Key points

1. The Chechen issue, which remains unresolved since the break-up of the , is one of the most difficult problems of today’s Russia. Since 1991, the Chechen conflict has passed through four phases: the “Chechen revolution” and Dzhokhar Dudaev’s rule (1991–1994), the (1994–1996), the period of C h e c h n y a ’ s quasi-independence (1996–1999) and the that began in 1999 and continues until now. Despite the fact that the Kremlin has taken certain measures to put an end to the conflict in the republic, these have not produced the desired results. On the contra- and Ru s s i a : ry, the war is growing increasingly violent. 2. The impact of the rebellious Chechnya on con- The significance of the temporary Russia reaches far beyond the repu- blic’s territorial borders. Over the last twelve Chechen problem for years, the events in the republic have resounded in , substantially influencing the shape c o n t e m p o r a ry Ru s s i a of contemporary Russia. The Chechen conflict has had a considerable, largely negative impact Maciej Fa l k o w s k i on the process of the Russian transformation which followed the break-up of the Soviet Union and the events in the North , closely connected with the situation on the Russian po- litical scene, constituted landmarks in the histo- ry of post-Soviet Russia.

3. Even today, it is difficult to overestimate the impact of the Chechen conflict on certain areas of Russian politics, economy and social life, al- though this influence is certainly not dominant. Chechnya is an important factor among many other elements determining the shape of con- temporary Russia. The ongoing war affects near- ly all spheres: the internal situation, foreign po- licy, government system, elites, institutions and state structures, society, economy, media, etc. Chechnya is a threat to the state’s security and an obstacle to reforms, a source of corruption, degeneration of the state administration and de- moralisation of the Russian army. It affects the views of the Russian elites and society as well as the authorities’ approach to citizens and such is- sues as human rights. Developments in the re- public were among the main stimuli behind the reinforcement of the country’s power depart-

CES Studies ments, they also brought about the rise of au- I n t r o d u c t i o n thoritarianism and restrictions on freedom of speech during President Putin’s rule, and promo- ted an increase of Caucasophobia and Islamo- The purpose of this analysis is to examine the si- phobia in the Russian society. gnificance of the Chechen issue for contempora- ry Russia. Part I discusses the history of the con- 4. The solution of the Chechen problem is of im- flict from 1991 to date and the impact of deve- mense importance to contemporary Russia. The lopments in the republic on Russia as a whole. experience of the last twelve years shows that Part II is an attempt to indicate the areas of Rus- so long as there is no peace and stability in the sian reality that are most deeply affected by the Caucasus, Russia will remain undemocratic and Chechen problem. its future largely unpredictable. Even though the Kremlin is certainly aware of the pressing need to promptly solve the Chechen conflict, the me- I. History of the Chechen asures taken by Putin’s administration hardly conflict and its impact appear to bring the prospects of a true peace in the Caucasus any closer. on developments in Ru s s i a

1. Origins of the conflict

The conflict in Chechnya, like all other conflicts within the former USSR, brok e out in the early 1990s. Its causes are deeply rooted in history. Fol - lowing are the events in mutual Rus s i a n -C h e c h e n relations that have contributed to this conflict: – conquering of the North Caucasus by Russia in the 19th century, preceded by the long and mur- derous Caucasian War during which greatly resisted the Tsar’s army; – repressions of Chechens carried out by Rus- sians, who treated the Caucasus as a conquered colony rather than an integral part of the Rus- sian empire and brutally put down numerous Chechen rebellions, the last of which broke out in 1944; – repressions of the 1920s and 1930s which inc- luded compulsory collectivisation and the Stali- nist purges among Chechen intellectuals, clergy and people whose authority was deeply respec- ted in the republic; – deportation of Chechens accused of collabora- tion with Germans to Central Asia decreed by Stalin in 1944; – policy of the Soviet authorities towards the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Re- public following the Chechens’ return from exile in 1957 (under this policy, were favo- ur ed in the republic and Chechens had res t r i c t e d access to education, administration offices, army, etc.) combined with Chechnya’s economic under- development and extensive unemployment

CES Studies As the Soviet Union broke up, central authorities publics of the empire and the rivalry between faltered and Russia slipped into an economic cri- Mikhail Gorbachev, then president of the USSR, sis, all these factors made the Chechen problem, and Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian suppressed for decades, explode with a renewed Federal Soviet Socialist Republic. These issues force1. clearly overshadowed the situation in the re- gions. Besides, the events taking place in Chech- 2. The rule of Dzhokhar Dudaev nya in the early 1990s to some extent resembled ( 1 9 9 1 – 1 9 9 4 ) the developments in other republics, such as Ta- tarstan or Bashkiria, which had also proclaimed When Mikhail Gorbachev announced the pere- independence and openly opposed the Kremlin3. stroika, a radical national movement began to At that time, Chechnya’s impact on Russia was develop in Chechnya. It soon proposed indepen- mostly economic: the republic was gradually dence mottos and, in autumn 1990, Chechen de- transforming into an economic “black hole” (it mocratic organisations established the Chechen was becoming the centre of diverse types of ille- National Congress (CNC). The Congress carried gal business) and destabilising the situation in out a coup in Grozny a year later (August – Sep- the neighbouring entities of the Federation. tember 1991), forcing the communist authorities of the then Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet 3. The first Chechen war (1994–1996) Socialist Republic, led by the head of the Supre- me Council of Checheno-, Doku Za- The first Chechen war commenced when Rus- vgaev, to step down. Shortly afterwards, Chech- sian troops invaded Chechnya on 11 December nya proclaimed independence and Dzhokhar Du- 1994. The official reason for the armed interven- daev, a retired general of the Soviet Army, beca- tion was the need to “restore constitutional or- me president of the new republic. The events of der” in Chechnya and prevent separatism and in- autumn 1991 came to be known as “the Chechen stability from spreading to the remaining repu- revolution”. Chechnya refused to sign the Fede- blics of the North Caucasus. In fact, it was a lar- ration Treaty of 31 March 1992 and remained ge group of Russian generals who had pushed outside the Russian state. Following a failed mi- for war, intending to strengthen the position of litary intervention in November 1991 (when the the army, improve its prestige, prevent the do- Russians blew up landing troops at the Grozny wnsizing of the force and conceal illegal busi- airport but soon retreated peacefully), Moscow nesses in which the military were involved with withdrew its forces from the republic, leaving the Chechens. Deciding for military interven- behind substantial quantities of weapons. tion, Yeltsin hoped that, with the rapid victory After the separatists came to power, Russia im- promised by the military, he would demonstrate posed a very ineffective economic blockade on Russia’s power on the international scene and Chechnya, trying to force Dudaev into conces- show its strength and resolve in dealing with in- sions. The dictatorial rule of the Chechen leader ternal matters. Finally, Moscow also wished to soon brought about an open conflict with the regain control over the Chechen section of the opposition. Opposition forces even attempted oil pipeline from to Novorossiysk4. coups to overthrow Dudaev, several armed cla- In the first months of the war, Russian troops se- shes also took place and Grozny witnessed tho- ized Grozny and a major part of lowland Chech- usands-strong demonstrations. In 1993, Moscow nya, but they were unable to break the resistan- began to actively support the opposition Interim ce of Chechen guerrillas. The militants, widely Council of Chechnya, hoping to topple Duda- supported by locals, carried out successful guer- ev’s regime. However, the several attempts at ar- rilla warfare. They even managed to perpetrate med coups by opposition forces all failed2. several terrorist attacks beyond the Chechen Initially, authorities in Moscow were not particu- borders and, eventually, recaptured Grozny from larly interested in the situation in Chechnya as the Russians in August 1996. After Russians as- they focused on problems involved in the break- sassinated Dzhokhar Dudaev in April 1996, the up of the USSR, the development of a new sys- Kremlin decided to meet the Chechens at the ne- tem of power in Russia, relations with former re- gotiating table and put an end to the war. This

