the most sensational statement to emerge from his Valdai speech, Putin said: "Certainly, the Syrian government must establish working contact with those opposition forces that are ready for dialogue. I understood from my meeting with President Bashar Assad the day before that he is ready for such dialogue." In this way, Moscow assumes the role of a major player in the Middle East. Putin devoted a significant part of his presentation to denouncing Washington for attempting to differentiate between "moderate" and "immoderate" terrorists. That means everyone who is warring with Assad is a terrorist and a legitimate target for Russian aircraft. In this case, which opposition groups do Assad and his Russian patron define as "correct" and "patriotic," as suitable negotiating partners? Obviously, only those that are willing to cooperate with Assad. Well, good luck finding such a group in the chaos of Syria's sprawling civil war. Putin made no secret of his intentions. "For all the drama of its current situation, Syria can become a model for partnership in the name of common interests, resolving problems that affect everyone, and developing an effective risk management system," he said. It is obvious that Putin embarked on his foray in faraway Syria to force the West to accept Russia as a partner. And when that does not work as planned, Putin slips effortlessly into wishful thinking: "We are also close to starting an exchange of information with our Western colleagues on militants' positions and movements," he said. However, I have seen nothing to suggest that the West is preparing to share intelligence on Syria with Russia. Just the opposite is true. For example, The New York Times reported that White House officials recently met to discuss the establishment of a no-fly zone over Syria. That hardly looks like a prelude to closer cooperation with Moscow. The world that Putin inhabits is far removed from reality. But that is what makes it so interesting for the foreigners invited on this "otherworldly" excursion. Who could fail to feel enthralled when a leader who single-handedly decides the fate of his country and his citizens recounts a lesson

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

from childhood with such pleasure? "Fifty years ago, I learned one rule in the streets of Leningrad," he said. "If the fight is inevitable, be the first to strike." Otherwise, Putin implies, the West might really attack Russia. Alexander Golts is deputy editor of the online newspaper Yezhednevny Zhurnal. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putin-s-world-is-far-removed-from-reality-op- ed/540395.html Return to Top

