BennoGaljar t
Departmentof rural sociology of the tropicsand subtropics, Agricultural University, Wageningen, theNetherlands
Peasantmobilizatio nan dsolidarit y
Ipudoe1
CentreforAgriculturalPublishingandDocumentation Wageningen-1976
^y>w\ Presentaddres so fth eauthor : Rijksuniversiteit teLeide n Faculteitde rsocial ewetenschappe n Subfaculteit der cultureleantropologi ee nsociologi ede rniet-westers evolke n Stationsplein 10 Leiden,th eNetherland s
ISBN90-220-0602- 6 © Centrefo rAgricultura lPublishin gan dDocumentation ,Wageningen ,1976 . No part of this book may be reproduced and/or published in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm oran yothe rmean swithou twritte npermissio nfro m thepublishers . I » ' } -—r
Tableo fcontent s
Prefaceto th eDutc heditio n 1
Prefacet oth eEnglis h edition 2
Chapter 1 Probleman dtheoretica lframewor k 3
Chapter2 Researchmethod san dth eresearcher' svalue s 12 2.1 Thepreliminar y investigation 12 2.2 Thesurvey s 14 2.3 Theanthropologica fieldl researc h 15 2.4 Myow nvalue s 17
Chapter3 Themobifzatio no fpeasant si nLati nAmerica : Approacht oa theor y 20 3.1 Definition andbrie fdescriptio n 20 3.2 Kindso floca linterests :a mode l 21 3.3 Local,structura l obstaclest o mobilization 25 3.4 Structural and cultural conditions for peasant mobilization on the nationalleve l 28 3.5 Factorsleadin gt o aweakenin go fth epatronag e relationship 34 3.6 Obstacles to mobilization present in theloca l culture and their possible removal 37 3.7 Classawarenes san d theaim so fmobilizatio n 40
Chapter4 Mobilizationi nChile : testingpar to fth etheor y 44 4.1 Introduction 44 4.2 Analysis of the differences between comunas with and without syndi cates 44 4.3 Correlations ofth edegre eo forganizatio n 49 4.4 Multipleregressio n analysist oexplai nth edegre eo forganizatio n 50 4.5 Conclusion 54
Chapters Mobilization with noloca l opponent:th e small independentpeasant s andthei rco-operativ e 55 5.1 Introduction 55 5.2 Thespontaneou s settingu po fco-operative s 56 5.3 Theinduce d co-operative 56 5.4 Theimplici t ideology 59 5.5 Casedescriptio n 61 5.6 Postscript 66
Chapter6 Members andnon-member so fassociation s 67 6.1 Introduction 67 6.2 The syndicates 67 6.2.1 Hypotheses 67 6.2.2 Results 69 6.2.3 Themember : anideal-typica l portrait 75 6.2.4 Thenon-member s 76 6.2.5 Multiplecorrelatio n 77 6.3 The co-operatives 78 6.3.1 Introduction 78 6.3.2 Hypotheses 78 6.3.3 Results 79 6.3.4 Localdifference s 86
Chapter7 Leadershipan dparticipatio n 90 7.1 Thefunction s ofleader s 90 7.2 Thedysfunction s ofleadershi p 91 7.3 Thedifference s between leaders and memberso f syndicates 93 7.4 Thedifference s between leaders and memberso f co-operatives 95 7.5 Participation and oligarchization 95
Chapter8 Co-operation and solidarity 98 8.1 Introduction 98 8.2 Peasant interests and conflicts ofinteres t 99 8.3 Solidarity 101 8.4 Factors whichinfluenc e solidarity 106 8.4.1 Theinstrumenta l valueo fth eassociatio n 106 8.4.2 The common opponent 109 8.4.3 Support for certain values:equality ,justice ,participatio n 110 8.4.4 Affection 110 8.4.5 Compensations:reciprocity , prestige,leadershi p and suspicion 112 8.4.6 Social control 113 8.4.7 Braking factors: differences in status and sub-group solidarity 114 8.4.8 Therol eo fpolitic s 117 8.5 Solutions 119 8.6 Recommendations 121
Epilogue: Theoretical andpractica l conclusionsfo rpolicy-maker s 124
References 127
Subjectinde x 131 vi Preface to theDutc h edition
Thefield researc h in Chile upon which the greater part of this book is based, was carriedou tbetwee nJun e196 9an dSeptembe r 1970.Fro mth eNetherland sOrganizatio n for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO)I received a scholarshipwhic h covered my research and travelling expenses,whil eth e Agricultural University of Wageningen granted me leave to spend over a year in Chile. I am exceedingly grateful to both organizations for theopportunit y thusoffere d me,bu t acceptsol eresponsibilit y for the manner inwhic h I availed ofit . In ChileI received hospitality from theInstitut e deCapacitació n eInvestigació ne n Reforma Agraria, established in Santiago. This organization was of particular helpi n providingm ewit hintroductions .I a mgratefu l toSolo nBaracloug han dDavi dAlalu ffo r their readiness to smooth my path with a note or a telephone call. In addition I had frequent contact with a number of members of the scientific staff. I am particularly grateful to Hugo Zemelman, Sergio Gomez and Emilio Klein for their many services, large and small.Ther e is noroo m to mention hereal lth eCOR A and INDAP officials whogav eu pthei rtim es ofreel yt oa ninterchang eo fideas ,introduce dm et ofarmin gcom munitiesan dallowe dm et oaccompan ythe mo nthei rfiel dtrips .A nexceptio nmus tb emad e forJuli oManrique z andAlejandr oRui zLamas ,wh obecam em yfriends . Since my research entailed visits to a large number of places, I got to know many peasants and peasant leaders. Although the exact nature of my intentions may not alwayshav ebee nclea r tothem ,I wa streate d everywherewit hgrea tcourtes y andhelp fulness. Myintention shav eno wbecom efac t inth efor m of abook . Ihop etha tb ycor rectlyinterpretin gthei rthoughts ,action s andaspiration sI hav eredeeme da tleas tpar to f thedeb t Iow ethem . Theresearc hwa scarrie dou tdurin gth elas tyear so fPresiden tFrei' sgovernmen tan d theboo kwritte n duringth ethre eyear stha tPresiden tAllend ewa si npower .Afte r itwa s finished thearm yseize dpowe ri nChile . Sinceth eboo ki sno tintende da sa descriptio no f Chilean affairs but rather as an attempt at sociological theorizing on peasants who organize and on the vicissitudes of their organizations, I do not believetha t the altered situation in Chile since 1970ha s affected its validity. It does sadden methoug h that it should appear at atime whe n those to whom it was addressed, albeitobliquely ,whos e idealismI frequentl y counteredwit hm ymor epragmati capproach ,hav elos tthei rjob so r been obliged to leaveChile .Th efac t that Id ono t always sharethei r opinions doesno t meantha t Irejec t their aspirations.O nth econtrary ,thi sboo ki sintende da sa contribu tion towards achieving those objectives. Our discussion wasrudel y interrupted by out siders,bu t will surelyb econtinue d at anothertime an di nanothe rplace .
Wageningen,Septembe r 1973 Preface to the English edition
Thankst oa furthe r grantfro m ZWO,th eDutc htext ,afte r somemino rrevisions ,ha s beentranslate d intoEnglish .I a mgratefu l to Rudiva nLier ,Emanue ld eKad t andDic k Papousek for their critical reading of the Dutch edition of the book. Some of the blemishes they pointed out havebee n eliminated. Others I havelef t in, for the reader's sake, or for my own. I owe gratitude to Mrs Mary Foran for the care with which she translated thebook , andt o Ineke Smeetsfo r theconstructio n of anindex .
Leiden,Jun e 1975 Chapter 1 Problem aed theoretical framework
This book deals with the sociological aspects of the mobilization of and solidarity amongpeasants .Althoug hmos to fth edat awer egathere di nChile ,I believ etha tm ycon clusionsposses sa wide rvalidity .Unlik eothe rauthors ,wh oreserv eth eter mpeasant sfo r independent small agrarian producers,I understand by thister m allthos emor eo rles s poor peoplewh oear n their livingi n agriculture.Thi swoul dinclud ethos ewh owor ko n thelan d solelyfo r paymenti nmoney 1.1 shallcal lthes epeopl epeasant sand ,wheneve rit . becomes necessary todistinguis h betweencategories ,spea k of smallholders(tha tis ,in dependent producers,whethe r theyow nth elan dthe ywork ,ren tit ,o rsharecro p it)and, agriculturallabourer s(eithe r permanent ortemporary) . Some people might regard a sociological study of the political mobilization of peasants, of their co-operation and solidarity, as a fairly unimportant and specialized exploration ofon efractio n ofth estupendou sdevelopmen tproble mwhic hconfront s the countries of theThir d World. Such an impression,however , wouldb eincorrect For a timei twa sthough ttha tdevelopmen twoul dhav et oconsis tchiefl yo frapi dindustrializa tion. Now, however, the view is growing that the solution to the immense problemso f poverty, unemployment, low agricultural production, low rates of internal savings,i n short,o funderdevelopment ,mus tb esough ti nth efirst instanc ei nth erura lareas ,i nth e agricultural sector. It may be said of the majority of developing countries that in the course of the next twenty years, their future willb edecide d inth e countryside and by thesepeasants .I twil lprov eo fcrucia limportanc et odetermin ewha tthe ywan tan dwha t they do not,wha t is capable of arousing their enthusiasm and what isnot ,wit hwho m they associate and arewillin gt o co-operate and withwho mthe y are not Themobilizatio n and solidaritywhic har eth esubjec t ofthi sboo koccu rwithi na par ticular structural and cultural context, namely that of an underdeveloped country in Latin America. I do not intend here to deal exhaustively with the problem of un derdevelopment.I twil ,however ,b enecessar yt otouc hupo ni tinsofa r asth ethinkin go n thisproble mha sinfluence d thecentra lthem eo fthi sstud yan dit stheoretica l framework. Thisi s allth emor eessentia l sincem ytheoretica lframewor k differs from that ofman y other rural sociological and anthropological studieswit hregar dt oagricultura ldevelop ment Until recently these studies concentrated mainly on the peasants' resistance to change, their conservatism, their apathy, in short upon the obstacles to development arisingfro mthei rculture 2. Traditionalwa sunderstoo d assynonymou swit hbein goppose dt ochange .Elsewher e (Galjart, 197la )I hav epostulate dtha t sucha focu s mustinevitabl ylea dt oa nemphasi s onth etransfe r ofknowledg ean dth eeliminatio no fcultura lopposition ,an d aneglec to f thoseobstacle s to change which are rooted in the social and economic structure. The focusitsel f resultsfro m theuncritica lexpor tt oth eunderdevelope dcountrie so fbot hth e concepts (tradition and modernity) andth eapproac h (research onth eleve lo fth esingl e village community) which had characterized sociological research into agricultural developmenti nth eindustria l countries.Thi sfocu swa sunderstandabl ei nthos ecountrie s whereth eprovisio n ofcredi tan dpric epolicie sha dminimize dth ebrakin geffec t ofalac k of capital upon agricultural development (and in so doingincrease d the importanceo f other brakes,suc ha sth ecultural) .I naddition ,expansio ni nothe rsector so fth eeconom y had cushioned and obscured theresult s of agricultural development, the disappearance from farmingfirst o fth efarmers ' sons andth epai d agricultural workers andlate r ofth e farm ownerswh oha d noon et osuccee dthem .Thes efarmer s vanishedfro m thefarmin g scene. However, this frame of reference cannot be applied inth e underdeveloped coun tries since it leads to the neglect of what is precisely the most important factor in agricultural development, namely the agrarian structure.
One important characteristic of an underdeveloped country is that the problem of development isregarde da scentra lb yth egovernment ,th epolitica lpartie s andlarg esec torso fth epopulation .Thi si sindee dth eautomati cresul to fth egenera ldesir efo ra highe r standard of living. It also means that the political struggle inthes e countries islargel y dominated by the various viewso fan d attitudestowar d theproble m ofdevelopment . Inth e course ofth epas tfifteen years ,thinkin g onthi s problem has changed inLati n America. Explanations of underdevelopment in terms of values and attitudes which people hold have comeunde r attack for beingto o partial ifno t erroneous. Also, it has becomeeviden ttha t industrialization, aimed atth edomesti c market and intended as asubstitut efo r imports,coul dno tpreven teconomi cstagnation .Althoug hi t is impossible yet to speak of a consensus, certain schematic trends of thought have emerged, allimplyin g similar essential changes in social structure. Onetren d seesth eproble mo funderdevelopmen t asa consequenc eo fdependenc eo n and exploitation by the developed capitalist countries. Since this state of affairs is perpetratedb yth erulin gclasses ,whic hbenefi tfro mit ,radica lstructura lchange scanno tb e butth eoutcom eo fa socialis trevolution .Th eentir eproductiv eorganizatio no fsociety ,in cludingtha to fagriculture ,shoul dbecom esocialis ti fth ecountr yi st opu titsel fo nth eroa d todevelopment .
A second school of thought prefers to explain the development problem in Latin America as arising from theeconomi c structure whichha sgrow n upthroug h theyear s withinthes ecountries .Durin gth ecrisi so fth ethirtie smos tcountrie sbega na programm e ofindustrializatio n toreplac eimport so fnon-durabl econsume rgoods .Th econstan tlac k offoreig n currencylate rle dt ofurthe r industrializationt osav eo nimport so fdurabl econ sumergoods . Themarke tfo rthes ewa sver ysmal li nvie wo fth ever yunequa lincom edis tribution.Althoug hthi sproces scoul dmak emor eprogres si nth elarge rcountrie stha ni n the small, it everywhere led to a worsening of the terms of exchange for agrarian products: industryha dt omak eit sprofi tfro m highprices ,an dno tfro m alarg eturnover , which simply wasn't there. Yet the agrarian stagnation which results from the un favourable termso fexchang ean dth eunchange d incomedistributio ncanno tbu thampe r industrial growth. Evers &Vossenaa r (1971) show that inLati n America,unlik eothe r developingcountries ,th einfluenc e ofpopulatio ngrowt ho nindustria l expansionexceed s that of a growth in income.Thi si sdu et oth ehighl y unequal incomedistribution .The y therefore concludetha tfurthe rexpansio nwil lonl yb epossibl evi astructura lchanges :a n end to stagnation in agriculture and the redistribution of incomes throughout society. Why the seemingly apathetic acceptance by agriculture óf this relatively worsening position? It seemst o metha t thereason s aretwofold . Insofar assmallholder s stillprac tisesubsistenc efarming ,the yescap ethi sproces si npart 3.I nadditio nth elarg elandowne r is often able to make his tenants, share-croppers or workers absorb part at least of the consequences of agriculture's unfavourable position. Whereasthes etw otrend so f thought areno tver yexplici t aboutth eprecis eproductiv e organizationtha ti st oresul tfro magraria nreform ,i nChil ei nth esixtie sidea swit hregar dt o thisproble mwer edevelope db ycatholi cgrouping swh owishe dabov eal lt oen dth esociall y marginal position of thepeasan t population and create a society consistent with human dignity.The yrejecte dth eabsolut epowe ro fth estate ,s oeviden ti nth eEuropea nsocialis t countries(cf . Silva& Chonchol , 1969)an dpreferre dinstea dcommuna lenterprises ,th efu sion of labour and capital in the same persons. We seethu s that, starting from different positions, various observerscam et oregar dth esocia l structurean dnotabl y themod eo f ownershipo fth emean so fproductio n inth ecountrysid ea sa problem . Thetask s assigned toa reforme d agriculture arebot heconomi c (thecreatio no fa nin ternal market, an increase in production so as to cut down on the import of food and create morejo b opportunities) and social, particularly inChil e(equalit y andincorpora tion in the national polity). Land reforms carried out in Bolivia andMexic o had shown thatth edivisio n ofth elan dint ofamil y farms asdesire db yth epeasants ,ha ddiminishe d their poverty and marginality only slightly andha dlef t many peasants out in thecold .
Thisbrie foutlin eshow stha tth eproble mo fpeasan tmobilizatio nan dsolidarit ycanno t be viewed exclusively in terms of the desires, aims and insights of the peasants themselves. Itmus t also be viewed withinth e larger framework ofth enationa ldevelop ment effort andth epolitica l struggle for consensusregardin gthi s effort. Thisi sno tonl y because whatth e peasants want andd o will influence these efforts,bu t alsobecaus eth e political leaders and movements in their turn will seek to influence the peasants' aspirationsan dactions .Th elas ttw ochapter so fthi sboo kwil lexamin ei nsom edetai lth e extentt owhic hthes etw o'intentions 'converge d ordiverge di nChile .Now ,however ,w e shalldea lwit hthos etheorie so nindividua lan dloca lgrou pleve lwhic hserve da sguide-line s tom ystudy . Itha s been animplici tassumptio no fthi sstud y andon eo fwhic hI only becam ereall y aware as I collated my data, that peasants view theirinterest s primarily inloca lterms , that ist o sayi nterm s ofth e social structure andth edistributio no fresource s asthe yar e found inthei rloca l community. I amno w convincedtha tthi s assumptioni scorrec t and hopetha t my results will convince the reader as well. A hypothesis developed by Röling (1970) concerning the reasons motivating in dividual peasants to change, provides a suitable starting point for elaborating a theory based onthi s assumption.Rölin gdefine s development asth eincreasin g possibilityo fth e individual to control his own environment. He postulates that a peasant, noting a difference betweenth e situation he experiences andth esituatio nwhic hh ecovets ,(no ta s a gratuitous, wishful dream, but measured against the situation which he sees others enjoying),wil lfirs to f allwis ht o eliminatethi sdifferenc eb yalterin ghi sow nexperience d situationi nsuc ha wa ya st obrin gabou tth eon edesired .H ewil lthe ntr yt odiscove rho w this may be done, and will do his best to put into practice the knowledge gained.Thi s voluntaristic modeldoe s not,o fcourse ,describ e what actuallyhappens .Onl yto oafte n thepeasant sar eincapabl eo ffollowin ga planne dcours eo faction .Rölin gdoe sno tpreoc cupy himself overmuch with why this is so,bu t postulates that a permanent difference between conditions experienced and desired givesrise t ofrustratio n whichth e peasants attempt either tosuppres so rt oovercom eb yvariou sreactions .W eshal lretur nt othes e reactions which are thought to giverise t o particular cultural patterns. The fact to be stressed herei stha t Röling'stheor y makesi tpossibl et osee kth eobstacle st oinnovatio n and agrarian development primarily in circumstances outside the individual peasant, notably in the social structure andi nth edistributio n ofland .Moreover ,a theor ywhic h attributes cultural resistance to development not to tradition but to frustration arising from previous attempts to achieve development, chimes much better with the fact that new opportunities in traditional peasant cultures are often rapidly seized upon and exploited. In an earlier study of Brazil (Galjart, 1968) I found no indication that the peasants resisted the introduction of new techniques or crops.Th e entiretheor y ofth e traditional stick-in-the-mud peasants in non-western countries is, if not inaccurate, at. least based upon assumptions which areusuall y too simplistic for thecircumstances .
