American Doctrine: the Foundation of Grand Strategy

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American Doctrine: The Foundation of Grand Strategy

Lamont Colucci Ripon College

There is an organic American grand strategy, expressed over three centuries in multiple presidential doctrines. Through an examination of grand strategy and doctrines, a clear pattern of success and failure can be demonstrated. Doctrines and grand strategy continue to vanish from policy and public discourse. Often the concept of American Grand Strategy has nearly vanished from any discussion of national security and foreign policy. There is an assumption that expressions such as national security, foreign policy, national security doctrines, grand strategy, vital, national, and peripheral interests are the same concept; they are not. There are many definitions of Grand Strategy; they range along the spectrum from the simple to the complex. Grand Strategy is put into practice with the adoption of national security doctrines. These doctrines should be the highest form of statecraft, but they are often ignored or misunderstood. This article examines the definition of Grand Strategy, why Grand Strategy is often ignored, how Grand Strategy relates to national security doctrines, how national security doctrines are created and implemented, what have been the common themes in American Grand Strategy and doctrines, and what the future holds for American Grand Strategy. It postulates the return to an organic American doctrine that can engage the current national security threats.

Keywords: The United States, National Security, Foreign Policy, De- fense Policy, American Grand Strategy, Successful National Security Pol- icy, Themes in National Security Doctrines, Current National Security Threats, National Interest, Definition of Grand Strategy, History of U.S. National Security Doctrine, American Exceptionalism, Geopolitics, Pri- macy, U.S. Way of War, Transnational Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Presidential Doctrines.

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La doctrina estadounidense: los fundamentos de la gran estrategia Hay una gran estrategia americana que es orgánica, expresada a lo largo de tres siglos en múltiples doctrinas presidenciales. A través de el examen de doctrinas y de gran estrategia, puede ser demostrado un claro patrón de éxito y fracaso. Las doctrinas y la gran estrategia continúan desvaneciéndose de las políticas y del discurso público. A menudo, el concepto de la Gran Estrategia Americana casi se ha desapa- recido de cualquier discusión sobre política exterior y seguridad nacional. Hay un supuesto que sostiene que las expresiones tales como seguridad nacional, política exterior, doctrinas de seguridad nacional, gran estrategia, intereses vitales, nacionales, y periféricos son el mismo concepto; pero no lo son. Hay muchas definiciones de Gran Estrategia; varían a lo largo de un espectro que va desde lo simple hasta lo complejo. La Gran Estrategia es puesta en práctica con las doctrinas de seguridad nacional. Estas doctrinas deberían ser la forma más elevada del arte del estado, pero a menudo son ignoradas o malinterpretadas. Este artículo examina la defin- ición de Gran Estrategia, por qué la Gran Estrategia es frecuentemente ignorada, cómo la Gran Estrategia se relaciona con las doctrinas de seguridad nacional, cómo las doctrinas de seguridad nacional son creadas e implementadas, cuáles han sido los temas comunes en las doctrinas y Gran Estrategia Americanas, y lo qué es de esperarse en el futuro de la Gran Estrategia Americana. Postula el retorno a una doctrina americana orgánica que puede vincularse con las actuales amenazas a la seguridad nacional.

Palabras clave: Estados Unidos, Seguridad Nacional, Política Exterior, Política de Defensa, Gran Estrategia Americana, Temas de la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional, Temas Actuales de Amenazas a la Seguridad Nacio- nal, Intereses Nacionales.

美国学说：大战略的根基

三个多世纪以来，多个总统学说中都体现了一种统一的美国大战略。通过对大战略和学说进行检验，能够清晰证明成功和失败的模式。然而如同以往，学说和大战略仍然没有在政策和公共话语中有所体现。美国大战略概念几乎在任何关于国家安全和外交政策的探讨中消失。有假设认为，诸如国家安全、外交政策、国家安全学说、大战略、重要利益、国家利益和边缘利益之类的表述都是同一概念；但他们并非属于同一概念。关于美国大战略的定义有很多；这些定义或简单或复杂。大战略随着国家安全学说一起投入实践。这些学说本应成为最高级别的治国之道，然而却时常被忽视或误解。本文检验了：大战略的定义、大战略为何时常被忽略、国家安全学说是如何产生和实行的、大战略和学说中常

134 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci

见的主题有哪些、以及大战略的未来是什么。本文假设了”统一的美国学说”所能获得的回报，它能应对当前的国家安全威胁。

关键词：美国，外交政策，美国大战略，国家安全学说，国家安全威胁，美国安全利益

The concept of American Grand Strategy has nearly vanished from discussions of national security and foreign policy. Although some scholars have reignited the debate, the debate tends to focus narrowly on the present, whereas true grand strategy harnesses centuries—in both direc- tions. Grand strategic visions for the United States were not discussed through the 2016 presidential election; some candidates developed pieces of national security and foreign policy, but few outlined how America should protect its national interests or presented a vision to guarantee American primacy, prosperity, and values. Sometimes, expressions such as national security, foreign policy, national security doctrines, grand strategy, vital, and other national interests are assumed to be the same concept. They are not. The dominant subject in national strategy since 9/11 has been counterterrorism, but intelligence and counterterrorism policy are not national security policy, and national security policy is not national security strategy, which in turn is not grand strategy or national security doctrine. Nothing is more important to the survival of American civilization than a coherent, competent, and robust national security doctrine that can provide a foundation for grand strategy. An all-encompassing doctrine is needed for the 21st century, an American Doctrine that would adhere to nine grand strategy themes: American Exceptionalism, expansion, the empire of liberty and democracy promotion, free commerce, unilateralism, internationalism, the American way of war, geopolitics, and primacy. These themes must be embraced in a bipartisan way that affirms Daniel Webster’s (1831, 8) quotation: “[e]ven our party divisions, acrimonious as they are, cease at the water’s edge.” The result of adopting an American Doctrine based on America’s history, traditions, and values would be the inability of any particular administration to renounce such a doctrine. Grand strategy is the most critical form of statecraft. If security is the first order of any state, grand strategy is the method to achieve it. We have become focused on the present with an assumption that inertia will carry us through. The success of past administrations to create and harness a grand strategy has allowed this attitude to appear successful. As is illustrated here, there

