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Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: a New International Strategy REPRESSION AND REGRESSION IN TURKMENISTAN: A NEW INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 4 November 2004 Asia Report N°85 Osh/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. POLITICAL UPDATE: SHORT-TERM STABILITY AND OUTLOOK............... 2 A. POLITICAL CONTROL AND DECISION-MAKING.....................................................................2 B. REPRESSION..........................................................................................................................3 1. Human rights abuses..................................................................................................4 2. Freedom of movement...............................................................................................5 3. Religious tolerance ....................................................................................................6 4. Ethnic minorities........................................................................................................7 5. Civil society ...............................................................................................................8 III. LONG-TERM THREATS TO STABILITY................................................................ 9 A. THE RUHNAMA AND EDUCATION ...........................................................................................9 B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION...................................................................................................11 C. NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY..................................................................12 D. THE ECONOMY AND CRIMINALITY......................................................................................13 1. Budgetary strains .....................................................................................................14 2. Resource dependency ..............................................................................................15 3. Lack of foreign investment......................................................................................17 4. The mafia economy: drugs trafficking.....................................................................18 5. Economic stability? .................................................................................................20 IV. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SCENARIOS........................................................ 21 1. Death and succession...............................................................................................21 2. Palace coup ..............................................................................................................21 3. Popular uprising.......................................................................................................22 4. The immortal Niyazov.............................................................................................22 V. THE FAILURE OF QUIET DIPLOMACY .............................................................. 23 A. BILATERAL ACTORS: RUSSIA AND THE U.S. ......................................................................23 1. The Russian factor ...................................................................................................23 2. United States............................................................................................................24 B. MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY ..............................................................................................26 1. United Nations .........................................................................................................26 2. OSCE .......................................................................................................................26 3. NATO ......................................................................................................................27 4. European Union .......................................................................................................28 C. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.......................................................................28 VI. A NEW STRATEGY: ENGAGEMENT WITH RED LINES ................................. 29 A. BENCHMARKING .................................................................................................................29 B. SANCTIONS .........................................................................................................................30 1. Political sanctions ....................................................................................................30 2. Financial sanctions...................................................................................................30 3. Economic sanctions .................................................................................................31 VII. SAVING SOCIETY: A LIFEBOAT STRATEGY.................................................... 32 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 32 APPENDICES A. MAP OF TURKMENISTAN...............................................................................................................33 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................34 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ON ASIA SINCE 2001 ..........................................................35 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .................................................................................................................38 ICG Asia Report N°85 4 November 2004 REPRESSION AND REGRESSION IN TURKMENISTAN: A NEW INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Sapamurad Niyazov's Turkmenistan, one of the and social services. Much of the population lives in world's most repressive regimes, has not responded to poverty, while a small elite earns vast incomes from quiet diplomacy, modifying a few policies only when the energy sector. The private sector is very small, the faced with a threat of sanctions or other punitive agricultural sector is in crisis, and perhaps a majority action. In failing to take a strong stand against of young people are unemployed. widespread human rights abuses and the plundering of the country's wealth, the international community A reform of the education system has cut schooling has prioritised short term economic and security opportunities and introduced an array of ideological benefits. Given the longer-term risks of serious courses that restrict the chances of children. Higher instability if the trends are not reversed, however, a education is increasingly difficult to obtain and is firmer line is needed. International organisations and limited to two years. An increasingly ill-educated, concerned governments should forge agreement on a ideologically indoctrinated generation will be list of key reform benchmarks and start working unprepared to take on responsibilities. much more actively for real change. The decline of state institutions and lack of unity within Heavy ideological indoctrination and destruction of the political elite virtually ensure that succession will the education system suggest that Turkmenistan’s be difficult. There is a strong possibility of internal problems will not end whenever Niyazov leaves the dissent and possibly violence around a struggle for scene. The economy is becoming brittle, despite oil power. Since much of the population one way or and gas, and the eventual political succession could another is highly dependent on the state, even a short well be violent. period of disorder could lead to a real humanitarian crisis. Since an alleged assassination attempt on him in 2002, there has been increased repression, and the The international response to Turkmenistan has been president has further concentrated power in his own weak and poorly coordinated. Niyazov has successfully hands. He controls the political system absolutely played different states and organisations against each and has introduced the cult of his personality, other. Russia is his most influential partner because through his quasi-spiritual guide, the Ruhnama, into almost all gas exports pass through its pipelines but every aspect of life. He has personal use of revenue its response to repeated humiliations of Russian from lucrative oil and gas reserves, and much of the government officials and overt discrimination against money goes into grandiose construction projects. No ethnic Russians has been remarkably weak. A few opposition political activity is permitted, there is no parliamentarians have spoken out against Niyazov but independent media, and increased pressure has mostly the lure of cheap gas has kept Moscow silent forced most NGOs to close. about the worst abuses. Although Turkmenistan has huge gas reserves, misuse The U.S. has been more critical but its stance has been of revenue threatens long-term economic stability. made ambiguous by its security and geopolitical Budgetary problems have already forced cuts in health interests. The EU has increased aid and is talking Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy ICG Asia Report N°85, 4 November 2004 Page ii about engagement with the regime, apparently without To the U.S. and EU: conditioning these steps on policy changes. 4. Agree on a list of key benchmarks to be met International organisations
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