MASARYK UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Social Studies

Department of IR and European Studies

PhD Dissertation

Brno 2014 Zinaida Shevchuk

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Social Studies

Department of IR and European Studies

Mgr. Zinaida Shevchuk

Understanding Armed Conflicts: Evolving Nature of Conflicts in the South Caucasus

PhD Dissertation

Supervisor: doc. PhDr Zdeněk Kříž, Ph.D.

Brno 2014

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Zdeněk Kríž, for his guidance throughout my research and my professional development. You have set an example of excellence as a researcher, mentor, and instructor along this journey. Second, I express my profound gratitude to Professors Vít Hloušek and Peter Suchý, both of whom have contributed tremendously to my professional growth. I would also like to thank my best friend, Radana Kubová, for her support. Last but not least, I would like to thank my soul mate, Ondřej Bechný. Your love and support helped make the completion of this dissertation possible.

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Svetlana and Vladimer Shevchuk

Declaration

I hereby declare that this PhD dissertation is my own work, that it has been written on the basis of the sources listed here, and that these listed sources have been referred to and acknowledged in the text.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT ...... 1 1.2 CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ...... 8 1.3 RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD ...... 12 1.4 DATA COLLECTION ...... 14 1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY ...... 15 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...... 17 2.1 TYPOLOGY OF ISSUES AT STAKE IN ARMED CONFLICTS ...... 17 2.2 ETHNIC CONFLICT ...... 20 2.3 CONFLICT OVER POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS ...... 25 2.4 IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ...... 27 2.5 ECONOMIC CONFLICT ...... 30 2.6 TERRITORIAL CROSS-BORDER CONFLICT ...... 33 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 35 3.1 CONFLICT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK: RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 35 3.1.1 Research Design: “Building Block” ...... 37 3.2 CATEGORIZATION OF THE CONCEPT ...... 38 3.3 CONFLICT-MAPPING FRAMEWORK ...... 39 3.3.1 Conflict Parties ...... 40 3.3.2 Issues at Stake and Incompatibility ...... 41 3.4 CONFLICT TYPOLOGY BY PROCESS—VIOLENCE INTENSITY ...... 43 3.4.1 Conflict Phases ...... 46 CHAPTER 4: ARMED CONFLICT OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH ...... 50 4.1 PHASE A: FROM LATENT CONFLICT TO ESCALATION ...... 52 4.1.1 The Dynamics of Politicization of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue for Armenian National Identity ...... 54 4.1.2 Politicization of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue and Azerbaijani Statehood ...... 56 4.1.3 From Nonviolent Demonstrations to Violent Events ...... 58 4.1.4 Conflicting Parties and Emerging Issues at Stake ...... 60 4.2 PHASE B: TRIGGER EVENTS – EMERGENCE OF SPORADIC CLASHES ...... 63 4.2.1 The Road to Armed Conflict: Political Mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaijan .... 66 4.2.2 Violent Stage of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh ...... 72 4.3 PHASE C: “FROZEN” CONFLICT...... 75 CHAPTER 5: ARMED CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA: CASE STUDIES OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA ...... 78 5.1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN GEORGIA: STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE ...... 79 5.2 CASE STUDY: ARMED CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA ...... 82 5.2.1 Phase A: The Spiral of Conflict: The Process of Escalation to War ...... 83

5.2.2 Phase B: Economy of Conflict in South Ossetia ...... 89 5.2.3 Phase C: Red Lines in South Ossetia ...... 96 5.2.4 Putting the Armed Conflict into the Context ...... 99 5.3 CASE STUDY: ABKHAZIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT ...... 105 5.3.1 Phase A: Latent Conflict Between Georgians and Abkhazians ...... 106 5.3.2 Phase B: The Logic of Violence in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict ...... 121 5.3.3 Phase C: Changing the Paradigm – Backwards Instead of Forwards ...... 130 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION ...... 138 APPENDIX ...... 148 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 152

List of Tables Table 1 Categories of Conflict Intensity...... 44

Table 2 The Population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region...... 55

Table 4 Evolution of the Issue at Stake: De facto, De jure and Desired Status of Abkhazia (1989-2008)...... 130

Table 5 The Summary of Argument and Cases...... 139

List of Figures Figure 1 Conflict Mapping...... 42

Figure 2 Vicious Cycle of Conflict ...... 49

Figure 3 The Layout of the Ergneti Market in South Ossetia ...... 91

Figure 4 Demographic Changes in Abkhazian ASSR...... 108

Figure 5 Mechanism of Smuggling in the Gali and Zugdidi Districts in Georgia ...... 127

Figure 6 Georgian Attitudes Towards Abkhazia‘s Independence...... 134

List of Maps Map 1 Ethno-linguistic Distribution in the South Caucasus, 2004...... 6

Map 2 Smuggling Routs in South Ossetia ...... 92

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Questions and Argument

Armed conflicts in the Caucasus represent one of the most complex challenges that emerged with the breaking apart of the Soviet Union. Patterns of political, economic, and cultural discrimination, intensified by historical grievances, as well as the effects of political transformation and economic development, national doctrines, and the role of external actors have all contributed to the escalation of conflicts in this region. That created a challenge for the conflict analysis and has led to the development of different interpretations emphasizing the role of weak states, economic depression, and external support. The aim of this research is not merely to illuminate the factors that are responsible for armed conflict in the South Caucasus. This study follows the logic of qualitative research to ―scale down‖ and trace the bellicose aspects of armed conflict. The objective is to take the analysis of these factors one step further by tracing the path of evolution of the life cycle of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh during the two decades. In this way, we avoid a static study of the causes of conflict in the selected case; instead, we follow the transformation of the issues at stake of the conflict over time. While the number of academic studies about the conflicts in the South Caucasus region has considerably increased during the last decade, studies combining theoretical and empirical knowledge are relatively few. This dissertation aims to bridge theory with empirical knowledge and enrich academic knowledge about one of the most volatile post- Soviet regions in the world—the South Caucasus. The major objective is to provide a solid, elaborate picture of the conflict processes in the South Caucasus region. This small area has a high number of unresolved conflicts, which might lead to an escalation in the future. After the end of the bipolar world order, attention of scholars and policymakers was turned to the armed conflict, mainly because of the extent of violence involved. However, if we want to understand this conflict, it should be taken into consideration that

1 escalation of conflict to a violent form represents only one of the stages of the conflict. What is more, not every conflict escalates and transforms to armed conflict. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union witnessed the outbreak of a new wave of ethnic conflicts that were suppressed during the Cold War period. International violence has become less problematic than it was during the last century. This means that there are more intrastate conflicts than interstate struggles and the number of ethnic conflicts has increased considerably. The emerging political map has complicated the prospects for peace. This complication includes particular types of societies and governments, the rise of ethnic nationalism, and distinctive nationalist doctrines that divide national states and contribute to tensions across ethnic lines. Perceived grievances, patterns of political, economic, cultural discrimination, intensified by historical grievances, the effects of political transformation and economic development, as well as national doctrines divide humanity into distinctive nations. These nations raise their claims for self-determination and cultivate a peculiar identity of their own, demanding their separate spaces. We can hardly find a mono-ethnic state without any ethnic animosity inside its borders. Dividing lines between ―us‖ and ―them‖ contribute to ethnic awareness; however, such a situation does not always lead to armed conflict. For example, in Georgia, there are many ethnic groups, but its ethnic divisions have not lead to an escalation of conflict in Adjaria or Southern Georgia, populated by ethnic Armenians. The question is if it is correct to label every conflict that has some ethnic element (for example, enrolled conflict parties are ethnically different) as an ethnic conflict. Following this logic, it is legitimate to ask: Was World War I an ―ethnic conflict‖ too? In accordance with one outstanding political scientist, Michael E. Brown, every conflict has multiple causes, and while the issues at stake could be different, the conflict is ―ethnic‖ if conflict parties are ―ethnic groups.‖1 This study argues that in order to increase scholarly knowledge about evolving nature of armed conflicts, it is necessary to address the issues at stake. In order to determine the casus of escalation of the conflict, the intensity of ethnic hatred is not

1 Michael E. Brown, Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.

2 treated as an independent variable; rather, the explanation of ethnicity and its role in transformation of the conflicts is needed. For this purpose, the claims of conflicting parties have to be analyzed and the reasons why they contradicted each other must be explained. This research does not deny that perceptions, historical narratives, and images of the enemy have a negative influence on the mutual relationship between conflicting parties. However, in order to understand their positions, it is important to understand the claims of political elites and their strategies. Furthermore, as argued by Valerii Tishkov, existing typologies of the armed conflict fail to explain decisions and strategies of political leaders, as well as of individuals, the roots of political disorder, the desire to attain specific status, and the reasons for outside interventions in the post-Soviet space.2 It means that we cannot place any armed conflict in this region into a single category. The reason for this is that there are a lot of factors that influenced the outbreak of bloody and unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus. These include competing interpretations of historical injustice, ethno-demographic, territorial, political, legal, ideological, and socioeconomic factors that aggravated tensions and unrest in this region.3 As this dissertation will illustrate, the armed conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh contain all of these dimensions, but what is most important to understand is which of these issues (or which combination of issues) caused escalation and transformation of conflict from one phase to another. Many researchers and analysts have emphasized different aspects that caused the violent upheavals in the South Caucasus region. This dissertation brings key events to analysis without disregarding alternative useful interpretations, such as the role of ethnicity, geopolitical contexts, and neo-imperial policies, developing a newly structured analysis of conflict processes. The central questions of this dissertation are formulated in the following way: First, what types of conflict do we have in the South Caucasus? Second, what are the issues at stake leading to an escalation of conflicts? Third, are these issues different now, and if so, how are they different? This research does not aim to present a comprehensive history of the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus. Nor does it

2 Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1996), 571–591. 3 A. N. Yamskov, ―Ethnic Conflict in the Transcausasus,‖ Theory and Society 20, no. 5 (October 1, 1991): 631–60, doi:10.1007/BF00232663.

3 aim to assess the mistakes of conflicting parties and the consequences of the conflicts. Rather, what this dissertation aims to do is to overcome the static study of the various factors determining the type of the conflict by tracing its evolution over time. From there, the dissertation sheds light on the conflict processes, provides a balanced and overarching approach, and draws some tentative conclusions about common factors of unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus region. This research is important for three reasons. First, the dissertation presents five analytical categories of armed conflict to frame my discussion and that of the literature. Second, these types are then applied to the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Third, by uncovering complexity of and linkages between domestic and structural factors, the dissertation studies the modes of escalation and transformation of issues at stake in time. This dissertation makes two basic arguments. First, ethnic diversity is not sufficient condition and does not provide a strong enough explanation of conflict to become violent. Contrary to the way in which the relationship between ethnicity and armed conflict has been conceptualized in the post-Soviet space, and in the South Caucasus in particular, the linkage between ethnicity and violent conflict is indirect and requires in-depth analysis. In other words, it is necessary to reconsider the relationship between ethnicity and armed conflict and to create an analytical framework for better understanding of these conflicts. Second, this dissertation argues that the key issue at stake, which transforms low- scale violence to full-scale armed conflict, has its political goals. Political elites play a significant role in mobilization of masses and transformation of low-scale struggles into organized, full-scale war. This is not to purely support the instrumentalist account about manipulative leaders. The argument sheds light on the question whether political leaders are the cause of armed conflicts or whether they merely contribute to the escalation processes. I argue that escalation of armed conflict is the outcome of a decision made by political leaders in order to impose, institutionalize, and legitimize their rule over a territory. South Caucasus has been a frontline for the collision of empires, as well as the location of considerable migration by different national groups. Unrest in this region has

4 had a significant impact on the demographics of the local population. This small region has heterogeneous demography composed by a mixture of various ethnic and linguistic groups. This makes the South Caucasus as a test case for explanatory power of ethnicity as a cause of armed conflicts. As illustrated in Map 1, Armenia is the most ethnically homogeneous state in the South Caucasus: 98,1% Armenians, the Kurds compose 1.1%, Russians 0.5% and other compose 0.2% of population.4 Azerbaijan has more minorities: Lezgian 2%, Russian 1.3%, Talys 1.3% and other 2.4%. Armenians live in the Nagorno- Karabakh region. 5 Georgia is the most ethnically heterogeneous state in the South Caucasus even after the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the 2002 census, 83.8% are Georgians, Armenians compose 5.7%, Russian 1.5% and other 2.5%.6 Giving the ethnic heterogeneity in the South Caucasus, this study demonstrates that the argument about ethnic hatred across ethnic lines fails to explain why violence has occurred in some places and not in others. Ajara represented the third autonomous region along with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Georgian Soviet Republic, the population of which was 250, 000 Ajars in accordance to the 1989 census. Historically, Ottoman Empire ruled this region and imposed Islam. Consequently, Ajars ―tended to associate with the ―Turks‖ rather than the ―Georgians‖7 due to Islam. However, the reason why armed conflict did not occur in this region lies in the political goals of the Ajarian leadership. As political leader of Ajara, Aslan Abashidze, claimed: ―We have never had, and never can have, any territorial claims against Georgia... Ajara is historically a part of Georgia, and there has never been any instance in history in which Ajara has created problems for its motherland. The conflict which occurred in 2004 was largely political. It has to be emphasized that Abkhazias and South Ossetians were not the largest ethnic groups in Georgia. According to the Soviet census in 1989 Armenians, Russians and Azerbaijanis (8.1 percent, 6.3 percent, and 5.7 percent of the population, respectively) constituted the majority of ethnic groups in Georgia. Ethnic Armenians live

4 CIA, ―Armenia‖ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/am.html. 5 CIA, ―Azerbaijan‖ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/geos/aj.html. 6 CIA, ―Georgia‖ (Central Intelligence Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/gg.html. 7 Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (New York: NYU Press, 2009), 200.

5 in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region in Georgia. According to the 2002 census, almost 55% (207, 600 people) of population is Armenian. 8 Azerbaijanis are concentrated in the Kvemo Kartli region (45% of population). Both of these ethnic groups have strong ethnic identities and weak sense of Georgian identity. Lack of knowledge of Georgian, the official state language, strong Armenian and Azerbaijan ethnic identity, economic underdevelopment in comparison to the rest of Georgia, and poor representation in the government, are the factors that contribute to the tensions between Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis communities. Theoretically, these tensions could have transformed into armed conflict similar to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. If ethnicity is the sufficient condition to explain the occurrence of armed conflict, then Pankisi Gorge inhabited by Muslim Kists (related to the Chechens) could have been area of irredentist conflicts. While ethnic animosity is the outcome of conflicts, it serves to prolong unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus region. This dissertation argues that trigger events and sporadic waves of tension cannot be transformed into full-scale war without the support of political leaders. Map 1 Ethno-linguistic Distribution in the South Caucasus, 2004.

Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Ethno-linguistic Distribution on the South Caucasus, http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/ethno-linguistic-distribution-in-the-southern-caucasus_99d4# In order to address the main objectives of this dissertation – the type of armed conflict in the South Caucasus region, the modes of escalation and transformation of

8 Jonathan Wheatley, The Integration of National Minorities in the Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli Provinces of Georgia. Five Years into the Presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili (European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), September 2009), 5, http://www.ecmicaucasus.org/upload/publications/working_paper_44_en.pdf.

6 issues at stake – I differentiated between two intellectually different tasks. First, one has to explain the issues at stake and the nature of the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Second, one can try to understand the causes and reasons why the conflict turned violent. Through the process of conceptualization and operationalization on the theoretical level, the objective of this research is to present the most balanced approach in studying the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus. This study defines the armed conflict in that region by the nature of issues at stake, and then traces the absence or presence of operationalized aspects in the theoretical part. The findings of this study could pave the way for a future academic study, which is to explore why these conflicts took a violent form and what the causal mechanisms are between the issues at stake that keep these conflicts ―frozen‖ for more than two decades. There are three reasons for choosing the Caucasus for this analysis: the strategic importance of the region; the potential for re-escalation of these conflicts in the future; and ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus can be viewed as examples for ethnic problems in other parts of the world. The strategic significance of the region attracts the attention not only of regional leaders, but also of great power actors. The Caucasus is a relatively small region with a high number of unresolved ethnic conflicts. It lies in relatively close proximity to other strategically important regions such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Because of its strategic importance, the Caucasus was a battlefield of numerous wars among Persian, Ottoman and Russian Empires. Strategic significance of this region attacks attention of the West due to the oil and natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea. Russia is reluctant to lose its dominance in the South Caucasus and its military presence in the region is the highest in the last twenty years. From the Russian perspective armed conflicts and instability leads to security vacuum in the Caucasus and Russia‘s role is to maintain control over the region. Otherwise, these countries can be pulled into the orbits of other great and regional powers, such as Turkey, Iran, United States or China. Conducting an assessment of stability in this region is important, as those conflicts can re-escalate and may lead to broader conflicts in the region. Escalation of Caucasian conflicts has implications not only on the stability in the region and its neighboring countries, but on the broader European security architecture.

7 As mentioned above, South Caucasus is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the world. The armed conflicts in this region represent case studies to tests the theories about the causes of ethnic conflict and uncover the explanatory power of ethnicity as a variable responsible for escalation of conflict into full-scale war. The results could be applicable to the unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Armed conflicts in the South Caucasus have gained less scholarly interest than, for example, the former Yugoslavia or conflicts in Africa. Scholarly studies about this conflict are sophisticated, but still unsatisfying. The conventional wisdom about causes and consequences of these conflicts lies on an assumption that they are driven by ―ancient hatreds‖ or a ―spill over‖ effect, which are processes beyond human control.9 ―Because of the multi-ethnic composition of almost all major areas of the former Soviet Union (the only exception is Armenia after the exodus of the Azeris from this territory), practically all kinds of conflicts and clashes - social or political (from young men's fights in local discotheques to collisions at the highest levels of power) - easily acquire an ethnic manifestation and flavour, making these conflicts and contradictions deeper, more complex, and extremely hard to resolve.‖10 These conflicts remain unresolved and can lead to other armed conflicts in the future. The so-called ―frozen conflicts‖ in this region limit the internal development of these countries and have a huge influence on their security and foreign policy goals. Consequently, it has an impact not only on the development inside the state boundaries, but also has a regional and international dimension involving different regional and great powers.

1.2 Contemporary Research

The armed conflicts in the South Caucasus have been the subject of increasing number of studies during the last two decades. Different authors have explained dramatic upsurges of armed conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh from

9 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, 1 edition (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001). 10 Valery A. Tishkov, ―Ethnic Conflicts in the Context of Social Science Theories,‖ in Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery A. Tishkov ed (Tokyo, New York, Paris: Unitied Nations University Press, 1996).

8 different perspectives. This literature can be divided into two groups: empirical studies of regional authors and theoretical works within the Western academic community.

In the first case, regional authors write in local languages and in Russian. The main objective of these publications is to capture the chronological evolution of the conflicts. Unfortunately, the conclusions of these empirical studies are predictable in accordance with the ethnicity of the author. Indeed, ideological beliefs and lack of methodological standards have negative effects on the scholarly values of these studies (one outstanding exception is the work of Georgian political scientist Ghia Nodia). Because of heavy ethnocentric, nationalistic,11 or Russo-centrist12 attitudes, the causes of bloody conflict in the South Caucasus are explained along ethnic lines or along the sentiment of a great game in a small place. Such types of explanation neglect the complexity of internal conflict processes and dynamics. These authors tend to overemphasize the strategic importance of the South Caucasus region. This dissertation offers an original way to understand conflicts without any ambition to advocate interpretation of any conflict party. This dissertation posits its findings among those authors‘ work who contributed to the study of these armed conflicts in a more sophisticated way – by applying and testing the theories of international relations and the causes of wars in the South Caucasus. In this regard, the work of the following scholars has particular importance.

Stuart Kaufman, one of the most important representatives of the symbolic theory of ethnic conflict, argues that the conflicts in the South Caucasus region were driven by fear. His argument contradicts the rational choice theory and claims that, ―rather, ideological and prejudice driven ethnic fears caused conflict and violence that, over time, weakened and finally destroyed the state.‖ 13 Kaufman belongs to small number of scholars who utilize empirical material to support the theory of symbolic politics of

11 Chirikba, Viacheslav A., ―The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict: In Search for Ways out,‖ in Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement., Bruno Coppieters, Ghia Nodia and Yuri Anchabadze (Brussel: Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1998), http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/Georgians/chp0301.html; See also: Elkhan Nuriyev, The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and Great Power Politics (Paperback) - Common (Lit Verlag, 2007). 12 Valery A. Tishkov, ―Ethnic Conflicts in the Context of Social Science Theories.‖ 13 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 82–83.

9 ethnic wars. The findings of his research are significant as they explore the common indicators (e.g., ethnic diversity, political culture status, emerging national mobilization, etc.) in the Moldova and South Caucasian region. Such approach contributes to the establishment of general patterns of conflict escalation in this area after the collapse of the communist regime. Besides this interesting argument about the origins of the conflicts, other studies propose that the region emerged as a battlefield of clashing national projects, 14 which led to secessionist ethnic conflicts that were escalated by foreign intervention; 15 mass mobilizations aimed to challenge Soviet order and its legitimacy;16 this led to internal power struggles with a high level of corruption in the newly created, weak states.17

An outstanding book that offers a cross-case analysis of the armed conflicts in the Caucasus region – Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, and two Chechen wars – is War and Peace in the Caucasus. Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics by Vicken Cheterian. This book helps to understand the unresolved turmoil in this region. In his analysis, Cheterian seeks a common indicator and patterns for these armed conflicts. He argues that even though history played a role, the escalation of these conflicts had its own cause. He views nationalism as a significant but insufficient factor to explain the conditions of war in the Caucasus; the disintegration of the Soviet Union matters more and is a key cause of the armed confrontation in this region.18 In his most recent book, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier, the author explains the causes of conflicts from a historical perspective, underlying the role of mass mobilization and repression.19

14 Ghia Nodia, ―Causes and Vision of Conflict in Abkhazia,‖ Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post- Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series (Berkeley: University of California, 1997), http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/1997_02-nodi.pdf. 15Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 16 Vicken Cheterian, ―The Origins and Trajectory of the Caucasian Conflicts,‖ Europe-Asia Studies 64, no. 9 (2012): 1625–49, doi:10.1080/09668136.2012.718415. 17 Vicken Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 18 Vicken Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus. Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 30-31. 19 Vicken Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus: Russia’s Troubled Frontier (London: Hurst, 2011).

10 Thomas de Waal‘s research reflected in his book Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War captures special attention among existing literature on Nagorno-Karabakh‘s armed conflict. Rich data from the field offer deep insight into the relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.20 One of the first books aiming to test theories of internal armed conflicts on a series of case studies in the Caucasus is presented in Cristoph Zurcher‘s famous book The Post-Soviet War: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationahood in the Caucasus. The author explores the reasons for conflict in the Caucasus and addresses the question why the conflicts did not occur in other regions such as Ajara and Dagestan. This ambitious goal is tested by quantitative theories on the causes of civil wars. His research reviews the history of the conflicts and argues that state weakness and nationalist rhetoric increased the likelihood of conflicts.21

Svante Cornell, in his book Small Nation and Big Powers, explores the role of the institutional structures of autonomy within the republics of the Soviet Union as a major factor to explain the outbreak of conflicts in the Caucasus.22 Other scholars highlight the role of intellectuals and ideologies of confrontation23 or historians, who quite often served as source of justification for mobilization of ethnic groups. Some studies have geopolitical appeal and overemphasize the role of external powers in these conflicts.

The international dimension of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict is addressed in Ronald Asmus‘s book A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West. According to Asmus, the main cause of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict was the political status of Georgia‘s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other hand, Russia tried to prevent penetration of Western influence and block Georgia‘s aspirations to become a part of European and transatlantic structures. According to Asmus, who had direct contact with the Georgian president, Saakashvili was convinced that Russia would not launch a military operation only over South Ossetia, but in the background of the Russian intervention was an effort to overthrow the Georgian political regime. As the author argues, Russia‘s aggression was not directed

20 Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 21 Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars. 22 Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (Routledge, 2005). 23 Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union.

11 only against Georgia. The conflict revealed the weaknesses of the European security arrangements. Russia wants to avoid strengthening Western influence and further expansion of NATO to the borders of the Russian Federation by any means. The Russian- Georgian armed conflict is, according to Asmus, the first armed clash between East and West after the Cold War. This conclusion can be debated, and the Russian-Georgian armed conflict of 2008 had no significant impact on the functioning of the international system. Despite an initial cooling of Russian-American relations, Russia is seen as an important partner to the United States and the European Union. And it turns out that the United States and the European Union will not significantly interfere against further important actors in world politics, such as Russia.

The variety of interpretations and the challenges of competing theories on armed conflicts in the South Caucasus create a demand for a scientific inquiry into the nature of the conflicts. In accordance with conventional wisdom about the conflicts, ethnic diversity and historical grievances plus post-communist era equal violent upheavals. This study rejects the common notion that the contemporary conflicts in the South Caucasus region can be understood as ―unfinished business‖ from the past ethnic conflicts that had been ―frozen‖ under the communist regime.24 The author does not deny that ethnicity and system change are significant factors in prolongation of conflicts; however, the link between ethnicity and armed conflict is indirect and should be reconsidered. Furthermore, the issues at stake today are different from what they were more than twenty years ago.

1.3 Research Challenges and Contribution to the Field

There are two major problems with the study of armed conflicts. First, the changeable nature of armed conflicts; that is, there is no consensus how to classify internal armed conflict due to the variable nature of warfare. Conflict can change its character, and the goals and objectives of the belligerents change, and so the object of research may change continuously.

24 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers; Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2011; Kaufman, Modern Hatreds; Valery A. Tishkov, ―Ethnic Conflicts in the Context of Social Science Theories‖; Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: NYU Press, 2004); Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars; Mark Malkasian, “Gha-Ra-Bagh!”: The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia (Detroit, Mich: Wayne State University Press, 1996).

12 The second issue is connected to how internal armed conflict has been studied. Research in this field requires going beyond disciplinary boundaries. Research requires different methods, different ontological and epistemological perspectives than traditional studies of conflict, for example, of World War II. This study aims to address these problems by advancing a model that shows how to solve them. Theories of armed conflict are very well developed in explaining conditions under which conflicts can occur. The research design of this dissertation, which is represented in the methodological section below, creates a model of how to study armed conflicts that last over two decades and have not been resolved yet. That model can be applied to other internal armed conflicts in other regions, as, for example, to former Yugoslavia. In addition my argument contributes to improving our understanding of conflicts in one of the most dangerous regions of the world – the South Caucasus. It presents five ―analytical categories‖ of conflicts: ethnic, ideological, political, economic, and strategic/territorial conflict. Analytical categories help us to classify the different types of internal armed conflict. What makes the study‘s typology valuable is that it does not pivot on naming a conflict, but enables us to put these different categories next to each other and observe how they complement each other. Accordingly, my argument allows us to capture the complex lifecycle of a conflict in a structured way and focus our analysis on the issues at stake to proceed further in the analysis and to examine to what extent the conflicts in the Caucasus region actually are about ethnicity. The research focuses on an assessment of the extent to which ethnicity is merely a convenient common dominator to mobilize ethnic groups in the struggle over resources, land, or power. It is an unfortunate fact that armed conflicts are a reality of international relations. Practical politics as well as theories of international relations must study them. It is the only way to develop an appropriate framework for the prevention of armed conflicts and to detect early warning signs prior to their eruption. The proposed project represents original research and its expected outcomes are especially useful for the development of international relations theory. The study can shed considerable light on the significance of the different aspects in conflict dynamics and illustrate their change in time. Finally,

13 the project outcomes will also serve as a valuable contribution to the prediction and prevention of conflicts for the international community, especially because conflicts in the studied area are particularly dangerous and contain a high potential for escalation.

1.4 Data Collection

Understanding the correlation of actions of conflict parties, levels of analysis, and theoretical approaches requires extensive and systematic empirical investigation. As this research seeks to advocate a more balanced and dynamic approach to the processes of conflict transformation in selected case studies, triangulation of sources helps to eliminate the problem of biased data. It also allows us to capture wider spatiotemporal contexts and processes within evolving conflict policies and actions. This dissertation is based on multiple sources, including both primary and secondary materials, such as official documents from the relevant Ministries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, scholarly literature, media reports including newspapers, surveys, and interviews, and direct observation in the field during my study visits at Ilia State University in Tbilisi (2010). During this visit I collected data from the University library and interviewed some leading experts in the field. My research at the Baylor University, Texas (2012) and Free University Berlin (2013) contributed to my collection of considerable data, including Russian and English language documents and publications. Conducting research decades after the armed conflict took place involves caution in measuring and evaluating the narratives about the causes of escalation. How ―true‖ are the stories told? In reality, involved conflict parties believe in their versions of events, which inevitably include possible mistaken assessments about how the conflict evolved. One of the biggest challenges in this research was the reliability of data from primary and secondary sources. Armed conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are usually politicized; one can hardly find unbiased analyses. Furthermore, it is very hard to verify the data, especially on events that took place more than twenty years ago. None of the Armenian, Azerbaijan, and Georgian ministries provide enough statistical and analytical resources on socioeconomic developments in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, especially during the 1990s. The data from these breakaway republics are also unrealizable and serve different political agendas. In this respect, there

14 is a huge lack of systemic information. Rumors and myths during the violent phase of the conflicts have also contributed to the increasing mistrust between conflict parties. For this reason, triangulation of sources – checking different versions of the same events in newspapers, documents, and archives – is an important step in getting closer to the truth. This research also employs interviews with some experts in the region conducted in 2010, including those that were published in the press, which shed some light on local perceptions. On the one hand, the position, decisions, and activities of conflict parties are derived from the available primary sources, which serve as a good starting point to understanding the issues at stake for each conflict party. However, when it comes to verification of reliability of information, comparative analysis is used: data from the Abkhazian, Ossetian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Georgian sources are crosschecked. In some case when such verification was not possible, the author indicates and quotes the names of sources and documents. Including literature from English- speaking scholars achieves greater objectivity. Addressing perceptions of conflicting parties and the nature of dichotomies among them helps to uncover the impact of collective memory on the evolution of mutual relationships and the sequence of events. In this regard, the study of issues at stake, concrete events, and claims aims to shed light on the nature of armed conflict in selected case studies. Qualitative examination of the main Georgian and Russian-language newspapers from the region allows us to assess the way in which conflict escalation processes have been portrayed by primary conflict parties. Heterogeneous materials for this study draws upon the most relevant sources that are essential for the key objectives of this research.

1.5 Structure of the Study

In order to address the research questions outlined in the first chapter of this dissertation, the second chapter provides a theoretical framework for this study. By operationalization of aspect of issues at stake at the end of the each analytical category, the second chapter offers typological theorizing and grounds the dissertation within the literature on the causes of armed conflict. Chapter 3 illustrates the methodological tools in order to conduct typological theorizing and a process-centered approach to conflict

15 evolution, namely, categorization of conflict and conflict dynamics, explaining the logic of vicious cycles during conflict. These tools are important in structuring the empirical data in the next sections. Chapter 4 to 6 present the main empirical evidence in the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazian, and South Ossetia armed conflicts. Each case study provides in-depth observations of particular conflict phases. The objective of these parts is not to provide a comprehensive description of the whole conflict dynamics but to focus on the scope of analyses pertaining to the issues at stake that transformed the conflict from one phase to another. The conclusion reflects upon the argument and utilizes debate on a theoretical level. It also illustrates divergent trajectories of mobilization leading to escalation processes and contributes to our understanding of the types of armed conflict in the South Caucasus. Synthesis and the combination of particular issues at stake and the way they evolve over time have significant implications for conflict resolution efforts in the future.

16 Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

2.1 Typology of Issues at Stake in Armed Conflicts

Conflict research has a long tradition in the field of International Relations. Conflict behavior is an integral part of social life and unfortunately will never end. In order to address and explain inter- and intra-state conflict situations, conflict dynamic, motivations of conflicting actors and external dimension of intra-state rivalry, many scholars have advanced theories to explain conditions under which a conflict may escalate. In conflict research literature, there is an ongoing debate over such issues as the relationship between ethnic diversity and armed conflict, 25 the role of political institutions, a process of democratization and violence,26 the linkages between religious beliefs and armed conflict.27 Many scholars study the economic dimension of a conflict and explore the impact of trade ties28 or apply greed and grievance models to explain the outbreak of wars.29 The nature and the level of territorial claims have been identified as the most war-prone issue in conflict studies.30 This dissertation deals with unresolved conflicts and puts its emphasis on the issues at stake. The reason why the conflicts in the South Caucasus region have never reached a resolution rests upon contented issues at stake that have never diminished. In other words, understanding the issues at stake in each phase of the conflict – starting with the latent conflict to the escalation phase – is important if we want to explore why such conflicts can last over two decades and what the issues are that hamper the peaceful

25 Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, ―Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set,‖ American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 316–37, doi:10.1177/000312240907400208. 26 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Updated Edition With a New Preface, 2nd edition (Berkeley, Calif.; London: University of California Press, 2000). 27 Amalendu Misra, Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention & Resolution (London ; New York: Routledge, 2008). 28 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, ―War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don‘t Always Keep the Peace,‖ Conflict Management and Peace Science 29, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 257–78, doi:10.1177/0738894212443342. 29 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ―Greed and Grievance in Civil War,‖ Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 563–95, doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064. 30 Jaroslav Tir, ―Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,‖ The Journal of Politics 72, no. 02 (2010): 413–25, doi:10.1017/S0022381609990879.

17 settlement of these disputes. Unlike many explanations about the causes of conflicts in the South Caucasus region, this research goes beyond a static study of the factors that contributed to the escalation of the conflicts. More nuanced study of conflict processes assists us in understanding the conflict cycle. This is of particular importance for the South Caucasus people, who still have to learn how to live in peace and build sustainable peace across the region.

