ISLAM AND POLITICS IN POST-2011 A.KADIR YILDIRIM, EDITOR

CONTRIBUTORS

Sarah Yerkes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Sharan Grewal, Princeton University Sabrina Zouaghi, Laval University, Quebec, Canada Francesco Cavatorta, Laval University, Quebec, Canada Maryam Ben Salem, University of Sousse, Tunisia

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between religion and politics has been one of the defining elements of post-revolutionary Tunisia. What makes the country’s transitional phase all the more intriguing is the fact that religion and religious actors were largely excluded from Tunisia’s political system prior to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011. In the current democratization phase, religion and religious actors have assumed a political significance that Tunisia has not experienced in recent memory.

The country’s oldest Islamist group, Ennahdha, has been the most critical actor in this process for several reasons. Not only was Ennahdha integral (until 2014) in the drafting of Tunisia’s new , the party also accepted major governmental roles, including that of a major coalition partner at one point.

In addition, Ennahdha’s relations and interactions with Tunisia’s secular and conservative actors have shaped the course of the relationship between religion and politics in important ways—and as a result of its multi- pronged approach to its role as a relevant and influential political actor, the party has similarly undergone a series of organizational and ideological changes.

Ennahdha’s efforts to navigate the constraints imposed by secular actors, conservative groups, and Salafists have key implications for the way other Islamist actors in the rest of the Middle East may respond to similar constraints in their own societies. Ennahdha’s experience is particularly informative because it offers a direct contrast to how the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) responded to countervailing pressures from secular revolutionaries and fundamentalist Salafist actors. In some respects, Ennahdha’s actions resemble those of the AKP in in the early 2000s, when the party embraced a Muslim democratic discourse to assure secular actors of its genuine interest in operating within the political mainstream; Ennahdha took a similar tack in 2016.

In this regard, the briefs that follow analyze Ennahdha’s political outlook and its place in Tunisia’s evolving political landscape since the Jasmine Revolution. While doing so, they pay particular attention to shifts in the relationship between religion and politics in the country.

In her paper “Too Strategic for the Base: How the Nidaa-Ennahdha Alliance has Done More Harm than Good,” Sarah Yerkes analyzes Ennahdha’s overtures to secularism and Tunisia’s secular actors as the party sought to survive in a new political environment. Yerkes argues that Ennahdha’s partnership with led to uncertainty about what Ennahdha stands for—and also alienated the electorate, ultimately hurting the party more than it helped.

Sharan Grewal examines how Ennahdha’s support base has responded to the party’s recent ideological change as it embraced Muslim democracy and distanced itself from conservative Islamist discourse. Grewal’s paper “Where are Ennahdha’s Competitors?” utilizes original data to show that Ennahdha has been moving away from conservatism not only in its discourse but also by removing more conservative officials from the party’s leadership.

Sabrina Zouaghi and Francesco Cavatorta focus on one particular outcome of Ennahdha’s retreat from conservatism. In their paper “A Doomed Relationship: Ennahdha and Salafism,” the authors show that as a fundamentalist political movement, Salafism can capitalize on the political space left behind by Ennahdha’s shift toward the political mainstream. The prospects for a rejuvenated Salafist mobilization have also recently improved, in part due to the social and economic challenges Tunisians face.

In her brief, “The Reconfiguration of Ennahdha’s Recruitment Strategy in Tunisia,” Maryam Ben Salem analyzes the effects of Ennahdha’s recent organizational changes, the transformation of the party’s member recruitment strategy, and its specialization policy. Ben Salem demonstrates that while the short-term effects of the membership changes are likely to be limited, the changes unleashed by a new crop of members will have long-term effects that firmly put Ennahdha on a secular path.

This compilation is based on “ and Politics in Post-2011 Tunisia,” a workshop held in on February 12, 2018. The workshop was part of a broader research project on “Building Pluralistic and Inclusive States Post-Arab Spring” that is generously supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The workshop was organized in collaboration with Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Center (KADEM).

A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute Principal Investigator, “Building Pluralistic and Inclusive States Post-Arab Spring” ISSUE BRIEF 04.25.18 Too Strategic for the Base: How the Nidaa-Ennahdha Alliance Has Done More Harm Than Good

Sarah Yerkes, Ph.D., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Control of Tunisia’s political apparatus has was strategic and coincided with an overall vacillated between the country’s two leading decline in public support for a strong parties—Nidaa Tounes and Ennahdha—for relationship between Islam and politics. most of its post-revolutionary history. However, at the same time, support for Nidaa, a loose coalition of Bourguibists, the party and its leaders has declined and former regime figures, and leftists, was the alliance has failed to net Ennahdha formed in 2012 explicitly as a counterweight important political wins. Furthermore, the to Ennahdha, an Islamist party that has Nidaa-Ennahdha alliance has contributed existed since 1989.1 However, the July 2016 to the Tunisian public’s growing Agreement, which established dissatisfaction with formal politics, which a national unity government under Prime has potentially dangerous consequences Minister Youssef Chahed (a Nidaa member), for the country’s democratic transition. has seen the parties grow increasingly close, leading to a joint Ennahdha-Nidaa coordination committee in June 2017 and WHAT DOES ENNAHDHA STAND FOR? a new “troika” in November 2017, when Ennahdha has maintained a clear religious the two parties formed an alliance with the foundation throughout its nearly 30-year economically liberal and anti-Islamist Free history. Ennahdha’s July 2012 statute Patriotic Union (UPL) party.2 The Nidaa-Ennahdha characterizes the party as a “moderate This paper examines what impact Islamist national political party.”3 And the alliance has contributed the strategic alliance between Nidaa and party’s 2011 electoral program lists Islam to the Tunisian public’s Ennahdha has had on Ennahdha’s popular as a “supreme point of reference that is support. Although the “marriage” between growing dissatisfaction balanced and interactive with any human Nidaa and Ennahdha was formally dissolved with formal expertise of proven benefit, through the in January 2018, it is important to understand method of ijtihad [interpretation].”4 The politics, which has how voters interpreted the compromises party also strongly advocates for justice, potentially dangerous Ennahdha’s leaders made by cozying up dignity, and freedom—what Cavatorta and consequences to Nidaa. Specifically, in the context of the Merone call the “fundamental social goals of Nidaa-Ennahdha alliance, is there space in for the country’s Islam.”5 While the party has long accepted the Tunisian political landscape for voters democratic transition. democratic principles and procedures, it who favor a stronger relationship between has served as the home for Islamist voters— religion and government? those who would like to see a role for Using survey data that examines religion in lawmaking and governance. levels of support for Ennahdha and Nidaa In late 2016, Ennahdha underwent as well as views on the relationship its most dramatic shift, voting to split its between Islam and politics, I argue that religious and political wings—a move the Ennahdha’s decision to partner with Nidaa party had rejected in 2012.6 As party leader RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.25.18

Rachid Ghannouchi explained after the split, One could argue that Ennahdha’s policy “Ennahdha has moved beyond its origins as changes, which will be discussed in more an Islamist party and has fully embraced a detail below, have caused the attitudinal new identity as a party of Muslim Democrats… changes among its base. However, if the [It] is no longer both a political party and a party’s shift away from political Islam was social movement.”7 Ghannouchi justified the driving public attitudes, we should also expect move, arguing that because religious freedom to see an increase in public support for the is enshrined in the Tunisian constitution, party and its leadership. But we find the Ennahdha no longer needs to protect Islam.8 opposite, that concurrent with Ennahdha’s While this radical change may have policy shift is a decrease in favorability ratings satisfied Western donors and the region’s for both the party and the policy shift’s main In late 2016, Ennahdha secularists who fear the rise of the Islamic champion—Ghannouchi. Thus, we find that underwent its most State and do not want to see a repeat of both Ennahdha’s leadership and a portion the Egyptian experience with the Muslim of Ennahdha voters are satisfied with the dramatic shift, voting Brotherhood, members of Ennahdha’s current more limited role of religion in politics to split its religious and base “continue to call for an increased as well as the ability of the constitution to political wings—a move role for Islam in politics, irrespective of the protect religious practice and belief and do not the party had rejected formal separation between preaching and see a need to push for stronger protections. political activities.”9 And according to a However, the decision to distance the party in 2012. November 2017 survey by the International from its founding principles has also alienated Republican Institute (IRI), a large percentage many Ennahdha voters, causing them to exit of Tunisians today (60%) want a greater the political scene and netting few political role for religion in government, which would victories for the party. suggest that Ennahdha should distance itself from Nidaa and embrace Islamism, not the other way around.10 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ENNAHDHA- But while 60% may seem like a high NIDAA RELATIONSHIP number of residents advocating for a closer Ennahdha led the Tunisian government from relationship between religion and politics December 2011 to January 2014, under Prime in what is often seen as a highly secular Ministers Hamadi Jebali and Ali Laarayedh. The country, it is actually a 10 percentage point Laarayedh government was forced to step decrease from 70% of survey respondents down in January 2014, bringing independent in June 2014 who said that religion should But if Ennahdha is Prime Minister to power. When play a role in government and lawmaking.11 Nidaa bested Ennahdha in the October 2014 moving more toward Furthermore, when the data is broken down parliamentary elections, winning 86 seats to Nidaa out of a desire to by political affiliation, the numbers tell an Ennahdha’s 69, Ennahdha chose to participate even more interesting story. gain and keep power, in the new government of Prime Minister In IRI’s June 2014 survey, 84% of those it is miscalculating the Habib Essid, a technocrat, after Essid failed to who planned to vote for Ennahdha wanted form a government without them. However, impact these moves a significant role for Islam in government, the decision to join Essid’s government only may have on its base. compared to 63% of Nidaa voters at that netted Ennahdha the labor ministry and three time.12 In the November 2017 poll, however, secretary of state positions. only 62% of Ennahdha voters wanted a In 2016, the resignation of 28 Nidaa significant role for Islam in government—a 22 members of parliament (MPs) over anger percentage point drop. Support for a religious with the Ennahdha alliance reduced Nidaa’s government also decreased among Nidaa seats in parliament from 86 to 58. This made voters, but to a much lesser extent—from Ennahdha the largest party in parliament once 63% to 55%, or an 8 percentage point drop.13 again (with 69 seats). Given this power shift, Thus, in the past three years, Ennahdha voters Ennahdha fared better in the August 2016 have dramatically decreased their support national unity government under Chahed, for a stronger relationship between religion garnering three ministries—trade, employment and politics, at a much higher rate than the and vocational training, and communication Tunisian public overall. technologies and the digital economy.14 2 TOO STRATEGIC FOR THE BASE: HOW THE NIDAA-ENNAHDHA ALLIANCE HAS DONE MORE HARM THAN GOOD

