IFS Info 3/02

Pavel K. Baev

Russia in 2015

Could the Former Super-Power Turn into a Battle-Ground? Table of contents

On the author ...... 4 Introduction ...... 5 A Road to the Abyss ...... 6 Parameters of Disaster ...... 7 Troubles "Tous Azimuts" ...... 10 Power-Play in the South ...... 10 Meltdown and Mutiny in the North ...... 11 Chaos in the East ...... 13 Neighbours-in-Need in the West ...... 14 Battlefield Environment: Unsuitable and Unfriendly ...... 15 South: Confronting the Southem Alliance ...... 16 North: Secttring Nuclear Assets ...... 16 East: Pre-empting China ...... 17 West: Reducing Instability ...... 17 Conclusions ...... 18 Notes and References ...... 20 On the author

Dr. Pave! Baev was born in Vladivostock, USSR in 1957. He graduated from the Geographic Faculty of the Moscow State University with an MA in political geography in 1979, and worked in a military research institute until 1988, when he received his Ph. D. in international relations, and started working at the then newly established Institute of Europe. In 1992 he moved to Norway and started working at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, PRIO. From 1995 to mid-2001 he combined research at PRIO with editing the quarterly journal Security Dialogue, and from 2000 Baev has been the leader of the Foreign and Security Policy programme at PRIO. Dr. Baev has published widely on issues concerning Russia and the former USSR, ranging from ethnic conflicts to geopolitics and from the Caspian borders to the Kursk tragedy. He has wide international networks and has participated in many international conferences on issues such as Russian military thinking, secessionism in Europe, and the Chechen conflicts, and been a frequent participant in the Norwegian public debate.

4 IFS lnfo 3/02 Russia 2015: Could the former Super-Power Turn into a Battle-Ground?

Introduction (autumn 2003 is a common point of reference) but primarily because many long-term factors The tragedy of September 11 and the US of instability may doom Putin's state-building response in the form of the global war against project to a failure. Russia is often described terrorism (conceptually problematic as it is) as a country with an unpredictable past, as have set in motion some real shifts in regional well as one that cannot be understood with a power balances but much greater alterations common sense; the evidence for both asser­ in perceptions of the nature and applicability tions is the fact that it can never arrive at any of power in the globalized world. The basic certainty about its identity and "mission". level of uncertainty about the mid-term out­ Putin's recipe of "pragmatic patriotism" may look of the system of international relations prove to be only a palliative measure with has increased dramatically. The middle-of-the­ limited mobilizational effect and his new "go­ road scenarios have lost much value, while West" course could contribute to its fast ex­ risk analysis has seen a surge in demand from piring.' political decision-making. There is obviously While it is always too easy to be pessimistic a greater need to look into the risks that had about Russia's future, now it is also necessary been dismissed as negligible in their proba­ to attempt to measure the scale of possible bility even if grave in scale - and to plan for disasters in medium-long perspective, which counter-measures. While the menu of such is the case with this study. 3 On the one hand, risks is quite rich, one of their greatest sources dealing with Russia you cannot be that far for the European security system continues off-target taking a catastrophic scenario as to be Russia. the basic one. Alexander Pushkin, writing in President Putin has found in the on-going the 1830s about "the Russian bunt (revolt), global confusion an opportunity to move senseless and merciless", was perhaps looking Russia a great deal closer to the \Vest, his not that much 60 years back at the Pugachev control over the structures of power across uprising as 85 years ahead at the Civil War. the enormous space of this country appears On the other hand, the relatively peaceful col­ firm and his popularity remains astonishingly lapse of the USSR and the relatively stable high. On the background of all the crises and (even if self-destructive) first decade of post­ recession in the world, Russia appears to be Soviet life were indeed a chain of miracles, both politically stable and economically dyna­ the famous Russian chudo,' and it would be mic, to much surprise and joy of its own a stretch to expect that it would continue for population.' This picture, however, may be 15 more years. deceptive, and not only because another eco­ This study is neither an attempt to warn nomic crisis could hit Russia in the near future about a looming catastrophe, nor an exercise

IFS Info 3/02 5 in "rationalising of chaos", aimed at develop­ Federation or even a serious spill-over into ing a post-deterrence version of "thinking the neighbouring regions. 8 The second war about the unthinkable" .5 It looks into a fairly was, in fact, used as the launching pad for disastrous scenario of erosion of the centra­ the project of consolidation and reinvigoration lized political structures by centrifugal forces, of the Russian state that has become a perso­ which - unfortunately - remains entirely nal crusade of Russia's second president, possible and therefore needs being spelled out. Vladimir Putin. While the risk associated with a self-fulfilling After two years of implementation of this prophecy is dismissed by this author as negli­ project, Putin can claim credit for significant gible, the limitations of focussing on just one achievements. Regional governors and repub­ narrow segment of a spectrum are fully recog­ lican presidents dare not disobey his orders, nized. There will be many cross-roads ahead the compliant parliament is ready to rubber­ where Russia could suddenly slip down this stamp those, the "oligarchs" are either tamed, slope, so the aim is to identify certain crucial or crushed (primarily those with media em­ points where a concentrated internal effort pires). Even the war in Chechnya, which stub­ and/or determined external engagement (inter­ bornly refuses to go away while its political vention) could make a positive difference. The usefulness has long since expired, is "virtually" paper starts with marking the road that might reduced by the means of media control to a lead to a series of complex and violent inter­ habitual and minor local problem.' At the nal conflicts between 2010 and 2015, then same time, doubts in the sustainability of examines the possible elements and parame­ these successes persist. 10 ters of these conflicts, then takes a closer look The problem is not that Putin has shown at several theatres and flash-points, and final­ signs of hesitation and weakness (for instance, ly comes to the requirements for possible in restructuring the all-powerful natural mono­ external (Western) interventions. polies like GAZPROM or RAO EEC). The real problem is that his project may have a fundamental flaw in the design. 11 Its two key parts- achieving strong economic growth on the basis of market reforms and strengthening A Road to the Abyss the executive "vertical" around the beefed-up "power structures"- could prove to be incom­ Several times during the 1990s Russia came patible." Markets normally react positively to the brink of a violent implosion: starting to stability but their sustained expansion re­ with the abortive putsch of August 1991; quires deregulation and decentralization. An followed by the confrontation between Pre­ indirect proof to this somewhat "theoretical" sident Yeltsin and the Parliament in October argument is that by the end of 2001 the 1993, which escalated to a street riot sup­ economic growth in Russia had visibly slowed pressed by tanks;' and finally the financial down, while many splits and divisions inside meltdown of August 1998 that threatened to the executive had become apparent. While evolve into a political collapse.' At the same many observers are still worried about the time, it should be noted that neither the first growth of authoritarian trends in Putin's re­ nor the second Chechen Wars, with all their gime, 1l the most grave risk is not that he will humiliating defeats and destructive intensity, build a rigid vertically-integrated "police" produced a significant resonance across the state but that he will fail in this undertaking. t; IFS Info 3/02 It has already become evident that the aim resonance of this Stalinist victory (entirely of strengthening the state has evolved into a feasible if deadly force is applied consistent­ much narrower goal of consolidating the re­ ly)" may, however, turn out to be much more gime, and Putin (starting as a quintessential destructive than that of the US victory in Afg­ gosudarstvennik) has become a hostage to his hanistan (providing it does not turn into a high ratings to a much greater degree than failure) and more expensive than is budgeted Clinton ever was. 14 The policy-making has for by the General Staff. evolved into a permanent campaigning, as if Putin's successor will, therefore, inherit the the elections are always a few months ahead. results of a failed state-rebuilding project; a That narrows significantly his space for man­ third president would have to accept that the oeuvring and the very ability to undertake means of public mobilization around a new serious (and inevitably painful) reforms; while "strong Russia" project are non-existent and Putin faces the need to advance simultane­ the levers of administrative control - quite ously massive restructuring in the social sector unreliable. Much the same way as Gorbachev (the pension fund and the communal was in late perestroika, 19 he may already in housing), finances (the tax system), natural the succession phase be betrayed by the state monopolies (RAO EEC is the first in line and apparatus (particularly the "power struc­ GAZPROM the close second), judiciary (the tures"), which could defect to other "power court system) and the military, his main focus centres';. This bureaucratic "chain reaction" has already been set on securing the re­ of centrifugal drift could easily go along re­ election in spring 2004. With the emphasis gional lines. Overall, the end result of Putin's on PR "technologies", simulation of activity statist project could hardly be a reinvigorated and apparatus intrigue, he may well succeed and self-assured Russia able to project po­ in that, but the larger results could be not wer (least of all westwards, so the Baltic sta­ just disappointing but destabilizing. 15 Instant tes are in fact quite safe), but very possibly a success may backfire through accumulation dysfunctional state and divided society with of a critical mass of neglected failures. massive conflict potential, multiple fault li­ Dominating so powerfully over Russia's nes and too many detonators. politics, Putin quite possibly will exhaust the expectations, credits and inertia by the end of this decade- much the same way as Yeltsin had exhausted the reserves of his system of control by the late 1990s. 16 One significant Parameters of Disaster corrosive impact here is again Chechnya. Keeping this crisis low profile, hoth domes­ Approaching the 1 OO'h anniversary of the Bol­ tically and internationally, Putin can hardly shevik revolution, Russia in many ways might deceive himself about its real costs and pains. look surprisingly similar to the huge mis­ Unlike Yeltsin, he does not have political sto­ shaped and overworked state that collapsed mach to accept defeat or even a compromise; in autumn 1917. The main cause of a new at the same time, the deadlock may well prove implosion may again be a structural economic unsustainable. That leaves him with the op­ crisis, this time caused not by a crippling war tion of military victory, which would require mobilization but by inconsistent and badly a significant escalation of hostilities from the mismanaged reforms, which create an unvia­ current level of slow-moving atrocities.17 The ble hybrid system. Over the next 15 years