CES Studies task was assigned to the Secretary of the Securi- The military and political defeat in the war aga- ty Council of the Russian Federation General inst Chechen separatists was a shock to the en- Aleksandr Lebed. After a few rounds of negotia- tire state and to the Russian army in particular. tions, on 31 August 1996 Lebed and General The army’s prestige was impaired by its with- Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the Chechen Staff, si- drawal from Eastern European countries and gned a peace agreement in Khasav-Yurt. Russia most of the former Soviet republics, and it now basically accepted Chechnya’s i n d e p e n d e n c e , took a further blow in the eyes of society. The and the question of the republic’s ultimate sta- Russian army proved to be completely unprepa- tus was postponed for another five years. Shor- red for wars like the one in Chechnya. It suffered tly afterwards, all Russian troops withdrew from enormous losses and its morale melted at a fri- Chechnya and militants took over the rule5. ghtening speed7. In times of the USSR, the Soviet army was prepared for a confrontation with the The outbreak of war, its development and conc- West and for a full-scale offensive military ope- lusion were of immense significance to the Rus- ration similar to the struggle with the German sian Federation. The year 1994, which marked army during World War II. Following the break- the Russian invasion of Chechnya and 1996, up of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold when the Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed, War, the Russian army faced new challenges and were clear landmarks in the history of post-So- threats: local conflicts with an ethnic backgro- viet Russia. When Yeltsin declared the war, he und and clashes with an internal enemy resor- hoped that the rapid victory expected by the mi- ting to guerrilla warfare and enjoying the sup- litary would afford him not only the opportuni- port of local people. The defeat in Chechnya ope- ty to demonstrate Russia’s power, but also crush ned Russia’s eyes to the urgent need to reform separatism in the other republics and prevent the Russian army and prepare it to cope with the break-up of the Russian Federation, which new challenges8. The war in Chechnya also sho- many politicians and analysts were forecasting. wed Moscow that major threats to state securi- However, it soon turned out that the war only ty were no longer rooted in the West, but in the exposed the weakness and disintegration of the regions south of Russia, mainly in the Caucasus Russian state. The Chechen issue, until then and Central Asia9. Finally, it exposed the ideolo- t reated as a local problem, became one of gical vacuum left in the wake of communism. Russia’s gravest and most difficult problems. “Defence of the constitutional order” was hardly In addition, individual political parties and the a motivation for the soldiers, most of whom tre- Kremlin itself treated the Chechen issue as an in- ated service in the Caucasus as a necessary evil strument to serve their own needs and manipu- rather than patriotic duty. Chechen militants, on lated it to further their own interests. The nego- the other hand, saw their participation in the tiations with Chechen militants in mid 1996, war as the fulfilment of a patriotic obligation. which led to the conclusion of the Khasav-Yurt They ware defending their homeland against an peace agreement, and the unilateral suspension aggressor and were, therefore, highly motivated. of war operations in Chechnya announced by Boris Yeltsin, were closely connected with the As a direct consequence of the war, the Krem- presidential elections in Russia6. Putting an end lin’s control over North Caucasian republics we- to the Chechen conflict, extremely unpopular akened and its sway over the South Caucasus al- with Russian society, was intended to promote so faltered. The Kremlin’s efforts of 1993–1994 Boris Yeltsin’s re-election as president. A prolon- to restore control over and Azerbaijan ged war was also prejudicial to the interests of were questioned. The leaders of these countries the fuel and energy resource lobby (because of understood that they should not fear a Russian the instability in the North Caucasus, Western military intervention if they infringed on the in- investors in Azerbaijan preferred to export oil terests of their northern neighbour. Undoubte- from the region using the southern route bypas- dly, Russia’s image in the West was damaged as sing Russia). In 1996, the Russian oil lobby pro- well, as the country came in for frequent and ved to be more influential than the power struc- harsh criticism over the war and human rights tures that wanted the war to continue. violations during military operations.

CES Studies Further dangerous consequences of the war inc- However, this failed to produce the expected re- luded the rise of Caucasophobia and Islamopho- sults. In late July and early August 1999, radical bia, which largely replaced widespread anti-Se- Islamic militant units (wahhabites), led by Sha- mitism and rendered ethnic and religious rela- mil Basaev and Emir Khattab, invaded the neigh- tions within the Russian Federation tenser. Even bouring Dagestan from Chechnya in order to li- though the Chechens raised no Islamic slogans berate the entire North Caucasus from Russian during the first war, the war contributed signifi- rule and proclaim an Islamic state. cantly to the radicalisation of Islam in Russia. From there on, Muslim fundamentalism develo- As in 1991–1994, throughout the period of ped hand in hand with the Islamic revival. Fur- Chechnya’s quasi-independence, the country re- thermore, the war brought about the mass mi- mained a “black hole”, i.e. a source of instability gration of Chechens and Russians living in spreading to the entire region of the North Cau- Chechnya to the southern districts of Russia, casus. Kidnapping of people for ransom and which bred conflicts between immigrants and bringing them into Chechnya became one of the the local populations. Finally, in the aftermath of most serious problems facing Federation entities the war, contemporary Russia had to face terro- neighbouring the republic. Drug traffic, trading rism for the first time10. weapons and illegally extracted oil thrived, whi- le Chechen militant units continued to invade 4. The period of Chechnya’s Dagestan, Stavropol Krai and North Ossetia. Isla- quasi-independence (1996–1999) mic fundamentalists established a network of training camps on Chechen territory, where On 27 January 1997 presidential and parliamen- young Muslims from the entire Caucasus rece- tary elections were held in Chechnya. Aslan Ma- ived their training12. Events in Chechnya also in- skhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen army and fluenced the situation in the neighbouring Dage- the most moderate of all the candidates, was stan. There, increasingly powerful Islamic radi- elected president. Initially, Maskhadov tried to cals demanded that the republic be transformed govern the country taking into account the inte- into an Islamic state modelled on Chechnya. In rests and ambitions of individual commanders 1999, Dagestani supporters of radical Islam se- and political groups, and was reluctant to rule ized several villages near the Dagestani-Chechen with an iron fist. This had catastrophic consequ- border and proclaimed them to be an indepen- ences for the country: anarchy raged as field dent Islamic territory13. Moscow faced a real commanders refused to subordinate themselves threat of losing control not only over Chechnya, to the central authorities and the opposition, but Dagestan as well. which was growing in strength, pursued a de- structive policy demanding that authorities step After the Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed, down and Chechnya be declared an Islamic sta- Chechnya once again ceased to count among the te. In mid 1998, the country was on the brink of Kremlin’s key political problems. The attention civil war. Even though Maskhadov advocated of Russian authorities was focused on other issu- the peaceful establishment of Chechen-Russian es such as President Yeltsin’s illness and the pro- relations, Russia itself offered him no assistance blem of the succession of power, the economic in dealing with the Islamic opposition and secu- crisis, relations with the West and the US in par- ring public order in Chechnya. On the contrary, ticular, or NATO’s eastward enlargement. Besi- Moscow would gladly use every opportunity to des, the vagueness and instability of the situ- discredit the idea of an independent Chechnya11. ation in Chechnya was in keeping with the inte- In early 1999, authorities in Grozny decided to rests of many Russian groups, politicians and bu- crack down on anarchy, armed Islamic opposi- sinessmen (like the media magnate Boris Berezo- tion and organised crime. In March, President vsky) who had broad and usually illegal business Maskhadov proclaimed Chechnya an Islamic sta- relations with the Chechens. te and introduced elements of the sharia law in- In 1996–1999, the Kremlin failed to develop any to its legislation, while authorities began to political concept for Chechnya, and the question combat groups kidnapping people for ransom. of the republic’s status, which was supposed to

CES Studies be resolved through bilateral negotiations, was a central position in the Kremlin’s policy and caught in a dead end. It seems that only the fe- Russia’s policy towards the republic became un- deral army had a clear idea of its policy towards coordinated and ineffective. Without taking any the republic during Chechnya’s quasi-indepen- real measures to end the conflict, authorities dence: namely, it was preparing to take revenge tried to make society and the international com- for the 1996 defeat. Most of the Russian military munity believe that a normalisation process was believed that politicians had betrayed the army taking place in Chechnya, and that economic re- in Khasav-Yurt and took away its victory. Hoping construction and a gradual return to peaceful li- that war would break out again, the Russian Ge- fe were under way. Meanwhile, a brutal guerril- neral Staff reinforced the North Caucasian Mili- la war was ravaging the republic, and both sides tary District, which was provided with the best were committing massive human rights viola- equipment and manned with the most experien- tions. The repression of civilians by the federal ced commanders and officers, and developed army, and the military disintegration and we- a new war tactic: the first phase of Russia’s se- akening of the Chechen guerrillas (as compared cond military intervention in Chechnya was mo- to the first war) contributed to the radicalisation delled on the NATO operation in Kosovo. This se- of actions taken by many militants, including re- cured the Russian army’s success in the initial sorting to acts of terrorism17. phase of the second Chechen war14. On 23 October 2002, the Chechens perpetrated 5. The second Chechen war an act of terror unprecedented in the whole hi- (from 1999) story of the Chechen conflict, evoking shock in Russia and abroad. A squad of suicide bombers A pretext for the second invasion of Chechnya by led by Movsar Baraev seized the Moscow Dubro- federal troops came with the raid of Islamic mi- vka theatre taking some 800 hostages. The terro- litants led by Basaev and Khattab on Dagestan rists demanded an end to the war in Chechnya and a series of bomb attacks in Russian cities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the (Moscow, Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September republic. In the early morning of 25 October, 1999, which claimed nearly 300 lives15. The Che- Russian special forces stormed the theatre buil- chens were blamed for organising these attacks, ding killing all the terrorists and more than one and the new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir hundred hostages. Shamil Basaev admitted to Putin announced an unrelenting campaign aga- organising this attack. In the successive months, inst terrorism, gaining wide popularity with the militants also organised several bloody terrorist Russian society. In September 1999, Russia be- attacks in Chechnya and North Ossetia killing se- gan mass bombings of Chechnya and on 1 Octo- veral hundred people18. They announced their ber, Russian troops invaded the republic. The intention to move the war into Russian territory commencement of military action brought on in the nearest future19. a mass exodus of people, most of who fled from Even though the terrorist attack on the Dubro- the republic primarily to the neighbouring Ingu- vka theatre and the subsequent suicide bom- shetia, causing a humanitarian disaster there16. bings exposed the failure of the Kremlin’s policy Over a few months, Russians crushed the main towards Chechnya, President Putin’s administra- Chechen formations and gained control over tion resolved to continue with the “Chechenisa- most of Chechnya’s territory. In spring 2000, the tion” policy launched in mid 2002. Its objective decimated Chechen militants began a guerrilla was to legitimise Akhmed Kadyrov’s pro-Russian war, which still continues today. team and gradually transfer power in the repu- blic to them, while firmly refusing to enter peace In June 2000, the Kremlin announced the end of talks with militant representatives20. The Krem- the “military phase” of the “anti-terrorist opera- lin tried to present “Chechenisation” as a genu- tion” and established an interim civil admini- ine peace process taking place in the republic, stration in the republic, led by the former “sepa- but it is difficult to determine whether this poli- ratist” mufti of Chechnya Akhmed Kadyrov. From cy was intended to end the war or just pretend that point, Chechnya clearly ceased to occupy to do so21. In November 2002, the Chechen Inte-