However, Ennahdha’s participation in 41% of those surveyed saying they have an the various Nidaa governments has been “unfavorable” opinion of the party in November relatively limited, with a clear dominance 2017, compared to 48% in August 2017.19 by Nidaa. None of its cabinet positions are Furthermore, Ghannouchi has the highest particularly influential, and it does not hold unfavorability rating of any of the political the ministries of education, religious affairs, figures listed in IRI’s poll, at 63% (with social affairs, or cultural affairs, arenas an additional 5% rating him “somewhat traditionally sought by religious parties. unfavorable”). This is a slight increase from Furthermore, Ennahdha has won few, if any, August 2017, when he received a 60% political victories. The municipal elections, unfavorability rating. Comparatively, the which Ennahdha is likely to dominate, have political figures with the next two highest been postponed numerous times. While unfavorability ratings are Hafedh Caid Essebsi, Ennahdha’s performance has suffered at the president’s infamous son (57%), and UPL’s the national level as of late, the party is still Slim Riahi, who is currently the subject of a well-placed for a strong showing in most of massive corruption investigation (56%).20 Tunisia’s interior and rural governorates due Conversely, President Beji Caid Essebsi has to its presence in every governorate and its a 45% unfavorability rating, while Prime strong grassroots apparatus.15 Minister Chahed’s unfavorability is at just 18%. Ennahdha has also witnessed major challenges to its social justice platform; its transitional justice process has been THE WAY FORWARD: THREE POSSIBLE undermined and anti-corruption efforts have SCENARIOS been woefully underfunded and lack political The growing discontent with Ennahdha support.16 And one of Ennahdha’s key that coincides with the alliance could principles—the protection of the Revolution— lead to three possible outcomes. First, has been threatened by the return of several Ennahdha voters may continue to turn While compromise members of the Ben Ali government during away from the party and instead move has been essential the latest cabinet reshuffle.17 toward informal politics.21 This could lead to to keeping Tunisia’s further erosion of trust between the public transition on track, PLAYING THE LONG GAME? and the political system, which will likely manifest in a continuing cycle of protest and the political marriage A common explanation offered for repression. As one Tunisian activist told me, between Nidaa and Ennahdha’s recent moves is that the party “Ennahdha voters will not choose anyone Ennahdha has diluted is playing a long-term game, staying away but Ennahdha—they would rather not vote the parties to the point from controversy and positioning itself as than vote for someone else.”22 If this is the nonthreatening in order to stay in power and case, we should expect to see lower levels of where the majority eventually seize it. As Netterstrom argues, voter turnout by Ennahdha supporters in the of Tunisians do not What mattered [for Ennahdha] was upcoming municipal elections this year and identify with any political calculation geared toward gaining in the 2019 presidential and parliamentary party at all. and keeping power. For the sake of the elections. This would be very dangerous for party’s overarching goals, some elements the Tunisian political system, likely further of Islamist ideology had to be left behind… consolidating power into the hands of a Ennahdha made these compromises out of single party (Nidaa). political necessity, and only later developed Second, some voters may seek an an ideological rationale for them.18 alternative party that provides a clearer articulation of pro-Islamist—albeit far more But if Ennahdha is moving more toward Nidaa extreme—positions, such as Jebhat Islah and out of a desire to gain and keep power, it is Hizb al-Tahrir, the latter of which has been miscalculating the impact these moves may repeatedly banned by Tunisian authorities. have on its base. Ennahdha’s unfavorability Of course, Ennahdha is not a monolith. ratings have risen from 56% in August 2017 to There is an increasing sense that Ennahdha 59% in November 2017. Conversely, Nidaa’s is experiencing internal division, with some party leaders and members pushing back unfavorability rating has gone down, with 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.25.18

against some of the party’s compromises. not only turned away voters, but also led to Thus, a third possible scenario would be confusion over what Ennahdha really stands for Ennahdha to split into two parties—one for. According to one Tunisian activist, more strategic and in line with Ghannouchi, “the only difference between Nidaa and and one more ideological. But this is not as Ennahdha today is that one drinks wine and likely as long as Ghannouchi continues to the other drinks orange juice.”25 By failing control Ennahdha’s moves. Additionally, to articulate a clear platform with explicit should Nidaa split into multiple parties, as policy positions, Ennahdha has confused and is likely the case, some of the more centrist alienated much of its base. And with no clear Nahdawis (Ennahdha members) could find alternative for those who seek a stronger a home in one of the new parties, leaving role for religion in politics, Ennahdha may Ennahdha to the more hardline elements. have inadvertently empowered the more But an Ennahdha split is not inevitable. The radical Salafist groups it has tried to tamp most likely factors to trigger a split would down over the past three years. As Georges be a poor electoral showing in the municipal Fahmi argues, Salafists were “incensed that elections or a change in party leadership, Ennahdha sought reconciliation with the leaving room for potential jockeying among symbols of the former regime by agreeing to senior members of the party. participate in a coalition government with While compromise has been essential the Nidaa Tounes party.”26 With no clear to keeping Tunisia’s transition on track, As Tunisia prepares for the May 6, 2018, alternative for those the political marriage between Nidaa and municipal elections as well as the 2019 who seek a stronger Ennahdha has diluted the parties to the national elections, all parties would be well role for religion in point where the majority of Tunisians do not served by articulating a clear policy platform, identify with any party at all. In IRI’s most something that voters can understand and politics, Ennahdha may recent poll, when asked which party they will identify with. To succeed in the elections, have inadvertently support in the upcoming municipal elections, and to continue to play a major role on the empowered the more 62% of survey participants responded with Tunisian political stage, Ennahdha needs to radical Salafist groups “don’t know” or refused to answer.23 do more than show up at the polls. It needs it has tried to tamp Finally, Ennahdha’s loss of support is to decide if it is a strategic party primarily not due solely to its relationship with Nidaa, focused on staying in power and willing to down over the past but rather also with its failure to achieve its compromise on its ideals in the short term, three years. objectives while in power. As Gerges argues, or if it is primarily a party of social justice, A vote for the Islamists implied a clean committed to protecting the principles of break with the failed past and a belief the Revolution, within an Islamist framework (to be tested) that they could deliver at all costs. Either way, in order to survive, the goods—jobs, economic stability, Ennahdha must make its positions clear and transparency, and inclusiveness. Thus, find a way to convince a Tunisian public that the political fortunes of Islamists will is increasingly turning away from Ennahdha ultimately depend on whether they live that it is a party they should support. up to their promises and meet the rising 24 expectations of the Arab publics. ENDNOTES

However, if voters were indeed holding 1. The party originally formed in 1981 as parties accountable for their economic the “Movement for Islamic Tendency,” but performance, certainly Nidaa’s support changed its name to Ennahdha in 1989. numbers would be decreasing, not increasing. 2. See Appendix for a timeline of the Nidaa-Ennahdha relationship. 3. Anne Wolf, Political CONCLUSION (London: Hurst and Company, 2017), 175. 4. Ibid., 170. It is clear that Ennahdha’s decision to 5. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio align with Nidaa has been politically more Merone, “Post-Islamism, ideological harmful than helpful. The relationship has evolution and ‘la tunisianite’ of the Tunisian 4 TOO STRATEGIC FOR THE BASE: HOW THE NIDAA-ENNAHDHA ALLIANCE HAS DONE MORE HARM THAN GOOD