What is the actual situation of a peasant in Latin America on theloca l community level? In answering thisquestio n I shallintroduc e asecon d assumption which seemst o mecorrec tbu tfo r whichw ehav ea sye tn oproof .Thi si stha tth epeasant' schanc eo fsur vival and development possibilities are determined byth e(local )distributio n ofwha ti s for him the most important resource,namel y land. In alate r model,t o bedeal t withi n detaili nChapte r 3 (seep .22 )th eassumptio n ismad etha tonc ethi sresourc ei sclosed ,th e rivalry for land between households- orothe r groups- canresul ti nthre etype so fdivi sion,or ,t o uséRöling' sterms ,thre edifferen t experienced situations.Thes eare : a. The distribution of land among the households displays a fairly high measure of equality. b. Thedistributio n oflan d amongth ehousehold si sunequal ,bu tth egrea tmajorit y has accesst oland . c. Thelan di si nth ehand so fon eo ra fe windividuals .Th eremainin ghousehold shav en o lando fthei r own,o rhardl y anyalthoug hthe yma yhav eth eus eo flan dbelongin gt oth e monopolist. In situation (a), all the households dispose of a roughly equal quantity of land. Examples of situation (a) may be found in the settlements of European colonists in Southern Brazil,i nmos to fth emoder ncolonizatio n andirrigatio nproject s andi nsom e farming communities,whethe rthe yb eIndia no rnot .Th eIndia ncommunitie sinclude di n thiscategor y arethos et owhic hn oon eca nla yan yclai mo fdomai n andwhic hhav eno t beendeprive d oflan dt oan yextent .Example so fsituatio n (b)ar eth ecommunitie so fin dependentpeasant st ob efoun d inal lLati nAmerica ncountries .Her eeconomi c differen tiationca nadmittedl yb efoun dbu tno tt oth eexten ttha tth elan dma yb esai dt obelon gt o onlya handfu l ofindividuals . Examples of situation (c) are the communities or local groups which either rent or sharecrop,o rwor kfo rwage so nlan dbelongin gt oon eo ra coupl eo fowner s;th epopula tiono fhacienda so rplantations .I als oinclud eunde r(c )thos ecommunitie so fpeasant s - usually Indian - who, while possessing a certain amount of land, which they work themselves,have ,i nth ecours eo fth ecenturies ,los tth elarge rpar to fthei rlan dt oth esur roundinghacienda s which(enclos eth eterritor ybelongin gt oth ecommunity .I ncategor y (c) thus wefind not-onl y independentproducer s (minifundia) buttenan tfanners , share croppers andwage -workeits .I nsom ecase sth egrou pdisplay s aconsiderabl e amount of cohesion, but according asthe y haveles s access to land,eithe r as owners ortenants ,i t tends to fragment. My research in Chile dealt with peasants in situation (b) and groups of agricultural labourers on largeenterprise s who found themselvesi n category (c). It is clear that peasants, depending upon the situation in which they find themselves and upon the specific manneri n which they areinvolve d in the process of production, may have both similar and varying interests.Thei rinterest s aresimila r in thatthe y are poor in a society, andofte n ina loca l communityi nwhic hwealth ,income ,an dt oa cer tain extent power, are concentrated in the hands of a fairly restricted élite. Insuc hcir cumstances how can thepeasan t gain morecontro l over his surroundings? 1. As an individual he can try,b y hisow n efforts,t ojoi nth eélite ,tha ti st osa y acquire the attributes of theélite . In practice this implies migration, an attempt to improve his education andt o exploitth epossibilitie s inagricultura l enterprise,insofa r asthes eexist . As we have observed a great deal of earlier rural sociological research has concerned itself chiefly with this possibility of development. 2. He can, as an individual, attempt to improve his situation by means of patronage. Patronage is, in principle, a dyadic relationship between people of unequal social stan ding,whereb y the party possessing the higher status dispenses economic advantages to the party of the lower. In exchange the advantaged party rewards his patron with' /prestige,politica l supportan dothe rservices 4. 3. Hecan ,b yco-operatin gwit hhi ssocia lequals ,attemp tt oimprov ehi slo tan dtheir sa t thesam etime .S olon ga sthi sattemp tdoe sno tprov ea flash i nth epan ,i twil lusuall y find expression in some organization whichpromote s thepeasants 'interests . In my Brazilian research (Galjart, 1968) I found, among peasants in situation (b), attemptsa t 1 and2 bu tonl yabortiv eattempt sa t3. 1eve ncam et oth econclusio ntha tth e active solicitation for patronage explained why solidarity between social equals was so weak inBrazil . It is my opinion, however, that only co-operation can help relieve the poverty of smallholders and agricultural labourers. For the latter (situation (c)) this seems self- evident: it is their association in a trade union which provides them withth e necessary 'countervailing power' to insist on higher wages and better living conditions. Theirin terestsan dthos eo fthei remployer sLe .th elande dproprietors ,ar et oa larg eexten ti ncon flict3.Regardin g the smallholders in situations (a) and(b ) thepositio n is different intha t theyhav e nodirec tloca l opponentswit hth e exception,perhaps ,o fmerchants .The yar e menaced by a complexo f phenomena, such as unfavourable termso f exchange,th ein crease in socio-economic inequality which accompanies the development of farming unitsint ofamil ybusinesses ,an demploymen topportunitie sh iothe rsector so fth eeconom y whichar einsufficien t toabsor bth eexpecte dexodu sfro magriculture .Fo rtha tmatte rth e limitedcapacit yo findustr yan dth eservic esecto rt oabsor ban ysurplu slabou raffect sal l categories of the agrarian population. Publications issued by FAO (1969) and ILO (1971) predict that in many developing countries agriculture will havet o providewor k for not less but more people inth e coming decades.Agricultura l development after the West European model based on family units and with the less successful, superfluous smallholders and agricultural labourers drifting from the land would condemn the majority ofLati nAmerica npeasant st opermanen tan deve nincreasin gpoverty .Thi sca n only be prevented by their working together and so achieving advantages of scale to which they could not aspire as individuals. In this way they could also assert their 'countervailing power' on themarket s and thusnibbl e away to some extent atth elarg e trade margins.I n allprobabilit y too a greater equality ofincom ewil lhav et ob ecreate d byth ecollectivizatio n ofsom eo ral lo fth emean so fproduction .I nWes tEuropea ncoun tries such as the Netherlands, the shrinkage ofjo b opportunities in agriculture and the growth of socio-economic inequality among farmers hasno t been arrested by anexten sivenetwor ko fservic eco-operative s(Weerdenburg , 1970, p.6 f.)6. Thequestio no fwha tsociologica lfactor s influenceco-operatio n amongpeasant sma y bedivide d upint o anumbe r of subsidiary points. Firstly, what sociological factors influence the mobilization process which leads peasantst ose tu passociation sfo rthei rmutua ladvantag ean dt oente rint oothe rne wco operative links?I nChapte r 3 weshal ldevelo pa theor y regardingthos efactor s which,o n the level of society and local community influence the mobilization of agricultural labourersint osyndicates .I nChapte r 4thi stheor yi steste dt osom eexten tagains tquan titative data relating to Chilean communities, while Chapter 5 develops a theory with regard to the mobilization into co-operatives of peasants who find themselves in situations(a )an d(b) . A second question concerns the individual differences between those who are mobilized andthos ewh oar eno t(or ,t opu ti tanothe rway ,member san dnon-members) . In Chapter 6 hypotheses are developed and tested regarding the differences between members and non-members of syndicates on the onehan d and of co-operatives onth e other. Thedat a arederive d chiefly from asurvey .I n Chapter 8 (leavingChapte r 7asid efo r the moment)w einquir e intothos efactor s whichinfluenc e solidarity amongpeasant si n their newassociations . Wehav e already suggested that co-operation,eve nthoug h born of the participants' expectation of individual economic advantage, cannot succeed without a certain readiness to sacrifice on the peasants' part. Solidarity as an attitude becomesincreasingl yimportan taccordin ga smor esacrifice s arerequire do fth epeasant s than mere participation in associations. Since this was the case in Chile and since - should I prove correct in mypredictio n that inth efutur e a certain degreeo f social and economicequalit ywil lb ecreate d amongpeasant si nothe rdevelopin gcountrie sthroug h thecollectivizatio n ofth emean so fproduction -governmen t agriculturalpolic yi nothe r countries willperhap s comet ob edetermine d bywha trura l sociologists understand by solidarity, it seemst o meimportan t to dissect this concepttheoreticall y withth e aido f data gathered during my research. In countries whereth e government attaches impor tancet oa certai nsocia lequality ,i ti softe n thesociologist swh oar easke dwha tmeasure s thepeasant swil laccep tt oachiev ethi sequalit y andwha tmeasure sthe ywil lnot .I nsuc h a situation solidarityi sa ke yconcep tan dsociologist swh ohav eno tkep tabreas t ofthei r subject are inclined to proffer rash recommendations which not only fail to advance equality butma ywel lresul ti nth epeasan thavin gt oendur ea lowe rtha nnecessar y stan dard ofliving .
8 Our research was carried out within a very welldefine d context:th eChilea n central valleybetwee nAugus t 1969an dAugus t 1970.Thi scontex tinfluence d theresearc han d even the approach to the problem. In 1965 the Frei government had embarked on a programme of land reform which included the organization of the small fanners and agriculturallabourers .Thi srefor mconsiste di nth eacquisition ,unde rvariou spretexts ,o f enterpriseslarge rtha n 80hectare so firrigate dlan do rtha tamoun to flan dwhic hmigh tb e considered theloca lequivalent .Afte rth eexpropriation ,thes eenterprise swer eru nb yth e workerslivin g(an dworking )o nthe ma tth etim eunde rth esupervisio no fth egovernmen t bodyCOR A(Corporatio n deReform a Agraria)whic hwa sresponsibl efo r carryingou t thelan d reform.Fo rth efirst thre eyears ,a slai ddow nb yth elan drefor mlaw ,th eenter prise,no wcalle dasentamiento ,woul db eorganize dalon gcommuna llines .Afte r thisth e peasantswoul db eallowe dt ochoos ewhethe rthe ywishe dt oretai nthi scommuna lenter prise or break it upint o family unitswhich ,thoug h united in a co-operative,woul db e otherwiseindependent .The ycoul dals oop tfo r amixe dform ,a communa lfar mi nwhic h houses and gardens would be private property. In any case the peasants themselves wouldexercis econtrol ,withou t theinterventio n ofCORA . For theagricultura l workersINDA P(Institut ed eDesarroll oAgropecuario) ,anothe r government body, founded syndicates, as for that matter did other groups, whether catholic or socialist-communist orientated. The syndicates were regarded as militant organizations topromot eth eworkers 'interests .The ywoul dals oserv ea sa preparatio n ortrainin gschoo lfo rth esel fgovernmen twhic hwoul dcom ewit hth eexpropriatio no fth e largeestates .Syndicate swer eestablishe d ina communit y andha dt onumbe r atleas t a hundred members; sub-sections, known as committees, could be started up in a par ticular enterprise as soon as there were six members. Where one farm was unable to provide six members, one committee was allowed to take in several enterprises. After some time the syndicates united on the provincial level in a federation. A number of federations could,i nthei rturn ,procee d toth esettin gu po f anationa l confederation. Finally, at the outset, the independent smallholders wereencourage d by INDAP to unitei nloca lcommittee sa tneighbourhoo dlevel .Thes ewer eintende dchiefl yt oserv ea s channels for thevariou sform s ofcredi tprovide db yINDAP .When ,afte r twoyears ,th e committees proved too small to develop into viable co-operatives, the setting up of municipalco-operative swa sencouraged ,eac hcomprisin ga numbe ro fth eorigina lcom mittees.Th ecommitte eremaine di nexistenc ea sa loca lbu tn olonge rindependen tsub divisionwhos emember sme tregularly .Representative so fth evariou scommittee sha dt o maintaincontac twit hth eexecutiv eo fth eco-operative .Sinc ei nman ylocalitie sINDA P started to provide credit only via the co-operative, the peasants were to some extent obliged tojoin .I n many localitiestoo, bu t again byn omean s everywhere,INDA Pad vanced capital credit onlyt ocommuna lgroup swhic hha ddevelope dthroug hco-optio n and whichha d decided toco-operat e inproductio n - usually chickens orpigs . Wese etherefor e that onth easentamiento s atleas t andi nth efarmin gco-operatives , not alone was affiliation required but acceptance of and participation in communal production as well.Governmen t policy displayed a certain preference for this form of production, certainly insofar as the smallholders and asentados were concerned. The political parties to the left ofth eChristian-Democrat s showedth e same preference. In these circumstances solidarityimplie dth eacceptanc eo fth ecommuna lfor m ofproduc tionand ,naturally ,o fthos evalue swhic hgovernmen tpolic ydesire dth epeasant st oprac - tice: social equality, participation in community affairs and national policy, and economic development7. In Chapter 7w eshal ldiscus swhic h factors influence participation,dealin g principally with the differences between leaders and members of associations.
I conclude this chapter with a warning. Strictly speaking the results of this study are valid only for those groups of Chilean peasants whom I researched. However, as is already apparent from thetitl eo fthi sbook ,I believ emysel ftha tth eresult si ngenera lwil l prove to have a much wider validity. This fact notwithstanding, the reader wouldb ewel l advised to refrain from attempting to apply these results indiscriminately to all small farmers in Latin America. This study confirms a number of hypotheses formulated for Chile, but for the rest of Latin America hypotheses they must remain.
Notes 1 In a study which deals with the role played by peasants in Chilean society, it willno t do to exclude in advance a section of the agrarian working population, the agricultural labourers. Thisi sal lth emor etru esinc ethei rnumbe ri ss olarge .Ye tther ear eals otheoretica lreason sfo r including the agricultural labourers among the peasants.Th efirst i stha t a person canru n a smallfar m ofhi sow nan da tth esam etim ewor kfo rsomebod yelse .Th esecon di stha ti tseem s tom enonsensica lt oregar d anagricultura llaboure r asa non-peasant ,whil ethe nproceedin gt o classify him among the peasants as part owner of an expropriated hacienda. 2 Eveni na recen tboo klik etha to fRoger s(1969 )th emos timportan t obstaclest osocia lchang e arestil llocalize d inth e'subcultur eo f peasantry'. 3 Scott(1972 )show sfo r centralChil etha tmor etha n 75% o fhi srespondent s(smallholders )us e moretha n half ofthei r total production to supplythei r ownneeds . 4 The literature on patronage is very extensive. See for instance, Boissevain (1966) and Mühlmann &Llaryor a (1968)o n patronagei nEurope ;Foste r(1963 )an dHutchinso n(1966 ) onthi s phenomenon inLati n American countries. 5 I shallrefrai n for themomen tfro m goingint oothe rpossibl econsequence so fa wag e conflict, such as a decreasing demand for labour in agriculture due to accelerated mechanization, a changeover to lesslabou r intensive crops,etc . 6 It may perhaps be useful to point out that the view that agricultural labourers and peasant farmers need to co-operate is not necessarily theirs,bu t mine.Thi si sparticularl y trueo fth e assertiontha tpeasant smus tals oachiev ea certai nco-operatio ni nproductio ni fgrowin gsocio economicdifferentiatio n amongthe man dth etricklin gawa yo fth epoores tan dleas t successful towards the towns, ist o be prevented. In many countries the enforcement ofco-operatio ni n production has led in the beginning to a lower aggregate production (which is morejustl y divided).Ultimatel y theopinio n that acertai nsocia lequalit y mustb ecreate d inagricultur ei s basedno tonl yo nth econvictio n thatthi si spossibl ewithou t anoticeabl edecreas ei nth etota l production, but also upon avalue . Ishal ladher et othi svalu ebu tals obeliev etha t ato oradica llevelin gout ,notabl yth eelimina tiono fa direc tlin kbetwee nrewar dan d achievement,i sharmfu l toproductio n andi stherefor e undesirable. 7 Some may doubt whether the authorities werereall yi n earnest aboutth erealizatio n ofthes e values.Governmen t policy certainly varied according totim e andplace ,an di ti sals ocertai n that the most fervent supporters of the realization of the above-mentioned values came to doubtth eseriousnes so fth egovernment' s intentionsafte r acoupl eo fyears .A sa resul to fthi s many left the government and the party (thefirst t o go beingJacque s Chonchol, thenvice - president ofINDAP) .
10 It is also certain that within both the Christian-democratic party and the government, in fluence was brought to tear by people who certainly did not desire socialization, while the claimso fsector sothe rtha nth epeasants upo nscant ygovernmen tfund sle dt oa shortag ei nth e funds necessary for the reform of the agrarian structure(cf . Chonchol, 1970).
H Chapter 2 Research methods andth e researcher's values
2.1 Thepreliminar yinvestigatio n
Sotha tth ereade rma yjudg efo rhimsel fwha tvalu et opu to nm ydat aan dconclusion s it is useful to examine in some depth the way in which the research was carried out. Variousphase swer einvolve d andm yapproac ht oeac hdepende dupo nho wI viewe dth e problem. The problem has, for a very long time, been: what are wet o understand by solidarity.Th eproble moriginate di nBrazi lwher eI staye dfro mth emiddl eo f196 2t oth e middleo f 1965.Plan sfo r researching solidaritywer ealread y beingconsidere dthen ,an d I even got sofa r ast o hold a series ofdiscussion s ontha t themewit hm y colleaguean d friend, CarlosAlbert o deMedina .I als obega nt operus eth eliteratur eo nth esubjec t and havecontinue dwit hthi sstud yb yfits an dstart so nm yretur nt oth eNetherlands ,despit e the claims of other work. At that time I saw solidarity as the attitude of which co operation was the perceptible result. This may have been because I had concluded in Itaguai(Galjart , 1968)tha tth ecolonist sdi dno tco-operat ebecaus ethe yha dn osens eo f solidarity. The books I read did not focus upon any specific problem but consisted of practically everything I could lay my hands upon, there on the spot, which dealt with aspects ofco-operatio n andwit hcohesion .Althoug hI dre wu pa pla n ofresearc hi nth e summer of 1968an d senti t ini norde r to beabl et o apply for research funds, I still felt confused. This confusion sprangi nlarg emeasur efro m theinclinatio nt ovie wsolidarit y as a quality which a person either showed in all relationships or in none. Only very gradually I came to understand that the concept could be applied only in relation to a definite group.Th epla n ofresearc h wasparticularl y concerned with tracking downth e differences - in structural and personality traits - between peasants who collaborated with others and those who did not. Shortly before my departure for Chile someone observed, quitecorrectly ,tha t co-operation needno tnecessaril y bebase do nsolidarity , but could also for example springfro m self-interest. When, therefore, I arrived in Chile in June 1969, I had as it were two problems: solidarity and co-operation.Th elatter ,n omatte r howmotivated ,wa sperhap sth emor e important for the development of the rural areas. Particularly important was co operationi nth emoder npeasan torganizations ,th esyndicate san dco-operatives ,i nothe r wordsth eaffiliatio n anddegre eo fparticipatio ni nthos eassociations .Th echoic eo fcon cerning myself particularly withthos e newly founded organizations seemed an obvious onebu ti tstrongl yinfluence d mymetho do fwork .Ther eseeme dhttl esens ei nstayin gfo r anylengt ho ftim ei na smal lpreasan tcommunity ;on ecoul dshado wa peasan tfo rweek s on end without noticing oncetha t hewa s amembe r ofa norganization .Anothe r argu mentagains tresearc hi nonl ya smal lnumbe ro floca lcommunities ,sa ytw oo rthree ,wa s thefac t that both the syndicates and theco-operative s wereorganize d on municipality level, a unit wnich comprised several local communities, sometimes more than twenty.
12 Every large agricultural enterprise andever y concentration ofpeasant sconstitute dsuc h a local community. I doubted whether it was worthwhile to devote much time to a thorough studyo fthre esuc hunits ,apar taltogethe rfro mth efac ttha ti twoul db edifficul t toobtai npermissio n fromth eowne ro fa larg eestat et ocom ei nan dd oa prolonge dstud y ofa phenomeno nwhic hcould ,i nitself ,hardl yb eexpecte dt oappea lt ohim .And ,strictl y speaking,o nth eloca l community levelI woul dno teve nb eabl et oobtai n anoveral lvie w ofth e entireco-operativ eo rsyndicate . Forthes ereason sI decide dt ovisi ta muc hgreate r numbero fplace sfo r ashorte rtim eand ,beside sinterviewin gleader s andmember so fth e organizations, to be particularly assiduous in attending meetings. These meetings were the occasions above allother swhe nco-operatio nmigh tbecom evisibl ei nth ebehaviou r of the peasants and when, Ihoped , indealin g with the agenda, any difficulties they had might be revealed. This attending meetings as an observer at every level of the organizations turned out very well for me. My presence was apparently not resented: people wereno t inhibitedb yth eoutsider .I n additionthi smetho ddi dindee d providem e with considerable data which would have been much more difficult to acquire by questioning. Now it was possible to ask concrete questions atth e end of the meeting,i f there was anything I didn't understand. Naturally I was unable to ferret out thé local background ofever y incidento rcase ,bu tt ocompensat efo rthi sI gaine da goo dimpres sion of the extent to whichcertai nproblems ,attitude s andincident s occurred generally. As Glaser and Strauss have written (1967), the researcher's insight into a particular, recurrent phenomenon,grow st oth epoin to f surfeitwher eh ebelieve stha thencefort hh e can safely take it for granted. In this way I have visited and attended meetings of organizations in the municipalities of La Serena (province of Coquimbo), Puente Alto, Melipilla,Sa nAntoni o(provinc eo fSantiago) ,Sa nVicent ed eTagua-Tagu a(provinc eo f O'Higgins), Chepica (province of Colchagua) and, morefleetingly, hav e made contact with various co-operatives inth e provinces of Cautin, Llanquihue and Chiloe. Thechoic eo fthes eplace san dorganization swa spartl ypragmati can dpartl ybase do n theoretical sampling (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The choice was pragmatic insofar as it was backed up by good introductions and the possibility of obtaining these: whenever I arrived anywhere forth efirst tim eI alway s madesur et o beequippe dwit ha good introduction. The choice was theoretical insofar as itwa sbase d upon information concerning local circumstances or problems. In La Serena,fo r example, it was theper sonality of the young syndicate leader which greatly influenced my choice; in the province of Santiago the contrast between the poor, dry coastal region where the peasants proved easy to organize, according to my INDAP informants, and theregio n bordering onth e bigcit y whereorganizatio n was saidt o bedifficult . SanVicent ewa sa n area in which co-operatives in various stages of development were to be found, and where, in comparison with other regions, there existed a fairly close link between co operative and syndicate. The local syndicate was, moreover, large and fairly strong. Chepica was one ofth efe wco-operative s containingproductio ngroup swh oha dlan da t their disposal. For that matter theentir e province of Colchagua was interesting sincei t seemed that precisely here the peasants were deliberately engaged in bringing about a radicalalteratio no fth eagraria nstructure .I nCautin finally,, I wa sparticularl yintereste d inth eMapuch ereduction s andth ewa yi nwhic hth eproble mo fth eminifundi awa sbein g tackled atloca l level by therelevan t government authorities.
