The a to Z Guide the a to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance Assistance
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Construction Sector Sector Overview
Construction Sector Sector Overview OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR FE BR UA RY 2017 This report has been made via interviewing with several organizations Organization Interview Date Discussion Summary MUDH October 06, 2015 Work on establishing Policy for sector is going on. Afghan Builder Association October 07, 2015 Introduction of ABA & List of Companies, and Challenges is asked. Kabul Municipality October 11, 2015 Procedures of housing in KM, NO. of Housing Dwellings Revenue Department of MoF October 13, 2015 Taxes and Revenues of Major Companies and Sector AISA October 13, 2015 List of Housing Companies registered & investments Private Construction Companies October, 2015 Current Project, Prices, Challenges of Company CSO October 27, 2015 No of buildings, Labor, Value of Construction Sector Housing Construction Enterprise November, 2016 Existing Capacity and predicted Capacity Banaee Construction Enterprise November, 2016 Existing Capacity and predicted Capacity Afghani Construction Enterprise November, 2016 Existing Capacity and predicted Capacity Construction Directorates of MoE, MoI and MoD November, 2016 Construction performance, capacity and budget for 2017 Central Bank of Afghanistan (DAB) December , 2016 Housing Finance Industry Data MUDH December, 2016 Housing Schemes, Challenges, shortage and recommendations 2 Table of Contents Sections Executive Summary 1 Housing Construction Overview 2 Demand Supply Regulatory Bodies MUDH Tasadees Overview 3 HCE Banaee Afghani Housing Financial Overview 4 Case Studies Schemes Recommendations 5 Annexes 6 Executive Summary This report on housing construction sector of Afghanistan has four main objectives. This includes (1) providing an overview of housing construction industry of Afghanistan, (2) providing an overview of the major players, (3) examining the possibility of providing low cost housing for militaries personnel and other civil servants, and (4) examining ways to help government to stimulate the private housing market. -
121111-SEA-Class-Analysis-English
Preface The two practical and class characteristics distinguished the scientific philosophy of Karl Marx, the leader of world proletariat, from all other philosophies. This knowledge was not meant to only interpret the phenomena, but to change them; that is why any assessment of phenomena in light of this knowledge, has class characteristic and it believes nothing in the world is non-class. Revolution, which means the replacement of one class by the other, is not possible without practical actions. Also, a revolution can only triumph when its vanguard draws an accurate distinguishing line between the friend and the foe. This is only possible through a class analysis. In the absence of class analysis, triumph of the proletarian revolution will remain impossible. These classes consist of friends, foes and intermediary forces. Following a thorough assessment, communists expand the size of friendly forces, attract the intermediary forces, and isolate the enemy to the possible extent. Hence, for a practical action, there is need for thorough class analysis of the society where revolutionaries launch their revolution. This enables revolutionaries to tell who their class friends and enemies are; where to trigger revolution; and what stages the revolution is supposed to pass through. Afghanistan Revolutionary Organization (ARO), a Marxist organization, is committed to world proletarian revolution. It aims at successfully bringing about a revolution in Afghanistan as part of the world proletarian revolution based on scientific analysis of a given situation. To do so, ARO sees the urgent need to thoroughly analyze the overall status of classes in Afghan society. Without such an analysis, it is impractical to achieve revolutionary objectives. -
Beyond Boundaries II
Beyond Boundaries II Beyond Boundaries II Pakistan - Afghanistan Track 1.5 and II cc Connecting People Building Peace Promoting Cooperation 1 Beyond Boundaries II Beyond Boundaries II Pakistan – Afghanistan Track 1.5 and II Connecting People Building Peace Promoting Cooperation 2 Beyond Boundaries II Beyond Boundaries II ©Center for Research and Security Studies 2018 All rights reserved This publication can be ordered from CRSS Islamabad office. All CRSS publications are also available free of cost for digital download from the CRSS website. 14-M, Ali Plaza, 2nd Floor, F-8 Markaz, Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: +92-51-8314801-03 Fax: +92-51-8314804 www.crss.pk 3 Beyond Boundaries II TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... 5 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................... 9 3. CONTEXTUALIZING BEYOND BOUNDARIES................................................... 11 4. FIRST MEETING OF THE PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ........ 56 5. SECOND MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE .......... 72 6. THIRD MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE .............. 95 7. FOURTH MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ........ 126 8. FIFTH MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS/TRADE ........................................................................................ 149 9. SIXTH MEETING OF PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN JOINT COMMITTEE ............ 170 10. UNIVERSITY -