Islamist party al-Nahda,” Journal of Political survey respondents said they didn’t know Ideologies 20, no. 1 (2015): 27-42. what party they will vote for or refused 6. Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia, to answer. See Center for Insights in and Rory McCarthy, “Ennahdha’s Next Survey Research, Public Opinion Survey of Move,” Sada, November 4, 2014: http:// Tunisians: November 23–December 3, 2017. carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=57120. 16. Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher, 7. , “From Political Tunisia’s Corruption Contagion: A Transition Islam to Muslim Democracy: The Ennahdha at Risk (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Party and the Future of Tunisia,” Foreign Endowment for International Peace). Affairs (2016): 58-69. 17. Sarah Yerkes, “Democracy Derailed?” 8. Ibid. Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2017. 9. Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia. 18. Kasper Ly Netterstrom, “The 10. Center for Insights in Survey Research, Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia,” Journal of Public Opinion Survey of Tunisians: November Democracy 28, no. 4 (October 2015): 110-124. 23–December 3, 2017. (Washington, D.C.: 19. Center for Insights in Survey International Republican Institute, 2017). Research, Public Opinion Survey of 11. In June 2014, 50% of all respondents Tunisians: November 23–December 3, 2017. believed that “the principles of Islam 20. Huffington Post Maghreb, “Slim Riahi should be one consideration but not the condamné à 5 ans de prison pour l’affaire only consideration when making policy or des chèques sans provision,” Huffington law,” and an additional 20% believed that Post Maghreb, October 9, 2017. “Islamic texts should form the foundations 21. For more on the impact of a shift of all policy and lawmaking.” In November away from formal to informal politics in 2017, 37% of those polled believed that Tunisia, see Sarah Yerkes, Where Have all “the principles of Islam should be one the Revolutionaries Gone? (Washington, D.C.: consideration but not the only consideration Brookings Institution). when making policy or law,” and an 22. Author’s conversation with Tunisian additional 23% believed that “Islamic texts civil society activist, January 2018. should form the foundations of all policy 23. Center for Insights in Survey Research, and lawmaking.” See Center for Insights in Public Opinion Survey of Tunisians: November Survey Research, Public Opinion Survey of 23–December 3, 2017. Tunisians: November 23–December 3, 2017. 24. Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Islamist 12. Among Ennahdha supporters, 28% Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam?” of respondents believed that “Islamic texts Political Science Quarterly 128, no. 3 (2013): should form the foundations of all policy 389-426. and lawmaking” and an additional 56% 25. Author’s conversation with Tunisian believed that “the principles of Islam should civil society activist, January 2018. be one consideration but not the only 26. Georges Fahmi, “The Future of consideration when making policy or law.” Political Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia,” See Center for Insights in Survey Research, Carnegie Middle East Center, November 16, Public Opinion Survey of Tunisians: 2015, http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/11/16/ November 23–December 3, 2017. future-of-political-salafism-in-egypt-and- 13. Ibid. tunisia-pub-61871. 14. Following a cabinet reshuffle in September 2017, Ennahdha lost the ministry of vocational training to the liberal Afek AUTHOR Tounes party, but picked up the ministry Sarah Yerkes, Ph.D., is a fellow in the Middle of industry and small and medium-sized East Program at the Carnegie Endowment enterprises. for International Peace. Her research focuses 15. IRI’s polling on the municipal on Tunisia’s political, economic, and security elections projects Ennahdha winning only developments as well as state-society 5% of the vote (second to Nidaa’s 12% and relations in the Middle East and North . tied with Jebha Chaabia). However, 62% of 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.25.18

APPENDIX — TIMELINE OF THE ENNAHDHA-NIDAA TOUNES POLITICAL COALITION

August 14, 2013 Ennahdha’s Rachid Ghannouchi and Nidaa Tounes’ Beji Caid-Essebsi meet discreetly in Paris in a meeting initiated by Slim Riahi of the Free Patriotic Union (UPL) and Nabil Karoui of Nessma TV. The pair discussed ways of getting out of political deadlock shortly after the assassination of Arab nationalist politician in July 2013. This issue brief is part of a two-year research December 25, 2014 Essebsi announces that there will be no alliance with Ennahdha. project on pluralism in February 2, 2015 Prime Minister Habib Essid announces an inclusive coalition the Middle East after government that includes members of Ennahdha. the Arab uprisings. The project is generously July 2015 Ennahdha and Nidaa Tounes plan to run on common lists for supported by a grant municipal elections (that were scheduled for 2016). from the Carnegie January 9, 2016 Twenty-eight Nidaa Tounes members of parliament (MPs) defect Corporation of New York. during the party’s congress in Sousse in protest of Nidaa’s mariage de raison with Ennahdha.

January 10, 2016 Former Nidaa Tounes Secretary General Mohsen Marzouk launches a new political party—Machrouu Tounes.

July 13, 2016 The signing of the “Carthage Agreement” takes place in Carthage between Ennahdha, Nidaa Tounes, the Tunisian General Labour Union See more issue briefs at: (UGTT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs the Tunisian Union of Agriculture and Fishery (UTPA), the Free Patriotic This publication was written by a Union (UPL), , Machrouu Tounes, the National Destourian researcher (or researchers) who Initiative Party, the Joumhouri Party, and the Massar Party. The participated in a Baker Institute project. document laid out the foundation for a national unity government. Wherever feasible, this research is reviewed by outside experts before it is June 8, 2017 A joint Ennahdha-Nidaa Tounes coordination committee is formed released. However, the views expressed to bridge political differences, sparking controversy. herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s November 15, 2017 Ennahdha and Nidaa Tounes make a new alliance with the Free Baker Institute for Public Policy. Patriotic Union (headed by Slim Riahi) to form a new “troika.”

© 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute January 7, 2018 Ennahdha and Nidaa Tounes announce the end of their alliance. for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cover image credit: Fadel Senna/AFP

Cite as: Yerkes, Sarah. 2018. Too Strategic for the Base: How the Nidaa-Ennahdha Alliance Has Done More Harm Than Good. Issue brief no. 04.25.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

6 ISSUE BRIEF 04.26.18 Where Are Ennahdha’s Competitors?

Sharan Grewal, M.A., Princeton University

FROM ISLAMISTS TO MUSLIM REMOVING THE RIGHT DEMOCRATS In analyzing the potential for an Islamist The past decades have witnessed a challenger, we must first ask whether there remarkable transformation in the ideology are conservative Ennahdha leaders who of Tunisia’s Ennahdha. While in the 1970s may split from the party. While observers the movement could have been described as have noted that a handful of conservative an “anti-democratic and illiberal movement “firebrands” like Habib Ellouz and Sadok […] determined to impose religious law over Chourou have recently been moved from democratic electoral decisions,”1 it is today politics to preaching,5 it is unclear what better known (and seeks to be known) as a has happened to other conservative figures Muslim Democratic party—a party inspired beyond these well-known personalities. by Islam yet accepting core tenets of secular Below, I show that Ennahdha has democracy. Particularly during the drafting systematically sidelined conservative voices, of Tunisia’s 2014 constitution, Ennahdha removing them from leadership roles in made considerable compromises, eschewing the party. In particular, in choosing which a reference to Islamic law and enshrining members of the Constituent Assembly to freedom of conscience and gender equality.2 renominate for the 2014 parliamentary Ennahdha’s movement toward the elections, Ennahdha generally preferred center of the political spectrum raises its more liberal-minded members.6 There are a number the question of whether a new Islamist Accordingly, a potential splinter party of experienced party will emerge to challenge Ennahdha may have access to a pool of experienced from the right.3 On the one hand, ex-parliamentarians. conservative leaders Tunisia’s electoral system (proportional Figure 1 plots each of Ennahdha’s who appear to have representation without thresholds) is 89 members of the 2011–2014 National been sidelined by particularly conducive to new and niche Constituent Assembly (NCA) according to Ennahdha and who parties, as evidenced by the plethora of their “ideal points,” or underlying ideologies. secular parties.4 Yet on the other hand, These ideal points were calculated by could, in theory, despite the presence of a few small Salafi analyzing all 1,731 votes in the NCA using a form the leadership parties (such as Jabha al-Islah), Ennahdha methodology similar to that used by scholars of a new party. today retains its monopoly of the Islamist of the U.S. Congress.7 On the left are more constituency with no challenger in sight. liberal members, such as Imed Hammami, This brief explores the potential for a Zied Ladhari, and Ameur Laarayedh. On the new Islamist party to emerge, analyzing right are the more conservative members, whether there are prospective leaders and like Ellouz and Chourou. The algorithm voters for such a party. It then speculates corresponds well to a qualitative reading as to why a rival has not yet emerged, and of the NCA: the most conservative member what implications a potential rival may have according to the data, Nejib Mrad, was the for Tunisia’s democratic transition. single Ennahdha member to vote against RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.26.18

the constitution, while the second-most while those in red were not. As the figure conservative, Ahmed Smiai, was the only clearly indicates, there are far more names one to abstain. in blue toward the left than toward the right, Names in blue were chosen by indicating that conservatives were generally Ennahdha to run in the 2014 elections, not renominated by Ennahdha.

FIGURE 1 — ENNAHDHA MPs FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (2011–2014)

Renominated in 2014?

Yes No

-3 -2 -1 0 1 2

Ideal point

SOURCE Author’s own analysis

2 WHERE ARE ENNAHDHA’S COMPETITORS?

These overall results also track with the key votes in the NCA. For instance, on January 4, FIGURE 2 — OPPOSITION TO ENNAHDHA’S DECISION TO LEAVE 2014, the NCA voted on whether to enshrine POLITICAL ISLAM the Quran and the Sunna as the basis of legislation.8 While this proposal ultimately Strongly agree failed, members of Ennahdha were split. Of the conservative Ennahdha MPs who voted yes, only 9 percent were renominated, Agree compared to 47 percent of those who voted no or abstained. In short, there are a number of Disagree experienced conservative leaders who

appear to have been sidelined by Ennahdha Laws should be based on sharia Strongly disagree and who could, in theory, form the leadership of a new party. While some of them may have voluntarily decided to 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% leave politics, interviews with Ennahdha Percentage opposing Ennahdha’s decision leaders confirm that many did not. In 2014, the executive board had to intervene in a SOURCE Survey of 505 residents of Tunis conducted May 31–June 4, 2016, by Sharan Grewal, number of party lists to block conservative Amaney Jamal, Tarek Masoud, and Elizabeth Nugent individuals.9 Others were convinced to not even put forth their names. Sadok Chourou, for instance, observed, “The leadership is highest among the most conservative dominated by a specific political orientation, Tunisians. Figure 2 displays the percentage and that orientation states that in the best who disagreed with Ennahdha’s decision interests of the party, some figures and according to level of support for Islamic law, some faces serve the current phase better or sharia. Among respondents who strongly than others.”10 agreed that laws should be based on sharia, 55 percent opposed Ennahdha’s decision.11 Second, we can examine nationally DISILLUSIONED VOTERS representative data from Arab Barometer surveys conducted in 2011, 2013, and 2016.12 A potential splinter party would need not The Barometer asked respondents for their Survey data suggest only leaders, but also voters. Survey data level of trust in Ennahdha, with the highest suggest that there is a conservative flank that there is a value being “a great deal of trust.” Overall, of voters disappointed in Ennahdha’s conservative flank the percentage of respondents reporting a compromises and potentially willing to great deal of trust has fallen considerably— of voters disappointed support a more hardline party. from 22 percent in 2011, to 16 percent in in Ennahdha’s The primary evidence for this claim 2013, to 8.5 percent in 2016. comes from an unrelated study my compromises and To examine if this decline in co-authors and I conducted of 505 residents potentially willing Ennahdha’s popularity is strongest among of Tunis between May 31 and June 4, 2016. conservative respondents, Figure 3 plots to support a more While not a representative sample of Ennahdha’s popularity by a respondent’s hardline party. Tunisians nor of residents of Tunis, these level of support for sharia. Trust in data are still useful for examining the Ennahdha fell across the board, suggesting public’s immediate reaction to Ennahdha’s that Ennahdha’s moves to the center did decision to leave political Islam, which was not win it domestic support even among announced at its party congress held May those who do not support sharia (orange 20–22 of that year. line). Among respondents who strongly In the study, 42 percent of respondents agree that laws should be based on sharia disagreed or strongly disagreed with (the blue line), trust in Ennahdha fell “Ennahdha’s decision to leave political precipitously, from 43 percent in 2011 Islam.” Moreover, this disagreement was to just 17 percent in 2016.13 In 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.26.18