War on the Rocks.com OPINION/Commentary Why We Still Need a Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missile By Mel Deaile and Al Mauroni October 26, 2015 “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme,” Mark Twain is reported to have said. Two years ago, also at War on the Rocks, Elbridge Colby responded forcefully to an op-ed calling for the elimination of the Air Force’s nuclear-armed Long Range Standoff (LRSO) missile that is to replace the existing nuclear-equipped cruise missile, the AGM-86 (also known as an air-launched cruise missile or ALCM). Today, it appears we need yet another defense of the LRSO, a program vital to U.S. national security and deterrence posture. In a recent op-ed in the Washington Post, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former defense acquisition official Andrew Weber called on President Obama to defund the LRSO, reiterating many of the talking points of two years ago. The strategic environment has only worsened since then, making the need for LRSO even more acute. Perry and Weber believe that stealth bombers with direct-attack nuclear munitions are sufficient for the bomber leg of the nuclear triad, and that stealth bombers negate the need for cruise missiles. They make an unsupported claim that developing a nuclear cruise missile is not affordable in today’s budget environment. Finally, echoing previous arguments, the two make the statement that dual-capable cruise missiles are inherently destabilizing. History does not support this claim. Since the Gulf War, the U.S. military had possessed a dual-capable version of the AGM-86. In fact, all three of the last major air campaigns the U.S. military has engaged in — Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom — began with salvos of conventional dual-capability cruise missiles (the Air Force’s AGM-86 and the Navy’s Tomahawk). No one misinterpreted those actions or the intent of the United States. Furthermore, in each of these conflicts, the United States flew direct-attack sorties with the B-2 stealth bomber — but only after launching cruise missiles against command and control or integrated air defense targets. The reality is that cruise missiles are still an essential part of the U.S. arsenal. No bomber, no matter how stealthy, is completely invisible to radar; expendable, high-volume dual-capability cruise missiles will be critical in the increasingly hostile anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threat environment. When President Obama made his 2009 Prague speech, he stated, “As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama guarantee that defense to our allies.” Deterring our adversaries and assuring our allies was a central premise of Obama’s message. The nuclear deterrence capability of this nation and its ability to extend that deterrence rests on acquisition of LRSO. The AGM-86 became operational in the early 1980s when the most advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were focused on America’s pre-stealth fighter aircraft fleet. The second-generation AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile (which incorporated some stealth technology) has already been scrapped. While the AGM-86 will be operational until 2030, its penetration capability against advanced SAM systems will continue to decline. As the radar cross-section of our aircraft decreased, the systems that sought to target them became more advanced. Today, anti-aircraft (and missile) systems are not only more advanced but have proliferated. Russia recently announced it was giving S-300 SAMs to Iran. Meanwhile, it is important to consider the ages and capabilities of our aircraft. The B-52 is programmed to remain in active service well into 2040; even the B-2’s 1990s-vintage stealth technology will eventually be overtaken. Coupled with this, the Air Force has decided that the next-generation stealth bomber will be fielded with conventional capabilities first and nuclear capability to follow. In the next 10 years, our airborne strategic deterrent will rely on a 1980s missile launched from a 1960s bomber or a 1990s penetrating bomber going against the most advanced SAM systems. All of this happens as the nation waits for the next-generation stealth bomber to gain nuclear capability. This is why the United States needs the LRSO. It will keep the airborne strategic deterrent viable and serve as a capable hedge. Deterrence and assurance only work if the U.S. military can hold all necessary targets at risk. A2/AD advances make it harder for our forces to reach their targets and our inattention to these limitations makes it harder to convince our allies that we can and will come to their defense in an emergency. Most importantly, dual-use aircraft and missiles allow us the greatest deterrent flexibility. In contrast to the widely-accepted salvos of conventional cruise missiles with which we have begun military operations from the 1990s onward, any ballistic missile launch would unambiguously escalate a conflict. The LRSO’s attackers also fail to account for its importance as a hedge vis-a-vis submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Should either of these legs be subject to technological failure or decreased capability, a flight of 30 B-52s armed with 20 LRSO missiles each would give the STRATCOM commander 600 warheads at the ready. Furthermore, under New START accounting rules, the 600 warheads would only count as 30 deployed weapons. “Killing the missile” as Perry and Weber suggest would severely weaken one leg of our nuclear deterrence triad. Without the LRSO, adversaries would only have to defend themselves against submarine-launched or intercontinental ballistic missiles, plus the weakening capabilities of our existing bombers and AGM-86 cruise missiles. Specifically, in cases of limited nuclear escalation scenarios, adversaries might believe that the U.S. government has no realistic course of action if limited to those weapon systems. It defies logic to claim, as Perry and Weber do, that our current bombers and missiles offer sufficient penetrating capabilities. In highly contested airspace, these put more U.S. personnel at risk and do not guarantee a successful strike. President Obama himself has promised to maintain a credible deterrent and to field forces that will assure our allies. No matter how many recycled arguments its opponents marshal against it, the

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

need for a next-generation nuclear-capable cruise missile make the LRSO a necessity in the face of the aging of our current offensive systems and the proliferation of sophisticated A2/AD defenses. Dr. Mel Deaile and Al Mauroni work at the U.S. Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/why-we-still-need-a-nuclear-armed-cruise-missile/ Return to Top

Straits Times – Singapore OPINION/By Invitation The New Nuclear War Threat in US-China Ties As the American lead in conventional military arms narrows with China, there is a growing risk of either side turning to nuclear options in a conflict. By Hugh White October 27, 2015 Could a confrontation between America and China ever escalate into a nuclear war? At first glance, the idea seems absurd - surely no one has worried about that kind of thing since the Cold War ended 25 years ago? But as rising maritime tensions make conventional conflict between Asia-Pacific's two strongest states an increasingly credible possibility, it becomes more and more important that we understand just how bad such a conflict could become. Otherwise, we will not know how hard we should be working to avoid it. No one really knows the answer. In the 70 years since nuclear weapons were first and last used, the India-Pakistan war of 1999 is the only armed clash between nuclear-armed states. Of course, Cold War strategists spent decades studying how a conventional conflict might cross the nuclear threshold, but the conclusions they drew reflected the specific strategic, political and geographic conditions of the superpower confrontation of that time. Today, things are very different. What we think we know about how a nuclear war could have started between the United States and the Soviet Union on the central front in Europe in the 1960s might not tell us much about how one might start between America and China in the Western Pacific in 2016. Since the Cold War, it has been easy to assume that America's overwhelming preponderance of conventional military power means that nuclear weapons have lost their relevance. In its last major Nuclear Posture Review in 2010, Washington itself argued that America would rely less and less on nuclear weapons to deter or defeat potential adversaries as it became easier for it to prevail with high-tech non-nuclear forces. But that is not what's happened here in Asia. Over the past decade, America's traditional naval and air superiority in the Western Pacific has been steadily eroded by major enhancements in China's