CES Studies rior Ministry was established, in March 2003, ader. Yeltsin appointed the largely unknown Vla- the new constitution of the republic was passed dimir Putin as prime minister at the time when (defining Chechnya as an inseparable part of Russia was overwhelmed with fear following Russia) and, in June 2003, amnesty was declared the raid of Islamic militants on Dagestan and the for the militants22. The Kremlin also announced terrorist attacks of September 1999, and when that presidential elections would be held in the the media were fanning an anti-Chechen hyste- republic on 5 October 2003, to be followed by ria. Shortly after coming to power, Putin anno- parliamentary elections within a year of the re- unced a resolved decision to combat terrorism, ferendum, that an agreement on the division of gaining widespread popularity with the Russian powers between Moscow and Grozny would be society. The sense of being threatened by terro- signed and that more funding would be provi- rist attacks, skilfully heated up through the use ded to finance Chechnya’s economic reconstruc- of propaganda, continued to convince people of tion (including the payment of indemnities for the necessity to crack down on Chechen separa- homes lost in the course of military operations). tists. The successes of the federal army in Chech- Moscow also began to remove generals involved nya reassured Russians that the decision to inte- in illegal businesses and those refusing to co- rvene was right, and most of them began to see operate with the republic’s civil authorities. Ho- Putin as a providential man who saved their co- w e v e r, these measures did not produce the untry. This was precisely what the ill Boris Yelt- expected results, only strengthened the power sin wanted to achieve when he nominated Vla- of Chechnya’s acting president Akhmed Kadyrov dimir Putin as his successor and sought a way to and increased tensions in internal relations wi- safeguard the latter’s coming to power. On 31 thin Chechnya (e.g. between Kadyrov and the December 1999, when Putin’s popularity was at in Moscow or between Kady- its peak, Boris Yeltsin stepped down and trans- rov and the militants). Kadyrov, hated and consi- ferred his duties as head of state to the Prime dered a traitor by most of his compatriots, ma- Minister. On 26 March 2000, early presidential naged to subordinate nearly all central and re- elections were held in Russia, of which Putin gional civil authorities of the republic and gain was the unquestionable winner. It appears that a very strong position in relation to the Kremlin. the problem of the succession of power in the Presently, Kadyrov also has a substantial milita- Kremlin played a key role in the outbreak of the ry force – he controls the Chechen militia and second Chechen war, though there was also so- a “bodyguard team” of several thousand, which me pres s u r e towards a new confrontation on the recruits former militants and terrorises the Che- part of the Russian army, humiliated by the defe- chen people23. Even though the present leader of at in the first war and the compulsory withdra- the Chechen administration is inconvenient for wal from the republic in 1996, and eager to rei n - nearly all major groups in the republic, the fo r ce its position in the Russian power struc t u re s . Kremlin continues to support him because Kady- rov seems to be the only guarantor of the imple- mentation of the “Chechenisation” policy laun- II. Chechnya’s impact on Ru s s i a ched by the authorities24. following the outbreak of the There is direct link between the outbreak of the second Chechen war second Chechen war and the rise to power of Russia’s current president Vladimir Putin. It may 1. Internal issues be the single most striking example of how the Chechen issue affects developments in to- The conflict in Chechnya is one of many factors day’s Russia and how it is exploited as an instru- presently influencing the internal situation in ment in Russian politics. While the first war had the Russian Federation. Developments in the re- a negative impact on Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, public are having an adverse affect on Russia, al- as most Russians were firmly opposed to it, the though the real scale of this influence is difficult outbreak of the second war became a kind of to estimate. The Chechen issue is a serious pro- springboard to power for the present Russian le- blem for both the ruling team in the Kremlin and

CES Studies the Russian state as a whole, as it is difficult to promising the relentless prosecution of mili- speak of a stable future and the balanced deve- tants. Even though the attack in Dubrovka did lopment of Russia until this issue is solved. On not ruin his image as a guarantor of security, it the other hand, the situation in Chechnya is be- certainly unsettled it. As successive events sho- ing exploited by the Kremlin in order to reach its wed, Dubrovka was not an isolated case, but the specific political goals both on the internal and beginning of a terrorist campaign on a broader international scenes. scale. Suicide terrorist attacks modelled on tho- se from Palestine became an inseparable ele- 1.1. A vision of Ru s s i a ’ s f u t u r e ment of the Chechen conflict and Russian politi- Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Che- cal life. It seems that this “Palestinisation” of the chen conflict has been one of the most serious conflict in Chechnya will be irreversible unless political problems of the Russian Federation af- the situation in the republic undergoes a funda- fecting the country’s internal and foreign poli- mental change25. cies alike. Russia’s future as a modern, non-im- perial and democratic state hinges on the solu- 1.3. An obstacle to reforms tion of the Chechen issue. The present situation After becoming President, Vladimir Putin under- in Chechnya impedes Russia’s transformation in took to carry out numerous important internal this direction. The Kremlin’s inability to cope reforms in the state26. However, the situation in with Chechnya (both under Boris Yeltsin’s and Chechnya constitutes a major obstacle to the im- Vladimir Putin’s rule) and the inability of Rus- plementation of these reforms. Chechnya not sian political elites to develop a coherent and only consumes a large amount of “energy” of the mature concept to end the conflict demonstrate authorities, who have to respond to crises in the the absence of a clear vision of post-imperial republic and push successive measures that are Russia. still failing to produce positive results. Mainta- As the Kremlin lacks a clearly defined policy to- ining such a large numbers of troops and amo- wards Chechnya, the Russian central authorities unts of weapons in the republic and providing are also unable to develop a coherent policy for logistic support for the army, etc. is an enormo- the entire North Caucasus – the most turbulent us burden on the state budget, consuming funds region of the Russian Federation. Solving the that could otherwise be spent on other purpo- Chechen issue is a necessary prerequisite for the ses27. The republic’s “economic reconstruction” development of Moscow’s North Caucasian poli- has been progressing since mid 2000, absorbing cy. So far, Moscow has only been implementing huge amounts of funding each year that fail to improvised manoeuvres and supporting local improve the situation in Chechnya in any me- corrupted post-communist ruling elites dissocia- asurable way28. Most of the federal budget funds ted from their communities. The North Cauca- earmarked for the economic reconstruction of sus’ serious economic and social problems and Chechnya are stolen “along the way” and the the political, ethnic and religious conflicts preva- rest is appropriated directly by the pro-Russian iling in that area may soon seriously destabilise Chechen authorities on site. the region. 1.4. The degenerating effect on state 1.2. A threat to state security s t r u c t u r e s Chechnya is a serious threat to Russia’s internal The existence of Chechnya in its present shape security. The most evident proof of this was last within the Russian Federation contributes to the year’s attack on Dubrovka. It demonstrated that degeneration of the Russian state structures in a group of armed terrorists arriving from Chech- charge of Chechnya-related issues, i.e. sections nya, thousands of kilometres away, is capable of of the state administration, the federal army, the carrying out a terrorist operation on this scale. militia, secret services, the administration of ju- Since the beginning of his presidency, Putin has stice, etc. It also demoralises individual officials, been building his position and prestige on pro- functionaries and soldiers. This refers to institu- mises of ensuring security for the state and ordi- tions beyond the republic dealing with “Chechen nary Russians. He began as Prime Minister by issues”, as well as state bodies operating direc-