13 2.2 The surveys
During the preliminary research I worked constantly at drawing up and refining hypotheses concerning affiliation and participation, for it was soon obvious that the presidential elections of September 1970 would cast their shadow so far before as to makei tadvisabl et ohol dth esurvey s ata time whe npolitica lpassion swoul dno tye thav e flared so high that every action was regarded as a political gambit. February, the last montho fth eholidays ,appeare deminentl y suitable. AccordinglyI bega ni nDecembe rt o work on the construction of a questionnaire, the appointment of interviewers and the selection of asample . Fortw oreason sI decide dagains ta rando m sample. Sucha sampl ei sonl y meaningful if one desires to generalize about the population from which iti staken . In explanatory andtestin gresearch ,however ,on efrequentl y reallygeneralize s aboutpopulation swhic h areno tlimite di n spacean dtim e(Philipsen , 1969, p. 19). Thisbein gs oi tseem sbette rt o chosecase si nwhic hth ediversit yo fth eunivers efinds expression .Th epopulatio n about which I wished to generalize,th e peasants whomigh t bemember s of a co-operativei n Latin America, or even Chile,wa s so enormous that drawing a random samplewoul d have entailed insurmountable difficulties. The same held good for the agricultural workers who might be members of a syndicate. In addition, I wanted to compare members with non-members who were working and living in the same natural cir cumstances or - inth e case of the syndicates- dealt withth e same owners.I t seemed therefore afairl y obviousmov et otak emember s andnon-member sfro m thesam ecom munity or the sameenterprise . Ithu s interviewed 274peasan t producers,member san d non-members of co-operatives,fro m the following seven communities: Cuncumen and LoAbarc a (Santiagoprovince ,Cuncume n Co-operative),Lo sSilo sd ePirque ,Sa nJos é de la Estrella and Los Canas (Santiago province, Brisas de Maipo Co-operative); Auquinco and Quinahue (Colchagua province,Chepic a Co-operative).Al lth emember s inthes ecommunitie swer einterviewe dan don ethir do fth enon-membe rpeasant s- after I hadobtaine d alis to fth elatte r from thosefamilia r withth eloca lsituation .Thes eseve n communities represent the contrast between the non-irrigated costal region and the irrigated central valley;betwee n agriculturei nreall y rural areasan dfarmin g carriedo n beneath the smokeo f a city.The y alsosho wco-operative si nvariou sstage so fdevelop ment and of varying viability. Cuncumen was one ofth efe w co-operativest o bedoin g welleconomicall y andwhic hcoul dals oavai lo fgoo dmanagement .Brisa sd eMaip owa s muchles swel lconducted ,bein gscarcel y active,bu ti tha dreceive d alarg esu mo fcapita l credit from INDAP for a horticultural marketing project. As I have said already, Chepica was one of the few co-operatives to have as members communal production groupswit h land at their disposal. Inadditio n atota lo f21 0member san dnon-member so fpeasan tsyndicate swer einter viewed innin eenterprises .Thes ewer eSa n Manuel(Syndicat eMelipilla) ;Lo sToros , El Penon and Zeralda (Syndicate Puente Alto); Vina Vieja, Vinâ de Tagua - Tagua, Pumaiten,Idahu eNort ean dLo sMayo s(Syndicat eSa nVicent ed eTagu a- Tagua).Th e firsttw ocommunitie smentione dar esituate di nth eprovinc eo fSantiago ;Sa nVicent elie s inth eprovinc e of O'Higgins. Inal lthes efarmin genterprise sa considerabl esectio no fth eworker swa sno to rwa sn o longerorganized .Thes efarm s weregenerall y amongth emos tprosperous ;irrigatio nwa s
14 practised on«1 1 of them, but crop patterns differed. San Manuel grew wheat and kept dairy cows; the enterprises in Puente Alto went in for viniculture while those in San Vicente had fruit and tillage in addition to the vines. All three syndicates belonged to those founded by INDAP and were members of the confederation El Triunfo Campesino, attha t periodth elarges ti nChile . Allthre ewer e alsofairl y efficient. Onth e enterprises mentioned allmember swer einterviewe d andhal fo fthos enon-member swh o werei npermanen temployment .Th erespondent sma ythu sb eregarde da spopulation so f whichdifferen t sectorsar ecompare d(wit heac hother) .Althoug hI shal lapproac hm ycon clusions with caution, I am of the opinion, an opinion reinforced by die results of the anthropological research,tha tthe y aremuc hmor ewidel yapplicable . Thesurve ypasse dof fwell .Ther ewer epracticall y norefusals-les stha nJ% .I tdi dad mittedly provedifficul t on some occasions todetermin ewhethe r aperso ncomplie dwit h theterm sfo r being arespondent ,notabl ywhethe r amembe ro fa co-operativ ecoul dstil l beregarde d as afarmer . Inextremel y doubtful casesI late rremove dth erespondent ;th e number of such people amounted to about ten. On the conclusion of the survey the questionnaireswer ecode dbu tno timmediatel y punched andru noff . Iwishe dt oge tbac k as quickly as possible toth efiel d research.
2.3 The anthropologicalfield researc h
After the survey I took a closer look at one place, Cuncumen, to see how the co operative fitted into the social structure. The intention was to gainsom e idea ofwha t I had missed by the method I had employed hitherto - the gathering of incidents, par ticularly atmeetings . A second problem-wastha to fsolidarit yi nassociations .Althoug hi tha dbecom eclea r that the most important motive for affiliation was thehop e ofimprovin g one'sow nper sonal,economi c lot,i twa s equally clearthat ,give nth eco-operatives 'lac k ofmean san d the divisions among the small farmers and the agricultural workers, the peasant move mentcoul d notge t offth egroun d without alarg emeasur eo fsolidarit y amonga numbe r of members at least. I had in the meantime come to view solidarity not as a quality which a person either possessedo rdi dnot ,bu ta sa nattitud ewhic hh edisplaye dtoward son egrou pan dnot ,o r to a lesser extent, towards another. I was therefore primarily interested not in who felt solidarity towards their syndicate or co-operative and who did not, but in how that solidarity grew or could bemad e to grow. Thebes twa yo fdiscoverin gthi smigh tperhap sb et otr yonesel ft oinduc ethi ssolidari ty. Since this was impossible I selected various approaches, namely: - attending,a sa participan tobserver ,course swhic hwer eintende dt oincreas esolidarity ; - interviewswit hpeasan tleader san dother swh omigh tb eregarde da sworkin gi non ewa y oranothe rt oincreas esolidarity ; - seeking out the differences between associative groups some of which appeared solidary and some of which did not (in this connection I concentrated on produc tion groups, i.e. aseatamientos and groups provided with credit by INDAP). I also coached two of my students during a five month stay in asentamientos in Aconcagua province where they investigated the acceptance of this communal enterprise and its
15 functioning inpractice .I wa sabl et ous ethei rnote so nthes eassentamiento sfo rthi sboo k (they have sincebee n published ind eRanit z &d eRanitz , 1972); - analyzing those incidents relating to solidarity which wereprovide d by themeeting sI continued to attend.
Beforeth een do fm ysta yi nChil eI wrot ea first versio no fwhat ,i nthi sbook ,i sth elas t chapter.Thi si nitsel fprove da usefu l exercise;th econcep to fsolidarit yi ss ocomplicate d that it helpst o beoblige d from timet otim et o marshal one's thoughts on paper. Inth ethir d place,I spen tth elas tmonth sexaminin gth efactor swhic hplaye d arol ei n thestructure san dinstitution ssurroundin gth eloca lcommunity .Thes efactor s seemedo f particularimportanc ewit hregar dt oth eco-operative swhic hwer eto owea kfinancially t o developentirel y underthei row nsteam .Th esmal lfarmer s acceptedth eco-operativ ei fi t seemed economically successful and embarked onviabl eprojects .I therefore paid par ticularattentio nt oth eexpertis eo fth epeasan tleader san do fINDAP .I examine dchiefl y theleader so fth efederatio n ofColchagua -th eorganizationa l zealan dconsciousnes so f leaders appeared less advanced in other provinces, even though federations existed everywhere.Concernin g INDAP Iinvestigate d severalplace swher elarg eproject s were intrain .Withi nthi sframewor k - butals oi norde rt ose ewhethe raffiliatio n andsolidarit y wereperhap s influenced by other factors -1 devoted thelas tmont h ofm ysta yt oa tri p south,wher eI visite dvariou s associationso nth eislan d ofChilo ëan di nth eprovince so f Llanquihue and Cautin. Irelinquishe d myorigina lpla nt ohol da secon d surveyt ofind ou twha t structuralfac tors at local community leveldetermine d thedegre eo f affiliation. This wasbecaus eth e political situation rendered further surveys inadvisable and also because the technical execution wouldhav eprove d difficult andtime-consuming .Instead ,I collecte d data,fo r each community, on the degree of organization of the agricultural workers into syn dicates, on the extent to which CORA had taken over enterprises and on the agrarian structure as revealed in the agricultural census of March 1965.Afte r my return to the Netherlands thesedat a werearrange d and transferred to punch cards. Duringth eanthropologica l part ofm yresearc h I proceeded withgrea tcaution .I di d not want to run the risk of being accused of espionage, either by the right or by the extreme left. This caution led me to confine myself to one of the three national con federations of syndicates,namel y ElTriunf o Campesino,th econfederatio n withwhic h thegovernmen t bodywhic husuall y introduced me- INDAP- hadth emos t dealings. I did not approach the other two; the communist - socialist confederation - Ranquil - becauseI onl yobtaine d sufficiently goodintroduction s at alat estag ean deve nthe nha d thefeelin g that itwoul d costm eto omuc htim et ogai nth econfidenc e necessaryi fI wer e tod owha tI wishe dt odo ,an dth eCatholi cconfederatio n- Libertad- 1 avoidedbecaus e it was rumoured to work with American, even CIA money and I did not wisht o lay myself open to gossip from leftist quarters. What now were the consequences of this voluntary limitation which on hindsight mightb esai dt ohav esprun gfro m anexcessiv e degreeo fcaution ?Regardin gth ebehaviou r ofth epeasant sI thin ktha ti tha dhardl yan y consequences at all. Many of my informants assured metha t there was no difference betweenth econfederation s atth eleve lo fth emembers .I shoul dhav elike dt olear na littl e moreabou tth ewa yi nwhic hRanqui li nparticula rse tabou tindoctrinatin g itsmembers . Howdi d it managet oreconcil e the apparently democraticelectio no floca lleader swit h
16 thedisciplin e whichwa s atth esam etim edemande do fthes eleaders ?However ,thi sga p did not affect the validityo f what Idi d manage to discover.
2.4 My own values
A person'sfram eo freferenc edetermine st o alarg eexten twha th esee san dho wh ein terprets what hesees .Certainl y nowtha ti nrecen tyear sth eopinio ni sbein gvoiced ,tha t agrea tdea lo f social-scientific researchwhic h purportst ob eobjectiv ei si nrealit ybase d upona particular ideology - often conservative- itwoul d seem sensiblet otr yt ose tou t myvalue sexplicitl y here.Th ereade rwil lthe nb ei na bette rpositio nt ojudg eth econtent s ofthi sbook .
This is by no means a confession. Suffice itt asa y that certainexperience s duringm y adolescence have inspired me with an aversion to propaganda and dogmatism, from whatever side.I hav eneve rbee na membe ro fa churc ho ra politica lparty .Wit hregar dt o the churches, it is my conviction - which I will not elaborate - that they stifle man's religious feeling, thati s to say hisabilit y to construct apersona lrelationshi pwit hnatur e andwit hGod .Th ever ynatur eo fth eassociatio nwit hit sinheren tsocia lcontro love rth e contento fwha ton ebelieve smake sthi sunavoidable .A sregard spolitics ,I wa sfairl ycon servative when I went to Chile. This was not, I think, because I had any economic in terests; my main interest, as an intellectual, is the freedom to publish my opinion. In Europe those countries in which the socialist revolution has taken place, have a bad reputationo nthi spoint .I wa srepelle db yth elac ko fintellectua lfreedom ,th edoubl etal k aimeda tintellectua linfant swhic hstreame dou to fth eEaster nEuropea ncountrie sbefor e the Czechoslovakian spring of 1968, by the dogmatism and the glorification of Marx expressedb yman yo fthos ewho ,i nth ewest ,cal lthemselve s Marxists.Al lthis ,seeme dt o met ob eirretrievabl y bound.upwit h socialism assuch .I find mysel fcompletel y inagree ment with the opinion of Deutscher, Coletti and many others- whom I only began to readafte r myretur nfro mChil e- thatth eMarxis mwhic hgaine dpowe ri nRussi aha sac tively contributed to blocking the progress of socialism elsewhere in Europe. Eveni nBrazil ,wher eI worke dfro m 1962-1965,i nsurrounding swher eI encountere d few leftist colleagues, I found the 'left' rather hollow, with the exception of a couple of extremely intelligent people such as Caio Prado. Marxist theory seemed to suggesttha t therevolutio n(th ereal ,no tth ebourgeoi sone )wa simminent ,whil eprovin grathe ruseles s at analysis.A tth e endo fthei rbook s many authorsha dconjure du pte nclasse s ormor e instead ofonl y two. Itwa swit h a certainwr y pleasuretha t Itrie dt oshow ,i n'Class an d following inrura lBrazil 'tha tth epeasant s alsoavaile do fpatronag ei nthei rmobilizatio n or, to put it in Marxist terms,thei r class struggle (Galjart, 1964).Thi s article has come undercriticis mfro m several colleagues(Huizer , 1965;Quijano , 1967).I believ eno wtha t I did wrong, in my impatience with the terms class and class struggle, which carried teleological nuances that helpedt o conceal from othersth epatronag e mechanism inth e peasant movement, to deny, not the existence of a conflict, but its character as a class struggle. Yet I believe too that I was acutely aware of reality at that time. I came to realize, during this'conservative ' period in Brazil, that peasants can only achieve com munaldevelopmen tthroug hco-operation ,an dtha tpatronag ewa s anobstacl et othi sco operation.I too k withm efro mBrazi lpar to fth eproble mwhic hI wa slate rt oinvestigat e
17 inChile :upo n what does solidarity among peasants depend?
In 1965 I returned to the Netherlands and a year later took up a position with the Department ofRura l Sociology ofth enon-wester nregion si nth eAgricultura lUniversi ty.I mentio nthis ,becaus em ycontac t withth estudent swho ,a shor twhil elater ,revive d their confrontation activitieswa simportan tt ome . Inotice dtha tI coul drelat et othe mo n anequa lfooting , andI wa sgla do fthis .Thei rpolitic swer eleftist , sometimesdogmatical ly so,bu tthe ywer eno t politicianswh oha dt okee pu pthei rpositio nregardless .Contac t withthe mha smad em emor e'leftist ' onth eon ehan d ando nth eothe r strengthenedm y impatience with and aversion to dogmatism.Th e world isgre y and Ithin k that iti ses peciallyimportan t that idealists should realizethis . Chileprove dt ob eno tautomaticall ycomparabl ewit hBrazil . Itwa sfurthe r developed, economically,bu ta tth esam etim eth elimi to fdevelopmen toffere d bycapitalis mseeme d to have been more or less attained. I madefriends , especially inth ecircle s ofth e leftist Christian-Democrats, the Mapu,wh oa t thistim eha d already broken away.I sawtha t they were serious-minded, worked hard and retained their critical faculties even with regard tothei rpolitica lallie so nth eleft .Thi slatte rwa sextremel yimportant ,fo ri nChil e too thelef t wasvociferousl y dogmatic andbelieve dit sow npropagand a andhal ftruths . Importantto owa sth efac t thatI sa wth eidea li nactio n andho wsom epeasant sreacte d to it and gaveo f their utmost. I heard tales ofth e past, ofth einjustic e donet othe mo r their forefathers bysom euncarin glande d proprietor. Iwa sdisturbe d byth elac ko fsen sitivity, the absence of any fellow feeling for their poorer compatriots among the memberso fth eélit ewit h whom Icam eint ocontac t in Santiago.I n addition I sawtha t Chilewa slef twit hlittl echoice :a nagraria ndevelopmen tlik etha ti nWester nEurop ewit h a constant exodus ofth eles s successful peasants towards other sectors ofth eeconom y wasimpossibl ether esinc eth ejo bopportunitie swer elacking .I fagricultur ewa sgive nth e function of keeping people on the land a certain measure of equality would havet o be created, and a redistribution of the land into family enterprises seemed less recommendable. Thus,bot h intellectually andemotionally ,I veeredtoward s thelef t duringm ysta yi n Chile.Ho wfar ? Tosom eo fm yChilea nfriends ,t owho mI the nexpresse dm yfea rtha ti n Chileto o adogmati c and authoritarian government bycivi lservant swoul dsuccee dan y eventual revolution, I am probably a half 'momio'; to Dutch friends, themselves half momios,I mus tappea r asa nextrem eleftist , hairy sociologist.I d ono treall yfee la thom e in either camp and count among myfriend s peoplewh o areprepare d to seeth e person behindth eideology . Perhapsthough ,thi spositio ni sa valuabl eon eafte r all.I hop et opu ti tt ous eb yactin g asinterpreter : herei nth eWes t Ica n explainth ereason sbehin dth eswerv et oth elef ti n underdeveloped countries; in those countries I may perhaps serve as a scientific con science.I tseem st om etha tth ebasi so fal lplan smus tb ea sobjectiv e ananalysi so freali tya spossible .Fo rthi sreaso n ascientifi cworke rwh oact sa sa restrainin ginfluenc eupo n hiscolleague swh oma yb ecarrie dawa yb ythei rideologica lenthusiasm ,ma yprov ehelp ful. I know that a doubter like myself does not bring about a revolution, but to the necessaryfanatic s inth eThir dWorl dI shoul dlik et osay :hav eyou rrevolutio nbu twhe n it is over learn to listen event o the doubters.N o account istake n inthi s book,writte n between 1970 and 1973,o fth eChilea n attemptst o achieve a socialist society.Th eim -
18 plicitdialogu e iswit hth egovernmen t ofth eUnida d Popular,no twit hth eme nwh ono w hold power.Th edialogu edeal swit hth eorganizatio no fpeasant sint oco-operative san d the degree to which certati socialist convictions, for examplethos erelatin g to the'ne w man',ma ylea dt otha torganizatio nbein g setu pi na manne rwhic hi nm yopinio nwoul d beundesirabl e ifth e hoped for goals aret o be attained. ' The military coup of September 1973 has, for the time being, detracted from the relevance of my arguments, at least so far as Chile is concerned. This does not mean, however,tha tth eboo k hasbee novertake nb yevents .Wha tpeasant swant ,wha tthe ydo , why they band together and co-operate, and why they do not, all these are questions which remain relevantfo rth ewhol eo fth eThir dWorld ,an da sociologis t who attempts toanswe rsom eo fthe mrémain srelevan ttoo .Indee di tseem st om etha tth etragi ccours e of events in Chile proves how difficult it is, in terms of national mobilization and the reaching of a consensus, to create a somewhat more just and human society. It is therefore still useful to know how peasantsvie w sucha nattempt ,eve nthoug hthe yma y seem less influential thanothe r categories.