Typological theorizing can be a powerful tool in conflict studies. In particular, explanatory typology is based on explicitly stated preexisting theory. It is a complement to deductive approaches. The creation of each type requires working through the logical implication of a particular theory to identify the key aspects of a particular conflict type. Thus, typological theorizing may have a classificatory function too. When applied to case studies, we can determine to which ―type‖ this case belongs. Empirical data could be coded as falling into one category or another. It allows us to trace if there is congruence between categories. By placing cases in different categories, we can make the most productive comparisons for testing theories. As stated by Jeffrey Checkel, it is critically significant to think about the dialog between the conceptual and operational levels of our analysis.31 The problem remains how to assess the causal impact of one factor in relation to others. One of the possible ways for establishing the relation between operationalization and measurement lies in the case-oriented view. Within-case causal process observation involves the reconstruction of an empirical sequence of conditions, which are postulated by the theory. The challenge for further research is to explore not only the combination of issues at stake in armed conflict, but also the correlation and causal relationships among these aspects. Such an approach allows us to bridge theory with practice and assess the extent to which a conflict is about ethnicity, political claims, ideology, territoriality, or a combination of these factors. However, no conflict is motivated by a single factor, and to avoid oversimplification of our analysis, we have to be aware of some challenges in the process of assessment at the extent to which an individual case conforms to the stipulated causal logic outlined in the theory or shows variation in causal explanations. In within-

31 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

18 case causal process observation, the empirical question is to identify not only whether antecedent conditions are linked with the outcome but also whether they do so through the stipulated causal mechanisms too. Each conflict differs and may include ethnicity, religion, as well as political, economic, and territorial aspirations. The question is how these dimensions interrelate in the whole process of conflict dynamics and how far each contributes to armed conflict. This dissertation provides operationalization of issues at stake in the outlined types of conflict mentioned above. The logic of inferences is grounded in empirical evidence. The case-oriented research goes beyond the concept formation and explores specific kinds of issues at stake, which could be studied individually. In this way, we can address each aspect of the conflict separately. This can explain the existence or absence of particular issues during each phase of the armed conflict, allowing us to overcome simplistic and probabilistic explanations through the use of more asymmetrical explanations of conflict processes. The aim of this chapter is to provide a typology of conflict. The created typology helps to explore the characteristic features of the phenomena and utilize discussion on the theoretical level. Such nuanced distinction relies on a better understanding of conflict processes. Even though it is hard to grasp the entire dynamics of an armed conflict within a single study, it is important to distinguish the nature of conflicting groups, conflict onset, its escalation, the context of conflict termination, and peacekeeping efforts. A conflict may erupt, for example, from ethnically defined groups, ignited by incompatibility goals over a political issue, which may result in secession at the stage of conflict termination. In other words, ethnic mobilization can be useful for explaining some aspects of armed conflicts, but not useful for explaining others: in time, other features may become a much more powerful identifier of the conflict relationship. By analyzing the heterogenic nature of internal armed conflict, we can promote academic study, explore the causes of the conflict and how they change over time, which will contribute to resolution efforts in the future.

In this respect, typology of conflict by issues at stake is necessary. Academic research focuses on such aspects as religion, ideology, language, ethnicity, resources and

19 markets, dominance, equality, and territory.32 This classification is widely accepted in political science, and conflict research illuminates the significance of each aspect at the stage of conflict outset, its escalation, and its resolution. This section differentiates the major aspects in conflict research in order to explain five major types of conflict: (1) ethnic conflict, (2) conflict over political arrangements, (3) ideological, (4) economic, and (5) territorial cross-border conflict. Such analytical categories present a definition of a particular conflict type and illuminate aspects that are at stake during the entire conflict dynamics. As mentioned above, the aim is to provide a typology of conflict with regards to issues at stake. By identifying clusters of characteristics that differentiate instances of the conflict phenomenon, typological theorizing contributes a powerful tool in conflict studies.

2.2 Ethnic Conflict

The ubiquity of ethnic aspects in armed conflicts has increased the necessity of giving a scientific definition to the phenomenon of ethnic conflict. There is no comprehensive and widely accepted empirical theory to explain ethnic conflict. Rather, each of the approaches (as discussed below) explains a particular aspect of ethnic confrontation. There is an ongoing scholarly debate over the study as to whether ethnic diversity breeds armed conflict,33 what the relationship between ethnicity and the duration of armed conflict34 is, and whether ethnic conflicts are more violent in comparison to non-ethnic conflicts.35 Some scholars argue about the ―banality‖ of ethnic conflict36 and emphasize the role of violence as a central component of both ethnic and non-ethnic

32 Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., ―Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,‖ Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (September 1, 2002): 615–37, doi:10.1177/0022343302039005007. 33 Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, ―Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict,‖ 316–317. 34 Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, ―Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies,‖ American Political Science Review 101, no. 01 (2007): 173–85, doi:10.1017/S0003055407070086; Nicholas Sambanis, ―Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1),‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June 1, 2001): 259–82, doi:10.1177/0022002701045003001; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ―Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,‖ The American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 715–35, doi:10.2307/2945838. 35 Kristine Eck, ―From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict Intensification,‖ International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 369–88, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00538.x; Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 1 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 36 John Mueller, ―The Banality of ‗Ethnic War,‘‖ International Security 25, no. 1 (July 1, 2000): 42–70, doi:10.1162/016228800560381.

20 conflicts.37 The major shortcoming of such approaches lies in their linking ethnicity and armed conflict in a problematic way – as if all ethnic conflict had uniform causes. Qualitative research highlights the need to ―scale down‖ and trace the bellicose aspect in the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict.38 What marks ethnic conflict as different from other types of conflict is that the interests and claims of ethnic groups are based on ethnic affinities rather than material payoffs.39 In other words, the contested nature of the claim defines what a conflict is about and whether key issues and incompatibility in goals are overtly ethnic in nature. Ethnicity in this study is defined as ―thought and action stemming from identification with a community of putatively shared ancestry that exceeds the scale of face-to-face gemeinschaft‖.40 Aspects like a common proper name, the myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of common culture, a link to homeland, and a sense of solidarity are used by ethnicities to demarcate their boundaries.41 An influential piece of conventional wisdom about ethnic conflict is based on the assumption that ethnic composition of a society influences the probability of ethnic conflict due to tensions across ethnic lines. Many theories – primordial, instrumental, and constructivist – have proposed the explanation of ethnic conflict. Primordialists argue that ethnicity is rooted in historical experience and that ethnic identity does not change over time.42 Primoridalist is an umbrella term, which, according to one of the most prominent scholars, Adam Smith, 43 involves three different approaches: (1) ―naturalist,‖ (2) ―evolutionary,‖ and (3) ―cultural‖ determinants. The

37 Stathis N. Kalyvas, ―‗New‘ and ‗Old‘ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?,‖ World Politics 54, no. 01 (2001): 99–118, doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0022. 38 William Rose, ―The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses,‖ Security Studies 9, no. 4 (2000): 1–51, doi:10.1080/09636410008429412; Michael Edward Brown, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (MIT Press, 2001). 39 Sambanis, ―Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?‖. 40 Eric Kaufmann and Daniele Conversi, ―Ethnicity and Nationalist Mobilization,‖ in The Study of Ethnicity and Politics: Recent Analytical Developments, Adrian Guelke and Jean Tournon ed. (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2012), 50. 41 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, Ethnicity (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 6–7. 42 Max Weber, ―The Origins of Ethnic Groups,‖ John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 35–40; Clifford Geertz, ―Primordial Ties,‖ in Ethnicity, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith ed. (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 40–45. 43 Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995); Prof Anthony D. Smith and Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London ; New York: Routledge, 1998).

21 naturalist approach emphasizes that the nation or ethnic group to which one belongs is ―naturally fixed‖.44 Naturalists do not differentiate between nations and ethnic groups. All nations have a distinctive way of life, ―natural frontiers,‖ specific origins, a golden age, ―as well as a peculiar character, mission and destiny.‖45 According to one of the main representatives of the evolutionary approach, Pierre L. van den Berge, a human society is based on three principles: kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion.46 This involves more ―intergroup than intra-group variance‖47 based on kinship and loyalties of ―inclusive fitness.‖ 48 (Smith 1998: 146-150, Thayer 2009). ―Reciprocity is cooperation for mutual benefit ... and it can operate between kin or between non-kin. Coercion is the use of force for one sided benefit.‖ 49 A similar combination of ethnic affiliation with kinship ties is presented in Donald Horowitz‘s very influential work Ethnic Groups in Conflict: ―ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.‖50 The next approach, which is known as cultural primordialist, goes beyond pure primordialism and is based on a combination of three major ideas: primordial identities are a priori given and static, coercive, and emotional. 51 The most prominent representatives of cultural primordialism are scholars Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, who emphasize the power of cultural perception and a belief in ―sacredness‖ by ethnic groups. The second approach, which is in contradiction with primordialism, is

44 Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, 31. 45 Ibid., 32; John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, Nationalism (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3. 46 Pierre L. van den Berghe, ―Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective,‖ Ethnic and Racial Studies 1, no. 4 (1978): 403, doi:10.1080/01419870.1978.9993241. 47 Ibid., 406–407. 48 Smith and Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 146–150; Bradley A. Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009). 49 Pierre van den Berghe, ―A Socio-Biological Perspective,‖ in Nationalism, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 97. 50 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 1985), 52. 51 Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, ―The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments,‖ Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, no. 2 (1993): 183–202, doi:10.1080/01419870.1993.9993779.

22 instrumentalism. The instrumentalist approach explains ethnic conflict as rooted in modernization, economic indicators, and the role of political leaders.52 Through the process of modernization – which involves better education, urbanization, the creation of better communication channels and mass media — ethnic groups become more aware about their disadvantages, distinctions between them and others, and a need to compete with other ethnic groups.53 Political leaders manipulate ethnic identities for their own interests — for example, to stay in power. Accordingly, political leaders may occur as supporters of conflict across ethnic lines ―in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantages for their groups as well as for themselves.‖54 There is a big debate in mainstream academic literature between primordialist and instrumentalist approaches. In order to challenge fundamental assumptions, scholars of each approach have developed a broad range of critical arguments. However, instead of going into a discussion about the weak and strong points of each approach, I would like to introduce a ―third way‖ in the study of the causes of ethnic conflict represented by such outstanding scholars as Anthony D. Smith, John Hutchinson, John Armstrong, Stuart Kaufmann, Daniele Coversi, and Andreas Wimmer. Ethno-symbolism is a more homogeneous category, involving the elements of both previous approaches. It allows us to capture the complex nature of ethnic identity formation, which ―can be located on a spectrum between primordial historic continuities and instrumental opportunistic adaptations.55 According to this approach, the causes of ethnic conflict are rooted in (1) myths and symbols, (2) fears, and (3) opportunity for mobilization. Myths, history, and symbols are significant in an ethnic group‘s construction process. Memories, myths, symbol values, common feelings and opinions may justify a collective behavior. It may take different forms, such as, for example, flags, language, rituals, hymns, special food and costumes, banners, coins, and representations of ethnic

52 Fearon and Laitin, ―Explaining Interethnic Cooperation‖; Paul R. Brass, ―Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation,‖ in Ethnicity, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 85–90. 53 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994). 54 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (SAGE Publications, 1991), 111. 55 Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics, 1 edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 15.

23 heroes and the glorious past. The core meaning of these symbols represents ―inclusive fitness‖ to one group, its legitimacy for existence and fear for other groups56. The next necessary condition for ethnic conflict is fear for the existence, security, and status of the ethnic group. As is very rightly stated by David Lake and Donald Rothchild, ―ethnicity is not a cause of violent conflict. … But when ethnicity is linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and, indeed, fear of what the future might bring, it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which societies fracture.‖57 The causes of ethnic conflict stem from ―emerging anarchy‖ when a weakening state is unable to provide security guarantees for ethnic groups within the state.58 Barry Posen‘s neorealist assumption is based on the ethnic security dilemma explanation. According to this logic, the incentives to use preemptive offensive strategies are high, and factors like emotions, historical memories, and myths exacerbate the escalation of tension to armed conflict. The combination and interaction of those aspects creates a spiral of escalation, if the necessary conditions – myths justifying ethnic hostility, ethnic fear, and opportunity to mobilize – are present. While ethnic myths and fears can provide justification for ethnic mobilization, there should be political, territorial, and external opportunities for ethnic groups in order to mobilize their forces.59 The role of the political system,60 the strength of political institutions, the pattern of ethnic settlement, the geographic distance of the ethnic group from the political center 61 , trans-border kinship support, 62 and willingness of external powers are the main determinants of ethnic mobilization. To sum up, ethnic conflict is a conflict in which the key causes of confrontation run along ethnic lines, which involve some elements of ethnic identity, the status of

56 Smith and Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 146–150. 57 David A. Lake et al., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998), 7. 58 Barry R. Posen, ―The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,‖ Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47, doi:10.1080/00396339308442672. 59 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 32–34. 60 Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2013); Stephen M. Saideman et al., ―Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998,‖ Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 1 (February 1, 2002): 103–29, doi:10.1177/001041400203500108. 61 Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, ―Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis,‖ World Politics 62, no. 01 (2010): 87–119, doi:10.1017/S0043887109990219. 62 Stefan Wolff, Disputed Territories: The Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004).

24 ethnic groups, and the opportunity to mobilize violent confrontation. At the outset of a conflict, ethnic conflict could be identified by the observable pattern of rebel recruitment, while ethnicity by itself could be a motivation to mobilize forces. Ethnic conflict in this study is understood as a conflict in which the goals of at least one conflict party have ―(exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault-line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues over which conflict erupts (e.g., linguistic, religious, or cultural rights and/or corresponding claims to conditions conducive to their realization), at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms, i.e., will claim that its distinct ethnic identity, and lack of recognition thereof and/or equality of opportunity to preserve, express, and develop it, is the reason why its members cannot realize their interests, why they do not have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied.‖63

2.3 Conflict Over Political Arrangements

Academic research on the links between the political system of the state and armed conflict has a long history in the social sciences. The most prominent scholars of democratization and political transformation, such as Samuel Huntington, Robert Dahl, and Edward Mansfield, have emphasized the significance of strong political institutions capable of managing popular political participation of newly enfranchised masses.64 Political conflict is a broad term. For the purposes of this chapter, political conflict is defined as clashes and violent attacks used by groups within a political community against political regimes and authorities.65 It is a conflict in which rebels target a political community or regime in a given state with the goal to achieve some degree of political change; a violent confrontation between political elites and counter elites ensues.66 As is outlined by Harry Eckstein in the Handbook of Political Conflict Theory and Research, the fundamental incompatibility in goals between conflicting parties is

63 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective, 1st edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2. 64 -January 1 1969, Political Order in Changing Societies, 3rd edition (Yale University Press, n.d.); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 3rd edition (Yale University Press, 1969). 65 Ted Robert Gurr, Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research (Free Press, 1980), 3–4. 66 Harry H. Eckstein, ―Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence,‖ in Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, Ted Robert Gurr ed. (Free Press, 1980), 137.

25 the desire to maximize influence or power over decision-making institutions in a state. In order to achieve this goal, collective political violence is a ―normal‖ action, whereas violence is a matter of tactical considerations. Such tactical choice involves cost-benefit ratio calculations, which make cultural patterns less important,67 unlike, for example, in ethnic conflicts where the logic of violence is important. As we have witnessed, the causal connection between democratization and conflict has been significantly striking since the end of the Cold War. Ted Gurr‘s findings in the late 1980s and 1990s are embedded in the process of democratization.68 One of the most influential scholars, D. Horowitz, argues that weak civil societies, lack of power-sharing commitments, sharp cleavages between elite and non-elite groups all increase the probability of armed conflict. ―Democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power. … In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded.‖69 A considerable contingent of academics argue that the beginning stages of any transition to democracy are most dangerous and give rise to armed conflict. The argument that transition to democracy is risky does not prevent such a development. The struggle for self-determination and political change in newly created states is a dynamic process and cannot be stopped.70 What matters is the way the transition is brought about – with the right steps toward democracy. ―The probabilities of a political system developing in a non-violent, non-authoritarian and eventually democratically viable manner are maximized when a national identity emerges first, followed by the institutionalization of the central government, and then the emergence of mass parties and mass electorate.‖71 Weak institutions per se do not increase the chance of an armed conflict; they do so only during the early phase of an incomplete democratic transition.72 In this case, political leaders frequently employ ideological or charismatic appeals to bolster their rule.

67 Ibid., 143. 68 Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2000), 163. 69 Donald L Horowitz, ―Democracy in Divided Societies,‖ Journal of Democracy 4, no. 4 (1993): 18–38, doi:10.1353/jod.1993.0054. 70 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007). 71 Eric Nordlinger, ―Political Development, Time Sequences and Rates of Change,‖ in Political Development and Social Change, James L. Finkle and Robert Grable, ed (New York: Wiley, 1971), 458. 72 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.

26 The contest over national self-determination takes place as the fortunes of both elites and mass groups are shifting. Elites left over from the old regime seek strategies that will prevent their fall, while rising elites try to muscle in, and both scramble for allies among the newly aroused masses. From this we can stipulate the conditions under which a political conflict is more likely to occur. Of course, the political problems discussed above do not lead to all kinds of political conflict. A more fruitful avenue of inquiry than focusing our research on the ―causes‖ of conflict and the ―conditions‖ of peace is to uncover significant characteristics directly relevant to political consolidation and struggle. In order to explain political conflict, it is necessary to operationalize those aspects by which two or more politically defined actors learn that their goals could be achieved only by armed confrontation. The long-term political relationship becomes increasingly conflictive and hostile when (1) political change is used as a tool to mobilize masses, (2) there are conflicting visions about the political arrangement of a state, and (3) incompatibility of goals rests upon a change of political regime.

2.4 Ideological Confrontation and Its Consequences

Ideology has been one of the most widely used terms in political thought during the twentieth century. Different scholars used the term in different ways, which raises the question of what this concept exactly means. In this section, I will explore the role of three core determinants of ideology, which are significant to explain armed conflict: (1) a set of norms, (2) political orientation, and (3) religion. The function of ideology can be explained in different ways. Ideology could be understood as a set of systemic principles, that projects and justifies a socio-political order. Ideology can be understood as the moral basis to justify the use of power by elites. This means that in order to process power, it is important to have a moral and legal basis, doctrines, and beliefs that are accepted by the population. The function of ideology, in this sense, is to integrate the group and legitimize its normative order. It could be a tool used by conflicting parties to maintain or create such normative orders. Other scholars have explained ideology as a ―myth‖ that has supported and determined the group‘s action in a struggle against other groups. Thus, ideology can have different roles, ranging

27 from strengthening the ties within the group and its identity to aiding conflicting groups in their claims and interests to strengthening the will of particular members of the group to wage war against other groups.73 In some armed conflicts, the same ideology that strengthens ties within a group can also contribute to conflict behavior against other groups. The linkage between ideology and armed conflict is profound in the states that emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union. The state ideology of Marxism-Leninism was pronounced defunct and Western neo-liberalism was introduced in order to assist the political transformation in the whole post-communist space. The crucial factor in this process was a need to determine a new place in the ―new order,‖ to ensure membership in alliances and access to foreign economic assistance, trade, and investments. Following this logic, ―ideology needs to be placed in a continuum of expression of political thought‖ and as a concept that provides a ―systemic interpretation of the past and a programme or unfolding future.‖74 In this sense, ideology assists the understanding of foreign policy goals of countries and their aspirations in defining their roles on a regional and international level. Put in the words of one of the most prominent scholars, K. J. Holsti, ―an ideology provides the intellectual framework through which national roles, images, policy and moral and ethical beliefs are constructed.‖75 The demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of its institutions were followed by the displacement of universal values, the task of state-building, and the rise of nationalist movements. All of these factors contributed to the significance of a new ideology in post-communist states. The foreign policy goals of these states cannot be understood without a discourse on belief structures, their systems of values, and the perception of the population‘s and the political leaders‘ ideological orientation (even if it is in the process of formulation) and their place in the world. Another type of ideological conflict is rooted in disputed religious beliefs. Religious segregation leads to struggle in a similar way that ethnicity does, but often with

73 Malcolm B. Hamilton, ―The Elements of the Concept of Ideology,‖ Political Studies 35, no. 1 (March 1, 1987): 18–38, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1987.tb00186.x. 74 Rick Fawn and Rick Fawn, Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policy, 1 edition (Routledge, 2004), 3–4. 75 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 7 edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Pearson, 1994), 266–267.

28 more vehemence.76 Religious identity forms a group identity that might be different from the others and contributes to the escalation of in- and out-group dynamics. The goal of conflicting parties is to replace their civic identity with more faith-based identities.77 Religion serves as a power tool for mobilization, strengthening the identity-related need of the individual.78 The crucial point that one needs to keep in mind is that particular religious ideas, values, and beliefs have their origins in the supernatural. Religion in this sense is uncompromising.79 Differences on this level may contribute to violent behavior by religious actors: non-believers might be converted by force and punished.80 Overall prejudice against any particular religion by others may have an impact on conflict dynamics. Multi-religious states, such as India, could be more prone to armed conflict across religious lines. The intergroup relationship between Muslim and non- Muslim groups is problematic in European countries too, as, for example, in Great Britain. Links between religion and armed conformation are the subject of increased interest in international politics. Much of the academic literature focuses on terrorism or tests Samuel Huntington‘s famous thesis on the ―clash of civilizations.‖81 Some studies argue that in order to answer such a question as, ―How has it come about that a generation of village boys and girls, born in the atheist Soviet Union, have turned into Islamic suicide bombers and child killers?‖82 we have to understand the process of politicization of religion and the role of political leaders. Ideological conflict can turn to armed confrontation if (1) the religious make-up of a state involves different religious

76 Wendell Bell, Walter E. Freeman, and International Studies Association, Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Comparative, International, and Historical Perspectives (Sage Publications, 1974). 77 Misra, Politics of Civil Wars, 15. 78 Jeffrey R. Seul, ―`Ours Is the Way of God‘: Religion, Identity, And Intergroup Conflict,‖ Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 5 (September 1, 1999): 553–69, doi:10.1177/0022343399036005004. 79 Timothy Samuel Shah et al., Rethinking Religion and World Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 80 Matthias Basedau et al., ―Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence From Sub- Saharan Africa,‖ Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (2011): 752–79, doi:10.1080/09546553.2011.619240. 81 In his study political scientist Houman A. Sadri undemines the explanatory power of ―clash of civilization‖ theory in the South Caucasus. He argues that in order to understand to the security in this region, we have to address three major factors: separatism, internal instability and international rivalry. See: Houman A. Sadri, Global Security Watch - The Caucasus States (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2010). 82 Thomas De Waal, ―A War of Unintended Consequences,‖ Index on Censorship 33, no. 4 (2004): 55, doi:10.1080/03064220408537408.

29 groups, (2) there are conflict-prone religious structures, and (3) there is a competing ideological believes, that determine diversity in foreign policy orientation of a country.

2.5 Economic Conflict

The economic dimension of conflict, uneven distribution of wealth, contributes to antagonism within a state. This has been investigated by many international studies. Since economic stability affects almost all aspects of human life and states alike, research has identified several core issues that are central for international stability. They include fair trade relations, fair competition, foreign investments, distribution of goods, services, and technology, North-South inequalities, and economic crises. The well-known liberal argument that economic interdependence promotes peace is based on the assumption that trade agreements and institutions reduce conflict on an international level.83 Trade ties among national states generate a sense of community, increase trust, and enhance peaceful relationships through expectations of future profit.84 Some studies have illustrated that trade ties promote peace processes and that trade partners within the same institutional arrangement use military force against each other less often than states that do not have trade ties.85 However, this liberal assumption has its limitations, and there are good reasons to be skeptical about its empirical evidence. Trade ties may lead to trust-building and reciprocity only under a symmetrical relationship between liberal states. However, interdependence is complex, and mutual membership in institutions – realistically speaking – is epiphenomenal. Like military power, membership in international institutions ―gives states ability to coerce, bribe, reward, or punish others, defining the

83 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Regional Integration;: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, n.d.); John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000). 84 Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Globalization and Armed Conflict (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, ―The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950–85,‖ International Organization 52, no. 03 (1998): 441–67, doi:10.1162/002081898550626. 85 Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, ―Institutions, Interdependence, and International Conflict,‖ in Globalization and Armed Conflict, Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri and Nils Pettwe Gleditsch ed. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 233–50.

30 conditions under which acts of military aggression or cooperation are rational strategies of action.‖86 Research by Katherine Barbieri illuminates that bilateral trade increases the probability of armed conflict.87 Thus, it is important to find out which variables and what different levels of dependency (direct and indirect, dyadic and systemic, single and multi- dimensional) generate incentives for peace in some circumstances and conflict under others. Liberal preconditions could be expected in such circumstances under which economic dependence among states is relatively equal. However, disparity in interdependence may promote distrust and intensification of armed conflict.88 Where economic causes of armed conflict are concerned, outbreak of armed conflict is causally connected with rapid industrialization and transformation of centrally regulated economies to the principles of unregulated market economies. Theories of armed conflict suggest that the causes of violent conflict are rooted in ―greed and grievance.‖89 The mechanism for mobilization stems from political deprivation and self- interest in material gain.90 According to the theory developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the probability of violent conflict is high under the following conditions: dependency on a primary commodity export, a low level of secondary education, large populations, low economic growth, low income per capita, and the presence of previous armed conflict. All of these are assigned to ―greed‖ proxies. This theory emphasizes the role of greed and grievance to explain the outbreak of war. Another economic model of armed conflict emphasizes the role of self-interested behavior ―in which participation is a form of crime, the rebels are criminals acting in pursuit of economic gains.‖91 It does not mean that grievance is unimportant; it is a ubiquitous aspect of every conflict. In other words, while grievance creates the

86 Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, ―War, Trade, and Distrust,‖ 258. 87 Katherine Barbieri, ―Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?,‖ Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1, 1996): 29–49, doi:10.1177/0022343396033001003; Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 88 Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, ―War, Trade, and Distrust,‖ 263. 89 Collier and Hoeffler, ―Greed and Grievance in Civil War.‖ 90 Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, ―Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (June 1, 2005): 319–36, doi:10.1177/0022002704273441. 91 Ibid., 322.

31 ―backbone of protest‖ of minorities at risk, the resources and the incentives to mobilize are significant factors in the process of escalation. Distinguished scholar Jeremy Weintien argues that ―differences in how rebel groups employ violence are a consequence of initial conditions‖ that rebel groups have at their disposal. ―Rebel groups that emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with the external support of an outside patron‖ are ―opportunist rebels‖ (greed assets grievances). ―Movements that arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and employ violence selectively and strategically‖; these are ―activist rebellions‖ (grievance assets greed).92 The logic of violence according to the theory of relative deprivation is related to the instrumentalist approach, which is discussed in the section about ethnic conflict. The economic model of armed confrontation is also linked to the rational choice theory. However, what is more important for the analysis of economically motivated armed conflict is that the ―greed model‖ and easy access to valuable resources can contribute to the creation of ―opportunistic rebellion‖ motivated by self-enrichment incentives, but there are also powerful theories that explain the motivation of rebel groups to achieve their political goals: the ―grievance model‖ and the ―activist rebellion.‖ The relationship between economic issues and armed conflict takes a violent form if there are contested attitudes between conflicting parties about primary access to the valuable resources, if there is asymmetric dependency on trade ties and export, and if there is disparity in access to jobs. Economic development, improvement of a social- economic situation, and democratic transition cannot be achieved without peaceful resolution of conflicts. Almost every armed conflict results in huge economic losses. However, to address economic issues at stake that may lead to conflict escalation, it is essential to point out that some economic processes may lead to armed conflict. For the purposes of this dissertation, economic aspects of conflict are operationalized as follows: (1) economic decline and inequality in economic development of different regions; (2) shadow economy (smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal trade activities), and (3) interest to control key economic resources.

92 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, 1 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7–10.

32 2.6 Territorial Cross-border Conflict

Territorial issues have been identified as the most war-prone issues in conflict studies. The tendency is seen in the great willingness of people to fight over their homelands as well as over economically and strategically important territories. As John Vasquez wrote, ―territorial issues are ‗best‘ handled by use of force and violence.‖ 93 People tend to be emotionally attached to their territory; homeland becomes an integral part of their identity; and the question who controls the territory becomes very important.94 Territory is a significant part of any state-building process, and it carries its own value. Natural resources, strategic importance in terms of state boundaries, access to the open sea or control over transport routes are all factors contributing to the significance of this issue. It is not surprising, then, that when territoriality is at stake in armed confrontation, a conflict is linked with such issues as the territorial integrity of a state.95 The territorial dimension of internal armed conflict is based on close study of how an internal armed conflict in one place can generate instability in another and what the effects of the actions of one country are on the development of internal conflict in another. When studying territorial cross-border it is necessary to evaluate mechanisms that increase the risk of transmission of instability to a different place.96 Trans-border cooperation and military support against a state government may make internal armed conflicts more likely. The nature of the external group and the impact on regional security should be taken into consideration, as they may lead to the outbreak of conflict. Most internal armed conflicts have notable implications for regional stability and have a ―spillover‖ effect. Some neighboring states can trigger the conflict by supporting different groups. This strategy is based on the interests of a particular state. Conditions under which the spillover effect can transmit violence to different places occur when internal tension and instability in one country provide an opportunity for an

93 John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 140. 94 Tir, ―Territorial Diversion.‖ 95 Wolff, Disputed Territories. 96 Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

33 external power to intervene in order to maximize its interests and gain power. The issue of military intervention is the subject of another chapter of this study. One of the types of armed conflict involving territorial issues is irredentism. Irredentism is not a state-based process; it is a movement that seeks to attain the external support and territory of the group across the existing border. The goal of this group is to add territory and population into an existing state by reason of common affinities, such as ethnic, cultural, historical, or linguistic ties (derived from Wolff). An outstanding study of the complexity of territorial claims of particular minority groups living within the borders of one country and gaining support from outside kinship groups is Stefan Wolff‘s Disputed Territories: The Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement. Another type of territorial confrontation is secession, which is a process at the end of which a population group inhabiting a defined territory within an existing state has succeeded in splitting itself and its territory off from a titular state. As a result, it has established an independent state of its own (derived from Wolff 2004). Secession is a process of political divorce and the formation of at least one new sovereign unit through a formal declaration of independence.97 Secession has consequences on political structures, economic development, and the geographic borders of a state. However, it is first of all about the territoriality and sovereignty of a particular land. It may take different forms. First, a large political unit (like a state) separates from the larger entity (union, empire) and declares itself to be an independent unit (for example, the secession of colonies from Great Britain). Second, the larger unit is dissolved and all regions secede from it. An example could be the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, what is the most significant feature of this process is that it involves violence used by conflicting parties to achieve independence. In summary, a study of territorial armed conflict has to distinguish between the nature and the level of territorial claims of conflicting parties. In most cases of armed conflict, territorial issues are strongly correlated with other issues in conflict dynamics, such as, for example, ethnicity, lootable resources, or the political system of a state.

97 Steven Yates, ―When Is Political Divorce Justified,‖ in Secession, State and Liberty, David Gordon ed (London: New Brunswick, 1998), 35.

34 Chapter 3: Methodological Framework

3.1 Conflict Analysis Framework: Research Design

The main goal of this research is to address the complex phenomena of armed conflict in the South Caucasus region and to provide a comprehensive analysis of all possible kinds of cases. In order to avoid oversimplification, this study will be based on typological theorizing through the classification of theories of armed conflicts. In contrast to general theories in the field of international relations, typological theory provides a rich and differentiated depiction of a phenomenon and serves as a foundation for explanation, generalization, and policy recommendations.98 The categorization of ethnic conflict theories offers a framework of multidimensional typologies. Scholars sometimes refer to their analytical categories as ideal types, creating an abstraction that may not consistently serve to classify empirical cases. In analytical categories the degree of abstraction is lower. Complementing major theoretical approaches in the conflict studies will create analytical categories for the theories of armed conflict. For example, as illustrated in the theoretical part of this dissertation, the ethnic conflict category reviews all major theoretical approaches and uses their core arguments to create an independent type. Complementing one theory with another within a single category will help to define the arguments of one theory against another, thus leading to the incorporation of multidimensional independent and dependent variables in each analytical category. Typological theorizing has a distinguished history in the social sciences. Scholarly research has generated different kinds of types, for example, ―ideal,‖ ―empirical,‖ ―classificatory,‖ ―constructed,‖ ―heuristic,‖ or even a ―typology of typologies.‖ This dissertation identifies the explanatory typology (in my terminology, analytical category) of Colin Elman, which is understood as the multidimensional conceptual classification derived from the stated theory. Furthermore, such typology can

98 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Fourth Printing edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005), 235.

35 test theories and assume what we can expect if the theory is correct.99 Research design based on typological theory depicts the independent variables in the categories and leads to a better understanding of how these variables are operating in hypotheses. It allows us to understand how and under what conditions they behave in a specific connection to lead to a specific outcome (by producing a certain effect on dependent variables). Typological theorizing is useful both in theory testing and theory development. With respect to a theory-developing task, typologies allow us to identify multiple causation. With regard to theory testing, typologies are helpful too in identifying the degree of causal homogeneity and for positing its counterfactual reasoning. There are two techniques that can be employed in refining typologies: compression and expansion. With compression techniques, we are able to work with multivariable explanatory typology in a more sophisticated way, whereas with expansion techniques, we are able to discover missed combinations and assumptions.100 In this dissertation, typological theorizing has a classificatory function. When applied to case studies, we can determine to which ―type‖ this case belongs. Empirical data are coded as falling into one category or another. It allows us to trace congruence between categories. By putting cases into different categories, we can make the most productive comparisons for testing theories.101 After creating four analytical categories of theories of armed conflict, they will be applied to the selected case studies. Each case will be evaluated through each of the categories to find out their strengths in explaining research questions of this study. Bearing in mind the problem of the research subject in question – the conflict‘s constantly changing character – the observation for each category will be divided into three time periods: (1) latent conflict and low level violence, (2) escalation of conflict to full-scale war, and (3) ―no war, no peace‖ situation. This will allow us to uncover the importance of each aspect through time and on different levels of conflict development.

99 Typological theorizing can be a powerful tool in conflict studies. The creation of each type requires working through the logical implication and causal mechanism of a particular theory when its variables take on different values. 100 Colin Elman, ―Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,‖ International Organization 59, no. 02 (2005): 295–300, doi:10.1017/S0020818305050101. 101 Collier, David, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, ―Typologies: Forming Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables,‖ in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry Brady and David Collier ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 161–162.

36 Characteristic features of the conflict change through time. Understanding this change is critically important for bridging theoretical assumptions with empirical cases. This will lead to more equitable interpretations of the evolving nature of armed conflict in the South Caucasus region.