CES Studies tly in Chechnya29. Corruption and stealing of entire federal army, the Interior Ministry and the budget funds for Chechnya (formally earmarked Federal Security Service. This new situation is for the “anti-terrorist operation” and the recon- hardly conducive to democratic reforms in Rus- struction of the republic) are widespread thro- sia, as the power departments and the people ughout all levels of the state administration30. In forming them are direct heirs of the Soviet Army, addition, for many years Chechnya has basically the Soviet Interior Ministry and the KGB. Preva- been a territory without any laws. Individual of- iling attitudes in these departments are a Soviet- ficials, the military, etc. do not need to abide by style, imperial and superpower-like perception any rules. Consequently, lawlessness prevails, of the world and society, and a conviction that manifesting itself in the attitude of state bodies one should rule with an iron fist without taking towards Chechen civilians (the life or death of public opinion or society’s interests into acco- ordinary people frequently hinges on the arbi- unt. These attitudes impede the reform of the trary decisions of individual representatives of power departments themselves, which is at pre- the authorities). The military, officials and mili- sent urgently needed in Russia. tia functionaries are frequently involved in cri- minal activities such as trade in illegally extrac- It is very difficult to estimate which of the po- ted oil, weapons and drugs, human trafficking, wer departments profited most from the war etc. The war in Chechnya is their private war, and which gained the most influence. It seems which they treat mainly as an opportunity to get that compared to the other bodies, the federal rich. This is why they disregard their state’s in- army, humiliated by the 1996 defeat and the for- terests, which they were sent to promote in the ced withdrawal from Chechnya, gained a lot. By rebellious republic. Lower rank military or offi- starting a new military intervention in the repu- cials sometimes sabotage or disregard the deci- blic in autumn 1999 and scoring the initial suc- sions of higher instances. Individual Russian po- cesses in the war against Chechen militants, the wer departments (the Ministry of Defence and military took revenge for that defeat and the the federal army, the Interior Ministry and the “betrayal of the politicians”. Having gained Federal Security Service) compete for influence a strong position and taken control over Chech- in Chechnya and for legal and illegal revenues nya, the army is now the main opponent of any from the war raging in that area. At the level of changes in the republic that could bring about the government and heads of individual depart- a genuine ending to the war. For quite some ti- ments, this rivalry is more moderate and less ap- me, the military have been trying to torpedo the parent but in Chechnya, where various institu- Kremlin’s moves intended to end the war. The tions operate on a parallel basis, it is distinctly army is reluctant to accept the “Chechenisation” visible. policy pursued by the Kremlin, which signifies All this leads to the demoralisation of Russian a drop in their powers to the benefit of “Che- state structures. The problem is further exacer- chen civilians”. Army representatives have fre- bated by the rotation of tens of thousands of pe- quently stressed that they will not allow “ano- ople from all over Russia who arrive in, and le- ther Khasav-Yurt” and will not let their victory ave Chechnya each year. For example, officers be taken away from them. and soldiers usually stay in the republic for no longer than six months, following which they Today, Chechnya is a closed military zone in are replaced by others. They take the models of which the federal army is the most influential behaviour learnt there back to their permanent body31. Troops are repressing civilians on a mass jobs and homes. scale, most definitely with the approval of hi- gher-rank commanders. It is in the best interest 1.5. The increased influence of the military to continue with the “anti-terro- of the power departments rist operation” for several reasons. Firstly, while In the aftermath of the second Chechen war the- the operation in Chechnya continues, the ar- re has been a dangerous expansion of the influ- my’s position in the state will remain very ence of Russian power departments, i.e. the Mi- strong, bringing in large amounts of funding nistry of Defence, the General Staff alongside the and promotion opportunities for the army. Se-

CES Studies condly, the unstable situation in Chechnya, tre- 1.6. The rise of authoritarianism ated by the army as conquered territory, and its in Ru s s i a isolation from the rest of the country, allow the The Chechen conflict, and especially the second military to engage in a multitude of illegal busi- Chechen war, helped the political forces striving nesses, especially the sale of oil illegally extrac- to reinforce the authoritarian system of power ted in Chechnya to destinations all over the and restrict civil rights in Russia. The outbreak of North Caucasus32. To this end, Russian military war against “Chechen terrorists” and the threat leaders frequently co-operate with Chechen field of “international terrorism” overemphasised by commanders with whom they share the profits. the Kremlin were among the factors allowing They have unspoken agreements on mutual tole- Vladimir Putin to create this kind of power sys- rance in a given area and, besides, the militants tem and, in particular, reduce the role of the re- profit from the perpetuation of the present situ- gions and the media. The Kremlin has also used ation in the republic as well: for them, this pro- the threat of Chechen terrorism to integrate Rus- vides an opportunity to get rich and retain con- sian society in the face of an internal and exter- trol over certain groups of people in Chechnya. nal danger and distract its attention from other Finally, ever since the conflict began, the army important problems faced by the country. has been robbing civilian property, mainly du- Freedom of speech in Russia and the Russian me- ring the so-called zachistki, i.e. the pacification dia were hit especially badly by the second Che- of Chechen villages accused of supporting the chen war. During the first war, Russian and fore- guerrillas. It has been accepting bribes without ign journalises faced no restrictions on access to any limitations, chiefly at checkpoints on roads Chechnya and there were no substantial inte- scattered all over the republic, trading in impri- rventions in the content of their coverage of the soned people and selling the bodies of those kil- events in the republic (this refers both to press led to their families33. and television). Today, the situation has changed In many matters, President Putin, who came to radically. Chechnya is a zone closed to indepen- power “thanks to” the war in Chechnya, must dent reporters. Articles and TV news broadcasts take into account the interests of the military on the situation there are censored or self-censo- who have become much more influential in the red by most media35. The state’s control over the present phase of the conflict. The army has media is not limited to coverage of the develop- strengthened its position in relations with the ments in Chechnya. The Kremlin has used the remaining Russian power departments, especial- war in the republic and the threat of terrorism ly the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security overemphasised by its propaganda machinery to Service (these three institutions have a long hi- restrict freedom of speech in Russia in general. story of competing for influence in Chechnya Only a few Russian media can afford to criticise and in Russia as a whole). For many Russian ge- Russian policy in Chechnya and openly oppose nerals, Chechnya was the beginning of a politi- the Kremlin on other issues, however, these are cal career. For example, General Viktor Kazant- usually low-circulation newspapers or radio sta- sev, the former commander of federal troops in tions and websites with small audiences36. the Caucasus, is presently the Russian presi- dent’s envoy to the Southern Federal District; 1.7. The political elites and Russian General Anatoli Kvashnin, the former comman- s o c i e t y der of the North Caucasian Military District, is To some extent, the war in Chechnya is affecting presently Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the views and attitudes of the Russian political the Russian Federation, and General Vladimir elites and the way they see Russia and the Shamanov, the former commander of the 58th world. As regards Chechnya, most forces on the Army in Chechnya, is Governor of the Ulyanovsk Russian political scene hold positions similar to oblast. The federal army has gained an unqu- that expressed in the Kremlin’s official policy. estionable and apparently permanent influence They firmly deny the Chechens their right to le- in the entire North Caucasus (especially in the ave the Federation, refuse to allow negotiations eastern part), and the region is ever more frequ- with the militants, believe that a hard line poli- ently referred to as “the military republic”34. cy should be implemented towards Chechnya

