The US Air Force After Vietnam: Postwar Challenges and Potential for Responses / by Donald J
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mrozek, Donald J. The US Air Force after Vietnam: postwar challenges and potential for responses / by Donald J. Mrozek. p. cm. Bibliography: p. Includes Index. 1. United States-Military policy. 2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975-Public opinion. 3. Public opinion- United States. 4. United States. Air Force. l. Title. II. Title: United States Air Force afterVietnam. UA23.M76 1988 88-7476 355' .0335'73-dc 19 CIP ISBN 1-58566-024-8 First Printing December 1988 Second Printing July 2001 DISCLAIMER This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflectthe official policy or position of the Department of Defenseor the United States government. This publication has been reveiwed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release . For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents US Government Printing Office Washington DC 20402 ii 7~ THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK CONTENTS Chapter Page DISCLAIMER ... .... .... ............ .... .... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ii FOREWORD . .... .... ... .... .... ... .... .... .... ........ .... .... .... ... vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR. .... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ..... .... .. ix PREFACE.... ... .... .... ... .... .... .... ........ .... .... .... ... .... .... xi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .. .. ...... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... xiii 1 Introduction: The Scope of the Study . ... .... .... ... .... .... 1 Notes .. .... .... .... .... ............ ..... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... ... 4 2 Vietnam in History... .... ... .... .... ... .... ........... .... ... .... .. 5 The Continuing Relevance of the Vietnam Era .... 7 The Emergence of History and Advocacy . .... ... .... 10 Vantage Points and Visions .... ... ... .... .... ......... ..... ... 15 Principles or Preferences .... .... ... .... .... .... ......... .... .. 18 Historical Reflections and a Grasp at the Future .. 22 Notes .... ........... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .......... 30 3 Interpreting Vietnam: School Solutions . .... ... .... .... ... 37 Learning at Leavenworth ... .... .... .... .... .... ..... ......... ... 37 Spreading the Word . ........ ........... .... .... .... ... .... .... .. 43 Training and Learning . .... .... .... .... ........ ..... .... .... .... .. 45 Notes .... .... .... ........ .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ............. .... ...... 49 4 Post-Vietnam Events and Public Discourse .... ... .... .... 53 National Security Issues and the Post-Vietnam Press... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ... .... .... ... .... .... ... ... 54 Leaders and Their Memories .. .... .... ... .... .... .... .... 58 Vietnam in Public Memory... .... .... .... .... .... .... ... .... 62 v Chapter Page Thought and Feelings .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ........ .... .... 65 Notes . ... .... .... ............ ... .... .... ... ..................... .... .... 66 5 The Congress and National Security after Vietnam: Business as Usual?. ..... .... .... ........ .... .... .. .. .... .... ... ... 69 The Cold War Consensus and the Issue of "Normalcy.. ............ .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ............. .... 69 Surveying Congressional Views, 1984 .... .... .... .... ..... 71 Common Ground .. .... .... .... ... .... .... .... ........ .... ..... 73 The Distinctiveness of Proadministration Viewpoints . .... .... ... .... .... .... .... .... .... ........ ... .... 81 Sources of Skepticism ... .... .... .... ................. .... .... .... 86 Congress and the Military: Politics, Threat, and "Normalcy.. .. .... .... .... .... .... ............ .... .... .... ... .... 89 Notes ... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ... .... .... ... .... 90 6 Alternative Visions: The World beyond Vietnam . .... ... 95 Other Wars, Other Analogies .. ........ .... .... ..... .... ....... 95 a Beyond Crisis .. .... .... ... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ... .... ... 98 Beyond Deterrence.. ... .... .... .... ........ ............ .... .... ... 104 Masters of Our Fate ... .... .... .... ........ ........ ..... ... .... ... 108 Notes ... .... .... .... .... .... ... .... .... .... .... .... ........ .... ... .... ... 109 APPENDIX A. ... .... .... .... ..... .... ............ .... .... .... ... .... ... 115 APPENDIX B. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 119 INDEX . .. .