short, there appears to be a base of to move Ennahdha back to the right.15 More voters who strongly support sharia and generally, given Rachid Ghannouchi’s age have lost trust in Ennahdha. These voters (76), it is possible that some conservatives could potentially be picked up by a more are waiting to seize control of Ennahdha in a hardline Islamist party. post-Ghannouchi era. Others may view a splinter or competing party as simply not viable. Ennahdha’s extensive grassroots FIGURE 3 — TRUST IN ENNAHDHA BY SUPPORT FOR SHARIA infrastructure may be difficult for any potential challenger to match. Moreover, 50% a challenger may have trouble securing the level of funds or media backing that 40% Ennahdha now enjoys. Former prime minister Hamadi Jebali may be an important 30% exception, as he is already a household name. If Jebali creates a rival party for 20% his rumored 2019 presidential run, it may prove to be a significant threat 10% to Ennahdha. Even if electoral calculations would

Percentage expressing “a great deal of trust” Percentage 0 support a splinter party, Ennahdha leaders 2011 2013 2016 may be reluctant to cause a split. Nahdaouis often reference “the unity of the ummah” as Laws should be based on sharia encouraging them to have intense internal Strongly agree Somewhat agree Strongly/somewhat disagree debates within the party, but not to publicly break away.16 Beyond these religious SOURCE Arab Barometer motivations, decades of shared repression under former autocratic regimes may have strengthened Ennahdha’s identity and WHY NO RIVAL? solidarity to the point of making a splinter party unlikely.17 If the conditions are truly ripe for an Islamist If a challenger emerges, however, it challenger, why hasn’t one yet emerged? will likely have important consequences The simple answer, as Ennahdha leader Said for Tunisian politics. Ennahdha may need Ferjani observed, is that “the pace of social to demonstrate its conservative credentials, change is slow. The whole experience in forcing it to move back to the right, just Tunisia is still very young.”14 as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was Some conservative figures may also pushed right by the Salafi Nour party. A rival have calculated that for the time being, it party would likely increase the salience of may be advantageous to remain within the secular-religious cleavage and deepen Ennahdha. As a result of the separation political polarization, threatening the or specialization of politics and preaching, stability of Tunisia’s democratic transition. Ellouz, Chourou, and other conservatives On the other hand, a competitor have been promised central roles in the may provide political representation for preaching aspects of the movement. They conservative voters that currently feel may be mollified with these still influential abandoned by Ennahdha. On a normative roles, or they may anticipate using these level, a challenger may therefore be good for institutions to challenge Ennahdha at a Tunisian democracy. Moreover, channeling later date. Ellouz in particular mentioned these disillusioned, conservative voices into that the upcoming parliamentary elections a peaceful political party, rather than leaving would be an important test: if Ennahdha them potentially exploitable by violent loses considerably more votes than it did in extremist groups, may be important to 2014, it may create the momentum needed Tunisia’s long-term stability and security. 4 WHERE ARE ENNAHDHA’S COMPETITORS?

to be coded as a middle vote between yes ENDNOTES and no. Absences were coded as missing 1. Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio data. I am indebted to al-Bawsala for sharing Merone, “Moderation Through Exclusion? NCA voting data. The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahdha from 8. See the results of the vote here (in Fundamentalist to Conservative Party,” and French): http://majles.marsad.tn/ Democratization 2, no. 5 (2013): 858. See vote/52c92fa112bdaa7f9b90f423. also Anne Wolf, Political Islam in Tunisia: 9. Sahbi Atig, interview with author, This issue brief is part Tunis, January 25, 2016. Atig noted that the The History of Ennahdha (Oxford: Oxford of a two-year research University Press, 2017). executive board intervened in “four or five 2. Monica Marks, “Convince, Coerce, governorates” and in particular mentioned project on pluralism in or Compromise? Ennahdha’s Approach to the electoral district of 2, where the the Middle East after Tunisia’s Constitution” (Brookings Doha aforementioned Habib Ellouz was not the Arab uprisings. renominated. Center Analysis Paper Number 10, 2014). The project is generously 3. While it is not the focus of this 10. Sadok Chourou, interview with brief, Ennahdha has also made considerable author, Tunis, February 6, 2018. supported by a grant compromises on the goals of the revolution, 11. In the sample, 27 percent of from the Carnegie such as refusing to ban members of the old respondents strongly agreed that laws Corporation of New York. regime from running in the 2014 elections, should be based on sharia. forming an alliance with Nidaa Tounes, and 12. In each wave, the Barometer endorsing the administrative reconciliation surveyed roughly 1,200 Tunisians. Read law. Ennahdha may therefore also be more at http://www.arabbarometer.org/ challenged by a more revolutionary report/tunisia. splinter party. 13. Importantly, the percentage of 4. Anne Wolf, Can Secular Parties Lead respondents who strongly support sharia the New Tunisia? (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie has remained relatively stable, at 14 percent See more issue briefs at: Endowment for International Peace, 2014). in 2011 and 12 percent in 2016. www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs 5. See, for instance, Monica Marks, 14. Said Ferjani, interview with author, Tunis, February 2, 2018. This publication was written by a “How big were the changes Tunisia’s researcher (or researchers) who 15. Habib Ellouz, interview with author, Ennahdha party just made at its national participated in a Baker Institute project. congress?” Monkey Cage (blog), The Tunis, February 9, 2018. Wherever feasible, this research is Washington Post, May 25, 2016, https:// 16. Chourou, interview. reviewed by outside experts before it is www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey- 17. Rafik Abdessalam, interview with released. However, the views expressed author, Tunis, February 10, 2018. herein are those of the individual cage/wp/2016/05/25/how-big-were-the- author(s), and do not necessarily changes-made-at--ennahda-just- represent the views of Rice University’s made-at-its-national-congress/?utm_ AUTHOR Baker Institute for Public Policy. term=.f9936d8e584d. 6. Each local branch of Ennahdha drafts Sharan Grewal is currently a Ph.D. candidate © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy their particular party list, which is then in politics at Princeton University. His sent to the executive board for approval or research agenda examines democratization This material may be quoted or modification. in the Middle East, with a focus on two reproduced without prior permission, 7. See, for instance, Keith T. Poole and actors: security forces and Islamist political provided appropriate credit is given to Howard Rosenthal, Ideology & Congress parties. He holds a bachelor’s degree summa the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, cum laude from Georgetown University, and 2005). To compute ideal points, I used the a master’s degree from Princeton University. Cover image credit: AFP emIRT approach proposed by Kosuke Imai, James Lo, and Jonathan Olmsted, “Fast Cite as: Estimation of Ideal Points with Massive Data,” Grewal, Sharan. 2018. Where Are American Political Science Review 110, no. 4 Ennahdha’s Competitors?. Issue brief no. 04.26.18. Rice University’s (2016): 631-56. Given the prevalence and Baker Institute for Public Policy, strategic nature of an abstention in the NCA, Houston, Texas. I used an ordinal IRT that allowed abstentions

5

ISSUE BRIEF 04.27.18 A Doomed Relationship: Ennahdha and Salafism

Sabrina Zouaghi, M.A., Laval University, Quebec, Canada Francesco Cavatorta, Ph.D., Laval University, Quebec, Canada