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama maritime capability - especially its capability to find and sink US aircraft carriers and attack US bases. As America's ability to score a swift and decisive victory over China with conventional forces alone dwindles, the probability grows that any conflict between them would escalate in time, space and intensity. And as that happens, the risk that it would cross the nuclear threshold rises too. Many American strategists nonetheless remain very confident that a US-China nuclear war is a very remote danger. That's because they are confident that China would always shy away from any confrontation as soon as the possibility of a nuclear conflict loomed. They believe that America's 7,000 nuclear weapons dwarfs China's 260 by such an enormous margin that any Chinese leader would see that China has much more to lose from a nuclear war than America does. Moreover, many assume that America could minimise any Chinese nuclear attack on the US homeland by destroying China's intercontinental-range forces either before they were launched or in flight. And they assume Chinese leaders believe this too. They therefore think China's leaders would be terrified that in any nuclear confrontation, they would find themselves without any way to respond to, and therefore to deter, a US nuclear attack. But what if Chinese leaders see things differently? Viewed from Beijing, the nuclear balance might look much less unfavourable to China. Indeed, the Chinese might even see the nuclear calculus coming out in their favour. That's because they think that America's advantage in weapons is counterbalanced by their advantage in resolve. To see how they might think this, consider how, in a crisis over Taiwan, Beijing could try to deter Washington from helping Taiwan resist a Chinese attack by threatening a nuclear attack on Guam. That threat would be credible only if the threat of US retaliation against China for an attack on Guam was deterred by the threat of Chinese counter-retaliation against the US. But that might easily happen. Americans cannot really be sure that all of China's intercontinental missiles could be stopped before they delivered warheads against US cities. And they'll become even less sure over the coming years as China's long-range missiles become harder to find and hit. And that means Washington could aid Taiwan only if it really was willing to put Guam and US cities at grave risk of a devastating Chinese nuclear attack. Would any US president really be willing to run that risk? Chinese leaders might well think that they wouldn't. They assume that Taiwan matters a lot more to them than it does to Washington, and they are probably right. The danger remains, however, that each side underestimates the other. That is one of the key differences between the escalating rivalry between the US and China in Asia today and the Cold War confrontation between America and the Soviets. In the Cold War, both sides fully understood the determination of the other. Each side knew that both of them would be willing to fight a nuclear war to deny any advantage to their rival. That made both sides very careful, and ultimately kept the peace between them. Today, there is a real risk that both sides assume the other would back down rather than fight a nuclear war. That makes both sides more willing to take risks that might lead to a confrontation, and increases the risks that a confrontation could escalate to a conflict, and that a conflict might cross the nuclear threshold. What's even more worrying is that no one is very clear where that nuclear threshold might lie. During the Cold War, it was usually very clear to both sides exactly what actions by either of them would trigger a nuclear exchange - especially in Europe where there was a clearly defined border between East and West.

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

In Asia today, this is much less clear. Neither Washington nor Beijing really know where one another's red lines lie, and that makes it dangerously easy for miscalculations to occur, especially when they confront one another in a vast swathe of open ocean without clearly demarcated strategic boundaries. None of this means that nuclear war is a looming and imminent danger in Asia today. It remains a remote risk. But the consequences if it occurs would be unimaginably grave. That means no one thinking about the rapidly shifting strategic dynamics of our region can afford to overlook this risk in deciding how we should be trying to shape events over the coming years. It emphasises how vital it is for all of us that the US and China should find a way to step back from escalating rivalry, and seek some form of accommodation. The writer is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-new-nuclear-war-threat-in-us-china-ties Return to Top

The National Interest – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Feature Nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missiles: They Still Matter The simple fact is that nuclear cruise missiles are no more destabilizing than any other weapon. By Adam Lowther October 28, 2015 In a recent article by former Secretary of Defense William Perry (1994-1997) and Assistant Secretary of Defense Andy Weber (2009-2014), the two men urge President Obama to kill the Air Force program to develop and field a replacement for the AGM-86 nuclear air launched cruise missile (ALCM). The long range standoff cruise missile (LRSO) is expected to be able to evade advanced radar with its stealthy airframe and will be far more accurate. While I appreciate their insights, the problem with Perry and Weber’s argument is that it relies on questionable assertions that are simply unproven and untrue. Destabilizing ALCMs? Perry and Weber’s primary assertion suggests that cruise missiles are destabilizing weapons. They go on to suggest that the recent decision by Britain to forgo the fielding of sea-based nuclear cruise missiles was for this reason. The problem with this argument is that the ultimate decision not to field nuclear cruise missiles was a financial decision, not one based on a view that nuclear ALCMs are destabilizing. For those carefully watching the defense cuts Britain’s Ministry of Defense has faced in recent years, the debate that took place concerning the affordability of the British nuclear arsenal was as bitter as the debate over cuts to its conventional forces. To save the submarine-based deterrent while also fielding a new submarine, giving up the cruise missile was a necessary trade-off. Prime Minister Cameron did not make the decision to forgo a nuclear cruise missile because he or his cabinet believed it to be a destabilizing weapon. It came down to a lack of cold hard cash.