CES Studies and negate crimes committed by Russian troops. frequently unnecessarily expose them to the risk This attitude to the Chechen issue influences the of death), ordinary people incidentally involved way politicians, journalists and analysts see Rus- in the conflict (e.g. the hostages in Dubrovka), sia’s other internal and external problems. It al- Chechen in Ingushetia (denied assistan- so shows that imperialist and superpower-like ce by the state and forced to return to the war- thinking still dominates the Russian political ravaged republic) and civilians in Chechnya scene. The majority of Russian society thinks the (whose basic rights are constantly being viola- same way. Politicians such as Sergei Kovalov, jo- ted and who are, after all, citizens of the Russian urnalists like Anna Politkovska or social organi- Federation). sations like Memorial, who openly criticise Kremlin for its “iron fist” policy, for initiating the 1.8. Caucasophobia and Islamophobia war in Chechnya and for massive human rights in Ru s s i a violations in the republic, and who call on au- The war in Chechnya stimulates the rise of na- thorities to stop the war and begin negotiations tionalist and xenophobic sentiments in Russia, with the Chechens, constitute a small, if not which leads to national or even racial and reli- marginal, section of the Russian political elite. gious conflicts. The steady growth of the Cauca- They hold hardly any significance in Russian po- sian diaspora in the “Russian” regions of the Rus- litics and have barely any support from society. sian Federation, especially in Moscow, is condu- The Chechen conflict is a major obstacle impe- cive to these types of developments39. Tensions ding the development of a democratic civil so- are arising between the local Slavic population ciety in Russia. It perpetuates the traditional and newcomers from the North and South Cau- passivity of Russian society, the susceptibility of casus and Central Asia. Conflicts between diffe- most people to official propaganda and the co- rent nationalities are superimposed on religious nviction that any objection against the doings of clashes, as most of the immigrants from these the authorities is pointless. Even though public regions are Muslims. Hatred of Chechens, fanned opinion polls show that most Russians are be- by Russian propaganda and the media-promoted hind the conclusion of the war in Chechnya and Chechen stereotype defining them as being ban- a large group would be willing to support nego- dits, terrorists and kidnappers (this kind of pro- tiations with militants37, people approve the paganda reached its peak in autumn 1999 follo- Kremlin’s policy towards Chechnya by failing to wing attacks in Russian cities) is automatically protest. This attitude, typical of the Russian so- extended to all “persons of Caucasian nationali- ciety, manifested itself following the terrorist at- ty”40. Contemptuously referred to as “black” in tack in Dubrovka in October 2002. Even though everyday speech, emigrants from the Caucasus more than one hundred hostages died after the are permanently persecuted by the militia. The- troops storming the building used an unknown re are also anti-Caucasian pogroms, to which pu- gas and failed to organise the evacuation proper- blic security services usually respond passively. ly (exposing Russia to fierce criticism from the A substantial role in the dissemination of chau- West), most Russians expressed their support for vinistic, anti-Caucasian and anti-Muslim attitu- the president’s decision and admitted that he des in society is played by various nationalistic had had no other choice38. or Cossack organisations and some high officials There is also a link between the situation in and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Chechnya and the Russian authorities’ attitude growing aversion towards Muslims is also fuel- towards citizens and their rights. Unlike in de- led by the Kremlin’s official propaganda, which mocratic states of law, the Russian state and its represents Russia as a victim of “international Is- leaders are above individual people, their rights, lamic terrorism”. It is a justified claim that, at constitutional freedoms and frequently even the moment, Caucasophobia and, to a smaller above personal dignity. This model is perpetu- extent, Islamophobia, are widespread in Rus- ated, for example, by the way the authorities sia41. This poses a major threat to the state’s sta- treat the soldiers fighting in the Caucasus (they bility, given the fact that the percentage of non- are compulsorily sent to the conflict region whe- Slavic and Muslim people in Russia’s population re their commanders disrespect their rights and is increasing rapidly. The exact number of Mu-

CES Studies slims in the Russian Federation is difficult to es- ment of extremist Muslim organisations in the tablish, but they probably account for seven to republics of the North Caucasus, particularly in 15 percent of the population42. Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia46. Because of the disastrous economic situation of the region 1.9. The impact of Chechnya and the widespread conviction that Moscow has on the North Caucasus left the Caucasian republics to fend for themse- The Russian North Caucasus is the region most lves, such groups are increasingly popular, espe- affected by the situation in Chechnya43. The Cau- cially with young people. In the nearest future, casus, which always used to be one region, is this fact may play a substantial destabilising ro- presently broken into many isolated parts and le in entire North Caucasus. divided by dozens of borders. The situation in The Chechen conflict is also having an adverse Chechnya has contributed to this. Constituent effect on the economic situation in the North republics of the Russian Federation neighbo- Caucasus. The disintegration of the socialist eco- uring Chechnya have remained in the frontline nomy, the closing down of thousands of facto- zone for over ten years. Huge numbers of troops, ries and businesses, breaking off of economic militia forces and detachments of other Russian links with the South Caucasus, corruption of au- power structures are stationed there, and the thorities and other factors have caused a steadi- entire region is covered with a network of road ly deepening economic crisis in the region. The checkpoints resembling state borders. People ha- -stricken North Caucasian republics can ve a limited ability to move from one republic to function solely with subsidies from the federal another and they have to undergo endless budget. The Chechen conflict, which has been checks by public security services. The territo- continuing for more than a decade, has exacer- ries of Ingushetia, Dagestan and North Ossetia bated the catastrophic economic situation of the sometimes witness clashes with Chechen mili- North Caucasus. The region has been split into tants trying to reach Chechnya from Georgia two parts: Dagestan in the East and the rema- (Russia has repeatedly accused the latter of tole- ining republics in the West. Economic contacts rating separatist bases in its territory) or hiding between these two parts have been largely re- from the Russian army. There is a serious risk stricted because of transport difficulties, among that the war could spread to the neighbouring other factors. Following the outbreak of war in republics, as the radical militants have frequen- Chechnya, it became impossible to use several tly announced (in June 2003, the first serious ter- important roads crossing the republic, including rorist attack was carried out in North Ossetia). the railway main and the motorway from Rostov The situation is particularly complicated in Ingu- on Don to Makhachkala and Baku47. Because of shetia, temporary home for 70 to 100 thousand the instability in Chechnya (and the conflicts in Chechen refugees whom the authorities are try- Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the borders betwe- ing to force to return to Chechnya. There are al- en the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and so large groups of Chechen refugees in Dage- Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other, have actu- stan, South Ossetia, Stavropol Krai, Krasnodar ally been closed. Only a small number of people Krai and the Rostov Oblast. This situation breeds is able to cross them, hence the inhabitants of serious ethnic and religious tensions that may the North Caucasus being deprived of the oppor- transform into open conflict. The Chechen issue tunity to make a living on cross-border trade48. is straining relations between Chechens and The second war in Chechnya has “disciplined” Russians, as well as between the native Slavic the remaining North Caucasus republics and we- people of southern Russia and “Caucasian” im- akened separatist tendencies emerging there. migrants44. With his war “scare”, President Putin has been Because of the proximity of Chechnya, the North able to get rid of troublesome republic leaders, Caucasus has become the region with the hi- e.g. the long-time (1991–2001) president of Ingu- ghest rates of organised crime in the entire Rus- shetia Ruslan Aushev was replaced by a general sian Federation45. The evident radicalisation of of the Federal Security Service, Murat Ziazikov49. Chechen Islam observed since the mid 1990s has Finally, the war has contributed to the erosion of also contributed substantially to the develop- the sense of a Caucasian community. During the

CES Studies first war, Chechens enjoyed universal sympathy the activities of Islamic radicals in the Fergana and support in the region, but today people tend Valley and, finally, the Taliban’s rise to power in to blame them for the conflict and largely appro- Afghanistan, in order to realise that the real in- ve of the military solution to the Chechen pro- ternational challenge for today’s Russia was the blem. “southern problem”50.

2. Foreign policy 2.2. Chechnya vs. Ru s s i a ’ s relations with the We s t Ever since the first war broke out in 1994, the Chechen issue has had a substantial influence on Western Europe the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, When Russia initiated the first Chechen war, it both in terms of its general direction, and rela- came in for severe criticism from the West, tions with individual states. The conflict in which continued until the signing of the Khasav- Chechnya not only made Moscow aware of the Yurt agreements in 1996. On its part, Russia ac- threats from the South (the Caucasus, Central cused European countries and organisations of Asia, Near and Middle East and Arab countries), lawless interference in its internal affairs and su- but it also had a substantial and largely negati- spected that the criticism was intended to un- ve effect on its relations with Western Europe, dermine its position in the continent. Initial en- the United States and other countries. thusiasm for Europe displayed by the Russian elites and authorities gradually waned and gave 2.1. New challenges in the South way to distrust, lack of understanding and aver- Throughout the history of the USSR, the rela- sion in the aftermath of the Chechen war and tions (confrontation) with the West were the the Western countries’ disapproval of Ru s- most important area of Moscow’s foreign policy. sia’s human rights violations. A similar situation This changed with the break-up of the Soviet took place after the Kremlin started the second empire: Russia no longer had to fear any threats war in Chechnya in October 1999. At that time, from the West. On the contrary, it appeared that the European Union even imposed some limited the interests of Moscow and the Western world sanctions on Russia, while the OSCE and the Co- were convergent in many ways. However, the si- uncil of Europe threatened that Moscow could tuation in countries and regions south of Russia be expelled from these organisations. Things be- also changed radically. A number of new states gan to change with time, following the Russian emerged, ethnic and religious conflicts broke army’s successes in the Caucasus. out, geopolitical relations in Afghanistan, the The emergence of a ne w , energetic and modern Caucasus and Central Asia were complicated, Russian leader and the desire to maintain good and the menace of Muslim fundamentalism, se- economic relations with Russia overshadowed paratism and terrorism came into view. Conse- the European values of democracy and human ri- quently, threats from the southern direction be- ghts. The Chechen issue gradually lost prom i n e n - came an increasingly difficult problem and chal- ce in relations between Russia and Western Euro- lenge for Russia. Even though the failed Soviet pean states, and European politicians were loath intervention in Afghanistan was the first indica- to openly criticise Moscow for its Chechen policy. tion of the changing geopolitical situation in the Nevertheless, the Chechen issue does affect the South, Moscow did not realise the proportions of Kr emlin relations with the West: it undermines the problem until the Chechen war broke out. the European countries’ and the Euro p e a n Before, conflicts on the Empire’s southern out- Un i o n’ s confidence in Russia as a partner for co- skirts were treated as marginal troubles and the operation, especially when it comes to security. problems emerging there were seen as being of Eu r opean organisations such as OSCE and the Co- secondary importance. The Kremlin had to face uncil of Europe have adopted a stricter attitude an escalation of the Chechen conflict and espe- to w a r ds Rus s i a ’ s Chechen policy. They are syste- cially the raid of Islamic militants on Dagestan, matically criticising and even condemning Mo- the outbreak of the second Chechen war, the in- scow over the inadequate use of force against creasingly tense situation in Central Asia and Chechen separatists and human rights violations