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION Reporting Formats for Article 7 STATE [PARTY]: Afghanistan Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, Director Directorate of Mine Action Coordination POINT OF CONTACT: (DMAC1), Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA). Email: [email protected] Tel: +93 (0) 705 966 401 (Name, organization, telephone, fax, email) (ONLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION) 1 The government department working for mine action previously known as Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) was officially changed to DMAC in 2015. COVER PAGE OF THE ANNUAL ARTICLE 7 REPORT NAME OF STATE [PARTY]: Afghanistan REPORTING PERIOD: 1St January 2018 to 31st December 2018 (dd/mm/yyyy) (dd/mm/yyyy) Form A: National implementation measures: Form E: Status of conversion programs: Form I: Warning measures: ✓ changed changed ✓ changed unchanged (last reporting: yyyy) ✓ unchanged (last reporting: yyyy) un changed (last reporting: yyyy) non-applicable non-applicable Form B: Stockpiled anti-personnel mines: Form F: Program of APM destruction: Form J: Other Relevant Matters ✓ changed ✓ changed ✓ changed unchanged (last reporting: yyyy) unchanged (last reporting: yyyy) un changed (last reporting: yyyy) non-applicable non-applicable non -applicable Form C: Location of mined areas: Form G: APM destroyed: ✓ changed ✓ changed unchanged (last reporting: yyyy) unchanged (last reporting: yyyy) non-applicable non-applicable Form D: APMs retained or transferred: Form -
The a to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance 2nd Edition, August 2003 Writer: Shawna Wakefield Editor: Christina Bennett, Kathleen Campbell With special thanks to: Kristen Krayer, Nellika Little, Mir Ahmad Joyenda Cover illustration: Parniyan Design and Printing: The Army Press © 2003 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. Preface This is the second edition of The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance. Our first edition was brought out one year ago at a time of great change in Afghanistan. At that time, coordination mechanisms and aid processes were changing so fast that old hands and new arrivals alike were sometimes overwhelmed by the multiplicity of acronyms and references to structures and entities that had been recently created, abolished or re-named. Eighteen months after the fall of the Taliban and the signing of the Bonn Agreement, there are still rapid new developments, a growing complexity to the reconstruction effort and to planning processes and, of course, new acronyms! Our aim therefore remains to provide a guide to the terms, structures, mechanisms and coordinating bodies critical to the Afghanistan relief and reconstruction effort to help ensure a shared vocabulary and common understanding of the forces at play. We’ve also included maps and a contact directory to make navigating the assistance community easier. This 2nd edition also includes a section called “Resources,” containing information on such things as media organisations, security information, and Afghanistan-related web sites. Another new addition is a guide to the Afghan government. As the objective of so many assistance agencies is to support and strengthen government institutions, we felt that understanding how the Afghan government is structured is important to working in the current environment. -
Public Sector Development Programme 2019-20 (Original)
GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT PUBLIC SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 2019-20 (ORIGINAL) Table of Contents S.No. Sector Page No. 1. Agriculture……………………………………………………………………… 2 2. Livestock………………………………………………………………………… 8 3. Forestry………………………………………………………………………….. 11 4. Fisheries…………………………………………………………………………. 13 5. Food……………………………………………………………………………….. 15 6. Population welfare………………………………………………………….. 16 7. Industries………………………………………………………………………... 18 8. Minerals………………………………………………………………………….. 21 9. Manpower………………………………………………………………………. 23 10. Sports……………………………………………………………………………… 25 11. Culture……………………………………………………………………………. 30 12. Tourism…………………………………………………………………………... 33 13. PP&H………………………………………………………………………………. 36 14. Communication………………………………………………………………. 46 15. Water……………………………………………………………………………… 86 16. Information Technology…………………………………………………... 105 17. Education. ………………………………………………………………………. 107 18. Health……………………………………………………………………………... 133 19. Public Health Engineering……………………………………………….. 144 20. Social Welfare…………………………………………………………………. 183 21. Environment…………………………………………………………………… 188 22. Local Government ………………………………………………………….. 189 23. Women Development……………………………………………………… 198 24. Urban Planning and Development……………………………………. 200 25. Power…………………………………………………………………………….. 206 26. Other Schemes………………………………………………………………… 212 27. List of Schemes to be reassessed for Socio-Economic Viability 2-32 PREFACE Agro-pastoral economy of Balochistan, periodically affected by spells of droughts, has shrunk livelihood opportunities. -