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is a clear method of success and failure, as well as an ability to create a strategic solution that, in the American case, is done through strategic doctrine. After illustrating grand strategy, interests, and doctrines, this study will assess the themes of successful doctrine and the road forward. Grand strategy is the expression of doctrine in practice. National security doctrine serves grand strategy since grand strategy imposes a “vigorous coherence between ends and means” (Dueck 2015, 15). Simple definitions of grand strategy identify it as the “calculated relation of means to large ends” (Liebert 2014, 2). More complex definitions illustrate a “hierarchy of interests and principles” (Martel 2015, 339). Grand Strategy in practice announces and adheres to a permanent national security doctrine. The fundamental purpose of any state is to create grand strategy that attempts to harness military, economic, and political power to advance the nation (Strong 2005, 25). It implies the use of force to promote these interests (Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala 2007, 5). Grand strategy is married to hard power and military force; unlike domestic policy, it creates the conditions for either total triumph or total destruction (Art 2004, 1–2). Grand strategy is often ignored because it is inconvenient, hard to change, and subject to the “tyranny of the status quo” (Drezner 2011). Its development requires a formidable depth of knowledge. No electoral constit- uency holds a president accountable for not having a grand strategy even though having one is the raison d’être of the presidency. To ignore grand strategy is to engage in “episodic adventurism and incremental crisis man- agement” (Doherty 2013). Grand Strategy is further burdensome since it requires constant adaptation (F. W. Kagan 2008, 63). And the public and practitioners may easily ignore it because it tends to be translated through doctrines that start primarily with words, not actions.

Vital and National Interests Nations’ hierarchy of interests is often divided among vital, national, and peripheral interests. Discussing national security requires an understanding of particularly the first two of these. Vital interests are existential; a civilization’s failure to protect them could bring about its extinction. A “state is unwilling to compromise” (Snow and Drew 2010, 4) these interests, which include population protection, territorial integrity, and sovereignty (Yarger and Barber 1997). For most of the last century, America’s greatest vital interests were preventing the Soviet Union or international communism from controlling Eurasia (Bush 1990) and protecting itself from the USSR’s nuclear threat. Primarily, Grand Strategy, expressed through doctrine, must address vital interests.

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Whereas vital interests tend to be blatant, national interests often cause more debate. The stakes, though important, are lower. If an important interest is not met, the nation will be hurt but not destroyed (Yarger and Barber 1997). This is perhaps the most expansive category of interests because it covers most of the ground in National Security interests. Examples of events that could concern national interest include a single terrorist attack inside the United States, an attempt to close the straits of Hormuz, or a redux of North Korea’s 1953 invasion. National interests consume much national security strategy. By defining national interests, a nation works to achieve national objectives—objectives that may concern power, economy, and morality. Successful national security doctrines unite the geopolitical, the commercial, and the just to create a whole. American grand strategy, and its doctrinal outcome, is unique in that it has attempted to mix all interests to form a whole.

Doctrine A nation’s strategic-level security interests must function within a comprehensive national security doctrine capable of resisting the fluctuations of time, shifting administrations, party lines, and personalities. In addition to safeguarding its citizens, land, and way of life, American national security includes the expectations of protecting individual freedoms and national values (Jordan et al. 1999). As a new republic, America’s realistic national security goals were preserving its independence and maintaining its geographical integrity and national honor in the service of creating a viable nation. America’s initial national security aspirations to create a “more perfect union,” “insure domestic tranquility,” and “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity” have expanded globally (Collins 1974, 74). Any attempt to create a national security or foreign policy without clear national objectives, let alone a national security doctrine, would fail. The contemporary focus on the immediate “house on fire” prevents true strategic thinking, leading to strategic failure. Primarily, national security doctrines serve as an overarching goal that provide the foundation for a national security policy that can gov- ern a particular administration—only then can the administration create specific tactical policies aligned with this foundation. These policies provide the groundwork for turning ideas into action (Gray 1999, 35–6). The most effective doctrines create and amplify a resilient strategic vision that endures without micromanaging security or foreign policy (Over- holt and Kahn 1974). To date, national security doctrines have been

SUMMER 2018 137 AMERICAN DOCTRINE unilateral leadership-driven statements offered through the authority of the U.S. president. Doctrines bearing the name and authority of “Mon- roe” or “Truman” were not mere rhetoric; they were statements of the highest policy (Overholt and Kahn 1974). In their cultural moment and stretching into the present, these doctrines have legitimized the foreign policy of the United States, signaled national security direction and objectives to the world and the electorate, and demarcated U.S. views from nation states whose perspectives clash with American values. The best doctrines are beacons of justice and stability, broadcasting hope in a world rent by desperation and lawlessness.

Creating National Security Doctrines Historically, a national security doctrine can be delineated by a particular proclamation. For example, the inception of the Monroe Doctrine rests in Monroe’s 1823 State of the Union speech. Other doctrines, however, must be compiled from many sources (i.e., the Hoover Doctrine). While their origin may be more or less defined, all national security doctrines develop through speeches, declarations, laws, and edicts. Since 1986 and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which required presidents to produce a “National Security Strategy,” identifying a president’s national security doctrine has become somewhat easier (Snider 1995). Still, the only commonality among all such strategies is that they have all emanated from the president. Presidential supremacy in national security ensures that he alone may create, enhance, destroy, or change national security policy, strategy, and national security doctrine. Congress and the courts have little, if any, role in these matters. The president, as the commander- in-chief of the armed forces and the national security and intelligence establishment, is solely responsible for diplomacy, treaty creation and enforcement, and homeland security. Only he can enact grand strategy, declare national objectives, and exercise the right to create a national security doctrine (Baker 2007, 13). All American national security doctrines, while burdened with the implied use of military force, have described American actions through the constructs of morality and ethics (Watson, Gleek, and Grillo 2003). Most importantly, presidential national security doctrines transcend U.S. borders; they articulate American national strategy domestically and internationally (Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala 2007). Some are more regionally focused; others are global. However, they all clearly exemplify presidential unilateralism (Brands 2006). Through the turn of the 21st

138 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci century, this has made the American president, as regards national security and foreign affairs, something of an American emperor (Friedman 2011a, 14–15). In consequence, those presidents least comfortable using American power are the ones without a coherent doctrine (Johnson) or with less-than-successful doctrines (Wilson, Hoover, Carter, Obama).