IFS Info 3/02 7 Russia may experience several short periods appalling health care - tends to increase." of sharp growth (involving mostly export­ What is relevant here, is that with the arrival oriented energy and primary commodities at the labour market of a new (and numerical­ sectors), interspersed by longer periods of ly smaller) generation born after the USSR, depression that would produce an overall the overall geographic mobility would remain picture of prolonged stagnation (in fact, low, making links even between neighbour continuing since the late 1980s).20 A key fea­ communities fragile. In parallel with this ture of this pattern of "muddle-down" is sus­ societal fragmentation, the reserves of tole­ tained under-investment in basic assets, rance and endurance in the society are run­ caused by their low attractiveness for foreign ning thin, much the same way as most of the investors and unstoppable capital flight. 21 basic assets and infrastructure built on tech­ This paper cannot aim at presenting an ela­ nologies of the 1960-70s are coming to the borate macro-economic forecast, what is re­ end of their "life cycles" .27 Soviet (and more levant for its topic is the trend of fragment­ ancient) traditions of obedience and hard ation of Russia's economic space. A few is­ work are being replaced not by democratic lands of export-oriented industries (for in­ values and entrepreneurial drive but by cyni­ stance, the aluminium production) are becom­ cism, passivity and corruption. Putin may be ing disconnected from the rest of the economy, able to tap into the nostalgic longing for "or­ where regional-size markets are dominated der" and residual trust in a "good tsar", bur by protected local producers, while Moscow this personification condemns his reign to stands apart as an area of arrogant affluence.22 inevitable bitter disappointment.28 As an ex­ Oil and gas industries, controlled by a few tra corrosive, Chechnya gradually spreads the giant companies, keep investing primarily in destructive culture of violence. The atomised their own export capacity, while many ele­ and sick society is becoming ripe for a chain ments of basic infrastructure - such as elec­ of conflicts. tricity grids - deteriorate beyond repair.23 Yet another key parameter of the on-going Transport networks (including railways) transformation, which contains seeds of pos­ could no longer support cost-efficient econo­ sible conflict, is regionalism. This trend was mic interactions; in terms of distance "resis­ developing strongly if unevenly during the tance", Russia is not just becoming even larger 1990s,29 so Putin has started his presidency than it really is, it is becoming impenetrable, with a series of measures aimed at restoring and the area, which is becoming virtually dis­ the integrity of central control. He may have connected as well as derelict, is the Far East. 24 succeeded superficially in that but structurally Another important dimension of the the basic factors that drive the growth of multiple crises that might escalate between regionalism remain in place; the regional 2010 and 2015 is demographic. Russian media elites continue to rely on well-established is currently full of dramatic projections that political structures and to build their own present the sustained population decline and economic foundations of power. There is also disturbing health statistics as a "looming a distinctive growth of regional identities humanitarian catastrophe".25 More sober an­ caused by the fragmentation of economic alyses show that migration from other post­ space and low geographic mobility, and the Soviet states remains a significant reserve respective elites eagerly cultivate this process.30 against depopulation (except for some areas in One noticeable feature in this patchy picture the Far North), while life expectancy- despite is growing alienation of "provinces" from

8 IFS Info 3/02 Ivloscow, both as the federal center and an by targeted investments, some other elements arrogantly rich region. It is possible that of strategic deterrent (like early warning) may Putin's plan for creating seven federal districts essentially disintegrate. Such logistically vul­ would not be that effective in curbing the nerable branches of the Armed Forces as the republican quasi-independence. In some cases Long-Range Aviation or the "blue-water" (first of all, in the North Caucasus) it could Navy could loose most of their combat effec­ even create political structures for larger-scale tiveness and retain only symbolic roles as nuc­ regional separatism.31 lear "assets";35 at the same time, plenty of Current developments that might most Army hardware (such as armour and artillery) significantly determine the character and may prove to be remarkably durable. In ge­ intensity of future conflicts involve the Armed neral, the military structures will continue to Forces and other "power structures". While generate high risks of technological accidents for the military the overall trend through the and even catastrophes, which could trigger 1990s was that of degradation, for most other serious political conflicts. 36 "armed bureaucracies" (from the Ministry of With all the best intentions about "profes­ Interior to the Tax Police) it was strengthen­ sionalization", the Armed Forces, as well as ing and diversification. The second Chechen several other "power structures", would most War, which was so instrumental in propell­ probably remain dependent on the draft- and ing Putin to the summit of power, has proved that will have significant societal conse­ beyond doubt the urgent need in reforming quences. One is that a large proportion of the Armed Forces - but has also massively young and middle-age men will have basic complicated this process.32 Even placing his military training, and perhaps up to most trusted "lieutenant" Sergei lvanov in 2,500,000 veterans (including a large majo­ charge of the Defense Ministry, Putin cannot rity of officers in the Army) could have first­ guarantee the successful advancement of hand combat experience. Another is that the reforms which remain under-financed and Armed Forces will not be able to improve seriously affected by the pressure of the war.33 the internal cohesion and remain prone to While the economic realities dictate further spontaneous loss of control. 37 Yet another is numerical reductions of the Armed Forces, that the pattern of locally conducted draft they may go through several phases of con­ would reinforce the trend towards regional­ traction and expansion in the next 10-15 years ization of the Army. (oscillating on the basic level of 1,000,000), This trend fits naturally into the general since local wars remain manpower-intensive picture of "Russia of the regions" character­ endeavours. 34 ized by the fragmentation of economic space, Modernization, in the mean,vhile, remains deterioration of transport infrastructure and the most problematic part of the current and consolidation of decentralised political any future Armed Forces reform project; frameworks. A key factor here is the interests several crucial elements of military infra­ of regional elites in "domestication" and even structure will, quite possibly, deteriorate "privatization" of military units based in their beyond the level of acceptable risk (for Russia's respective domains.38 For the military, reli­ neighbours this level might be significantly ance on local sources of supply could become lower than for the authorities in Moscow). the only possible survival strategy, which also While the system of control of the strategic provides them with an opportunity to acquire missile forces will, perhaps, be kept functional a profile of a usable and useful instrument in