AFGHANISTAN - Base Map KYRGYZSTAN
AFGHANISTAN - Base map KYRGYZSTAN CHINA ± UZBEKISTAN Darwaz !( !( Darwaz-e-balla Shaki !( Kof Ab !( Khwahan TAJIKISTAN !( Yangi Shighnan Khamyab Yawan!( !( !( Shor Khwaja Qala !( TURKMENISTAN Qarqin !( Chah Ab !( Kohestan !( Tepa Bahwddin!( !( !( Emam !( Shahr-e-buzorg Hayratan Darqad Yaftal-e-sufla!( !( !( !( Saheb Mingajik Mardyan Dawlat !( Dasht-e-archi!( Faiz Abad Andkhoy Kaldar !( !( Argo !( Qaram (1) (1) Abad Qala-e-zal Khwaja Ghar !( Rostaq !( Khash Aryan!( (1) (2)!( !( !( Fayz !( (1) !( !( !( Wakhan !( Khan-e-char Char !( Baharak (1) !( LEGEND Qol!( !( !( Jorm !( Bagh Khanaqa !( Abad Bulak Char Baharak Kishim!( !( Teer Qorghan !( Aqcha!( !( Taloqan !( Khwaja Balkh!( !( Mazar-e-sharif Darah !( BADAKHSHAN Garan Eshkashem )"" !( Kunduz!( !( Capital Do Koh Deh !(Dadi !( !( Baba Yadgar Khulm !( !( Kalafgan !( Shiberghan KUNDUZ Ali Khan Bangi Chal!( Zebak Marmol !( !( Farkhar Yamgan !( Admin 1 capital BALKH Hazrat-e-!( Abad (2) !( Abad (2) !( !( Shirin !( !( Dowlatabad !( Sholgareh!( Char Sultan !( !( TAKHAR Mir Kan Admin 2 capital Tagab !( Sar-e-pul Kent Samangan (aybak) Burka Khwaja!( Dahi Warsaj Tawakuli Keshendeh (1) Baghlan-e-jadid !( !( !( Koran Wa International boundary Sabzposh !( Sozma !( Yahya Mussa !( Sayad !( !( Nahrin !( Monjan !( !( Awlad Darah Khuram Wa Sarbagh !( !( Jammu Kashmir Almar Maymana Qala Zari !( Pul-e- Khumri !( Murad Shahr !( !( (darz !( Sang(san)charak!( !( !( Suf-e- (2) !( Dahana-e-ghory Khowst Wa Fereng !( !( Ab) Gosfandi Way Payin Deh Line of control Ghormach Bil Kohestanat BAGHLAN Bala !( Qaysar !( Balaq -
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs February 10, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21922 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Summary The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are growing factors in debate over the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as expressed in an Administration assessment of policy released December 16, 2010. A competent, respected, and effective Afghan government is considered a major prerequisite for a transition to Afghan leadership that is to take place by 2014, a timeframe agreed to by the United States, its international partners, and the Afghan government. Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at the local level, are unfilled or governing functions are performed by unaccountable power brokers. On corruption, the issue that perhaps most divides the United States from the government of President Hamid Karzai, the Afghan leadership is accepting U.S. help to build emerging anti- corruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. Effects of corruption burst into public view in August 2010 when the large Kabul Bank nearly collapsed due in part to losses on large loans to major shareholders, many of whom are close to Karzai. Some in Congress have sought to link further U.S. aid to clearer progress on the corruption issue. Purportedly suspicious that U.S. -
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance
Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 5, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21922 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance Summary The central government’s limited writ and widespread official corruption are helping sustain a Taliban insurgency, and have fed pessimism about the Afghanistan stabilization effort. However, ethnic disputes remain confined largely to political debate and competition, enabling President Hamid Karzai to focus on trying to build Afghan institutions, and on his bid for re-election in presidential elections slated for August 20, 2009. Karzai has faced substantial loss of public confidence, in large part due to widespread official corruption, but his opponents—divided by ethnicity and personal ambition—were unable to form a strong electoral coalition as the presidential election registration process closed on May 8, 2009. At the same time, U.S. officials have been shifting away from reliance on building the central government and toward promoting local governing bodies and security initiatives. That trend is to accelerate, according to the Obama Administration’s review of U.S. strategy, the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The core of the new strategy is a so-called “civilian surge” that will virtually double, to about 900, the number of U.S. civilian personnel to deploy to Afghanistan to help build its governing and security institution, and to increase economic development efforts. The Administration also says it will develop “metrics” by which to judge the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government, including its efforts to curb official corruption, although the Administration and many in Congress appear reluctant to tie any U.S. -