to the retreat of many young people from INTRODUCTION various forms of political participation. While Having weathered a period of volatility it is difficult to measure how large this after President Ben Ali’s sudden downfall, contingent is, there is evidence to suggest Tunisia’s main political and social actors that young people in Tunisia under 30 years saw in the mechanisms of a procedural of age are not as invested in elections and democracy the solution to their ideological electoral politics as their counterparts in and organizational problems. This coincided other states transitioning to democracy, with the will of the majority of Tunisians and such as South Africa in the early 1990s. For the hopes of the international community instance, the voter turnout for young people for the country’s stability. Yet success in this decreased 11 percentage points between process has led to the marginalization and Tunisia’s 2011 and 2014 elections (Yerkes exclusion of Salafism1—which represented 2017). While many young Salafis might have a considerable number of Tunisia’s other reasons not to participate in electoral marginalized youth—from the public sphere. politics, such as ideological ones, their Building on fieldwork carried out in 2015 marginalization and official exclusion from and 2017, this brief provides an overview social and political activism nonetheless of the complex relationship between compounds the problem of low youth While the narrative Ennahdha2 and Tunisian Salafism, and interest in Tunisia’s formal political process. regarding the explains why and how Ennahdha “betrayed” At the peak of Salafi mobilization in 2011 and close relationship 2012, up to 30,000 people—mostly young its Salafist constituency. We argue that between mainstream while Ennahdha’s actions have had positive men—participated in the annual consequences for the stabilization of congress of the largest Salafi movement in Islamists and Salafis is Tunisia’s political system and contributed the country. certainly an important to reducing the perceived polarization Similarly, democratic consolidation aspect of the transition has yet to deal with the causes that led between Islamists and laics, they have also to democracy in prevented Salafi associations and groups to to the rise of Salafism in the first place. voice legitimate grievances through radical Salafism is considered both an expression Tunisia, it tends to discourse and actions within a clear legal of socio-economic malaise and a tool of misrepresent the goals framework (Merone 2017). revolutionary mobilization that has a far of both Ennahdha and greater political dimension than one that is Relatively speaking, the issue of the Salafis. Salafism remains on the margins of current strictly religious or doctrinal. The majority debates on Tunisian politics. However, it is of Salafis in Tunisia were active in Ansar a central concern for the evolution of the al-Sharia, a Salafist movement with clear country’s relationship between religion and jihadi and revolutionary undertones that politics for several reasons. The official ban adapted to a transitional situation specific on Salafist discourses and practices that to Tunisia. Another movement, Political came into effect in the summer of 2013 led Salafism, emerged quickly in 2011 after RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.27.18

the fall of Ben Ali and attempted to make persuasions were motivated to act—to avoid inroads in parliament, but failed to mobilize passively witnessing what they perceived enough supporters to gain any elected could be the descent of post-revolutionary seats. A third movement, quietist Salafism Tunisia into a state based on un-Islamic (also referred to as scientific Salafism), built democratic pillars and corrupt morals (Grami on the institutions and networks that had 2014). The Salafis’ mobilization and activism emerged in the later years of the Ben Ali reflected their ideological leanings. During regime, positioning itself as an intermediary the elected assembly’s work to draft a new between the state and revolutionary constitution, Salafis pushed their agenda for Salafism. Its success was modest, however, a post-revolutionary Tunisia: a redefinition and revolutionary Salafis labeled quietist of tunisianité—or national identity—that sheikhs and scholars as “Salafi lights” to included a major role for Islam (Merone suggest that they did not have a genuine 2014). This would be achieved by recognizing attachment to a radical interpretation of the sharia as the sole source of legislation in the faith and the politics derived from it. new constitution: “we have the Quran and the sunna that give us an alternative: with our religion we can dominate the world, just THE SALAFISTS’ AGENDA FOR like we used to in the past” (Merone 2013). POST-REVOLUTIONARY TUNISIA In their vision, sharia would halt corruption and redistribute wealth: “where there is The quietist form of Salafism that originated sharia, there is a complete program—no during Ben Ali’s regime was tolerated by more divisions, injustice” (Marks 2013). the authorities for two reasons: From an Salafi groups used top-down (institutional ideological standpoint, quietist Salafism Ennahdha was more changes) and bottom-up (societal changes) favored the political status quo and did not strategies similar to those employed by the committed to building constitute a challenge to the regime. From more traditional Islamist movements during democratic institutions a more pragmatic perspective, the regime the 1980s and 1990s (Roy 1992). The main wanted to increase its religious legitimacy than to maintaining its goal was the Salafization of society through and respond to popular demands for a links with the Salafis, dawa (proselytizing). greater role of religion in society (Personal In the early stages of the transition to as Ennahdha had communication with former Ennahdha MP, democracy, it seemed that the Salafis would abandoned its radical March 2017; Zeghal 2013; Haugbølle 2015) handle “street politics” to generate support without permitting a politicized form of Islamist agenda in for a greater role of religion in guiding public it. Quietist Salafism is apolitical; therefore, the 1990s. policies, while Ennahdha would take care of it appealed to the Ben Ali regime. Similar “institutional politics” to lay the groundwork decisions to tolerate and even encourage to legally take over the country. This was quietist Salafism were made in Egypt, Jordan, a popular interpretation of Islamist politics , and Algeria during the 2000s. among secular, nationalist commentators Historically, Salafism has been divided and politicians (Sayah 2012). Yet it was a in terms of its relationship to institutional fundamental misreading of both the Salafis— politics and how the goal of the Islamic particularly Ansar al-Sharia—and Ennahdha, state should be achieved (Wiktorowicz as their relationship was much more 2006 Revolutionary and politicized Salafi complex and conflicted. groups emerged in Tunisia in the aftermath Initially, Salafis lacked political of the general amnesty law3 adopted on representation in the National Constituent February 19, 2011. The new public freedoms, Assembly because no Salafi party was together with the return of Ennahdha registered to participate in the 2011 to political prominence, represented an legislative elections, and no independent opportunity for Salafi groups to mobilize candidates from the government-legalized and play a long-denied public role through Jabhat Al-Islah4 were elected. In the the creation of civil society associations, Salafis’ search for a powerful ally against political parties, and individual initiatives secular parties, it seemed that Ennahdha (Cavatorta 2015). Salafis of all ideological could fill the role, particularly through its 2 A DOOMED RELATIONSHIP: ENNAHDHA AND SALAFISM

more conservative and traditionalist wing featuring Mohamed Hassan, a controversial represented by MPs such as Sadok Chourou Egyptian preacher (Business News 2013). and Habib Ellouze (International Crisis Group These examples underscore the fact that 2013). At the same time (according to a Salafis attempted to be closer to Ennahdha personal interview with a former Ennahdha irrespective of whether they recognized the MP), Ennahdha was trying to broaden its legitimacy of involvement in formal politics. voter base and to delegate tasks it could not While the narrative regarding the close perform as a major, credible elected political relationship between mainstream Islamists party—tasks such as filling the streets with and Salafis is certainly an important aspect young men demanding “the impossible,” i.e., of the transition to democracy in Tunisia, the creation of a sharia-based Islamic state it tends to misrepresent the goals of both (Cavatorta 2015). Accordingly, we observe Ennahdha and the Salafis. Ennahdha’s that both Ennahdha and Salafis professing strategy of inclusion was based on the a range of ideologies had interests that idea that Salafis should take part in the With time, it became coincided, and they worked together to transitional process in order to moderate clear that whatever an extent for what appear to be different the Salafis’ discourses through interactions links the Salafis had ends. In other words, both ostensibly had a with political movements of different with Ennahdha would common objective (the Islamization of the political persuasions (personal interview state through sharia), seemed to belong to with a former member of Ennahdha’s be severed once the the same ideological family, and played a politburo, March 2017) and to avoid their latter announced its complementary role in post-revolutionary marginalization in society. Ennahdha intention to refuse the Tunisia. In reality, Ennahdha wanted as many considered dialogue to be the only way to insertion of sharia in the votes and as much support as it could gather correct the Salafis’ strict, narrow religious constitution draft, and outside the assembly in order to negotiate interpretations (Greenberg 2015). Ennahdha from a position of strength with the elected also believed that the marginalization that violent episodes representatives of secular ideologies, all the of Salafism would represent a national attributed to Salafis while being fully aware that the most radical security threat and that the conciliatory and would increase. Islamist demands would never be accepted pragmatic path Ennahdha followed during by its prospective institutional partners. For its political integration in the 1990s and its part, Ansar al-Sharia wanted institutional 2000s was the best way forward. Ennahdha and political outcomes that were often was more committed to building democratic at odds with the will of the majority of institutions than maintaining its links with Tunisians and were ultimately unpalatable to the Salafis, as Ennahdha had abandoned its Rachid Ghannouchi’s party. radical Islamist agenda in the 1990s (Allani Joint participation in various activities 2009; Cavatorta and Merone 2013) and had such as demonstrations, political meetings, made it clear after the fall of Ben Ali that Ansar al-Sharia gatherings, and religious it would honor the agreement made with conferences reinforced the perception other opposition parties in October 2005 to of a close relationship between Salafis participate in the construction of a liberal- and Ennahdha. For example, a large democratic order in partnership with secular demonstration on March 16, 2012, featured and nationalist movements equally opposed various Islamist actors: “political” Salafis to Ben Ali’s rule. from Jabhat Al-Islah (Zelin 2012b); Ennahdha Three reasons stand out for rejecting the members, including MPs Sahbi Atig and idea that there was a united Islamic front Habib Ellouze; representatives from the of Ennahdha and the Salafis in opposition Tunisian Front of Islamic Associations; and to the secularists. First, the preservation of quietist Salafis (Radio-Canada 2012; AFP Ennahdha’s organization was paramount for 2012). Ghannouchi attended the founding the vast majority of decision-makers within congress of Jabhat Al-Islah; likewise, he the party and a successful transition to attended two Ansar al-Sharia official democracy was the only way to guarantee gatherings, along with fellow party members it, particularly after the Egyptian military Sadok Chourou and Habib Ellouze. The latter coup. Netterstrøm’s (2015) investigation two were also present during a conference of how the party’s leadership went about 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.27.18