IFS Info 3/02 9 regional politics. From that perspective, distant locations a division from the mighty Putin's master-plan to integrate the systems Moscow Military District, since their key task of control over the military and other "po­ is to secure stability in the center. This certain­ wer structures" in the seven federal districts ly cannot preclude attempts at using military does not look promising (even leaving aside force in political battles inside the Garden the lack of compatibility between various Ring (a highway encircling downtown "power districts"), since pure administrative Moscow), but overall it is quite possible that sub-ordination cannot compensate for the Moscow, with its relatively high level of "indigenization" which comes natural for the prosperity and plentiful levers of control, special units under the Ministry of Interior would remain stable and reasonably peaceful, (OMON and SOBR) and, in cases where state shielding itself from regional troubles.40 An­ borders are subject to trans-regional inter­ other important geographic feature of the actions, the forces of the Border Service." future conflicts is their predisposition to Overall, the most serious risks of internal spread cross-border or interplay with possible conflict in Russia appear to come not from a instabilities in neighbour-states. deep ideological divide (like the "reds" against the "whites") or from a violent clash for po­ Power-play in the South wer in the center (Putin would most probably Russia is and will continue to be exposed to be able to orchestrate a smooth transition of po­ much violent instability in the areas to the we~ applying sophisticated "political techno· south of its borders; at the moment of this logics"), but from instabilities in far-away pro­ writing, the epicentre of turbulence in Afg­ vinces. Regional authorities gradually acquire hanistan appears to be under US control but significant "power instruments" and would the situation will continue to remain fluid for perhaps be more inclined to use them against months if not years to come. It could be point­ one another than against the federal center. ed out that Putin shifted strategic attention The latter could find itself with limited capa­ to Central Asia well in advance of the US bilities to suppress or control local civil wars. retaliatory campaign, perhaps drawing some lessons from the history of the Great Game.41 The crushing defeat of the Taliban may well play into Russia's hands as far as the aim of consolidating its positions in the region is Troubles "Taus Azimuts" concerned.42 However, already in the mid­ term the fundamental issue of inadequacy of Geography might be a crucial factor in available instruments and resources for a pro­ determining the scale and intensity of, as well active strategy of a "security guarantor" will as spill-over from, various possible regional inevitable strike back. 43 Conducting a stra­ conflicts. It is not the distance from Moscow tegic withdrawal from Central Asia, which as such that is the key independent geographic might start with a retreat from the Tajik-Afg­ variable; it is rather the density of transport han border, Russia would probably be able networks (Murmansk ob last is in fact as dif­ to limit the violent spill-over inside its fron­ ficult to reach as Primorye, and Kaliningrad tier regions. The vast steppes of Kazakhstan is not much easier to keep under control than make a natural "buffer"; feeling safe behind Sakhalin). It is also foreseeable that the federal it, Moscow may even decide to take advant­ authorities could be reluctant to deploy to age of the possible collapse of this poorly

10 IFS Info 3/02 stitched-together state, taking sides with the into the Crimea which may become yet an­ Russians in the North and North-East in or­ other quasi-state with significant military der to seize control over the oil-rich Caspian assets but ruined economy. littoral in the West. But with all the potential The southern Russian regions, controlling cataclysms in the Caspian area, the area where the major oil pipeline Tengiz-Novorossiisk, Russia could directly encounter most grave as well as the oil terminal in this port, and, and penetrating security challenges is the possibly, the gas pipeline to Turkey, may deve­ Caucasus. lop taste for playing in the "Great Game" Complete devastation of Chechnya might around the Caspian Sea, and their reach might lead to a broad destabilization of the whole extend as far as undercutting the Baku-Cheyhan Northern Caucasus. Facing this violent neigh­ pipeline. Even if Georgia and Azerbaijan would bourhood, the Stavropol and Krasnodar kray be able to forge a counter-alliance with some may form a tight strategic alliance, backed quasi-states of the Northern Caucasus and by the Rosrov, Volgograd and Astrakhan secure some support from Turkey, their defense oblast. The newly-created structures of the capacity would hardly be a match to the po­ Southern administrative district may be used wer projection capabilities of the alliance. for consolidating this security-driven "Alliance The whole Caucasian region would then of 5 regions" and turning it into a reasonably become a theatre for a range of overlapping unified political unit, able not just to bargain low-intensity conflicts, fought mostly by irre­ with Moscow but also to make its own policy. gulars but contained and controlled from the Instead of "privatizing" the military assets North by a hardened military structure. This of the North Caucasus Military District, "army-without-a-state" could be sustained only mem-bers of the "Alliance" might be able to if the five Russian regions maintain a reason­ keep most of them under unified control, and ably high degree of unity and obtain extra re­ that will give it a military force of up to sources from energy exports. While most of 100,000 troops, backed by para-military the heavy weapons and other hardware avail­ Cossack formations. able for these forces would be seriously ob­ The basic strategic aim of the Southern solete (by NATO standards), and the organi­ Alliance may be to fortify and protect the zation could resemble more the Soviet Army southern borders of Russia "proper", which than a modern Combined Joint Task Force may be justified through aggressive (CJTF), the alliance could be able to dominate nationalistic ideology that would assert the militarily its immediate neighbourhood. need to protect the "real Russians against the "Caucasians". Effectively cutting out Kalmykia Meltdown and Mutiny in the North and Dagestan, the alliance may also build a The Kola Peninsula remains one of the most military-political partnership with North militarized areas in the world- and certainly Ossetia, which would serve as a bridgehead the one with the heaviest concentration of vis-a-vis the unruly mountaineers and a bridge nuclear weapons, reactors and materiel. Du­ towards the Southern Caucasus. Krasnodar ring the 1990s, the geo-strategic profile of kray, while swallowing Adygeya, may also Russia's North-West changed significantly: on provide military assistance to Abkhazia, seek­ the one hand, the Northern Fleet preserved ing to keep Georgia weak and divided." In its strategic role and may even strengthen it case of a major turmoil in Ukraine, the alliance if the plans to concentrate all SSBNs here may send "volunteers" across the Kerch Straight would indeed be implemented during this