What Is American National Security Doctrine? The many attempts to synthesize American national security doctrine identify nine consistent, identifiable themes. Before analyzing those themes, it is valuable to consider the tensions and alternate views inherent within the concept of America’s national security doctrine. One school of thought identifies the tension between “realists” and “idealists” as being instrumental in producing a successful fusion between the creation and pursuit of American national interests (Combs 1997, 8). Historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that the identifiable themes created by these tensions include preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony (Gaddis 2004, 16–30). Others identify unilateralism, moral pragmatism (where one can morally judge state behavior and the United States can be the arbiter), and legalism (where the United States is the source of global stability) (Hastedt 2003, 62). Historically, others have perceived themes such as independence, freedom of the seas, and westward expansion (Magstadt 2004, 35). Another school focuses on the tensions and debates themselves. In this instance, conflict is the only unifying aspect. A common modern delineation paints four competing disciplines of thought: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy (Posen and Ross 2000, 3). A more historical account divides the landscape into Hamiltonians (partnering government with big business, aspiring to global commerce and free trade), Wilsonians (stressing American moral obligations to spread democracy and values), Jeffersonians (safeguarding liberty at home), and Jacksonians (stressing populism, military strength, and honor) (Mead 2001, xv–xviii). The multi-faceted argument(s) between idealism and realism, free trade and protectionism, liberty and despotism, and republic versus empire exist(s) over the entire American experience (Hendrickson 2009, 9). In light of this, Cecil Crabb and Albert E. Cowdrey (1982, 382) has identified five principles of American national security doctrine: the power of America’s example, the concept of America’s mission, the utopian quality of American ideals (Novus Ordo Seclorum), the universalization of doctrines beyond American shores, and unilateralism. This development of themes in national security doctrines has been consistent and has only been seen

SUMMER 2018 139 AMERICAN DOCTRINE differently by those who have purchased the myth of isolationism and a misunderstanding of the nation’s blood-soaked origins. The United States, born of republican revolutionary ideology, set the foundations for nine themes that have pervaded the development of American grand strategy—themes to which I now turn individually in some depth.

American Exceptionalism American Exceptionalism—the assertion that America is unique among nations across all time—is the first of the nine themes that run through the U.S. national security doctrines. This asserted uniqueness transcends the United States’ particular history, geography, or demography. Americans perceive themselves as exceptional insofar as they see theirs as the only nation fundamentally defined by ideology. This American creed or ethos of liberty created a gulf between the United States and all other nations. It has meant that American Exceptionalism and American nationalism have always been one in the same (Hunt 1987, 195–9). This Exceptionalism results from America’s inherent liberal character that has often contradicted the dictates of realpolitik (Deudney and Meiser 2012, 31). It created a nation diverse in religion but unified in its civic religion expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. This “new Jerusalem” was qualitatively different and became a central precept of national security and foreign policy (Papp, Johnson, and Endicott 2004). Abraham Lincoln (1862) talked of the American destiny as the “last, best hope of earth,” which was “destined to be a barrier against the return of ignorance and barbarism.” Similarly, John Adams (1765) noted that America was “destined beyond a doubt to be the greatest power on earth.”

Manifest Destiny and Expansion “American law, American order, American civilization, and the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, but by the agencies of God henceforth to be made beautiful and bright” (Beveridge 1900). “Manifest destiny” is a purely American term; it espouses the belief that Americans, as ordained by God in connection to American Exceptionalism, have been destined to expand. Four hundred years of steady expansion were based on this belief, and the roots of manifest destiny predate the birth of the nation with the concept of an “imperial republic” taking hold early. “The early colonies were no sooner established in the seventeenth century than expansionist

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impulses began to register in each of them. Imperial patterns took shape, and before the middle of the eighteenth century the concept of an empire that would take the whole continent was fully formed” (Rosati and Scott 2013, 22). Continental expansion connected to the Puritan’s desire to create the Christian “city on a hill”—an idyllic and divinely blessed society whose republican government would serve as an example to the world. This “American messianism” created a mission for the United States (McDougall 1998, 16). During and after the revolution, enlighten- ment founders justified expansion into Indian Territory as a way of sharing the blessings of democracy and civilization. As this conflation of national security, foreign policy, and national identity indicates, these state matters and perceptions were completely intertwined (R. Kagan 2006, 42). It granted the Americans the view that their expansion along with their culture and institutions were inherently superior and different from those of rivals (Herring 2011, 180–1). After the War of 1812 under Presidents Monroe and Adams, the idea became to redeem and remake the world through the pursuit of a divinely inspired destiny (Weeks 1996, 60; Rosati and Scott 2013, 23). Manifest destiny combined nationalism, idealism, and self-confidence (Herring 2011, 180–4). American expansion was not for territorial acquisition, or great power, but as a force of good (Hoff 2007). Many would argue the height of this expansion was the late 19th century where America could be considered outright imperialist. Another apex of this belief was under Woodrow Wilson (Ninkovich 1999, 12). In the contemporary era, George W. Bush encouraged America to embrace its “crusader state” nature (Merry 2005, xiv). Dominic Tierney correctly identifies two resultant crusading impulses as a result of manifest destiny: (1) “an idealistic sense of mission to spread our values” and (2) “a desire for retribution to punish evildoers” (Tierney 2010, 20). These impulses have created our current “unintended empire.”