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Perry and Weber also suggest that U.S. President Ronald Reagan supported banning nuclear ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe because he viewed them as destabilizing. This assertion does not stand up to scrutiny. During the Oct. 13, 1981, National Security Council meeting, then-Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger suggested that the United States pursue a “zero option,” which would ban all intermediate range ballistic missiles and ground launched cruise missiles. President Reagan responded to this suggestion, “Do we really want a zero-option for the battlefield? Don’t we need these nuclear systems? Wouldn’t it be bad for us to give them up since we need them to handle Soviet conventional superiority?” In the years that followed, President Reagan never came to see nuclear cruise missiles as destabilizing. He supported ratification of the INF Treaty (1987) because the United States was required to dismantle 846 weapons (Pershing II and GLCM) while the Soviet Union dismantled 1,846 weapons (SS-4, SS-5, SS-20). With the Soviets giving up better than two weapons to every one American weapon the INF Treaty was too good for the United States to pass up. Given the United States’ technical superiority in intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the INF Treaty added to American advantage while reducing Soviet weapons in Europe. The simple fact is that nuclear cruise missiles are no more destabilizing than other weapons. The United States currently has the fewest types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the history of its arsenal. Given the small size of the nuclear arsenal and the types of delivery systems, the United States is more susceptible to strategic surprise (i.e. development of game changing technology) than it has been at any point since the development of nuclear weapons. During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Army’s nuclear force was greater in the variety of nuclear weapons and delivery systems than the United States’ entire current force. Yet, during that period, the Soviet-American nuclear standoff remained largely stable. Thus, Perry and Weber’s argument that a dual use weapon—like a cruise missile—is destabilizing because an adversary will not know which of the two variants (conventional or nuclear) is headed toward them is simply incorrect. Russia and the United States have a long history of facing and fielding weapons that have a nuclear and conventional variant. The Soviet and American arsenals were built to ensure a “secure second strike” specifically because there was an acknowledged level of uncertainty in the use of dual-capable weapons that would only become clear once they began to hit their targets and it was possible to determine whether they were conventional or nuclear. The Post Post-Cold War: The larger mistake Perry and Weber make is that they fail to understand that the United States and Russia have entered into a Post Post-Cold War. The period of relative stability in the Russo- American relationship that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union is now over. Whether they like it or not, President Vladimir Putin is seeking to reassert Russian influence in the Near-Abroad and those countries that were aligned with the Soviet Union. As a result of this increasingly bellicose Russian foreign policy, nuclear weapons are more relevant today than they were a decade ago. Given Russia, China and North Korea’s ongoing efforts to develop and field advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the United States would be negligent if it failed to develop the LRSO. If, as Perry and Weber suggest, nuclear cruise missiles are a “Cold War relic” why is Russia fielding the new KH-102 nuclear cruise missile, which Russian bombers can launch from within Russian airspace to strike the United States? Neither Russia nor China seem to think nuclear cruise missiles are Cold War relics. Both countries understand that cruise missiles have the ability to defeat advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS) in ways that even the stealthy B-2 cannot. Issue No.1189, 30 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

