Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Understanding Modern State
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United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Faculty Theses and Dissertations Department of Social Sciences Fall 12-2010 Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Understanding Modern State-Building (and Counterinsurgency) Scott aP ul Handler United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/ss_etd Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Handler, Scott aP ul, "Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Understanding Modern State-Building (and Counterinsurgency)" (2010). Faculty Theses and Dissertations. 1. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/ss_etd/1 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Social Sciences at USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WOLVES IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING: UNDERSTANDING MODERN STATE- BUILDING (AND COUNTERINSURGENCY) A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Scott Paul Handler December 2010 © 2011 by Scott Paul Handler. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/hx652xg5284 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Stephen Krasner, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Yoshihiro Fukuyama I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Barry Weingast Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become intimately involved in trying to strengthen weak and failed states. External actors, both multilaterally and unilaterally, have intervened in Europe, Asia, and Africa to bring internally conflicted parties together and to change the domestic authority structures of these countries. This dissertation explains how external actors can successfully contribute to the development of domestic authority structures in conflict- torn or post-conflict countries. Conventional state-building theories follow the Weberian conception of the modern state as an entity that maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of violent coercion. Further, standard approaches to ending civil conflict recommend the use of population-centric strategies to achieve stability. These prevailing assumptions are problematic as they ignore a credible commitment problem that exists in conflict-torn societies: elites within the government and opposition have no incentive to disarm due to the rational fear that once they do so they will be taken advantage of by the opposing elites. This dissertation proposes a theory of self-enforcing stability to explain, from a rational-choice perspective, how it is possible to overcome this credible commitment problem. The theory contains four testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that an elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to greater success in establishing stability in conflict-torn states. Second, external actors contribute to the establishment of stability more successfully when they help nations establish limited iv access orders created by elite pacts rather than encouraging the creation of liberal democracies, or open access orders. Third, external actors must help internal actors overcome their underlying credible commitment problems by guaranteeing elite pacts. The final hypothesis is that the decentralization, or oligopolization, of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities balances power amongst elites, ensuring that competing elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening each other with overwhelming force. This dissertation finds support for the proposed theory’s hypotheses in its examination of two cases: the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960, and the stabilization effort in Iraq between 2006-2008, which includes the “Awakening Movement” and the “Surge. Both cases demonstrate how an external actor can contribute to developing enduring stability in conflict-torn societies by breaking from the standard Weberian conception of the state and population-centric focus. This dissertation concludes with a discussion of policy implications, based on the dissertation’s findings, for current state-building efforts in Afghanistan. v Acknowledgements Some people say that pursuing a Ph.D. is a long, lonely adventure; fortunately for me, the experience was neither long nor lonely. There are too many people to thank individually for preparing me intellectually, organizationally, and emotionally to successfully pursue a doctorate, and others for keeping me grounded. The credit for this work belongs with my soldiers, peers, commanders, former teachers, advisors, mentors, friends, and family. Thank you. The Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy laid the foundation for this opportunity over a decade ago. As a cadet, my professors made me want to follow their example as soldier-scholars and return to West Point to teach and develop cadets—the future leaders of the Army. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Lieutenant Colonel Suzanne Nielsen for her mentorship since my days as a cadet, and to her and Colonel Mike Meese for having confidence in my ability to complete my Ph.D. on a constrained timeline. Generals Martin Dempsey and David Petraeus were both instrumental in encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. More importantly, along with Colonels Jim Greer, J.R. Martin, and Laura Potter, they exemplify adaptive military leaders. They each utilized the knowledge and analytical skills gained from advanced studies to improve the strategic thinking necessary for the military to function in today’s complex operating environment. I have also been fortunate to have an amazing set of advisors at Stanford. Steve Krasner helped me transition to academia, and forced me to rigorously think vi through the broad puzzles with which I was concerned. I could not have hoped for a better advisor and mentor. I also appreciate the support of my other dissertation committee members. Barry Weingast opened me up to a whole new way of thinking about problems, and provided extremely constructive criticism and encouragement. Frank Fukuyama introduced a healthy skepticism about my theory and asked the important “so what?” questions to ensure the dissertation remained relevant beyond academia. Additionally, I am thankful for the support of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. Mike McFaul, Larry Diamond, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss all welcomed me in and provided me a home that sought to bridge the academic and policy worlds. My peers at Stanford also helped make this an amazing journey through our shared trials and tribulations. I am especially grateful to Major Bryan Price and Colonel Joe Felter for establishing a strong reputation for Army officers in the program and showing me a path to success. Additionally, I have to thank my officemates, Molly Cohn and Ruth Krichelli for supporting me with their intellectual, methodological, and editing talents during every stage of preparing this dissertation. Steve Brennan found the time on short-notice to proofread and provide constructive criticism for each chapter. The Stanford Department of Political Science administrative staff provided tremendous support. Judy Low, Chandelle Arambula, and Jackie Sargent made my life much easier, allowing me to focus on my studies. Finally, I am thankful to my wife, Stephenie. We have been very fortunate to be at Stanford sharing this journey together. I will miss our dates at coffee shops, where you studied your law texts and I focused on my political science readings, all vii the while unsuccessfully trying not to distract one another. You have been an amazing sounding board and critic. Thank you. viii Table of Contents ABSTRACT IV! ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VI! TABLE OF CONTENTS IX! CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1! 1.1. INTRODUCTION 1! 1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 2! 1.3. METHODOLOGY 4! 1.4. HYPOTHESES 5! 1.5. EXISTING LITERATURE 8! 1.5.1. CONFLICT OUTBREAK 8! 1.5.2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 9! 1.6. THE DISSERTATION’S CONTRIBUTION 12! 1.7. DISSERTATION OUTLINE 17! CHAPTER 2: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY 20! 2.1. INTRODUCTION 20! 2.2. BRIEF HISTORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE 23! 2.2.1. ASYMMETRY IS NOT A NEW PHENOMENON 23! 2.2.2. DEFINING THE TOPIC 26! ix 2.3. INFLUENCES ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY LITERATURE 29! 2.3.1. CIVIL WAR LITERATURE 29! 2.3.2. INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING LITERATURE 30! 2.3.3. STATE-BUILDING LITERATURE 31! 2.4. DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY LITERATURE 33! 2.4.1. COERCION OR COST-BENEFIT THEORY 34! 2.4.2. “HEARTS AND MINDS” THEORY 36! 2.5. LOGIC OF “HEARTS AND MINDS” THEORY 46! 2.5.1. CAUSAL LOGIC 46! 2.5.2. EXTENDED FORM GAME MODEL OF “HEARTS AND MINDS” THEORY 49! 2.5.3. ORDER OF THE GAME 51! 2.5.4. ACTOR PREFERENCES 53! 2.5.5. SOLVING THE GAME 57! 2.6. EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE OF “HEARTS AND MINDS” 59! 2.6.1. RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES 59! 2.6.2. HAM SUCCESSES? 61! 2.7. CONCLUSION 63! CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS A THEORY OF SELF-ENFORCING STABILITY 65! 3.1. INTRODUCTION 65! 3.2.