The Empire of Liberty and Democracy Promotion Much contemporary criticism and evaluation has been leveled at the Bush Doctrine and its primary pillar: democracy promotion. However, in connection to manifest destiny, this promotion was part of America’s genesis. The United States has always dreamed liberal imperial dreams (Ferguson 2004). Out of the nine, this theme has received the most robust and consistent reiteration (Smith 1994, xiii–xvi). John Adams (1765) recorded this enduringly relevant sentiment: “I always consider

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the settlement of America with Reverence and Wonder—as the Opening of a grand scene and Design in Providence, for the Illumination of the Ignorant and the Emancipation of the slavish Part of Mankind all over the Earth.” America’s consistent expression of its values through this goal of nurturing and expanding democracy reached its height in the 20th and 21st century (Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala 2007, 8). Presidents who deviate from this narrative to prioritize policy under- mine American grand strategy. This was true of Nixon’s doctrine of contraction. In the national security context, policies based on uni- versalizing American national interest transformed into policies of liberation and rollback in tune with Americanism. This goal of a liberal empire and democracy promotion contribute immensely to America’s overall power abroad (Nye 2002, 11). This “liberal grand strategy” is a pragmatic approach to American national interests—not merely an attempt to do the right thing. The argument here evokes Kant’s “per- petual peace,” which forms the basis of democratic peace theory (Doyle 1983). The approach to grand strategy and national security that cham- pions democracy abroad as a way to secure national interests is patently American and fits within the larger liberal view of international order, civil society, institution building, human rights, free trade, and progress (Trubowitz 1999). This point cannot be overemphasized: American promotion of the empire of liberty has never simply been about elections; it has always been about civil society and liberty under law, whose greatest success has been in the post–World War II (WWII) period with Japan and Germany.

Free Trade, Free Commerce, and Markets Economics also influence national security doctrines. Economics are structured around the basic American demand for unhindered trade, free navigation of the seas, and open access to international markets. To achieve this, America has frequently pursued a verifiably useful policy of armed neutrality “From Washington’s proclamation of neutrality of April 22, 1793, to President Wilson’s address of April, 2, 1917, neutrality, in the sense of legal impartiality in foreign wars, was the official policy of the United States” (Wright 1942, 12). The United States, from the Founding Fathers onward, viewed any attempt to interfere with American commerce as a hostile act. Its first foreign war overseas was fought with the Barbary pirates partially over this issue. However, protecting goods on the seas fits within a broader belief that America can reform the world through its principles, free trade, and

142 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci economic influence (Herring 2011, 3). Furthermore, as America grew to be a world power, it recognized that both order and trade could not be maintained unless it had full control of the sea-lanes and skies. Thus again, the national American interest of prosperity at home could also promote prosperity, law, and freedom abroad.

Unilateralism The word “unilateralism” has become a contemporary epithet used to bludgeon policy makers as “barbaric.” Many scholars have argued that President George W. Bush was unilateral, but no president is truly unilateral when engaged in major diplomacy and war. We have made the ‘term into a cartoon. However, it is important to acknowledge that the United States has always functioned within a tradition of unilateralism, which has necessarily replaced the assumed tradition of mythical isolationism (Schlesinger 2004, 3). Unilateralism is the oldest of the various realistic traditions in American national security (Lowi 1985, 162). It exists in connection to the American president as a single source of power. “Beginning with George Washington, presidents had legitimated the notion of unilateralism through dramatic proclamations extolling the right of the nation to remain free from foreign entanglements” (Zelizer 2010, 9). This was not simply based on realist notions of power politics and the need to determine one’s own fate; part of the belief in exceptionalism demanded American unilateral action apart from the other powers. While acquiring recognition on the world stage, the nation also acquired the need to be unilateral based on worldwide commitments to support the Pax Americana. Unilateralism has allowed America to hold strong to its national morality and goals without automatically adhering to multilateralism.

Internationalism Historically, the United States has not shunned its allies or friends; it has often pursued alliances to defeat what it has identified as evil (Hendrickson 2009, 3). Again, as America grew in global prominence, it became clear that grand strategy was only sensible within a worldwide context. “American internationalism in the 20th century was truly exceptional because it abandoned the idea of interest as traditionally understood over thousands of years, opting instead to identify its national security with global needs” (Ninkovich 1999, 14). It became clear that alliances with certain European states would be the source of American national security (Hixon 2009, 13). This would later be expanded into

SUMMER 2018 143 AMERICAN DOCTRINE permanent alliance structures around the world. The recognition that American grand strategy required a national security doctrine enabled the United States to build coalitions of free people to counter the threats of tyranny and extremism. American internationalism, based from the beginning on a commitment to creating alliances when needed, matured along with the nation’s sphere of influence.

The American Way of War The United States was birthed from war—an attribute that distinguishes it from other nations and great powers whose genesis have been rooted in tribe, land, language, and religion (Millis 1956, 13). America sprang from a revolutionary ideology grounded in natural law, and America, as a warlike power, succeeded because of what happened on the battlefield (Friedman 2011, 39–45). War is the rule in American history and international experience (Snow and Drew 2010, 287). Jerel Rosati and James Scott (2013, 15) register 163 military interventions before WWII. Max Boot (2002, 2) catalogs 180 U.S. Marine landings abroad between 1800 and 1934. These operations were punitive, protective, or “profiteering.” As of the writing of this article, the United States is engaged in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and numerous special operations and low-intensity conflicts. U.S. military objectives in national security are clear: the complete domination of North America by the U.S. Army, the elimination of any threat to the United States by any power in the Western Hemisphere, the complete control of maritime approaches to the United States by the Navy, the complete domination of the world’s oceans and trading system, and the prevention of any other nation from challenging U.S. global naval power (Friedman 2009, 39–45). In addition, the American way of war has become total destruction of the enemy—what Russell Weigley (1977, xxii) identifies as a strategy of annihilation—ultimately through advanced firepower in an attempt to minimize casualties and assure total victory (see also Boot 2002, 1). But Americans’ primary motivation has not been destruction but to “set in motion America’s ‘righteous power” to punish evil and to brook no compromise with evildoers (Stoessinger 1985, 5). This has generated criticism that Americans embrace crusading (military conflict) but are uncomfortable with the quagmire of nation building (Tierney 2010). However, this ideological component of American war praxis has also led to the formation of history’s most humane military. The military’s paradoxical civility springs from an obsession with upholding honor by avoiding intentionally killing civilians, carefully attending to prisoners of war, and strictly adhering to the rules of war. While the

144 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci question of when to utilize war is at the epicenter of grand strategy, the threat and use of war is clearly American national security doctrine’s most instrumentalized tool.