3.1.1 Research Design: “Building Block” This dissertation is based on a similar-cases research design, dealing with cases with similar outcomes. A case study allows us in-depth and direct observations. The choice of this method can be justified, as it is an adequate tool to depict interrelationships between issues at stake and a type of armed conflict under study. In order to study these linkages, typological theorizing is based on identifying the variables that define each type. To strengthen the inferences, process tracing will be used to check their presence. This allows for proper classification of case studies. Process tracing is used as a technique to strengthen typological theorizing. It will check the validity of explanations and reduce the risk of mistaken inferences. It should be mentioned that in some cases the interactions‘ effects are relatively easy to define while in others it is not an easy task. Process tracing can help in both circumstances. In the first case, it will be attributed as a check for identifying the interactions‘ effects between operationalized aspects in each type of conflict. Second, it allows us to trace the conflict processes and dynamics over longer time spans. This study goes beyond the classification of cases by further classifying within selected cases. Such detailed research into the processes of conflict onset, escalation, and de-escalation is necessary for the creation of efficient early warning mechanism. The findings of this research illuminate the most significant aspects that have to be addressed in order to achieve resolution of the armed conflicts in the future. In addition, the results of this research can contribute to future research, which will test existing theories in the field, propose theories addressing the issue of equifinality, and, most importantly, develop theories with causal mechanisms and interaction effects between independent and dependent variables leading to escalation of armed conflict.

37 3.2 Categorization of the Concept

Conflict is part of human history, and, unfortunately, will probably never disappear entirely from human interaction. The concept of conflict has been used to identify a variety of social interactions. The most destructive types of conflict involve coercion and armed confrontation among parties, leading to casualties among human lives. Scientific efforts to understand the multiple causes of conflict have resulted in some knowledge about the various phenomena. The mainstream academic literature has produced different approaches about how to study conflict; however, the outcome to delineate the concept remains ambiguous. In order to understand the research object, an adequate conceptualization that will formulate concepts and illuminate what is theoretically significant is essential. This section gathers the most influential definitions in the field of International Relations by those who have collected data on armed conflict. The term conflict is derived from the Latin word pugna, which means strife and refers to behavior or action. Most of the definitions include the element of collision of inconsistent interests and values among conflicting parties, ranging from struggles for status to resources and social change. In general, conflict is understood in terms of aspirations of conflicting parties to achieve incompatible goals simultaneously.102 Goals are incompatible when the action of one party threatens the interests of another party. The complexity of the conflict depends on whether tangible issues (like recognition, security, territory, money) are more significant than intangible aspects like symbolic meanings that shape values and ideologies, legitimizing a certain conflict behavior.103 Thus, in the conflict research literature, the term conflict entails a situation in which at least two actors fight over mutually exclusive and incompatible goals. In the words of one of the most prominent scholars, Donald Horowitz, ―conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.‖104 The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research defines conflict as ―the clashing interests (political differences) on national values of some duration and

102 Dean Pruitt, Jeffrey Rubin, and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 3 edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2003). 103 Ho-Won Jeong, Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis (Los Angeles ; London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008), 26. 104 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 95.

38 magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organization) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases.‖105 A similar definition is used in the book Using Conflict Theory, which describes conflict as a unique type of behavior caused by incompatible goals and/or expression of hostility among conflicting parties.106 This dissertation employs the definition by Peter Wallensteen, one of the most recognized scholars in peace research, whose definition is accepted by the majority of the academic community in the field. In order to understand and provide conflict analysis, we have to focus on three major components of the phenomenon: (1) actors, (2) process (action), and (3) incompatibility (issues at stake). By combining these aspects, we arrive at a most comprehensive analysis of all possible kinds of conflict, which is a ―social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources.‖ 107 Therefore, conflicts can be categorized in terms of types of conflicting parties, interaction patterns ranging from war to non-violent conflict, and incompatibility of issues at stake within a particular conflict. This scheme will be applied in the following sections.

3.3 Conflict-mapping Framework

Conflict represents a compound competition among involved actors that determine power dynamics among them. In order to capture the complexity of issues at stake and the diversity of parties and factors that contribute to the transformation of a conflict from one phase to another, this dissertation adopts a multidimensional framework for conflict analysis. A conflict-mapping method is applied to assess incompatible goals among conflict parties and issues in contention. Each analytical step within this method requires identification of disputed issues at stake embedded in each phase of a conflict.

105 ―Conflictbarometer 2005: Crisis - Wars - Coups d‘État Negotiations - Mediations - Peace Settlements. 14th Annual Conflict Analysis‖ (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2005), http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2005.pdf. 106 Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr, Using Conflict Theory, 1 edition (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13. 107 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, Third Edition edition (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011), 15.

39 Comparison of the issues at stake in each case study sheds light on the main factors, the relationships between them and their transition in the outlined phases. In this way, we are able to deepen our analysis and trace the differences of these conflicts, even though they share conditions under which the conflicts occurred. Indicators provided in the theoretical chapter are needed for proper conceptualization and better structuring of complex reality of the armed conflicts under study. For each conflict analysis, it is imperative to identify and assess key conflict parties, types of issues at stake, and modes of process leading to any particular outcome. The issue at stake has a profound effect on conflict strategies, mutual relationships among conflict parties, dynamics of escalation, and the overall outcome of the conflict. The mapping method allows us to categorize specific conflict behaviors and to assess each factor on the escalation process of a conflict.

3.3.1 Conflict Parties When actor analysis is addressed, the conflict-mapping method focuses on the scope of the analysis of the groups that are in antagonistic relationship, directly opposing each other in order to achieve their incompatible goals. Membership types can identify conflict groups, legitimacy of their goals, and their ability to mobilize resources for their struggle. In actor analysis, the dissertation does not provide the dividing lines along states on the one hand and non-state actors on the other. The conflict actors in the South Caucasus at the stage of initiation involved the nationalist movements on both sides, competing over the rules of the new political game in this region. In this regard, analyses involve individuals and groups that play a significant role in the escalation of a conflict. Conflict processes and outcomes are affected by many actors. Allies across borders increase the struggle capabilities of the primary conflict parties. The strategic interests of an ally could be different from the interests of parties opposing each other over contested issues. While primary conflict parties initiate a spiral of conflict, new actors may change the outcomes and peace-building patterns in a conflict. In order to regulate the intensity of violence, a third-party intervention is required. As there are many international actors involved within the processes and duration of conflicts in the South

40 Caucasus, it is essential to address the goals of each conflict party that was involved in a direct or indirect manner. For the purposes of this research, the conflict parties under analysis are identified by their goals, attitudes toward the goals of other actors, and their mutual relationship— all of which contributes to changing the conflict dynamics. This dissertation adopts a definition according to which an actor is referred to ―as a decision maker[; this] may be an individual or a group of people represented by an organization. To be included as a decision maker in a conflict model, it must have some power to influence the conflict, the power of the decision maker is expressed in terms of options or courses of an action which are under its control to initiate in order to alter the conflict situation.‖108

3.3.2 Issues at Stake and Incompatibility The issue at stake reveals the core aspects in the heart of a conflict and defines what the conflict is about. An analysis of issues at stake points out the significance of the aspects embedded in a conflict. Such analysis goes beyond the surface of conflict phenomena. For example, ethnic autonomy can be manifested in terms of preservation of traditions and culture of a conflict party, but the main issue at stake might be a fight over access to the power-sharing institutions of a state. The detailed study of issues at stake furthers better academic understanding of the conflict nature. Furthermore, it is essential to differentiate what is a key issue at stake and whether it correspondents with the actual claims of conflict parties. In other words, some issues might be masked and manipulated by leaders of conflicting parties. In order to achieve conflict resolution, it is essential to uncover and address the key issues at stake in each conflict. Goals are defined as an aspiration of a conflict party to achieve particular conditions and outcomes. Goals are incompatible when different conflict parties seek the same thing, such as, for example, territory, political re-arrangement, or economic advantages, prestige, or respect. Each conflict party may have multiple goals. Identification of goals of conflict parties and manifestation of the incompatibility of these goals is essential in illuminating the nature of a conflict.

108 Niall M. Fraser, Keith W. Hipel, John Jaworsky, Ralph Zuljan, ―A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian- Azerbaijani Dispute,‖ Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4 (1990): 652–77.

41 Issues at stake could be manifested in terms of incompatible interests or incompatible values. ―Interests‖ of involved conflict parties refer to their economic, political, or occupational aspirations. Incompatible values represent a belief system according to which a conflict party interprets the behavior of others. It also serves to legitimize certain behavior of conflict parties. Conflict analysis should go beyond the symptoms that characterize a conflict to uncover the real issues at stake that transform the conflict into its violent form. This will contribute to the creation of social and political formulae that meet the needs of conflict parties in order to build sustainable peace. In order to analyze a conflict process, this research is built upon a study of developments and mutual relationships at different phases following the changes in the conflict parties‘ perceptions and issues at stake. These modes of inter-relation among conflict parties have tremendous influence on escalation and de-escalation of the conflict. Therefore, activities of conflict parties are analyzed in terms of their synergy. The operationalization of issues at stake is presented in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation.

Figure 1 Conflict Mapping.

Source: Ho-Won Jeong, Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis (Los Angeles ; London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008), 21.

42

3.4 Conflict Typology by Process—Violence Intensity

The study recognizes that conflicts are not always violent. In fact, the vast majority of conflicts in international relations are non-violent. Thus, there is a significant and growing literature on these types of conflicts. The COSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model) conflict categorization belongs among the most prominent classifications; it has been developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), aiming to grasp armed conflict from non-violent, latent conflict to violent war phases. Conflict analysis within this framework is divided into two main categories: non-violent and violent conflicts. The non-violent form of a conflict does not mean that the conflict is absent, but rather that conflicting parties do not employ violent methods to resolve incompatible goals. Put in the words of Dennis Sandole, non-violent conflict is a manifestation of conflict processes during which one party seeks to undermine the goal- seeking capabilities of another conflicting party by non-violent means, as, for instance, with economic sanctions, through exclusion of some groups from access to power, and so on.109 There are two types of non-violent conflict: latent conflict and manifested conflict. While conflicting parties do not use force against each other, a latent conflict occurs when one of the conflicting parties has incompatible differences over issues, values, or objectives that have national significance for them. When these clashing interests are articulated in the form of demands and claims, the conflict enters a stage of manifestation in which tensions still remain below the threshold of full-scale violence. As illustrated in Table 1, the conflicts are divided into two major categories: non-violent and violent conflict.

109 Dennis JD. Sandole, ―A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach.,‖ Peace and Conflict Studies 5, no. 2 (1998): 1–30.

43

Table 1 Categories of Conflict Intensity.

Name of Violence Intensity Definition Intensity A positional difference on values of national meaning Latent Conflict articulated by one party and perceived by the other as such.

The use of measures located Non-violent Low at the preliminary stage to Manifest violent force, such as Conflict economic sanctions or verbal pressure to use violence.

At least one of the parties Medium Crisis uses violent force in a sporadic way.

A conflict in which violent force is used repeatedly in a Severe Crisis systemic and organized Violent way.

High The type of armed conflict in which violence reaches a War certain magnitude and the conflicting parties exercise extensive measures.

Source: Derived from the Conflictbarometer 2005: Crisis - Wars - Coups d‘État Negotiations - Mediations - Peace Settlements. 14th Annual Conflict Analysis.

As far as violent conflicts are concerned, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) introduces empirical-quantitative analysis of conflicts and offers a deeper differentiation of conflict intensity. There are three categories of armed conflict: (1) minor armed conflict, which involves at least 25 battle-related deaths, but less than 1,000 for the whole duration of the conflict; (2) intermediate armed conflict, in which the

44 number of deaths counts more than 25 people and fewer than 1,000 per year, but more than 1,000 during the entire conflict; and (3) war, a conflict in which there are more than 1,000 deaths in one year (Wallensteen 2012: 22). It means that a conflict has to reach a certain magnitude before it is classified as ―armed.‖ It is measured in terms of a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. Undoubtedly, the highest level of violent conflict is war. In order to grasp the whole dynamics of war, scholars have created definitions that stem from different theoretical perspectives. As a result, the research has developed different sets of aspects for investigation. Hedley Bull‘s definition, which has guided research within the field of IR, defines war as ―organized violence carried out by political units against each other.‖110 Significant assumptions made by this definition elucidate the following aspects of war: first, it is fought by political organizations (not by any other collective actors, as, for example, economic corporations); second, war is organized violence with its own rules and norms; and third, war is collective, not individual.111 This definition, however, does not include that war is a special tool to compel opposing actors to fulfill will and attain a goal that cannot be achieved by other means. As the most well-known definition by famous military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claims, ―war is mere continuation of policy by other means.‖112 Given the diversity of theoretical perspectives and plurality of hypotheses in the literature about the causes of war, it has been impossible to reach a universally acceptable definition on a theoretical level. Further significant attempts to define war were determined by the empirical domain of the concept. An attempt was made to create a data set that could be used by every scholar to verify or falsify hypotheses derived from different theoretical approaches. In this regard, the criteria to define war were drawn across the causality line. Quincy Wright, an outstanding political scientist, made one of the first contributions to this attempt by including under the criteria of war all hostilities among ―members of the family of nations, whether international, civil, colonial, or imperial, which were recognized as states of war in the legal sense or involved 50,000 troops.‖ Another prominent scholar, Lewis F. Richardson, took a different perspective.

110 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 4 edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 178. 111 Vasquez, The War Puzzle, 35. 112 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Wilder Publications, 2008), 42.

45 He differentiated war from other acts of violence by the number of the dead, grouped by various logarithms to base ten.113 Melvin Small and David Singer, who have developed the conceptualization and typology of war within the Correlates of War Project, have combined work of their two main predecessors, Wright and Richardson. The starting point for Small and Singer, who collected data on war from 1816 to the present, was to understand the concept as follows: ―we must define war in terms of violence. Not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic of war.‖114 Since then the concept of war has been based on two primary criteria: first, a certain magnitude of battle-related fatalities (initially including only soldiers and military staff) and second, the status of the conflicting actors. According to these scholars, the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths caused by sustainable, organized armed forces differentiates war from other types of conflict.115 This criterion is broadly accepted by the academic community; however, the threshold of 1,000 deaths was broadened to include civilian casualties. Clearly, there is a number of issues over which conflicting parties fight. Classification of the issues is necessary to achieve a comprehensive analysis and potential policy recommendations for the resolution of a conflict. The next section of the chapter presents the typology of major theoretical approaches that shed light on the causes, processes, and conditions that are entailed in understanding interaction patterns in a conflict. 3.4.1 Conflict Phases Each conflict has specific lifecycles of its own. The dynamic approach to conflict analysis allows establishing a dialogue between conflict phases. In spite of variations in patterns, conflict research literature postulates several phases that offer a clear framework for analysis. The core set of interrelated conflict behavior ranges from the initiation over

113 Lewis F. Richardson, Quincy Wright, and C. C. Lienau, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Boxwood Pr, 1960), 6. 114 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980, 2 Sub edition (Beverly Hills, Calif: SAGE Publications, Inc, 1982), 205–206. 115 Joel David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1972), 8.

46 escalation, stalemate, de-escalation to peacekeeping efforts. Stalemate is the highest peak in the pathway of conflict evolution. While it is helpful to have an ideal model for conflict analysis, this research emphasizes that conflict dynamics is not a linear process. It proposes a better model to capture the pathway of conflict development in the cases under study. This is especially needed for conflict analysis with long duration that does not follow a strictly predictable model. The path of a conflict is not a straightforward process. Most of the conflicts go through a complex cycle, transforming one phase of a conflict to another while each phase diverges in terms of duration and possibly changes issues at stake. Thus, a trajectory of the conflict does not follow the stipulated stage-by-stage model. Some conflicts do not even reach the phase of conflict resolution, as has been the case in the South Caucasus. The change in conflict dynamics to a rapid eruption of violence can be caused by accumulated tension between conflict parties. A trigger event can lead to the escalation of violence. On its way to escalation, a conflict produces uncertainty and unpredictability. The significance of issues at stake reflects the incentives of conflicting parties to full engagement in the full-scale confrontation. This process of escalation turns non-violent conflict into full-scale war. The enemy is portrayed ―as a negative mirror image of oneself. … Each party tries to outdo the other‘s behavior in a vicious circle of hostile action and negative reaction.‖116 The escalation process leads to a new spiral of armed confrontation. Conflict parties are involved in military strategies to achieve their goals via coercion. During this phase, mistrust and suspicion are major features of the mutual relationship. A cycle of coercion, political chaos, and disputes among conflict parties determines perceptions on costs and benefits of a conflict. Even after material exhaustion, parties are not willing to accept an ―unworthy‖ compromise, even if achieving incompatible goals is not realistic. A stalemate indicates a phase when none of the conflict parties are able to reach decisive victory. Both escalation and stalemate last as long as there is hope to attain their goals. The modification of behavior comes with huge losses and extensive damage after a long, intensive struggle.

116 Jeong, Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis, 36.

47 De-escalation does not come with the offer for ceasefire. Decrease in violence does not mean that the issues at stake or the goals of the conflict parties have changed. The issues at stake embedded within the conflict may escalate tensions in order to achieve objectives or remain on the level of a status quo. In this case, the issues at stake are unresolved, the images of the counter-actors remain unchanged, and the conflict parties are typically soon ready to fight against each other so that (enemy) victories are symbolic and short term.

3.4.1.1 The Vicious Cycle of Conflict: The Nexus of Escalation, De-escalation, and Re-escalation

Different characteristics of conflict dynamics can be distinguished by escalation and de-escalation modes, levels of violence, their continuity and duration. We can identify the directions in conflict development in terms of pulling toward or backward from the full-scale struggle. Different types of conflict have different time spans, depending on the conflict cycle. Changes in conflict behavior are usually asymmetrical and reflect diverse characteristics in mutual relationships of conflicting parties. As the conflict evolves, a new balance of power is established. The complexity of armed conflicts can hardly be captured in a linear way. Trajectory of conflict represents the culmination of the latent phase to intensification of violence leading to full-scale war. Once the conflict starts, it may transform leading to an increase or decrease of intensity in violence. The analysis of conflict processes in this dissertation traces the relationships among the different phases. The modes of escalation of conflict have a significant influence on the behavior of the conflict parties. As the conflict evolves, the pattern of this behavior becomes more complex, the number of issues at stake increases, and the intensity of violence leads to a vicious circle of escalation. In order to explain the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region, this dissertation employs the scheme of ―vicious cycle of conflict‖ as illustrated in Figure 2 below.

48 Figure 2 The Vicious Cycle of Conflict.

Armed conflict

Trigger Vicious Cycle Ceasefire events of Conflict

Frozen stage

Hidden Peace-building Tensions Efforts

Note: This figure was prepared by the author.

49 Chapter 4: Armed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh Armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh started a series of bloody conflicts in the South Caucasus region, followed by armed conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (addressed in the next two chapters of this dissertation). It has also determined further security arrangements and the process of political transformation both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The ―Karabakh issue‖ casts a dark shadow over modern development in these countries, and so far, there is no strategy for conflict resolution. The interest of conflict parties, their demands and decisions had a crucial impact on the process of escalation of the conflict, the complexity of the situation today, and the inability to find permanent solutions. Systemic analysis of this armed conflict serves the principal aim of this chapter, which is the exploration of key issues at stake that have influenced one of the first armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space, launched in February 1988, triggering fierce confrontation between two nations. The complexity of this conflict will be examined through the actors involved in the conflict, including governments, political leaders, as well as military and external actors. Decisions and mutual interactions will be demonstrated in an attempt to portray the process of escalation. Political claims of the ―host republics‖ of Armenia and Azerbaijan were embedded in specific interpretations of history, 117 national identity, and territory. As argued by distinctive scholar Adam Smith the role of the past to legitimize action in the present is a common phenomenon in ethnic struggles: ―in order to create a convincing representation of the ‗nation,‘ a worthy and distinctive past must be rediscovered and appropriated.‖118 Indeed, such processes in new states created on the ruins of the Soviet empire can be translated into political mobilization. The armed conflict in Nagorno- Karabakh is an ideal example in which historical narratives were interpreted in terms of historical injustice and played an influential role in the process of conflict escalation.

117 Competing historiographies are elaborated in Donald Victor Schwartz and Razmik Panossian., Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (University of Toronto: Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 1994). 118 Smith and Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 36.

50 The scholarly studies on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have developed into a considerable amount of literature in an attempt to explain the causes of this bloody conflict and to offer potential approaches for its resolution. History remains the most silent aspect in the studies of the local authors. On the one hand, mismatch in the argument and ethnic belonging of regional authors makes the interpretation of these armed conflicts biased. On the other hand, many Western scholars overemphasize the role of the Soviet institutional structures or the Caspian oil politics and the role of the external powers. The analysis in this chapter points out the need for a more balanced approach to understand the complex picture of this conflict. Like any other conflict, the armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh involves multiple issues at stake. Basically, it is a struggle for independence of Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan. The predominant Armenian wisdom about the conflict is embedded in the notion of national survival, emphasizing a fear of genocide. Azerbaijan, however, points out the significance of territorial integrity in accordance with the standards of international law. Armenians and Azerbaijanis conceptualize the Karabakh issue in mutually exclusive terms. The analyses provided in this chapter do not aim to contribute to the history of this region to provide an exhaustive account of the events and background of the conflict. Focusing on the significance of historical continuity, this chapter will explore how competing narratives of conflicting parties transformed and legitimized political mobilization. The role of actors involved in the conflict will be assessed in order to uncover how their claims and their interactions led to an escalation of the conflict. Thus, we can explore how issues at stake changed conflict dynamics and led to the transformation from one phase to another with sporadic violence emerging. For these purposes, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is divided into three phases. The conflict processes is divided in accordance to the stages defined by escalation modes and level of violence. First, the latent conflict from 1988 to 1992, characterized by a low intensity of violence (phase A). Second phase, full-scale war from 1992 to 1994: after a high number of victims, the conflicted ended in stalemate (phase B). Third, the so-called ―frozen‖ stage with high potential to re-escalate to violent confrontation in the future (phase C): from 1994 to the present. In order to address the question about the long

51 duration of this conflict and the impossibility of building sustainable peace, the following sections proposes an analysis of issues at stake in the outlined phases.

4.1 Phase A: From Latent Conflict to Escalation

Nagorno-Karabakh is perceived as having deep historical roots for armed conflicts; therefore, it has become an epicenter for conflict in the South Caucasus region.119 The question of historical events and their role in the outbreak of the conflict is very delicate. Deeply rooted antagonism between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh took place during the ―Armeno-Tatar Wars‖ in 1905-1907.120 Later, from 1918 to 1920, the clashes between independent Armenia and Azerbaijan took place over three regions: Nakhichevan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh.121 After the Sovietization of the South Caucasus region by the Red Army in 1920, the ―Treaty of Brotherhood and Friendship‖ was signed between Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which gave the latter the status of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), 122 incorporating the region within Soviet Azerbaijan as an autonomous oblast. It has to be pointed out that Armenians and Azerbaijanis contradicted each other three times in 100 years. First, at the beginning of the 20th century, when Armenians controlled the oil industry in Baku gubernia, Azerbaijanis expressed their dissatisfaction over Armenian dominance in the economic sphere. The series of civil unrest between Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the Armenian-Tatar War in 1905 resulted in casualties.123 Second, tensions in the mutual relationship was caused in the aftermath of the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous oblast within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan (over 90% of the population were ethnic Armenians). According to

119 Vrezh Karduman, ―Karabakhskyi Konflikt v Kontexte Porriisko-Amerikanskikh Otnoshenii. Vzglad iz Armenii. (Karabakh conflict in the context of Russian-American relations. View from Armenia),‖ “Vestnk” Rosiisko-Armnaskogo Universiteta (RAU), 2007, http://rau.am/downloads/Vestnik/1_07/kardumyan.pdf. 120 Levon Chorbajian, The Caucasian Knot: The History & Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh (Zed Books, 1994), 112–113. 121 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 89. 122 ―An Autonomous Oblast (province) is supposed to have considerable cultural and administrative autonomy and is distinguished by a particular national composition and way of life, while an autonomous republic, which is structured as semi sovereign state, is supposed to have greater political clout and prestige. In reality, both autonomous oblasts and autonomous republics are highly dependent on the republic to which they are subordinated― see in: Niall M. Fraser, Keith W. Hipel, John Jaworsky, Ralph Zuljan, ―A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Dispute,‖ 656. 123 There are no precise data about the number of casualties. Some estimates put the number of victims between 3, 000 and 10, 000. See in: Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 69.

52 available data, the number of victims between 1918 and 1920 was over 12,000 people.124 And third, at the end of the 1980s, the territory of this region was disputed again, which led to a full-scale war in from 1992 to 1994. The armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was the first political mobilization, which started in the second half of 1987. Armenian authors attribute the conflict to the legally incompetent decision of the Caucasian Bureau of Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. According to the Azerbaijani government, Nagorno-Karabakh is occupied by Armenia, which makes this an interstate conflict between two states. Armenia as well as the de-facto government of Nagorno-Karabakh support the struggle for self- determination of the Armenian population in this region against Azerbaijan.125 At first glance, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the latent phase looks like a typical example of a secession. Historical arguments, emotional appeals were constructed in favor of this goal. The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh‘s status is a key aspect in this conflict. Even inside Nagorno-Karabakh can we find divergent positions: the majority of the population supports unification with Armenia, but one part of the population is for independence. The Armenian administration, together with the Armenian population, is skeptical of an independent Nagorno-Karabakh.126 The ―Nagorno-Karabakh factor‖ determines the political development both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan. As one of the leading Russian anthropologists, Victor Shnirelman, sums it up: at the end of 1980s, both republics had ―diametrically opposed yet mirroring attitudes: in Armenia they were sure of the existence of a worldwide Turanic conspiracy, while Azerbaijan believed in a worldwide Armenian conspiracy.‖127 In order to understand the processes in the latent phase of the conflict, the goal of the

124 For example, the „bloody March― events in 1918 is a „Day of Genocide of Azerbaijanis―, when according to the Azerbaijan version, the Armenian armed forces „Dashnaktsutun― committed massacres and pogroms against Azerbaijanis. See in: ―Tragichiskie sabitie marta 1918 v Azerbaijane (Den genocida) [The tragic events of March 1918 in Azerbaijan (‗Genocide Day‘)],‖ Kavkazskii Uzel, March 28, 2014, https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/204012/. 125 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, ―Nagorno-Karabakh Issue: Position of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh,‖ http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/#a5. 126 Gegam Bagdasarjan, ―Tochka Zrenija Karabakhskogo Armenina [Karabakh Armenian Perspective],‖ Conciliation Resources Working Together for Peace, 2005, http://www.c- r.org/sites/default/files/Accord17_p22_Karabakh_Armenian_perspective_0.pdf. 127 Viktor Shnirel‘man, Voiny Pamjati: Mifi, Identichnot I Politika v Zakavkazie [Wars of Memory: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia] (IKC Akademkniga, 2003), 38.

53 following sections it to discuss the competing components of Armenian and Azerbaijani national identities.

4.1.1 The Dynamics of Politicization of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue for Armenian National Identity Historical memories, a collective sense of identity, ethnic grievances, and fear of others have been perceived as a threat not only to physical extinction, but also to the Armenian national identity.128 Armenian identity is complex: one of the oldest Christian nations in the world—they had adopted Christianity in AD330 - was divided between the Turkish and Persian Empires in the 16th and 18th century. The sense of vulnerability and perception of threats from ethnic others played a significant role in the formation of Armenian national identity. The ethnic card has been played in the process of escalation of tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh. The turbulent history and the Armenian Genocide led to the loss of territories in Western Armenia and to the victimization of the nation. Another explanation for the Armenian self-image is the fear of being caught between external powers. From the Armenian perspective, the political system and the policies implemented by Azerbaijani president Heider Aliev had a significant influence on the development in Nagorno-Karabakh. His rule started a new process of implementing tighter control within Azerbaijan. First came the migration of the Azeri population to the Nagorno-Karabakh region. There are two factors that intensified the fear of extinction by the Armenian settlers of this region: first, the decrease in relative size in comparison to ethnic ―others‖ in the aftermath of the migration; and second, the high birth rate of Azeri people.129 The following table illustrates these features following the 1989 census:

128 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds. 129 Anastasia Voronkova, ―Understanding the Dynamics of Ethnonationalist Contention: Political Mobilization, Resistance and Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and Northern Ireland‖ (PhD diss., Queen Mary University of London, 2012), 110, http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/2516.

54

Table 2 The Population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.

Armenians Azerbaijanis Population Population Years Actual number Actual number growth % growth % 1921 128,060 7,594 1939 132,800 3.7 14,100 77.2 1959 110,100 -17.1 18,100 27.6 1970 121,100 10 27,200 51.1 1979 123,100 1.6 37,200 36.7 Source: Y. Mahmudov and K. Shukurov: Garabagh - Real History, Facts, Documents (Tahsil Publishing House 2005), 71.

From this table, we can see that the number of the Azeri population increased from 7 594 in 1921 to 37200 in 1979, while there is a slight decrease in the Armenian population. However, the ethno-demographic shift from the 1970s was used by intellectuals to supported Armenian claims about fears of ethnic extinction. In connection with these claims, the latent fear of being the subject of genocide was broadly projected onto Nagorno-Karabakh. The term ―white genocide‖ or ―white massacre‖ expressed the existential fear of the Armenian nation. Another term, which was also broadly used was ―ecological genocide,‖ referring to the pollution problems that resulted in the first mass demonstrations on February 16, 1988. Sumgait pogroms emphasized the fear of physical extinction as well. This dramatic event in Sumgait informed the discourse of victimization and historical injustice, developing into the new nationalist paradigm. The physical survival of the Armenian nation and the fear of losing Nagorno-Karabakh (a region with a majority Armenian population) was perceived as a repetition of failure during the Armenian Genocide. The Nagorno-Karabakh question represents a combination of all of these aspects: first, the essentialization of collective historical memories and the victimization of the Armenian national consciousness are the result of the 1915 Genocide by the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in the perception of a permanent threat stemming from Turkey

55 and its ―kin brother nation,‖ Azerbaijan. Second, a demographic shift and the forced migration of the Armenian population intensified the issue of physical survival and the identity crisis of the Armenian nation. In the words of the president of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, ―The inclusion of NK within the borders of the Azeri SSSR put the Armenian people on the verge of extinction.‖130 From the Armenian perspective, the dynamics of the conflict over Nagorno- Karabakh could be framed in a struggle of the Armenian people to defend their co-ethnic and illegitimate rule of Azerbaijan over this territory. Armenian sources tend to emphasize the significance of Nagorno-Karabakh as the ―political, cultural and, subsequently, the revolutionary center of Armenia.‖131 While it is impossible to find out objective historical facts that are not influenced by nationalist narrative, these claims illuminate the political discourse and examine the roots of the conflict through an ethnic lens. Historical injustice, fear of ethnic extinction, depopulation, and oppression of the Armenian population contributed to the struggle against Azerbaijani rule over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The interests of Kabarabakh Armenians were voiced by creating the Karabakh Committee, which was established in 1988. The major goal was to achieve a transference of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction. Intellectuals on both sides played a significant role by emphasizing the narratives about the rights over this territory.

4.1.2 Politicization of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue and Azerbaijani Statehood The process of formation of an Azerbaijani nationhood is different from the Armenian one. Azerbaijani national identity was heavily influenced by the powers that ruled them for many centuries. Unlike Armenians, whose threat perception and vulnerability emphasized their uniqueness and isolation in the region, Azerbaijanis have

130 A. Goukasyan, ―V Karabakhe Reshaetsya Ne Politicheskaya Zadacha, a Vopros Vyzhyvaniya Naroda [The Problem in Karabakh Is Not Political, but the Question of Survival of People],‖ Karabakhskiy Kourier 3, no. 18 (2006): 17. 131 Kevin Devlin, ―‗L‘Unita on ‗Armenian Document Sent to Kremlin",‖ Radio Free Europe Background Report/39 (USSR), March 11, 1988, http://osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/139-3-232.

56 emphasized their belonging to and affinity with bigger communities: Turkic and Muslim.132

The Nagorno-Karabakh issue played a significant role in the process of unification and formation of Azeri national identity. Territorial integrity of Azerbaijan became the symbol of national cohesion. It was part of an attempt to create a strong sense on national identity in Azerbaijan. While the Karabakh issue mobilized masses in Armenia, it did not have the same significance in the process of creation of Azerbaijani national identity from the very beginning. Nagorno-Karabakh was perceived as an integral part of Azerbaijan; therefore, there was no need for mass mobilization. The dominant issue for Azerbaijani historians were the consequences of the Russo-Persian wars and the Treaty of Turkmamchai in 1828, which resulted in a division of Azerbaijani territory. The cornerstone of Azerbaijani national identity until 1988 was not the Karabakh issue, but the significance to unify ―north‖ and ―south‖ Azerbaijan. This claim was raised in December 1989 during the demonstration of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan close to the Soviet-Iranian border in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.133 The Karabakh issue changed the political discourse in Azerbaijan, and after the events at Sumgait in February 1988, the events took an unpredictable path towards one of the bloodiest conflicts in the South Caucasus, which has not been resolved yet. With the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijani national identity emphasized the significance of preservation of territorial integrity in order to strengthen national unity. There is no vivid evidence to suggest that the official policy of Azerbaijani authorities at that time was directed against Armenians. Rather, it was meant to emphasize the solidarity of the titular Azerbaijani nation, and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue played a catalyst role in the process of Azerbaijani self-determination. Academic literature points out that Azerbaijani mobilization took place in response to the Armenian nationalist movement. However, an in-depth analysis of conflict actors and their demands reveals that primary actors did not possess a clear strategy to alleviate the escalation of conflict.

132 Dmitri Furman, Azerbaijan i Rossia: Obshestvo i Gosudarstvo [Azerbaijan and Russia: Society and State] (Moscow: Letnii Sad, 2001), 122–123. 133 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 96.

57 4.1.3 From Nonviolent Demonstrations to Violent Events Summer 1987 is considered the starting point of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, when the Armenian nationalist movement voiced the significance of kinship between NK Armenians and supported the process of reunification of this enclave with Armenia. 75,000 Armenians signed a petition addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to merge Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Liberation from Azerbaijani rule was perceived as a significant step forward to rebuild a depressed nation. While in most of armed conflicts ethno-histories compete with each other to legitimize the grievance of conflicting parties, this section uncovers the trajectories of mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to explore the correlation between ethnicity and armed conflict in this case. Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, in which political scene was more fragmented than in case of Armenia, advanced nationalism led to consensus among political elites and prevented the emergence of a civil war. Furthermore, as mentioned above, to achieve unity among its people, Armenians used the issue of genocide and victimization of nation as a paradigm for strengthening national identity. Consequently, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in Azerbaijan was characterized by a lower level national activism. There could be little doubt that the political elite, along with intellectuals, played a significant role in the radicalization of tension and escalation of the conflict. Referring to the right for independence before Sovietization, as well as to the nation‘s history as a propaganda tool, they legitimized their actions in the eyes of the masses. It is significant to note that initial clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis were neither new nor about ethnic belonging. ―In October 1987 the regional administration of the Azerbaijan town of Chardakhly in the vicinity of the Armenian border took the decision to transfer some land from one kolkhoz (collective farm) to a neighboring one; the former kolkhoz was administrated by Armenians, the latter by Azeris.‖134 Armenian workforce protested in a demonstration against such a decision, which led to a confrontation with Special Forces of Azerbaijani SSR. The first mass demonstration of

134 Christoph Zürcher Jan Koehler, ―The Art of Losing the State: Weak Empire to Weak Nation- State around Nagorno-Karabakh,‖ 2003, 149.