CES Studies in the republic, which brings on frequent crises 2.3. Chechnya vs. Moscow’s r e l a t i o n s and tensions in mutual rel a t i o n s 51 . Even though with other CIS countries Russia formally co-operates with these orga n i s a - The first Chechen war weakened Russia’s posi- tions on issues relating to Chechnya, it actually tion in the entire post-Soviet region, especially tries to minimise their presence in the rep u b l i c in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia’s defeat and rejects the possibility that they could play showed the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uz- a role in the regulation of the Chechen conflict. bekistan, the Baltic states and that it was not possible to rebuild the empire through The United States the use of military power: Moscow had neither During the first Chechen war, the attitude adop- enough political will nor sufficient military for- ted by Washington towards the Russian policy in ce. The role of the Commonwealth of Indepen- Chechnya differed from the one prevailing in Eu- dent States lost a good deal of its significance, rope. Bill Clinton’s administration was much less and Russia began to prefer bilateral relations inclined to criticise Moscow for initiating a mili- with the former Soviet republics to co-operation tary operation in the Caucasus, emphasising within the CIS. In 1994–1996, the CIS countries that the Chechen issue was the RF’s internal pro- refused to back Moscow in its dispute with NA- blem. The outbreak of the second Chechen war TO and an organisation uniting post-Soviet sta- coincided with a crisis in Russian-US relations tes but excluding Russia, i.e. the GUUAM, began caused by NATO’s eastward enlargement and its to form within the Commonwealth54. operation in Kosovo, of which Moscow strongly The second war in Chechnya and Vladimir Pu- disapproved. Washington condemned the Krem- tin’s rise to power changed the situation in the lin for initiating the anti-terrorist operation in CIS radically. By initiating a new intervention in Chechnya and repeatedly criticised Russia for Chechnya and launching its hard line policy to- human rights violations in the republic calling wards the republic, Russia demonstrated its po- on Moscow to begin negotiations with militants. wer and made it clear that the Kremlin could re- There was a link between this stand of the Uni- spond resolutely to those opposing it. In 1999, ted States and the fact that, at that time, Russia Russia also began to press CIS countries (espe- and the United States were competing for influ- cially Georgia and Azerbaijan), demanding their ence in the Caucasus and Central Asia over Ca- unequivocal support for the “anti-terrorist ope- spian oil and gas resources. ration” in Chechnya and co-operative policies ta- However, the situation began to change gradual- king into account Moscow’s interests in the re- ly even before 11 September 2001. The rivalry gion55. This instigated many tensions, mainly in over oil resources in the Caspian region was no Russian-Georgian relations 56. In the end, coun- longer as heated and Washington began to see tries of the region adopted more pro-Russian po- the positive sides of Russia’s influence in the licies and began to seek rapprochement with Caucasus and Central Asia. A breakthrough in Moscow, while GUUAM lost its significance. This Russian-US relations came with the terrorist at- way, the second Chechen war constituted a fac- tacks on the United States and Russia’s joining tor contributing to the strengthening of Rus- of the anti-terrorist coalition formed by George sia’s position in the post-Soviet region during W. Bush. From that moment on, the Kremlin co- Putin’s rule. uld represent its “anti-terrorist operation” in Chechnya as part of the worldwide struggle aga- 2.4. Ru s s i a ’ s relations with other inst terrorism and claim that Russia was the first c o u n t r i e s country to have faced the challenge of interna- tional terrorism. At the same time, President Pu- Arab countries and Israel tin had the opportunity to justify the Russian ar- The Chechen conflict has been one of the main my’s activities in the Caucasus52. In return for factors bringing about a change in Russia’s tra- the support granted by the Kremlin to Washing- ditional policy towards the Near East, i.e. Arab ton following 11 September 2001, the United countries and Israel. Throughout the Cold War, States adopted a less critical disapproving attitu- Soviet foreign policy was distinctly anti-Israeli de towards Russia’s policy in Chechnya53. and pro-Arab. However, the support granted to

CES Studies Chechen separatists by many Arab countries in- Moscow’s foreign policy and Russian society. Re- cluding Saudi Arabia, the , cent events in Chechnya, and especially the se- Qatar and Kuwait, and their backing of wahha- ries of suicide attacks in the republic, the North bism and Islamic fundamentalism in Russia and Caucasus and the Russian capital suggest that the entire post-Soviet area, led to a change in Chechnya may play a significant role in influen- Russia’s attitude towards these countries57. Whi- cing developments in the Russian Federation le Arab countries officially maintained that over the nearest future. Even though the Krem- Chechnya was Russia’s internal problem and lin is taking some measures to normalise the si- that the Kremlin had legitimate jurisdiction over tuation in the republic (amnesty, presidential the republic, they were unable or unwilling to elections, the agreement on the division of po- stop the numerous organisations and individu- wers between Moscow and Grozny), these me- als supporting the separatists or sending volun- asures appear unlikely to bring about an end to teers into Chechnya. In the aftermath of the Che- the conflict as they aim to eliminate its sources chen wars, relations between Russia and Israel (separatism) in a unilateral manner rather than improved for the first time in history. Tel Aviv through dialogue with the Chechen society and and Moscow began to develop official contacts, the anti-Russian opposition. However, one can co-operated in the field of secret services and expect continued instability in the republic and mutually backed each other’s hard line policies new terrorist attacks both in Chechnya and bey- on terrorism58. ond its borders. This means that the Chechen is- sue will continue to affect Russia similarly to China how it does today, and the adverse processes sti- The conflict in Chechnya has also influenced re- mulated by the conflict in Chechnya will conti- lations between Moscow and Beijing. From the nue. The republic will remain a threat to Rus- very beginning, China resolutely backed the firm sia’s security, a barrier to reforms and a source policy of Russian authorities towards the rebel- for the degeneration and demoralisation of the lious republic. In return, the Chinese hoped to state administration and the Russian army. win Russia’s support for their policies on Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang (where they struggled over It appears that the Chechen problem will also Uygur irredentism). Beijing’s position is that affect the future of the Russian Federation. each state has the full right to use military force The nature of this influence will depend mainly in its territory and other countries should not in- on whether the Kremlin manages to develop and terfere with such state’s internal affairs, espe- carry out a practical plan to end the conflict in cially when it comes to separatism and human the longer term, or whether it continues with rights. This is in keeping with the Russian stand- the current policy involving the “anti-terrorist point. This way, the Chechen conflict served to operation” and strengthening pro-Russian au- bring the positions of Moscow and Beijing closer thorities in the republic, which seems to be do- on the international scene59. omed to failure in its present shape. It seems that, as long as there is no peace and stability in the Caucasus, Russia will not become ademocra- III. Outlook for the future tic country respecting human rights and civil freedoms, and its political situation will remain susceptible to destabilisation. The conflict in Chechnya, which dates back to Maciej Falkowski the early 1990s, has become one of the symbols of post-Soviet Russia and its transformation. Al- though it is just one of many factors determi- ning the present and future shape of this coun- try, it is difficult to overestimate the significance of the Chechen issue for today’s Russia. The two Chechen wars have not only affected the inter- nal situation in the Russian Federation, but also