Geography, Geostrategy, and Geopolitics “The study of geopolitics tries to identify those things that are eternal, those things that are of long duration, and those things that are transitory” (Friedman 2011b). Geopolitics brings together the demands of a nation and the limits of its geography. For the United States, only its demands could limit its vast geographical ability to project power. The natural boundaries of two oceans, a weakened power to the north, and a chaotic regime on the southern border greatly influence American national security. Although this was the case for most of its history, geopolitics played a pivotal role in the constitution ratification debates and in the years of the early republic precisely because America was existentially threatened by the British, French, and Spanish empires. When America took the world stage, it became clear that geopolitics would dictate its projection of power (Stratfor 2011, 2016).

Primacy As the United States developed, it embraced primacy as a necessity. America’s quest to be the Sheriff (Gray 2004) or an order-making Goliath (Mandelbaum 2005) began in the 19th century and proceeded apace as the United States grew from a world power, to a superpower, to the facilitator of the Pax Americana. However, this quest for primacy is not synonymous with the desire for empire (Nye and Welch 2016, 318). Primacy was sought to ensure that America’s grand strategy goals were served, and the only way to achieve this certainty was to build a nation without any serious peer competitor for international and military power. This form of primacy simultaneously served American national objectives and interests while proliferating democracy, human rights, and free markets. These nine themes illustrate consistency in American grand strategy and are exemplified in the most robust and successful national security doctrines. They serve as a historical model, current benchmark, and future standard for the analysis of national security, foreign policy, and strategy. These themes illustrate America’s past and ongoing fight against tyranny. Thomas Jefferson’s (1800) quotation applies in this way to the organic nation as a whole: “I have sworn upon the Altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man”

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(letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush from Thomas Jefferson, September 23, 1800). This began with the war against the tyranny of monarchy from 1775 to 1918 and was followed by the tyranny of Nazism, fascism, communism, and militarism from 1918 to 1991 and beyond. The United States’ current wars are being fought against the tyranny of Islamic extremism and the resurgence or continued existence of worldwide authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Gaging Doctrinal Success From the founding of the country until today, there have been numerous presidential doctrines. Eight were extremely successful. Two others, while in some ways productive, were generally problematic. The first of these ten was the successful, if oft forgotten, Washington Doctrine. This doctrine established the Constitution as a national security document, set an opening national security tone, and created the first conditions for presidential supremacy, alliances, armed neutrality, expansion, free navigation of the seas, and the issue of diplomatic recognition. The second was the Monroe Doctrine, which has become known for noncolonization, nonintervention, noninterference, and nontransfer and expansionism. Following Monroe was Polk—a doctrine that combined manifest destiny, expansionism, and projection of power. Historically, the fourth doctrine was Lincoln’s, an unusual doctrine derived from National Security Unionism, which provided a foundation for how to deal with a range of Civil War–related issues, including battlefield combatants, insurgents, terrorists, and the ultimate protection of America’s vital interests. This was followed by the Roosevelt Corollary—a doctrine that The- odore Roosevelt created. This established a precedent for extra-continental American intervention, “civilizing,” and stabilization. Subse- quently, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s [FDR’s] only marginally successful doctrine emphasized American internationalism and alliances, and attempted to combine realism and democracy building. The Truman Doctrine was next; its influence has spanned history and provided the foundation of the modern national security system and apparatus, and modern grand strategy. Its combination of realism with liberalism was a contextual product of America’s waking to a ferocious existential threat. The Truman Doctrine was followed by Eisenhower’s—a grandiose doctrine of rollbacks that was tested and failed only to be revived by Ronald Reagan. Carter’s initial doctrine based on hyper-multinational liberalism also failed, but it was partially redeemed by Carter’s decision to extend

146 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci the Washington Doctrine over the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The Reagan Doctrine created a realistic rollback strategy and endorsed the modern concept of primacy. Finally, the crusading realists within the G. W. Bush administration created a doctrine based on preemption (destroy an immediate threat), prevention (neutralize a long-term threat), primacy, and democracy promotion. This doctrine attempted to merge realism with liberalism. Successful national security doctrines have adhered to the above nine identifiable themes. Successful doctrines have also rested on domestic support (Drezner 2011). These nine themes are uniquely American; their instigation and application has transcended political parties and historical eras. The doctrines that have deviated from, ignored, mutated, or dismissed these themes have proven to be disastrous. National security doctrines foundationally provide the architecture and guidance that create national security strategy and policy. As such, doctrines that are poor or lacking will always result in similarly poor or lacking strategies. As detailed, some presidents have fully embraced the nine themes and, thus, enhanced the nation’s security: Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt (T. R.), Truman, Reagan, and Bush. Monroe, Polk, FDR, and Eisenhower generally upheld the themes and improved the country’s lot. Unfortunately, Wilson, Hoover, Nixon, Carter, Clinton, and Obama deviated from, ignored, or mutated these nine tenets of grand strategy, and the nation paid a dear price. These presidents failed to carry out the themes’ organic directives and abandoned or squandered American leadership and dominance. As this evaluation indicates, the rankings of successful or unsuccessful doctrines have little to do with a president’s political party. However, the majority represented a conservative, hawk- ish position regarding national security affairs and supported the use of hard power. Seven out of the ten presidents who sponsored these doctrines were Freemasons who upheld democracy, natural law, and univer- sal justice as moral absolutes. All ten were deeply committed Christians, adhered to doctrines that closely associated the United States with the grand themes, and were cognizant of the resulting negative outcomes if the United States failed to lead.