19 Chapter 3 The mobilization of peasants inLati n America: Approach to a theory
3.1 Definition andbrie fdescriptio n
Mobilization isth eproces swhereb ysocia lunit s- whetherindividual so rgroup s- are led to expend an amount, and sometimes a large amount, of theresource s at theirdis posal:time ,money ,energy ,enthusiasm ,i norde r to attain agoa lwhic hthe y sharewit h otherunits .Mobilizatio ni sthu sth etransfer ,toward sa ne wdestination ,b yindividual so r groupso fresource spreviousl yuse dfo rthei row nends .Thi stransfe r usuallyoccur sfairl y suddenly. Mobilization will take place when individuals are unable to bring about a desired situation bythei r own efforts. They arethe nconfronte d withth echoice ,eithe ro f attempting to do sotogethe r or of abandoning hopeentirely . Inthi schapte rw eshal ldiscus sth eobstacles t omobilizatio nwhic hpeasant sencounte r inth esocia l structurean di nthei row nculture .W eshal lals odea lwit hth econditions un derwhic hthi smobilizatio n may occur. Ina late r chapter,devote dt osolidarity ,w eshal l discussth eproblems arising aftermobilization, with reference toth epermanen t alloca tion of resources infavou r ofth ene w structures of collaboration. Ourdefinitio n impliestha tmobilizatio ni sa concep twhic hmus tonl yb euse dfo r apar ticular goal or set of similar goals (cf. Etzioni, 1968,p .420) .I n other words it isonl y whensocia lunit stur nthei reffort s toth esam egoa ltha tthe yca nb esai dt ob eundergoin g the samemobilizatio n process.I t appears from theliteratur e andfro m theresult so fm y own research which willb e dealt with inth efollowin g chapters,tha t peasants mobilize primarily for reasons of self-interest. To put it in somewhat more general terms, they mobilizei nth eprospec t ofloca l objectives. They wisht oachiev ea desire d situation for themselves, for their own locality. This is so both because peasants' interests are of a local-territorial nature andbecaus emobilizatio n assumes contact and interaction. Ishal lbegi ntherefor eb yanalyzing ,i nmode lform ,th eexten tt owhic hLati nAmerica n peasants share, or do not share, the same interests. After this my argument will focus upon those peasants having aloca l opponent or opponents. Theobstacle s to and con ditionsfo r themobilizatio no fthes epeasant sca nb edistinguishe di na sketc hlik eth eon e givenbelow .
local national community society STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES Sections Section4 3+ 5
CULTURAL OBSTACLES Section6 Section4
20 The squares contain the numbers of the sections of this chapter in which the relevant problems aredeal twith . Whether agrou po fpeasant swil lattemp tt oan dsuccee di nvanquishin ga loca loppo nentdepend supo na larg enumbe ro ffactors .A tth epresen ttim ei twil lb etru et osa ytha t almosteverywher ether ei sa considerabl edegre eo feconomi can dpolitica lincorporatio n ofloca lcommunitie sint olarge r(regiona lan dnational )economi can dpolitica lsystems . Thisbein g so,th epeasants 'loca lopponen tha seconomi can dpolitica lallie st ofal lbac k on,includin gi nth elas tinstance ,th eStat ewhic hcan ,an dusuall ywill ,protec thi mwit h allth epower sa tit sdisposal .Thi si nit stur nmean stha t apurel yloca lpeasan tmobiliza tion has little chance of success. Only mobilization on a national or regional scale whereby thepeasant s too seek alliesi n other economic andpolitica l sectorsi slikel yt o succeed. We shall thus be obliged to include in our discussion those structural and cultural changes which lead, on a national level,t o a weakening of thepositio n ofth e landed proprietors and a strengthening oftha t ofth epeasants . Itwil lb enote dtha tth eaggregatio no finterest swhic hoccur swhe npeasant smobiliz e atth enationa lleve llead st oa fairl y vaguedefinitio n ofobjectives .Generall yspeakin gi t will be the State again which defines in detail the future picture of agrarian productive organization.Anothe rfacto r whichplay sa nimportan trol ei ndeterminin gth esucces so f mobilization on the local level, is the extent to which the peasants are able to rid themselves mentally of (the need for) a particularistic relationship with a patron. In situations of inequality, patronage is an almost ubiquitous redistribution mechanism whichturn s peasantsint ocompetitor s andkeep sthe m divided. Afourt h factor isentirel yinheren ti npeasan tculture ,an dderive sfro m certainvalue s andattitude sdevelope di na situatio no foppressio nlastin gman ygenerations .Thes eca n makeco-operatio n exceedingly difficult.
3.2 Kindso floca linterests : a model
Weshal lbegi nb ydeterminin gt owha texten tLatin-America npeasant s(campesinos ) shareth esam eaims 1.For ,afte r all,th eter mcampesino scover scategorie swhic hhav ea different accesst oth emean so fproduction .I ti spossibl et odistinguis ha tleas fivet suc h categories.I nth efirst plac ether ear eth esmal lowner san d'squatters 'wh ohav emor eo r lessindependen tpossessio no flan dupo nwhic hthe yru nfamil yfarm swhic hma yo rma y not be large enough to supply their own needs. Secondly there are the tenants and sharecroppers who lease land from others against some form of payment but retain a degreeo findependenc e on howi ti sfarmed . Thirdly,w ehav eth ecolono so rinquilinos , peasantswh ospen dth egreate rpar to fthei rtim eworkin gfo r alandowne ran dreceiv ei n exchange,whethe ro rno ti nadditio nt owages ,th eus eo fa smal lpiec eo flan do nwhic ht o grow food for themselves and their families. Fourthly, there are the permanent wage- labourers whowor k full-time for other peoplean d arepai di ncash ,an dfifthly, th etem porary workers whoar eals opai d incas h but areonl yemploye dfo r acertai n period. A first distinction of these categories is necessary, but not yet sufficient for an un derstanding of the mobilization process. It is necessary because, aswil lb ecom eclea r later on, these categories do not have exactly similar interests and may thus aspire to different goals. Usually they do not join the same organizations. In Brazil, during Goulart'stime ,th efamou sLiga sCamponesa sdirecte db yJuliào ,focusse dthei rattentio n
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Hëi'ill If Hf*i "N II1-1 S3; Il'ililIUirl •SIT B€ - 3* -i S.1 § » aa c,..- a § g SS gS •â,'| 1 § 8I8J.& I I ^ as- sg &. g.. ra * »| i g ifsi§ji£8>l 'gfejllji I« 11S j il -sI « a*..css»..;i gil§ s nriîi'=5 -Bg S. i 8 %&& S5. 2 0<2 M O O S ilS£lB|1{§6g,liil»S O 87 3 3.^ oJ £Osu»o 'S o o 23 ,*_^_^ primarily on thefirst tw o categories (Moraes, 1970,p .467) ;i t was more usual for the workers to become members of rural syndicates. In Chile, during the time of Frei's government, by far themajorit y ofrura l tradeunio nmember sbelonge dt oth ethir d and fourth categories;th etemporar y workers werescarcel y organized atall . However,anothe rdistinctio nmus tb emade ,base do nth eloca ldistributio no fth emai n resource, land, in the community or territorial unit in which the peasants are located. Uponthi sdistributio n dependsth elikelihoo do fth epeasants 'havin ga loca lopponent ,a localconflic t ofinterests .A sCose r(1956 ,p .3 4an d90 )ha spointe dout ,th eexistenc eo f a negativereferenc e groupi simportan t for theformatio n ofne wgroups .Conflic t witha negative reference group will promote the internal cohesion of the peasants. Amacro - sociological viewwhic h postulates that a conflict exists for thecountr y as awhole ,bu t whichdoe sno t examineloca lcondition si si nm ymin dto oloos et oexplai nth emobiliza tion process.I t isprecisel y theinstigatio n of aloca l action, theexistenc e ofa loca lcon flict, which often leads to full-scale mobilization, and this action depends upon the existence of local opponents. The macro viewpoint tends to assume a unity among peasants which isa t best problematic andcertainl y cannot betake n for granted.O nth e otherhan di tdoe ssuggest ,an drightl yso ,tha tultimatel ya certai ncommunit yo finterest s existsan dtha ttherefor eth epeasant swil lstriv eafte r unity. By way of hypothesis, I assume that certain attitudes, values and mechanisms are linked with theloca ldistributio n ofth emean so fproductio n whichha softe n existedun changed for a very long time2. The possible distributions with their associated cultural elements aregive ni nth e model on pages 22-23. The basisis ,a s wehav e said,th eloca l distribution ofland .Th emode lals ocontain sassumption sregardin gth emechanism san d valueswhic hhel pt opreserv ethi sdistribution ,onc eachieved ,an dregardin gth einterest s andobjective sa twhic hth epeasant swil lai monc emobilized .I tmus tb estresse dher etha t the model comprises ideal types and not descriptions.I n reality elements from various idealtype sca nb efoun d inon econcret elocality . Minifundistas oftyp eA ma yfo rexam ple work as labourers upon the surrounding farms, giving rise to type C. The sharecroppers in Cma y form a separate ethnicgrou p with strong mutual solidarity,s o thatth esituatio n comest oresembl etha to ftyp eA fro m acultura lpoin to fview .Tenan t farmers andsharecropper sma yb efoun d inB andeve nworker so nth esomewha tlarge r enterprises; it is,moreover , possible that as time goesb y the distribution inB becomes moreunequal ,givin gris et oa situatio nwhic hha sa grea tdea li ncommo nwit hC .I ncer tain cases a large enterprise may be organized in such a way as to contain both sharecroppers andwag eworkers . Yeteve nthoug hth erealit yi softe n difficult to classify, itseem st om etha t themode lI emplo yma yserv et obrin ga certai ndegre eo fconceptua l order into thechao s of appearances. Oneimportan t distinction suggested by themode li stha t between situationsi nwhic h onema y speak of aloca lmonopolizatio n oflan dan dthu so fa clea rconflic t ofinterest s (C)an dsituation si nwhic hthi si snot ,o rhardl yth ecas e( Aan dB) .I nC th emobilizatio n of the dependent peasants willb e aimed at thelande d proprietors. Doubtful casesma y alsooccur .Situatio nA ma ysometime saris ebetwee nth elarg eestates ,fo rinstanc ei nth e higher sections of a catchment area, in thefor m of communities of small,independen t peasants,t awhic hth esurroundin glande dproprietor sd ono tbelong .I fon eexamine sth e riverbasi na sa whol eth edistributio no fth elan di sver yunequal ,bu tlocally ,withi nsuc h a community, the distribution may be comparatively fair. It is my hypothesis that a 24 cultural pattern developswhic hi sdetermine dbot hb yth erelativ eloca lequalit y andb y theinequalit yexistin gi nth ewide rarea 3. The difference between one Indian peasant community possessing a reasonable acreage althoughsurrounde do nal lside sb yhacienda s(situatio nA )an danothe rIndia n communitywhic hha sto olittl elan d sincei tha slos tpar to fi tt oth esurroundin ghacien das(situatio nC )i son eo fdegree .I nsuc ha situatio nth ecours etake nb ymobilizatio nwil l dependi nth efirst plac eupo nwhethe ro rno tpeasant sinclud eth elan downe db yth esur rounding enterprises in their assessment of the local distribution. In other words, are these surrounding landed proprietors for them a negative reference group of land usurperso rd othe yleav ethe mentirel you to fthei rcalculations ?I nth efirst cas ether ei sa conflict ofinterest swithi nthi styp eA community ,whil ei nth esecon dcas ether ei snot . Indian communities of type A are seldom unaware that the surrounding landed proprietors have appropriated land whichformerl y belongedt othem ;the ythu sindee d - regardthe ma sopponents .Sometime sto ow eca nspea ko fa conflic tO finterest swhe nth e inhabitantso fa communit yo ftyp eA o rB alsowor kfo rpar to fth eyea ra slabourer so r colonosupo n aneighbourin g enterprise(cf . Cotler, 1970,p .60) . We shall now discuss in particular the mobilization of peasants against the landed proprietors, that is, situation C and, where relevant, A included in C. It is in such situations that theinequality , the social injustice isth emos t glaring.I nthes e situations too mobilization most clearly assumes the character of a fierce political struggle - sometimes even carried on by force of arms. It is the outcome of this struggle which promisest ohav eth emos tfar-reachin g consequencesfo rth efutur edevelopmen to fLati n America, both rural and urban. Nevertheless wemus t point outtha t situations such as those we call C are not the only ones to occur. Millions of peasants live in situations which more closely resemble A or B. Mobilization against the landed proprietors ig nores,i npar ta tleast ,th einterest so fth epeasant si nsuc hsituations 4. Ata late rstage ,whe nth epeasant si nsituation sA an dB hav ebecom emor epoliticize d and class conscious, and basethei r activitiesupo n avie wo fth e agrarian structure ina muchlarge r area,thei r mobilization too maytur nagains ta propertie d class.I nth e first instance,however ,thei rai mwil lb et odefen dthos einterest sdea rt othe ma sindependen t producers. 3.3 Local,structura lobstacle st omobilizatio n The model assumes that in Cther ei sno t alon equestio n of aconflic t betweenthos e whomonopolize dth elan d andthos ewh ohav elittl eo rnone ,bu tals oo fmechanism sin tended to preserve the existing distribution and of cultural patterns which indicate an adaptationt othi ssituation .Th emechanism sreferre dt oher ear ecoercion andpatronage. Coercionshow sitsel fin :lo wwages ,lon ghour so fwork ,ora lcontract sfo r shortperiods , paymenti ncoupon swhic hca nonl yb eexchange dfo rgood si nth estor eactuall ylocate d onth ehacienda ,i nth eobligatio nt oprovid eextr aservice swhic har eofte nno tpai dfor ,i n theobligatio nt osel lagricultura lproduc ethroug hth eowner ,i ndishones tpractice swit h weightsan dmeasures ,i nth econtro lexercise dove rth esocia lcontact so fpeasant slivin g ondi eproperty ,an di nth ereprisal stake nagains tthos ewh ower ei nan ywa yrebellious . In somecountrie s and atcertai n periodsth eowne rha da thi sdisposa la troo po farme d 25 henchmen whose task was not only to protect him against hisequal sbu t alsot o keep 'order'o nhi sproperty .Sinc eth eintroductio no fformal ,democrati celectio nprocesse si n the Latin-American countries thelande d proprietorshav etrie d inever ypossibl ewa yt o persuade those peasants who are dependent upon them to cast their vote for the can didate of their (the landlord's) choice.Her e too,i f it proved necessary,tha t ist o sayi f other means seemedlikel y toprov eineffective , coercion wasuse di nth efor m ofthreat s and reprisals (cf. Petras &Zeitlin , 1970,p .510) . Amuc hmor esubtl emechanis mwhic hhelpe dt omaintai nth eexistin gdistributio nwa s patronage. Patronage is an institutionalized relationship based upon an agreement, usuallyinformal ,betwee ntw operson s(o rparties )wh odiffe r inth edegre et owhic hthe y can influence the allocation of goods and services.Th e agreement implies that theon e withth emos tinfluence ,th epatron ,wil lus ei ti nfavou r ofth eothe rparty ,th eclient ,wh o willperfor m various servicesi nreturn .Accordin gt oWebe r(1925 ,p .68 1 ff.)th esee do f this structural principle must be sought in the Oikos, the patrimonial property upon whicha lor dha dpowe rove rth eothe rmember so fa household ,whethe rrelate dt ohi mo r not.I ti sgenerall y knowntha tlan d inLati n Americawa susuall y givenou ti nver ylarg e parcels;thos ewh oreceive dlan di nthi smanne rwer esometime sabl et oavai la tth esam e time of certain services from Indians living on the land or in the neighbourhood. Sometimesthe yha dt ose et oth esuppl yo fworker sthemselves .Th emethod semployed , such as slavery,deb t bondage orth eextrem emonopolizin g ofth elan db y afe wowner s (cf. Pearse, 1970, p. 17), all led equally to the agrarian workers becoming extremely dependent uponth eowner .I nothe r wordsth eagraria n structurewhic hWebe rregarde d asth ebreedin ggroun do fpatronag eexiste di nman yplace si nLati nAmerica .Patronag e relationships,however ,ar eals oencountere dbetwee npeopl ewh od ono tliv eo nth esam e property,bu twh odiffe ri nstatus .Ou rmode lassume stha tpatronag ewil loccu rwheneve r an unequaldistributio n oflan d canb e saidt oexis twithi n anagraria n community.Thi s hypothesis isbase d onth evie wtha t in such casespatronag e can fulfil ausefu l function for bothparties .Th efavou r ofth ehigher-rankin g party,th esurrende r ofgood so ro fth e disposal offutur e goods,i s'exchanged ' for theservic eo fth elowe rrankin gpart ywhic h consistsi nacknowledgin g theprestig ean dlegitimat eauthorit yo fth eother .A somewha t greater economic equality is obtained at the expense of greater social and politicalin equality. The higher-ranking person can use his legitimated power to promote, either directly or indirectly,hi sappropriatio n of economicgoods . One important aspect of patronage is that it is not a relationship which springs up automatically between aric hlandowne r and apoo r peasant.It sinceptio ndepend supo n thequalit yo fth epersona lrelationshi pbetwee nth etw oparticipants ;i tals oassume sper sonalloyalt yo nth epar to fon etoward sth eother .Th eperso ni nth elowe rpositio nplace s himself under the protection of the person in the higher. Usually the initiative for em barkingupo nth erelationshi pcome sfro m thelowe rplace dperson ;i nmos tcase sh eha s moret ogai ntha nth eother .Fo r someonewh oalread yenjoy sth eprestig eo fa numbe ro f dependents,th eincreas ei nprestig ewhic hh egain sb yacceptin ga ne wclien ti sslight .Th e fact that the initiative usually comes from the person oflowe r status hasbee n directly observed(Galjart , 1968,p .86 ;Hutchinson , 1966;Williams ,1969 ,p .88 )bu ti ti sals oap parentfro m thetendenc y whichoccur si ndifferentiate d communitiest oacquir eperson s ofhighe r status asritual co-parents ,potentia lpatron s(se eMint z &Wolf , 1967, p.195) . Although iti stru etha tpatronag eha sye tanother ,latent ,functio n whichma ybenefi tth e 26 ^^wpm patron, Huîzer's suggestion (1970,p .2 2an d 188)tha t iti sth epatro n whoseek st oes tablish thepatronag e relationshipmus tb eregarde d asincorrect. ' Thislaten tfunctio n of*patronage ,on etha ti sver yimportan twit hregar dt omobiliza tion, is that it keeps the dependent peasants divided. They are rivals for a patron's favours. In an earlier piece of research undertaken in Brazil (Galjart, 1968,p i 86) I viewedth elac ko fhorizonta lsolidarit yamon gpeasant so fequa lsocia lstatu sa sformin g part ofthei rtendenc yt osee kpatronag erelationships .Cotle r(1969 ,p .65 )indicate dth e samephenomeno n for Peruwhe nh ecalle dth epatter no f socialrelationship so fdepen dentpeasant sa 'triangl ewithou ta base' .Eve nthoug hpatronag ecertainl ydoe sno t affect all,o reve na majorit yo fth epotentia lclient s- thepeasant san dlabourer so na propert y - and even though only afe w profit by agoo d relationshipwit hth epatron ,thi sdoe sno t detractfro mth ecultura linfluenc eo fth einstitution .I thelp st okee pthos eindividual swh o seek patronage apart from the majority and thus harms their solidarity.I n this wayi t fulfils for thepatro n a useful roleo fdivid ean dconque r andachieve sthi ss o effectively preciselybecaus ei tdoes ,o noccasion ,offe r aperso no flowe rstatu sth epossibilit yo fver ticalmobility .On efrequentl yfinds tha tth esupervisor y- andbette rpai d- personnelo n the large agricultural enterprises originate from the category of agricultural workers. Certainlyi ti sonl ya smal lpercentag eo fth eagraria npopulatio nwhic hca nbette ritsel fi n thismanner ,bu tequall ycertai ni sth efac ttha tthei rexampl ehelp st okee paliv ea belie fi n theeffectivenes s ofpatronag e inmuc hwide rcircles . The increasing, almost obligatory openness of the local agrarian community or the hacienda, the growing influence of the central government and state institutionsupo n local events has not led automatically to thedisappearanc e of patronage.O n thecon trary,th emechanis mha sbee nstrengthene drathe rb yth eintroductio no felection san do f suffrage. The patron, belonging as he did to the local élite which enjoyed power and prestige,could ,i fh ewished ,tak eo nanothe rfunction . Hecoul dbecom eth eintermediar y between the central government apparatus and theloca l community. Hecoul dd othi s eitherb yenterin gpolitic shimself ,o rb yinitiatin gpatronag erelationship swit hinfluentia l persons in the comprehensive systems. The function of 'broker' has already been described by many authors (including Wolf, 1956;Dandier , 1969;Pascal , 1968). This function needno tnecessaril yb efulfille d bya lande dproprietor ,sinc eth epreconditio ni s not ownership of land but the possession of relations and contacts with strategically placedperson si nth eoutsid eworld . In anycas ei ti sa fac t thatth eintroductio n offorma l democraticpolitica lprocedure s hasno tcurtaile dth epowe ro fth elande dproprietor .Fo ra lon gperio di tha sserve drathe r toincreas eit .Th eclien to rpotentia lclient ,th edependen tpeasan twa spu ti na positio nt o perform avaluabl eservic efo rth epatron ,tha to fvotin gfo rth epatron' scandidate .I nac tualfac t itwa sa lon gtim ebefor e thepeasan t himselfrealize dth etru evalu eo fthi sser vice. Coercion andpatronag ebot hmad ei tpossibl efo rth epatro nt odispos eo fth evote s ofthos epeasant sdependen to nhim 5.Th eresul twa stha tth eowner so flarg eestate swer e ablet o retain aconsiderabl edegre eo fpolitica lpowe rfo r alon gtime, eve nwhere , from the nationalpoin to fview , theywer ebecomin gles simportan t as aneconomi cforce .I n somecountrie sthe ystil ldo .A goo dexampl eo fthi si swha thappene di nChil ei n 1939(cf . Affonso etal, 1970,1, Chap. 1).I n spiteo fa nelectio n victory byth ecandidat eo fth e popularfron t whoha dth esuppor to fth ecommunis tan dsocialis tparties ,th eradica lpar ty was able to make its participation in the coalition government dependent upon the 27 promisetha t the government would not tolerate syndicates of agricultural worker?. Despiteth eris eo fpolitica lpartie sdrawin gthei r electorateprincipall y from theurba n proletariat and being also interested in the peasants' votes, the landed proprietors dominatedthes et osuc ha nexten ttha ti twa sa lon gtim ebefor eth epartie sgo ta foothol d at all.Indeed ,i nsom ecountrie sthe yhav eno tmanage dt od os oyet .Th epolitica lpowe r ofthes elarg epropert y ownersmean stha tth eState ,wit hit smachiner yo frepression ,i s on their side when it comes to frustrating thepeasants ' concrete attempts tomobilize . They are also ablet ohav ereform s ofth eagraria n structurepostpone d evenwher elaw s havebee n enacted tothi s purpose despitethei r opposition. From what we have said thus far it becomes clear that even though the peasants mobilizet obrin gabou ta loca lredistributio no fincom eo rresources ,th edegre et owhic h the local community and, notably, their opponents, the landed proprietors, are incor porated in the national political system, means that they have more to cope with than merely local opposition. Although the breaking down of the patronage relationship betweenlande dproprieto r andpeasan tremain son eo fth econdition sfo rsucces so fthes e attempts atmobilization ,i ti sno tth emos timportant .Thi scontinue st ob eth esmashin g or at least the neutralizing of the landed proprietors' political power at national level. Several authors have suggested that reforms ofth eagraria n structure andth emobiliza tion of the peasants only got under way after thelarg e estate owners had already lost some of their power (cf. Moraes, 1970,p .46 7 ff.; Chonchol, 1970,p . 