IFS Info 3/02 11 decade.45 On the other hand, the Leningrad One consequence of this sustained inability Military District (MD) is no longer perceived to finance and support the complex structures as a "frontline" district and this perception of the Navy is a permanently high risk of of very low external threat would probably technological disasters. While it is the poorly con-tinue, even if Finland and the Baltic "trio" maintained combat systems that are the most would join NATO. As a result, most Army units prone to accidents/' the most grave risks will in this district were either disbanded or re­ come from the damage inflicted by these acci­ duced to low readiness status (skeleton units); dents to nuclear weapons and reactors, as well the only full-strength unit is the 76•h Pskov as the accidental destruction of dozens of re­ Airborne Division, located some 1300 km tired nuclear reactors that will continue to south of Murmansk. be stored in the close vicinity of the naval This corresponds to the relatively high level bases without proper attention.52 Another of internal stability in this vast region consequence is that the under-financed, under­ (currently known as the "presidential re­ staffed and poorly trained Navy inevitably gion"),'' but at the same time increases the becomes prone not just to all sorts of "human specific risks related to the nuclear-strategic errors" (which often aggravate technological "overload" of the Kola Peninsula. Indeed, the disasters), but also to erosion of discipline, probability of violent social unrest in the gross insubordination, and even mutiny. North-Western Russia is reasonably low: The Russian Navy has a rich history of Karelia is increasingly involved in cooperative mutinies in the early 20•h century, involving ties with Finland; while the coal-producing both battleships (Potemkin, Ochakov, Pamyat Pechora and Vorkura will continue to loose Azova) and naval bases (Sveaborg, Kron­ population, there might also emerge new shtadt), caused primarily by deteriorating economic dynamism related to the develop­ social conditions and humiliating defeat in ment of hydro-carbons in the Barents Sea. the war with japan. This time a mutiny might But as for the Northern Fleet, despite all its be triggered by a technological accident lea­ strategic importance, during the 1990s it was ding to panic and loss of control.53 The left to deteriorate to a level involving serious mutiny might quickly spread through several risks of major accidents. It is not just that the naval bases; while the marine brigade of the combat ships are dismally maintained (the Northern Fleet might remain reluctant to act proper logistics for major surface combatants against the rebellious garrisons, the command in fact never existed), it is also that the whole of the Leningrad MD would find it extremely logistic support infrastructure is now on the difficult to find reliable combat-ready units brink of collapse." In this situation, some and to transport them to Murmansk along poorly sustained efforts to increase finan­ the only railway link that can easily be cing" or to finish the construction of a few blocked or destroyed. Lacking any organiza­ new combat ships·" cannot reverse the trend tion or ideology, the mutineers can hardly keep towards disintegration of the Navy. At the any resemblance of order, some may attempt same time, the requirements of a 'grand to escape to Norway, but some hard-core strategy'50 and the prestige considerations groups, seizing control over a few nuclear would continue to push the Northern Fleet weapons, can blackmail Moscow and pre­ towards keeping several nuclear submarines sent a broad range of demands, from ransom and major surface combatants in its combat to resignation of the president. order, even if not combat ready.

12 IFS Info 3/02 Chaos in the East !ems translates into high level of social tens­ The vast and sparsely populated Russian Far ion." At the same time, the island has con­ East contains half a dozen loosely connected siderable resources of oil and gas and its go­ regions, which have plenty of common ills vernment has, after long delays, started to but very low sense of unity or common build stable relations with foreign investors, interests. Each region struggles with such first of all from Japan and South Korea. It is problems as industrial decline, urban degra­ hard to expect that energy projects would dation and depopulation on its own, trying generate a spectacular economic boom, but to get attention from Moscow (increasingly Sakhalin, with its crumbling urban infra­ complicated by the geo-economic drift, structure, might get irritated that most of the caused by ageing transport infrastructure) and income is "confiscated" by Moscow. This per­ seeking to attract foreign investors by their ceived injustice and "exploitation" might lead natural resources. From the point of view of to the growth of secessionist tendencies, potential violent conflicts, the three weakest fuelled by expectations of more "oil money" links are Kamchatka, Sakhalin and Primorye. but complicated by increasing migration from Kamchatka, as a heavily militarized region, Korea. Seeking to secure international sup­ faces many of the same problems of collapsing port for its independence, Sakhalin might naval infrastructure as the Murmansk oblast, offer Japan to strike a separate deal on the but is even more vulnerable from the point four contested Kuril islands (which formally of view of energy supply and does not have belong to Kamchatka oblast but are much such neighbours as Finland and Norway to closer to, and economically more connected keep a watchful eye on its troubles. Even if with Sakahlin). by 2010-2015 all strategic submarines are Primorsky kray, with its relatively dense redeployed from the Pacific to the Northern population (perhaps, around 2,000,000 by Fleet, the region cannot be completely de­ 2015), significant militarization and serious nuclearised - but might become even more energy supply problems, has been also distin­ neglected.54 A mutiny, therefore, could speci­ guished since mid-1990s by high level of fically target nuclear facilities in order to get political tensions, both internal and vis-a-vis a security guarantee against possible force­ Moscow. These tensions are likely to continue ful action directed from Moscow and to since the prospects of rapid economic develop­ receive instant international attention. While ment stimulated by opening of the "Eastern Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky (where about a gate" into Russia will hardly materialize.56 half of the region's population is concen­ In this permanently tense situation, a political trated) could be engulfed by the mutiny, grouping might try to mobilize public sup­ perhaps triggered by a disastrous accident and port around the idea of recreating the Far possibly instigated by regional elites (who Eastern Republic (which existed briefly in the might entertain an idea like "free Kamchatka") early 1920s). It could be combined with ethno­ the northern part of the region (Koryaksky nationalistic slogans aimed primarily against okrug) may try to split (as it attempted to do the illegal Chinese immigration, which might in 1991) and politically distance itself from reach such a scale that Russian border regions the conflict. can feel the threat of being overwhelmed.57 Sakhalin is much less militarised but is If the political conflicts in the region turn currently perceived by experts as one of those violent with some of this violence targeting regions where high level of economic prob- Chinese communities, China might feel ob-

IFS Info 3/02 13 liged to intervene, or jump at an opportunity cularly since its economy would be entirely to combine limited steps aimed at protecting re-oriented towards the EU and its military its citizens with more forceful measures aimed profile reduced to insignificant features. at resolving the border disputes." In Ukraine, growing frustration with the results of a pro-Western course paves the way Neighbours-in-Need in the West for a rapprochement with Russia which, in While Russia's western regions appear rela­ turn, radicalizes political opposition." A po­ tively stable and are not expected to generate tential crisis at any moment between 2005 violent conflicts between them or with Mos­ and 2015 might take a complex and multi­ cow, they can be strongly affected by possible dimensional character: a violent political con­ destabilization of Belarus and Ukraine. These frontation in Kiev, strikes and mass protests rwo countries for most of the 1990s followed in Kharkov and Donbass, an opportunistic remarkably different trajectories: Belarus op­ break-away drive in the Crimea, and a Europe­ ted for self-isolation and re-unification with oriented nationalistic uprising in Western Russia, while the Ukraine sought to cultivate Ukraine. There is no way that Moscow can ties with the West; currently, however, both take control over the whole of Ukraine or show potential for serious internal conflicts, effectively dominate all of these conflicts. which may remain latent and escalate sudden­ Most probably, it will focus its efforts on Kiev, ly due to some external trigger. In both cases seeking to ensure the victory for a pro-Russian Russia might find it impossible not to inter­ party in the capital and then to help it to re­ vene, but the aims would inevitably be mud­ store control over most of the state. At the dled by the overlapping agendas of regional same time, southern Russian regions may interests, nationalistic aspirations, restoration undertake their own interventions, advancing of order and relations with the West. a creeping annexation of Eastern Ukraine or, In Belarus the main line of the conflict could as described above, supporting the Crimean be that of implosion of a corrupt semi­ secessionism. Perhaps the most complicated authoritarian regime. While the opposition twist of this conflict may develop in Western groupings could rely on support from Pol­ Ukraine, which might find its European aspi­ and and Lithuania (by that time also a NATO rations enmeshed into particular interests of member), Moscow might find itself commit­ Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania ted to propping up the regime in Minsk.59 (which by 2015 would probably all be NATO Deploying troops (for instance, with the man­ members). This area would generally remain date to seal off Belarus' western and northern outside Russia's reach, but it could make a borders) and police forces (for instance, for serious impact from its southern flank, where riot control in Minsk), Russian government the conflict in Transdniestria may re-ignite could face not only sharp criticism from, and (even if the Russian troops are by that time certain counter-actions by the West, but also withdrawn)." resistance from its own regions, which might To summarise, it appears quite possible that engage into cross-border interactions with key violent conflicts of different format and centers in eastern Belarus, strengthening their intensity, with various resonance and spill­ hand against Minsk. 60 Another dimension of over, could escalate, perhaps even simultane­ this crisis might involve Kaliningrad: this ously, in peripheral Russia's regions and in isolated region might find in this turbulence its immediate neighbourhood. In each case, an opportunity to secede from Russia, parti- Moscow's limited ability to project power and