Challenges and Threats to National Security Doctrine At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States faces challenges possibly more threatening than ever before. Of the myriads of threats, ten stand out for their immediate and long-term consequences. In what follows, these major threats are evaluated based on which national

SUMMER 2018 147 AMERICAN DOCTRINE security doctrines they challenge and what national security strategies may be used to confront them. Of course, the reasons given here are only a few among many, highlighting the main tenets. To create contemporary national security strategy and policy solutions, the United States must incorporate aspects of successful past presidential doctrines. The premier threat is anything that stands in the way of primacy. In fact, scholars and policy makers have argued that without primacy, other threats fall into irrelevancy. Luckily, America has had formulas for success in responding to primacy, including Lincoln’s validation of total war, T. R. Roosevelt’s demonstration of force, Reagan’s military rebuilding and selective rollback, and Bush’s maintenance and expansion of military and space primacy. The United States took a long road to military primacy; however, this primacy has advanced world order, commerce, and peace beyond anything encouraged by past empires, treaties, or organizations. Primacy means maintaining and expanding the eleven Carrier Task Forces and all branches of the military, intelligence, and even diplomatic services. International stability is dependent on the primacy of the American military and the Pax Americana. The United State’s permanent strategy must ensure that this primacy continues and expands. Several key strategies that must be implemented to promote primacy include U.S. development and deployment of a multilayered national missile defense that will cover our allies, the United States making permanent its Way of War, and the resurrection of the Weinberger Doctrine as it concerns overwhelming force. First, during war and at home during violence and rioting, American national security is best served by swift and massive force as such force results in lower casualties. All of this can occur by first stopping any attempt to reduce the defense budget to dangerously low levels. The defense budget must be based on the grand strategy of the United States designed to protect American vital and national interests. This should be a bipartisan and immediate commitment. Second, America must reinvigorate its space program since any future military conflicts will be won by the nation that achieves space dominance. The evolution and history of military technology has proven this for five thousand years. Unsurprisingly, the next threat on many national security threat assessments is terrorism. Those focused on quelling the activity of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other such groups can draw from Washington’s per- spective of the Constitution as a national security document and the supremacy of the executive in national security. Doctrine developers can utilize Lincoln’s stance regarding national security as the prime role of

148 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci the executive and his focus on national survival. They can take from the Bush Doctrine Bush’s commitment to preemption, prevention, primacy, and democracy promotion. In confronting this threat, it is important to realize that a new terrorism, primarily motivated by an extremist Islamic vision focused on apocalyptical designs to bring about a new Islamic era, emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s. These groups and individuals are willing to use any means, especially weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Roughly 44 transnational Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are pursuing the destruction of the United States, its citizens, and western civilization. This is a war that requires the use of all national resources. The rise of Wahabism, Salafism, and Shi’ism is currently the greatest long- term ideological threat to the United States and its western allies. The threatening combination of trans-national terrorism, rogue states, and WMDs is driven primarily by Sunni extremism (with the notable excep- tion of Shiite terrorism sponsored by Iran). All such movements mutate and multiply, generating more terrorist movements that continue to be self-perpetuating until and unless a strategic formula is found to defeat them. A successful national security strategy in response to these threats must go beyond the tactics of counterterrorism and use the full power of the U.S. military, intelligence services, covert operations along with the soft power of democracy building, and economic aid. Debate on the official designation of “enemy combatants” should end; terrorists are neither criminals nor prisoners of war—military tribunals must deal with them. The United States should push the United Nations to adopt this policy as part of international law. In addition, the United States should have an established policy that any provision by any nation of any part of WMD to a terrorist group will be considered an act of war. Future presidents must treat this as a war, not just a conflict or a law-enforcement exercise. No contemporary threat assessment could be complete without considering the problem of Rogue Regimes. These regimes create and amplify conditions for threats such as terrorism. In this regard, the United States can draw from Truman’s support for people facing hostile threats and aggressive containment, Eisenhower’s initial commitment to liberating captive peoples, Reagan’s selective rollback and support for anti-tyrannical forces, and Bush’s prioritization of preemption, prevention, primacy, and democracy promotion. Since President Bush described North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as “The Axis of Evil” in 2002, Iran and North Korea have continued spread- ing malevolence. Since 1979, Iran has engaged in a laundry list of

SUMMER 2018 149 AMERICAN DOCTRINE problematic policies and behaviors designed to kill Americans and hurt American interests. Iran is currently working on a massive campaign to produce nuclear weapons and build, modernize, and develop its long- range ballistic missile capability. This illustrates the real failure of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan on Action (JCPOA) where the deal was more important than the grand strategic implications. It bears the baleful distinction of being the number one state sponsor of terrorism (by backing groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and assisting both Al Qaeda and the Taliban), number one partner or sponsor of other rogue regimes like Syria, and number one conduit for the training and arm- ing of Iranian Shiite militias to kill American troops and Iraqis. Iran is one of the worst offenders against its own citizens’ human rights. The United States must make a permanent and declared policy demanding zero tolerance for any further development of Iran’s nuclear or missile program. This policy must also state that America will consider anything short of a complete reversal of Iran’s terror strategy an act of war and that America will act accordingly. The United States should be prepared to successfully implement aspects of the verifiably effective Truman, Rea- gan, and Bush doctrines by destabilizing the regime, using covert operations, assisting pro-democracy Iranian elements with more than rhetoric, and preparing to use hard power. This power may have nothing to do with the deployment of ground troops; however, it can still be utilized to make Iran pay a high price for its recalcitrance.