33ff. ; Craig Jr., 1969,p .292) . Before returning to the local level in order to determine under what conditions a weakening of patronage might beexpected , weshal l deal with the power of the landed proprietors within the national political and economic systems. Even there theirpowe r doesno tlas tfo r ever,althoug h itha sexiste dfo r centuries.Th etraged yis ,however ,tha t thepeasant s themselves can contribute verylittl etoward screatin gth econdition sunde r whichthi spowe r can becurtailed . 3.4 Structural andcultura lcondition sfo rpeasan tmobilizatio no nth enationa lleve l Iti stru et o say ofmos t Latin American countries that for centuries thepowe r ofth e landedproprietor sha sbee nchiefl y local.I nth eabsenc eo fa stron gcentra lauthority ,th e boundarieso fthei rterritor ywer ea tth esam etim eth eboundarie so fa politica luni twhic h wast o allintent s and purposes independent. Thegreates tpotentia lenem y ofth elande d proprietor wasofte n anotherlande dproprieto r andther ewer efrequen t conflictsbetwee n them about land or other matters.Thi s was tied up with the fact that the hacienda, no matter how large, was always potentially capable of further expansion (see Wolf & Hansen, 1966, p. 171). Local or regional alliances were also formed when it became necessary to promote aparticula r interest. The landowners only began to act as a national interest group when the central authority became strong enought o start laying downth ela wt othe mo ncertai npoints . Their power within the national system was based upon three factors. Inth efirst plac e therewa sthei reconomic importance .I nman ycountrie sthe ywer eth echie fproducer so f export products and since a large part of the state income was derived from an export 28 levy,the ywer eals oth emos timportan tta xpayers .Bu teve napar tfro mthi slevy ,th efac t remained that the agrarian product accounted for a considerable share of the total national product and that the landed proprietors therefore earned a large part of the national income. Inth esecon d placethei rpowe r waspolitical andbase dupo nthei rdominatio no fpeo ple.Thi sapplie dno tonl yt oth edependen tpeasant so nthei row nestate sbu tals ot othos e of smaller landowners in the neighbourhood and to the relatives, servants and other members of the household of all these people. Both during the time of the regional caudilloswh ofough tamon gthemselve st odecid ewh owoul dcontro lth eposition so fcen tral authority andlater ,whe ndemocrati c elections took overth efunctio n of oustingth e governmenti noffice , thosewh ohel dth epeasants 'loyalty ,hel dpower .Althoug hsom eo f the caudillos were not of thelande d proprietor class, many of themwere ,an di n almost every LatinAmerica ncountry ,unti lwel lint oth etwentiet hcentury ,th elarg elandowner s furnished many prominent politicians. In addition the power of the large landowners foundexpressio ni nthei rcontro lo f anumbe ro fpolitica lparties ,som eo fthe mextremel y large,whic h succeded for alon g timei nblockin g changes inrura l areasthroug hth eac tions of theirparliamentar y delegates.The y managed,fo rinstance ,t o holdu pth eexten siont oth erura larea so flabou rlegislation .I nthi swa yto othe ywer eabl et omobiliz eth e armed power of the state for their own ends if by any chance some movement ofrevol t did break out. In such cases the police andth e army were none too gentle inrestorin g order. Their third power base was the actual interest group, the lobby, often called somethinglik e'nationa l society ofagriculture' .Suc ha societ ystrov eno tonl yt opromot e certain government measures which would be advantageous to its members, but also analyzed the possible consequences for agriculture of other measures and bills. If its analysis proved negative, it initiated resistance, often successfully. McBride (1970, p. 169) describes how the Chilean Sociedad Nacional deAgricultura ,i na communication to the members of 1924, states that not alone has it put a stopt o theradica l movement amongth eworker sbu ti tha s alsoprevente dth econstructio no fa railwa yove rth eAnde s inth esout ho fChil ewhic hwoul dhav emad ei tpossibl et oimpor tcattl eo nth ehoo ffro m Argentinaan dthu swoul dhav eweakene dth ecompetitiv epositio no fcattl efarmer slivin g in southern Chile. What factors have contributedo rca ncontribut et oa weakenin go fth epowe rpositio n of thelarg elandowner s ort o neutralizing their power? Inm yopinio nth efirs tt ob ementione dmus tb eth egradua lgrowt ho findustry ove rth e past forty years. Thisi s based chiefly onimpor treplacemen t andmus ttherefor efin d an internal outlet in order to continue in existence. This leads one immediately to a basic contradiction;i ti si nth einterest so findustry ,o ra tleas to fth eproducer so fordinar ycon sumer goods, to have a farming population which earns enough to be able to buy its products.Industrializatio ni nitsel fcreate stw one winteres tgroups ,th eindustrialist s and the workers. Other processes of change,suc h asurbanization ,th eris eo f abureaucrati c government apparatus and the emergence of middle classes to man the service sector, which may in partoccu r autonomously butwhic h may alsob ecause db y industrializa tion, also lead to the appearance of new interest groups. All this means, ipsofacto, that the national producti s no longer earned solely in agriculture, by thelarg elandowners . 29 The basic conflict between industry and the surplus appropriation byth elan e 'and- ownersremaine dfo r alon gtim esubmerged .I thas ,nonetheless ,give nris et oadaptation s in the price relationships between industrial goods and agricultural produce which are disadvantageous toagricultur e(cf . Evers & Vossenaar, 1971).I norde rt oavoi da direc t confrontation, industrialists and landowners have arrived at a sort of compromise;th e absence of a home market is compensated for by high prices for industrial goods and stringent import restrictions.Ultimately , however, thisha sweakene d thepositio n ofth e landownersnonetheless .Deprive do fincentives ,agricultur ewa sunabl eeithe rt oincreas e production andproductivit yt oan ygrea texten to rt ooffe r thepeasant sa nexistenc emor e consistent withhuma n dignity.This state ofaffair s wassometime sacknowledge d byth e landowners: in Chile it wason eo fth e arguments withwhic h the SNAtrie d to shift the blamefro m itsmember s(Gomez , 1969,p .8 3ff). However ,i na situatio nwher efo r years arguments have been employed with the object of preventing, postponing or watering downreforms , noon epay s attention any moret o thetrut h content of an argument. Industrialization thus has ledi n more than onewa y to aweakenin g ofth eeconomi c power of the landowners. That this weakening favours peasant mobilization seems beyond dispute.Whe nmobilizatio n begani nChil ei n 1965,th eagraria n populationstil l formed at most 30%o fth etotal .I n addition the agriculturalists,tha t ist o say,th elan downers, had been discredited in the eyes of a broad section of the public (Chonchol, 1970 , p.5 6 )b yth efac t that agriculture,whic hbefor eth esecon dworl dwa rha dprovide d a foreign exchange surpluso fsom e4 0millio ndollars ,wa ss oincapabl eo fsatisfyin g the demand for food in the sixties that an annual food import of 150 million dollars was necessary. One might assumetha t theemergenc e ofne winteres t groups which arebeginnin g to takepar t inth epolitica lproces s and helpt oinfluenc e theallocatio n ofpubli cresources , willaffec t thepolitica lpowe ro fth elandowners .Thi si sindee d so,i na certai n sense, but theproces s may at best becalle d devious.Insofa r ason eca n speako fa democraticall y elected government, this can no longer beforme d entirely by parties dominated byth e landowners. It will have to be acoalitio n government. Wehav e already seen,however , thateve ni nthes ecircumstance sth elandowner smanag et opreserv eth estatu squ oi nth e countryside for quite a long timeb yformin g alliances or entering into agreementswit h other interest groups.The ymanage dt opreserv ei tfo r sosurprisingl y longi nfac t thati t has given rise to a theory of political development having special reference to Latin America. Anderson (1964) has postulated that, in the Latin American countries, every newly emerginginteres tgrou pha st oprov eit spowe rcapability .Thi si sthe nfollowe db yadmis sion toth epolitica l arena,provide dtha tth esittin gpowe r groups areconvince d thatth e newcomer willkee pt o therule so fth egame .And ,on eo fth emai nrule si stha tthe ywil l not eliminate any ofth etraditiona l power groups.Eac h group continues to participate. This'theory 'whic hi snothin gels ebu ta nidea ltypica ldescriptio no fwha t actuallyseem s to take placei n anumbe r ofcountrie s impliestha t newgroups ,whic h often started out withver yrevolutionar y ideasan d slogans,ar ei na certai n senseabsorbed .The yconniv e with the others to keepth e system functioning andthemselve sbecom e members ofth e élite. Several authors in fact (including Fais Borda, 1968, p. 67) speak of a workers' aristocracy. This 'theory' isimportan t in relation toth epeasant s intha tthe yar eon eo f the few remaining collectivities which still have to prove their 'power capability' and 30 therebyfind themselve soppose dt oa syste mo finterest swhic hi salread yt oa larg eexten t differentiated. In a certain sense all the other power groups will have to give way a little when the peasantsfinally begi nt oparticipate .Conversely ,thi sals omean sthat ,despit eal lslogan s to the contrary,th e peasantscanno t count on the urbanworker s as convinced political allies. However, this situation will not last indefinitely. Developments such asth eexten sion ofth efranchis e toilliterates 6,a considerabl eincreas ei nth enumbe ro fliterate s(wh o areentitle dt ovote )an dreform si nth eelectio nprocedure swhic hwil lensur etha tvotin gi s really secret (and thus impossible for the owners to check upon ) and fraud impossible, make it an attractive proposition for those parties not controlled or influenced by lan downers,t osee kvoter si nth erura lareas .I nthi swa ya powe rrati oma yfinally emerg eo n thenationa llevel ,withi n acoalitio nfo rexample ,suc htha ta governmen twil lb ereluctan t to userepressiv e measures againstth epeasants ,eve ni frequeste d tod os o byth elande d proprietorsan dthei rallie si nparliament 7. Iti s also possible, however, that the largelandowner s willfind politica l alliesi nthos e parties dominated byindustria linteres t groups andth emiddl eclasses .Thi sca nhappe n when the groups which champion agrarian reform also threaten the non-agrarian ownership of themean s of production. Thereca n ben odoub ttha tth eState' sreluctanc et oemplo yrepressiv emeasure si ses sential to peasant mobilization. The history of many LatinAmerica ncountrie si sful l of examples of dispersedjacqueries , vanished organizations, ill-fated actions on thepar t of thepeasants . On theothe rhan di ti sfrequentl y possiblet odetec tgovernmen t neutrality oreve ngood-wil l underlying successful peasant actions.Accordin gt oCrai gJr .(1969 ,p . 286), the more open policy of the Prado government in Peru towards new trade unions stimulatedth esettin gu po fth efirst o fthes eorganization si nth eConventio nvalley .Syn - dicalization later received a welcome stimulus from a recommendation favouring the peasants which was made by a research commission of the Ministry of Labour, sent to the valley to investigate a conflict (idem, p. 288). Arroyo and Gomez (1969) have gathered data for Chilewhic h showth eenormou sconsequence sresultin gfro mth ecorn - Table2 . Numbero fconflict si nagricultura lenterprise s(Chile ) Occupationo fenterprise sb y Year C.W.C.1 Strikes Workers Mapuche 1960 60 3 — 1961 12 7 1 1 1962 21 44 — 1 1963 10 5 — 2 1964 31 39 — 1 1965 395 142 7 6 1966 526 586 14 4 1967 1167 693 7 2 1968 1852 647 24 2 1. Collectivewag econtract s 31 ingt o power of the Frei government i.e. a government welldispose d towards tradeun ionism. This was so even in the early years when the legislation remained unchanged, being merely differently applied. Whereas before 1964 there were only about 20 rural syndicatesi nexistence ,thi snumbe rha dgrow nt o20 1 by 1966an dt o39 4b y 1970.Tabl e 2, derived from the same authors, shows that the number of actions also increased by leaps and bounds during theperio d of Frei's government. Peasant organizationsthemselve sdevelope da numbe ro ftactic s aimeda tneutralizin g the power of the landed proprietors and increasing the government's reluctance to use repressive measures. Firstly, in many countries they came to realize that local organizations, acting alone, always lose a conflict. Even though their action usually remains local, the organizations are in a stronger position if they unite in an umbrella movement;thei r solidarity notonl ymake srepressio nmor edifficult , but alsomor erisk y for agovernmen t which ultimately depends upon winningelections . In the second place oneofte nfinds (cf . Huizer, 1970)tha t the peasants start out by making demands which amount merely to the application of an already existing law; demandsfo r thepaymen to fa lega lminimu mwage ,demand sfo r theenforcemen t ofth e legally prescribed hours of work, demands for the abolition of contractual obligations declaredinvali db ylaw . Suchtactic s alsomak ei tmor edifficul t forth egovernmen tt oac t repressively. Thirdly thepeasant s- andlate rthei rorganization s- seek alliesamon gothe rpopula tion groupso r elseaccep t invitations tojoi n alliancesmad et othe m by other groupso r persons.Thi sscoutin groun dfo r alliesi seviden ti nth efirst plac efro mth efac ttha tman y of the leaders of peasant organizations were not peasants themselves but had ahighe r standing in the community as lawyers, priests or urban intellectuals. The name of the lawyer Francisco Juliào is linked with the famous Ligas Camponesas from Goulart's period. Intha t same period thepriest s Crespo andLag ewer ewel lknow nleader so fth e syndical movement innorth-easter n Brazil.Hug oBlanco ,th ema nwh ohelpe d organize thepeasant si nth eConvenció nValle yi nPer uwa sa studen to fagriculture ;Emili oLoren zini, who organized thefirst bi g strike of Chilean agricultural workers in 1953,wa s a jurist and sono fon eo fth eloca lnotables ;Jua nCifuentes , whodi dth esam ethin ga yea r later ina neighbourin g community,'cam efro m afamil y whichha dproduce d alon glin e ofbishop s and ministers of state'(Landsberger , 1969,p .223) . Through their higher social-economic status- andsometime sb y virtueo ffamil y ties with localnotable s- they areles seasil y 'got at' by theloca l landowners.Th elatte r are not quite sure what hornet's nest they may be stirring up if they try to take reprisals against them, for they prefer to aim their reprisals at the local leaders of peasant organizations.Eve na slat ea s 1965i twa sdifficult ,i nChile ,sa yAffons oet al. (1970II ,p . 236), to find peasants who were prepared to occupy any leading position in the syn dicates. It isno t surprising therefore that it is sometimes necessary to have an alliance beforehand toge tan yloca lpeasan t organization goinga t all.I na larg enumbe ro fcase s the first impetus towards a local association must come from an outsider. Such an organiser mayb esom esociall y awareperson ,lik ea pries to r astudent ,o rsomeon econ nectedwit ha leftis t politicalgrouping ,o reve na civi lservan t(Chile) ;thi sdepend so nth e political circumstances. The aimo fsuc ha mobilize ri sfrequentl y notmerel yt oorganiz eth epeasant s soa st o 32 be able to demand better living conditions. If he has political affiliations he will also be eagert ogai nsuppor tfo rhi spart yo rgroup ;i fh eha sa particula rsocia lidea li nmind ,h e willtr yt o whipu pth epeasants 'enthusias mfo ri ts otha tthe ywil ldeman dth enecessar y changes;i fh ehimsel fha spolitica l ambitions hewil lwan tt owi nvoters .Certainly ,i fth e mobilizer is affiliated to an important party any alliance he sets in motion will serve severalfunctions .I tprotect sth epeasant san dserve sa sa channe lfo rcommunicatio nan d negotiation with the national level on whichdecision s regarding thesolutio n of conflicts aretaken .Fo rth e governmenti sno timportan t merely asth epossibl etoo l ofth elande d proprietors.Eve nwhe ni tcease st ofulfi lthi srol es oobviously ,i tmus tstil lsolv econflicts , takedecision s regardingth e allocation ofresource s andlegaliz e anyne wmeasures . The governmentremain simportan tt oth epeasant san ds oaccordingl yd ogoo drelation swit h thisgovernmen t andth echannel so fcommunicatio nvi awhic hthe yma yargu ethei rcase . For the political party any alliance withth e peasants isintende dt o bindthe mt oit 8.Th e APRA inPeru ,th eMN R inBolivia ,A.D .i nVenezuela ,PR Ii nMexico ,FRA Pan dPD C in Chile were all familiar with such 'tied' peasant organizations. However, although in onecas e(Mexico )th epeasants ,onc e'tied' ,receive dhardl yan yhel pfro mthei rpart yan d inth eothe r(Venezuela )i ti sdoubtfu lwhether ,afte r aver ypromisin gstart ,th epart yno w pays much attention toth epeasant s atall ,ther esee mt ob ecase si nwhic hth epart ycon tinued to support the peasant organizations (Peru, Chile). One seems justified in assuming that the support the peasants receive is directly related to the importance of their political support for those groups or organizations which hold power within the state or,conversely ,t oth ethrea twhic hthei roppositio nmigh tpos et othes epowe rélites . In any case, such an alliance, which sometimes assumes the character of a client relationship, is one more example of theimportanc e for the peasants of linking upwit h other groups. One cultural factor which helps to weaken the power of the landed proprietors is ideological. It concerns the emergence, first among the urban intellectuals, and later amongothe rpopulatio ngroups ,o fa se to frelate didea san dconcept swhic hdetrac tfro m the prestigeo f the hacendados. The actual origin of these ideas seems to be connected with a question which began once againt opre-occup y LatinAmerica n intellectuals duringth etwenties .The ystarte d to ask themselves whythei r countries were under-developed. Previous generations had usually sought the answer in a supposed racial inferiority of the Indian or, as the case might be, black section of the population. Gradually, however, the stereotypes of the stupid,apatheti cpeasant ,devoi do fan ycultur eo fhi sow nan dincapabl eo fcreatin gone , became unacceptable (Quijano, 1965,p . 