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Ukraine: on the Margins Rights Violations Against Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union

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Ukraine: on the Margins Rights Violations Against Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union Human Rights Watch November 2005 Vol. 17, No. 8(D) Ukraine: On the Margins Rights Violations against Migrants and Asylum Seekers at the New Eastern Border of the European Union Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 3 Background .................................................................................................................................... 5 Migration Trends in Ukraine................................................................................................... 5 External Dimension of E.U. Asylum Policy......................................................................... 6 Readmission Agreements .................................................................................................... 8 E.U. Relations with Ukraine..................................................................................................10 Operation of Existing Bilateral Readmission Agreements...........................................12 Readmission Agreement with Slovakia ...........................................................................13 Readmission Agreement with Poland..............................................................................15 Readmission Agreement with Hungary...........................................................................16 Proposed E.U.-Ukraine Readmission Agreement.........................................................17 Ukraine as Location for Future Regional Protection Programs..................................18 Treatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Ukraine .......................................................18 Relevant Legal Standards.......................................................................................................19 Limitations of the Asylum and Migration System .............................................................20 Impact of Repeated Institutional Restructuring ............................................................20 Denial of Access to Asylum Procedures.........................................................................23 Lack of Protection against Return to Torture................................................................26 Impact of Detention on the Right to Seek Asylum.......................................................26 Refusal of Guards to Transfer Applications ..................................................................27 Systematic Profiling of Foreign Nationals......................................................................29 Processing Within the Ukrainian Asylum System .........................................................31 Alternative Protection: UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination .................................32 Detention of Migrants and Asylum Seekers ...........................................................................33 Legal Standards on Detention of Asylum Seekers.............................................................33 Profile of Immigration Detainees in Ukraine.....................................................................34 Women and Children in Detention .................................................................................36 Prolonged and Arbitrary Detention.....................................................................................38 Ill-treatment in Detention......................................................................................................41 Beatings................................................................................................................................42 Substandard Conditions of Detention.................................................................................43 Overcrowding .....................................................................................................................44 Poor Nutrition.....................................................................................................................46 Limited Access to Fresh Air, Natural Light, and Exercise...........................................47 Unhygienic Toilet and Bathing Facilities ........................................................................49 Inadequate Medical Treatment.........................................................................................54 Limited Access to Exercise and Recreational Activities...............................................56 Inadequate Heating during Winter...................................................................................56 Procedural Rights Violations.................................................................................................57 Information on Rights and Procedures...........................................................................57 Access to Legal Counsel....................................................................................................58 Challenging the Lawfulness of Detention ......................................................................59 Access to Interpreters ........................................................................................................60 Communication with the Outside World .......................................................................61 Expansion of Detention Capacities in the Absence of Adequate Legislation...............62 The Role of IOM in Detaining Migrants and Asylum-Seekers...................................62 Conditions for Those Not in Detention .................................................................................63 Reception Conditions.............................................................................................................63 Integration for Recognized Refugees...................................................................................65 Deportation and Refoulement Concerns ................................................................................66 Deportations............................................................................................................................66 Recommendations.......................................................................................................................68 Methodology................................................................................................................................76 Acknowledgements.....................................................................................................................77 Executive Summary The May 2004 enlargement of the European Union (E.U.) to the border of Ukraine brought the country to the frontline of international migration. Though traditionally a country of migration, Ukraine’s location as a gateway between Europe and Asia, coupled with long, often un-demarcated borders and weak border enforcement capacity, make the Ukraine increasingly appealing as a transit country for people seeking to enter the E.U. clandestinely. Ukraine is now confronted with pressure at both its eastern and western borders. Increasing numbers of migrants and asylum seekers attempt to reach E.U. territory from the east. At the same time, more and more migrants and failed asylum seekers are returned to Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary via bilateral returns agreements. Returns from the E.U. are set to increase once an E.U.-wide returns agreement is concluded. Ukraine is already incapable of managing the migrants and asylum seekers on its territory. Migrants and asylum seekers are routinely detained in appalling conditions; subjected to violence, robbery, and extortion; denied legal assistance; and in some cases sent back to countries where they face persecution and torture. In the words of one detainee, if the police “feel like beating you, they’ll beat you. Whatever they feel like, they’ll do.” Many detention facilities are severely overcrowded. Detainees are frequently deprived of appropriate bedding and clothing, access to exercise, fresh air, natural light, adequate food, and proper access to medical services. Those in detention lack basic rights including access to counsel, doctors, and interpreters, the right to apply for release, and the ability to let loved ones know where they are. Many of those interviewed by Human Rights Watch had no idea why they had been detained, or how long they were likely to be held. Detention time limits are not respected in many cases. A detainee interviewed by Human Rights Watch had not seen a lawyer or spoken to his family once during his eight-month detention. Ukraine’s system for dealing with asylum seekers and refugees is barely functioning. Ukrainian officials frequently refuse to recognize a UNHCR-issued document attesting that the bearer has applied, or is in the process of applying, for asylum. Migrants and asylum seekers face a significant risk of arbitrary detention. Protection against return to persecution is inadequate, especially for Chechens. 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 17 NO. 8(D) The reasons for Ukraine’s poor record as a country of refuge are complex. Principal factors include: its lack of experience in managing migratory flows; an underdeveloped legal system; outdated institutional structures; limited financial resources to support refugees and asylum seekers; no tradition of asylum; and the lack of a human rights culture. Ukraine’s inadequately functioning asylum system
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