Due to the Clinton administration’s dithering and lack of strategy, North Korea (DPRK) with its advanced nuclear and missile program poses an even more difficult problem. This underscores the need to have acted in Iraq and to take action immediately on Iran. Additionally, the DPRK proliferates arms, counterfeits American dollars, sells drugs, and egregiously violates human rights. North Korea operates a vast expanse of concentration camps where citizens are treated worse than animals and punishes dissent of any kind with torture and execution. (United Nations 2014)

Pivotal to American strategy and inherent to American values is the eradication of such practices whether by covert or overt means. The United States must make and declare a permanent policy focused on seeking the removal of the North Korean totalitarian regime, treating any missile tests as aggressive acts, stopping North Korea’s nuclear program, assisting the North and South Korean elements that strive toward liberation, and preparing to assist South Korea through eventual

150 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci reunification in an effort to avoid one of the world’s potentially worst refugee-based humanitarian disasters. The North Korean and Iranian regimes diametrically oppose American values and interests. America’s grand strategy should reflect the fact that it exists within a state of war with both countries. Regardless of the outcome from the Singapore Summit, North Korea’s strategic interests are in a permanent state of hostility as long as the Kim and communist regime rule it. The fourth threat is generated by Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. The doctrinal elements that guide policy here are Lincoln’s adherence to total war, FDR’s interest in international alliance building, Truman’s commitment to protecting free people from hostile forces, Eisenhower’s original doctrine of liberating captive people and maintaining that liberation, and, again, Bush’s democracy promotion. Americans should have moved past debating whether or not the United States should have invaded Iraq and Afghanistan long ago and focused on how to achieve victory. Iraq is at a decisive point regarding whether it succeeds or fails, stabilizes or turns to violence, allies with the United States or Iran. Iraq’s choices at this juncture will clarify Ameri- can sacrifices as either triumph or tragedy. As a template to other Arab countries of how a Muslim democracy can be created, Iraq must be a linchpin in any future American Middle East policy. The United States must exhibit a permanent commitment to Iraq that demonstrates its zero tolerance for Sunni terrorists, Shiite militias, or Iranian machi- nations. As for Afghanistan, Obama’s strategy here was predicated on greater European involvement, but the Europeans are suspicious of such increased involvement and have followed Obama’s lead in announcing withdrawals in Afghanistan (Zirulnick 2011). In following a Nixonian precedence, the Obama administration was set to satisfy a lack of geostrategic and historical understanding by abandoning another ally while letting another region succumb to terror. Instead, the United States’ long-term strategic goal must be to destroy the Taliban, establish law and order, and bring stability to Afghanistan. Achieving this goal will be the only way to ensure respect for American credibility and that Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS cannot use Afghan- istan as a terrorist haven. The fifth threat is the same challenge that George Washington faced in the French and Indian War—that of great powers. Today, this threat is posed by a resurgent Russia and a rising China. Responding to this threat is not about belligerently creating enemies. The four doctrines and prioritizations needed to cross this unique and dangerous minefield

SUMMER 2018 151 AMERICAN DOCTRINE are T. R. Roosevelt’s advancement of alliances and coalitions; Truman’s military posture and containment; Reagan’s threat of selective rollback, military spending, and missile defense; and Bush’s commitment to the primacy of the U.S. military. In developing a policy-driven response to these threats, aggression and statements of war are not needed; instead, what is required is the simple realization that the interests of a resurgent Russia and rising China are often at odds with America’s ideological and material interests. The United States cannot accept the Russian practice of treating sovereign states such as Ukraine and Georgia like subservient satellites. The United States must build a defensive missile system based only on its own national security interests, treat any Russian attempt to support rogue regimes as an act of aggression, and not ignore the dismal state of human rights inside Russia. China poses similar problems. Here again, the United States must not turn a blind eye from China’s egre- gious human rights violations. Also, the United States must put China on notice that any attempts to use its modernizing military to threaten American primacy in the Pacific or any continued support of regimes in Iran or Sudan will be considered an act of aggression. Finally, with regard to economy, China must be made to realize that free trade should be fair trade or no trade at all. The vacuum created by America’s decline as a global leader gener- ates the sixth threat—the crisis of confidence in Europe and subsequent feelings of betrayal. In this regard, the United States can learn from the doctrinal elements of three internationalist presidents who understood that a lack of American leadership in Europe would have long-term, devastating results for the United States: FDR’s embrace of internationalism and Atlanticism, Truman’s support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the collective West, and Reagan’s prioritization of American leadership primacy. The landscape of American graves across Europe resulting from the United States’ twice willingness to go to war to help save that region testifies to the special relationships the United States has with specific European countries. Upholding these relationships is critical to ensuring American values and advancing American interests. NATO, which teeters on the edge of an identity crisis, is the United States’ most important alliance, and its strength requires dynamic American leadership. Americans must reinvigorate its relations with Europe in a way that integrates security and economics and collectively promotes western values. This cannot happen when America talks more about burden sharing and less about leading. This is particularly critical for Eastern Europe; the United States engineered

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NATO’s eastward expansion and is now responsible for protecting that trust. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic know that the price they paid under Nazi and communist tyranny resulted, in part, from betrayal by the western powers’ betrayal. The West’s continued appeasement of Hitler created the conditions for his conquest. The United States grand strategy must factor in these people under all conditions. The seventh threat comes from a loss of opportunity that has turned into a threat—illustrating the problem incurred when grand strategy, doctrine, and policy are absent. This lost opportunity is the past, present, and future of the Arab Spring. The three doctrines that could provide a long view response to this aftermath are T. R. Roosevelt’s validation of law, order, and stability; FDR’s international alliances and international aid; and Bush’s democracy promotion. While the Bush Doctrine pro- moted Arab Democracy, the Obama administration failed to lead. Results of continued leadership failure could be absolutely disastrous: hope for democracy, human rights, and civil society could be lost; revolutions could be overtaken by dictators or Islamic extremists; the region could descend into factionalism and chaos; other great powers could gain influence to threaten American interests. The United States must take the strategic lead and show itself as these people’s greatest supporter. Japan and Mexico face destabilization, albeit for different reasons and under different circumstances. Their destabilization poses the eighth threat. Unsurprisingly, the doctrines that can be productively applied to this situation were generated by presidents particularly focused on these regions. Monroe was interested in hemispheric involvement and defense, Polk adopted an aggressive policy against hostile forces near America, T. R. Roosevelt strove to stabilize the region, and Reagan worked to rebuild relationships with Japan. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has been in economic and societal turmoil (Kingston 2010); Japan fears that the United States will abandon it either in favor of China or for with- drawal and retreat. American grand strategy in the Pacific is predicated on America’s security alliance with Japan—an alliance that provides for Japan’s primary sense of stability. The United States must reinforce and make permanent the unambiguous relationship and alliance with Japan. While Mexico provides a much different setting for a potentially failed state, clear policy is also required here. The United States must clarify that it will not tolerate the chaotic violence created by Mexican drug cartels. This intolerance must motivate the United States to offer the Mexican government the necessary tools to break the cartels’ back or do the job itself.