57). People began toregar dth epositio no fth e dependent peasant,existin g on thever yedg eof , orbelow ,th esubsistenc e level, asbein g contraryt o alljustice .I nth efirs tinstanc ethi sle dt oa nunfavourabl evie wo fth eagraria n sector, whichwa sconsidere dtraditional ,clingin gt oout-of-dat e techniques andmethod s and to a social order in which the enterprising peasant was givenn o opportunity. At a laterstage ,durin gth efifties ,peopl eals obega nt oattribut eth estagnatio ni nth eeconomi c development of society asa whol et oth e excessively stratified social structureobtainin g inrura l areas.Thi swa ssee n asa nobstacl eno tonl yt o agrariandevelopment ,bu tals ot o industrial growth since itwa s accompanied by a lop-sided distributiono fincom ewhic h ledt oth eabsenc eo fa larg ehom emarket .T o crowni tall ,th erich section so fth epopula tion,whic hinclude d thelarg elandowners ,di dno t evenfulfi l thoseobligation s entrusted 33 to them earlier by the economists. In other words they neither saved nor invested.A luxuriouslif estyl ean dth eflight o fcapita lprevente dthis .I twoul dlea du sto ofa r astray toexamin ethes eidea si nan ymor edetail ;suffic e iti st osa ytha tthe ydi dan dd oexis tan d are expressed more and morefrequentl y by very serious andrespectabl e organizations sucha sth eEconomi cCommissio nfo rLati nAmeric a(se eCepal , 1969, p.2 8 ff.)9. These ideas, theories and facts led in their turn to divisions within what, for con venience sake, we will call the ruling élites and within the actual landed proprietor category. The more far-seeing, progressive and enterprising individuals and groups within these élitesrealize d that it would beimpossibl e to preserve the status quoi nth e rural areas much longer and that a timely attempt at reform could prevent later revolutionary outbursts. The United States too urged reforms in 1961. This at least resulted in most Latin American countries adopting somelaw srelatin g tolan d reform, although none of them seems to have been in much of a hurry to put these laws into execution.I nsom eo fth ecountrie sthemselve ssevera lélit egroup swer eprepare dt odro p the landed proprietors in order to saveinterest s towhic hthe y attached moreweight .I t alsohapene d thatth emor eprogressiv e andproductiv elan downer swer equit eprepare d toaccep ta typ eo flan drefor mwhic hwoul dspar ethe mwhil epenalizin gthei runproduc tive colleagues (Bourricaud, 1967,p . 297).Indee d the Chilean government deliberately madeus eo fthi sdifferentiatio n betweenproductiv e andunproductiv eestate si norde rt o sowdiscor d among thelarg elandowner s (McCoy, 1969,p .19) . One other result, has been that young people,especiall y students,wer estimulate d to activism. In various countries and at different periods they surged intoth e countryside bento norganizin gth epeasants ,makin gthe mawar eo fthei rconditio nan dspurrin gthe m toaction .Thei r activitiesme twit hconsiderabl esucces si nsom eplace s(cf .Home ,1971) ; elsewhere,wher ethe yembarke d upon aguerill astruggl e againstth egovernmen t andit s army inth e hopeo fcarryin g thepeasant s alongwit hthem ,thei r effect remained slight. In conclusion it may be stated that the peasants themselves can exercise only a minimalinfluenc eupo nth ecreatio no fthos econdition snecessar yt oneutraliz eth epowe r of the landed proprietors at the national level. Even when voting in elections and in seeking political allies, they depend upon the existence of parties, groups and persons willingt o helpthem . Now that we have reviewed at the national level the processes necessary for a successful mobilization ofth epeasant s letu sretur n toth eloca llevel . Therew eshal ldis cuss what circumstances may contribute to a weakening of the patronage relationship between owner and peasants. 3.5 Factorsleadin gt oa weakenin go fth epatronag erelationshi p That patronage relationships hamper peasant mobilization becamever y clear during our anthropological research in Chile. It was not infrequntly said of completely un organized enterpriseso fan ysiz etha tth eowne r'bribed 'hi speasants .H efoun d outwha t minimum wageth esyndicat ewa sdemandin g andthe noffere d slightly morehimsel fo n theconditio n- either tacit or openlyexpresse d- that thepeasant sshoul dno torganize . Under what circumstances now does this relationship between owner and peasant 34 become more contractualan d specific, embracing fewer facets of life? In general we may expect this to happen whenever economic and agrariandevelop menttake splac ewithi na district .Ther ear esevera lreason sfo rthis .Economi cdevelop ment implies increasing differentiation and specialization of rolesi n economic life. This creates alternative outlets for the peasants, enabling them to break the link with the patron through individual migration. The very fact that such alternatives exist will already lessen their dependence. The incorporation of the local community into the national economic, political andcultura l systems whichi scharacteristi c ofdevelopmen t also results inth epeasant s making contact with authorities anddispenser s of assistance other than the landowner alone, the regional representatives of various government bodies for instance. Even if these persons must still be approached through channels, peopleothe rtha nth eowne rwil lposses sth enecessar y contacts. In a diagram derived from Coder (1969, p. 72) we might convey the accompanying changei nth epatronag erelationship so fth epeasant sa sth etransitio nfro mFig .A t oFig . B. Brokerage occurs alongside feudal patronage (Blok, 1969). fig. A / \\^ /J^^S In a somewhat later stage of development the neighbourhood begins to offer the peasants all kinds of possible new roles such as parento f school-going children,marke t seller,adopte ro fsom enovelty ,sportsman .Albert i( 1970) ,workin go na theor yadvance d by Young, analyzed three Peruvian farming communities and concluded that in these changed circumstancesth epeasant sresen tthei rcomplet e dependence moretha nbefor e andthat , sincethi s feeling is shared, solidarity among themgrows . Agrarian development on the farms themselves also leads to a differentiation and specialization of roles. The patron becomes dependent upon the special skills of some workers;hi s relationship with thembecome s moreimpersonal , morecontractual . It has been established that in several countries - Peru, Brazil, Chile- agrarian development leadst oth etraditiona lmetho do fpaymen ti.e .receivin gth eus eo fland ,bein greplace db y paymenti n cash(cf . Cotler andPortocarrero , 1970,p . 133;Ramirez , 1969,p .56) .Thi s phenomenon too renders the relationship more contractual. It often happens that the worker whoreceive spaymen tpartl yo rentirel yi nth efor mo flan dha sa highe rstandar d of livingtha nhi scolleagu ewh oreceive sonl ymoney .O nth efarmin g enterprisesi nwhic h bothcategorie soccu rth efirst regard shimsel fa sth emor eprivileged ,whic hals omean sth e more dependent uponth eowner' s favour. Insofar asdevelopmen t alsoimplie s ahighe rincom e forth e peasants,a swa sth ecas e forexampl ei nth evalle yo fL aConvenció ni nPeru ,i tals oallow sthe ma greate rdegre eo f independence fromth elandowners . Inth evalle yth esharecropper s had earneds o much from the coffee they grew on their land that they were able together, per hacienda, to enlistth eservice so f alawye r inorde rt o lodge acomplain t withth eMinistr yo fLabour . .Late rthe ywer eeve ni na positio nt oboyco tth eowners ,tha tis ,t orefus et owor kfo rthe m any longer either for money or any other inducement. Itseems ,however , thatdevelop - 35 ment of this sort, which arouses such expectations, must either be halted or menaces leavingthe m apre yt ofrustration , before amor eradica lmobilizatio n ofth epeasant soc curs (cf. Huizer, 1970,p . 185ff.; Crai g Jr., 1969,p . 285;an d Lamond Tullis, 1970)10. Factorsclosel yconnecte dwit hdevelopmen t areth eproximit yo fa nurban centre and thepresenc eo feducational'facilities. Theurba ncentr ehelp st omak eth epeasant sawar e of alternative opinions and possibilities of behaviour - a rolewhic h may nowadays be fulfilled to someexten t byth etransisto r radio- andmake si teasie r for themobilizer st o reach them. Education can, in theory, increase their chances of detaching themselves from the patron individually and open their eyest o the existence of alternatives.Othe r factors whichma yb eexpecte dt ocontribut et oa weakenin go fth epatronag erelationshi p relate toth e individual farm or ranch.Thes eare : - The sizeo fth eenterprise . Thelarge r thenumbe r ofworkers ,th emor edifficul t iti sfo r theowne r to embark upon arelationshi po fpatronag ewit hth emajority . Therei sa nin creasedlikelihoo dtha ta considerabl enumbe rwil lno tfee lan ypersona llin kwit hth eowne r atall . In Chile it was often the smaller farms with only two or three workmen besides the owner,whic hwer eno tsyndicalized .Quijan o(1965 ,p .47 )point sou ttha tth epeasan tun ions in the Peruvian Sierra usually emerged where the population was dense and there werepracticall y nomedium-size d enterprises. - Owner absenteeism. Even where theowner' s replacement isa n administrator and not an overseer who has risen from the ranks of the workers,h e usually doesno t haveth e owner's liberty to dispense favours which cost money. He cannot thus maintain the patronagerelationships .Moreover ,i tseem sa sthoug h theadministrator sten dt oexploi t their positioni norde rt ogro wrich a squickl ya spossible ,t oth edisadvantag ebot ho fth e owneran dth eworkers .A tleas tI frequentl y gotthi simpressio nbot hi nBrazi lan dlate ri n Chile. Whenever the peasants' conversation came round to an administrator, it was remarkable how often they held a more unfavourable opinion of this man than of the ownerhimself . - Therapi d succession ofowners .Patronag ei sa persona lrelationshi pan dneed stim e in order to develop;th e worker hasfirst t o provetha t hei s worthy of the landowner's trust.I twoul dsee ma nobviou sassumptio n- butthi si sa hypothesi swhic hcoul donl yb e illustrated by a few examples- that the saleo f afarm , or its beinginherite d byanothe r member ofth efamily , would weakenth epatronag e relationships betweenpeasant s and owner. Alongside factors relating to conditionsi na particula r regiono r enterprise onemigh t also mention a number of others involving the experiences or characteristics of the peasants themselves. It may be assumed, for instance, that peasants with a coupleo f years experience of working inth etown s or inth e mines willb eles s inclined to anun critical acceptance of patronage relationships with the owner ofth e agricultural enter priseo n whichthe ylate rfind themselve sworking .Severa l authorsmentio n thefac t that in particular theleader s ofpeasan t movements have undergonethi s kind ofexperience , which might becalle d re-socializing(Huizer , 1970,p . 181;Alberti , 1970, p. 187; Craig Jr., 1969,p .268 ;Affons o etal., 1970 ,2 ,p .227) . Inarea swit ha nIndia npopulatio npartia lo rcomplet eparticipatio ni nth eLati ncultur e andstructur eals oform spar to fthi sre-socializin gexperienc e(cf .Quijano , 1965,p .5 9f.) . 36 Thesam eeffec t mightb eexpecte do fmigratio nwithi nagricultur eitsel fa soccur swhe n temporary agricultural labourers travel from one farm to another. Gilhodes (1970,p . 449) says that in Colombia it was largely from the landless wandering mass of agricultural workers that the participants in the armed conflicts, collectively called la violencia,emerged .O nth ebasi so fthei recologica lanalysi so fth eresult so fth eChilea n presidential electionso f 1958an d 1964Petra s andZeitli n(1970 ,p . 515)sugges ttha ti t will be the migratory seasonal workers, the afuerinos, who will be more inclined to perceiveth ecommo ninterest sthe yshar ewit hothe rpeasant san dworker san dt oaccep t radical politicalexplanation s for their common situation. Finally we must mention the possible role of aparticular event which increases the peasants' frustration. These would include attempts on the part of the owners to alter conditionso fwor kt othei row nadvantage ,th ecancellatio no ffavour spreviousl ygrante d orattempt st odriv eth epeasant sfro m theirlan d(cf . Alberti,1970 ,p .211) .I ti sno tonl y theirincreasin gfrustratio n butals oth efac ttha tth epeasant sca nhol dn oon ebu tth elan downer responsiblefo r thisfrustratio n whichmake sthe mripe fo r mobilization. Inthi ssectio nw ehav ementione d anumbe ro fconcret efactor s whichi nou rvie wcon tribute to a weakening of thepatronag e relationship.I n the following chapter weshal l examine,i nth eligh to fquantitiv edat arelatin gt oChilea nrura lmunicipalities ,wha tcon firmation weca nfind fo r theserie so fhypothese s developedhere . Weshal lno wtur nt oa discussio no fth ecultura lobstacle st omobilizatio nan dth econ ditions under whichthes ema y beremoved . 3.6 Obstaclest omobilizatio npresen ti nth eloca l culturean dthei rpossibl eremova l From the model presented earlier it may be deduced that also cultural obstacles to mobilization may exist. The model in fact postulates that there will be a connection betweenth eloca ldistributio n oflan dan dth eoccurrenc eo fa numbe ro fcultur epattern s othertha npatronage .Whil epatronag eis ,i na certai nsense ,a nimplici tacceptanc eo fth e inequality which lies behind it, some quite different reactions to this inequality exist. Röling(1970 )assume stha t peasantswh oar eunabl et ocarr ythroug ha ninnovatio nfo r whateverreaso nma ytr yt owor kou tthei rfrustratio n invariou sways .I nagreemen twit h Mertonh emention srebellion ,escapism ritualism, an dconformis m andadd sth ecreatio n of controlling forces. Wema y regard the century-long inability of the majority of the LatinAmerica n agrarian populationt obette rthei rpositio ni nlif e asth eimpossibilit y to create aparticula rdesire dsituation .W ema ythe nexpec ttha tthi spopulatio ngrou pwil l havet owor k out theconsequen t frustrations in somewa y or another.I tmake ssens et o regard what Huizer (1970)call s 'thecultur eo frepression 'a sinbuil t adaptations tothi s frustration. The literature dealing with LatinAmerica n peasant cultures containsdescription so f elements which would fit very nicely into one of Röling's rubrics. The widespread drunkenness, for instance, could be classed under escapism as could the apparent laziness,th eapathy ,th elac ko fforesight .Ther ei sals oth ebelief ,s owidesprea di nBrazil , inth e'golpe' ,th estrok eo fgoo dluc kneede dt osucceed .Thi swoul dcom eunde rth ecrea - 37 tiono f controlling forces. Under ritualism onemigh tmentio n the strivingafte r satisfac tiono fritua lobligation sinstea d ofwealt ha sdescribe d byva nZantwij k (1965,p . 166f. ) writing of an Indian village in Mexico. Rebellion would cover not only the countless jacquerieswhic hhav eoccurre di nMexico ,Per uan dothe rcountrie sbu tals oth eemergenc e ofwha tha sbee ncalle dsocia lbanditry 11. There can be little doubt that the kinds of adaptation to frustration mentioned by Rölingoccu r frequently inth erura l areaso fLati nAmerica .However ,onl y afe wo fth e authorswh odescrib ean yo fthes eform so fcultura ladaptatio ngiv esufficien t information concerningth eloca ldistributio n oflan dt ob eabl et o'place 'th evariou scultura lpattern s inou rmodel .The nagain ,othe rcultura ltrait ssuc ha sth epeasants 'mistrustfulness ,whic h has been remarked upon by many, seem not to fit very well into any of Röling's categories. Williams too (1969) in a research conducted with Peruvian peasants, has attempted to detect psychosocial characteristics which might have resulted from their being dominated for generations by thelande d proprietors12. Hemention sth etendenc y to avoid taking decisions; to approach the outside world with rough and ready dichotomic concepts such as friend and enemy, ignoring, as it were, the more subtle nuances in attitude; a lack of tolerance for vagueness and ambiguity; an orientation towardspresen to rpas tbu tno ttoward sth efutur e overwhic hth epeasan tha sn ocontrol , fatalism, in other words;an d the active solicitation ofpatronage . Allthes e examples,t owhic h may beadde d theenv y and socialcontro l alreadymen tioned,indicat etha tth eagraria n structurei nLati nAmeric aha sle di nman ypart st oth e formation ofmor eo r lessstabl ecultura lpattern swhic h willinfluenc e thesucces so fan y eventual attempts at mobilization and eventh e acceptance ofne wsocia lstructures .W e stillkno wlittl eabou tth ewa yi nwhic h cultural patternschange .I twoul db emistake nt o think, however, that even where acultura l trait has originated as aresul t ofa particula r structure, the cultural pattern in question will automatically disappear with any later structural change.I ti sals ocertai ntha tth emobilizatio no fth epeasant swil litsel fhav et o overcome theresistanc e of such dysfunctional culturepatterns . What factors may help to neutralize and overcome cultural obstacles such as the mutual mistrust, the lack of solidarity, the tendency to interpret a person's actions in termso f self-interest, toregar d thenon-relate d other as arival in th estruggl et ogras pa t least a share of life's limited opportunities? Insofar as the peasants still form a certain community and do not live completely atomistically within a geographical area, the threatfrom outsidei sa nimportan tfacto r inpromotin g solidarity.Thi sthrea t maycom e from atraditionall y negativereferenc egrou pfro m whichth epeasant sdiffe r radically.I n such cases the community will often preserve a certain show of unity no matter how divided itma yb eo nth einside .Thi smixtur eo finwar ddivisio nan dth epresentatio n ofa united front towards outsiders is not infrequently found in Indian communities. The peasantsma yals ob emad eawar eo fth eexistenc eo fa threa tb ya particula revent ,disad vantageoust othe mall ,o rb yth estimulatin geffec t ofmessage semanatin g fromexterna l agents. Thecampaig n against adult illiteracy wasuse di nBrazi la tth ebeginnin go fth esixtie s (cf. deKadt , 1970)an dlate r inothe r countries,t ohel ppromot ethi sawarenes sb yusin g texts which explained, in terms of power and class,th e situation in which the peasants found themselves. Inth eSa nMigue lValle yi nth ePeruvia n Andes,eleve no fth eeightee n 38 Indian communities, son* lying inside and some outside a large hacienda, united in a federation whentaxatio no nthei rlan dwa sinstitute d(Diaz , 1970).O nth efund oPullall y in Chile a similar event, which was to everyone's disadvantage, was the refusal of the patron to rebuild at his expense houses which had been partially destroyed by an earthquake. This led to the sharecroppers andth e overseers,wit hthei r higher incomes, becoming members of the syndicate (de Ranitz and de Ranitz, 1972). One other factor which promotes solidarity isthe project, the aiming towards some particular goalwhic h can be achieved within a measurable space oftime . According to Etzioni (1968, p. 403) mobilization often beginswit h aprojec t andi ti seas y to seewhy . Not only doesi tembod y acommo n goal,th e attainment of whichi st oth e advantageo f all, but it exemplifies that such goals really exist. It pan be carried out within a limited periodo ftim e andthu spostpone sth edifficul t question of'whati sou rultimat egoal?' .I n addition, the project puts only a temporary demand upon the resources Of those mobilized. As a socializing process, however, the project may lead to the peasants placing part of theirresource s permanently atth eorganization' s disposal whenthe y see that they are not being duped by some crafty leader. In farming communities such a project may be one that does not immediately lead to a conflict of interests with the landed proprietor, for example the building of schools andothe r community amenities. Allthre eo fth epeasan torganization sstudie db yAlbert i(1970 )bega ni nthi smanner ,an d the samei stru eo fth ecelebrate dfirst Lig aCampones ai nBrazil .Ye teve nnewl y formed conflict organizations notinfrequentl y beginwit ha project .The y aima t aconcret e goal and attempt to achieve it;th e enforcement of a particular law, the abolition of a hated obligation, a higher wage, shorter working hours. The most importantfacto r inovercomin g cultural obstacles,however ,i sth epresenc e of a leader with outstanding qualities, both instrumental and human. Huizer (1970, p. 192f. )an dals oLamon dTulli s(1970 ,p .225 )spea ko fa charismati cleader .Wh yi ssuc h a leader with exceptional qualities necessary? Inorde rt o consider how peasants might improvethei rsituation ,i ti sfirst o fal lessentia lt oposses smor einsigh tint othi ssituation , its causes and component, interdependent elements than is usual among peasants. The patronage relationship, for instance, must be seen for what it is. At the same time it is necessary to drawu pconcret eaim swhic hare ,i ntheory ,attainable ,an dt osupervis eth e action this entails;th e project must be planned. In additioni ti sessentia l thatth e action should bewel l organized, that no objectives bese t andn o actions undertaken whichfa r exceedth ecapabilitie so fth epeasants .T okno wexactl ywha ton ewishe st oai ma timplie s a fairly considerable ability to evaluate the situation and the possibilities, including the possibilities of success and defeat at higherlevel s of decision. Inth eligh t of thisw e not surprisingly found that leaders often possess more non-agrarian experience, and more education, than their followers. Thepersona l qualitieso fth eleader sar eals oo fth eutmos timportance .I nman y cases (inou r terms:i n situation C andi n situationA surroundedb ylarg eestates )th epeasan t community is oftenriddled wit h suspicion and envy. The only strong relationships are those with members of the family and a few privileged others, either friends or com- padres.Thes elatte rrelationship sare ,moreover ,dyadic :the yalway sinvolv etw operson s and no more. In such circumstances norms exist at most for traditional forms of co operation- organizingfestivities ,helpin geac hothe ro nth elan d- butno tfo rbehaviou r within an organizationwit h a particular objective. Inothe r cases, on largefarm sfo rin - 39 stance,wher ether ei smuc h coming and going,on eca n scarcely speak ofa communit y but more of a collection of individual families loosely related on the basis of varying criteria. In communities of this sort, the personality of the leader must be such that he gains the confidence of the majority ofth e peasants. He must in fact be someonewit h whom they would bewillin g to enter upon adyadi c relationship.Unti lth efirs t success hasbee ngaine d- andth eeconomi cmotiv efo rjoinin gth eorganizatio nbecome srealisti c - theleade rmus tinspir esufficien t confidence tounit eth epeasant san dkee pthe munited . Hemus tno tb ecorrup tan dh emus tb eabl et oconvinc eth emember so fhi sgoo dfait h(for , apartfro m reprisals,th elande dproprietor s alsoattemp tt oneutraliz eth einfluenc e ofth e peasant leaders by bribing them, with promotion, an extra piece of land or something similar.Sometimes ,i tmus tb eadmitted ,the yar esuccessful) .H emust ,o fcourse ,posses s authority;peopl emus t beprepare d tod ofo r theorganizatio n what heasks ,no tbecaus e they arecomplyin gwit hsom enor mo rothe rregulatin gth ebehaviou r ofa norganizatio n member,fo rthi snor mfrequentl y doesno tye t exist,bu tbecaus ei ti sh ewh oasks .Ther e is, however, a norm which governs acceptable behaviour towards one's partner in a dyadic relationship13. This, for the rest, implies that it is difficult for such a leader to extricate himself later;h eha s become accustomed to beingth ecentr e ofthings . Allw e havesai dthu sfa r provestha tleader sar eo fcrucia limportanc efo rth eembry o organization.Th emor es owhe n werecollec tth eimportance ,mentione d earlier,o fcon tactswit hpossibl eallie so nth enationa llevel . Toa larg eextent ,thes ewil lb ehis contacts . 