CES Studies 1 The reasons why the Russian-Chechen conflict turned in- extent of the Army’s defeat in Chechnya were considerably to the longest and most bloody war in the entire post-So- greater. During the Afghan war, the Soviet Army failed to viet area include the specific traits of Chechen society, i.e. overpower the mujaheddin who received massive support its division into competing clans (teips) that unite when fa- form the West and the Arab world. In Chechnya, however, cing a common enemy; and the absence of modern elites, the Russian Army gave in to the levy of masses of highlan- and the system of Chechen values, including freedom ver- ders defending their villages. ging on anarchy, egalitarianism, aversion to externally im- 8 For more information on the impact of the first Chechen posed authority, a preference for clan laws based on the war on the Russian army see: Witold Pasek, Armia rosyjska principle of bloody vendetta over written laws, a sense of po Czeczenii, Eurazja: CES No. 5/1995; Andrzej Grajewski, honour and irrational behaviour of individuals and entire Federalni po Czeczenii, Eurazja: CES No. 5/1995. communities, etc. For more information on problems regar- 9 See: Aleksei Malashenko, Dmitri Trenin, Vremia yuga, Mo- ding the social structure of contemporary Chechnya see: scow: Moscow Carnegie Center 2002, p. 180–188. Dmitri Furman (ed.), Chechnia i Rossiia: obshchestva igosu- 10 During the fist Chechen war, several major terrorist acts darstva, Moscow 1999. were committed, including hijackings of planes and buses. 2 For more information on the history of the Chechen con- The greatest acts of terror in 1994–1996 were two raids car- flict from the early 1990s until the end of the first Chechen ried out by Chechen militants and the taking of hundreds war see: Piotr Grochmalski, Czeczenia: rys prawdziwy, Wro- of hostages. The first one was carried out in June 1995 by c∏aw: atla2 1999. Shamil Basaev’s detachment that seized a hospital in the 3 Troops were not withdrawn from any of the other repu- town of Budennovsk in Stavropol Krai taking some one tho- blics and, following the initial period of conflict with the usand hostages. This operation was a success for the Che- Kremlin, all of them ultimately signed the Federation Treaty chens: they were allowed to safely return to Chechnya whe- of March 1992 (by 1994). There are grounds to believe that re the Russians and the Chechens entered into negotiations Dudaev did not aspire for Chechnya’s full independence concerning the terms of a cease-fire. The other operation either. It seems that he played a kind of game with the took place in January 1996 when militants led by Salman Kremlin hoping to elicit a good deal of independence by Raduev seized a hospital in Kizlar, Dagestan, once again ta- making far-reaching demands. The developments in Chech- king hundreds of hostages. This time the Russians refused nya and, above all, the shaping of the political situation in to negotiate with the militants who withdrew to Chechnya the Kremlin (the increased influence of advocates of milita- following a few days of fighting near the village of Pervo- ry intervention) brought about the transformation of the maiskoye. Russian-Chechen conflict into an open war. 11 To this end, Russia would publicise the cases of people, 4 Other causes for the outbreak of the Chechen war include mainly foreigners, being kidnapped for ransom. These ty- ill-considered, illogical and venturesome moves of Chechen pes of kidnappings were widespread in Chechnya in and Russian leaders motivated by an excess of ambition, 1996–1999. There was considerable evidence suggesting the failure of many politicians on both sides, including that some of them were perpetrated by the Russian secret Dzhokhar Dudaev, to objectively assess the situation, the services trying to destabilise the situation in Chechnya and pursuit of private, usually economic, interests and alack of prepare the ground for a new military intervention. There professionalism among both Chechen and Russian politi- were also documented instances of secret services co-ope- cians, etc. rating with Islamic radicals in Chechnya, even following 5 The outcome of the almost two-year-long war was tragic. the outbreak of the second war in the republic (Sanobar The war claimed approx. 60 thousand lives, including ap- Shermatova, Tainaia voina spetssluzhb, Moskovskie Novosti, prox. five thousand Russian soldiers and approx. ten tho- 8 August 2000). usand militants. Hundreds of thousands of people fled 12 A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., p. 101–105. Chechnya (most of the refugees were Russians). As a result 13 This was agroup of several villages in western Dagestan of the war, Chechnya became almost ethnically homogeno- in the “Kadar zone” (the Botlichsk and Tsumadin regions), us, as most Russians and left permanently. which included Kadar, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. The war also brought about a deep transformation of Che - 14 In 1999 and 2000, Russian troops in Chechnya pursued chen society. The original clan structure and clan elders lost a different tactic than during the first war: first, they bom- their former significance and were replaced by young field bed the positions of militants and civilian facilities for over commanders who rose to power in the aftermath of the vic- a month in order to hit the Chechen forces as hard as possi- torious first war. See: Jacek Cichocki, Konflikt rosyjsko-cze- ble and force civilians to leave Chechnya; next, they seized czeƒski, Warsaw: CES 1997; V. A. Tishkov, Obshchestvo vvo- the lowland part of Chechnya and Grozny and finally blew oruzhennom konflikte: Etnografiia chechenskoi voiny, Mo- up landing troops on the Chechen-Georgian border preven- scow: Nauka 2001. ting Chechens from advancing towards Georgia. In spring 6 Nevertheless, the Khasav-Yurt peace agreement wasn’t si- 2000, nearly all of Chechnya was in Russian hands. gned until after the presidential elections of June 1996, in 15 Russian authorities have blamed these attacks on the Che- August 1996. chens, but it remains unclear to date just who was actually 7 The fact that the Soviet Army was not prepared to deal behind them. There is substantial evidence indicating that with guerrillas had been previously exposed by the inte- these attacks may have been perpetrated by the Russian se- rvention in Afghanistan; however, the poor style and cr et services. This is the opinion of Aleksandr Litvinenko,

CES Studies a former Federal Security Services (FSS) officer who fled to six percent of voters said “yes” to the passing of the consti- Gr eat Britain (he presents his view in the book Chechen- tution. The results of the vote appear to have been falsified. sk oye koleso by Aleksandr Mikhailov, Moscow: Sovershenno The amnesty passed in June 2003 by the Russian Duma is se k r etno 2002) and the media magnate and political oppo- supposed to cover persons who committed offences in the nent of president Putin, Boris Berezovsky (he attempts to territory of the former Chechen-Ingush ASSR after 1 August pr ove his case in the movie “Assassination of Rus s i a ” ) . 1993. The precondition is that militants surrender their 16 In the early phase of the war, approx. 350 thousand pe- arms by 1 September this year. The amnesty will also cover ople fled Chechnya, most of which went to Ingushetia. Pre- Russian soldiers who committed offences against civilians. sently, some 70 to 100 thousand Chechen refugees remain The amnesty will not include perpetrators of serious crimes in the republic, of which approx. 20 thousand live in refu- such as murder, robbery, rape, kidnapping and acts of ter- gee camps (source: http://www. m e m o. ru / h r / h o t p o i n t s / rorism. Because of the absence of security guarantees for N -Caucas/ingush/winter2002.htm). Since mid October former militants, the short duration of the amnesty and the 2002, they are being forced to return to Chechnya. In this exclusion of persons convicted for serious crimes, there is manner, the Kremlin is trying to demonstrate that the situ- a question mark over how effective the amnesty will be for ation in the republic is becoming normalised. There are al- Chechen militants (the amnesty will probably mainly apply so several thousand or several tens of thousands Chechen to Russian soldiers). refugees in Dagestan, Georgia and Stavropol Krai. Incre- 23 The present strength of the Chechen militia is approx. asingly more Chechens who managed to leave the republic 11 thousand people (http://www. p o l i t c o m . ru / 2 0 0 3 / are heading to the West, to destinations such as Poland, the zloba2297.php), while Akhmed Kadyrov’s personal body- , Germany and Belgium. guard led by his son Ramzan totals approx. four thousand 17 In the present war, Chechens are avoiding open confron- (http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/05/20/kadyrovstalb.shtml). tation with the federal troops and are not attempting to 24 For more information on this topic see Maciej Falkowski, reclaim individual villages, as was the case during the first Chechnya: suicide attacks and the Kremlin’s pre-election war. They are focusing on planting landmines along routes propaganda, Tydzieƒ na Wschodzie 314, CES 2003. used by Russian military columns, firing at posts of federal 25 For more information on the “Palestinisation” of the Che- troops and assassinating Chechens collaborating with Mo- chen conflict see: Anna Politkovska, Palestina nr 2: terakty scow. For a while now some militants have been resorting kotorykh ne byt uzhe ne moglo, Novaia Gazeta, 15 May to Palestinian-style suicide attacks. 2003; Anna Politkovska, Novaia, posleNord-Ostovskaia ide- 18 On 27 December 2002, suicide bombers blew up the bu- ologia v Chechnie: vozmite menia otomstit, Novaia Gazeta, ilding of the pro-Russian administration in Grozny using 13 Fe b ru a ry 2003; Vitaly Po r t n i ko v, Strana shakhidia, a truck loaded with explosives, killing over 70 people. In http://www.politcom.ru/2003/pvz180.php May 2003, the regional administration and FSS building in 26 See: Jadwiga Rogo˝a, Iwona WiÊniewska, A summary of the village of Znamenskoye (northern Chechnya) was de- the politico-economic changes taking place during Vladimir stroyed in a similar way. This attack claimed approx. 60 li- Put i n ’s first time of office, “CES Studies” 10, CES 2003. ves. Several days later, female suicide bombers detonated 27 According to the Nezavisimaia Gazeta daily, the “anti-ter- explosives during a religious ceremony in Iliskhan-Yurt (the rorist operation” costs the Russian budget US$ 1.3 billion to Gudermes region) killing approx. 20 people. On 5 June 1.4 billion a year (Petr Orekhin, Chechnia stanet ofshorom, a female suicide bomber blew up a bus in Mozdok (North Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 22.04.2003). According to Novaia Gaze- Ossetia) carrying Russian airmen as it drove by, killing ta, costs of the operation amount to approx. US$ 10 billion some 20 people. Shamil Basaev claimed responsibility for (Yuri Baulin, Skolko stoit den voiny vChechnie?, Novaia Ga- all of these attacks. zeta, 20 November 2002). 19 On 5 July, asuicide terrorist attack was carried out in the 28 According to estimates of the Nezavisimaia Gazeta daily, Tushino airport in Moscow where a rock music festival was which quotes the Minister of Finance of the Russian Fede- taking place. It claimed 16 lives. Russian authorities blamed ration Aleksei Kudrin, the Russian budget earmarks US$ this attack on the Chechens, but there has been no convin- 600 to 700 million annually for the reconstruction of the cing evidence to substantiate this, and none of the Chechen war-ravaged Chechnya (Pert Orekhin, op. cit.). groups has claimed responsibility. 29 Chechnya-related issues are the responsibility of several 20 President Aslan Maskhadov was accused of organising bodies of the Russian Federation, including the Ministry for the attack in Dubrovka and was rejected as apotential part- Chechen Affairs, the envoy of the president of the Russian ner in negotiations. Nevertheless, behind-the-scenes talks Federation to the Southern Federal District, the Federal Se- have taken place with some Chechen leaders who were pro- curity Service and individual ministries. mised to be admitted into political life in Chechnya. 30 For more information on corruption in Chechnya see: 21 For more information on the Chechenisation policy see: Svetlana Ofitova, Maxim Glinkin, Vor uiut vse!, Ne z a v i s i m a i a Aleksei Makarkin, Chechenizatsya: proiekt Putina–Kadyro- Gazeta, 13 March 2003. va, http://www. p o l i t c o m . ru/2002/spec_pr3.php; Aleksei 31 Pres e n t l y , some 80 thousand Russian troops are stationed Makarkin, Krizisnoie upravlenie chechenizatsyei, in Chechnya, of which nearly half are detachments of the Ar- http://www.politcom.ru/2003/pvz72.php med For ces of the Russian Federation (Musa Muradov, Ogra- 22 According to official figures, turnout in the constitutional nichennyi izbytochnyi kontingent, Kom m e r s a n t , 3 March referendum of 23 March 2003 exceeded 80 percent. Ninety- 2003). For more information on the composition of the Rus-