convincing ordinary members and activists (Guazzone 2013), including “the leftists, of the necessity to drop the issue of sharia the Marxists, and the very secular elites” in the new constitution makes this clear. (Personal interviews with sitting Ennahdha Second, ideological change had taken MPs, March 2017). Such a move would also place within the party over time. It had create a “red line” that its political partners, become more moderate for years, and the Congrès pour la République (CPR)—a securing a smooth transition away from center-left secular political party—and the Ben Ali regime had been a priority. The Ettakatol, a social democratic political party, relative strength of the Salafis could be could not cross. Thus, the party’s shura, or employed to put pressure on other parties consulting council, issued a statement on during the negotiations over the text of March 26, 2012, confirming its commitment The radicalism the new constitution, but a successful to preserve Article 1 of Tunisia’s 1959 of Salafism was transition to democracy with the party as constitution as it stood. The article states marginalized in favor of one of its central actors was more of a that Islam is Tunisia’s religion, but it does a pragmatic approach priority than adhering to the radical Salafi not mention that its precepts should be to political change— agenda. Ennahdha’s priorities and interest employed as a source of legislation. in governing can be seen in its participation For their part, the Salafis saw the refusal but the success of the in a grand coalition with the secular Nidaa to insert sharia in the constitution as “giving liberal-democratic Tounes party following the 2014 elections, nothing to them” (Personal interview with institutions that despite the potential costs to Ennahdha. former Ennahdha MP, March 2017). This Ennahdha played a Third, Ennahdha represented a social class development, as anticipated, represented that had very little interest in radical and the breaking point in the relationship significant part in revolutionary change when it came to between the Salafis and Ennahdha. Indeed, creating has not led socio-economic issues (Merone 2014). This it led to profound disappointment and to improvements social class wanted to be integrated into the frustration among Salafis toward Ennahdha in Tunisia’s socio- state and “share” in the project of national because many considered the party to construction from which they had been belong to a common Islamist front for the economic conditions. excluded since Tunisia’s independence Islamization of state and society (Personal from France in the 1950s. Like its political interview with former Ennahdha MP, representative, Ennahdha, this middle-class March 2017). In addition, there existed a social bloc had no interest in subverting the certain level of misunderstanding on the socio-economic order. part of political actors and commentators With time, it became clear that as to what Salafis wanted and stood for. whatever links the Salafis had with This was because the Salafis’ ideological Ennahdha would be severed once the boundaries had not been clearly identified latter announced its intention to refuse and Salafis themselves, for several reasons, the insertion of sharia in the constitution had difficulty expressing—beyond easy draft, and that violent episodes attributed sloganeering—what they wanted. to Salafis would increase. In this complex First, the complexity of the Salafi situation, many within Ennahdha maintained political landscape was underestimated in a pragmatic approach, a moderate discourse, political circles in Tunisia and abroad. While and a long-term vision (Personal interview some Salafis—the so-called politicos— with member of Ennahdha, March 2017) disagreed with Ennahdha on the issue of when it came to the Salafis. Some within the sharia, they did not break entirely with party had argued for Ennahdha to walk back institutional politics. Instead, they promoted from its position on sharia, and to instead their radical policy positions (such as the push for its addition to the constitution creation of a morality police) in the free because it could represent a potential market of ideas created during electoral political gain in the 2014 elections (Personal campaigns, although they failed to elect a interview with former constituent Ennahdha single representative. MP, March 2017). However, the “costs” were Second, Ansar al-Sharia represented deemed too high, i.e., a polarized society a social bloc that did not seek inclusion around pro- and anti-sharia contingents in the state. Instead, it called for the 4 A DOOMED RELATIONSHIP: ENNAHDHA AND SALAFISM

dismantlement of the liberal-democratic Ennahdha MP, March 2017). Notwithstanding institutional system being created because the criticism leveled against it, Ennahdha the group had never benefited from it, and advocated for democracy and women’s would not do so if a compromise on the rights, notably by campaigning for a Code of concept of tunisianité were to be reached Personal Status that would establish equality through liberal-democratic institutions. between men and women in many areas, A “continuation of the revolution through and against polygamy (Personal interview Salafism” found support in areas of the with current Ennahdha MP, March 2017). country that had always been marginalized and deprived of socio-economic opportunities (Lamloum and Ben Zina 2016). CONCLUSION In many ways, the relationship between Contrary to the expectations of those who the Salafis, in particular those linked to Ansar observe Tunisian politics, the relationship al-Sharia, and Ennahdha was doomed from between Ennahdha and the Salafis was the start. The vitriol following the ban on destined for failure. Religious and doctrinal Ansar al-Sharia is testimony to that. Salafis differences between the two were not began issuing several virulent critiques only profound, but they also masked a toward Ennahdha and its deputies when it class conflict of sort. While Ennahdha became apparent in mid-2013 that Ansar finds support among the pious bourgeoisie, al-Sharia’s legal status would be withdrawn Salafis are strong in disenfranchised and that Ennahdha would drop them in working class areas where citizens are favor of consolidating its ties with Tunisian much more interested in material gains political actors committed to the new and the subversion of the social order, as liberal-democratic order (Personal interview promised by the revolution. The radicalism with current Ennahdha MP, March 2017). of Salafism was marginalized in favor of Salafism offers different The Salafis’ scathing critiques recounted a pragmatic approach to political change the numerous concessions Ennahdha had paths of mobilization, in the post-Ben Ali era—but the success made to save the troïka government5 and and a radical political of the liberal-democratic institutions former members of Ben Ali’s party. Such that Ennahdha played a significant part agenda could compromises collided with the Islamist in creating has not led to improvements re-emerge in the face mission, according to Salafis. Salafis also in Tunisia’s socio-economic conditions. accused Ennahdha of being a puppet of of Tunisia’s current This failure threatens to undermine the the West and Israel (Personal interview social and economic consolidation of democracy and suggests with former Ennahdha MP, March 2017), that while Salafism might have disappeared difficulties. focusing on its own interests as a “normal” from the public scene, many of the reasons political entity rather than on promoting why a large number of young people Islamic values in politics (Boukhars 2017). looked to it for revolutionary purity and Accompanying this criticism were public inspiration have not. For the moment, Salafi denunciations of Ennahdha members by revolutionary radicalism is manifested in Salafis—an attempt to delegitimize the isolated acts of political violence, but armed religious credentials of Ennahdha’s ideology jihadism is unlikely to topple Tunisia’s and suggest that the party’s progressive democratic institutions. Of much greater principles contradicted the values of Islam concern is the widespread dissatisfaction (Personal interview with current Ennahdha with the lack of socio-economic progress, MP, March 2017). Finally, Ennahdha’s particularly among young people. Salafism deputies were labeled atheists, traitors, and offers different paths of mobilization, and kuffar (nonbelievers) (Personal interviews a radical political agenda could re-emerge with current Ennahdha MPs, March 2017). in the face of Tunisia’s current social and At the same time, Ennahdha escalated its economic difficulties. In light of this, both anti-Salafi discourse to distance itself from domestic and international actors interested Salafis, stating the latter were “intruders in the stability of the Tunisian regime should in Islam” and “extreme among extreme not take the defeat of Salafism for granted. individuals” (Personal interview with current 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.27.18

Greenberg, Nathaniel. 2015. “The Rise and ENDNOTES Fall of Abu ‘Iyadh: Reported Death 1. Salafism is an ultraconservative and Leaves Questions Unanswered.” literalist interpretation of Islam. Jadaliyya, July 13, 2015. http://www. 2. Ennahdha is the main Tunisian jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22176/the- Islamist party. It has now become the party rise-and-fall-of-abu-‘iyadh_reported- of Muslim democrats and has officially death-lea. separated its religious and political activities. Guazzone, Laura. 2013. “Ennahdha Islamists 3. Amnesty legislation came into effect and the Test of Government in Tunisia.” in February 2011 and allowed for the release The International Spectator: Italian of all political prisoners incarcerated during Journal of International Affairs 48 (4): the Ben Ali regime. 30–50. 4. Jabhat Al-Islah is a Salafi party Haugbølle, Rikke Hostrup. 2015. “New that opted to participate in democratic Expressions of Islam in Tunisia: An institutional politics. Ethnographic Approach.” The Journal of 5. The first post-Ben Ali elected North African Studies 20 (3): 319–35. government was a coalition of three parties— International Crisis Group. 2013. “Tunisie: Ennahdha, Ettakatol, and CPR—commonly violences et défi salafiste” (Tunisia: referred to as the troïka. Violence and the Salafi Challenge). Middle East/North Africa Report no. 137, Brussels. REFERENCES Lamloum, Olfa and Mohamed Ali Ben Zina. 2016. Les jeunes de Douar Hich er et Allani, Alaya. 2009. “The Islamists in d'Ettadhamen: Une enquête sociologique Tunisia Between Confrontation and (The young people of and Participation: 1980–2008.” The Journal Ettadhamen: A sociological inquiry). of North African Studies 14 (2): 257–72. Tunis: Arabesques. Boukhars, Anouar. 2017. “The fragility of “Manifestation pro-charia en Tunisie” (Pro- elite settlement in Tunisia.” African sharia demonstration in Tunisia). 2012. Security Review 26 (3): 257–70. Radio-Canada with Agence France- Business News. 2013.“Tunisie? Le prédicateur Presse, March 16, 2012. http://radio- Mohamed Hassen remplit la coupole canada.ca/nouvelle/554029/tunisie- d’El Menzah.” April 30. https://bit. islamistes-salafiste. ly/2HNkmYG. Marks, Monica. 2013. “Youth Politics and Cavatorta, Francesco. 2015. “Salafism, Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Liberalism and Democratic Learning Jihadi Current.” Mediterranean Politics in Tunisia.” Journal of North African 18 (1): 104–11. Studies 20 (5): 1–14. Merone, Fabio. 2017. “Between social Cavatorta, Francesco and Fabio Merone. contention and takfirism: the evolution 2013. “Moderation through exclusion? of the Salafi-jihadi movement in Tunisia.” The journey of the Tunisian Ennahdha Mediterranean Politics 22 (1): 71–90. from fundamentalist to conservative Merone, Fabio. 2014. “Enduring Class party.” Democratization 20 (5): 857–75. Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity Ghannouchi, Rachid. 2016. “The evolution beyond Political Islam.” British Journal of Political Islam during the transition.” of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (1): 74–87. In The : Part 2 Merone, Fabio. 2013. “Salafism in Tunisia: (New York: United Nations Development An Interview with a Member of Ansar Programme), 173–82. al-Sharia.” Jadaliyya, April 11, 2013. Grami, Amel. 2014. “The Debate on Religion, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/ Law and Gender in Post-Revolution index/11166/salafism-in-tunisia_ Tunisia.” Philosophy and Social Criticism an-interview-with-a-member-of-. 40 (4–5): 391–400. 6 A DOOMED RELATIONSHIP: ENNAHDHA AND SALAFISM