58 Armenians took place in Stephanekert and Yerevan, demanding to transform Nagorno- Karabakh and Nakhichevan into an Armenian SSR.135 In border regions, rumors about violence between Azeris and Armenians were spreading from one village to another. Initially, ecological issues came to the surface. As stated in the study by experts Jan Koehles and Christopher Zurcher, ―a situation in which local incidents between individuals or collectives have been interpreted along ethnic lines – independent of the actual background of the concrete conflict – was not new to the kitchen gossip of Armenian and Azeri households. What, indeed, was new in Armenia was the galvanized atmosphere of mobility of a rapidly evolving public with the organizational know-how of the new masters of those masses. This situation in the Armenian capital was in stark contrast to the reality in Baku where no public was fermenting into a movement independent from the organizational potential of official Soviet institution‖ at this point in time.136 There are no available economic indicators for Nagorno-Karabakh pointing to a worsening development in this region.137 The issue at stake was not about economic underdevelopment, but about the function of illegal activities. At this point, the Azerbaijani ―shadow‖ economy organized a broad offensive to expel Armenian economic activities. The politicized economic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was concentrated in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Since Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) as the main channel of influence for the Armenian ―shadow‖ capital in the Azerbaijani ―shadow‖ businesses, it was the key point within the internal struggle.138 In other words, the armed conflict was derived from a clash of interests between Armenia‘s and Azerbaijan‘s ―shadow‖ business.

135 Elizabeth Fuller, ―Armenians Demonstrate for Return of Territories from Azerbaijan,‖ Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (München) 441, no. 87 (1987): 1–3. 136 Jan Koehler, ―The Art of Losing the State,‖ 152. 137 Soviet sources indicate steady growth in Nagorno-Karabakh region. For example, in 1973 and 1988, industrial production of agricultural goods increased by 1.5, and industrial production was 3 times bigger, See in: ―Nagornyi Karabakh: Pograma Rozvitija [Nagorno-Karabakh: Development Program],‖ Izvestija, March 25, 1988. 138 Suren Zoljan, Nagornyi-Karabakh: Problema I Konflict [Nagorno-Karabakh: Problem and Conflict] (Moscow: Lingva, 2001).

59 4.1.4 Conflicting Parties and Emerging Issues at Stake In order to see the whole picture, we have to study the behavior of major conflict parties involved in the process of escalation. Both of the governments, Armenian and Azerbaijani, were integral to this process. We can claim that none of the governments had a clear strategy how to stop the worsening situation. A close study of the situation reveals that they changed political course in due to various developments in the process. Three major issues determined the spiral of escalation. First came the demands to close a nuclear plant in Armenia, which led to the two demonstrations in 1987. Demands against environmental pollution were related to protection of the homeland and national heritage. ―The environmental movement gave the Armenian a popular, broad-based issue that mobilized significant numbers of people but that did not yet appear to threaten political authority.‖139 It is important to note that at that time, environmental issues were voiced in many Soviet republics, such as Lithuania, Estonia, and Ukraine. In case of Armenia, the role of intellectuals in the process of mobilizing the masses has particular importance. 350 intellectuals sent a letter to the Kremlin about the devastating consequences of environmental issues in Armenia, which threatened the physical existence of this nation. This letter stated that ―Armenia‘s cancer rate had quadrupled between 1965 and 1985, while cases of abnormal births, leukemia, and mental retardation had likewise soared.‖140 Furthermore, a literary journal, Karoun published some statistics about dangerous air conditions in the city of Hraztan due to a cement factory, which generated almost 280,000 tons of dust and smoke.141 The Armenian environmental movement and nationalists raising the question of national survival often consisted of the same people. By raising the environmental issue, they were criticizing the government. 142 Demonstrators in Yerevan and Kirovakan in September and October 1987 carried banners in this spirit, for example: ―Shut down

139 Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 196. 140 Mark Malkasian, Gha-Ra-Bagh!, 133. 141 Ohannes Geukjian, ―The Politicization of the Environmental Issue in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh‘s Nationalist Movement in the South Caucasus 1985–1991,‖ Nationalities Papers 35, no. 2 (2007): 236, doi:10.1080/00905990701254334. 142 Mark Malkasian, Gha-Ra-Bagh!, 33.

60 Nairit so the Armenian people will survive!‖143 In February 1988, this environmental group had established itself as the Karabakh Committee. Mass demonstrations at that time raised the second critical issue about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan. Environmental issues were soon transformed into calls for unification of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia. The Karabakh Committee, composed of nationalist intellectuals, organized demonstrations in 1988 calling for ―one nation one republic,‖ for ―unification,‖ and for the ―struggle to the end.‖144 Armenians demanded an official policy of Baku towards the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and continued to demonstrate in Stephanekert.145 A resolution that would make Nagorno-Karabakh part of Armenia was a turning point in the evolution of the conflict. The only issue that was emphasized in order to achieve this political goal was unification. ―Miatsoum‖ (unification) and ―struggle to the end‖ became slogans of the popular movement.146 The leader of the Karabakh Committee did not raise such issues as criticizing the Communist government for corruption or initiation of political reforms. It was more convenient to mobilize the masses for a struggle against pan-Turkism rather than proposing a strategy for initiation of political reforms. In reality, however, it meant that unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia was only a cover to achieve political goals. Apparently, the revival of national awareness showed that struggle for independence and conflict was prevalent in the mutual relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijani. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Krunk Committee was created in 1988, which coordinated its activities with the Karabkah Committee in Armenia. Both of these organizations supported mobilization of the masses throughout 1987 and 1988. A series of demonstrations about environmental issues paved the way for a nationalist movement. It is significant to point out that at this early age of activism two types of national elites

143 Nairit was a chemical plant in Yerevan, which produced low-cost synthetic rubber. The second target was the nuclear power plant at Medzamor, near Yerevan. ―In 1983 there was a real nuclear threat but the authorities tried to minimize the danger. The consequences of a nuclear accident at Medzamor would be a second genocide,‖ Geukjian, ―The Politicization of the Environmental Issue in Armenia and Nagorno- Karabakh‘s Nationalist Movement in the South Caucasus 1985–1991,‖ 238. 144 Christopher J. Walker, Armenia and Karabagh: The Struggle for Unity (London: Minority Rights Group, 1991), 123. 145 Mark Malkasian, Gha-Ra-Bagh!, 29. 146 Walker, Armenia and Karabagh, 123.

61 were created. On the one hand, there were the nationalist leaders (mostly intellectuals), and on the other hand, the Communist elites. They competed against each other for power and control over particular territories. A separation of Nagorno-Karabakh would have meant dissolution of the country. Not surprisingly, the first reaction of the Soviet Azerbaijani government towards the demonstration of Armenians in Stepanekert in 1988 was a complaint to Moscow, in which the government of Azerbaijan stated that this demonstration in the Nagorno- Karabakh region threatened the territorial integrity of the country. However, after Armenian delegates of the Soviet NKAO passed a resolution to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on transfer of the oblast to the Armenian SSR on 20 January 1988, the Government of Azerbaijan rejected the unilateral decision. 147 The Government of Azerbaijan emphasized that such a decision challenged the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan SSR and contradicted any stabilization of the situation in the region. However, the government was not able to stop the chain of events leading to a radicalization of the situation: ―the vehement and controversial measures taken by the government radicalized both the Armenian masses, and directly contributed to the steady escalation of conflict.‖148 Pushing environmental concerns and issues of unification further led to the emergence of political goals. It is clear that conflict parties had always had bigger goals than issues of ecology and unification. The third issue was connected to corruption and stagnation under the leadership of Karen Demirchian. The process of national consolidation was complex and involved renationalization of Armenia. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh revealed a multilayered problem – mass mobilization in Yerevan and Stepanakert was not anti-Soviet from the beginning but was hostile towards Azerbaijan. Ethnic irredentism merged with political reforms and national survival. The Armenian political establishment questioned the legitimacy of Azerbaijani rule over Nagorno-Karabakh territory. This brings us to consider whether ethnicity served as a tool to mobilize the masses over resources, power, and territory.

147 Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1998), 30. 148 Sanan Mirzayev, ―The Conflicting Theories of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh‖ (Thesis, Central European University, 2007), 24.

62 4.2 Phase B: Trigger Events – Emergence of Sporadic Clashes

The Sumgait episode (27-29 February 1988) is often referred to as ―the birth of the Karabakh conflict.‖ It was a trigger event, the point that turned political mobilization to armed and bloody conflict.149 According to Armenian reports, there were at least 26 Armenians killed and 54 militia personnel injured.150 Azerbaijani sources reported 32 dead (26 Armenians and 6 Azeris) and 400 wounded.151 Before investigating the issues at stake that sparked the spiral of violence between Armenians and Azeris, it has to be noted that one of the least investigated issues in the academic literature is the gradual polarization of the population and the mobilization leading to radicalization by presenting competing models over historical and border issues to the masses. Investigating objective factors that transformed the peaceful campaign over inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian SSR into an explosion of violence is not enough without explaining the meaning of these factors. Unfortunately, we do not have any tools to test the feelings of all masses and clarify whether all Armenians believed in genocide against them. Nerveless, the majority of expert and available data nowadays emphasizes the significance of fear and prejudice, which generated an Armenian public discourse. This perceived threat was used by some individuals to outline the ethnic character of this conflict. During the escalation phase, we can trace the emergence of events of sporadic violence. It is important to interpret milestone events that transformed a particular development into full-scale war. In this regard, on has to mention an earthquake that took place in Spitak in December 1988. In its aftermath, 25,000 people died and hundreds of thousand were left homeless. This event had an impact on the evolution of the conflict.152 Despite humanitarian aid, rail blockages and oil embargoes from Azerbaijan after the

149 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 97. 150 ―Zasedanie Politburo TSK KPSS 29 Fevralja 1988 [Politburo meeting 29 February 1988],‖ Rodina, 1994, sec. 4. 151 Human Rights Watch, ―Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh,‖ 1994, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/AZER%20Conflict%20in%20N-K%20Dec94.pdf. 152 Suny, Looking toward Ararat, 210.

63 earthquake aggravated Armenian antagonism and led to the radicalization of political representatives.153 Among violent events leading to full-scale war, the meaning of the Sumgait pogrom has to be addressed. It gave enormous symbolic legitimacy to the nationalist movement in Armenia. Their slogans at this time incorporated the paradigm of Genocide: ―the Sumgait Genocide – the test of pan Turkic tactics.‖ The protection of Armenians against a ―second Sumgait‖ was declared as a key national priority.154 The spirit of the demonstrations changed too: the Armenian nationalist movement was not only voicing support to Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh but underlined the survival of the nation as a whole. Sumgait also started the first wave of refugee flows: the first Armenian refugee flow was from Azerbaijan to Armenia; within the month, most of the Azerbaijani population living in Armenia (almost 160 000) fled to Azerbaijan.155 Sumgait was an industrial city in Azerbaijan, inhabited by 230 000 people of mixed ethnicities of which only 15 000-20 000 were ethnic Armenians. The city was characterized by a low level of development and a high number of unemployment. As stated in Azerbaijani sources, ―On February 28 a group of hooligan elements provoked disturbances in Sumgait. There were instances of outrages and violence.‖156 Two days later, the same newspaper published addition information: ―unstable and immature people who fell under the influence of provocative rumors and inflammatory talk about the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia were drawn into illegal actions.‖ 157 On 5 March 1988, the official Soviet communist newspaper added that there were 32 killed and 197 injured in this accident.158 Due to the lack of information about the identity of the ―hooligans‖ and their intentions, ―immature people ... fell under the influence of provocative rumors and inflammatory talk about the events in NK and Armenia were

153 N. Fraser, K. Hipel, J. Jaworsky, and R. Zuljan, ―A Conflict Analysis of the Armenian-Azerbaijan Dispute,‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 1990, 668. 154 Suren Zoljan, Nagornyi-Karabakh: Problema I Konflict [Nagorno-Karabakh: Problem and Conflict]. 155 Arif Yunusov, Karabakh: Past and Present (Baku, 2005), http://www.historyoftruth.com/ebook/kitab20100507055128666.pdf. 156 ―Communique,‖ Bakinsky Rabochii, March 1, 1988; R. Talyshinskii, ―Sumgait: Sledstviu Meshaut Sluxi,‖ Izvestija, March 30, 1988. 157 ―On the Situation in Sumgait,‖ Bakinsky Rabochii, March 3, 1988. 158 Y. Arakelan, Z. Kadymbekov and G. Ovcharenko, ―Emocii I Razum. O Sobytijax v Nagornom Karabakhe I Vokrug Nego [Emotions and Consciousness. The Events in Nagorno-Karabakh and around It],‖ Pravda, March 5, 1988.

64 drawn into illegal actions… Tragic events occurred and there were fatalities.‖159 Due to lack of information, both Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders overestimated and misunderstood each other‘s intensions. Key political leaders in the Karabakh Movement had different interpretations of the events in Sumgait. Levon Ter-Petrosian, the head of the Karabakh Committee and the president of Armenia, believed that the Sumgait events ―turned the constitutional process to physical clashes... Until then, we believed that if the Soviet Union was going towards democratization those questions had to be opened.‖ 160 According to this view, the Sumgait was not planned by the Kremlin, as it took three days for Moscow to intervene. Other influential leaders of the Karabakh Movement, Vazgen Manukyan and Ashot Manucharyan, believe that external parties organized the events in Sumgait. The idea that the KGB got involved in the escalation of the conflict between Armenians and Azeris is maintained by some Azerbaijani political leaders, as, for example, by Isa Gambar, the leader of the Azerbaijani Musavat Party. According to this view, the Sumgait pogrom was supported by Moscow in order to overcome the democratization of Armenia: ―The government is genuinely scared of our unity… They just wanted to intimidate us to stop the demonstrations from happening. They thought it was all being directed from somewhere… they just could not imagine that half a million people would interrupt the day-to-day business of their lives to express their bitterness at how they had been treated.‖161 Sumgait converted past trauma into immediate threat. The genocide provided the most suitable framework through which the events could be portrayed. For Armenians, the Sumgait pogrom was a continuation of genocide by Turks. Placards at mass demonstrations underlined this perspective: ―What took place in Sumgait was genocide especially since the pogroms were perpetrated by the representatives of one nation towards another… the genocide had deep roots.‖ 162 Lack of information and rumors contributed to the escalation of tensions.

159 ―On the Situation in Sumgait.‖ 160 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 88. 161 Y. Mahmudov and K. Shukurov, Garabagh - Real History, Facts, Documents (Tahsil Publishing House, 2005), http://www.abebooks.co.uk/Garabagh-Real-History-facts-documents-Mahmudov/6560067503/bd. 162 Sarkysian 1988:2.

65 The violence in Sumgait was followed by other events leading to the gradual transformation of conflict to its armed phase. The next tragic event took place in Ganja, the second largest city in Azerbaijan. It resulted in the next wave of refugee flows of Armenians. The situation escalated further in January, when the opposition in Baku organized a demonstration against the government calling for more radical measures in the Karabakh issue. This resulted in the intervention by the Soviets in Baku. ―Black January‖ caused a victimization of Azerbaijani consciousness, as did the Sumgait events to Armenians. In the aftermath, more than 100 people died and over 1,000 were wounded.163 Karabakh Armenians struggled against corruption while asking for improvement of environmental and working conditions. This struggle transformed into demands for political independence. What started as a nonviolent protest over environmental issues and clashes over activities in a ―shadow‖ economy was soon taken over by leaders of an emerging nationalist movement that sought to strengthen a sense of solidarity in the Armenian and the Azerbaijani nation in order to attain political advantages. This served as a platform for an emerging pro-independence democratic movement.

4.2.1 The Road to Armed Conflict: Political Mobilization in Armenia and Azerbaijan While the conflict was escalating and mass demonstrations took place, the Kremlin established a ―special administration‖ in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow approved 400 million rubles to improve industrial, housing, and educational capacities in Nagorno- Karabakh. Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) reacted with rail blockades in order to block any special assistance from Moscow. 164 This had a huge impact on the evolution of Armenian attitudes towards Azerbaijan. Armenia was completely dependent on Azerbaijani gas and oil imports after the earthquake in Spitak mentioned above. The government of Azerbaijan supported the radical measures of the APF. Evidently, the Armenian nationalist movement became frustrated with Moscow‘s unwillingness to support the Armenian demand for unification.

163 Bill Keller, ―Soviets Claim Control in Baku: Scores of Azerbaijani Killed: Coup Averted Gorbachov Says,‖ New York Times, January 21, 1990. 164 Burbyga Nikolai, ―Na Zheleznoi Doroge Zakavkazija [On the Railway Transcaucasia],‖ Izvestija, February 14, 1990; Elizabeth Fuller, ―Nagorno-Karabakh and the Rail Blockade,‖ Report on the USSR 2, December 28, 1990, sec. 52.

66 If we analyze the relationship between the government and its role in the escalation process of the conflict, it is evident that it had a direct role in this process. The inability of the government of Azerbaijan to prevent Soviet intervention in Baku delegitimized the communist rule in the eyes of masses. 165 The weakness of the government supported the creation of paramilitary forces, and their cooperation with the Soviet Army led to the military operation ―Ring.‖ The goal of this operation was to deter Armenians from their major demand: unification with Armenia. 166 This resulted in escalation of the conflict and in its transformation to the military form because at this point, a military confrontation was seen as the only solution to the situation. The Kremlin‘s policies towards Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in growing tensions and in distrust about its intension. After the events at Sumgait and the deployment of the Soviet Army in Yerevan, the new nationalist government in Armenia changed its strategy. The environmental issues and calls for unification were transformed into calls for full sovereignty and the creation of an independent Armenian state. Democratization and reform slogans were a tactic used by the Karabakh Committee in order to overcome direct conformity of politicized masses with Soviet Security forces. This would assure achieving political goals and the replacement of the old, corrupted Communist government by a new nationalist one, which would rescue the state from collapse. Moscow‘s involvement in the violent events between Azerbaijan and Armenia contributed to the confusion. ―The Azerbaijanis believed that Gorbachev favored the Armenians, particularly after the administrative arrangement of 12 January 1989, which the Azerbaijan considered as the fist step in giving Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Armenians, who considered that the Karabakh cause was a test of perestroika and hoped that Moscow would unify Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, gradually came to believe that he was pro-Azeri.‖167 The failure of the Government of Azerbaijan to achieve its objectives in Nagorno- Karabakh, in the Sumgait events, and during Operation ―Ring,‖ as well as their

165 Mark Saroyan, ―The ‗Karabakh Syndrome‘ and Azerbaijani Politics Problems of Communism,‖ Problems of Communism, 1990, 14–29. 166 For detailed information about Operation Ring see: David E. Murphy, ―Operation ‗ring‘ the Black Berets in Azerbaijan,‖ The Journal of Soviet Military Studies 5, no. 1 (1992): 80–96, doi:10.1080/13518049208430053. 167 Geukjian, ―The Politicization of the Environmental Issue in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh‘s Nationalist Movement in the South Caucasus 1985–1991,‖ 247.

67 ineffective relationship with APF contributed to an escalation of the conflict. The mass demonstrations in Baku demanded that the government resign. Since then, ―the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict became the single most important toy in the hands of the political struggle between opposition and government in Baku. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict grew to be dominant in Azerbaijan not as a nationalist cause of great urgency unifying the political forces in Armenia, on the contrary, it was simply the most important tool to political infighting in the capital.‖168 The process of statehood in Azerbaijan and Armenia took different forms. Regime type and its consequences on the dynamics in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are under- analyzed, and there is a need to address this issue in order to understand the outbreak, conduct, and duration of this conflict. It is important to note that the Armenian government remained loyal to the Kremlin. However, the pressure stemming from the Karabakh issue and the increase in tension resulted in the acceptance of a nationalist program by the Armenian government. It also supported the demand of the Karabakh Committee that Nagorno-Karabakh should be unified with Armenia, declaring itself as the United Armenian Republic including NKAO169 (see Appendix D). This decision was annulled by Azerbaijan, which resulted in growing antagonism at between the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The decision of the Azerbaijani government was based on Article 78 of the Constitution of the USSR, according to which ―the territory of a union republic may not be altered without its consent. The boundaries between republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the union republics concerned, subject to confirmation by the USSR.‖170 The growing antagonism between Armenia and Azerbaijan led to a rapid change of the communist government by the nationalist government, which started the process of attaining independence by declaring the Republic of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the new republic.171

168 Jan Koehler, ―The Art of Losing the State,‖ 159. 169 ―Moscow Domestic Service,‖ December 2, 1989, 12–13. 170 ―Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation on 7 October 1977‖ (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow, 1985), http://www.constitution.org/cons/ussr77.txt. 171 Shale Horowitz, ―Explaining Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts: Using Regime Type to Discern the Impact and Relative Importance of Objective Antecedents,‖ Nationalities Papers 29, no. 4 (2001): 641, doi:10.1080/00905990120102129.

68 Even though the Armenian nationalist government remained in power – and unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia there was no civil war in Armenia – the relationship with the Kremlin and Baku during this phase of the conflict was not free of tensions. Military groups that were against the Azeri population in Armenia also contributed to the escalation of the conflict. Later on, Ter-Petrosian‘s government failed to establish control over radical groups among Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Their declaration of independence and the creation of a national army172 were interpreted as undeclared war among the political elites in Azerbaijan.173 The pathway of Azerbaijan‘s political transition was bumpier than the one in Armenia and was affected by the armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict led to mass mobilizations in both countries. As argued by Rasim Musabekov the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh ―served as a key impulse mobilizing the population for social and political reforms.‖174 However, the reforms in Azerbaijan were not carried out in a sense of democratic transformation. The Popular Front was created, which organized a wave of protests over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.175 The militarization of the Popular Front led to a crisis of power characterized by fierce competition, violence, and military coups that resulted in a military revolt in June 1993.176 The regime of Azerbaijani President Ayaz Mutalibov relied on a small number of armed forces due to the lack of a professional army and the fear that it might threaten his regime. 177 The political landscape in Azerbaijan, which had an impact on mass mobilization, was different from the developments in Armenia, where less turmoil evolved. The process of a democratic transformation in Azerbaijan has not been implemented, the mechanism of elective

172 Mark Malkasian, Gha-Ra-Bagh!, 201. 173 Sanan Mirzayev, ―The Conflicting Theories of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,‖ 36. 174 Laurence Broers ed, The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process, Conciliation Resources (London, 2005), http://www.c-r.org/resources/limits-leadership-elites-and- societies-nagorny-karabakh-peace-process. 175 Waal, Black Garden, 82. 176 Abbasov Shahin, ―Azerbaijan: Achievements and Missed Opportunities,‖ in South Caucasus–20 Years of Independence (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011), 109, http://library.fes.de/pdf- files/bueros/georgien/08706.pdf. 177 Shale Horowitz, ―War After Communism: Effects on Political and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,‖ Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 37, doi:10.1177/0022343303040001204.

69 democracy has not been established, and the state is still governed by authoritarian methods ―in the presence of the decorative democratic institutions.‖178 Some popular organizations played an even more negative role than the government. The Karabakh Committee (later Armenian National Movement) played a decisive role in the escalation process. Together with the Azerbaijan Popular Front, which incorporated a number of groups in opposition to the Communist regime, the Karabakh Committee was a key player in radicalizing the masses. The Committee also supported the creation of militias to implement its popular goals. Both of these organizations acted similarly in that they both adopted a radical stance on Nagorno- Karabakh. Furthermore, the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians calling for secession from Azerbaijan had support from Armenia contributed to the transformation of the conflict to its military forms. On 8 August, the Karabakh Committee was transformed, calling itself the Armenian National Movement (ANM). The leaders of the newly formed movement indicated that they ―would organize rallies and strikes, would participate in the elections and campaigns for changes in Armenia‘s constitution and legal structures.‖179 Over half a million people gathered in the Matenadaran area to hear Ter-Petrosian‘s speech, in which he proposed democratization and a key role of ANM in the process.180 We have traced how an environmental movement became political in its content. The non-Communist government gained power on 5 August 1990, when political power was transferred into the hands of nationalists. Political elites included single-minded nationalists, former communists who were eager to wear a coat of nationalism, and liberal democrats.181 Relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated through continuing attacks on the transport routes connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The Government of Azerbaijan passed the ―Law of Sovereignty,‖ which underlined territorial integrity and Nagorno-Karabakh as part of it. The National Council of Nagorno-

178 Abbasov Shahin, ―Azerbaijan: Achievements and Missed Opportunities,‖ 108; Mark Malkasian, Gha- Ra-Bagh!, 201. 179 Geukjian, ―The Politicization of the Environmental Issue in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh‘s Nationalist Movement in the South Caucasus 1985–1991,‖ 248. 180 ―Dorogie Karabakhci [Dear Karabakhians],‖ Armjanskii Vestnik No 8, August 1990. 181 Graham Smith, The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, 2 Sub edition (London ; New York: Longman Pub Group, 1996), 13.

70 Karabakh and the Krunk Committee demanded transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, secession from Azerbaijan SSR, and creation of a common budget with Armenian SSR.182 Members of this committee supported creating paramilitary forces, which contributed to violent events. As a result, it ―grew to be an uncontrollable body neither by Moscow nor by Baku and Armenia.‖183 The Krunk Committee supported the decision of the Karabakh Oblast Soviet to secede from Azerbaijan and ―renamed the Oblast the Artsakh Armenian Autonomous Region.‖ This demand escalated political tensions between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The creation of a new state was the primary objective of the national movement in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, ready to struggle for democracy and independence. Uncontrolled military groups dominated the process of escalation of conflict in a very profound manner. The major activities of the Armenian military groups involved fighting against the Azerbaijan population and Azerbaijani military groups. The lack of clear strategy, disobedience to the government, self-enforced decisions escalated the conflict into a full-scale war. Similar methods against Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were deployed by the Azeri independent militias. The activities of these ultra-nationalist groups made an outbreak of war inevitable. It has to be noted that even the Armenian National Army (ANA) and the Special Function Militia Troops (OMON) were not under full control of their respective governments until the ceasefire agreement in 1994. The full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh was the result of politicization of issues at stake. For the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was an integral part of Azerbaijan (it was a part of Azerbaijan‘s economy and was entirely dependent on Azerbaijan oil and gas), it was obvious that Azerbaijan would not stand by and watch the loss of this territory and its unification with another state. Distrust of political leaders led to the creation and popular support of a nationalist opposition in both countries. Moscow used the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to manipulate both governments in Armenia and Azerbaijan and keep them under control. Pro-Kremlin Ayaz Mutalibov came to power in Azerbaijan in August 1991; his rule, however, did not last long. The prewar period in Azerbaijan cannot be characterized as a period of democratization; however, it was full of

182 Baku Domestic Service, 14 July 1988 in FBIS-SOV, #88-135, p.: 41. 183 Sanan Mirzayev, ―The Conflicting Theories of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,‖ 34.

71 competition among various groups, which used the Karabakh issue to advance their interests.184 The transfer of power in the case of Armenia took place through an election in accordance with the constitution. On 21 September 1990, Armenians voted for an independent state, apart from the Soviet Union. In October 1991, Ter-Petrosian, one of the active leaders of the nationalist movement, became the first president of Armenia. The escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the result of decisions made by nationalist governments rather than by Moscow or the Communist Party. Ethnicity became a political tool, which was used by the nationalist movement in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to mobilize the population in order to legitimize their demand to transfer this territory from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Environmental issues were manifested under a framework of genocide. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians interpreted Azerbaijani policies as a cultural genocide against them. It is significant to point out that Karabakh Aremenians identified themselves as Armenians, and nationalist leaders used this fact during various rallies and demonstrations. Gradually, what started as an environmental movement gained political momentum, involving two major demands: first, to secede the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh region from Azerbaijan; and second, democratization and the creation of independent statehood for Armenia. Azerbaijan used all available forces to strengthen its control over its territory. It is important to note that ―the Karabakh conflict was used as a pre-text for mobilizing power.‖185 Unsurprisingly, a violent stage followed from 1992 to 1994.

4.2.2 Violent Stage of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh Military operations escalated very quickly between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh became a battlefield for two years, and no solution has been reached to date for the issues at stake. The examination of military strategies goes beyond the scope of this study. What is more important for the purpose of the analysis is to shed light on the conflict processes at this stage and their meaning for the conflict parties involved.

184 Laurence Broers ed, The Limits of Leadership. 185 Nina Caspersen, ―Regimes and Peace Processes: Democratic (non)development in Armenia and Azerbaijan and Its Impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,‖ Communist and Post-Communist Studies, In Search of Legitimacy: Post-Soviet De Facto States Between Institutional Stabilization and Political Transformation, 45, no. 1–2 (March 2012): 134, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.03.005.

72 Starting with 1991, we can trace the offensive strategies by the Armenian side. Radicalization of guerrilla activities between the two nations were also intensified. Over 10 000 people were deported to Armenia on the pretext of self-defense. ―Bandits blocked roads between Azerbaijani villages, established military posts on the highway leading from Khanlar to Kelbajar, and blew up water pipes supplying Ganja with drinking water. Their unpunished activity was a direct threat for the activity of Western Azerbaijan with more than one million inhabitants.‖186 Full-scale war broke out in February 1992. The city of Khodjaly saw one the bloodiest massacres during which 636 people died.187 The Khodjaly massacre had sincere consequences for the Azerbaijani population. President Ayaz Mutallibov was forced to leave office, which contributed to the instability in Baku. New presidential elections were planned; 188 however, another crisis intervened after the fall of city Shusha (mainly populated by Azerbaijanis). Armenians seized this moment and chose an offensive strategy while Azerbaijan was very close to civil war and had no clear strategy for Karabakh. Armenians perceived Azerbaijan‘s lack of a unified political and military leadership and their struggle to attain their goals as a weakness.189 After the victory in Khodjaly, which ensured an air corridor between Nagorno- Karabakh and Armenia, the next step was to secure Shusha, which would ensure a land connection and end the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan. After two days of violence, there were 57 victims on the Armenian side and almost 200 on the Azerbaijani side.190 The next step in this struggle was to resolve logistical problems in order to supply the Armenian troops. In this regard, the occupation of the Lachin Corridor had particular significance. Without much confrontation, it was soon abandoned by Azerbaijani forces. At this point, it has to be pointed out that most of the Armenian victories were achieved during political turmoil in Azerbaijan. A power struggle, contradictions, and the lack of unified military forces capable of advancing military strategy are important

186 Ismet Gaibov and Azad Sharifov, Armenskii Terrorism (Baku: Azerbaijan, 1991), 6. 187 It is hard to find exact number of victims. According to Azerbaijani sources, the list of 636 names exists, most of them women, children, and old people. The Investigation Group of the Public Prosecutor of Azerbaijan documented 485 dead people, 487 wounded, and over 500 captured. Arif Yunusov, Karabakh: Past and Present, 43. 188 Waal, Black Garden, 172–173. 189 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 131. 190 Waal, Black Garden, 134.

73 factors that determined the developments at the beginning of the hot stage in this armed conflict. The first president, Mutalibov, was accused of being too weak to protect Nagorno-Karabakh. When Adulfaz Elchibey came to power in June 1992, his major strategy was to finish the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, we can see that a massive offensive was staged in the north Karabakh by Azerbaijan. But after some initial success, Azerbaijani forces were defeated in the battle of Kelbajar in March 1993. Elchibey lost control over military groups on the Karabakh front, which led to the loss of legitimacy of his rule. This brought further deterioration and another political crisis to Baku, leading to yet another change of presidents in Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliev, the third president of the country, was called up by the Popular Front. His presidency started with another offensive strategy in Karabakh. Initially, Azerbaijani forces were successful, but it did not bring any change to the war front. During the campaign, almost 5 000 of his soldiers were killed191 compared to 600 Armenian casualties. Azerbaijani forces were exhausted. Armenia and Azerbaijan were set to confront each other. What started as an internal problem within the Soviet Union in 1988, when Armenians demanded the transference of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia from the Kremlin, has become an armed conflict between two independent states. The ill-prepared response of the Soviet Union in terms of socio-economic support and their ignorance of political issues led to the emergence of a political movement with a new agenda leading to independent statehood. Unlike the turmoil in Azerbaijan, the political scene in Armenia was more stable, and Levon Ter-Petrosyan stayed in power throughout the war. However, this does not mean that there was no rivalry behind the scene. Not all the political leaders shared a common goal in regards to Karabakh. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh provided a window of opportunity for a shadow economy and for illegal activities of the ―mafia.‖192 In both countries, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was an important political factor. The security architecture and the fate of Armenians and Azerbaijanis living in the South Caucasus region have been shaped in various ways by this conflict. What started out as skirmishes in the early stage in 1988 turned into a full-scale war between Armenians and

191 Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict, 96; Also cited in Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 142. 192 Waal, Black Garden, 206; Caspersen, ―Regimes and Peace Processes,‖ 134.

74 Azeris by 1992 with over 20,000 casualties and over one million refugees.193 The number of Armenian refugees is 350,000. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre, more than 700,000 Azeris became refugees in 1994.194 This conflict, which resulted in the creation of a de facto unrecognized state of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, has shown that the conflict parties are unable to settle their rivalry, which has dragged on for more than twenty years. Nagorno-Karabakh, populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, is by international law part of Azerbaijan, constituting 14% of its territory.