14 IFS Info 3/02 restore order would raise demands and create battlefields may be outlined with reasonable imperatives for the Western powers, and first certainty. of all for the US, to intervene militarily. It is sufficiently clear that a US/NATO inter­ vention with the goal of protecting Poland or any other Eastern European country (in­ cluding the three Baltic states) against Russian invasion would hardly ever become a matter of practical consideration;" Russia would al­ Battlefield Environment: ways find its limited capabilities stretched way Unsuitable and Unfriendly too thin to challenge NATO in such a direct way. Much more probable are urgent requests from Field Marshal Montgomery allegedly placed concerned neighbours, international NGOs, the proposition to invade Russia at the very local authorities, and in some cases even from top of the list of military blunders, to be the Russian government, to perform an inter­ avoided at any costs.63 This post-WWII con­ vention into some kind of a civil war, most ventional wisdom may remain true for years probably of regional scale. There might be to come, however, the above-described con­ multiple parties to such conflicts with diffe­ flicts could produce a number of situations rent attitudes towards the intervening forces; where non-intervention would become an the violence, termination of which would be equally serious blunder. It goes without saying the immediate aim of an intervention, would that NATO is perfectly capable of committing mostly be unstructured and chaotic. While such a blunder; in fact, every situation where small arms would be widespread, in many an intervention inside Russia becomes a mat­ cases the warring parties would be able to ter of practical discussions is nearly certain use also armour and artillery, and in some to generate sharp disagreements and agoni­ cases even tactical aviation on a limited scale. zing doubts. Back in mid-2001, the options There will be practically no modern weapon described below would have seemed to be systems and very few of those build on entirely hypothetical; however, the chain of technologies of the 1990s; the Command­ events after 11 September necessitates a dif­ Control-Communication-Intelligence (C3I) ferent perspective. While it is true that NATO, systems available to the "enemy" would be even evoking for the first time the central very primitive and unreliable, but there could Article V of its Charter, has had little if any be instances where skilled use of sophisticated relevance for the US-led global anti-terrorist computer technology could damage the in­ war," the Alliance now has to look seriously formation systems of allied forces. into its possible functions in the next 'un­ One key question will inevitably be about expected' crisis, if it wants to prevent further the "enemy". In the environment of internal slide towards complete irrelevance. Typically, unrest it is never easy to distinguish between in such situations time and space would be friend-and-foe, and there would not neces­ available in proportions strictly opposite to sarily be ethnic, linguistic or cultural features the desires of operation planners (i.e. too little to help with this identification. Overall, the of the former and too much of the latter); population of the target area would be rela­ capabilities and intentions of the adversaries tively high educated (albeit, with poor ave­ could be unclear, but some other parameters rage knowledge of foreign languages), pre­ of the potential peacekeeping grounds/ dominantly urban, accustomed to all sorts of

IFS Info 3/02 15 hardship and possessing skills in exploiting would be an indispensable partner in con­ dilapidated equipment that most Western ducting this intervention, providing both the users would consider as scrap. The prevailing ports for US/NATO naval deployment and cultural patterns as well as the demographic the land access to the theatre. structure of the population make it highly While designed basically as a peacekeeping improbable that child soldiers might consti­ operation with limited enforcement capa­ tute a considerable portion of fighters. On bilities, it would also be one that may face a the other hand, a high proportion of men relatively well-organized "enemy" represented would have basic military training and even by the alliance of five of Russia's southern combat experience. Some groups may be regions. Besides possessing a regular army, highly motivated to fight against "foreign this alliance may sponsor a range of para­ invaders" and may continue resistance against military formations and would with few heavy odds. doubts resort to terrorism. A confrontation One of the major problems on the potential with this "enemy" might require rapid rein­ theatres would be mobility. It is not the terrain forcement of the initially deployed force and as such that constitutes the problem (no re-orientation of the whole operation. jungles, high mountains or deserts), but rather A major advantage of the intervening the need to cover large distances from the coalition would be the possibility to project "point of entry" with poor transport and com­ power from sea to shore with few impedi­ munication networks. The "enemy" would ments, since Russia's Black Sea Fleet would have the advantage of familiarity with the not be able to put up much opposition terrain and could specifically target lines of (whether controlled by Moscow or "priva­ communications, for instance \Vith intensive tized" by the Alliance); the deployment of an use of land mines. Local sources of supply aircraft carrier group is therefore highly might be pretty limited, even the quality of advantageous. The most vulnerable target for drinking water could be significantly sub­ blockade is Novorossiisk, since the "enemy" standard. While chemical and biological would be highly dependent on oil exports weapons would most probably not be used from this port. However, any deployment of (however, such use cannot be completely ruled troops inside the Caucasus (for instance, out), in many cases the destruction of along the pipeline) would expose them to risks industrial facilities may result in dangerous of partizan warfare. It would also be essential pollution. Nuclear weapons and materials to prevent any undesirable spill-over from the may be present in many potential conflicts, intervention, for instance, an attempt by and in some they would constitute the most Azerbaijan (possibly helped by Turkey) to win threatening dimension. back Nagorno Karabakh.

South: Confronting the Southern Alliance North: Securing Nuclear Assets While NATO could hardly be involved in An intervention might become necessary for hostilities in Central Asia, and even the US denying the mutinous Northern Fleet the con­ might find that theatre prohibitively demand­ trol of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. ing for sustained operations, an intervention Since the conflict might erupt with little-or-no in the Caucasus - in response to Georgia's warning and rapidly escalate, time would be plea for help or aimed at securing the Baku­ of high value, while information can be scarce Cheyhan pipeline -may be requested. Turkey and sketchy. The possibility to use northern