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A policy that continues the status quo will not cease the migrants, ref- ugees, cartels, or violence from spilling over into the United States. Any attempt to create grand strategy through doctrine would be incomplete without a discussion of Israel and Palestine. Two recent doctrinal administrations can offer strategic insight: the Truman Doctrine’s support for Israel and aid to allies and the Bush Doctrine’s democracy promotion. Bush rejected the policy of accommodating Palestinian terrorists as a way of promoting democratic Palestinian forces. This is the only way to deal with the crisis. This situation requires a permanent, continuous policy that supports Israel. Terrorists groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and states like Iran and Syria must be informed that an attack on Israel will be interpreted and treated as an attack on American interests. Fur- thermore, any support of Palestinian aspirations must be predicated on Palestinian peace with Israel, its recognition of Israel, and the development of Palestinian democracy and civil society. American interests will be best served when Palestine and Israel exist as two independent, sovereign states—each with a vibrant democratic civil society, respect for human rights, and adherence to international law. The last threat—Energy Security—is not often recognized as a national security concern. However, to increase its autonomy and max- imize its power, the United States must address Energy Security within the context of a grand strategy. America can look to Washington’s interest in free navigation and free commerce, Carter’s later response to the Persian Gulf, and Reagan’s application of selective military force. America’s energy policy must reflect its grand strategy and be based on fundamental and permanent declarations and actions including,

• T he United States will not tolerate any power or group that seeks to deny it access to petroleum and is prepared to use hard power if that denial occurs. • T he United States will seek favorable, free-commerce-based trade relations in energy and will not sacrifice its interests or values for that access. • T he United States will support pro-democracy adherents and groups that wish to replace despotic petrocracies. • T he United States will enforce the Carter Doctrine and free navigation and will combine alternative energy sources with the domestic opening of all viable petroleum sources.

All of this must become a permanent, declared, and enforced strategy.

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The common denominator across all ten of these threats is the need for declared, unambiguous grand strategy that follows the aforemen- tioned nine themes. A grand strategy grounded in these priorities succeeds by unequivocally warning America’s enemies, assuring America’s allies, and inspiring America’s friends.

The Way Forward The ultimate legacy of all of these national security doctrines was and is to create a successful American grand strategy that can cross party lines, time periods, and administration changes. If the United States were to embrace such a grand strategy, there would immediately be six decisive, positive results starting within the United States and continuing into the world. First, this grand strategy would root both national security strategy and foreign policy in natural law—a foundational grounding that would generate practical policies based on the global promotion of civil society, democracy, human rights, and liberty under law. This is not about setting up elections or “democracy” in countries that are unwilling to embrace such a structure; this is about selectively assisting particular nations’ progress toward civil society and republican values. There is no other long-term solution for resolving the vast majority of the threats facing America. Second, the success of this American Doctrine would depend on creating conditions for international credibility and consistency. American foreign policy and diplomacy are exceptional only insofar as America’s word is immutable. An American Doctrine is how world order and American leadership can be maintained. Third, the grand strategy would embrace the precepts of realistic international relations and the necessity of preemption and prevention. Presidents that choose against prevention and, thus, let a threat fester and eventually require preemption are of little value to the American people. However, to engage in such proactive policies, the United States will need primacy—the fourth positive result— to ensure that its military and national security apparatus transcends that of any competitor or realistic coalition of competitors. A fifth positive result is that this strategy would adopt a systemic policy toward and solution for tyranny and extremism. Tyranny and extremism blight the international relations system and create the supermajority of threats to American national security. The only way to protect American national and vital interests is to establish and act on a consistent policy of American opposition, destabilization, and ultimate destruction of these twin evils. Finally, this American Doctrine would do away with the fallacious argument that America can properly respond to transnational extremists

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and rogue states through deterrence and containment. These evils exist through expansionism and militarism and cannot be contained. How- ever, this does not mean that America must engage in a never-ending conflict by fighting every war. It means that all elements of U.S. national power and alliances must always be on the offensive. National Security doctrines grew out of the trials and tribulations of American civilization. Anchored in nine themes, they guided the nation through revolution, war, and turmoil. They can guarantee liberty, prosperity, and security as they guide America into the 21st century and beyond.

About the Author Lamont Colucci has experience as a diplomat with the U.S. Department of State and is, today, an associate professor of politics and government at Ripon College. His primary area of expertise is U.S. national security and U.S. foreign policy. At Ripon, he is the coordinator of the National Security Studies program and teaches courses on national security, foreign policy, intelligence, terrorism, and international relations. He has published two books as the sole author titled Crusading Realism: The Bush Doctrine and American Core Values After 9/11, and a two-volume series titled The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present and Future. He was contributing author of two books titled The Day that Changed Everything: Looking at the Impact of 9/11 at the End of the Decade and Homeland Security and Intelligence. In 2012, he became the Fulbright Scholar in Residence at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, Austria. He has undergraduate and graduate degrees from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a doctorate in politics from the University of London, England. In 2007, he was the recipient of Ripon’s Severy Excellence in Teaching Award and in 2010, the Underkofler Outstanding Teaching Award. In 2015, he received the National Sig- nificant Sig award of the Sigma Chi Fraternity. He is also an occasional columnist for the Washington Times, National Review, Weekly Standard, The Hill, and Defense News. He is a bi-monthly columnist for U.S. News and World Report: Foreign Policy and National Security—Insights, perspectives, and commentary on foreign affairs. He is also senior fellow in national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, senior advisor in national security for contingent security, and is advisor on national security and foreign affairs, to the NATO-oriented Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He also teaches in the graduate program in intelligence and security at American Military University. He served

156 WORLD AFFAIRS Lamont Colucci as founding interim director of the Center for Politics at Ripon College. In 2018, he was appointed to the National Task Force on National and Homeland Security.

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