3.7 Class awarenessan dth eaim so fmobilizatio n Inconcludin gou r attempt ata theor yo fmobilization ,w emus tdevot esom eword st o the dawning awareness, among the peasants, of their common interests, to their class consciousness andt oth eobjective s whichthe yhop et oachieve . Wehav ealread y pointedou ttha tth evariou scategorie so fpeasant sshar eth esam ein terestsonl yt oa certai nextent .Thi si sal lth emor etru esince.the yten dt othin ki nterm so f theconcrete ,loca lsituatio na si taffect sthem .A tth esam etim ew ehav eobserve dtha tth e presence of a local opponent helps to make them aware that they have interests in common. Weshal lhav eoccasion ,i na late rchapte rdealin gwit hsolidarit y- inothe rwords ,wit h thepermanen t allocationo findividua lresource si nfavou r ofth epeasan t organizations - to delve somewhat more deeply into the concept of class. The term is used in various meaningsbu tw ear eusuall yreferrin g toth ecollectivit y ofthos ewh ohav en opower ,n o possessions,a lo wincom e andfe w possibilities ofdevelopment .I tseem st om etha tthi s conceptwhe napplie dt opeasants ,wil ldescrib ea realit ywhic hfo rthe mexist sonl yo nth e locallevel , andthi sfo rth ereason sw ehav ealread ygiven . Theirmean so fproductio n are of alocal-territoria l nature andthei r economicincorporatio n intoa large rsyste mi s still far from complete. This also holds good for very many farms which sell most of their produce on the market and whereth eowne r isi n fact completely incorporated intoth e larger system. On the basis of the exploitation of the small- Indian - peasant, Frank (1967,ch . II) assumed that, contrary towha t someearlie r observers had asserted,the y were indeed integrated into a larger economic system. This may very well correspond witha nidea lnotion ,hel db yth esam epeople ,whereb ygettin gri do fexploitatio nals oim plies an abolition ofintegration ,th eretur n to areasonabl y prosperous isolated farming 40 community,on eno tboun du pi na lon gchai no finter-dependencies 14.Peasant sar eofte n very much aware of the conflict of interests which arises between agriculturalists and- urbajjconsumer sconcernin gth epric eo ffar mproducts .Thi smake sthe mtak ea sceptica l viewo fexhortation swhic hwoul dseerr tt osugges ttha tthe yan dth eindustria lproletaria t form oneclass . The terms in which the majority of peasants viewth e solution tothei r problems- a redistribution oflan dt oindividua lfarmer s andgovernmen tsuppor tfo r agriculture- are undeniably not class terms, but those of a local group. They do not aim to solveth e problemso fpovert y assuch ,no reve no fmos to fth epoor .A tbes tthe yar eintereste di n theloca lpoor .I ti sprecisel ythi swhic hlend stha t solution asligh t airo funrealit y atth e presenttime ,certainl yi fth eauthoritie sengage di npressin gthroug hth elan dreform s are preoccupied withth efat e ofal lth epoor .Suc ha nadministratio nca nhardl ypermi titsel f to leave a large section of the poor peasants and agricultural workers out in the cold. Hobsbawm (1971, p. 11) has pointed out that the peasants' class programmes and slogansstan dlittl echanc eo fbein gpu tint opractice ,a fac t whichI mysel fha dnote dals o (Galjart, 1971b). Thisleave stw opossibilities :eithe rth epeasant sar emobilize dfo r aprogramm ewhic h willno tgreatl yappea lt othe mi nth efirst instance ,a programm ei nwhic hth ecollectiviza tiono f agriculture occupies aprominen t place,o rthe yar emobilize dfo r amuc hvague r programme with which they can identify, a programme which promises land 'to those whotil lit 'bu tdoe sno t specify howi twil lb edistributed .Mobilizatio n ismor eeasil yac complished inth e second case, although it seemspossibl e for opponents to sowuncer tainty among the peasants regarding the concrete outcome of a land reform, quoting examplesderive d from other societies. Inherenti nth esecon dcase ,however ,i sth epossibilit ythat ,onc eth elan dreform shav e beencarrie dout ,th epeasant sma yb egrippe db ydisappointmen t andsuspicion .I nsuc h cases the majority may then turn their backs again on the regime which introduced collectivization. Our conclusion must betragic . Unless the peasants mobilize, a more equitable dis tributiono fland ,incom ean dpowe r seemsunlikel yt omaterialize .Ye tmos to fth esmal l producers, and a large section of the agricultural workers, mobilize for the sake of an ideal - a pieceo f land they can callthei r own- which seemslikely ,unde r present cir cumstances,t oremai n onlya nideal . Notes 1 Not allth eauthor so nthi ssubjec t havemad eth eattempt ;th eter mcampesin owhic hi s so handilyrendere db ypeasan tan dsuggest stha tw ear edealin gwit hon ean dth esam ecategor y ofth eagraria n activepopulatio n(i.e . thosewh o earnthei rlivin gthroug h agriculture)ma y taketh eblam efo rthis .Powel l(1970 )an dHuize r(1970) ,fo rinstance ,spea ko fpeasant stou t court;th elatte rdoe sno teve ndefin eth eter mpeasants . 2 Itma yb etha ta loca lélit emonopolize sno ts omuc hth elan da sothe rdesirabl eresource ssuc h asacces st oth emarke to rt oth egovernmen tinstitutions .Suc ha monopol yma yals olea dt o culturalpattern samdn gth epeasant ssuc ha sthos ese tou ti nth emodel . 3 Inth eliteratur edealin gwit hth eculture so fIndia nfannin gcommunitie s-no tinfrequentl yt o befoun di nsituatio nC - mentioni softe nmad eo flevellin gmechanisms .I na surve y- which 41 forth eres tdoe sno tstat eclearl yt owhic ho fth esituation sw ehav edistinguishe dher ei trefer s - Erasmus (1968,p . 67)mention s terms like 'jealousy pattern', 'institutionalized envy' and 'invidious sanction' used by researchers to describe theirresults . 4 It was in order to draw attention to this that Queiroz (1963) called the small owners and squatters a forgotten category. 5 Oneo fth emos tstrikin gexample so fthi si sth etelegra mreproduce di nVilaç aan dCavalcant i (1965)an ddate d October 6th 1942.I twa ssen tt oa loca lpolic echie fan dlande dproprieto ri n the state of Pernambuco, Brazil and read: 'We request you to reserve all the votes ofBo m Conselho for Barros Barreto. Sincerely.' 6 This isno t yet soi n many countries with theresul ttha t halfo fth e agrarian populationdoe s notvot e and isthu s uninteresting for the existingparties . 7 The argument in favour of such a request has become a standard formula: 'communist agitators coming from outside the area and who haven o connection with agriculture,...' 8 Asmall ,leftist , militant groupingi softe n unablet ofulfi l eitherfunction , since— cf . Anderson - itmenace sth eothe r powercontender st osuc ha nexten ttha ti ti sno tallowe dt oparticipat e indecisio n making.I imaginetha t thisi swh y suchgroups ,eve n after initialsuccesses , often do notfind an y permanent support among the peasants (cf. Galjart, 1969). 9 It is not surprising that in particular the internal relationships in rural areas have led to sociological theories in terms of dichotomous, conflicting classes. Examples of this areth e theoretical concepts such as colonialismo interno, advanced by Gonzales Casanova, and (exploiting) metropolis and (exploited) periphery thought up by Frank. Although these theories,a sNicke l(1971 )attempt st oshow ,ar eto oloos et ocove rth eentir ereality ,an d suffer from theus eo fconcept swhic hcanno tb eoperationalized ,a tleas tthe yhav eth emeri ttha tn o one, who studies development from a sociological point of view, can afford to ignore the problems they evoke. 10 Thefactor s mentionedher eals ooccu ri nLamon dTullis '( 1 970 )stud yo fPeru . Unfortunately Idi d not managet o get hold ofi t until after I had written this chapter. Tullisimitate s Young(1966 )i nworkin gwit hthre e conceptswhic h hecall sCapacity ,Op portunity and Solidarity. Capacity is the measure in which a community is aware of new possibilities of behaviour in order to realize its own goals. Opportunity is the objective possibility possessedb ythi scommunit yo fputtin gthi sne wknowledg eint opractice . Solidari tyi sth emeasur ei nwhic hth ecommunit ypossesse son evalu epatter nan ddesire st orealiz eit . Tullis postulates that as capacity grows,whil eopportunit y grows moreslowl y or not atall , solidarity - which may then assume the form of a movement - increases. He calls thedis crepancy between capacity and opportunity 'structural bind'. In my terms: as familiarity with other alternatives increases (through the introduction of modern agricultural methods,education ,travel ,experience si nth ecity ,proximit yo fth ecity ) capacity grows. Opportunity increaseswit hth edeclin eo fth epowe ro fth elarg elandowner s ona nationa llevel , andbecaus epeasant sfind allie so ntha tlevel . However,th eloca lattemp tt o preserveth estatu s quomean stha topportunit ydoe sno tkee ppac ewit hcapacity .I nth eresul tant state of structural bind a movement of solidarity willemerge .Tulli sto orecognize sth e need for charismatic leadership. Theterm s in which Tulliscouche shi stheor y area tth e sametim emor egenera lan dmor e vaguetha nmine .Th efac t thatthe yar emor egenera li sa nadvantage .Th epresenc eo fa loca l opponenti sindee da ver yimportan texampl eo fwha tTulli scall sa structura lbind ,bu ti ti sno t theonl yone .Advers eloca lcondition sma yals ocaus ea structura lbin dand ,correspondingl y anattemp to nth epar to fth ecommunit yt osurmoun tit . 11 In imitation of Hobsbawm this social banditry isindee d regarded asth efirst, albei t moreo r less individual,sig n ofprotest ; Quijano (1967)view si t asth e precursor ofth elate r peasant movements. In order to prevent the romanticizing ofth ebandi t iti swel lt o remember what Blok (1967) has pointed out in a soberly written article; hestresse s that inth elon g run the bandit alsofinds hi svictim samon gth epoo r agrarian populationi nwhic hh ecause sinterna l divisions. Blok bases his criticism upon European data but he might just as easily have utilized the history ofth ecelebrate d Brazilian bandit, Lampiäo. 12 Earlier attempts inthi sdirectio n havebee nmad eb yresearcher sint oth enationa l character; 42 Moog, forinstance ,for'Brazi l(1954) , SalazarBond yfor Per u(1969) .Th ecultur eo fpovert y conceivedb yLewi swh oworke dprincipall yi nMexic oals odeserve sa mentio ni nthis context . 13 This view bears a relationship to whatha s beenfoun d elsewhere (Scheidhnger, 1958,p .59) , namelytha t'i ngroup swit ha nautocrati ckin do fleadership ,th eleade rtend st oreplac eth ein dividual's superego. He assumes the role of a new inner authority and the tie to him is the basic cohesive force'. 14 Compare the interesting study of Mitrany(1961 ) which shows thatth epeasan t movements andpolitica l parties,whic hflourished in Easter n Europei nth eperio dbetwee nthetw oworl d wars, were in fact guided by similar ideals. 43 Chapter 4 Mobilization in Chile:testin g part ofth e theory 4.1 Introduction Thetheor y presented inth eprecedin g chapter wasbase d uponconclusion s arrived at by myself and other researchers and derived from data which was moreofte n than not qualitative and collected anthropologically. In this chapter I shall attempt to test a number of hypotheses for Chile on the basis of quantitative data. As indicator for mobilization I choseth edegree oforganization ofagricultural workers inpeasant syn dicates.Thi s is calculated for each community by expressing the number of those organized1 in the three large confederations of syndicates, El Triunfo Campesino, Ranquil and Libertad, as a percentage of thetota l agricultural wagelabou r force men tioned in the most recent agricultural census, that of March 1965. The following categories were included under wage labour: supervisory personnel, share cropper- inquilinos and inquilinos, permanent workers and the two categories of temporary labourersdistinguishe d byth ecensus .Ou to fth edat afoun d inth eagricultura lcensu sin dicators could be constructed for a part only of the variables and factors which were assumed in the previous chapter to influence the emergence and growth of peasant movements.I n some casesth e validityo r reliability ofa nindicato r is doubtful. Asth ecensu suni twa sth emunicipalit y(comuna) ,w ewil lb edealin gexclusivel ywit h indicators for those independent variables which,w epostulated ,wer eimportan t onth e locallevel .Thu sw ehav ethre eindicator s for thedegre eo fagricultura ldevelopmen t(th e presence ofirrigation ,th e useo fartificia l fertilizer, andth enumbe ro fhectare spe rtrac tor); one indicator for owner absenteeism and consequent weakening ofth e patronage relationship(th eoccurrenc eo fadministrators) ,on eindicato rfo rth eproximit yo fa larg e city(commo nboundarie swit htha tcity) ,a numbe ro findicator sfo rth epresenc eo flarg e agricultural enterprises inth e comuna,on e indicator for the degreeo furbanizatio n and and a number of indicators for the relative weight of the various status categories of farmers andworker s andthus ,perhaps ,fo rth econsequence so fdifference s instatus . All theseindicator s werecalculate d per comuna,usuall yi n thefor m ofpercentages 2.Othe r variablesno tmentione di nth epreviou schapte rwer eals ocalculated . Theseconcer nprin cipally the distribution of land,th e significance of particular crops,th e occurrenceo f property (in contrast to other forms oftenure )an dth eoccurrenc e of landrefor m inth e comunau pt oAugus t 19703. 4.2 Analysiso fth edifference s betweencomuna swit han dwithou tsyndicate s Not only wereth e correlation coefficients betweenth edegre eo forganizatio n andth e characteristics mentioned calculated, but alsoth eaverag evalu eo fth echaracteristic si n 44 different categories of comuna. The average values showing degree of organization are given in Table 3. At first sight the table seems to show that the degree of organization in comunas located near one of the three large cities i.e. Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepción is no higher than that in the remaining, more rural comunas. There seem to betw o reasons for this surprising fact. In the first place it appears that a relatively larger number of those Table 3. Average percentageorganize dwag elabourer s andaverag epercentag e members ofth e confederations ElTriunf oCampesino ,Ranqui l andLiberta d againstdi etota lo fthos eorganized , per comuna Chile:264 comunas %organize d of total wage labour in agriculture 29 % members of El Triunfo of total organized 44 %member s of Ranquil oftota l organized 22 %member s of Libertad of total organized 13 Comunas possessing an agricultural workers' syndicate: 212 comunas % organized of total wage labour in agriculture 37 % members of El Triunfo of total organized 54 % members of Ranquil oftota l organized 27 % members of Libertad of total organized 16 Comunas situated close to one of the three large cities: 30comunas* % organized of total wage labour in agriculture 28 % members of El Triunfo of total organized 18 % members Ranquil of total organized 29 % members Libertad of total organized 13 Remaining rural comunas: 234 comunas % organized of total wage labour in agriculture 29 % members El Triunfo of total organized 47 %member s Ranquil of total organized 21 %member s Libertad of total organized 13 Comunas where50% or more ofthe population liveson thefarms: 121 comunas %organize d of total wage labour in agriculture 28 %member s of El Triunfo of total organized 45 %member s Ranquil of total organized 21 % members Libertad of total organized 11 1 Santiago, Valparaiso and Concepcion were regarded as large cities. Comunas situated close to these cities arecharacterize d by having a common boundary with one of them. Table 4. Geographical position of comunas with and without agricultural workers'syndicate s Closet olarg ecit y Notclos et olarg ecit y Syndicate 19 193 No syndicate 11 41 45 comunas located close to the cities,d o not possess a syndicate at all.Thi s is showni n Table4 .I fw eleav easid efo rth emomen tth e5 2 comunaswithou ta syndicate ,i tappear s that the degree of organization is indeed higher in the comunas located near thelarg e citiestha n elsewhere,namel y4 4% asagains t 36% .Althoug hw emus tretur nt oth eques tion of why relatively more comunas without syndicates occur close to cities, the hypothesis that the degree oforganizatio n ishighe r closer toth ecitie sdoe s seem tob e correct. Thesecon d reasonwh ythi shypothesi si sno timmediatel y confirmed byTabl e3 isth e deviant behaviour of the confederation ElTriunf o Campesino.Thi s confederation con sisted largely of syndicates setu pb yINDA Pdurin gth eFre igovernmen t (INDAPwa s oneo fth etw o government bodiesinvolve dwit hagraria n reform). ElTriunf o appearst o be more important in the rural areas than close to thelarg e cities. Mobilization under government guidanceturne d out differently therefore from themobilizatio n led bynon - official personso rgroup s- INDAPevidentl ypai dparticula r attentiont ocomuna sa sye t unorganized,thos efa r fromth ecitie san dwher eagricultur ewa sles sdeveloped .E lTriun fo,a si twere filled, in th eblan kspace so nth emap .Thi si sobviou sfro mth efollowin g fact, as well as from the averages in Table 3.I f weexamin e the21 2comuna s inwhic h syn dicatesoccur ,th epercentag eo fthos eorganize dwh oar emember so fE lTriunf o-i n con trast toth epictur e presented by Ranquil andLiberta d- appearst ocorrelat enegativel y (R= —0.28)wit hth eoveral ldegre eo forganization .I nothe rwords ,th emor eorganize d workers in a comuna who belong to El Triunfo, the lower the total percentage of organized wage labourers. ElTriunf o is chiefly important in places wherether ei slittl e organization. ElTriunf o alsooccur s morefrequentl y asth e soleorganizatio n in acom una.Thi shappen s 74times ,wherea si toccur swit ha Ranqui lsyndicat e onlyi n2 4 com unas and with aLiberta d syndicate only in 11. The deviant behaviour of El Triunfo clearly demonstrates the importance of the government role in peasant mobilization and organization. Everywherethroughou t the country INDAP had small so-called area-offices each provided with a number of promoters whoseonl ytas k wast ohel porganiz eth eagricultura l workerso nth eestates . These people evidently took the opportunity of setting up syndicates in places where thesecoul dno t automatically beexpecte d according toth ehypothese s mentionedi nth e previous chapter. Does this now mean that these hypotheses are related more to promoters who have to come out from a town and are often dependent upon public transport than toth eactua l situation ofth epeasants ? Probably not entirely so.INDA P wasa governmen tbod yan deac ho fit soffice s waslinke db ytelephon ewit hth eprovincia l andnationa lhea doffices . Itwa seasie rfo r ElTriunf o tomobiliz eallie stha ni twa sfo rth e other two confederations. Moreover it willappea r that,despit eth edevian tbehaviou ro f ElTriunfo ,i.e .th egovernmen tinfluenc e uponth eprocess ,man yo fth ehypothese swer e nonetheless confirmed. Table 5provide s us with more information concerning thedifference s between those comunas which havea syndicate andthos e whichd onot .Th efirst tha t meetsth eey ei s theimportanc eo fth eproximit yo fa larg ecity .Th econfederation s Ranquilan dLibertad , but particularly Ranquil, have their most important bases closet o the aforementioned three large cities. However, the proximity of a large city appears also to specify the relationship between degree of organization and certain characteristics of the agrarian structure. For example,i n the countryside,th ecomun a without a syndicatei s 46 Table5 . Averageso fcharacteristic so fth eagraria nstructur efo rorganize dan dnon-organize d comunas AllChilea n Comunasnea r Comunasno t comunas the3 larg ecitie s neara cit y without with without with without with org. org. org. org. org. org. Variable (N= 52)(N = 212)(N=11)(N = 19)(N= 41) (N-l 193) (1 ) Organizedi nsyndicate so fwag elabeur '(% ) 0 37 0 45 0 36 (2) Memberso fE lTriunf oo ftota lorganize d(% ) 0 54 0 29 0 57 (3) Memberso fRanqui lo ftota lorganize d(% ) 0 27 0 46 0 25 (4) MembersofLiberta do ftota lorganize d(% ) 0 16 0 21 0 16 (9) Producersan dunpai drelative so fworkin gpopulation 2(% ) 73 54 57 43 77 54 (10) Sharecroppers-inquilinosan dinquilino so fworkin g population(% ) 4 10 10 12 3 10 (11) Sharecroppers-inquilinosan dinquilino so fwag e labour(% ) 16 23 26 21 , 14 23 (12 ) Permanentlabourer so fworkin gpopulatio n(% ) 7 14 15 22 5 13 (13) Permanentlabourer so fwag elabou r(% ) 28 31 32 43 26 29 (14) Temporarylabourer so fworkin gpopulatio n(% ) 11 19 12 17 11 , 19 (15) Temporarylabourer so fwag elabou r(% ) 48 41 26 29 54 42 (18) Farms0- 2h ao ftota lfarm s(% ) 18 36 41 61 12 34 (19) Farms2-10haoftotalfarms(%) 28 27 32 21 27 28 (25) Farms> 1000h ao ftota lfarm s> 200h a(% ) 26 32 37 25 23 32 (26) Lando ffarm sunde radministrato ro ftota lfarmlan d(% ) 31 48 54 54 25 48 (27) Privatelyowne dfarm so ftota lfarm s(% ) 56 42 54 41 56 42 (28) Irrigatedlan do ftota lare acultivabl elan d(% ) 19 40 51 71 10 37 (29) Farmingpopulatio no ftota lcomun apopulatio n(% ) 48 46 13 22 57 49 (31) Artificiallyfertilize dlan do ftota lcultivabl elan d(% ) 12 27 27 39 8 26 (42) Numbero fhectare scultivabl elan dpe rtracto r 387 217 72 15 470 238 1 Inthi san dth efollowin gtable sw eunderstan db ywag elabou rth etota lo fmal ewag eworker si nagricultur eabov e1 5 yearso fage . 