CES Studies sian contingent in Chechnya see: Kak voiska vvodilis 42 Aleksei Malashenko, Islamskoye Vozrozhdenie v Sovre- v Chechniu, http://www. g a z e t a . ru / 2 0 0 3 / 0 3 / 0 5 / k a k v o j s k a- mennoi Rossii, Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center 1998. vvo.shtml 43 This refers to both the autonomous Northern Caucasian 32 For more information see: Wojciech Górecki, Ewa Paszyc, republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardi- Walka o czeczeƒskà rop´, Tydzieƒ na Wschodzie 208, CES no-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adigea, and areas predo- 2001. minantly inhabited by ethnic Russians, i.e. Stavropol Krai, 33 Many NGOs are trying to bring about the awareness of Krasnodar Krai and the Rostov oblast. crimes committed by Russian troops in Chechnya; the Mo- 44 For more information on the problem of migrations in scow-based Memorial appears to be the most reliable of the- the south of Russia and related conflicts see: Dmitri Nikitin, se. In its reports, Memorial publishes evidence of specific Aleksandr Khalmukhamedov, Migratsionnyie potoki kak crimes committed by Russian troops and expresses its own faktor destabilizatsii polozhenia na Severnom Kavkaze, views on the Krem l i n’ s policy towards the republic and the Tsentralnaia Azia i Kavkaz No. 2 (20)/2002. terms on which the war should be concluded. For more in- 45 Ilia Maksakov, Kavkazski barometr, Nezavisimaia Gazeta, formation see: http://www.m e m o. ru / h r / h o t p o i n t s / c a u c a s 1 / 18 March 2003. index.htm 46 See: Vadim Ilich, Ismail Radzhabov, Sovetskoye nasledstvo 34 For more information on the expanding influence of the ne dayot pokoya Zapadu, Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 9 April 2002; military following the outbreak of the second Chechen war Akhmet Ya r l y k a p o v, Poklonniki dzhihada, N e z a v i s i m o i e see: Wojciech Górecki, Andrzej Wilk, A year of war in Voiennoie Obozrenie, 11 April 2003. Chechnya, Tydzieƒ na Wschodzie 198, CES 2000. 47 In Soviet times, Grozny was an important administrati- 35 On 8 April 2003, editors in chief of major Russian media ve, economic and educational centre for the entire North signed the “Anti-terrorist convention”, which is in fact an Caucasus and one of the region’s key transport nodes. obligation to self-censor information on anti-terrorist ope- 48 Maria Bondarenko, Ekonomika Severnogo Kavkaza ostay- rations. The convention governs the work of the media in otsia zalozhnitsei voiny, Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 14 January emergency situations such as terrorist acts and anti-terro- 2003. rist operations. Journalists are obligated to withhold infor- 4 9 Wojciech Górecki, Cz∏owiek Kremla prezydentem mation that could impede the battling of terrorists, as the Inguszetii, Tydzieƒ na Wschodzie 267, CES 2002. convention gives priority to the protection of life over the 50 Russian policy towards regions and states south of right to information. Interfax, 8 April 2003. Russia and the threats they pose are widely discussed in: 36 For example: Novaia Gazeta, Gazeta, Radio Svoboda, Echo Aleksei Malashenko, Dmitri Trenin, op. cit. M o s k v y, www. g r a n i . ru, www. a p n . ru, www. n e w s ru . c o m , 51 The Council of Europe most actively deals with the Che- www.kolokol.ru chen issue. It expressed its most recent position on the si- 37 According to research carried out by VCIOM (Russian Cen- tuation in the republic (and especially the human rights si- tre for Public Opinion and Market Research) in February tuation) in the report of the Human Rights Committee of 2003, 26 percent of Russians believe the war in Chechnya the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; see: should continue, while 70 percent support peace talks with Situatsiya s sobludeniem prav cheloveka vChechenskoi Re- the Chechen separatists. Source: “Putin stoit na chechen- spublike, http://kavkaz.memo.ru/analyticstext/analytics/id/ skom rasputii”, http://www.polit.ru/docs/612059.html 563978.html 38 Vzglad na sobytia w zdanii Nord-Osta mesiats spustia..., 52 For more information see: Gail W. Lapidus, Putin’s war on public opinion research carried out in November 2002 by terrorism: lessons form Chechnya, “Post-Soviet Affairs”, Vo- VCIOM; http://www.polit.ru/docs/477459.html lume 18/January-March 2002. 39 It is very difficult to estimate the number of immigrants 53 Nevertheless, Washington repeatedly emphasised that, from the Caucasus who stay in Russia permanently or se- from its point of view, the war in Chechnya could not be asonally, but this number certainly reaches several million. identified with the war against international terrorism be- According to different sources, approx. 100 thousand Che- cause of the different background and nature of both con- chens probably live in the Russian capital alone. flicts. Such statements, however, were not reflected in any 40 This term was made popular by the media in Russia in mid specific political activities. 1990s. “Persons of Caucasian nationality” refers to all inhabi- 54 GUUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Mol- tants of the Caucasus, irrespective of nationality or rel i g i o n . dova. They themselves find this phrase offensive and racist. 55 See: Wojciech Górecki, Kaukaz Po∏udniowy w polityce 41 For more information on the problem of Caucasophobia mi´dzynarodowej, Tydzieƒ na Wschodzie 235, CES 2001. and Islamophobia in Russia see: Aleksei Levinson, Kav k a z 56 Russia demanded that Georgia liquidate the bases of Che- podo mnoiu. Kratke zametki po formirovaniu i pr a k t i c h e s k o- chen militants on its territory (located mainly in the Panki- mu ispolzovaniu “obraza vraga” w otnoshenii lits kavkaz- si Gorge) and allow Russian forces to patrol the Russian- sk oi natsionalnosti, http://www.p o l i t . ru / d o c s / 6 1 8 8 3 4 . h t m l ; Georgian border. Moscow also demanded that Tbilisi give O polozhenii etnicheskikh Chechentsev v Moskve, a report away Chechens detained in Georgia. In order to press Geo- published on 23 February 2003 by rgia, Russia introduced visas for going to Russia, ( h t t p : / / w w w. h rw. o rg / ru s s i a n / re p o r t s / ru s s i a / 2 0 0 3 / c h e c h - frequently interrupted gas and electricity supplies to Geor- moscow.html). gia and even threatened to carry out a limited military in- tervention (the “Pankisi crisis” of October 2002).

CES Studies 57 The Russian press published numerous articles on the support offered by Muslim states, Saudi Arabia in particu- lar, for the subversive activities of Muslim radicals in Rus- sia, the activities of Arab countries’ secret services in the Caucasus and Central Asia, etc. 58 For more information see A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., p. 209–213. 59 A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., p. 222–224.

CES Studies