Netterstrøm, Kasper. 2015. “The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia.” Journal of AUTHORS Democracy 26 (4): 111–24. Sabrina Zouaghi, M.A., obtained a joint Roy, Olivier. 1992. “Les voies de la master's degree in international relations ré-islamisation” (The ways of and in law at Laval University in Quebec, re-Islamization), Pouvoirs 62: 81–91. Canada. Her research project examined Watanabe, Lisa and Fabien Merz. 2017. the role of Salafi movements during the “Tunisia’s Jihadi problem and how to deal transition to democracy in Tunisia. This issue brief is part with it.” Middle East Policy 24 (4): 136–47. of a two-year research Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2006. “Anatomy of Francesco Cavatorta, Ph.D., is an project on pluralism in the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict associate professor of political science at the Middle East after & Terrorism 29 (2): 207–40. Laval University in Quebec, Canada. His research focuses on democratization and the Arab uprisings. Wolf, Anne. 2017–2018. “Beyond the authoritarianism in the Arab world; political The project is generously ‘Revolution’: authoritarian revival and parties and Islamist movements; and elite reconfiguration in Tunisia.” The supported by a grant international relations in the Arab world. Middle East in London 14 (1): 12–13. from the Carnegie He received a Ph.D. in political science Yerkes, Sarah. 2017. Young people are staying from Trinity College in Dublin, Ireland, and Corporation of New York. away from Tunisian politics—here’s why. a master’s in international relations from Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, Syracuse University. March 20. https://www.brookings. edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/20/young- people-are-staying-away-from- tunisian-politics-heres-why/.

Zeghal, Malika. 2013. “Competing Ways See more issue briefs at: of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs Public Order in the Tunisian Transition.” Constellations 20 (2): 254–74. This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who Zelin, Aaron. 2012a. “Tunisia’s Contentious participated in a Baker Institute project. Transition.” Al-Wasat, August 23. Wherever feasible, this research is https://thewasat.wordpress.com/ reviewed by outside experts before it is category/hizb-ut-tahrir-tunisia/. released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual ——— . 2012b. Who is Jabhat Al-Islah? author(s), and do not necessarily New York: Carnegie Endowment represent the views of Rice University’s for International Peace, July 18. Baker Institute for Public Policy. http://carnegieendowment.org/ sada/?fa=48885. © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

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Cite as: Zoughaghi, Sabrina, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2018. A Doomed Relationship: Ennahdha and Salafism. Issue brief no. 04.27.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

7

ISSUE BRIEF 04.30.18 The Reconfiguration of Ennahdha’s Recruitment Strategy in Tunisia

Maryam Ben Salem, Ph.D., University of Sousse, Tunisia

Currently, Ennahdha presents itself as a conservative political party. In its 10th THE FORMER RECRUITMENT PROCESS congress in June 2016, the party announced At its inception in the early 1970s, that it had adopted a specialization policy Ennahdha’s recruitment process featured (takhassus) that formally separates its an initiation phase as its central element. preaching and political activities. Islam is During this phase, religiosity was a primary no longer considered to be a total political concern for membership and a key project as expressed in the slogan “al dimension of a neophyte’s identity. This islam din wa dawla” (“Islam is religion phase consisted of three stages: 1) the circle and state”), but rather, a system of ethical stage (halaqa. ) corresponded to a period of values that guides the policy choices of initial religious learning activity; 2) the open Ennahdha in the economic, political, and cell stage (osra maftouha. ) was for political social arenas. skills acquisition and activist identity- 1 This brief will discuss Ennahdha’s building; and 3) the closed cell (osra ideological renewal through the prism of moghlaqa) stage featured integration into recent changes in the party’s recruitment the group as a full member, with an oath of procedures. Ennahdha membership has allegiance. These three stages—fundamental grown from an estimated 10,000 adherents to the process of conversion to Ennahdha’s The Ennahdha party in the 1990s to about 100,000 today for Islamist ideology—touched on both an entry several reasons. The party ranks grew into the sacred and a desacralization of separated its preaching significantly following the end of Ben Ali activist motivations. and political activities regime, as the political costs of Ennahdha There were two main paths in the in 2016. Islam is now affiliation were no longer high. Likewise, initiation phase: preaching or political considered a system the party has adopted a policy of openness action. The supervisor (mushrif) assumed a (infitah) that removed various recruitment critical role in this process; he was tasked of ethical values that criteria that once limited its activist base. with discovering a neophyte’s skills and guides the party’s Given these changes, I ask the following: predilection for a religious or political path. policy choices in the what are the effects of these changes on While some activists worked in and Ennahdha’s party identity? How might such economic, political, engaged in social action, others were active and social arenas. changes in recruitment practices affect at college campuses and in student groups. party members’ relationship with and Political activism became especially prevalent loyalty to Ennahdha? In answering these with the second generation of Ennahdha questions, I will comparatively analyze activists who had gained experience at Ennahdha’s former and present-day university campuses throughout the 1980s. recruitment procedures. This distinction is also critical to better understand the contemporary divisions RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.30.18

within the party, i.e., to move beyond for the Islamist insider. Likewise, secrecy the idea of a simple dichotomy between performs a group identification function. The radicals and moderates in Ennahdha. The exclusivism generated by secrecy implies a training received by the older generation of sense of belonging to a distinct group that is members focused on their political-religious composed of qualified people united by their qualifications and the internalization of the beliefs and ideology. group’s motivation. It was up to the murshid This cult of distinction—grounded in to define the mission to which the activist the principle of adherence to Islam and would commit, to recognize the specific rooted in religious qualification—diminished aptitude required to fulfill the mission, and over time in favor of the more material Ennahdha as a political to proceed with a specific form of social rewards generated by activism, such as party will no longer and cultural activism in order to uphold the official positions within the group or access oversee religious group’s Islamist ideology. to patronage. A key component of the initiation activities. The new process was the notion of elevation (isticla). policy is part of the This was intended to differentiate an A POLICY OF OPENNESS Ennahdha initiate from the masses: “Our movement's survival The policy of openness (al-infitah) adopted mission is to distinguish ourselves and strategy in a new by Ennahdha fundamentally altered the to carry the flame for those lost in the party’s recruitment process. This policy is political context. meanders of the Earth and the labyrinths a direct consequence of its specialization of deserts.”2 The initiate had to consider policy. The core of the specialization policy himself/herself superior by standing out is that Ennahdha as a political party will from the masses, rejecting their values, no longer oversee religious activities (i.e., and proving his/her distinction. The idea preaching and sermons in mosques, or of elevation implied a total break with a through civil society organizations). While society that was regarded as impious. This members are free to participate in religious concept of society thus opens the way to a activities as individuals, any member holding process of communalization in the Weberian an elected office or a leadership position sense—a subjective feeling of belonging to within the party cannot simultaneously a distinctive community. In this regard, a hold a leadership position within a religious separation from broader society reflects organization or engage in preaching. the prophet’s exile (hijra) to Medina in Many factors contributed to Ennahdha’s 622, following conflicts with unbelievers adoption of the specialization policy. First, the in Mecca. This exile constitutes the core main argument in favor of specialization was “mobilizing utopian construction” of the that a dictatorship—and the threat it posed to Muslim world, according to French historian religious freedoms—was no longer in power. Maxime Rodinson.3 During the initial phase, The Arab-Muslim identity was no longer in the reference to the prophet’s life served peril, as was the case under the Bourguiba several functions: it allowed the neophyte to and Ben Ali regimes. According to party grasp the importance of action to transform officials,4 Ennahdha’s previous demands for the world, to undertake such actions and the Islamization of state and society were conform to the will of God, and to confer the result of restrictions placed on political sacredness to the actions. parties. However, re-Islamization is no longer The context in which the early pertinent given the renewed religiosity in Ennahdha generations evolved necessitated Tunisia since the 2000s. Hence, Hamadi the use of secrecy. Secrecy served a dual Jebali, a former Ennahdha leader, and head function: protection against repression of government under the troika,5 declared under the regimes of and that he was delighted to see that Ennahdha’s Ben Ali, and the formation of forces capable dream of lifting the ban on the veil was of opposition. Secrecy also strengthens realized without the party’s help. Indeed, the the demarcation between the insider and resurgence of religiosity in Tunisia began the outsider, thereby serving a valorization in the 2000s under the influence of Arab function. Knowing what the outsider does satellite television channels. Apparent signs of 2 not is a source of pride and distinction THE RECONFIGURATION OF ENNAHDHA’S RECRUITMENT STRATEGY IN TUNISIA this development include massive attendance the sacrifices made for the Islamist cause at mosques and, as mentioned earlier, the contributed to an unflagging loyalty to the wearing of the veil by women.6 Moreover, movement and a great sense of solidarity while the 2014 constitution guarantees among its members. religious freedoms, it clearly states that The specialization policy fundamentally Islam is the religion of the Tunisian state. As altered the party’s recruitment process. such, Ennahdha has access to the democratic Since the policy’s adoption, Ennahdha’s process to influence policy choices, including stated goal is to function only as a political those that counter the party’s vision of Islam, party in which membership is no longer according to party officials. exclusive to those who share the same A second argument for specialization political-religious ethos. New members is that Ennahdha’s current political must, in principle, be exclusively interested challenge involves its ability to propose in political work. This entails, then, the viable solutions to Tunisia’s political and end of exclusivism, i.e., the policy of economic problems. Yet the responses and reserving entry into Ennahdha to those policies proposed and adopted by the party who have been initiated; it also creates the must also conform to Islam to the extent need to open the party to all who share Compared to older possible. A bill on Awqaf in October 2013 Ennahdha’s vision, whether Muslim or not. members, new 7 is a case in point. Although the bill, which Indeed, political competition demands the members are less aimed to resurrect the institution of Awqaf, broadening of the party’s electoral base. has not been adopted by the National Membership in Ennahdha today follows intensely engaged in Constituent Assembly (NCA), it remains a conventional methods of political party party activities. The priority for Ennahdha because of its symbolic recruitment. A prospective member need fully committed activist significance in Islamic law.8 For Islamist only apply for membership in order to obtain who sacrificed his activists who have long been immersed in his/her membership card and gain voting Islamist ideology and for whom religion is a rights within the party; nonetheless, an private life and studies, part of their identity, such symbolic acts of introduction by an existing member of the and who took risks Islamic idealism will continue to be part of party remains de rigueur. The application for for the Islamist cause, their political discourse. membership is only accepted if an Ennahdha has given way to the Third, specialization policy is part of member testifies to the character and distant activist who the movement’s survival strategy in a integrity of the applicant. The new recruit new political context. While maintaining must go through a probationary period does not hesitate to its presence in the social and religious of one year before he or she is eligible for turn his back on the fields, the movement protects itself from positions of responsibility at the local level, party at the slightest accusations that it is using Islam for and two years before he or she is eligible for disagreement. electoral purposes. positions at the central level. An academy primarily catering to young members has been set up to train new recruits. The NEW ENTRY PROCEDURES: A trainers in the academy are Tunisian and DECREASE OF LOYALTY? foreign experts in communication and other skills, as opposed to being party activists. As explained earlier, party mobilization The religious component of recruitment has expanded in the mid-1980s. Recruitment thus been abandoned in favor of training in and initiation procedures were relaxed due areas such as communication, diplomacy, to the expansion of Ennahdha and its activist economics, political regimes, and electoral base. Members were integrated without systems. Fifty-two members were involved always going through the first level of the in the first year of the program, which was organizational hierarchy. Nonetheless, social launched in July 2017; the second class control mechanisms remained strong. (February 2018) had around 200 people. The new entrants were supervised by their New party members who joined between predecessors in the areas of ideological 2011 and 2017 were therefore not a part of transformation, knowledge of Islamist the new training program. As a result, there doctrine, and appropriate social behavior. is a great level of heterogeneity among At the same time, the hardships suffered and party members and a shift toward the new 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.30.18