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance
Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs March 25, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21922 Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance Summary The capacity, transparency, and legitimacy of Afghan governance are considered crucial to Afghan stability as U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security mission to Afghan leadership. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but the government remains weak and rife with corruption. The government has struggled to widen its writ, even though substantial powers are concentrated in the elected presidency through powers of appointment at all levels. President Hamid Karzai has served as president since late 2001; he is constitutionally term-limited and will leave office after presidential and provincial elections scheduled for April 5, 2014. Several major figures—some close to Karzai and others opposed—have registered to run for president; many of their slates include faction leaders long accused of human rights abuses. Some observers are concerned that Karzai might try to use state machinery to favor a particular candidate, and he appears to have tilted toward his longtime confidant and former Foreign Minister, Zalmay Rasoul. If a run-off is needed, it is possible that the new president would not take office until some time in July 2014. Fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009 and parliament in 2010) was extensively documented, but Afghan officials, civil society organizations, and key donor countries have taken substantial steps to limit the potential for systemic manipulation and fraud in the upcoming vote. -
The Coils of the Anaconda: America's
THE COILS OF THE ANACONDA: AMERICA’S FIRST CONVENTIONAL BATTLE IN AFGHANISTAN BY C2009 Lester W. Grau Submitted to the graduate degree program in Military History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ____________________________ Dr. Theodore A Wilson, Chairperson ____________________________ Dr. James J. Willbanks, Committee Member ____________________________ Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Committee Member ____________________________ Dr. Maria Carlson, Committee Member ____________________________ Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Committee Member Date defended: April 27, 2009 The Dissertation Committee for Lester W. Grau certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: THE COILS OF THE ANACONDA: AMERICA’S FIRST CONVENTIONAL BATTLE IN AFGHANISTAN Committee: ____________________________ Dr. Theodore A Wilson, Chairperson ____________________________ Dr. James J. Willbanks, Committee Member ____________________________ Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Committee Member ____________________________ Dr. Maria Carlson, Committee Member ____________________________ Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Committee Member Date approved: April 27, 2009 ii PREFACE Generals have often been reproached with preparing for the last war instead of for the next–an easy gibe when their fellow-countrymen and their political leaders, too frequently, have prepared for no war at all. Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little–study. However changed and strange the new conditions of war may be, not only generals, but politicians and ordinary citizens, may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future and, in their search for it, that some campaigns have more than others foreshadowed the coming pattern of modern war.1 — Field Marshall Viscount William Slim. -
Strategic Insight
Strategic Insight The Loya Jirga, Ethnic Rivalries and Future Afghan Stability by Thomas H. Johnson Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. August 6, 2002 On June 24 the Afghan transitional government and administration of Hamid Karzai was installed during formal ceremonies in Kabul. Karzai had easily won the June 13 election at a national political assembly, or loya jirga. The loya jirga consisted of 1500 representatives, elected or appointed from 32 provinces, and debated the political future of Afghanistan over a seven-day period. The Karzai government is supposed to rule Afghanistan through 2003. During the ceremony, Karzai and his new cabinet took an oath in both major Afghan languages (Pashtu and Dari), vowing to "follow the basic teachings of Islam" and the laws of the land, to renounce corruption, and to "safeguard the honor and integrity of Afghanistan."[1] How successful they are in achieving these vows will be critical to the near term future of Afghanistan, its reconstruction, and possibly the stability of the entire region of Central Asia. This transitional government was the result of an Emergency Loya Jirga and part of the Bonn Agreement (of November-December 2001). While not explicitly stating so in the Bonn Agreement, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the U.N.