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 123 Vi FOREWORD In this study, Dr Donald J. Mrozek probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. He poses far more questions than he answers, and, some of what he says may invite strong dissent. Yet it will serve its author's purpose if something here pro- vokes creative thinking and critical reexamination, even of some long-cher- ished ideas. Viewing the Vietnam War as a logical outcome of American defense thinking has challenging implications, as does seeing the "cold war consensus" on foreign affairs as an oddity. Yet this is not a litany of objection and protest. For example, Doctor Mrozek raises serious questions about how the contemporary notion of deterrence has emerged; and dealing with such questions forthrightly could make deterrence more effective. So, too, questioning the past relationship ofmilitary professionals with the mass media is not an assignment of guilt but an invitation to develop a beneficial and cooperative relationship . Nor is this study a tale of gloom and despair; it is rather an appeal for self- consciousness and self-awareness . It is a plea for us to take command of the problems that beset us by taking control of ourselves first. vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ABOUT THE AUTHOR Donald J. Mrozek is professor of history at Kansas State University, where he has taught since 1972. He earned both his MA and PhD degrees at Rutgers University, and his dissertation study on defense policy during the presidency of Harry Truman yielded articles in publications such as Military Affairs and the Business History Review. Later research in wartime and postwar defense issues resulted in articles in such journals as Annals ofIowa and Missouri Historical Review. In 1980 his article "The Croatan Incident: The US Navy and the Problem of Racial Discrimination after World War II" appeared in Military Affairs. Also in 1980 he coedited The Martin Marauder and the Franklin Allens: A Wartime Love Story with Robin Higham and Jeanne Louise Allen Newell. With his colleague Robin Higham, he coedited A Guide to the Sources of US Military History, including the 1981 and 1986 supplementary volumes. Doctor Mrozek has also researched, published, and taught in the area of American culture. Some of his publications have fused the areas of military and cultural history. His essasy "The Cult and Ritual of Toughness in Cold War America" appeared in Rituals and Ceremonies in Popular Culture, ed. Ray Browne, in 1980. In 1984 "The Interplay of Metaphor and Practice in the US Defense Department's Use of Sport" was published in the Journal ofAmerican Culture. In 1985 "Sport and the American Military: Diversion ix and Duty" appeared in the centennial issue of the Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport. One of his more recent sole-authored military history publications, titled "The Limits of Innovation: Aspects of Air Power in Vietnam," appeared in the January-February 1985 issue of Air University Review. In 1986 Air University Review also published his essay "In Search of the Unicorn," a discussion of the broad development of military reform movements since the Federalist era. Having completed recent studies focused on the era of the Vietnam War, Doctor Mrozek plans a book-length essay on US defense policy after World War II. x PREFACE The Vietnam War stands uneasily on the edge of public memory-slip- ping into the past and becoming part of our national history, yet still too recent to be forgotten by those who lived through its trials. But history seeks a meaning in its clouded events, a retrospective order and pattern that could instruct, and sometimes even inspire, successive generations . At present, then, Americans face the peculiar dilemma of having to respond to the impact of a war for which there is still no comprehensively shared vision. One cannot expect broad enthusiasm for a vision of the past whose primary purpose is to justify current policies, acquisitions, deployment, and research. I am reminded here of the adage that, "to be an honest politician, one must first fool oneself before fooling the public." There is much truth in this thought, and it probably applies to many, including historians, defense analysts, and businessmen. The most persuasive visions ofthe past are the distillations ofexperience and answers to questions asked in an effort to handle the problems of the present. The challenge before any society is to maximize the balance between sincerity and accuracy. We need to listen to ourselves-all of us-to our individual thoughts and words, to public statements and pronouncements of policy, and to the less sharply articulated sound of public sentiment . When we hear generalizations about the Vietnam War, we obviously need to ask whether the remarks are valid and ask for the questions behind the questions. In that way, we may isolate the common assumptions which lie behind seemingly conflicting views; and logical