members’ ideas of what the party is and who live in rural areas, and which most should stand for. Indeed, some discomfort Islamists support, favors the return of is felt among the older members, especially traditional values such as modesty, gender those who entered the party with the segregation, and chastity. As a result, ambition to assume positions of power or Ennahdha’s newly proclaimed conservative to benefit from the political protection that party identity is likely to resonate among a party in power could offer. Due to the new entrants. Yet neither the party’s new recruitment changes, some view Ennahdha identity nor its strategy satisfies everyone as a new Democratic Constitutional Rally within the party. A party official stated: (RCD)—a party to distribute aid, patronage, For the moment, we are not yet able to and favors of all kinds. recruit members or to collect votes in a Compared to older members, new district like yours [District of Menzah],10 members are less intensely engaged in party either because we are seen as too activities. The fully committed activist who conservative or because we have not done While the elders still sacrificed his private life and studies, and enough to achieve it … We did not conduct dominate the party who took risks for the Islamist cause has a rational and pragmatic reading of the and have managed to given way to the distant activist who does electoral map. We risk losing everything if not hesitate to turn his back on the party in maintain control of we seek to broaden our electoral base by the case of the slightest disagreement, and addressing very different groups and using it, new members are who voices dissent or only participates in contradictory discourses.11 bound to eventually elections. This shift reflects not only societal become the party changes but also a weakening of the group’s Moreover, a kind of ostracism still exists solidarity and attachment to the cause. within Ennahdha. For instance, a smoker will majority and eventually Disengagement, therefore, has become overtake the decision- face discrimination in a subtle way, even if easier; shared experiences that once the party rules do not sanction exclusionary making positions within provoked excitement or were sources of practices based on personal behavior. the party. pain no longer define Ennahdha membership. Despite higher levels of heterogeneity One member noted: among the rank and file, informal control If I am in conflict with one of the brothers over the morality of new members and [the older ones], it will not alter our the selection process of party officials relationship because there are strong leads to a relatively homogenous and more links between us. However, the only link conservative party leadership. between us and the new member is the While significant changes have taken membership card. We have no idea if place in the party’s recruitment strategy, he understands or not our ideal Islamic the extent of their impact—as far as repository [shared values and practices].9 Ennahdha’s move away from political Islam is concerned—remains unclear. Although the party has instituted measures to WHAT LIES AHEAD signal changes, it remains timid and often imbued in ambivalence. This ambivalence is Despite radical changes to Ennahdha particularly visible in the conflict between recruitment, membership is not entirely the party’s admittance of non-Muslims and open. The first wave of new Ennahdha non-Islamists on one hand, and its emphasis entrants was primarily composed of on Islamic references and strong morality movement sympathizers, especially those on the other hand. It leads us to believe that related to an existing member of Ennadha the changing political and social context in who were unable to join during the Ben Ali Tunisia necessitated the newly instituted regime; however, this wave lacked social changes, especially following Ennahdha’s diversity. Ennahdha continues to recruit lackluster performance in the seat of power. from the conservative, petite bourgeoisie If we take seriously the assertion by and the lower socioeconomic classes, both Tunisian political and intellectual elites that of which mirror the traditional Islamist the specialization policy is merely a decoy profile in Tunisia. The conservatism to allow Ennahdha to continue functioning cultivated by the middle class and those 4 THE RECONFIGURATION OF ENNAHDHA’S RECRUITMENT STRATEGY IN TUNISIA in the religious sphere, the strategy Congress for the Republic, and Ettakatol appears to be unsustainable because the parties in December 2011. transformations at work in party recruitment 6. Maryam Ben Salem, “Le voile will alter the party’s activist base in the islamique en Tunisie. La réalisation de long-term. While the elders still dominate soi entre traditionalisme et modernité,” the party and have managed to maintain Revue des mondes musulmans et de la control, new members are bound to Méditerranée REMMM 128 (2010): 61-77. eventually become the party majority and Maryam Ben Salem et François Gauthier, eventually overtake the decision-making “Téléprédication et port du voile en Tunisie,” This issue brief is part positions. This strategy could portend a Social Compass, Special issue: Religion in a of a two-year research radical transformation of Ennahdha into Consumer Society, 58 no. 3 (2011): 323-330. a secular party in the long-term unless it 7. The institution of Awqaf was project on pluralism in manages to do one of two things: 1) maintain liquidated in the aftermath of independence. the Middle East after a bridge between members from different It is defined as “Holding certain property the Arab uprisings. generations so that older members can and preserving it for the confined benefit The project is generously transfer their vision for Islamic activism to of certain philanthropy and prohibiting any the younger members, or 2) retain control use or disposition of it outside that specific supported by a grant over preaching and the social and charitable objective.” See M. Kahf, “Waqf: A Quick from the Carnegie activism of its base. Provided that the party Overview,” February 3, 2015, retrieved from Corporation of New York. has anchored itself politically and socially kahf.net at http://monzer.kahf.com/papers/ in the specialization policy, the odds for the english/WAQF_A_QUICK_OVERVIEW.pdf. successful implementation of either of these 8. Personal interview with Ridha Saidi, two options remain low. who was in charge of Ennahdha’s planning and studies section, January 2018. 9. Author interview with Mohamed ENDNOTES Gueloui, January 2018. 10. In the 2011 and 2014 elections, 1. This brief is based on the data See more issue briefs at: Ennahdha fared poorly in the District of produced by a qualitative survey conducted www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs between 2006 and 2013 with members of Menzah, in the Tunis Governorate. Ennahdha for my Ph.D. thesis. See Maryam 11. Personal interview with Abdelhamid This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who Ben Salem, “Le militantisme en contexte Jelassi, January 2018. participated in a Baker Institute project. répressif. Cas du mouvement islamiste Wherever feasible, this research is tunisien [Militantism in a Repressive AUTHOR reviewed by outside experts before it is Context. The Case of the Tunisian Islamist released. However, the views expressed Movement],” Ph.D. thesis in political Maryam Ben Salem, Ph.D., is an assistant herein are those of the individual science under the direction of Daniel Gaxie, professor in political science at the author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Panthéon-Sorbonne Université, 2013. It University of Sousse in Tunisia. She is also Baker Institute for Public Policy. is also based on the preparatory work for an associate fellow at the Center of Arab a new research project I am engaged in Women for Training and Research and the © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute (interviews conducted in January 2018 with vice-president of the Association Tunisienne for Public Policy eight leaders of Ennahdha). D’études Politiques. Ben Salem’s research This material may be quoted or 2. Sayyid Qutb (our translation). focuses on political Islam and political reproduced without prior permission, participation. She obtained a degree in provided appropriate credit is given to political science from Saint Joseph University the author and Rice University’s Baker 3. Maxime Rodinson, L’islam: politique et in and her Ph.D. in political science Institute for Public Policy. croyance (Paris: Fayard, 1993). from Panthéon-Sorbonne Université. 4. Personal interviews with Abdelhamid Cite as: Ben Salem, Maryam. 2018. The Jelassi, Mohamed Gueloui, Ridha Driss, Reconfiguration of Ennahdha’s Ridha Barouni, Fethi Ayadi, and Ridha Saidi, Recruitment Strategy in Tunisia. January 2018. Issue brief no. 04.30.18. 5. Troika refers to the coalition Rice University’s Baker Institute government formed by the Ennahdha, for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

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