Why They Matter: Nuclear cruise missiles provide a number of advantages that Perry and Weber overlook. First, the reality of employing cruise missiles is that they require far less logistical and planning support and can fly profiles that no bomber can fly. This enables the United States to employ ALCMs in degraded environments that a bomber required to penetrate enemy airspace would not be able to fly. Second, ALCMs will save the lives of American aircrews. They will do this by penetrating enemy airspace that would put both the B-52 and the B-2 at great risk. Should an ALCM be lost to enemy IADS, the loss is considerably less than if an American bomber were lost over enemy territory. Third, bombers carrying ALCMs provide the president a level of flexibility that bombers carrying gravity bombs do not have. Where a bomber carrying the B-61 gravity bomb would likely strike a single target, that same bomber carrying the AGM-86 or the new LRSO would be capable of striking more than a dozen targets. Lastly, Perry and Weber are incorrect to suggest that the B-2 alone can effectively serve as the air- based leg of the nuclear triad. The current fleet of B-2 bombers consists of sixteen operationally available aircraft, with a fraction of these aircraft available to fly missions at any given time. Given such small numbers, B-52 launched cruise missiles play a central role in sustaining the credibility of American deterrence. Conclusion: With the United States facing the prospect of modernizing all three legs of the nuclear triad over the next twenty years, long time advocates of cutting the nuclear force to minimal levels see an opportunity to make significant gains in the reduction of both nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Our adversaries do not see such efforts as an attempt to make the world a safer place. They see it as weakness. As Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative.” Adam Lowther serves as the Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at Kirtland Air Force Base. His views are his own. http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-air-launched-cruise-missiles-they-still-matter- 14182?page=show Return to Top

Breaking Defense – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Commentary The Nuclear Option: Long Range Strike & the Case for Dual-Use By Blake McMahon October 29, 2015 Tuesday, Northrop Grumman won the contract to develop the Air Force’s next strategic bomber. Specifics about the competing designs have remained a closely-guarded secret, and the exact capabilities of the new aircraft are likely to remain classified for some time. One fact that is already known about the new bomber, however, is that, like the B-52 and the B-2 before it, it will be

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama designed to be “dual-use,” meaning that it will be able to carry either conventional or nuclear weapons as required. Dual-use is a critical — but controversial — capability. The Air Force is also considering whether or not to pursue a new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). The new ALCM – known in defense circles as the long-range standoff (LRSO) weapon – would possess advanced capabilities to increase the chances of success and against modern air defenses. Like the new bombers that may one day employ it, this missile is dual-use as well. The most obvious benefit: The ability to carry both nuclear and conventional payloads provides a key economic advantage during a period of tight budgets. With dual-use capabilities, there is no need to develop both nuclear weapon systems and conventional ones; the two are combined in the same basic package. Training and logistics pipelines can be simplified, operations unified. Yet skeptics argue that the adoption of dual-use capabilities will endanger strategic stability, and is therefore dangerous. The most common form of this argument revolves around the supposed “misidentification problem”: If weapon systems are dual-use, an adversary may mistake an incoming conventional attack for a nuclear strike. According to these skeptics, such misperceptions could lead a nuclear-armed adversary to escalate by accident. There are a few historical and conceptual issues with this line of thinking. From a historical perspective, dual-use platforms are not new. In the past they have included artillery; land- and sea- based fighter aircraft; strategic bombers; surface vessels; submarines; as well as short, intermediate, and long range missiles. Today, aircraft and ALCMs remain the only dual-use platforms in the US arsenal (adversaries may have more options). Why then, was strategic stability among nuclear adversaries maintained during periods in which dual-use capabilities were much more common? The answer to this question is a conceptual one that is derived from the grim logic of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence depends on the logic of secure second strike. Maintaining the ability to retaliate is the key driver of stability, since it is the expectation of a costly response that prevents opponents from attacking in the first place. Consequently, the most destabilizing capabilities are those which could largely or completely wipe out an opponent’s retaliatory forces. It is unclear why one would expect weapon systems like ALCMs and bombers to be particularly destabilizing. For these new dual-use capabilities to disrupt the deterrence calculus that creates strategic stability, one would have to argue that these weapon systems would fundamentally change our ability to threaten a critical mass of our adversary’s retaliatory forces. But dual-use bombers are not good first-strike systems, because they take longer to reach their targets than ballistic missiles. On the deterrent side, by multiplying the number of platforms that could deliver the second strike, we make it harder for an enemy to wipe out our retaliatory force, which makes it less likely for them to gamble on a first strike in the first place. It is not so much a specific capability that threatens an adversary’s ability to retaliate, but rather the way in which capabilities are used. A conventional strike from a bomber or ALCM would not itself threaten strategic stability for the same reason why US artillery strikes against Communist targets in Vietnam did not: These dual-use capabilities were employed in a way that did not threaten the retaliatory capability of our nuclear adversaries. Of course, there are two sides to the strategic stability coin. If the ability of opponents to retaliate following a first strike is crucial for preserving peace, then the United States must also maintain this capability. The defenses that would protect enemy targets against a second strike by the United States are becoming harder to defeat. The type of modern air defenses cited by Secretary of Defense Ash Issue No.1189, 30 October 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies

(CUWS) Outreach Journal

Carter in Tuesday’s announcement — like the Russian-built S-400 system — can reportedly target the re-entry vehicles from ballistic missiles coming through the atmosphere. These anti-access systems likely pose even greater threat to the survivability of the aircraft and cruise missiles already in the United States’ inventory. It is this threat to our current, aging bomber force that drove the Long-Range Strike Bomber project from the beginning. This underscores the biggest threat to strategic stability: an enemy that no longer fears our retaliatory capability. The new bomber and ALCM are 21st century platforms designed to contend with 21st century countermeasures. It is these capabilities that will help to guarantee strategic stability and peace into the future. Dr. Russell “Blake” McMahon is a research professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Defense Department, or the US Government. http://breakingdefense.com/2015/10/the-nuclear-option-long-range-strike-the-case-for-dual- use/ Return to Top

The National Interest – Washington, D.C. OPINION/The Buzz America's New LRS-B Stealth Bomber: How Many Does Washington Need? By Dave Majumdar October 28, 2015 The U.S. Air Force has selected Northrop Grumman to build its new Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), but the service is only planning to buy 100 of the stealthy new warplanes. With only 100 aircraft, the Air Force will not be able to replace its entire bomber fleet which consists of sixty-two surviving Rockwell International B-1B Lancers, seventy-six Boeing B-52s and twenty Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bombers. As such the Air Force should consider extending the LRS-B buy—especially if the service makes good on its promise of reducing the new jet’s cost. In previous years, former Air Force intelligence chief—now dean of the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute—retired Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula argued for a minimum buy of 155 LRS-B aircraft. That would be enough to equip ten squadrons with twelve bombers each. But in an ideal world, the service would need 175 LRS-B bombers, Deptula had told me in early 2011. With a fleet of the175 bombers, 120 of those jets would be "combat coded" aircraft. About fifty-five additional jets would be needed to fully equip the service for training, attrition reserves, backup aircraft inventory and flight-testing. With the Air Force paying $21.4 billion to develop the jet in 2010 dollar and then paying $564 million per aircraft for the bombers production run, the cost estimates are fairly low--by the service’s own admission. In fact, the Air Force says it can surpass that number in its own cost estimates, not to mention the two independent cost estimates it commissioned for the program. “If we remain disciplined and keep program requirements stable, we believe we can beat these estimates in the future as part of ‘should cost’ savings,” Air Force acquisitions chief William

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama LaPlante told reporters on Oct. 27. Further, given that the bomber is being designed with an open mission systems architecture, upgrades and support costs should be less. The LRS-B, in other words, is a relative bargain and the service could achieve greater economies of scale with an even larger buy. If one accepts the premise that the Western Pacific will take center stage in the decades to come, an extremely long-range broadband all-aspect stealth aircraft will be far more relevant than any short-range tactical fighter in that theatre. Bases in the region are not only scarce, they are also highly vulnerable to Chinese attack. Moreover, while the Air Force has a plan to replace most of its current tactical fighter fleet with the Lockheed Martin F-35, there is no plan in place to replace the Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle. Conceivably, the Air Force could replace the Strike Eagle with a variant of its forthcoming F-X sixth- generation fighter, but service officials say that program is focused on replacing the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and Boeing F-15C Eagle in the air superiority role. There has been no thought given to replacing the long serving Strike Eagle interdictor. What the Air Force should consider doing is extending the LRS-B buy past even Deptula’s 175 aircraft figure and procuring enough jets to replace the service’s six squadrons of Strike Eagles. Obviously, there is no need to replace the 219 F-15Es one-for-one with the LRS-B, but the Air Force should consider buying eighty-four additional bombers to replace the Strike Eagle fleet. That would buy six more squadrons of twelve aircraft with two back-up jets a piece. So the total LRS-B buy should be 259 aircraft—which would make the massive initial investment pay some dividends. How to pay for it? With 259 LRS-B bombers, which are far more relevant for future wars in the Asia-Pacific, the United States would not need as many short-range tactical fighters—especially one that was optimized for a less robust threat environment than the one that is starting to emerge. The F-35 buy should therefore be truncated to pay for more bombers. Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-new-lrs-b-stealth-bomber-how-many- does-washington-14190 Return to Top

ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation . The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to

(CUWS) Outreach Journal provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.