4.3 Phase C: “Frozen” Conflict

Despite the fact that a ceasefire was declared in 1994, the new dynamics of the conflict have increased the unpredictability of the situation in an already tense region. Skirmishes, low intensity violence, and shooting across front lines have increased, leading to a growing arms race, accompanied by political propaganda, threats, and plans of war.195 The enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh now finds itself under ―no war, no peace‖ conditions. The official standpoint of the Nagorno-Karabakh is threefold: first, Nagorno- Karabakh is against subordination to Azerbaijan; second, its major goal is to overcome the status of enclave and get land access to the outside world; third, it is necessary to provide security guarantees, the level of which has to be defined by the de-facto government and the population of this region. 196 The question of territory, which Armenian sources interpret as the ―security belt,‖ is the issue for negotiations. In fact, this

193 According to Azerbaijani President Aliyev at the end of 1993, Azerbaijan counted 11,000 dead and 25,000 wounded in the armed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The number of casualties has varied greatly because of inaccurate statistics and because of propaganda needs. The majority of sources agrees that 11,000 Azerbaijanis and 6,000 Armenians were killed and 30,000 Azerbaijanis and over 20,000 Armenians were injured between February 1988 and April 1994. The list of Azerbaijanis killed during the first year of the conflict is available at http://karabakh.org/ethnic-cleansing-1987-94/list-of-killed-2/. 194 Nina M. Birkeland, Edmund Jennings and Elizabeth J. Rushing (eds.), Global Overview 2011. People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2012), 61–65, http://www.unhcr.org/IDMC/IDMC-report.pdf. 195 Crisis Group Europe Briefing, Armenia and Azerbaijan:A Season of Risks (Baku,Yerevan,Tbilisi,Brussels: International Crisis Group, September 26, 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/b071-armenia-and-azerbaijan-a-season-of- risks.pdf. 196 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, ―Nagorno-Karabakh Issue. Position of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh.‖

75 postulate represents the official standpoint of Erevan since 1988, when Robert Kocharijan came to power. The post-war period both in Armenia and Azerbaijan has not been democratic. Both countries are very far from democracies: Armenia is marked as ―partly free,‖197 and Azerbaijan as ―non-free‖ in regards to political rights and civil liberties. As identified by many experts, this ―no war, no peace syndrome‖ contributes to further militarization and ―the internationalization of identities of victor and victim.‖198 The official Azerbaijani discourse over the unresolved conflict in Nagorno- Karabakh underlines the significance of a military build-up, which is the second only after Russia in military expenditures in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).199 ―For comparison, I can say that in 2003 our military budget was $163 million. Last year the figure reached $3.6 billion and this year $3.7 billion. This in itself shows that the construction of the army is a priority issue. The biggest expense item of our budget is the army. And this is natural,‖ proclaimed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the official military parade on June 26, 2013. 200 According to the president, Azerbaijan is at war, and the ―Azerbaijani army should be ready at any moment to liberate occupied lands.‖201 There has been a regular exchange of shooting among Armenians and Azerbaijanis. For example, in 2010, 25 soldiers were killed and the number of casualties in 2009 was 19.202 Since Heyder Aliyev came to power in 2003, his goal has been the restoration of

197 Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2012. The Arab Uprisings And Their Global Repercussions (Freedom House, 2012), 14, http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf. 198 Caspersen, ―Regimes and Peace Processes,‖ 135. 199 ―Azerbaijan Has Second Highest Military Expenditure in CIS,‖ News AZ, February 22, 2011, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/31785. 200 Ilham Aliyev, ―Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Official Military Parade on the Occasion of the 95th Anniversary of the Armed Forces‖ (Prezident of Azerbaijan, June 23, 2013), http://en.president.az/articles/8574; ―Azerbaijan Budet Narashivat Voennuju Mosh Do Reshenija Karabakhskou Problemy - President [Azerbaijan Will Increase Its Military Power to Resolve the Karabakh Problem - President],‖ Iterfax-Azerbaijan, June 26, 2013, http://interfax.az/view/578122. 201 ―Prezident Azerbaijana Prizval Armiu Byt Gotovoi K Voine Za Karabakh [President of Azerbaijan Called Army to Be Ready for War in Karabakh],‖ ZN,UA, June 26, 2013, http://zn.ua/WORLD/prezident- azerbaydzhana-prizval-armiyu-byt-gotovoy-k-voyne-za-karabah-124657_.html. 202 Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War, Policy Breifing (Tbilisi,Baku,Yerevan,Istanbul,Brussels: International Crisis Group, February 8, 2011), 3, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20--- %20Preventing%20War.pdf.

76 territorial integrity and Azerbaijan‘s transformation into a country with regional power. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dominates the national discourse in Armenia and Azerbaijan because of the Armenian military victory. While Armenia celebrated its victory, Azerbaijan threatens to wage a new war. As claimed by Azerbaijan‘s president Aliyev in 2010, the country is ready ―at any moment to resolve the Karabakh problem by military means.‖203 During the largest military parade since the collapse of the Soviet Union in Baku in June 2010, Aliyev declared that ―Azerbaijan is in a state of war‖ and that the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh territory cannot last too long.204 Under these circumstances, the question is how long the unresolved armed conflict over Nagorno- Karabakh will remain ―frozen.‖

203 Yurii Roks, ―Prinuzhdenie K Voine [Coercion to War],‖ Nezavisimaja Gazeta, November 10, 2010, http://www.ng.ru/cis/2010-11-10/1_karabah.html. 204 Ilham Aliyev, ―Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Official Military Parade on the Occasion of the 95th Anniversary of the Armed Forces.‖

77 Chapter 5: Armed Conflicts in Georgia: Case Studies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia The similarity in aspirations of Abkhazians, South Ossetians, and Nagorno- Karabakh Armenians to secede from their titular states is remarkable. The characteristic features of this conflict are mutually exclusive goals and interests of Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Incompatible goals, hostile attitudes, and the strategies of conflict parties determine the conflict dynamics nowadays. Without any attempt to provide a historical overview, this section points out the nature of the most significant events that led to tensions in two armed conflicts on Georgian territory. There is an ongoing politicized scientific debate between Abkhazian, Ossetian, and Georgian intellectuals about the roots of these conflicts, about the motivations of separatist ideology, and about the reasons for struggle among these people who lived peacefully side by side for many centuries. While both sides have their own interpretation of ethnic origins and the evaluation of armed conflicts, an analysis of documentary sources offers some valuable insight into ―demagogic theories‖ of mutual relations.205 According to Georgian historiography, Georgian national identity has been inclusive. Different nationalities have peacefully coexisted for many centuries.206 Up until today, Georgians have been proud to accommodate Georgian, Armenian, Muslim, and Jewish citizens, proving that ethnic tolerance exists in their country. However, as one of the most prominent Georgian political scientists Ghia Nodia rightly suggests, ―in this era

205 For example, it is very hard to trace the beginning of Abkhazian antagonism towards Georgians. Local historians underline historical injustice and suggest the idea that „Abkhazia is not Georgia.― See more in Zhorzholiani, G. (2000): Istoricheskie i politicheskie korni konflikta v Abkhazii, p. 7. Some researchers claim that Abkhazians have North Caucasian origins and live across the Black Sea region since ancient times. Others claim that Abkhazians came to this territory in the first and second century AD. One of the theories claims that Abkhazians moved to Abkhazia in the 17th century, and they called themselves „Apsua― in Mariam Lortkipanidze, Apkhazebi Da Abkhazeti [Abkhazians and Abkhaiza] (Tbilisi: Ganatleba, 1990). 206 Georgian historiography emphasized ethnic unity between Abkhazians and Georgians: ―Georgians and Abkhazians are united by blood relations, common families and common children. The unity of Georgians and Abkhazians is determined by life itself. Abkhazians participated actively in the process of the political unification of our common homeland and the creation of a culture common to both our nationalities. This obligates both of our peoples to protect and deepen, and not to destroy century old tradition of our common life in peace and understanding, mutual trust and mutual support and the tradition of brotherhood made holy by the blood of ancestors‖ in Giorgi Zhorzholiani, Istoricheskie I Politicheskie Korni Konflikta v Abkhazii [Historical and Political Roots of the Conflict in Abkhazia] (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 2000), 88.

78 of democracy, in the contrast to the medieval period, it is not enough just to tolerate ―the other‖; a state must find a way to integrate ―the other‖ – to make those who are different willing participants in the national project.207 In the beginning of the 1980s, national liberation movements erupted all over the former Soviet territories. Georgia‘s national movement was one of the most radical ones. Neither the creation of a national government, nor the declaration of Georgian sovereignty led to political stability and he settling down of national emotions. The process the country was undergoing inside the national liberation movement, the demonstrations in Tbilisi, and the demise of the first Georgian government (December 1990 – January 1991) contributed to the division of the nation, causing anti-Georgian politics to erupt in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with consequent social destabilization all over the country.

5.1 Political Development in Georgia: Struggle for Independence

In order to address the escalation of two armed conflicts in Georgia, specific features of political developments have to be introduced at this point. In Georgia, the years 1987 to 1989 were marked by the emergence of different political groups, which had a serious impact on the political development of the country. By 1989, there were almost 50 political organizations and informal groups competing for the political re- arrangement in Georgia.208 The most influential one was the national-radical political wing, which played a significant role in the political processes during that period. The Georgian political landscape was so fragmented that there was no unity at all – even within one party. During 1987-1991, the radical wing was represented by the Helsinki Union, headed by the leaders of the Georgian national movement, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava. In 1988, they established new organizations, such as the Society of Saint Ilia the Righteous and the National Democratic Party. The major goal of these organizations was to secede from the Soviet rule and restoration of Georgia‘s

207 Ghia Nodia, ―Georgia: Dimensions and Insecurity,‖ in Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Bruno Coppieters and Roberts Legvold ed. (Cambridge ; New York: MIT Press, n.d.), 46. 208 Dimitri Shvelidze, Politikuri Dapirispirebebi Da Erovnuli Khelisuplebis Damkhoba Saqartveloshi (1989-1992) [Overthrow of the Government and National Political Controversy in Georgia (1989-1992)] (Tbilisi: Gamomcemloba ―Universali,‖ 2008), 19.

79 independence. They also shared an aspiration for a pro-Western orientation. These parties presented the future of the Caucasus as a unity. It was to be a political-economic and cultural space, a ―Caucasian‖ confederation of the states.209 Georgian intellectuals established the Ilia Chavchavadze Society on October 31, 1987. The major objective of this organization was to establish a Georgian democratic republic by ―peaceful means, political struggle, proclamations and spread of literature, meetings, demonstrations, manifestations and strikes.‖210 Democratization through the meetings and massive demonstrations together with disorganization of the ruling parties strengthened the idea of a national liberation and consolidated the space for such development. In 1988, due to the national liberation movement, the trans-Caucasian railway project as well as the construction of huge hydropower plants in the mountainous areas failed, causing the country to approach ecological disaster.211 One important detail about the political landscape in Georgia is that after two years the founders of this political organization – except one member, Tamar Chkheidze – created their own parties. This indicates that a lack of unity existed within the organization. Another significant detail is that the Ilia Chavchavadze Society was in opposition with Zviad Gamsakhurdia. 212 This had dramatic consequences on the evolution of political processes in Georgia and brought the country to a fierce civil war. On November 12, 1988, constitutional changes – loss of the (theoretical) right to secede from the USSR – led to a wave of demonstrations in Tbilisi. The major slogan at this time was the demand of Georgian people for full independence. On the domestic level, the worsening of the social-economic situation, the deficit of food production, a dramatic decrease in trading with the outside world, the radicalization of the opposition against the president led to the creation of oppositional forces. Along with the armed oppositional force – the National Guard, which led a campaign against Zviad

209 Ibid., 30. 210 Damoukidebloba [Independence], April 1990. 211 Damzir Jojua, ―Saqartvelos Modzraobis Periodizaciis Sakitkhisatvis. XXs. II Nakhevari [The National Movement and the Issue of Periodization. The Second Half of the XX Century],‖ Saistorio Dziebani, June 2003, http://matiane.wordpress.com/2010/02/10/periodization-of-national-movement/. 212 Giorgi Ciqarishvili, ―Zhami Cheshmariti,‖ Damarckhebuli Modzraobis Qronika, 2003, 15.

80 Gamsakhurdia – armed clashes took place in South Ossetia against separatist and Soviet armed forces. The years 1990 and 1991 could be marked as years of permanent demonstrations and meetings in Georgia, which led to civil war. This took place at the same time as the armed conflict in South Ossetia and therefore strengthened anti-Georgian feelings in another region, leaving the country at the brink of another unwanted conflict in Abkhazia. At the same time, the process of dissolving the Soviet Union was taking place. Under these conditions, Georgia had to face its nation-building effort and become an independent state, separated from the former Soviet empire. However, in order to achieve success, Georgia lacked basic attributes. First, Georgia had to have a relatively strong army. Second, Georgia had to achieve territorial and national unity. Third, Georgia needed international support in order to neutralize Russian aggression. At this point in time, Georgia did not have its own armed forces that could have addressed any aggression coming from the Kremlin. There were National Guards struggling against the Georgian government. The latter was not supplied by any armed forces or military technology. Furthermore, the Georgian nation was not united and, consequently, was not ready to confront the Russian Federation. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a leader who struggled for Georgian independence, had strong popular support, but the military coup in Georgia led to the end of his rule. Lastly, Georgia did not have any international support, any allies to counterbalance the Russian influence. Georgia was not that important for the USA or for European countries to intervene in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, the Georgian government supported the idea of the Chechen struggle for independence. This step strengthened the confrontation not only with Russia but distanced Georgia from the West, which did not question the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. To sum up, their fierce struggle for independence was doomed to fail. As a result, instead, two armed conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia occurred, neither of which has been resolved yet.

81 5.2 Case Study: Armed Conflict in South Ossetia

The newly established state of Georgia faced all the difficulties of a troublesome transformation process involved in forming a political and economic system independent of the Russian Federation. It witnessed bloody conflicts, all of which emerged under a weakening Soviet power, creating opportunities for various political projects competing with each other.213 Tensions in Ossetian-Georgian relations could be traced back to the short period of Georgian independence from 1918 to 1921. The Bolshevik-led Ossetians revolted against the Menshevik Democratic Republic of Georgia in April 1920, as result of which more than 5,000 people died. 214 South Ossetians were calling for unification with North Ossetia; however, after the Sovietization of Georgia by the Red Army in March 1921, a South Ossetian Autonomou Oblast (SOAO) was created. For the first time in the history of relations between Georgia and South Ossetia, this turmoil period marks a serious deterioration of the relationship. According to some scholars, the Soviet ethnofederal system provided a framework to rule nations within the Soviet Union. Consequently, the demise of this system can explain the outbreak of a new wave of ethnic conflicts on the territory of post-Soviet states rooted in historical grievances and memories from the past. As mentioned above, the objective of this dissertation is to uncover the limits of that type of explanation. While history is a significant aspect to be studied, one has to consider the conditions under which the armed conflicts of the 1990s occurred. They were quite different from those in 1918. Furthermore, systemic and structural dimensions of the conflict overlook micro-level analyses. A more productive way to understand the conflict processes and the issues at stake of contemporary conflicts involves a detailed analysis of the conflicts that erupted in the early 1990s and reached the second stage of escalation in 2008. Since 1988 the armed conflicts in South Caucasus has passed through several phases. This section explores the characteristic features of the armed conflict in its initial stage, turning discussion to the factors that had led to the violent confrontation in the

213 Aleksei Zverev, ―Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994,‖ in Contested Borders in the Caucasus (VUB University Press, 1996), http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/. 214 Toal, Gerard and OĽoughlin, John: Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State, Post-Soviet Affairs, 2013, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp: 136-172.

82 beginning of 90s, exploring the reasons contributing to the ―frozenness‖ of the conflict along the way. The frame of analysis is divided into three major periods: first, Phase A, the stage of initiation, last years before the demise of the Soviet Union; second, Phase B - culmination, when the conflicts escalated to the violent stage; third, Phaze C the second stage escalation during the Russia-Georgian armed conflict in august 2008. The objective of the section is to trace the process of transformation of aspects that determined conflict behavior in the outlined phases.

5.2.1 Phase A: The Spiral of Conflict: The Process of Escalation to War The tensions between Georgians and South Ossetians started in 1989, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and lead to the full-scale escalation in 1991. Due to the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia has a high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs): in the 1990s, the number of IDPs was 233,453 (6 percent of the Georgian population); it increased to 249,365 after the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008 (initially there were 22,000 people, but only 15,912 had refugee status in accordance with Georgian government policy).215 The number of victims in the armed conflict in 1991 in South Ossetia is unclear. According to South Ossetian data, more than 1,000 people died and 3,500 were wounded in the aftermath of the conflict in SOAO, and the number of refugees topped 20,000 people.216 The beginning of Georgia‘s campaign for independence was characterized by a permanent jostling for power between the former members of the communist Nomenklatura elite, some of whom were inspired by nationalistic ideas. The process of dissolution of the Soviet Union opened up opportunities for bloody confrontations. It was believed that the ―Russian empire‖ would use military force to defeat the Georgian national movement. The radical wing of the Georgian political spectrum at that time emphasized the need to restore independence. 217 On November 14, 1990, Zviad

215 Angarishi Idzulebit Gadaadgilebul Pirta Da Konpliktis Shemdeg Dazaralebulta Uplebebis Mdgomareobis Shesaxeb Saqartveloshi [Report on the State of Human Rights of IDPs in Georgia] (Saqartvelos Sakhalkho Damcveli, July 2010), http://www.ombudsman.ge/uploads/other/0/92.pdf. 216 Gerard Toal (Gearóid Ó Tuathail) and John O‘Loughlin, ―Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a de Facto State,‖ Post-Soviet Affairs 29, no. 2 (2013): 136–72, doi:10.1080/1060586X.2013.780417. 217 Dimitri Shvelidze, Politikuri Dapirispirebebi Da Erovnuli Khelisuplebis Damkhoba Saqartveloshi (1989-1992) [Overthrow of the Government and National Political Controversy in Georgia (1989-1992)], 42.

83 Gamsakhurdia, the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Council (or Parliament), declared Georgia‘s high national consciousness for freedom and declared this as the beginning of the more significant war for independence.218 The nationalist mobilization and radicalization of the newly formed Georgian government, however, boosted separatist movements of non-Georgian ethnic groups. The dynamics of the Georgian-Ossetian armed conflict were shaped by a number of factors, including the extreme position of Georgian nationalists in 1989, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia‘s coalition ―Round Table – Free Georgia‖ and his first presidency, the lack of a clear idea by the Georgian establishment of the autonomous regions, and the great faith of South Ossetian leaders in being supported by North Ossetia and the Russian Federation.219 According to one of the most prominent social scientists in Georgia, Ghia Nodia, ―Georgia‘s nationalist movement was probably the most radical in style in the former Soviet Union, at least among the movements at the union republic level. However, this radicalism was primarily targeted at the imperial centre, not ethnic minorities.‖220 After the tragic events of April 9, 1989, the Soviet rule lost its legitimacy in Georgia. The Georgian national movement called for a separation from the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces form Georgian territory.221 ―The peculiarity of Georgia,‖ according to Nodia, ―consisted in the fact that it was a single republic where the ‗irreconcilable‘ mentality dominated the opposition political agenda.‖222 Ossetians, who came from North Ossetia and who composed two thirds of the population in South Ossetia in 1989, were perceived as ―ungrateful guests‖ on Georgian soil.223

218 ―Saqartvelos Uzenaesi Sabchos Tavdzdomaris Baton Zviad Gamsakhurdiis gamosvla 1990 Clis 14 noembris skhdomaze [The Speech of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia at the meeting on 12 November 1990],‖ Saqartvelos Respublika, 1990. 219 Fond ―Otkrytoe Obshestvo,‖ O Poiske Prichin, Putei Uregulirovania I Vozmozhnych Napravleniax Razvitia Gruzino-Osetinskogo Konflikta [On the Search of the Causes, Possible Directions and Ways to Resolve the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict] (Tbilisi, 2005). 220 Ghia Nodia, ―Causes and Vision of Conflict in Abkhazia,‖ 30. 221 Toma Chagelishvili, 9 Aprilidan 9 Aprilamde [From 9 April to 9 April], n.d., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i36VwV-KDLI. 222 Ghia Nodia, ―Political Crisis in Georgia,‖ Current Politics and Economics of Europe 2, no. 1/2 (1992): 32. 223 G. Zhorhyoliani, S. Lekishvili, L. Mataradze, L. Toidze and E. Khoshtaria, Historic, Political and Legal Aspects of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict (Tbilisi: ―Samshoblo‖ Publishers, 1995), 3–4.

84 The initial phase of the escalation of the conflict is interlinked with the political processes within Georgia. ―Independence‖ and ―democracy‖ became keywords in Georgian political discourse. Zviad Gamsakhurdia‘s nationalistic agenda was primarily directed against the Soviet regime in Georgia, and the problem with Ossetia was considered part of that struggle. Claims of minority were interpreted as dictated from the Kremlin, and so there were no trust-building efforts for compromise.224 Gamasakhurdia‘s rule and his struggle for independence had strong popular support; however, his efforts to dismiss the opposition and strengthen his power at the expense of the democratization processes led to his overthrow by military means, organized by anti-Zviadist pro- democratic coalition.225 Under these conditions, when anti-Gamsakhurdia forces were strengthening, the president of Georgia played the nationalistic card to stay in power at the expense of democratization and minority groups in the country. However, the further development failed to ―unite the nation‖ by compelling the spirit of armed conflict in South Ossetia.226 One of the first manifestations of this process started with the confrontation over amendments to the Georgian Constitution - the law on the status of the state language, which demanded the need for the Georgian language in the public sphere. In the August 1990 election, which excluded the small region-based parties from participating in the parliamentary elections, this language law was passed.227 These policies were interpreted as antidemocratic as they cut down on the influence of minorities in the power-sharing institutions in Georgia. Political issues at stake provoked the spiral of violence, causing increasing distrust between the titular nation and the South Ossetian minorities. A parallel trend took place in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region. In order to express their aspirations and

224 Gia Nodia and Álvaro Pinto Scholtbach, The Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects (Eburon Uitgeverij B.V., 2006). 225 Dimitri Shvelidze, Politikuri Dapirispirebebi Da Erovnuli Khelisuplebis Damkhoba Saqartveloshi (1989-1992) [Overthrow of the Government and National Political Controversy in Georgia (1989-1992)], 30–44. 226 Ghia Nodia, ―Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,‖ in Contested Borders in The Caucasus, Bruno Coppieters eds. (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1996), http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0201.htm. 227 Fond ―Otkrytoe Obshestvo,‖ O Poiske Prichin, Putei Uregulirovania I Vozmozhnych Napravleniax Razvitia Gruzino-Osetinskogo Konflikta [On the Search of the Causes, Possible Directions and Ways to Resolve the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict], 12.

85 their dissatisfaction with Georgian nationalist politics, the Ossetian minorities formed a popular front named Ademon Nykhas. In the atmosphere of accumulating tensions, South Ossetia adopted a declaration on the ―sovereignty of South Ossetia‖ on September 20, 1990, which emphasized the right of self-determination of the Ossetian people. The demands of South Ossetians at this stage included the follow aspects: 1. Convert the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic; 2. Ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to absorb South Ossetia in the Soviet Union as an independent entity of the federation; 3. Request that the republics of the USSR sign a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with South Ossetia.228 Thus, the process to attain national liberation was twofold: Georgian political leaders aspired to attain independence from the Soviet Union while disregarding grievances by their own national minorities. At the same time, South Ossetia struggled for the preservation of its specific status, which it had enjoyed within the Soviet ethno- federal system. This system was asymmetric in its nature and enabled some groups to have certain political, economic, linguistic, and cultural rights under Soviet rule. After the demise of the Soviet Union, South Ossetians feared that the Georgian national movement would undermine their right to self-determination, which would lead to their assimilation with the titular nation. As a result, a triangular struggle occurred: Georgia struggled for independence, Moscow fought against Georgian secession from the Soviet Union, and South Ossetia tried to carve out a special status for itself and to protect its rights vis-à-vis Georgian nationalism under the protection of Moscow. A second feature characteristic for the conflict at this time was the process of collapsing existing political institutions and the challenge to create a new one. The clashes that took place between the titular nation (Georgia) and ethnic groups (South Ossetians, for instance) were about the national project of how to organize political arrangements in the newly created state. In the early 1990s, South Caucasian states had started constructing their own state structures without armed forces. Conflicts that arose from these changes were led by paramilitary armed formations, often inspired by

228 Ibid., 14.

86 nationalistic ideology motivated by self-enrichment and criminal interest.229 According to the Georgian political establishment, these conflicts were not ethnic, as South Ossetians and Abkhazians were not recognized as ―other.‖ Everybody was Georgian. So the armed conflict in South Ossetia was considered ―political‖ because the conflicts were about statehood and territorial integrity of the post-Soviet state of Georgia. In other words, it has been argued that Georgia was not fighting specific ethnic groups but ―separatists,‖ that is, people who are challenging its territorial integrity, whatever their ethnic origin.230 According to this logic, the conflicts inside Georgia with separatists were not caused by ethnic hostility. Rather they were struggles of forming a nation state, struggles over the status of some specific groups, and they were caused by contradictions between national projects.231 Conflicts in Georgia were about defending territory, political status, and independence. However, it should be said that, nowadays, mutual relations between conflict parties are ethnically hostile. This can lead one to conclude that ethnic animosity was not the cause but the result of the armed conflict in South Ossetia. For Ossetian minorities, then, the conflicts were about self-determination and reinforcement of their political rights in their ethnic homes. Ossetians themselves claimed that they did not have any better choice than looking for security guarantees from the Kremlin, ―striving for survival as an ethno-historian entity – and identity – drove [them] ‗to side with Soviet Russia‘ – not [their] genetic love for bolshevism, sovietism and other ‗isms‘ … .‖232 Finally, the armed conflict in South Ossetia was accompanied by mass mobilization. Clashes between popular movements were led under nationalist slogans of former dissidents and intellectuals. They played a significant role in the events of ―re- writing‖ the history of the Caucasian nations. These clashes, involving mass-level

229 Alexander Kupatadze, ―Radiological Smuggling and Uncontrolled Territories: The Case Of Georgia,‖ Global Crime 8, no. 1 (2007): 40–57, doi:10.1080/17440570601121852. 230 Ghia Nodia, ―Causes and Vision of Conflict in Abkhazia,‖ 3. 231 Petre Mamradze, Absurduli Omi, Romelic Ar Unda Momkhdariko [Absurd War] (Tbilisi: Bakur Sulakauris Gamomcemloba, 2011), 302. 232 Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski, Confidence-Building Matters. The Goergia-South Ossetia Conflict (London: Verification Technology Information Centre, March 1996), http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived_Publications/Matters/Confidence_Building_Matters_No6.pdf.

87 violence, were attempts to define their strength, territory, and rights for independence.233 As Georgia was seeking to change its status from a Soviet republic, the former autonomous region - South Ossetia – was trying to upgrade its position as well. The South Ossetian parliament demanded to transform the region‘s status from ―Autonomous Region‖ to ―Autonomous Republic.234 Georgian policies towards its secessionist regions were ambivalent and, therefore, have resulted in two secessionist conflicts inside Georgia, in South Ossetia (1989–1992) and Abkhazia (1992–1993). The conflicts have not been resolved, and in most of the specialized literature, they are referred to as frozen conflicts.235 Consequently, clinging to exclusivist national identity in an ethnically mixed Georgia led to armed conflict and destroyed a state. Having failed at creating a new statehood, Georgia collapsed. It was the price the Georgian political establishment had to pay in order to abolish an exclusivist nationalist political culture. Furthermore, the Russian involvement in these conflicts resulted in the defeat of a titular nation against their minorities. Rumors had it that the conflicts really were not between Georgia and its ethnic minority, the Ossetians, but with Russia, which was punishing post-Soviet republics for their aspirations for independence. However, in order to study the conflict mechanisms in South Ossetia, it is significant to point out that this conflict was not between the state and non-state actors. The conflict actors at the stage of initiation involved parties involved in nationalist movements on both sides, competing over the rules of the new political structure in this region. The international recognition of Georgia as an independent state did not change course in the process of conflict escalation. As mentioned above, Georgia did not possess the tools to regulate these increasingly severe tensions, nor did the government have the means to stop the escalation from conflict to war. Georgia was ill equipped to address the process of state building and the demands of ethnic minorities for autonomy.

233 Dimitri Shvelidze, Politikuri Dapirispirebebi Da Erovnuli Khelisuplebis Damkhoba Saqartveloshi (1989-1992) [Overthrow of the Government and National Political Controversy in Georgia (1989-1992)], 178–179. 234 Fond ―Otkrytoe Obshestvo,‖ O Poiske Prichin, Putei Uregulirovania I Vozmozhnych Napravleniax Razvitia Gruzino-Osetinskogo Konflikta [On the Search of the Causes, Possible Directions and Ways to Resolve the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict], 9. 235 Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars, 112–113.

88

5.2.2 Phase B: Economy of Conflict in South Ossetia Control over oil, Black Sea ports, flow of commodities, and trans-Caucasian roads, as well as over local markets played a significant role in igniting conflicts in South Ossetia. The process of privatization also contributed to the escalation of tension. Even more so, ―separatism and other political demands suggested by sides‘ serious political and economic interests result from a vehement power struggle. This ends in oligopoly – a subject of the study of the economic theory – and explains how deeply-rooted economic interests are distorted by political, ideological, and religious motivations to be presented as the conflicting sides‘ demands,‖236 according to Paata Leiashvili, professor and leading expert in the administration of the Parliament of Georgia. The issue at stake, which is understated and needs in-depth analysis, is economic development and its impact on the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region. Economic development is a crucial factor as it will influence future dynamics of the conflict. It can also serve as a tool to promote peace in this unstable region. However, the unresolved status of the armed conflicts has jeopardized political stability and economic development in this region and has contributed to a re-escalation of tensions in 2008. Unresolved armed conflicts in Georgia cause fundamental socio-economic problems in Georgia, such as vulnerability of the domestic market, economic insecurity along state borders, a large-scale contraband trade, a shadow economy and corruption, the criminalization of business, financial and budgetary crises causing tax and trade deficits, huge external debts, a high level of poverty among refugees, difficult living conditions in temporary shelters and consequent threat of political instability. Leaders in conflict zones are involved in illegal trade with drugs, contraband, and weapons, and they are not interested in a resolution of the conflicts because of the benefits from the zones of conflicts. ―Millions of dollars change hands in such places;

236 Paata Leiashvili, ―Post-Soviet Ethnic Conflicts: The Economic Aspects Require an In-Depth Study,‖ The Caucasus & Globalization 2, no. 1 (2007): 37.

89 this gives rise to powerful economic interest that exploit high-sounding patriotic slogans to keep the conflict alive.‖237

5.2.2.1 Smuggling Across the South Ossetia Region

Economic development in the Shida Kartli (South Osseti) region has proven to be most difficult. Some sources put the GPD of South Ossetia at 15 million USD per year or 250 USD per capita, one of the lowest in the region. The Ergneti market near Tskhinvali was a key place for illegal tax revenues. The ―invisible‖ movement of goods across the state border, bypassing customs, has reached alarming proportions. Goods and petroleum products were imported without customs clearance into Georgia from Russia through the Roki Tunnel. Highly organized transnational groups were smuggling narcotic substances, weapons, and cigarettes, threatening the economic development in Georgia.238 According to the Emergency Legion of Tax Revenues, different groups smuggle goods worth 105 million USD per year, not including gasoline or diesel fuel. More than 260,000 USD per month worth of contraband in tobacco products alone was distributed to different parts of Georgia by cars from the Tskhinvali region. There were three market places controlled by high representatives of the South Ossetian and Georgian political elites before 2004. Most of the fuel, tobacco, flour, and food products entered Georgia through these channels. According to Georgian sources, the Georgian budget lacked almost 3.1 million USD due to smuggled goods, with the largest share, 1.6 million USD, attributed to illegal fuel and cigarette imports.239 The Ergneti market represented a ―black hole‖ in the Georgian economy.240 It was also used to smuggle goods from Georgia to Russia. Heroin has been one of the major products smuggled through the conflict zone in the South Caucasus. According to some resources, the volume of heroin import from the Ergneti market is twice as much as the

237 Ibid. 238 As one of the leading Georgian expert Mamuka Areshidze suggests, illegal activities in South Ossetia were protected by the ―Sport Mafia‖ of Jambul Tedeev, the trainer of wrestling team. Mamuka Areshidze, Konpliktebis Mimdinare Ekonomikuri Mizezebi [Current Economic Causes of the Conflicts], 2010. 239 Roman Gotsiridze and Otar Kandelaki, Vliatelnye Gruppy I Korupcia: Ugroza Nacionalnoi Bezopasnosti Gruzii [Influential Groups and Corruption: Threat to National Security of Georgia] (Tbilisi: ELF, 2001), 158. 240 Petre Mamradze, Absurduli Omi, Romelic Ar Unda Momkhdariko [Absurd War], 34.

90 amount of drugs flowing from the territory of Azerbaijan.241 The smuggling of drugs and weapons through South Ossetia was under the control of a few locals. Most of these products were imported and sold to Russian military forces before the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008. The mechanism of the Ergneti market is illustrated on the Figure 3 below. Figure 3 The Layout of the Ergneti Market in South Ossetia.

Source: Vakhtang Dzhikaev and Alan Parastaev, Economy and Conflict on South Ossetian, in From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., (International Alert, 2004), 204.

The armed conflict in South Ossetia and its frozen status for more that two decades created unique conditions for the illegal distribution of goods. The region‘s political instability led to an escalation of tensions in 2004, when the Georgian

241 Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus (International Alert, 2004).

91 administration started an anti-smuggling campaign, aiming to close Ergneti market. Even though the Ergneti market produced the biggest part of South Ossetia‘s economy, it did not guarantee stability and economic growth of the region (see Map 2 below). One reason for this was the fact that capital produced in Ergneti market did not stay in South Ossetia but was sent abroad. In addition, most of the profit from this market ended up in Russian and Georgian customs in the form of bribes. And finally, the market and its illegal economic activities had a negative impact on settling the Georgia-South Ossetia armed conflict. Under these conditions, it has to be pointed out, illegal border trade and dependence on illegal economic activities jeopardized the stability of this region and led to an escalation of armed conflict, as witnessed in 2004 and 2008. Map 2 Smuggling Routs in South Ossetia.

Source: Vakhtang Dzhikaev and Alan Parastaev, Economy and Conflict on South Ossetian, in From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., (International Alert, 2004), 206.