16 IFS Info 3/02 Norwegian ports is sine qua non for any inter­ large-scale and high-risk intervention due to vention. at least two factors: one is again the control Since the "enemy" would most probably be over nuclear weapons belonging to the Pacific unable to organize any serious resistance, the Fleet, another is the possibility of Chinese intervention could be of small-to-medium size intervention under the pretext of saving the and involve several special operations aimed lives of its citizens. at securing nuclear weapons at the 3-4 main While it may be short to impossible to pre­ naval bases and the deployment of some vent China from advancing towards Khaba­ 3,000 troops to Severomorsk (a city of 50,000 rovsk and Blagoveshensk, taking control over population with perhaps up to 1,000 rebel Vladivostok and the area around it up to the forces) with the mandate to restore order. For border with Korea is generally feasible. Such the first phase of the operation, surprise may an operation might involve a rapid deploy­ be the key factor, but for the second non­ ment (perhaps, up to a Marine division), which combat phase the arrival of sufficient person­ will then have to be expanded and sustained; nel trained for handling nuclear material is that would require building a considerable cruciaL Technical solutions and engineering coalition force (involving Australia, Canada, work might prove to be much more compli­ Japan, and South Korea, with the US provid­ cated than restoring order, particularly since ing the core of the expedition force). The goals most of the Fleet's nuclear weapons will be of territorial control could be consistently kept well beyond the warrant period. Regio­ achieved only if cooperation from local nal authorities in Murmansk, certainly shaken authorities is secured, for which the political by the rebellion, could be cooperative and, framework of the Far Eastern Republic may perhaps, more cooperative than Moscow, prove usefuL which could grant the permission for inter­ vention only reluctantly. West: Reducing Instability Potential crises in Belarus and Ukraine East: Pre-empting China (especially if developing simultaneously) The chaotic crisis in Russia's Far East could could create instability of such a scale that necessitate several interventions with diffe­ no Western intervention could realistically rent aims and formats. The response to a aim at restoring a stable order; the goals could naval mutiny in Kamchatka could be similar be rather to stabilize the areas adjacent to to the operation in the Kola Peninsula, the four East European and the three Baltic securing nuclear weapons being its prime states, while preventing these states (all of goaL The scale of the operation may be even them NATO members at the time) from smaller (the only place to take control of acting unilaterally on some nationalistic would be Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, a city agendas. of perhaps 150,000 inhabitants), and the main In the case of Belarus, a key consideration logistical difficulty would be the lack of any would be to avoid direct confrontation with port facilities in the vicinity. Russia, \Vho-actingonsome "union" commit­ If the secessionist drive in Sakhalin would ments - might try to prop up an unpopular turn violent, the role of key peace-maker regime in Minsk. Brest and Grodno could be could be left to Japan, perhaps in cooperation the initial targets of an intervention, designed with Canada and Australia. But a violent in a peacekeeping format; the situation in unrest in Primorsky kray might require a Kaliningrad should be closely monitored in

IFS Info 2/02 17 order to prevent any violent unrest in this thing possible to avoid such a confrontation. isolated enclave. A possible serious compli­ Facing the threat of losing control over parts cation requiring some special operations of the periphery, the Russian government, would be the deployment of Russian nuclear most probably, would be reluctant to ask for weapons in Belarus and Kaliningrad prior to a NATO intervention but quite possibly the crisis, which may be ordered in "response" would stop short of opposing one. That to NATO enlargement." creates a "grey area" of potential crises where In the case of Ukraine, the main area of con­ some Russian military units are turning their cern would probably be the Trans-Carpathya, arms against Hinvaders", while other remain as well as Lviv, lvano-Frankivsk and Cher­ 'neutral' or even turn supportive. novtsy regions. Complicated history, uncer­ It is exactly this "grey area" that is targeted tain relations with neighbours and ethnic by the above analysis, while all the compli­ patchwork make this area potentially volatile cated foreign policy intrigues are left to a se­ and difficult to pacify, with some groupings parate investigation.'? The only observation enthusiastically welcoming an intervention in this regard is that the US under no circum­ and others- violently opposing it. Romania stances would be able to conduct them should be discouraged from acting unilateral­ unilaterally and would find itself seriously ly vis-a-vis Moldova, and Turkey- in Crimea, dependent on the support of key allies. Even where a secessionist conflict might require a if NATO mechanisms would prove unsuitable US-led multilateral intervention of several or inefficient," the very possibility of con­ Black Sea states. structing an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" would depend upon expensive and sustained efforts of European states (whether in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy or not) in building up their Conclusions own power projection capabilities. Russia, despite its present-day semblance This paper deliberately avoids the fundamen­ of stability, may see a chain of violent con­ tal issue of whether the West in general and flicts engulfing the most vulnerable parts of NATO in particular would be politically its vast periphery - and some of those may willing to perform any of the described pose such risks to international peace and interventions. Neither does it discuss the security that external interventions might crucial issue of NATO-Russia relations, seem the only solution. Neither the Gulf War, which could hardly have much impact on nor the air war against Yugoslavia offers a regional developments inside Russia but useful model for these interventions, but the might significantly influence the attitude of KFOR deployment (with all its complications) the central Russian government towards the can perhaps provide some lessons on taking spectre of foreign intervention. The scenario control over a highly unstable area. These of a full-scale confrontation between NATO lessons could be compared with the historical· and Russia is left outside the scope of this records of interventions in Murmansk/Ar­ paper not only due to its high complexity khangelsk and in the Far East during the Civil (would require much extra space and addi­ War of 1918-1922; while highly contro­ tional research) but also because of the versial, these experiences are definitely worth assumption that Moscow would do every- revisiting. In most cases, it would be not an

18 IFS lnfo 3/02 organized military force equipped with old intensive, reqmnng the deployment of con­ Soviet weaponry that would constitute the siderable forces for many months. Securing "enemy" for the intervening forces, but a pleth­ control over nuclear weapons, building ora of para-military forces, spreading violent elementary safety systems for various nuclear chaos. The operations, therefore, might not facilities and dealing with nuclear contamina­ be that demanding regarding high-technology tion could be the most serious risks in con­ weapon systems, but could be manpower- ducting the interventions.

