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Political Consultations Between the United States and the French National Committee, 1942-1943 : the Embassy of Admiral Harold R

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Political Consultations Between the United States and the French National Committee, 1942-1943 : the Embassy of Admiral Harold R Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1968-04 Political consultations between the United States and the French National Committee, 1942-1943 : the embassy of Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN. Simpson, B. Mitchell http://hdl.handle.net/10945/12855 NPS ARCHIVE 1968 SIMPSON, B. Benjamin Mitchell Simpson, III POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 1942-1943. Thesis S4965 .IP. 9*o^ Political Consultations Between the United States and the French National Committee, 1942-1943: The Embassy of Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy by Benjamin Mitchell Simpson, III Lieutenant- Commander , /junited States Navy In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy April 15, 1968 5\/v\ fSov\, 6 LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOO* MONTEREY, CALIF. 93940 VITA Benjamin Mitchell Simpson, III, Lieutenant- Commander , United States Navy Born: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 16, 1932 Education: Private and public schools, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Colgate University, 1949 -• 1953 University of Pennsylvania, 1953 - 1956 Fletcher School, 1965 - 1968 Degrees: A, B. , Colgate University, 1953 Ll.B. , University of Pennsylvania, School of Law, 1956 M.A. , Fletcher School, 1966 M.A. L. D. , Fletcher School, 1967 Upon graduation from the University of Pennsylvania, Lieutenant- Commander Simpson attended Officer Candidate School where he was initially commissioned as an Ensign, United States Naval Reserve, in December 1956. Subsequently he received a commission as a regular officer in the United States Navy. He served in the amphibious force, the carrier strike force and in destroyers before being assigned by the United States Navy as a postgraduate student at the Fletcher School. His publi- cations have been limited to newspaper articles, cations have been limited to newspaper articles ABSTRACT ' -v Before the United States entered World War II, the President was concerned with the security of the Western hemisphere. Military plan- ners addressed themselves to the strategic problems of hemispheric defense and to the potential threat which would be posed by Axis control of North and West Africa. On the diplomatic scene Secretary of State Cordell Hull negotiated the Act of Havana in 1940 with its far reaching no transfer principle. The United States also maintained diplomatic relations with the government of Marshal Petain at Vichy in an attempt to encourage French independence from Germany or at the very least to inhibit a collaboration policy. When the United States entered the war in December 1941, the necessity for dealing with Vichy still remained. However, prosecution of the war required contacts with the French National Committee under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle. The United States needed the use of landing fields and other facilities in the Pacific and in the sub- Saharan portions of the French Empire. These colonies had declared their support for General de Gaulle. Thus the United States had to deal with a legal French government at Vichy and with a dissident French movement. While still maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy, the United States in July 1942 designated Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and Brigadier General Charles L. Bolte, USA, to consult with the French National Committee on all matters relative to the conduct of the war. Within a short time, Admiral Stark became a de facto ambassador, conducting consultations on political as well as on technical military questions. His diplomatic duties continued until the French Committee of National Liberation, formed in June 1943, obtained recognition by the United States following the Quebec Conference in August 1943. Despite the official designation of an Army officer as an associate, Admiral Stark by virtue of his rank and because of his capable staff, including Commander Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, shouldered the main burden of the diplomatic functions, which were performed in close cooperation with the American Ambassador and his staff. The North African landings in November, 1942, produced a major crisis in American relations with the French National Committee. While admitting the necessity of an Allied understanding with Admiral Darlan and the French authorities in North Africa, General de Gaulle was out- raged that the Allies, and particularly the Americans, did not turn to him to lead the French forces in that area. A meeting in Washington between President Roosevelt and General de Gaulle was arranged for the end of December 1942 or early January 1943 for the purpose of recon- ciling or at the very least, ameli orating opposing views. The assassination of Admiral Darlan on Christmas Eve, 1942 removed a political embarrassment for the Allies. The selection of General Henri Giraud to succeed him created a rival to General de Gaulle for leadership of all the French forces opposing Germany. The ensuing six months saw a political struggle between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud in the guise of negotiations for the unification of French forces. While the United States supported General Giraud, Great Britain tended to back General de Gaulle, but not to the detriment of the Anglo-American special relationship. These differing views complicated matters and at times threatened to produce severe strains. Admiral Stark in London dealt with General de Gaulle in an attempt to further the unification of the French forces. Much of his diplomatic duties consisted simply of reporting to Washington on the status of the de Gaulle-Giraud negotiations. Gaullist recruiting of seamen from North African French ships in American and British ports threatened to disrupt shipping needed for the war effort. The Secretary of State specifically requested Admiral Stark to discuss the question with General de Gaulle. These consultations were fruitless. Indeed, the ultimate solution was an agreement with General Giraud on the unification issue. The question of recruitment of seamen came to a head in the JAMAIQUE incident. To forestall Gaullist recruitment and possible desertions from a North African French ship, chartered to the Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa, and at that time in the Clyde, Admiral Stark ordered an American armed guard placed on board. This extraordinary act created an uproar among the Fighting French, who saw the issue as a political one relating to the right to control the crew. Admiral Stark saw the issue in terms of operational necessity. The JAMAIQUE incident illustrated the vast difference in outlook between American policy and that of the Fighting French. General de Gaulle sought the political salvation of France. To this end, he endeavored to achieve the greatest political advantage for his movement and for France, particularly since he saw the Axis defeat as inevitable. The United States, on the other hand, felt the war should be won before political commitments were made. This divergence in outlook was never resolved and explains much of the troubles encountered. Political differences were only exacerbated by the incompatible personalities of the President and General de Gaulle. Fortunately, Admiral Stark was able to establish a good working relationship with General de Gaulle and in this way he was able to minimize difficulties as they arose. Admiral Stark's success can be measured in terms of accurate observations and reporting, and; particularly, in terms of good personal relations with General de Gaulle. TO MY FATHER, A GENTLEMAN . PREFACE In the world of 1968, Charles de Gaulle as President of the French Republic has irritated and angered many of France 's oldest friends and closest allies. Today it may be truly said that Franco-American rela- tions are at a low point. Much scholarly and journalistic attention has quite properly been given to the current state of relations. Since in the very real sense of practical politics, Charles de Gaulle is France, a study of the early contacts during World War II between General de Gaulle and the United States may tend to shed some light on present relations There is always a danger in any historical writing of assigning more importance to past events than is really due in an attempt to assert a causal relationship of some sort. In examining the conduct of the first official political contacts between the United States and General de Gaulle, no such assertion will be made. The purpose of this study will be to elucidate for the record the significant features of the consultations conducted by Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, with the French National Committee. By doing so, some elements of General de Gaulle's outlook and understanding will surface. The application of such elements of Gaullism to the contemporary scene must be left to others. 11 In the grim days of early 1942, Admiral Stark was sent to London to assume duties as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. This command was the successor to that of Special Naval Observer, London, which, prior to American entry into the war, facilitated all possible Anglo-American naval cooperation. The scope of Admiral Stark's duties was as broad as the duties themselves were varied. As the senior military representative in Europe, he was the logical choice to conduct consultations with the French National Committee relative to the conduct of the war. Although such consultations were originally intended for technical military and naval purposes, they quickly expanded into full- fledged political consultations. These consultations were the first official political relations the United States established with General de Gaulle, at that time President of the French National Committee. Admiral Stark's official files, still held by the Navy, provided the bulk of the primary source material. Without the most willing, if not eager cooperation and assistance of Dr. Dean C. Allard of the Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, I would never have come upon this fascinating topic in the first place, let alone discover the rich sources of documentary material.
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