92 Saakashvili‘s main goals were to accomplish a process of transformation for the Georgian state, eliminating corruption and poverty in the country, and achieving NATO membership and territorial integrity. Georgian political establishment verbally emphasized its desire for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. The new Georgian government realized the need to deal with the issue of territorial control to build a strong state. The first success in this regard was achieved in Ajara by overthrowing Aslan Abashidze‘s regime in 2004.242 In a way, this turned out to be a double victory for the Georgian government: first, the victory over an autocratic ruler in the name of democracy, and second, a victory in the state building process. After Ajara had become a part of Georgia without major international complications or an outbreak of violence, the Georgian government started to deal with the issue of South Ossetia. Before 2004, there was no major deterioration of the situation on the conflict zone with South Ossetia. Georgians and South Ossetians were engaged in active trading across the zone. The characteristic ―cold peace‖ ideology – free movement and trade in the region-wide Ergneti market — saw the biggest challenge for peace in the ruling clan of Eduard Kokoiti in South Ossetia. They assumed that sending support to the Ossetian people would lead to the fall of the separatist government in Tskhinvali. The Georgian government believed that the problem was only the corrupt clan of Eduard Kokoiti ruling in South Ossetia and that South Ossetians would be willing to fight him. Indeed, the overall goal of the Georgian administration was not only its economy, but the usage of ―anti-contraband measures as a dual-purpose mechanism: ... to add revenues to Georgia‘s ailing budget (but also) to oust the ... government of the de-facto president, Eduard Kokoiti ... Without contraband funds to prop up his government and security services, Kokoiti‘s ‗regime of bandits‘ would fall apart.‖243 In May 2004, Georgia launched a campaign against smuggling in South Ossetia. Contrary to the expected outcome, the Georgian strategy of trade restrictions threatened South Ossetians, which led to armed skirmishes, while Ossetians consolidated behind the de-facto government in order to defend their territory, their freedom of movement, and to

242 ―Acharis Krizisi – Movlenata Qronologia [Adjara Crisis - Timeline],‖ Civil Georgia, May 5, 2004, http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=6700. 243 Theresa Freese, ―A Report from the Field: Georgia‘s War against Contraband and the Struggle for Territorial Integrity,‖ SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2005): 109–110, doi:10.1353/sais.2005.0008.

93 prevent Georgian military success in this zone. From the Georgian perspective, the countermeasures taken by Ossetians represented a danger for the local Georgian population and the territorial integrity of the country. On the other hand, Kokoiti blamed the Georgian government of following aggressive policy and countered with an offensive operation, declaring that the South Ossetians were ready to defend themselves with armed forces.244 At the same time, Kokoiti claimed that the relationship with Georgia would not be restored until the Georgian side fulfilled the following demands: first, restoration of the damages in the Republic of South Ossetia caused during the Georgian aggression; second, the Georgian parliament was expected to give a political assessment of the events of 1989 to 1992, recognizing the genocide of the Ossetian people; third, Georgia was expected to adopt a law on refugees that included reinstituting their rights and fully reimbursing for reparations. Kokoiti also claimed that he had ―no doubts‖ that ―the historical justice will prevail, and the Ossetian people will be united and be a part of the Russian Federation.‖245 These demands led to a rapid escalation, which reached its culmination in August 2004, when fire-fights erupted between Georgian and Ossetian soldiers near the village of Tamarasheni.246 The Georgian side attacked the village of Didi Liakhvni in its attempt to take control over the bypass road. According to the Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, Georgia‘s goal was to protect Didi Liakhvni in order to overcome ―large-scale ethnic cleansing.‖247 The spiral of insecurity-driven escalation of tension in the conflict zone led to the edge of an unwanted conflict. Unlike the triumph in Achara, this development indicated an overall setback and worsening relationships in the conflict zone.

244 ―Silovye Struktury Juzhnoi Osetii Privedeni v Sostojanie Boeboi Gotovnosti, Ozhidaja Provokacii [Security Structures in South Ossetia Have Combat Readiness, Awaiting for Provocation],‖ Newsru.com, June 11, 2004, http://www.newsru.com/arch/world/11jun2004/osetia.html. 245 ―Prezident Juzhnoi Osetii Ne Somnevaetsja, Chto Respublika Voidot v Sostav RF [The President of South Ossetia Has No Doubt That the Country Will Become a Part of the Russian Federation],‖ Newsru.com, June 10, 2004, http://www.newsru.com/world/10jun2004/osetia.html. 246 Guram Vashakidze, ―Cxinvalis Gavlit – Tamarashenshi: Konpliktis Zona [Through Tskhinvali to Tamarasheni: The Conflict Zone],‖ Saqartvelos Respublika, 2004, N160(4889) edition, 2. 247 Cory Welt, ―The Thawing of a Frozen Conflict: The Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War,‖ Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 1 (2010): 86, doi:10.1080/09668130903385390.

94 The ―war on smuggling‖ in South Ossetia was in line with the new anticorruption strategy of Saakashvili‘s government by improving state revenue collection and increasing state involvement in cross-border crime to secure Georgian territory. The cornerstone of the new administration, which gained popular support and legitimacy, rested upon the fight against corruption, strengthening state institutions, and increasing state security. The struggle against corrupt activities was part of the broader security strategy. As declared by Michael Saakashvili in June 2004, South Ossetia ―was a black hole from where contraband was coming. We have stopped that contraband. This is the main achievement… According to my calculations, this will bring an extra 200 – 250 million lari (100 – 125 million USD) to the Georgian budget, once we have (also) blocked contraband in Samegrelo (the region, which borders with the second breakaway region – Abkhazia). Most of that money will be spent on strengthening our state agencies, including in the first place, our police and military structures, so that there is peace and our population is protected.‖248 The intensification of rhetoric and discourse about the peaceful transformation of South Ossetia into the Georgian jurisdiction, along with the claims of Georgian political elites that ―we do not need a war,‖ indicates that there were no plans for a full-scale offensive military strategy. However, the deployment of Georgian troops on May 31 was an alarming sign for South Ossetia and Russia. It foreshadowed the possibility of a repetition of the tragedy of 1991. Consequently, the reaction of South Ossetia was perceived by the Georgian side offensive operation and disproportionate to Georgia‘s own action. As rightly identified by Cory Welt, ―while Georgia knew that it was making at least the South Ossetia insecure, it still perceived that it was doing it non-violently, while the South Ossetian leadership was now threatening violence and ethnic cleansing in response.‖249 Thus, the unresolved conflict in South Ossetia has remained the biggest challenge of Georgia‘s state-building efforts. Since the developments in 2004, Saakshvili‘s strategy has been to achieve success through internationalization of any Georgian conflicts, through NATO membership, and by gaining support from the West. Georgia came up

248 ―Kurieri,‖ News (Tbilisi: Rustavi-2 TV, June 12, 2004). 249 Welt, ―The Thawing of a Frozen Conflict,‖ 90.

95 with peace initiatives based on a three-level solution in 2005 – demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and political solution – and Mikhail Saakashvili‘s peace plan in 2007. However, this took place against a backdrop of pressure on South Ossetian political representatives. For example, in December 2005, the Minister of Defense of Georgia at the time, Irakli Okruashvili, announced that Georgia would regain control over South Ossetia by January 1, 2007. None of the peace plans were ever implemented or contributed to a substantial improvement of mutual relations and the situation in the region.250

5.2.3 Phase C: Red Lines in South Ossetia The second stage of escalation of the conflict started 18 years after the ceasefire agreement in 1992. State weakness was the key problem that undermined Georgia‘s development since its independence. Nation-building efforts to achieve national integration as well as state effectiveness (or ―state capture‖) to provide territorial control were ill prepared. After Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, he launched a policy of consolidating the Georgian state, developing the elementary features of functional statehood.251 On 7 August 2008 at 11:35 p.m., the Georgian armed forces entered the region of South Ossetia, according to official pronouncements, to ―restore constitutional order.‖252 The Russian response was very quick. The next day, using the Roki Tunnel, the Russian armed forces reached the territory of South Ossetia. During 10 and 11 August, Russia opened a second front on the territory of Abkhazia. The Russian armed forces crossed the borders of the separatist regions and entered the Georgian inland. The Russian armed forces stopped at the city of Mtskheta, only 35 km from the capital of Tbilisi.253

250 ―Report of the Government of Georgia on the Aggression by the Russian Federation against Georgia,‖ Civil Georgia, August 7, 2009, http://www.civil.ge/files/files/GeorgianGovernmentReportWar.pdf. 251 H.E. President Mikheil Saakashvili To The Parliamentary Assembly Of The Council Of Europe (Vienna: The Permanent Mission of Georgia to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, January 26, 2005), http://www.diaspora.gov.ge/files/faili/GoG_WarRep_Ch4/GoG_WarRep_Ch4.Att36.pdf. 252 Mehmet Bardakçı, ―EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in Georgia: Towards a More Proactive Role,‖ Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, no. 3 (2010): 214–36. 253 Svante E. Cornell, Johanna Popjanevski and Niklas Nilsoon, Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World, Policy Paper (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, August 2008).

96 After it became an independent country, Georgia had to build its own armed forces, starting with what it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Following the Rose Revolution in 2003, the Georgian armed forces went through the process of radicalization. To achieve that, a number of planning documents inspired by the US armed forces planning procedures were created, namely the ―National Security Concept‖ and the ―Threat Assessment Document and National Military Strategy.‖ The ―National Security Concept‖ defined the main tasks for the Georgian army: achieving compatibility with NATO standards; acquiring the capacity for providing assistance to civil-political authorities in post-crisis rehabilitation and maintaining law and order; and, last but not least, acquiring the capacity for carrying out peace support, military operations, and antiterrorist operations.254 In order to achieve ―de-occupation‖ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, resolution of conflict by peaceful means, struggle against terrorism, and integration into NATO, these tasks were broken down into more details in the ―Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia 2012-2015‖ 255 and in the ―National Strategy 2014.‖ 256 According to both documents, before the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, Georgia was equipped only to enter into territorial defense, deterrence of potential aggression, and international expeditionary operations. While the answer to who started the offensive campaigns in August 2008 remains in dispute among Georgian and Russian experts, the speed with which the Russians responded—opening of the second front in Abkhazia, Russian espionage activities in the region, military provocations carried out on the eve of the war, shooting down Georgian unmanned aircraft, attack on a radar station of Georgian aircraft defense, and Russian military exercises in the region—indicates that the armed conflict might have been prepared by Russia. If this assertion is true, that is, if what the Georgian army tried to resist was a carefully orchestrated Russian military operation for which the pretext had been supplied by the Georgians themselves, then Georgia clearly acted on a wrong strategic assessment

254 H.E. President Mikheil Saakashvili To The Parliamentary Assembly Of The Council Of Europe. 255 Ministry of International Affairs of Georgia, ―Saqartvelos Sagareo Politikis Strategia 2012-2015 [Georgia‘s Foreign Policy Strategy 2012-2015],‖ September 25, 2012, http://mfa.gov.ge/files/709_15575_959168_FPStrategy_FINAL-25.09.12.pdf. 256 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, ―2014 clis strategia [The Strategy of 2014],‖ 2014, http://police.ge/files/pdf/misia%20da%20strategia/ganvitarebis%20strategia_2014GEO.pdf.

97 of the situation and of Russian intentions. Attempting to resolve the secession issue through the use of military force clearly failed because the Georgian army lost to an army that outnumbered it heavily, was vastly superior in terms of heavy military weapons, and controlled the airspace over the battlefield.257 The deficiencies revealed by the war at higher levels of command are more serious and less easy to remedy than the deficiencies at the tactical level because education and military training at the top military level needed much more time than at the basic levels. Because of the deployment of large Russian contingents on Georgian territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the strategic situation of Georgia has deteriorated significantly. Apart from acting as a deterrent against any future attempt of Georgia to use force in dealing with the secessionists, Russian troops pose a permanent threat to Georgia by shortening the warning times for potential Russian attacks. Furthermore, the armed conflict also reduced the capacity of Georgia to participate in expeditionary operations. The Russian-Georgian conflict highlighted the importance of one of the main aims of Georgian defense policy – strengthening the capability of the Georgian army to defend the homeland against direct aggression.258 The Russian-Georgian armed conflict was by some scholars interpreted as a first armed clash between the West and the East after the end of the Cold War.259 However, it is questionable whether such an interpretation is sustainable. The West did not enter a conflict with Russia because of Georgia. After all, Georgia had never received any security guarantees from the West.260 On the other hand, this conflict involved some aspects of ideological confrontation: Georgian pro-Western orientation and Russian great

257 The strategic planning of the whole operation by the Georgian side was subjected to crushing criticism by the director at the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS), Richard Giragosian. He believes that Georgia overestimated its own military capability, underestimated the capability of the Russians to respond with military force, and, finally, underestimated the strategic significance of Roki Tunnel, See in Rechard Giragosian, New Threats to Regional Security: Considerations for Armenia, ACNIS Policy Brief (Yerevan, February 2009), http://acnis.am/old/publications/2009/ACNIS%20Policy%20Brief%20No.1%202009.pdf. 258 For analysis of military aspects of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict see Zdeněk Kříž and Zinaida Shevchuk, ―Georgian Readiness for NATO Membership after Russian-Georgian Armed Conflict,‖ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, no. 1 (March 2011): 89–97, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.01.003. 259 Ronald Asmus, Mcire Omi Romelmac Msoplio Shedzra [A Littel War That Shook the World] (Tbilisi: Ilia State University Press, 2010), 236. 260 For evolution of mutual relation between Georgia and NATO see Zdenek Kriz and Zinaida Shevchuk, ―Georgia on the Way to NATO after the Russian-Georgian Armed Conflict in 2008,‖ Obrana a Strategie (Defence & Strategy) 9, no. 1 (June 15, 2009): 101–15, doi:10.3849/1802-7199.09.2009.01.101-115.

98 power ambitions in the South Caucasus region. Russia started to recover after the demise of the Soviet Union and under the Putin‘s rule being a Great Power was no longer an aspiration but a determining element aiming to secure its special status. One of the most prominent scholars of Russia‘s foreign relations, Ted Hopf defines Russia has never really concealed its great power ambition and can hardly imagine itself in any other role261. According to Robert Kagan Russian-Georgian conflict is part of Russian grand strategy. ―Putin cares no more about a few thousand South Ossetians than he does about Kosovo's Serbs. Claims of pan-Slavic sympathy are pretexts designed to fan Russian great-power nationalism at home and to expand Russia's power abroad.‖262 Because of the war, Georgia has become a country without definite borders of its own territory, and hence it does not meet one of the key requirements for new NATO members declared in a NATO study on its potential expansion. Opponents of Georgian membership in NATO have been using this unquestionable fact intensively in recent years. However, it is only a secondary argument. The main problem lies in the lack of willingness in the West to provide Georgia with any obligations, as it is unable to defend it. In other words, Georgia is not strategically important for the West, despite many Georgians thinking quite the opposite. Recent development have reviled, that Russia maintains a substantial military presence in the conflict zones and even after Bidzina Ivanishvili became a head of the new government in Georgia, Russia continues to undermine Georgian territorial integrity by erecting barbed wire barricades in South Ossetia, as well as keeping Georgians from Western-style sovereign state by putting pressure on joining the Eurasian Union. It can be concluded that the Russo-Georgian armed conflict, and the subsequent recognition of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be independent states by Russia institutionalized the old dividing lines in the region of South Caucasus.

5.2.4 Putting the Armed Conflict into the Context Taking into consideration how complex and multidimensional the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is, as well as interests of international actors and their

261 Ted Hopf, Russia’s European Choice, First Edition edition (New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 274. 262 Robert Kagan, ―Putin Makes His Move,‖ The Washington Post, August 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/10/AR2008081001871.html.

99 mutually exclusive goals it is necessary to analyze the new realities after the August 2008 events. In this way we can trace that the process of transformation, which was not towards the resolution, but deepening the conflict. At the systemic level, the impacts of the Russo-Georgian conflict were minimal. This conflict had no impact on the anarchic nature of the international system or the distribution of power. In the international system, the number of the main powers did not change. Nor did the events in the Caucasus change the customs of forming military alliances. Even though some researchers do interpret this conflict as the first armed clash between the West and the East after the end of the Cold War, it is questionable whether such an interpretation is sustainable (Asmus 2010: 236). The West did not enter a conflict with Russia because of Georgia. After all, Georgia had never received any security guarantees from the West. Generally, it can be stated that the military campaign against Georgia and the unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did short-term harm to the Russian ―image‖ of a reliable and peaceful member of the international community. Hence if the Russian political elites had relied on the fact that the war would not do a long-term harm to its prestige in the world, this estimate has so far been successful. Nevertheless, Russia did fail to impose its own interpretation of the events on the West, i.e. that it had responded to an attack on its own citizens. The West also has disagreed with the adopted territorial changes and its representatives expressed their disapproval of Russia having recognized the independence of these two republics. On the other hand, the West is not willing to get involved in this matter and it prefers developing economic relations with Russia. After Barack Obama‘s inauguration, the tense relations between Russia and the USA, characteristic during part of the Bush administration, were replaced by an effort to converge. Negotiations between the USA and Russia concerning nuclear matters resulted in signing a new treaty on 8 April 2010, which replaced the START treaty from 1991, and it introduced further restrictions on strategic nuclear warheads. Georgia has not been of crucial importance for the Obama administration and is overshadowed by more important accounts of Afghanistan or the Iranian nuclear program.

100 Regarding Russian relations with non-Western countries, the consequences of the armed conflict up to now have been mixed. Russia has still not managed to gain support either of CIS or the Shangai Cooperation Organization. Even though Russia has great influence upon the states of the CIS, none of the states of this group recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 263 and China blocked any initiative to support separatist movements. After the Russo-Georgian war, the CIS states have exhibited more circumspection in their relations with Russia, especially those which are themselves exposed to separatist threats. The Russian military action in Georgia pointed out the dangerous new risks for this territory and European security. Russia acted in the interest of defending its ―kin- state,‖ exploiting the right of ethnic minorities to self-determination. As one of its foreign political goals, it declared the protection of ―kin‖ minorities. This concept was tested with success during the Russia-Georgia armed conflict, by which Russia sent a clear signal to other neighbors to take it as a lesson to be learned and the main result of the armed conflict. On the whole, it is possible to reach the conclusion that as a consequence of the armed conflict, Russia accomplished many of its aims: to have at its disposal strategic place d'armes in the middle of South Caucasus; to stop the penetration of Western influence into the region and prevent Georgian membership in NATO; to arouse a feeling of fear among Russia‘s neighbors; to get rid of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia representing the main obstacle to Russian annexation of this area, and to ensure a significant military presence. Russia‘s aim has been and further remains to suppress Western influence and make sure that Georgia will not set an example for other countries in the region. Last but not least, Russia managed to send a clear signal to its neighbors that their friendship with the West is not a guarantee against a Russian military attack. On the other hand, Russia did not manage to deprive President Saakashvili of power; additionally it failed to earn worldwide international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, it is also necessary to take into account that from the long-term

263 At the meeting on 5 September in Moscow, the Russian campaign against Georgia was supported by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Armenia; yet none of the states recognized the sovereignty of Georgian separatist areas.

101 perspective, financing the above-mentioned independent states will represent a certain financial burden for Russia. For Georgia, the armed conflict had an overall impact of the conflict on Georgia‘s prestige in the world was tremendous. Probably the most adverse consequence for Georgia was the violation of its territorial integrity, as Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, announced that Georgia could forget about its territorial integrity.264 The case of Georgia and South Ossetia resulted in hundreds of military and civilian victims and vast damages to infrastructure, which had a clearly negative impact on the country‘s economic development. Amnesty International reached the conclusion that approximately 192,000 people had fled from the fights, 138,000 of them to Georgia. A majority of them returned to their original places of living, which are the so-called ―buffer zones‖ near South Ossetia. As a result of the summer 2008 conflict, there remain 21,000 internally displaced persons on the Georgian territory. The World Bank report implies that the conflict had a negative influence on the stable development in Georgia and it reduced the anticipated economic growth for 2008 from 9% to 3.5%, and this reduced figure for economic growth in Georgia could last for several years. According to some experts, the Georgian government estimates war damages at 1 billion USD. This number includes damages to the civil infrastructure and costs arising due to internally displaced persons (approximately 30,000 people). In other words, this number does not include damages on the regions where the Georgian government has no access, and damages to military armament. Beyond any doubt, the Russian military intervention in Georgia did have a short-term impact on the Georgian economic growth, but it cannot be clearly determined what degree of reduction was caused really by the war and what was, on the contrary, brought about by the impending economic crisis. Besides the fact that the Georgian economy and infrastructure had been damaged due to the armed conflict, the Russian forces also destroyed a substantial part of the Georgian military armament. The Georgian army‘s ability to successfully defend the

264 ―Germania Otstaivaet Celostnost Gruzii [Germany Defends Integrity of Georgia],‖ Kommersant.ru, August 15, 2008, http://kommersant.ru/doc/1012261.

102 country‘s territory was undoubtedly undermined by the conflict. According to a report by the Georgian Ministry of Defense, 160 soldiers died and 10 were lost during the Russo- Georgian War.265 According to a different report released by Georgian government, 326 Georgian citizens died as a consequence of the conflict; 155 of them were civilians.266 Nevertheless, it is much more important that the Georgian strategic situation deteriorated by deploying relatively strong Russian contingents on Georgian territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Russia keeps 7,600 troops on the Georgian territory where secessionists have declared independent states. 267 These forces serve not only as a deterrence to Georgia‘s future efforts to use military force against secessionists, but they also pose a permanent threat to Tbilisi, as they reduce the period of warning for the Georgian army in case of a Russian attack against this country. Military experts have attempted to evaluate the purpose of Russian military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchira (in Abkhazia) and Java (South Ossetia). Gudauta could be used for offensive troops, air forces, or air protection, while Ochamchira could serve as a naval base, which would enable Russia to transfer the Black Sea fleet from Sevastopol. As far as Java is concerned, this city could be used for the dislocation of the motorized infantry brigade.268 However, the most serious military consequence is unquestionably the reduction of time necessary for a direct threat for the Georgian metropolis of Tbilisi by troops stationed in South Ossetia, which is situated on the southern side of the South Caucasus ridge, and thus it is an ideal strategic starting point for a potential military occupation of Georgia. The conflict also affected the perception of Georgia as a transit country for energy supplies to the European Union. If infrastructure was constructed over this state‘s territory permitting the transport of energy resources from the Caspian region to the European market, the country‘s geopolitical importance for the European Union would

265 Georgian Ministry of Defence, ―List of Casualties among the Georgian Military Servicemen,‖ 2008. 266 ―Opicialuri Monacemebit, Konpliktis Shedegad 326 Adamiani Daigupa [According to Official Figures,326 People Were Killed in the Conflict],‖ Civil Georgia, September 12, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=19495. 267 Nona Mikhelidze, ―After the 2008 Russia-Georgian War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus and Prospects for Western Involvement in Conflict Resolution‖ (presented at the The Caucasus and Black Sea region: European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and beyond, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2009), http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iai0901.pdf. 268 Global Security, War in Georgia, July 5, 2009, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/georgia-2008-1.htm.

103 certainly grow. Nonetheless, the armed conflict increased the risky character of Georgia for the European Union as a transport corridor for energy resources from the Caspian Sea region. Among others, the Russo-Georgian armed conflict strengthened anti-Georgian attitudes both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; despite President Saakashvili‘s optimistic declarations, this makes the possible reintegration of these areas into Georgia in the near future even less likely. Russia takes these attitudes into account in its politics and uses them actively when obtaining support for the new ―independent‖ states. As is evident from the negotiations in Geneva, the attitude of all sides of the conflict does not offer much space for a compromise. A great role in this respect is played by the fact that Russia wants Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be treated as sovereign states. The Russian Federation calls on Georgia to sign an agreement on the non-use of military force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this regard, the Georgian position lies in the preparedness to sign such an agreement with Russia, as it does not recognize the separatist regions as the subjects of international law.269 So far the most recent round of negotiations taking place did not lead to any particular results. The main issues lay in the requirements imposed by the Georgian side to withdraw financial support for terrorist attacks on Georgia‘s territory by the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation. The positions of the individual sides of the conflict remain unchanged and at odds on the issue of a secure return of internally displaced persons to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At this moment, it is evident that Georgia has de facto lost these territories and cannot hope to regain them soon. Due to the Russo-Georgian armed conflict, there has been a shift in the perception of domestic conflicts in Georgia both by Georgian political elites and inhabitants. The Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are regarded as a part of the Russo- Georgian conflict. After the Russo-Georgian armed conflict, the possibility of a direct dialogue between the conflicting sides (Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia) diminished as the separatist governments negotiated with Russia. In this respect, it is

269 ―Georgia Spells Out Conditions For Signing Agreement On Non-Use Of Force,‖ Radio Free Europe, July 2, 2009, Caucasus Report edition, http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Spells_Out_Conditions_For_Signing_Agreement_On_NonUse_Of_ Force/1767937.html.

104 necessary to point out the paradoxical situation that Russia recognizes the existence of South Ossetia as an independent state, while North Ossetia is regarded as a part of Russia. That implies that Russia considers the sovereignty of South Ossetia as an instrumental principle, using it as a tool to pressure Georgia and the international community.

5.3 Case Study: Abkhazian-Georgian Conflict

The armed conflict between Abkhazians and Georgians is sometimes referred to as a ―forgotten conflict.‖ 270 The tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians, which escalated to a full-scale war in 1992-1993, have never been resolved; instead, they were intensified after the Russian-Georgian armed conflict of August 2008. The Abkhazians‘ struggle for independence contradicts the territorial integrity of the Georgian state, having resulted in mutual mistrust, exclusive strategic goals, and an unresolved status of this conflict. This situation complicates the prospects for building stability and peace in the region. Detailed analyses of the origins of armed confrontation illuminate the explosive nature of this conflict, which can spark violence again in the future. The Georgia-Abkhazian conflict is complex and requires detailed analysis of the nature of this conflict. It is not an easy task to measure the extent to which the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus are about ethnicity, weak statehood, or the result of the decisions of external powers. However, as revealed in this case study, the eruption of violence among these Caucasian people should be seen ―as the result of failed institutional regulations, rather than inborn qualities or geopolitical factor.‖271 The debate about the causes of this conflict is subject to research among regional scholars. This conflict is often referred to as an ―ethnic conflict‖; however, as an in-depth analysis of the issues at stake unfolds in this chapter, it becomes clear that it is very hard to find the evidence for such conclusions (ethnic cleansing was not the primary objective of the conflict parties). Trying to explain the armed conflict in Abkhazia, the majority of regional authors emphasize the role of history in order to justify the claims of particular

270 Alexandros Petersen, ―The 1992-1993 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict,‖ Caucasian Review of International Affairs 2, no. 44 (2008): 187–99. 271 George Tarkhan-Mouravi, ―The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict in a Regional Contexts,‖ Policy Documentation Centre, 1996, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002157/01/IPS_Abkhaz_paper_jav.pdf.

105 conflict parties, the protection of rights of ethnic minorities within Georgia, and the role Russia played in all of this. 272 This dissertation, however, argues that the modern development in this conflict could be explained by ethnic hatreds going back to medieval times. This chapter addresses one of the bloodiest conflicts in Georgia – the armed conflict in Abkhazia. The goal is to uncover the characteristic features of the ongoing processes and to conduct a systemic analysis of each phase of the conflict. The subject of analysis is to uncover factors that formulated the attitudes of conflict parties toward each other, conceptualization of this armed conflict by Georgian administration and Abkhazian political elites, as well as changes in the paradigm273 transformation and shifts in policy formulation. This chapter offers a comparative analysis of three phases in the Georgian- Abkhazian armed conflict: phase A (1988-1992) addresses the factors that led to phase B (1992-1993), the armed conflict. This will be compared to phase C (August 2008). The period between the second and the third phase can be divided into several phases of de- escalation and escalation. Yet, for the analytical purpose of this study, this phase is examined as one whole because of the fact that there was no change in status quo – conflict resolution efforts were ineffective; there was no full-scale war.

5.3.1 Phase A: Latent Conflict Between Georgians and Abkhazians After Georgia regained its independence in 1918, there was a struggle between different forces in Abkhazia: supporters of North Caucasian peoples, supporters of the Turkish invasion, pro-Russian Bolsheviks, and pro-Georgian Menshevik forces. 274 In November 1917, the Abkhaz People‘s Council took place, which was originally in line with the interest of pro-Georgian supporters. At that time, Abkhazia gained autonomy. However, this status was abandoned soon after disloyalty of Abkhaz People‘s Council to

272 Some books published in the Georgian language advance these arguments: V. Chania, Konplikti Abkhazetshi: Istoriuli Kanonzomiereba Tu Sabediscero Shecdoma?! [ Conflict in Abkhazia:A Fatal Error or the Historical Pattern?!] (Tbilisi: Meridiani, 2003); Roman Miminoshvili and Guram Fandzikidze, Simartle Apkhazetze [Truth About Abkhazia] (Tbilisi: Merani, 1990); Tamaz Nadareishvili, Shetkmuleba Saqartvelos Cinaagmdeg [Conspiracy Against Georgia] (Tbilisi, 2002). 273 The paradigm is understood as attitudes of parties towards the roots of the conflict and towards each other, their goals, and the conflict‘s influence on the development within the country. 274 Avtandil Menteshashvili, Some National and Ethnic Problems in Georgia (1918-1922) (Tbilisi: Samshoblo, 1992), 12.

106 Georgian government in Tbilisi. This initiated a series of struggles that lasted until 1921, when the Red Army invaded Georgia. Between 1921 and 1931, the relationship between Georgia and Abkhazia was regulated by special treaty, according to which Abkhazia gave a piece of ―sovereignty‖ to Georgia. In 1931, Abkhazia became fully subordinated to Georgia since its status was reduced to Autonomous Republic. ―In February 1931 the VI Congress of the Abkhaz Soviets approved the decision of the Central Executive Committee to transform the ‗treaty Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia‘ into the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (AbASSR) within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR), still at that time part of the broader Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR), with the relevant changes made to the Abkhaz Constitution.‖275 This action became lodged in the collective consciousness of the Abkhaz as an injustice towards their people, perpetrated first and foremost by ‗Stalin the Georgian‘. Abkhazians had their own state structures that were subordinated to the Georgian union republic, which in turn was subordinated to the Kremlin. Unsatisfied with their position, 276 Abkhazians organized strikes and demonstrations in order to upgrade their status. The public‘s dissatisfaction was unambiguously restrained in 1931, 1957, 1965, 1967, and 1978. Demonstrations took place in Sukhumi, Gudauta, and Gagra. The demands of Abkhazians were to gain the status of autonomous Soviet republic incorporated into the Soviet Union, which meant separation from Georgia. Abkhazian discourse indicates that subordination to Georgia was perceived as political discrimination, which paved the way to ―Kartvelization‖ (Georgianization) and ―colonization‖ of Abkhazia.277

275 Ivlian Haindrava, ―Perceptions of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict before August 2008,‖ in Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm, Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava ed. (London, 2011), 7, http://www.c- r.org/sites/default/files/Georgian%20Perspective_Transformation%20of%20Georgian%3AAbkhaz%20Con flict_201102_ENG.pdf. 276 Russian sources describe the goal of Georgian policies as an attempt to assimilate Abkhazians through educational policies and demographic changes. ―Georgianization‖ of Abkhazia meant suppression of the Abkhaz language, giving privileges to Georgians in all administrative and state organizations and massive migration of Georgians into Abkhazia, in: Institute of Sociopolitical Studies, O Bezopasnosti Rossii v Svjazi S Sobytijami v Abkhazii, Analytical Paper (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1993), 3–4. 277 According to Stuart Kaufman, inter-ethnic relations between Abkhazians and Georgians are based on competing mythology about the origin and history of this region. Georgian attitudes towards Abkhazians are based on the beliefs that Abkhazia has been a historical part of Georgia since the ancient kingdom of

107 One of the features of this policy was perceived by Abkhazians as a demographic imbalance in favor of Georgians. According to the last official census conducted in the Soviet Union, Abkhazians constituted only 18% of the population in Abkhazia. There was concern about the growing number of Georgians over the past century (see Figure 4). Figure 4 Demographic Changes in Abkhazian ASSR.

Source: Bruno Coppieters et al., A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia–Abkhazia Peace Process (Conciliation Resources, 1999), http://www.c-r.org/accord/georgia%E2%80%93abkhazia.

Colchis in the second millennium B.C.E. The kingdom of Colchis and the kingdom of Egrisi are treated as subjects of Georgian ―statehood‖ stretching over what today is the Georgian territory. In line with this interpretation, Abkhazian people (Apsu) belong to the Georgian tribes, who migrated from the Northern Caucasus in the 17th century. Contrary to that interpretation, Abkhazians believe that they are a distinct ethnic group, with a different language (closer to the languages of North Caucasian people), who were the original inhabitants of the present-day territory of Abkhazia. The most disputed point in the interpretation of their history lies in the eleventh century: according to Georgian sources, the Abkhazian Kingdom was a part of the bigger Georgian Kingdom. This period is considered to be the golden age of Georgian unity under the rule of David the Builder. The unification process of different Caucasus nations was strengthened by broad usage of the Georgian language for administration. Accordingly, ―the ‗Abkhazia kings‘ … were Georgian, culturally and politically speaking.‖ Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 92.

108 Available data confirm that the Georgian government did not have an official policy on how to address growing anti-Georgian sentiments in Abkhazia. We cannot find any evidence of discriminating policies towards Abkhazians. While only 18% of the population in this region was made up of Abkhazians, they filled 70% of the positions in government. At the end of 1980s, Abkhazians enjoyed 13 posts out of 12 ministers and 8 deputy ministers. The first secretary of the oblast‘s committee was usually Abkhazian and the second secretary Georgian. 278 Furthermore, the minister of education was Abkhazian as well as the chairman of the Supreme Court and the Chief Prosecutor. 40% of seats in the Supreme Council were occupied by Abkhazians in 1988.279 In addition, due to the tensions and demonstrations in Gagra, some Georgian officials were dismissed from their posts, as for example the First Secretary of the City Committee, R. Kvantaliani, and G. Nachkebia, both of whom were replaced by ethnic Abkhazians. The proportion of Abkhazians in high-ranking positions did not correspond with the demographic size of this ethnic group. At that point in time, Abkhazians did not favor the democratization processes in Georgia. They were arguing against core democratic principles that would increase the number of ethnic Georgians and marginalize the position of the Abkhazian minority. In order to avoid confrontation, Zviad Gamsakhurdia proposed a compromise in the form of a new power-sharing rule in the Abkhazian Parliament. According to this proposal, Abkhazians would have 28 seats out of 65 in parliament (26 seats would go to Georgians and 11 to other ethnic minorities) in which any decision on constitutional matters required a two-thirds majority. However, ―Abkhaz over-representation in local structures did not diminish their fear of being turned into minority. In their view the threat of extinction could only be avoided through state sovereignty and full control of local states structures.‖280

278 Georgii Anchabadze, Voprosy Gruzino-Abkhazskikh Vzaimootnoshenii [Questions of Georgian-Abkhaz Interrelations] (Tbilisi: Kavkazskii Dialog, 2006), 212. 279 Out of 140 deputies, 57 were Abkhaz, 53 were Georgian, 14 Russian, and 16 were from other nationalities. Alexei Arbatov et al., Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives, First Edition edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1997), 375. 280 Bruno Coppieters, ―The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict,‖ in Europeanization and Conflict Resolution – Case Studie from the European Periphery, Coppoeter, Bruno, Emerson, Michael, Huysseune, Michel, Kovziridze, Tamara, Noutcheva Gergana, Tocci, Nathalie and Vahl, Marius eds (Gent: Academia Press, 2004), 196.