IFS Info 3/02 19 Notes and References see Graeme P. Herd, '~Russia: Systemic Transfonna~ tion or Federal Collapse?", Journal of Peace Re­ search, May 1999, pp. 259-269. 1 Summing up the achievements of2001, most experts 8 Anatol Lieven 's book Chechnya: The Tombstone pronounced it the most successful year in Russia's ofRussia s Power (New Haven & London: Yale post-Soviet history, both for internal consolidation University Press, I 998) stands apart in the vast bib­ and foreign policy. See, for instance, Sergei Karaga­ liography on that war due to its unique combination nov, "Europe Should Not Be Jealous of Us", Mos­ of field experience and intellectual sophistication. kovskie Novosti, no. 52, December 2001. However, 9 Speaking with US journalists after the meeting some economists warned about the price of missed with President Bush in Lublijana, Putin complained opportunities. See Mikhail Delyagin, "What a Waste that he was 'bored' to explain Russia's aims and of a Year", The Moscow Times, 10 January 2002. intentions in Chechnya. He well may be sick and 2 For sharp analysis of the contradictions of this tired of this war, but still cannot explain it away; "pragmatic patriotism", see Stephen E. Hanson, "The however, the need to do it has all but evaporated Dilemmas of Russia's Anti-Revolutionary Revolu­ when the US-led war against terrorism has started in tion", Current History, October 2001, pp. 330-335. earnest. For the full text of the interview, see 3 This publication is based on the paper prepared for Johnson S Russia List, no. 5312, 20 June 200 l; for a Strategic Studies Institute workshop (Washington, an analysis of the unsustainability of the current DC, 10-11 July, 2001) of the Future Landpower deadlock, see Pavel Felgengauer, "Ruthlessness Is Project (FLEP), which was a part of the US Defense No Solution", Moscow Times, 10 January 2002; for Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) study All Our To­ a sharp argument against the Western complacency morrows: A Long-Range Forecast of Global Trends about Chechnya, see "More Carnage in Chechnya", Affecting Arms Control Technology. Washington Post, 9 January 2002. 4 Yergin and Gustafson in their celebrated work used 10 Vitaly Tretyakov, former editor of Nezavisimaya the term chudo for a scenario of rapid and sustained Gaze/a, wrote that after the first year Putin had step­ economic growth, but that now looks as asking for too ped out of the image of a dynamic and determined much. See Daniel Yergin & Thane Gustafson, Russia leader and appeared lost without a clear sense of di­ 2010: And What// Means for the World. New York: rection. See uA Bad Week", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Random House, 1993. 23 January 2001. One year later many commentators 5 As Stephen Cohen has recently noted: "For the confirmed that impression, making an exception for first time in history, a fully nuclearized nation is in his decisive choice of pro-Western orientation. See the process of collapse. The result is potentially cata Andrei Ryabov, "Running Around in Circles", Vek, strophic". See Stephen F. Cohen, "Russian Nuclear 1 I January 2002. Roulette", The Nation, 25 June 2001. This paper, 11 See on that Stephen E. Hanson, "Can Putin Re­ while looking into a number of worst-case scena­ build the Russian State?", Security Dialogue, June rios, will stop short of addressing such extreme op­ 2001, pp. 263-266. tions as full-blown thermo-nuclear catastrophe in­ 12 Putin trusts his siloviki much more than his side Russia or strategic nuclear "exchangesn between liberal economic advisers, and the whole ideology Russia and the USA. of gosudarstvennost goes directly against reducing 6 The most detailed account of this crisis is Moskva. state's involvement in the economy. On the cult Osen-93: Khronika Protivostoyaniya (Moscow. of the state, see Evgeny Ikhlov, "Strong Rights­ Autumn 1993: A Chronicle of Confrontation). Mos­ Strong State", Nezavisimaya Gaze/a, 10 June 2001. cow: Respublika, 1994. Useful analysis can be found 13 On Put in's corrosive role in terms ofdemocratic con­ in Brian Taylor, "Russian Civil-Military Relations af­ solidation, see Michael McFaul, "Russia Under Putin: ter the October Uprising", Sun>ival, Spring 1994, pp. One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward", Journal of 3-29. I have looked into a version of a "Kremlin plot Democracy, July 200, pp. 19-33. Colton and McFaul gone wrong" in chapter 3 of my book The Russian have argued recently that shifts in Russia's political Army in a Time of Troubles (London: SAGE, 1996). system towards illiberal democracy"are not caused by, 7 That was the momentarily diagnosis of many West­ or for that matter consistently reinforced by, popular em experts. See, for instance, Paul Gable, "Moscow's attitudes towards democracy". Timothy J. Colton & Crisis and Russia's Regions", Endnote, RFEIRL McFaul. Are Russian Undemocratic? Camegie En­ Newslilw, 10 September I 998. Jacob Heilbrunn has dowment Working Papers, no. 20, June 2001, p. 2. started his article in The New Republic (28 Septem­ 14 For an insightful view on this dependency see ber 1998) with this punch-line: "Russia is not in Yuri Levada, "Spring 2001: Deeds and Symbols", crisis. It is in dissolution". For a more balanced view, Nezavisimaya Ga:eta, 16 May 200 1.

20 IFS Info 3/02 15 Slephen Holmes, emphasising problems with cre­ "The Energy Strategy, approved by the government ating an authoritarian regime in Russia "because the in November 2000, estimated the necessary size of underlying situation remains forbiddingly difficult", investment at $35 billion a year, with the impressive warned that Putin is "fabricating an illusion of power'' figure of $700 billion for the next 20 years. Only which brings only "a simulacrum ofsocietal order''. about 10% of these resources are indeed invested See Stephen Holmes, "Simu!ations of Power in and the controversial plans for reforming the RAO Putin's Russia", Current History, October 2001, pp. EEC are unlikely to generate the required $50 bil­ 307-312. lion in the next I 0 years. See Michae! Lelyveld, 16 Lilia Shevtsova, one of the sharpest analysts of "Russia: Government Plans Reform for Electricity Ye!tsin's Russia (see her book with this title pub­ Monopoly", RFEIRL News/ine, 22 May 200 I. lished by Camegie Endowment in 1999), has argued 24 On the state of Russia's Far East see chapter 5 of recently that Putin has shown more flexibility than Dmitri Trenin, The End ofEurasia. Moscow: many expected and thus created a sustainable system Camegie Center, 200 I. of control- but only in the environment of"stagnant 25 The point of departure for this wave of publica­ stability". See Johnson's Russia List, no. 5249, 12 tions was Putin's first address to the Federal Assem­ June 2001. bly in July 2000, where he emphasised that the 17 My more elaborate analysis of this option can be "survivability of the nation" is under threat and pro­ found in Pave! Baev, "Will Russia Go for a Military vided an estimate that in 15 years Russia could have Victory in Chechnya?", Research Paper 74, Conflict a population loss of 22 million. Characteristically, Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy in his second address (July 2001), Putin did not Sandhurst, January 2000. mention this problem at all. Both documents can be ta The reference point here is Stalin's elimination of found on the president's website (http:// his "Chechen problem" by cruel deportations com­ president.krem!in.ru). pleted in a matter of a few weeks. See on that Chap­ 26 See, for instance, Galina Vitkovskaya & Sergei ter 2 ("Soviet Genocide") in John B. Dunlop, Russia Panarin ( eds ), Migration and Security in Russia. Cotifronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Con­ Moscow: Camegie Center, 2000; Vladimir Shkol­ flict. Cambridge: CUP, 1998. nikov et a! (eds), Inequality and Death Rate in Rus­ 19 Georgi Derluguian examined that phenomenon in sia. Moscow: Camegie Center, 2000. "The Process and the Prospects of Soviet Collapse", 27 For a sharp analysis of this psychological phe­ pp. 203-225 in Georgi M. Derluguian & Scott L. nomenon, see Boris Kagarlitsky, "Iznos" (The Wear­ Greer (eds), Questioning Geopolitics. Westport, CT: Out), Novaya Gazeta, 21 February 2000. Praeger, 2000. "Dmitri Furman explains Putin's popularity as a 2° For a sober economic analysis, see lames R Millar, defensive reaction of Russian society against re­ "The Russian Economy: Putin's Pause", Current peated humiliations by the political elite. This psy­ History, October 2001, pp. 336-442. chological denial, however, cannot last forever. See " Conservative estimates of capital flights from Dmitri Furman, "The Formula of Love to the Presi­ Russia during the 1990s give the figure of $150 dent", Obshaya Gazeta, 7 June 2001. billion. With Putin's arrival to power, capital flight 29 Nikolai Petrov, one of the sharpest analysts of first dipped sharply but since late spring 2000 has this trend, described it as a "'swinging pendulum", resumed to around 2 billion dollars a month. See while in my understanding it was more of an ascend­ "Boom and Gloom", The Economist, 25 November­ ing spiral. See Nikolai Petrov (ed.), Russia's Re­ I December 2000, p. !25. Some Russian economists, gions in /998. Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1999, pp. including presidential adviser Andrei Illarionov, 58-60. seek to make a virtue out of a vice and present the "On regional symbolism, see Yuri Pertilyev's chap­ outflow of capital as helpful for preventing the un­ ter, and on regional brands of vodka, the chapter of desirable strengthening of the rouble. See Boris Petrov, both in Nikolai Petrov (ed.), Russia's Re­ Grozovsk-y, "A New Medicine for the Economy: gions in 1999. Moscow: Carnegie Center, 200 I. Export of Capital", Polit.Ru, 18 Apri!2001. 31 See Nikolai Petrov, "Seven Faces of Putin)s Rus­ "On the phenomenon of Moscow's hyper-charged sia: Federal Districts as a New Level of State-Terri­ drive, see Leonid Vardomsky, "Moscow: Administra­ torial Composition", Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. tive Moloch or Getaway for Globalization?", pp. I, March 2000, pp. 73-91. 138-149 in Klaus Segbers (ed.), Explaining Post­ 32 I have attempted a more elaborate analysis of this Soviet Patchworks. Volume 3: The Political impact in Pave! Baev, "The Russian Army and Economy ofRegions, Regimes and Republics. Al­ Chechnya: Victory Instead of Reform?", pp. 75-96 dershot: Ash gate, 200 I. in Stephen Cimbala (ed.), The Russian Military Into

IFS Info 3/02 21 the Twenty-First Century. London & Portland, OR: and the Caspian Area", Europeans Security, summer Frank Cass, 200 I. 2001, pp. 95-110. My reflections on the relevance of n As The Economist observed recently: "In charge historical experiences can be found in Pave) Baev, of this shambles is one of Mr. Putin 's closest pals, "How Does History Inform Russia's Policy in the the new defense minister, Sergei Ivanov. An urbane, Great Anti-Terrorist Game?", Central Asia and the polyglot ex-spy, he is trying to speed up reform and Caucasus, 2002, no I, pp. 14-17. improve the forces' abysmal public image." See 42 For a thoughtful argument on this see Douglas W. "Come On, Look Like Soldiers", The Economist, Blum, "Political Implications of the US Military 14-20 July2001. Intervention for the Transcaspian", PONARS Memo 34 See on that Alexei Arbatov & Petr Romashkin, 2 I I, Washington, DC: CSIS. "The State Has to Define Rational Guidelines for 43 See Roland Dannreuther, "Can Russia Sustain Its Military Reform", Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie Dominance in Central Asia?", Security Dialogue, (NVO), no. 8, 3 March 2000; Alexei Arbatov & Petr June 2001, pp. 245-258. Romashkin, "What Kind of Wars Can Russia Af­ " The highly confusing and obviously dangerous ford?", NVO, no. 15, 27 April2000. clashes in Abkhazia in October-November 200 I "For my more elaborate analysis of the degradation could be replayed again and again. On the balance of the Navy, see Pave! Baev, "The Russian Navy of forces, see Vladimir Mukhin, ''Sukhumi Is Ready After the Kursk: Still Proud but with Poor Naviga­ to Everything",Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 19 tion", PONARS Report215, Washington: CSIS. October 200 I. 36 While the Kursk remains the most dramatic illus­ 45 See on this Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic tration of this trend, the devastating fire at a space Modernization (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Little­ control center in Kaluzhskaya ob last in May 200 I field, 2000), chapter 4, particularly pp. 135-140; and the explosion at an air defense unit in Moscow Alexei Arbatov, Bezopasnost: Rossiisky Vybor (Se­ ob last in June 200 I confirm the assumption about curity: Russia's Choice). Moscow: Epicenter, 1999, the near-inevitability oflarge-scale accidents. pp. 335-360, 380-393. 37 One symptom here is the scale of desertion: ac­ 46 For an overview, see Boris Pitersky, (

22 IFS Info 3/02 "MINATOM is capable of unloading and removing "Arkady Mashes offers an insightful explanation nuclear reactors from I 0- I 5 submarines a year, of this development in "Russian-Ukrainian Rap­ while the current "waiting list" is 113 and at least 15 prochement of200 I: How Viable?", Security Dia­ submarines will have to be added to it during this logue, June 2002 (forthcoming). decade. The most detailed source of information is 62 Transdniestria might try to make a case for joining the Bellona Foundation (www.bellona.no), its third the Russian Federation according to the law ap­ report The Arctic Nuclear Challenge appeared in proved by the State Dum a in late June 200 I. See June 2001; see also Vladimir Temny, "Black Pen­ Mikhail Vignansky, "Russian 'Imperialism' Threat­ nants ofChernobyl", Grani.R11, 13 June2001. ens", Instirute for War and Peace Reporting, I 7 July 53 I have first made this argument in the paper "Rus­ 2001, in Johnson's Russia List no 5352. sia in the Nordic-Baltic Region", presented at the "One specific formulation of this dictum is: "Rule conference The New World Order- Russia Between I, on page I of the book of war, is: 'Do not march East and West at the Tel Aviv University in early on Moscow."' See Oxford Dictionary of Quota­ April2000 (i.e. some four month before the Kursk tions, Oxford: OUP, I 996, p. 48 I. catastrophe). 64 On the "death of old NATO" and its evolution " See on that Viktor N. Paviiatenko, "Russian Se­ into a "security and defense services institution" see curity in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Dangers of Francois Heisbourg, "Europe and the Transforma­ Isolation", pp. 13-44 in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. tion of the World Order", Survival, vol. 43, no. 4, Nosov & Koji Watanabe (eds), Russia and East Asia. Winter 2001, pp. 143-148. Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1999. "One such scenario (for the year 2006) can be ss See Roman Popov & Andrei Susarov, uSocial found in part 4 ofCaspar Weinberger& Peter Tensions and Social Problems", pp. 82-112 in Rus­ Schweizer, The Next War. Washington DC: Regnery, sia's Regions in 1999, on p. 104. 1996. 56 See Vik1or B. Supian & Mikhail G.Nosov, "Re­ 66 While the media reports about shipments of nu­ integration of an Abandoned Fortress: Economic clear warheads to Kaliningrad in early 200 I were Security of the Russian Far East", pp. 69-100 in disproved, the technical capability for such deploy­ Russia and East Asia. ment is certainly available. For competent analysis 57 Conservative current estimates give the figure of see the report ofthe Monterey Center ofNon-Prolif­ 2,000,000 of illegal Chinese migrants in the Far eration Studies, Nikolai Sokov, "The 'Tactical Nu­ Eastern region. For a solid analysis see Perspektil~v clear Weapons Scare' of200 I". Available at (http:// Dalnevostochnogo Regiona: Kitaisky Faktor (The cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/tnw.httn). Far Eastern Region Prospect: The Chinese Factor). 67 This author plans to look into those in his contri­ Moscow: Carnegie Center, 1999. bution to the project "Alternative Futures for Eu­ "For a sober analysis of these disputes see Dmitri rope and Eurasia" organized by the Center for Stra­ Trenin, The End of Eurasia. Moscow: Camegie tegic and International Srudies (CSIS), Washington, Center, 200 I, particularly chapter 5. with the final report scheduled for the end of2002. 59 For an informed discussion of Russia's aims and 68 Anatol Lieven has recently argued that it is likely aspirations see Arkady Mashes, "The Slav Triangle: that NATO, which has shown itself"completely Ukraine and Beiarus in Russia's Foreign Policy of worthless" for the campaign in Afghanistan, is likely the 1990s", Pro et Contra, vol. 6, Winter-Spring to "become visibly moribund". See "The End of 200 I (http://pubs.carnegie.ru/p&c ). NATO", Prospect, December 200 I (available at "'In fact, it is Belarus President Lukashenko who www.ceip.org!files/Pubiications/Lieven). For a has invested much energy in building ties with Rus­ thoughtful argument on NATO's uncertain future see sia's regions; these ties, however, might turn to work Peter van Ham, "Security and Culture, or, Why against him. See Sergei Golubev, "Lukashenko and NATO Won't Last", Security Dialogue, December Russian Regions", pp. 317-324 in Russia's Regions 2001, pp. 393-406. in !999.

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Pavel K. Baev

Russia in 2015 Could the Former Super-Power Turn into a Battle-Ground?

Institutt for forsvarsstudier Norwegian Institute for Defence Studi~s Pavel ~ Baev

lnstitutt for forsvarsstudier Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies

Tollbugt. I 0 N-0152 OSLO Norway

Tlf: +47 23 09 31 OS Fax: +47 23 09 33 79

Institutt for forsvarsstudier Norwegian ~nstitute for Defence Studies