109 A series of mass demonstration in Tbilisi followed. Georgians pointed out the underprivileged position of Georgians in Abkhazia. The Georgian nationalist movement, supported by the masses, required the Communist government to ―stop carrying out a policy of silence and deafness with regard to the existing anti-Georgian campaign in Abkhazia and to give a quick and relevant answer to the separatist call adopted on 18 March in the village of Lykhny, which ignores the desire of the majority of its native population.‖281 Calls for independence increased the number of demonstrators to 100,000 in April 1989. After the tragic events on April 9, when Soviet rule definitively lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Georgian population, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became one the most influential leaders of the national movement, and his policies to attain liberation have been the subject of debate among local intellectuals. The first phase of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict could be marked by the emergence of separatist movements in Abkhazia. Among them were ―Aydgylara‖ and ―Slavianski dom‖ with strong anti-Georgian ideologies. 282 The open manifest of Abkhazians declaring to secede from Georgia was a major issue at stake from 1988 to 1992. In this spirit, a mass rally was held that gathered 30,000 people. The ―Lykhny letter,‖ which was sent to the Kremlin, stated the aspiration of Abkhazians to return their region to its pre-1931 status. After multiple appeals to Moscow, Aydgylara established contacts with the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which was formed at the First Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus in August 1989. Militants from Adygeyan, the Karachayevo-Cherkessian, Kabardino-Balkarian, Chechen-Ingush autonomous districts, and Abkhazia composed the Assembly and aimed at political transformation in this region. The Assembly, which was renamed Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus, supported Abkhazians in their struggle against Georgia.283 During the armed

281 Grigorii Lezhava, Mezhdu Gruzieei I Rossiei. Istoricheskie Korni I Sovremennye Factory Abkhazo- Gruzinskogo Konflikta (XIX-XX Vv.) [Between Georgia and Russia. Historical Roots and Modern Factors in Abkhaz-Georgian Conflict (XIX-XX Centuries)] (Moscow: Rossiskaya Akademiya Nauk, 1997), 245. 282 Napo Meskhia, Rogor Gaskhviskhda Apkhazeti (paktebi, Paktebi, Paktebi...) Mcare Simartle Dauparavad [How Did We Lose Abkhazia] (Tbilisi: Chkhoria, 2009), 15. 283 Alexander Studenikin, ―Roots of the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkgazian Armed Conflict,‖ Centre for Analasis of Startegies and Technologies (CAST), 2002, http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/6-2002/ac/rgaac/.

110 conflict in Abkhazia up to 1,000 volunteers from the North Caucasus took part in the military confrontation in Gagra, which led to the defeat of the Georgian troops.284 First armed clashes between Georgian and Abkhazians, which resulted in 14 dead and over 200 injured, took place on 15 and 16 July 1989 in Sukhumi. The reason for the outbreak of violence was the opening of branch offices of Tbilisi State University in Sukhumi, a decision made by the republican government on 14 May. Several thousand people took part in the rally at Sukhumi, organized by the Abkhazian nationalist movement Aydgylara, which declared its negative position towards such a development. During 15 and 16 July, the situation worsened dramatically, ultimately resulting in fights during which stones, knives, batons, and even firearms were used. During these clashes, 9 Georgians and Abkhazians were reported dead, and 5,137 people were hospitalized, 15 of them in serious condition.

5.3.1.1 Issues at Stake: Clashes Between Abkhazian and Georgian National Agendas

It is significant to emphasize that the emerging national movement in Tbilisi was not united, but divided between ―radical‖ and ―moderate‖ wings, which had different visions about the way in which independence was to be achieved. The radicals ―were lead by former political prisoners and joined by young enthusiasts. They thought in moral rather than political terms, and these morals were based on the simple and clear values of Gulag life. There were ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ and the line dividing the two sides was sacrosanct,‖285 writes Ghia Nodia. To gain mass support and seize the power in Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia used the issue of ethnicity instrumentally. The political vocabulary used by Gamsakhurdia treated ethnic minorities as ―guests‖ – a label that put the loyalty of ethnic groups under question and was alarming in the context of rising tensions among Georgians and Abkhazians. On the one hand, political discourse contributed to the gradual ethnization and radicalization. On the other hand, it strengthened the attitude that it would have negative impact to be part of the Soviet Union, which might lead to ―Russification‖ of

284 Pavel K. Baev, ―Civil Wars in Georgia: Corruption Breeds Violence,‖ in Potentials of Disorder, Christoph Zürcher and Jan Koehler eds., New Approaches to Conflict Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 139. 285 Ghia Nodia, ―Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,‖ 75.

111 Abkhazia and South Ossetia. ―As for the question of Abkhazia joining the R.S.F.S.R., it can be evaluated as the logical result of the seditious policy conducted by certain political, clerical and other forces, first of czarist and then of Soviet Russia, to alienate Abkhazia from Georgia, eliminate the Georgian language and Georgian culture from Abkhazia, and introduce the Russian language and Russian culture into the Abkhazian milieu (which was achieved).‖286 One of the key issues at stake, which is significant, but under-studied due to the lack of official data from this period, is economy and its influence on the escalation processes of the Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation. Official statistics show that the industrial development in Abkhazia and its employment rate were lower than in other parts of Georgia.287 However, in reality the opposite was true. The living standard of people in Abkhazia was significantly higher than in the rest of Georgia. This discrepancy can be explained with the fact that economic activities in Abkhazia were mostly illegal. Access to the Black Sea, tourism, and a monopoly on the distribution of citrus fruits, tea, and flowers (mimosa) to non-state markets helped accumulate a lot of wealth in this region. ―The blossoming of corruption and the ‗shadow‘ economy in the 1980s created a peculiar quasi-market mentality among the political elite who took high profits from the natural rent for granted.‖288 This region was strategically and economically one of the most significant regions in Georgia. The calls for independence stemming from Georgia‘s nationalist movement might have been interpreted as a threat to already established illegal economic activities between Sukhumi and Moscow. Preservation of good relationships with Moscow promised more profits for leaders in Abkhazia than separation and paying taxes across the border. It is not my claim that economic incentives were the key issue at stake that caused the armed conflicts in Abkhazia, but we can argue that untaxed and illegal activities facilitated the eruption of the conflict.

286 Levon Toidze, ―K Oprosu O Politicheskom Statuse v Abkhazii (stranicy Istorii 1921-1931) [On the Question of the Political Status of Abkhazia (Pages of History 1921-1931)],‖ n.d., http://www.georgianweb.com/history/rus/abkhazia.html. 287 Employment rate in industry composed 13.7% in 1978 in Abkhazia, which was almost 6% less than the total employment rate in industry in Georgia. Boris Ashuba, Natalya Bushina and Alexandr Gulia, Problemy Rozvitiya Regionalnoy Ekonomiki v Abkhazkou SSR [Problems of Development of the Regional Economy in the Abkhaz ASSR] (Tbilisi: Ekonomika, 1982), 56. 288 Pavel K. Baev, ―Civil Wars in Georgia: Corruption Breeds Violence,‖ 130.

112 Lack of analysis and wise policy of Georgian political elites (which were fragmented and lacked unity and control over the escalation of tensions) led to the bloody and nasty conflict among Georgians and Abkhazians. The role of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, its Georgian faction, and the National Unity Council was significant. The Georgian faction, for instance, started to boycott parliamentary sessions. It formed a parallel government, the National Unity Council, which had its own (illegal) armed units, the Mkhedrioni. For the opposite side, Tengiz Kitovani led the National Guard units. The National Unity Council was against Gamsakhurdia, while the National Guard was initially loyal to the first president of Georgia. To sum up, at this time, Georgia was fragmented not between pro-communist and pro-independence ideology supporters, but between pro- and anti–Zviad Gamsakhurdia forces. Important decisions in Abkhazia were made by local representatives of the leaders of the ―Round Table‖ coalition, Aydgilara and Vladislav Ardzinba (chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia). However, as Napo Meskhia, one of the members of the Georgian faction, recalls in his memoires, the biggest problem was to establish trustful cooperation with the center in Tbilisi. The major challenge was that the State Council of Georgia perceived the members of the Georgian faction of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia as ―Zviadists‖ – supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.289 Crises of legitimacy, political fragmentation, different perceptions on how to acquire independent statehood were accompanied by the inability to handle the situation in two regions: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During the process of consolidation of oppositional force in Georgia, the leading political coalition ―Round Table – Independent Georgia‖ fell apart, Gamsakhurdia escaped to Samegrelo, and the National Guard turned out to be in opposition of the president as well. The country was drawn into civil war, which led the country to the edge of collapse. Under such conditions of lacking authority, unpunished illegal activities flourished across the country. The port in Poti and railways were blocked. Transit goods from Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were robbed

289 The head of the Georgian faction of the Supreme Coucil of Abkhazia was Tamaz Nadareishvili, who was appointed on Zviad Gamsakhurdia‘s recommendiation. However, this political fragmentation had not been used in order to establish more effective cooperation with Abkhazian leaders, when the national interest and territorial integrity of Georgia had to be adressed. Napo Meskhia, Rogor Gaskhviskhda Apkhazeti (paktebi, Paktebi, Paktebi...) Mcare Simartle Dauparavad [How Did We Lose Abkhazia], 124– 125.

113 frequently, and instances of human kidnapping increased. In the first half of 1992 alone, there were 1,142 occasions of attacks and explosions.290 According to Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia‘s second president, war in Abkhazia was planned and went through three major stages. During the first stage, stereotypes and ―enemy‖ images were created that instilled arguments about historical injustices in regards to ethnic groups. These were used to manipulate the national consciousness in Abkhazia. Appeals of Abkhazian nationalists when addressing Russia for help against Georgia intentionally hid the fact that during the Caucasian wars, the Czarist Russian administration exiled thousands of Abkhazians to Turkey and proclaimed that Abkhazians were a ―guilty nation.‖ At the second stage, pseudo-arguments were prepared to legitimate the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia. Laws and documents were created to implement this step. The final step was the material-technical, organizational, military- political preparation of propaganda for a direct military confrontation.291 The first period of the Georgian-Abkhazian armed conflict is characterized by a manifestation of issues at stake, which causes occasional outbreaks of violent events. It starts with the Lyhkny declaration in 1989 and ends with the hot stage in 1992. Escalation of tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians started over status, accompanied by a political struggle for independence. It is possible to conclude that the armed conflict in Abkhazia is the result of an escalation of political tensions in Tbilisi and Sukhumi. The civil war and the instability in the Samegrelo region only contributed to a transformation of the conflict into its armed form. Both Georgians and Abkhazians applied ethnic mobilization in order to bolster public support for full independence and to legitimize their right for independent statehood. A new coalition of democratic forces, which removed the communist government in Georgia, was unable to control paramilitary groupings and soon found itself in a crisis of legitimacy. This situation led to an escalation of tensions and eventually to a full-scale war in 1992-1993.

5.3.1.2 Manifestation of an Issue at Stake: Clashes Over Status

The primary goal of the Aidgylara National Forum was political: the secession

290 Eduard Shevardnadze, Pikrebi Carsulsa Da Momavalze. Memuarebi [Memories On Past and Future] (Tbilisi: Palitra L, 2006), 396. 291 Ibid., 400–401.

114 from Georgia and a change of status to Union republic in order to be a part of the (revised) Soviet Union. As mentioned above, the Lykhny letter in 1989 was sent to Moscow at the suggestion of Aidgylara. The Georgian side abolished the ―Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic‖ in 1990. In February 1992, when the Georgian Military Council restored the Georgian Constitution, Abkhazian deputies argued that it ignored the question of Abkhazia. In reality, however, the autonomous status of Abkhazia was part of the Constitution.292 But the major issue at stake for Abkhazian deputies was to achieve new status, which would be equal to the Georgian status. Aspirations of the Abkhazian national movement were regarded as a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. The Georgian government treated decisions made by Abkhazian colleagues as illegitimate. The Georgian political establishment did not treat Abkhazia as a separate nation. As Gamsakhurdia claimed in a meeting on 5 April 1989, ―The Abkhaz nation has never existed... They struggle with Georgians and with Georgia in order to become Russified.‖293 Additionally, the over- representation of Abkhazians in the regional decision-making organizations discriminated against Georgians. And the Abkhazian nationalist movement was a fifth column supported by Russia in order to punish Georgia for wanting to create a sovereign state.294 Abkhazian and Georgian national projects to attain new status contradicted each other and took diametrically opposed forms during the all-Union referendum in March 1991. The union republic for Abkhazia and independence for Georgia marked the beginning of ―war of laws‖ between Abkhazia and Georgia. Table 3 below illustrates the legislative struggle between conflict parties, which increased in scale after the overthrow of the first president of Georgia. The ―war of laws‖ describes the first tensions between Abkhazians and Georgians. If a decision was adopted by one side of the conflict, it was automatically a matter for

292 Article 107 of the 1921 Georgian Constitution stated, that ―Abkhasie (district of Soukhoum), Georgia Musulmane (district of Batum), and Zakhatala (district of Zakhatala), which are integral parts of the Georgian Republic, enjoy autonomy in the administration of their affairs.‖ Welt, ―The Thawing of a Frozen Conflict‖; Ghia Nodia, ―Causes and Vision of Conflict in Abkhazia,‖ 22. 293Konstantin I. Kazenin, Gruzino-Abkhazskii Konflikt: 1917-1992 [Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict: 1917- 1992] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Evropa, 2007), 41. 294 Ghia Nodia, ―Causes and Vision of Conflict in Abkhazia,‖ 19.

115 contradiction and was followed by rejection by the other conflict party. For example, the decision of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia to adopt the declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Republic, which declared a ―sovereign socialist state having all the power of authority on its territory except the rights voluntarily delegated by it to the USSR and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic by the previous agreements,‖295 was annulled by Georgia. As demonstrated above, the civil war in Georgia between pro- and anti- Gamsakhurdia forces and the fact that Georgian deputies left the Supreme Council of Abkhazia in order to establish another government gave Abkhazian deputies an opportunity to make a series of decision about the status of Abkhazia. The most significant decree justified the status of Abkhazia as follows: ―the Republic of Abkhazia enjoys sovereignty, has it state borders, independently decides issue related to the administrative-territorial settlement, performs the measures on its territory aimed at strengthening of the territorial integrity.‖296

295 ―Deklaratsiya O Gosudarstvennom Suverenitete Abkhazskoy Sovetskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Respubliki: Prinyata X Sessiyey Verkhovnogo Soveta Abkhazskoy ASSR 11 Sozyva 25 Avgusta 1990 Goda‘ [The Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic Adopted by the 10th Session of the 11th Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR, 25 Aug. 1990],‖ August 25, 1990. 296 Tamaz Diasamidze and Nana Tchkoidze-Japaridze, Regional Conflicts in Georgia (The Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, The Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia 1989-2008): The Collection of Political-Legal Acts, the 2nd, updated edition edition (Tbilisi: Regionalism Research Centre, n.d.), 117.

116

The ―War of Laws‖: The Spiral of Escalation in the Armed Conflict in Abkhazia Armedthe in Conflict Spiral The Escalation of ―WarLaws‖: of The

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120

5.3.2 Phase B: The Logic of Violence in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict became a military operation on 14 August 1992. ―Gangs, hundreds armed people, numerous cases of kidnapping of leaders and regular citizens, destroyed bridges, highways, looted buildings etc. This course of action could not be tolerated and there was a need of action. Measures had to be used against terrorist and bandits and at that point there had been no other power than military force. The police by then could not solve any serious problems,‖ recalled Eduard Shevardnadze two years later.297 What was intended to be a police operation turned to an armed conflict with political goals. Shevarnadze, the chairman of the State Council of Georgia at the time, claims that an agreement was reached with Vladislav Ardzinba (the chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia) that Tbilisi would send troops in order to establish order at Ingiri- Sochi Railway. However, fire was opened between Georgian and Abkhazian paramilitary groups at the Ochamcire and Gali border, on the outskirts of the village of Okhureis. In his televised speech on August 14, Ardzinba emphasized that by sending troops to Abkhazia, Georgian leaders demonstrated their real attitude towards Abkhazia. He called on every person to protect Abkhazia: ―... in these difficult times, I appeal to every citizen, no matter what nationality he is, defend Abkhazia.‖298 From the beginning, Ardzinba interpreted the deployment of Georgian troops ―as a real threat against sovereignty of the Republic of Abkhazia and its population.‖299 The war changed the relationship between the two conflict parties. As noted by Yuri Anchabadze, ―the antagonism of political elites having transferred to the level of mass consciousness could not but cause a growing feeling of ethnic resentment. That resentment, exacerbated by the losses and casualties of war, led to the deepening of negative emotions and turned them into a mutual phobia when everything to do with the

297 Eduard Shevardnadze and Nato Oniani, ―Kvekana Shevida Aqtiuri Msheneblobis Pazashi [The Country Entered a Phaze of Active Reconstruction],‖ Saqartvelos Respublika, August 16, 1994, sec. N143(945). 298 Nino Burchuladze, ―Gasrola Okhureistan... Apkhazetis Omi Daicko [Shot Nearby Okhureisi... The War in Akhazia Has Started],‖ Kviris Palitra, n.d., N33(889) edition. 299 Diasamidze and Tchkoidze-Japaridze, Regional Conflicts in Georgia (The Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, The Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia 1989-2008), 140.

121 other ethnic group was perceived as hostile, hateful, devoid of any moral and ethnical norms and, therefore, subject to destruction and annihilation.‖300 It is hard to pinpoint an exact strategy by the Georgian leadership. It can be argued that a ―small victorious war‖ in Abkhazia would have strengthened the popularity of the political elites that seized the power after the coup of Gamsakhurdia.301 However, the Georgian troops did not have any strategy how to achieve this goal. ―The Georgian leadership, then, ordered the military adventure in Abkhazia while being in a state of civil war against Zviadists, while knowing that Russian military would intervene as they had just done weeks earlier in Tskhinvali, while knowing that they would not control the mountainous part of Abkhazia and therefore face a guerilla war and all this without having a proper army.‖302 The Abkhaz side was supported by volunteers from the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and the Russian Ministry of Defense. Through this support, the Abkhaz people were able to shift the balance of power in their favor and take control over Gagra and northern Abkhazia by the end of 1992. The battle in Gagra on 24 August demonstrated disorder, a lack of united command, and insufficiency of Georgian troops. ―The Georgian forces: uncoordinated formations, hastily completed, absence of a united command. The forces are insufficient and they are not trained to break deep lines of defence and to fight an urban battle. Today we do not have superiority in forces or in means,‖303 wrote Levan Sharashenidze, the former Georgian Minister of Defense in a letter to Eduard Shevardnadze. This battle determined the major military offensive against Sukhumi in March 1993. After that, an already difficult political situation between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was destabilized even further to the extent that Abkhazia demanded separation from Georgia. Despite the fact that Georgian authorities believed that the armed conflict in Abkhazia was a result of the ―divide and rule‖ politics of the Kremlin, closer

300 Yuri Anchabadze, ―Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement,‖ in Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement (Brussels: Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1998), http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/Georgians/chp0501.html. 301 Cheterian, War and Peace in the Caucasus, 2009, 191. 302 Ibid., 193. 303 Levan Sharashenidze, Zametki Desantnika-Kommissara [The Notes of Commando-Commissioner], Manuscript, 2006.

122 investigation of this conflict reveals that internal problems actually caused the escalation of tensions. When the conflict in Abkhazia started, the political elites in Russia were not united and there was a power struggle between President Boris Yeltsin, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, and the Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev. While the first one had good relations with Shevaradnadze and supported him, the second one supported Abkhazians. 304 Indeed, it was not of primary concern to the Ministry of Defense of Russia to defend Abkhazia and its interests, but the conflict was perceived as a way to keep Georgia under Russian control.305 Russian military support to Abkhazians became evident when Abkhaz troops acquired sophisticated heavy weapons, T-72 and T-80 tanks, Su-25 and Su-27 aircrafts, artillery, and a Grad rocket system. The armed conflict in Abkhazia enabled Russian forces to keep a physical presence on this territory, at the pretext of maintaining security in Georgia. Most of the bases were stationed in strategically important locations, like the military base in Vaziani, Gudauta Batumi, and Akhalkalaki.306 As it was the case in the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Russians supported both sides of the conflict. While the Ministry of Defense of Russia supplied Abkhazians with heavy military force, it supported Georgia as well. In the biggest offensive in Sukhumi, Abkhazians attacked Georgian positions by Su-25 and Su-27. At the same time, Georgian troops received arms from Russia as well.307 During this phase of the conflict, Russia can hardly be described as a unified actor with long-term objectives. However, ―the acts of Moscow were guided by a secret genius enforcing a devilishly complicated plan, or deduce less hyperbolically that the events followed an inherently chaotic trajectory consisting of myriad contradictory acts and

304 The local Russian commanders in Abkhazia ―don‘t like Shevardnadze and they are defending their sanatoria in Abkhazia. The war will go on until either Shevardnadze or Ardzinba joins Russia in some form or other. The generals have lost too much with the break-up of the USSR. Where there is hope, they will try to regain it‖ in Aleksei Zverev, ―Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994.‖ 305 Dov Lynch, The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian “Peacekeeping” Policy (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 16–17. 306 For a detailed analysis of Russian military bases in Georgia, see David Darchiashvili, ―The Russian Military Presence in Georgia: The Parties‘ Attitudes and Prospects,‖ Caucasian Regional Studies 2, no. 1 (1997). 307 Major Events and Trends in Politics, Economy and Social Life, The Georgian Chronicle, Monthly Bulletin (The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, February 1993).

123 motivations that in the end benefited Moscow as still the most powerful player on the field.‖308 After the fall of Sukhumi in September 1993, a massive displacement of the Georgian population took place. The conflict parties accused each other of ethnic genocide; however, as stated by the UN fact-finding mission, it is hard to find any evidence of ethnic cleansing. The forced displacement of over 250,000 people was not ―to ascertain whether it [the massive displacement of population] had been an actively pursued policy of the authorities of either side, at any time, to clear the areas under their control of either the Abkhazian or the Georgian population.‖309 The military confrontation brought no change in contested issues at stake over the status of Abkhazia. In 1992, Shevardnadze was ―prepared to consider only defining the legal status of the Abkhazian autonomous region.‖310 Peace negotiations took place in Geneva in November 1993 with the UN, Russia, and the CSCE facilitators. The Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict was signed on 4 April 1994. Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces was approved on 14 May of the same year, which was annulled and replaced by the six-point agreement signed by Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008.

5.3.2.1 Economic Issues and Sporadic Violence

The ceasefire agreement did not bring a resolution to the issue at stake, the political status of this region. Furthermore, the conflict established conditions under which the resolution of the conflict was not a priority for involved actors. Characteristic features within Abkhazia are corrupted elites, lack of transparency, an underdeveloped party system with no long-term reform strategy, large-scale shadow economy, and weak institutions. Since the ceasefire agreement in 1993, Abkhazia has been under isolation and economic sanctions, which has a negative impact on the development in this region. This situation has considerably increased the dependence of Abkhazia on Russia as its only ally and contributed to the growth of illegal economic activities across the region.

308 Georgi Derluguian, ―Abkhazia: A Broken Paradise,‖ in Sarai Reader 07: Frontiers (New Dehli: Impress, 2007), 77. 309 UNSG, Report of the Secretary-General’s Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in Abkhazia, Georgia (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, November 17, 1993), 12. 310 UNSG, Resolution 893 (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, December 22, 1993).

124 Russian financial aid to Abkhazia has now reached 67 million USD per year, which is 22% of Abkhazia‘s 287 million USD budget. 311 Russia has allocated an additional 163 million USD in 2013 as a comprehensive aid plan to Abkhazia, which composes 70% of the overall budget of Abkhazia. 312 The majority of pensions in Abkhazia are paid for by the Russian Federation (according to the Crisis Group, this amounted almost 70 million USD in 2013).313 Illegal economic activities have been common in the break-away region of Abkhazia. There are several places in Abkhazia that allow for illegal border crossings: 1. the Psou River. 2. the Black Sea ports Sukhumi, Ochanmchira, Gagra, and Gudauta and 3. the Engurin River in Gali and Zugdidi districts (Appendix C). The major route for contraband runs along the Enguri River from the Black Sea to the village of Djvari. The central bridge over this river has various ―secret‖ passages, which have served the purpose of moving illegal goods in different directions. Non-ferrous metals and illegal cigarettes that reached Sukhumi on foreign ships (mostly from Turkey and Russia) were transported to Zugdidi and distributed throughout Georgia. Abkhazians smuggle goods to Russia too. In Georgia, high-ranking officials and the police of the Samegrelo region lobbied for the smuggling activities in Abkhazia. According to experts, both Georgian guerrillas and Abkhazian criminals were engaged in criminal activities. It is worth noting that despite different ethnic affiliations between the criminal circles, the different conflict parties found a ―a common language‖ and achieved full agreement in their activities. However, these mutually profitable economic relations have not contributed to a political solution of the armed conflict. Due to these economic activities being mostly illegal, the post-conflict chaos in this region has only been enhanced. One of the major reasons for the budget deficit in Georgia were lost revenues from petroleum goods,

311 Official budget of Abkhazia was 287 million in 2012, from this approximately 65 million USD (22%) was direct budget support from Russia, 144 million USD (49%) was financed by infrastructure development pograms finded by Russia. Only 28 % of budget was Abkhazia‘s own budget revenues. Apsnypress, ―Kabinet Ministra RA Utverdil Otchot Ob Ispolnenni Gosudarsvennogo Budzeta Pespubliki Abzhazii Za 2011 Gog [Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of RA Approved the State Budget for 2011],‖ March 8, 2012, http://apsnypress.info/news/5652.html. 312 Apsnypress, ―Gosudartvennii Budget Abkhazii Na 2013 God Po Doxodam I Po Rasxodam Sostavlaet 7 046 556,1 Tisac Rublei [Abkhazia‘s State Budget for 2013 rRevenue and Expenditure Is 7046 566 100 Rubles],‖ July 16, 2013, http://apsnypress.info/news/9557.html. 313 The International Crisis Group, Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation (Brussels, April 10, 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-the-long-road-to- reconciliation.pdf.

125 corruption, and unrealized taxes. The black market of tobacco products encompassed 75% of all trade with cigarettes without taxation in Georgia. Illegal trade with timber and scrap metals, kidnapping and human trafficking, as well as the drug and weapons trade have reached an alarming point. Available data show that specific economic activities in Abkhazia are taking place in specific regions. Criminal groups from western Abkhazia control the smuggling of tobacco, fuel, and food products into Georgia and drugs to Russia. An Armenian group from Gagra contributes to the production of drugs; the drugs, then, are exported by a criminal group from Gudauta. Some criminal groups are controlling Eastern Abkhazia and the main railways routes. Experts have reported that fishing boats, the railway, and vehicles have been used for the transportation of drugs in Abkhazia. ―Drugs produced in laboratories in Abkhazia are smuggled in specially constructed secret compartments across the River Psou, which marks the Russian-Abkhaz border. These exports are destined for Krasnoda, Rostov and Volgograd in southern Russia as well as Ukraine and Moldova... Latin American cocaine and heroin from Central Asia are both transported through Abkhazia en route to the Russian and European markets. High-ranking officials in the Russian military figure prominently in the trade, which makes use of Gudauta military airport. The drug route from Russia to Turkey also runs through Abkhazia, using Turkish shipping as its chief means of transport.‖314 This gray zone in the economy is a source of income to certain people who control illegal activities. However, the more influential illegal economic activities become in a country, the less interested people will become in a political solution of armed conflicts. This puts the economic development and security of the region under question. According to Georgia‘s Ministry of State Security, Abkhazia has control over the most profitable products, including smuggling of oil, petroleum, and cigarettes. Similarly, in South Ossetia, trading with narcotics is one of the most profitable illegal activities.315

314 Phil Champain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova eds., From War Economies to Peace Economis in the South Caucasus, 144. 315 The Georgian Ministry of Finance stated that ―smuggled petroleum enters the country mostly from South Ossetia (Ergneti), Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan (from Krasny Most, Lagodekhi and Jandara). The Ministry of Finance calculates that around 5,000 tons of petroleum enter illegally from Ergneti market every month, equal to 6% of the total consumption and 12% of smuggled fuel. Most of it is brought in by

126 Figure 5 Mechanism of Smuggling in the Gali and Zugdidi Districts in Georgia.

Source: Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and, and Roman Gotsiridze, Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tshkinvali Region of Georgia (Tbilisi: American University‘s Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) Georgia Office, 2004), 39.

Criminal activities in in Abkhazia occur for self-enrichment purposes rather than for political reasons. Any effort to resolve the conflict has met with more hostilities by criminal groups, as it happened in May 1998 and January 2001.316 The lack of economic development is identified as the key factor hindering the political resolution of the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict. According to a survey in 2002, 42% of Abkhazians believe that any development in Abkhazia is blocked due to the unresolved conflict with Georgia; 26% identified a lack of democratic experience, 21% pinpointed the economic isolation

train or unregistered vehicles. Petroleum is imported by ship from Russia to Abkhazia, from where it is transported across the River Inguri into Georgia. According to the State Department of Secret Services, gasoline is also shipped in railway tankers belonging to the Russian peacekeeping forces. Petrol and diesel are also brought in by rail and sea through Sukhumi and Ochamchira. Overall, Abkhazia imports more than 8,000 tons from the Russian Federation each month, the majority intended for resale in Georgia. The trade in petroleum products from Turkey adds an additional 1,000 tons to the monthly total‖ in ibid., 137. 316 For further details about the activies of military groups in Dodge Billingsley, ―Security Deteriorates Along the Abkhazia–Georgia Ceasefire Line,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review 13, no. 9 (2001).

127 of Abkhazia as a problem, and 21% found that a clan structure existed in conflict zones.317 In April 2001, the cooperation between criminal gangs deteriorated security situation in the Gali region. The ―Forest Brothers‖ (a Georgian partisan group) and Abkhazian separatists fought each other due to the contrabanding of tobacco when 2 Georgians were killed and 3 others were captured. The Georgians in return captured 5 Abkhazians. Following this incident, the chief of the regional office of the Security Ministry declared that this type of ―business is the main reason for the murders and explosion and unfortunately we have to admit the men in uniform are often mixed up in the smuggling.‖318 Georgian paramilitary groups – such as the ―Forest Brothers‖ and the ―Patriot‘s Union‖ – have played a dual role. On the one hand, they fought against Abkhaz separatism, but on the other hand, they were engaged in criminal activities with Abkhaz criminal groups.319 The Kodori-based paramilitary group ―Monadire‖ has also contributed to the escalation of sporadic violent events, as it was the case in 2006 during a ―police operation‖ of the Georgian government in this region.320 Smuggling and illegal activities have contributed to crime, corruption, and the prolongation of the conflict in Abkhazia. Lack of security and central control created a profitable environment to criminal groups. ―Smuggling and protracted conflict are two pillars which help political clans … to control material and coercive resources, limit democracy and keep political power for an indefinite time.‖321 This situation deteriorated the relationship between Georgians and Abkhazians and led to a series of sporadic violence. The first crisis started in May 1998 in Gali and was resumed in October 2001 in

317 Leila Tania, ―Public Opinion and the Georgian-Abkhazian Peace Process,‖ Perspectives 4 (2002). 318 Nana Khubutia, Western Georgia Blighted by Crime Wave. Smugglers and Armed Gangs Flourishing in the Border Zone between Western Georgia and Abkhazia (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, February 27, 2003), http://iwpr.net/report-news/western-georgia-blighted-crime-wave. 319 Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gotsiridze, Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tshkinvali Region of Georgia (Tbilisi: American University‘s Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) Georgia Office, 2004), 24, http://www.alexanderkupatadze.com/resources/Smuggling_Georgia_eng.pdf. 320 ―Police Operation Held in Kodori,‖ Civil Georgia, July 25, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13162. 321 Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and, and Roman Gotsiridze, Smuggling Through Abkhazia and Tshkinvali Region of Georgia, 28.

128 Kodori Gorge. Both ethnic Abkhazians and Georgian were killed and injured.322 The second Kodori crisis came when Georgian armed forces entered Kodori Gorge in July 2006, which was perceived as a threat in Sukhumi. The official mission of the Georgian units was to ―restore constitutional order‖ in the Upper Kodori area.323 The major goal of the Georgian administration was to relocate the Abkhaz government-in-exile to this region. However, as Abkhaz expert Liana Kvarachelia argues, this did no result in trust building between Tbilisi and Sukhumi; on the contrary, it deteriorated the relationship with the de facto government in Abkhazia.324 In conclusion, the stalemate in the relationship between Georgians and Abkhazians has not produced a reconciliation or any shift in the perceptions of the conflict parties. Instead, it reinforced Georgia‘s claims of territorial integrity and has resulted in a complete deadlock regarding negotiations of Abkhazia‘s status. On the one hand, Abkhazia is de jure part of Georgia; on the other hand, Abkhaz leadership had established their own statehood on the basis of pre-war institutions, including legislative and executive bodies. The following table presents the evolution of the contested issue at stake over the status of Abkhazia.

322 Almost 50,000 Georgians were forced to leave their homes and flee from the Gali region, resulting in the death of several dozen partisans. Despite these casualties, some influential politicians, including Zurab Zhvania (a chairman of parliament), supported the mobilization of all forces and military confrontation in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze decided to wage another war. For a detailed analysis of this episode see Petre Mamradze, Absurduli Omi, Romelic Ar Unda Momkhdariko [Absurd War], 19–21. 323 Civil Georgia, ―Conflicting Reports Prevail over Ongoing Kodori Operation,‖ July 26, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13166. 324 Natella Akaba and Iraklii Khintba, Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm (London: Conciliation Resources, 2011), 26–27, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c- r.org/files/Abkhaz%20Perspective_Transformaton%20of%20Georgian:Abkhaz%20Conflict_201102_ENG .pdf.

129 Table 4 Evolution of the Issue at Stake: De facto, De jure and Desired Status of Abkhazia (1989-2008).

Source: Francis, Celine (2011): Conflict Resolution and Status: The Case of Georgia and Abkhazia (1989:2008), VUBPRESS Brussels University Press, p. 100.

5.3.3 Phase C: Changing the Paradigm – Backwards Instead of Forwards The second phase of escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia came in the spring of 2008 when the Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ―Hermes-450‖ was shot down over the Gadida village in the Gali region by a Russian MIG-29 fighter plane.325 This incident was also confirmed in a report of the UN Observer Mission in Abkhazia. Russia accused

325 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, Report of UNOMIG on the Incident of April 20 Involving the Downing of a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Over the Zone of Conflict, April 20, 2008, http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/01/02/cf530afbef0fb6f305824428f6c83509.pdf.

130 Georgia of mobilization of troops in the Kodori Gorge and increased its number of Russian troops. 326 In addition, new checkpoints were added in the Ochamchire and Tkvarcheli regions and an additional 400 Volgograd railway troops were deployed. Russian troops were preparing platforms to transport military equipment to Abkhazia. These activities were criticized by the US,327 NATO,328 and the EU as a violation of the cease-fire agreement in 1994; however, the Russian side argued that it was in line with the ―peacekeeping mandate.‖ On 25 April, Russia‘s Ambassador-at-Large Valery Kenyaikin warned that ―... if a war is unleashed, we will have to defend our compatriots even through military means. We will use every means to do this; there should be no doubt about this.‖329 These developments were alarming for Georgia. As stated by the Georgian foreign ministry in May 2008, Russia ―started to enlarge its military infrastructure in Abkhazia, (Georgia), … to prepare for a large-scale military aggression against Georgia.‖330 According to the International Crisis Group, the increased military presence of Russia in Abkhazia might have ―reassured on their physical security but at the same time increased their fears of being swallowed by Russia. Many Abkhaz worry that their national cause is being diluted, and they are reverting to minority status in a larger entity by de facto integration into Russia.‖331 It is significant that Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh believed that ―Russia is interested in access to the sea, of which our territory offers 240km. That is why Georgia

326 In accordance to the Russian sources number of Russian troops composed 2, 500 soldiers, while the Ministry of Interior of Georgia stated that the number of Russian troops exceeded 4 000, See: Parliamentary Temporary Commission on Investigation of the Military Aggression and the Acts of Russian Against the Territorial Integrity of Georgia, Parliament of Georgia, Parliamentary Temporary Commission on Investigation of the Military Aggression and the Acts of Russian Against the Territorial Integrity of Georgia, n.d., http://www.parliament.ge/files/1329_22127_506571_Conclusion_E.pdf. 327 ―U.S. Calls on Russia to Reconsider Abkhaz Moves,‖ Civil Georgia, May 1, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17732; ―Rice Concerned over Increase in Russian Troops in Abkhazia,‖ Civil Georgia, May 1, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17743. 328 NATO, NATO Secretary General’s Statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into Georgia, Press Release, June 3, 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-076e.html. 329 Russia Warns Georgia Could Use Force against Abkhazai, South Ossetia, Ria Novosti, 25 April 2008, avaliable at: http://en.ria.ru/world/20080425/105945463.html 330 ―Saqartvelo Rusetis Qmedebas Mtrul Nabijad Apasebs [Georgia Assesses Russia‘s Actions as a Hostile Step],‖ Rustavi 2, June 1, 2008, http://www.rustavi2.com/news/includesG/get_news_print.php?id_news=26513&ct=1. 331 International Crisis Group, Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, June 5, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/193_georgia_and_russia_clashing_over_abkhazia.ashx.

131 needs to think and recognize us as a neutral and demilitarized country.‖332 The Georgian response at that stage was a new peace plan, which was proposed by Mikheil Saakashvili in March 2008. This initiative offered ―unlimited autonomy, wide federalism and very serious representation in the central governmental bodies of Georgia... We offer them (Abkhazia) the position of vice-president of Georgia and we offer them the right to veto all those decisions by the central authorities which concern or will concern their constitutional status, as well as all important preconditions related with the preservation and further development of their culture, language and ethnicity,‖ stated Saakashvili.333 The proposal, however, was rejected by the Abkhazian leadership, as it was perceived as a ―part of propaganda ahead of the NATO summit in Bucharest… Saakashvili‘s proposals are unacceptable for us and we reject them.‖334 From the low-intensity conflict that started on April 20 to the hot stage in August 2008, the development in Abkhazia could be characterized by militarization of the region. 335 While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to find out who launched offensive and defensive military operations, it is important to keep in mind that on 31 March 2008, Davit Bakradze, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that another 350 Georgian soldiers would be send to Afghanistan.336 The deployment of 2, 000 troops in Iraq was also extended for several months. This is an indication that the Georgian administration was not planning to wage war on its own territory any time soon.337 The escalation of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008 increased the scope of Russian targets beyond the South Ossetian territory. On 9 August, Russia opened the

332 Interview with Sergei Bagapsh, El Pais, 7 May 2008ibid. 333 ―Saakashvili Outlines Tbilisi‘s Abkhaz Initiatives,‖ Civil Georgia, March 28, 2008, http://www.civil.ge/eng/_print.php?id=17473. 334 ―Rukovodstvo Abkhazii Otnositsja K Novomu Predlozheniu Gruzii, Kak K Propagande Nakanune Sammita NATO [The Abkhaz Leaders Treat the New Georgian Iniciative as Propaganda on the Eve of the NATO Summit],‖ Interfax, March 29, 2008, http://www.interfax.ru/world/322551. 335 For militarization and deployment of Russian troops in Abkhazia see Illarionov, Andrei: The Russian Leadership‘s Preparation for War, 1999-2008, chapter 4, in Cornell, E. Svante and Starr Frederick (2009): The Guns of August 2008 Russia‘s War in Georgia, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, p.49-84. 336 Mark John, ―Georgia Offers NATO Troops for Afganistan,‖ Reuters, March 31, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/31/us-nato-georgia-afghanistan-idUSL3189194620080331. 337 Georgia respond was diplomatic by bringing attention of international actors on Russia‘s ―creeping annexation‖ of Georgian territory. ―The reality is that August 2008 war was neither provoked not a product of miscalculation. It was initiated and waged by Russia for well-articulated geopolitical reasons. Georgia behaved diplomatically – perhaps too long‖. See in David J. Smith, ―The Saakashvili Administration‘s Reaction to Russian Policies Before the 2008 War,‖ in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, Svante E. Cornell, Svante and Frederick S. Starr eds. (ME Sharpe, 2009), 142.

132 second front in Abkhazia and bombed Kodori Gorge (see Appendix A), where the Abakhazian government-in-exile was located. As a result, more than 2,000 Georgians had to leave their homes. The next day, Russia attacked other Georgian cities in Zugdidi, Senaki, and Gori. In combination with air and ground attacks, Russian battleships blocked the Georgian coast (see Appendix B). The armed confrontation in August 2008 between Russia and Georgia had an impact on the Georgian-Abkhazian relations and undermined any prospects of security. The Kodor factor, which escalated Georgian-Abkhaz relations in 2006, ceased to be important after the armed conflict in 2008. Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela recognized Abkhazia as an independent state. After a two-decade long hot stage of the conflict, Abkhazia remained isolated from international norms and rules, while the regional powers competed to monopolize their powers and influence. As argued by Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, this ―isolation has threatened to turn the South Caucasus into a proxy war.‖338 As indicate in a report by the International Crisis Group, there have been more than 30 so-called bilateral agreements between Moscow and Sukhumi, which deepened the dependency of Abkhazia to Russia in two significant ways:339 the build-up of the Russian military and the economy in Abkhazia. The military treaty, which was signed in September 2009, granted Russia the right to have military bases in Abkhazia for 49 years, with the possibility of extension for another 15 years.340 The agreement on Joint Measures to Strengthen the Security of the National Borders of the Abkhaz Republic, the Agreement on a Combined Military Base, and the Agreement on Joint Customs Space demonstrate that Abkhazia views cooperation with Russia a key factor for its security. The constantly bad relations between Abkhazians and Georgians have negative effects on the willingness of Abkhazia to become part of Georgia. In accordance to the survey of attitude in Abkhazia conducted in March 2010 ―ethnic Abkhaz tend to see the

338 Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell, ―Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia‘s Unrecognized States,‖ The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 62, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2010.516183. 339 International Crisis Group, Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence, February 26, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/202_abkhazia___deepening_dependence.ashx. 340 Moscow and Sukhumi agreed to establish a Russian military base in Abkhazia. It is very hard to verify the actual number, but according to offical statements, Gudauta base accommodates 3,800 Russian troops. Russian military also serves on the border with Georgia, and there is a Russian Black Sea fleet.

133 state as their natural right though their titular status, their hard-fought and costly separation from Georgia, and their effort to build a new state.‖ Political integration in Russia was not also desired: 79% of Abkhazians support independence of Abkhazia and only 20% wish to be integrated into Russia.341 The sporadic escalation of tensions (1998, 2001, 2006) and the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008 resulted in increased mistrust and the failure of confidence building among Georgians and Abkhazians. The negative role of the Russian Federation cannot be overseen in this process. Its support not only increased the dependency of Abkhazia on Russia but allowed the radicalization of attitudes between Abkhazians and Georgians. After the August 2008 events and the recognition of Abkhazia‘s and South Ossetia‘s independence, the only platform for negotiations and trust-building efforts were the talks in Geneva. However, the status issue remains as the most crucial aspect. Tbilisi‘s refusal to recognize Abkhazia‘s independence is preventing the conflict parties from finding a resolution. According to the Caucasus Research Resource Centre, 74% of Georgians are against granting Abkhazia any type of autonomy. Figure 6 Georgian Attitudes Towards Abkhazia‘s Independence.

Source: Caucasus Research Resource Center: Georgia-Abkhazia, 25 February 2014, http://crrc- caucasus.blogspot.cz/2014_02_01_archive.html

341 John O‘Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal (Gearóid Tuathail), ―Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State,‖ Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 1 (2011): 1–36, doi:10.2747/1060-586X.27.1.1.

134 In retaliation to the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian Law on Occupied Territories was launched on 23 October 2008. The key objective of this law was to ―define the status of those territories, that have been occupied by the Russian Federation as a result of military aggression.‖ The law emphasized two facts: ―Abkhazia‘s occupation by the Russian Federation‖ and ―Moscow‘s effective control‖342 over this territory. Tbilisi rejected to sign an agreement on non-use of force with Sukhumi, as Russia was perceived as a ―real‖ conflict party. President Saakashvili described Georgia‘s strategy and its tactics concerning the confrontation with Russia as follows: ―Even if there had been a chance of international legalization of the creation of a new state there [in Abkhazia] the Russian occupation has put an end to it.‖343 In other words, the will for independence in this ―occupied territory‖ was not executed by its people, but by Russian leadership in order to implement Russia‘s interests. On 27 January 2009, the Georgian Cabinet of Ministers created a new State Strategy on Occupied Territories: engagement through cooperation. The new strategy, which included an Action Plan, 344 aimed at economic cooperation with Abkhazia, educational opportunities, and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The primary objective of the document was to illustrate a goal to overcome the isolation of Abkhazia by establishing linkages among the ―divided societies.‖ The ultimate goal, of course, was to solidify the territorial integrity of Georgia.345 None of these documents and strategies were acceptable to the Abkhazian side. From the Abkhazian perspective, there was ―no connection between the future of Abkhazia as an internationally recognized state and the resolution of the conflict with Georgia.‖ 346 Abkhazian experts claim that after the recognition of Abkhazia‘s independence by Russia, a key strategic partner, ―Georgia lost its right‖ over Abkhazia.

342 Goverment of Georgia, ―Saqartvelos Kanoni Okupirebuli Teritoriebis Shesakheb [The Law on the Occupied Territories],‖ October 23, 2008, http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc215.pdf. 343 ―Interview with Mikheil Saakashvili,‖ Vlast’, March 1, 2010, No 8(861) edition. 344 Saqartvelos Mtavroba, ―Chartulobis Strategiis Samoqmedo Gegma [Action Plan for Engagement],‖ n.d., http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_382248_action_plan_ge.pdf. 345 Goverment of Georgia, ―Sakhelmcipo Strategie Okupirebuli Teritoriebis Mimart: Chartuloba Tanamshromlobi Gzit [State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation],‖ n.d., http://www.government.gov.ge/files/224_31227_132584_SMR-Strategy-ge(1).pdf. 346 Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm, 2011, 38, http://www.c-r.org/sites/c- r.org/files/Georgian%20Perspective_Transformation%20of%20Georgian:Abkhaz%20Conflict_201102_EN G.pdf.

135 Intensive cooperation with Russia opened up entirely new possibilities, economically and socially. The main objective for Abkhazia was not conflict resolution with Georgia, but recognition of its independence by other states.347 Sokrat Jinjolia, former prime minister and foreign minister of Abkhazia, declared, ―Georgia‘s policy towards Abkhazia, supported by Western countries, all European institutions and the U.S. aims to eventually convince us to return to Georgia, which of course is impossible. They say: ‗Russia will reconsider its decision and cancel it. And what are we going to do then? It is better to return to Georgia by your own independent decision.‘ But they must understand that it is impossible.‖348 In fact, there is now more to it than different positions of conflict parties over the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Abkhazia and Georgia are moving away from each other. On the one hand, Georgia determined its commitment to its ―European choice‖349 even after Georgia‘s first democratic transfer of power that followed the parliamentary elections in October 2012, which marks one of the most crucial moments in foreign policymaking since Georgia became independent in 1991.350 On the other hand, due to the current developments in Abkhazia as mentioned above, Abkhazia is even further removed from Georgia and closer to Russia than before August 2008. Paradoxically, in

347 In accordance to Sokrat Jinjolia, former Prime Minister and foreing minister of Abkhazia „Georgia's policy towards Abkhazia, supported by Western countries, all European institutions and the U.S. aims to eventually convince us to return to Georgia, which of course is impossible. They say: "Russia will reconsider its decision and cancel it. And what are going to do then? It is better to return to Georgia by your indepdentent decsion.― But they must understand that it is impossible― 348 ―Strategicheskoe Partnerstvo Abkhazii i Rosii Budet Ukreplatsja [Strategic Partnership Between Abkhazia and Russia Will be Strengthened],‖ Apsnypress, August 25, 2012, http://apsnypress.info/news/7063.html. 349 The latest data released by the EU Neighbourhood Barometer for Georgia, conducted in November- December 2012, found that the vast majority of Georgians support a greater role within the EU. According to the survey, 71% of Georgians consider the EU an important partner, with 62% believing that the EU and Georgia share common values to deepen mutual cooperation. The Georgian population supports economic development (92%), trade (87%), human rights (87%), democracy (85%), and regional cooperation (83%) with the EU. Most important, 71% of Georgians trust the EU more than their own government (65%), their parliament (62%), or their political parties (46%), see in EU Neighbourhood Barometer, Autumn 2012, http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPI_wave2-GE-EN1.pdf. 350 In his speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg on April 13, 2013, former Prime Minister Ivanishvili appealed to Europe for support in building good relations with Russia. On the one hand, Ivanishvili reiterated that a ―western policy course and integration into EU and NATO represent our [Georgia‘s] strategic choice that has no alternative. This choice does not belong to any particular political groups; this choice was made by Georgian people long ago,‖ see in: Goverment of Georgia, Adesss of the Prime Minister of Georgia H.E. Bidzina Ivanishvili to the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Govermnet of Georgia, Prime Minister‘s Press Service, April 2013, http://government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=270&info_id=36672.

136 the long term, these processes might put the key political goals of Abkhazia – independence and international recognition – in question.

137 Chapter 6: Conclusion Conflicts are not static, but multilayered and dynamic. In this regard, the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region are no exception, but an example of the extremely complex interplay of issues at stake that have not been resolved yet. The aim of this dissertation was to trace the evolution of aspects and the issues at stake within five analytical categories in order to achieve a better scholarly understanding of the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The study achieves this goal by analyzing the processes and patterns of conflict behavior in the South Caucasus. In this way, we can highlight the internal and external dimensions of the armed conflict and their transformation from one escalation stage in the 1990s to another in 2008, both of which shaped the outcome of the initial conflict. Understanding the fragile peace arrangements and the reasons why a resolution has become all but impossible is significant. However, what should be more important for scholars of the region is to understand all the factors at each phase of the conflict that may reignite to large-scale violence. Political, social, economic, and security dynamics may erode what stability is left in this region and enhance the potential for conflict escalation, as was the case in South Ossetia in 2008. Assessing the security arrangements is essential, as those conflicts may transform from the frozen status quo into violent confrontation and trigger, yet again, the vicious cycle of armed conflicts all over the region. This challenge underlines the need for a better understanding of conflict processes. Armed conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh were brought about by historical injustice as well as ethno-demographic, territorial, political, legal, ideological, and socioeconomic factors that aggravated tensions and unrest. Analyses of multidimensional aspects and their evolution throughout the conflict cycle will lead us to the most fruitful conclusions. Consequently, we can first define the real issue at stake (or a combination of issues at stake) causing the escalation. In accordance with these findings, we trace the transformation of conflict issues (if any exist or if new variables occur) from one phase to another throughout the operationalization of aspects on the theoretical level. Second, we can determine to what type these conflicts belong in

138 order to find ways that will expedite conflict resolution efforts. And third, we can draw theoretical conclusions, that ethnicity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the escalation of armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region. The following table sums up the empirical results of this research. Table 5 The Summary of Argument and Cases.

Cases Nagorno-Karabakh South Ossetia Abkhazia

Phases / A B C A B C A B C Issues at stake

Ethnic 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1

Political 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Ideological 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1

Economic 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1

Territorial 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Note: This table was prepared by the author.

Ethnicity was a key aspect for self-identification for different nations living within the Soviet Union. It was a ―determinant of national belonging,‖ granting ―the titular nation of these Soviet Republics (in the South Caucasus) exclusive political rights and served to enforce a strong ideological connection between ethnicity and territory.‖351 Assessing the extent to which ethnicity is used to mobilize masses in the struggle over resources, land, and power is not an easy task, especially in the South Caucasus region, where the notion of ethnic hatred and primordial characteristics are widely used to justify incompatibility in goals and rights of conflicting parties. The in-depth study of ethnicity as an explanatory variable that has ignited full-scale armed conflicts has revealed that ethnicity was not a sufficient condition for the conflicts to emerge. It was, however, used in legitimizing mass mobilization by political elites.

351 Ekaterine Metreveli et al., State Approaches to National Integration in Georgia Two Perspectives, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program (Washington, D.C: A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2009), 8, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/silkroadpapers/0902Georgia-integration.pdf.

139 The operationalized aspects in the case studies strongly support the following argument: ethnic animosity was the result rather than the cause of the escalation process in all three case studies. Ethnic animosity was not an issue at stake during the first phase. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic grievance and violence among Armenians and Azerbaijan was low. The same is true for the relationship of Georgians with Abkhazians and South Ossetians. In fact, the high level of inter-ethnic marriages and a history of peaceful co-existence without violent clashes along ethnic lines illustrate that ethnicity is not a strong explanatory paradigm to understand the modes of escalations of armed conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The most prudent explanation points out that there are three common factors determining evolution of the unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus region: secessionism, political transformation and international competition among regional and global powers. In case of the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, we have to distinguish between three ethnic groups: the Azerbaijani and Armenian population in Nagorno- Karabakh, the Armenian nation, and the Azerbaijani nation. Other ethnic groups – Russian, Chechen, and Afghan volunteers – were also part of the armed confrontations. The situation was even more complex due to the army factions and groupings that were not under control of any political leaders. These paramilitary groupings had a significant influence on the political development and led to coup d‘états both in Azerbaijan and in Georgia. The lack of unified control and strategies demonstrates the absence of rationalist calculations among conflict parties. Under these conditions, explanations based on a security dilemma prevail to understand the escalation processes in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. The sporadic violent events magnified the security dilemma model. Under these conditions, conflicting parties created military forces in order to guarantee their security. The argument about militarization and further escalation of tensions in 2004 during the ―war against smuggling‖ in South Ossetia demonstrates that a security dilemma can determine the behavior of conflicting parties even in the 21st century. Claims of Armenian President Robert Kocharian about ―the ethnic incompatibility‖ between Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the election campaign in January 2003 and the bellicose statements of Azerbaijani leaders show two nations

140 portraying images of each other in monstrous ways. Ethnic animosities nowadays are based on the notion of supremacy and rights of one nation over another. An assessment of actions of conflict actors during the first phase of escalation of the armed conflict in Abkhazia has revealed that the official goal of Georgian troops in August 1992 was to ensure security of railways. It could be argued that this claim was a pretext to mask the real intentions: overthrowing Vladislav Ardzinba in order to establish control over Abkhazia. It is important to acknowledge that even in this case, the objective of a very fragmented Georgian establishment (undergoing a civil war as well as experiencing a crisis of legitimacy of the first president and uncontrolled activities of paramilitary groups) was not the liquidation of ethnic Abkhazians. And on the other side of the conflict, the Abkhazian leadership interpreted Georgia‘s incursion into Abkhaz territory as an act of imperialistic politics. So, the struggle was directed not against ethnic Georgians, but it was about strengthening political power and control over particular territories by emerging political elites. During the violent stage, we can prove that Abkhazia received support from the Northern Caucasus and that there were Russian and Armenian fighters on the Abkhazian side. Abkhazian leaders tend to emphasize that Abkhazian troops were multiethnic. Therefore, the study of inter-group dynamics is equally important as the study of intra- group relations. From the Georgian perspective, it is not a struggle between Abkhazians and Georgians, but between Russia and Georgia in which Abkhazian leaders are manipulated for geopolitical goals of the Russian Federation. A detailed analysis of the case studies allows us to conclude that historical myths were manufactured and used by political leaders; these, then, had strong implications on the consolidation of populations and groups across ethnic lines. The question of territory accelerated the rivalry and reinforced the myths about the ethnic origins of the populations living in Nagorno- Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Indeed, as the conflict evolved so did the images of enemies in terms of primordial ethnic grievances, as illustrated in the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Along with the changing political situation, the claims of conflicting parties have changed as well, leading to competing theories constructed by intellectuals in order to mobilize the masses along ethnic lines. The case of Nagorn-Karabakh is exemplary in

141 this regard. Politicization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict took place through a process of separation of socio-economic structures of the NKAO from the ASSR. Harassment by corrupt structures that served the interests of the ―shadow‖ economy aggravated ethnic issues. One side of the conflict, Armenia, injected the ethnic issue, images of genocide, and latent danger of being subject to genocide as in 1915, as a prototype of the events in Sumgait. The other side of the conflict, Azerbaijan, pointed out the feeling of violated sovereignty and wounded national pride. The offensive strategies of the Azerbaijani mafia to undermine the position of the Armenian mafia accelerated the Karabakh problem. The conflict was transformed from economic to political through the implementation of principles for self-determination, justified ethnically and leading to the claim of a particular territory. From the moment the conflict became politicized, its ―shadow economic‖ nature was masked. The trajectory of the conflict reveals that clashing interests over territorial demands – Armenia supported the inclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory into Armenia while Azerbaijan wanted to preserve its territorial integrity – were transformed into an ethnic controversy (Sumgait, refugees), then into a political battle, and finally into a conflict between two nations. Thus, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region is presented by the conflict parties as a clash of two principles of international law: territorial integrity (Azerbaijan) vs. self-determination (of the Armenian nation). It was not the dissolution of the Soviet Union that caused violent conflicts in the South Caucasus region. Escalation of tensions and eruption of sporadic violent events were present before the demise of the communist regime. In the latent phase of the conflicts (before 1991), ideological motivations were the driving force behind achieving independence and seceding from the Soviet Union. The nationalist movement enjoyed bigger popularity among the Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani population. Escalation of conflict led to the replacement of two presidents in Azerbaijan and the first president in Georgia. Manipulation of the public consciousness by charismatic leaders, who used ethnic sentiments to mobilize and enhance collective action in order to achieve political goals, led to the spiral of escalation of tensions. A series of sporadic violence that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia transformed the conflict from its latent phase to phase B. The further transformation of conflict was the result of

142 the decisions made by each side of the conflict. The conflict was transformed by the institutionalization of violence by political elites. As a result, large-scale violence followed. In my analaysis, I have revealed that the armed confrontation from 1990 to 1992 differs from the one in 2008. Mass mobilization, which was a key factor in the first escalation phase, disappeared in the second escalation phase. Masses were mobilized in Georgia in a struggle against electoral frauds, corrupted elites, and state weakness, culminating in the Rose Revolution in 2003. In the armed conflict in 2008, the state is not endangered by popular movement, rather the state itself is the actor, initiating change through its military might rather than through nationalistic appeals of political leaders who use ethnicity for purposes of manipulation. The Russian-Georgian armed conflict did not touch the hearts of Georgians or their self-identification. It was more about defending Georgian territory and the state‘s borders. The issue at stake in 2008 was the pro-Western orientation of Georgia and Russia‘s interests to undermine the penetration of other powers in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, Georgia‘s main objective is to be incorporated into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which would guarantee security, democratic tranformation, sustainable economic development, and peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In this way, we can argue, the territorial issues that played a primary role in the second escalation phase were correlated with ideological aspects of the future orientation of the Georgian state. This ideological confrontation stems from grand startegic interests by the Russian Federation. Russia is against the Georgian integration into NATO for several reasons. First, there is a fear of the domino effect: if Georgia enters into NATO, it may serve as an example for Azerbaijan, which would then also seek to attain NATO membership. That would cause Armenia to become alienated from Russia and more inclined to turn to the United States for help; as a stronger power in the international system it would thus gain the ability to manage Azerbaijan. Consequently, Moscow would lose any leverage in Baku and become a footnote in Armenia. Despite the fact, that Russia rejects the notion that it was a conflict party in the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008, the conflict was a decision of leaders of two states, which resulted in worsening mutual relations between the complicated triangle of Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia.

143 ―Frozen‖ conflicts have a significant impact on the stability in this region. The heavy military presence in the South Caucasus gives the Russian Federation support in manipulating the unresolved conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno- Karabakh. This is especially dangerous now, during the crisis in Crimea, because as the crisis evolves, Russia can use its leverage in the South Caucasus in order to extend its power and control over these territories by supporting any escalation of simmering tensions and the transformation of ―frozen‖ conflicts into a next series of ―hot‖ wars. One of the major findings of this dissertation lies upon the role of political leaders and political processes that lead to escalation of tensions. Without the support of political elites, the conflict in the South Caucasus region would never have escalated to a war. The conflict in South Ossetia in the 1990s was the outcome of the disintegration of the previous political order and an attempt to create a new one. It was about defending territory, political status, and independence. The issue at stake at the stage of escalation was characterized by conflicting visions about the political arrangement and secessionist aspirations of the South Ossetians. Ethnicity was used by political leaders to legitimize their claims, strengthen their position, and mobilize the masses. At the end of the 1980s, we can identify the emergence of parallel political processes. Along with existing Soviet nomenclature, the nationalist movement emerged, composed of intellectuals without any experience to govern a state. In Armenia, the Communist government tried to find a balanced approach between Moscow and a nationalistic government. Azerbaijani representatives of the Communist party were in sharp opposition with the nationalists, as they counted on Moscow‘s support against irredentist claims by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ethnic narratives gained momentum in order to mobilize the masses. Territorial integrity and achieving independence were promoted to gain political support. Mobilization of ethnic kin around the idea of independence was to consolidate the rule of the newly emerged political elites both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is the legacy of war and persistence of unresolved conflict that has established ethnic animosity, mistrust, and mutually hostile attitudes among conflicting parties in the South Caucasus. Political elites in Azerbaijan and Georgia challenged by the crisis of legitimacy of their rule were ill prepared to handle the escalation of conflict in Abkhazia, South

144 Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Territorial integrity has been a key component of the national project; any division of the nation was seen as equivalent to dissolution of state and state failure. On the other hand, Armenia emphasized the notion of ―genocide‖ if they lose the war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Political leaders played on ethnicity and ethnic fears in order to mobilize masses and consolidate their rule. When economic decline and inequality is addressed, it has to be mentioned that at the initial stage of the conflicts, it is hard to provide evidence indicating that the economy triggered the spiral of escalation. In fact, there was not a big difference in economic development in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno- Karabakh, according to the official data. However, the overall decline in economic development in Georgian and Azerbaijan, civil war, and uncontrolled criminality led to concerns and disappointment of the population. As mentioned above, the lack of data makes it difficult to link the economic decline to the initiation of the armed conflict. In the case of re-escalation of tensions in 2008, one can argue that the large scale of the shadow economy was causally linked to the initiation of the armed conflict in South Ossetia. However, other factors that transformed a low-intensity conflict into a full-scale war also have to be taken into consideration. Indeed, the incentives of conflicting parties to have control over key profitable resources have always been high, but as data have revealed, the enclaves of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh belong to the poorest and least developed parts of Georgia and Azerbaijan. It is also a fact that all of these regions, including Abkhazia, are heavily dependent on financial support from Russia. The presence of this shadow economy is profitable for all conflict parties, and any change in this regard may cause another wave of anxiety and hostilities. In 2004, Georgia‘s efforts to contain corruption and to declare a ―war against smuggling‖ in South Ossetia as part of its state-building project, with broader political goals, led the country to the edge of war. Economic decline and a shadow economy were the results during the initial stage of the armed conflict at the beginning of the 1990s, which also contributed to the re-escalation of tensions in Georgia in 2004. The causal relationship between the armed conflicts and economic development became two-sided during the conflict initiation phase, but it cannot be explained without other variables that catapulted the conflict into its hot stage.

145 Even though it is hard to separate territorial issues and their correlation from other issues at stake in the process of conflict escalation, we have to make a distinction in nature and in the level of territorial claims of the conflicting parties. For Azerbaijan and Georgia, the conflicts are about territorial integrity of their countries, which was challenged by aspirations of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Abkhazians, and South Ossetians. Irredentist claims of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians were also determined by the geographical proximity to Armenia. It is more likely that, without Armenia‘s and Russia‘s support, Nagorno-Karabakh would not be successful in its struggle over this territory. The same is true for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazian secessionist (initially Abkhazia wanted to be a Union Republic within the Soviet Union, which is to say that its irredentism transformed into secessionist claims) and South Ossetian irredentist (South Ossetia seeks to be integrated with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia) claims are supported by trans-border support from Russia. Territorial claims were even stronger in 2008, when the armed conflict was about strengthening control over the entire territory of the state of Georgia. Defending Georgian territory and the state‘s borders was one of the key issues at stake in the conflict escalation process. The issue at stake in 2008 was Georgia‘s pro-Western orientation and Russia‘s attempts to undermine other powers that were penetrating into the South Caucasus region. Consequently, we can argue that territorial issues that played a primary role in the second escalation phase were correlated with ideological aspects. The majority of reports labels the conflict in the South Caucasus as ethnic. In reality, it is difficult to find any evidence of Georgian, Armenian, or Azerbaijani intolerance towards ethnic minorities. According to Georgian political discourse, the Georgian establishment is not fighting Abkhazians, Ossetians, or any other ethnic minorities because of their ethnicity. The issues at stake are political in nature rather than ethnic. Thus, ethnic hatred is the outcome of the armed conflicts in the South Caucasus region and will shapes the evolution of these conflicts in the future. Once the armed conflict erupts, violence can spiral out of control, shaping the outcome of the conflict. Issues at stake may persist for decades. Eventually, another trigger event may turn the lingering conflict into a new cycle of confrontation. Studying the trajectory of conflicts has demonstrated that the issues at stake during the onset of an

146 armed conflict are not necessarily the same as during the escalation of the conflict. A distinction should be made between conflicts over territory, political arrangement, ethnicity, ideological confrontation, or economic development. Differentiation between what is at the core of the conflict and what serves as a structural factor is significant in order to uncover necessary and sufficient conditions in the process of conflict escalation. Ethnic conflict could be just one of the outcomes of hostile relations between a state and its ethnic group, but it does not necessarily make the conflict ethnic by definition. National identity is one key aspect during the process of nation building in the newly creating states of the old Soviet Empire. The pattern of inter-ethnic relationships nowadays is determined by undefined relations with other ethnic minority groups. National unity and territorial integrity in this regard are the most significant aspects in order to strengthen and develop the states of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The varied types of issues at stake make us appreciate that conflict takes many forms. Understanding modes of escalation and the process how conflicts transform from one phase to another helps to illustrate the density of aspects both on the systemic and the unit level of analysis. Competing theories of armed conflict have illustrated that each of them can tell us only part of the story. Therefore, an approach that synthesizes different theories is more successful in pinpointing the issues at stake and how they transform over time. By understanding the modes of escalation, we can conclude that issues at stake in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have not been eradicated yet. Thus, unfortunately we should expect that the conflict in the South Caucasus will remain and that the path of escalation will be in the hands of political leaders who are determined to achieve goals desirable to them.

147 Appendix Appendix A: Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Zone

Source: ICG: Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia, European Report, No 193, 5 June 2008, p.26.

148 Apendix B: Russian Targets in Georgia, August 2008

Source: Government of Georgia, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/651_13908_947800_E_1(1).pdf

149 Appendix C: Illegal Shipping Caught by the State Department for the Protection of the State Borders of Georgia in the Ports of Abkhazia and Coastal Waters from 1999 to 2002

Source: State Department for Protection of the State Borders of Georgia, 2002

150 Appendix D: Joint Resolution of Supreme Soviet of the Armenia SSR and the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on the Reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 1 December 1989

Proceeding from the universal principles of national self-determination and acceding to legal aspiration for reunification of the two segments of the Armenian people torn apart by force, the Armenian Supreme Soviet recognized the fact of NKAO‘s self- determination, and the congress of the plenipotentiary representatives of the NKAO and the National Council it has elected as the sole legal authority in force in oblast. The Armenian Supreme Soviet and NKAO National Council declare the reunification of the Armenian Republic and the NKAO. The Supreme Soviet and the National Council hereby set up a joint commission to formulate practical steps to realize reunification. They assume the obligation to represent the national interests of the Armenian population in northern Artsakh (NKAO), Shaumyan rayon, and Getashen districts.

Source: ―Joint Resolution of Supreme Soviet of the Armenia SSR and the National Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast on the Reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh‖ (Yerevan International Service, December 3, 1989), http://karabakh-doc.azerall.info/ru/law/law034eng.htm.

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