2 Inthi san dth efollowin gtable sw eunderstan db yworkin gpopulatio nth etota lmal eworkin gpopulatio ni n agriculture above 15year so fage . the most rural(i.e .th epercentag eo fpopulatio nlivin go n farmsi shighe rthere) ; close to the large cities, however, the non-organized comuna is the least rural in this respect Anotherexample : inth erura larea si ti sprecisel yi nth eorganize dcomuna stha trelative lymor elarg efarm sar efound ;clos et oth ecit yth eopposit eseem st ob eth ecase .Tabl e6 shows that for all sizeso f farming the signo f therelationshi p between their occurrence andth edegre eo forganizatio ndiner si nth ecountrysid efro mtha ti nth ecomuna slocate d near a large city. To give one more example: in the countryside the presence of an ad ministrator(whic hserve sher ea sa nindicato ro fowne rabsenteeism ,a facto r assumedt o contributet oth eweakenin go fpatronag erelationships )is ,a sw eexpected ,mor efrequen t inth e syndicalized comunas;clos e toth e city this factor seems unimportant. Other variables appeart opla y arol e bothi nth erura larea s andi nth ecomuna sclos e to the large cities. In both cases the organized comuna seemst ohav e amor edevelope d form of agriculture withmor eirrigation ,mor e artificial fertilizer andmor etractors .Th e difference, however, is more pronounced in the ruralareas . Both closet oth ecitie san di nth emor erura larea sth eorganize dcomuna snumber ,o n average,mor epermanen tworker s amongth eactiv e agrarianpopulation .Togethe rwit h the inquilinos and the sharecroppers it is they among the wage workers whojoi n syn dicates.Th eoccurrenc eo ftemporar ylabourer samon gth ewag eworker scorrelate sfair - 47 lynegativel y withth edegre eo forganization ,bu t inTabl e 5 thisi sonl yeviden tfro m the averagesi nth erura l areas.Clos et oth ebi gcitie sther ei sye t another difference between organized and non-organized comunas which is not immediately apparent from the figures. Theonl y categorywhic hwa sinclude d amongth ewag eworker sbu tfo rwhic hn o separate percentages were calculated is that of supervisory personnel. Whereas in the rural areas and in the organized comunas close to the city this category accounts for between 5 and 6% of the wage-earners, it appears to reach about 16% in the non organized comunas close to the big cities. The relatively high significance of this category, which is generally not affiliated to any syndicate, is better paid than the or dinary workers and often regards promotion as a favour granted by the patron onth e basis of agoo dpersona lrelationship ,help si nm y viewt oexplai n the absenceo f asyn dicate inthes e comunas. What picture now emerges of the non-organized comunas close to one of the three large cities? One of a comuna with a small agricultural population, working for the greater part on family farms; a smaller section works on the relatively frequent large enterpriseswhic har echiefl ydevote dt oextensiv ecattl eraising . Theprincipa lreaso nwh y theinquilino san dpermanen twag eworker s areno torganize di sprobabl ythei rphysica l isolation;smal lnumber so nlarg ecattle-raisin gestates .A possibl esupplementar yreaso n istha tthe yinclud ea fairl ylarg enumbe ro fsupervisor swh oar egenerall yno tattracte dt o syndicates. Finally INDAP evidently took lesstroubl e to organize the wage earnersi n thevicinit y ofth elarg e cities;ther eE lTriunf o isles simportan t than Ranquil. Inth erura larea sw eobtai na simila rpictur eo fth enon-organize dcomunas .Admitted lyth eagraria n workingpopulatio nther ei slarge ,bu tth emajorit y worko nfamil y farms. Amongth ewag eworker sth eimportan tcategor yi stha to fth etemporar ylabourers ,wh o aredifficul t toorganiz e(an d whopossibl y originatefro m thesmall ,inadequat e minifun- dia).Agricultur ei sbackward ,a facto r whichapparentl yaccompanie sphysica lisolation ; theroad s arebad . Many ownerso flarg efarmin g enterprises(wh oar eth emos tincline d to appoint administrators to do their work) live on their ranches. This probably en courages both patronage and oppression;the y oppose syndicalization. In general these pictures confirm thehypothese s mentioned in thepreviou s chapter. Wefind fo r instanceth einfluenc e ofth efollowin g factors confirmed: - thedevelopmen to fagriculture ; - theproximit yo furba ncentres ; - the difference between various categories of the agrarian population, depending upon theirplac ei nth eproductio n process;notabl yth edifferenc e betweenpermanen tan dtem poraryagricultura lworkers ; - ownerabsenteeism ; - thecrucia lrol eo fth egovernment . Thereprove d to beon e other important factor. It ispartiall y implied inth efirst tw o mentioned but weourselve s have notreferre d to it before.Th ephysica lisolatio n ofth e peasants mayexplai nwh y someplace shav ea syndicat ewhil eother sd onot . 48 4.3 Correlationso fth edegre eo forganizatio n ForChil ea s awhol eth ecompariso n betweenaverage so fdifferen t categorieso fcom - una, applied above,appeare d morefruitfu l thanth e analysis of correlation coefficients betweenth edegre eo forganizatio n andth eothe rvariables .Tabl e6 contain sa numbe ro f coefficients for various categorieso f Chileancomunas . Thetabl e showsthat , for Chilea s awhol ea swel la sfo rth etypicall y ruralcomunas , the degree of organization correlates with the relative significance of the various categorieso fth e agrarian population.Th emor esharecropper-inquilinos ,inquilino san d permanent labourers among the wage workers, the higher the degree of organization. This lessens as the percentage of temporary workers increases. Thus the temporary workers are indeed less inclined towards affiliation, or more difficult to organize,tha n thosewh ohav ea permanen tjo b onth efarms .Th epercentag eo fextremel ylarg efarm s (largertha n 1000ha )compare dwit hal lfarm slarge rtha n20 0h aals ocorrelate st osom e extent with thedegre eo f organization. We have already encountered one reason for the scanty nature of the correlation coefficients. Someo fth e variablesinterweav e and soconcea leac hother .Moreover ,th e Table 6. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r)betwee n degree of organization and a number of characteristics of the agrarian structure, per comuna Comunas close Typical tolarg e Remaining rural Chile city comunas comunas Variable (N= 264) (N= 30) (N=234) (N=121) (9) Producers and unpaid members of working population -0.12 0.04 -0.15 -0.29 (10) Sharecroppers-inquilinos and inquilinos of workingpopulatio n 0.19 -0.01 0.24 0.45 (11) Sharecroppers-inquilinos and inquilinos of wagelabou r 0.27 -0.11 0.35 0.44 (12) Permanent labourers of working population 0.22 0.39 0.21 0.30 (13) Permanentlabourer so fwag elabou r 0.24 0.64 0.16 0.22 (14) Temporary labourers of working population -0.09 -0.32 -0.07 -0.02 (15) Temporarylabourer so fwag elabou r -0.36 -0.45 -0.37 -0.49 (18) Farms0- 2h ao ftota lfarm s 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.38 (19) Farms2-1 0h ao ftota lfarm s 0.03 —0.48 0.11 0.03 (20) Farms10-SOn ao ftota lfarm s -0.12 0.13 -0.16 -0.29 (21) Farms50-20 0h ao ftota lfarm s -0.04 0.42 -0.12 -0.21 (22) Farms200-50 0h ao ftota lfarm s -0.05 0.28 -0.11 -0.25 (23) Farms>50 0h ao ftota lfarm s 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 (24) Farms200-50 0h ao ffarm s>20 0h a -0.07 0.10 -0.11 -0.10 (25) Farms> 1000h ao ffarm s>20 0h a 0.19 -0.11 0.24 0.33 (26) Land of farms with administrator of all farmland 0.14 -0.20 0.22 0.38 (27) Privately owned farms of total number of farms -0.15 -fl.03 -0.17 -0.20 (28) Irrigated surface of total area cultivable land 0.02 -0.26 0.07 0.23 (29) Farming population of total in the comuna -0.08 0.14 -0.14 -0.25 (31) Land treated with artificial fertilizer oftota lcultivabl elan d 0.06 -0.12 0.12 0.34 (42) Number of hectares cultivable land per tractor -0.11 -0.09 -0.14 -0.28 49 influenceo fcertai n variablesma yno tb elinea rbu tcurvilinear .Le tu stak efo rexampl eth e degreeo fagricultura ldevelopment .W eearlie rfoun d confirmation ofou rhypothesi stha t organization occurs wherever agriculture is more developed. We also discovered, however, that this relation did not hold good under all circumstances. From an agricultural viewpointth eunorganize d comunas closet oth ethre elarg ecitie swer emor e advancedtha nth eorganize d comunasi nth emor erura l areas. Somethingsimila roccur s with regard to the presence of administrators (indicator for owner absenteeism).I t was our hypothesis that themor eadministrator sther ewere ,th egreate r thechanc eo fa syn dicate.Thi s hypothesis wasconfirme d for thosecomuna s somedistanc e awayfro m the city,bu ti tals oappeare dtha ti nth enon-organize dcomuna sclos et oa cit yth epercentag e of administrators isgreate r than inth eorganize d comunas inth erura l areas. Sinceth e proximity of a city and the degree of urbanization ofth evariou s comunas seemst opla ysuc ha nimportan trol etha ti tobscure sth elin kbetwee nothe rvariable s and the occurrence of a syndicate, we have set out separately in Table 6 the correlation coefficients betweendegre eo forganizatio n andth eremainin g variablesfo r thetypicall y rural comunas.Fo r these comunasth e correlations withindicator sfo r thedevelopmen t of agriculture, (nos. 28, 31,42) , for economic development (no. 29) and for owner absenteeism (no.26 )appea r notably strongertha nfo r Chilea sa whol ean di nth edirec tionw eha dsuggested .Fo rth ecategorie so fworkin gpopulatio nan dwag elabou rth ecor relations we discovered earlier are confirmed. The more family farms (and people working on them: nos. 9, 20, 21) the less organized the wage-workers. The more sharecroppers, inquilinos and permanent workers among the agrarian population, the more likely they are to be organized in syndicates. The more large farms (no. 25) the higher the degreeo forganization . Hereto o thepresenc e oftemporar y labourerswithi n thecategor y ofwag eworker sprove st ocorrelat eextremel ynegativel ywit hth edegre eo f organization. Our hypotheses arethu s confirmed for thetypicall y rural comunas. 4.4 Multipleregressio nanalysi st oexplai nth edegre eo forganizatio n In order to gain more insight into the way in which the variables are connected,w e have carried out both a multiple and a partial correlation analysis.Th eresult s for the threecategorie so fcomuna swhic hpreoccupie d usearlie r aregathere d togetheri nTabl e 7.Th e analysis tabulates theindependen t variables according toth esiz eo fthei r partial correlationcoefficien t withth edependen tvariable .Thi smean stha tth eothe rindependen t variables are kept constant.Thi spartia l correlation coefficient ismentione d separately. Thecolum n 'Fractionexplained 'indicate sth edirect contributio n ofth evariabl ei nques tion to explaining the variance of the dependent variable, in our case the degree of organization. In column R2 one should only pay attention to the bottom linewhic hin dicateswha tpercentag eo fth evarianc ei nth edegre eo forganizatio n isexplaine d byth e independent variables taken together. It is impossible to assess immediately from the column 'Fraction explained' the importance of the total contribution of a variable.A variable may contribute littledirectl y but agrea t dealindirectly .No r isi ttru esimpl yt o say that ifvariable s (A and B for instance)ar eomitte d byth eprogramm ebecaus ethei r partial correlation coefficient with the dependent variable is very small, then the hypothesis which postulated that they wereimportan t for the degreeo f organization is entirely incorrect. They may correlate strongly with another variable which has been 50 Table 7. Results of multiple and partial correlation calculations to explain the degree of organization in different categories of comuna. R2 is cumulating'square dmultipl e correlation, coefficient Partial Fraction correlation explained Variable R2 coefficient Commas close to one of the 3 large cities (N=30) (13) Permanentlabourer so fwag elabou r 0.40 0.73 0.35 (31) Artificially fertilized land of total cultivable land 0.42 -0.49 0.09 (25) Farms >1000 ha of total farms >200 ha 0.44 -0.45 0.08 (19) Farms2-10haoftotalfarms 0.55 -0.51 0.11 (29) Farming population of total comuna popu lation 0.61 0.31 0.03 (26) Land under administrators of total farm land 0.69 0.46 0.08 Commas not close to one of the 3 large cities (N=234) (11) Sharecroppers-inquilinoso fwag elabou r 0.12 0.40 0.14 (13) Permanentlabourer so fwag elabou r 0.18 0.27 0.06 (19) Farms2-1 0h ao ftota lfarm s 0.19 0.16 0.02 (9) Producers and unpaid relatives of work ingpopulatio n 0.25 -0.21 0.03 (25) Farms> 100 0h aoftota lfarm s>20 0h a 0.257 0.10 0.01 Typicalrural comunas(N= 121) (15) Temporarylabourer so fwag elabou r 0.23 -0.39 0.10 (25) Farms> 100 0h ao ftota lfarm s>20 0h a 0.27 0.19 0.02 (18) Farms0- 2h ao ftota lfarm s 0.36 0.19 0.02 (29) Farming population of total comuna population 0.38 -0.21 0.03 (28) Irrigated surface of total cultivable land 0.39 0.16 0.02 (31) Artificially fertilized land of total cul tivablelan d 0.40 0.15 0.01 (22) Farms200-50 0h ao ftota lfarm s 0.44 -0.24 0.04 retained (for instance Z) and so provide nodistinctiv e contribution. Had Z not beenin cluded in the analysis,the n A and B would occur among thevariable sretained .Al l this means that our lack of insight intoth e reasons for thelin k between thevariable s which defineth eagraria nstructur ema ymislea dus .I ti spossibl etha tther eno tonly seem st obe , but must be, a link between let us say, irrigation, the occurrence of large farms, the relativepreponderanc eo fa particula r categoryo fth erura llabou rforc ean dth epresenc e ofadministrators . However,w ehav en otheor yt oexplai nthis ,s otha ti ti ssometime sim possible to say why one variablei s retained and another not. The table shows that inth e three categories of comunas different percentages of the variance inth edegre eo forganizatio n areexplained ,namely ,69% ,26% ,an d44% .Thi s is not necessarily because inth e countryside,unlik ethos e areasclos et oth ecities ,othe r variables,no t includedi nou r research,hav e arol et oplay .A simplerexplanatio nwoul d betha tth emor ecomuna sinvolve di nou rcalculation ,th egreate rth enumbe ro fdivergen t findingsan d measurement errors. This is indeed so. It also appears that almost all the irregular, unexpected, percentages of thedegre e of organization concerndeviation s up wards. A lower degreeo f organization would be expected on the basiso fth eregressio n coefficients. Inthos e comunassituate d closet ocitie sth efollowin g variables seemt o contributet o 51 explainth evarianc ei nth edegre eo fmobilization : therelativ esignificanc e ofpermanen t wage workers, owner absenteeism and the rural character. A negative contribution is providedb yagricultura ldevelopment ,th epresenc eo fver ylarg efarm s ando fver ysmal l ones(probabl y horticultural).Th emor ether e areo fthes eth eles sth edegre eo fsyndica l organization. Lesseas yt ointerpret ,however ,ar eth enegativ esign sfo rth epartia lcoefficient s ofar tificial fertilizer use and large farms. They may indicate either the presenceo fintensiv e horticulture or ofintensiv e cattle breeding. Inth eothe rcomuna sa nimportan tfacto r is,onc eagain ,th erelativ epreponderanc eo f share-croppers, inquilinos and permanent workers in the totality of wagelabou r (and, negatively, the presence of independent peasants employing members of their own family).Th eoccurrenc e offarm s ofbetwee n 2 and 10 hectares alsoplay sa role ,bu ton e opposite to that in the 'urban' comunas. This time the relation with the degree of organization ispositive . Inth etypicall y agrarian communities therelativ e significance ofth etemporar y wage workers appears to be of great importance, as does both the occurrence of very large farms (>100 0ha )an do fver ysmal lone s(0- 2ha) .Together ,thes evariable sma yindicat e thepresenc eo fth eso-calle d latifundia-minifundia complex.Th edegre eo furbanizatio n alsocontribute s asdoe sth estag eo fagricultura l developmentindicate d byth eus eo far tificial fertilizer. Itmus tb epointe dou ttha tth evariabl emakin gth emos timportan tdirec tcontributio n in the interpretation, the occurrence of temporary workers, must not simply be inter preted as meaning that thetemporar y workers did not wish toorganize .I t may wellb e that the syndicates,whic hwer elegall y restricted inthei r operationst o asingl ecomuna , werethereb y renderedunattractiv et othi scategor y ofworker .Althoug hw eru n the risk of making a category-mistake, this interpretation is in line with that of various other authors. Despite thefac t that only onevariabl ewa sretaine d inal lthre eo fth ecalculation sth e data nonetheless showtha t the composition ofth eagraria n workingpopulation ,th eoc currenceo freall ylarg efarms ,th edegre eo furbanizatio n andth emeasur eo fagricultura l development(indicate d byth eus eo fartificia l fertilizer)provid eth emos timportan tclue s in explainingth evarianc ei nth edegre eo forganization .The yexplai nbetwee n 30%an d 70%. Weca nleav easid eth evariable swit hregar dt oth ecompositio no fth elabou rforc ean d the farm sizedistributio n in order to seemor e clearly therol e played byth eremainin g variables.Thes erelat e toth esignificanc e of: theoccurrenc e ofver y largefarm s (Variable25 ) theoccurrenc e of administrators (Variable 26) theoccurrenc e ofirrigatio n (Variable28 ) the rural nature ofth ecomuna s (Variable29 ) the significance of permanent crops (Variable 30) theoccurrenc e oftractor s (Variable 31) productivity per hectare compared withth eres t ofth eprovinc e (Variable32 ) Using only these variables a multiple correlation analysis was done for different categories of comunas with the degree of organization asth e variable to beexplained . 52 Table 8. Results of multiple and partial correlation calculations with selected independent variablest oexplai nth edegre eo forganizatio no fdifferen tcategorie so fcomuna .R 2i scumulatin g squaredmultipl ecorrelatio n coefficient Partial Fraction regression Variable R2 explained coefficient Allcomunas(N =264) (25) theoccurrenc eo fver ylarg efarm s 0.03 0.04 0.21 (31) theoccurrenc eo ftractor s 0.04 0.01 0.12 (28) theoccurrenc eo firrigatio n 0.05 0.01 -0.10 Allcomunas(N=256)1 (25) Theoccurrenc eo fver ylarg efarm s 0.06 0.04 0.21 (31) Theoccurrenc eo ftractor s 0.09 0.02 0.15 (28) Theoccurrenc eo firrigatio n 0.10 0.01 -0.13 (26) Theoccurrenc eo fadministrator s 0.11 0.01 0.12 (32) Productivity per ha compared with the resto fth eprovinc e 0.13 0.01 0.11 Comunasnear a city (N = 30) (28) Theoccurrenc eo firrigatio n 0.07 0.07 -0.27 Comunasnot near a city (N = 234) (25) Theoccurrenc eo fver ylarg efarm s 0.06 0.05 0.23 (31) Theoccurrenc eo ftractor s 0.07 0.01 0.10 (29) Therura lnatur eo fth ecomuna s 0.08 0.01 -0.11 Typicalrural comunas (N= 121) (25) Theoccurrenc eo fver ylarg efarm s 0.10 0.12 0.37 (29) Therura lnatur eo fth ecomuaa s 0.20 0.06 -0.29 (31) Theoccurrenc eo ftractor s 0.27 0.07 0.30 Typicalrural comunas (N = 118) 1 (25) Theoccurrenc eo fver ylarg efarm s 0.18 0.18 0.48 (31) Theoccurrenc eo ftractor s 0.35 0.14 0.42 (29) Therura lnatur eo fth ecomuna s 0.38 0.03 -0.22 1 Excluded are those comunas, in which it appears that 100% ormor eo f thewag elabourer s areorganized ;i nothe rword sthos e comunasi nwhic hsom eo fth eself-employe d havemos t probably alsobecom emember so fth esyndicate . Theresult s aregive n in Table 8. Thistable ,whic hmus tb econsidere di nconjunctio nwit hTabl e7 ,reveal sa numbe ro f facts. It appearstha tth evariable srelatin gt o thecompositio n ofth eworkin g population andth edistributio no fpropert yd oindee dprovid ea nimportan tcontributio no fthei row n in explaining the variance in the degree of organization; the explained percentages in Table 8 are significantly lower. This doesno t mean,however ,tha tth evariable srelatin g to the modernity of the agricultural methods have no role at allt o play;the y also,con tribute, albeit to a lesserdegree . It is also evident that the few strongly divergent observation results (i.e. comunas in which the wage labour appears 100%organized )detrac t sharply from the explanatory value of the variables. The elimination of only 8 divergent communities out of the 264 doubled the percentage of variance explained andals orestore dth eexplanator y roleo fa couple of the variableswhic hha ddroppe d outwhe nth edivergen tresult swer eretained . Evenwit hth etypicall y ruralcomuna sth eeffec t ofremovin gonl ythre edivergen tresult s was considerable. With regardt o the 30 comunas situatedclos et o a cityi t mustb eobserve dtha ti nth e 53 first instance the explanatory variables, taken together, explained 28% of the variation. They were, however, successively eliminated as having a (too) low T-value.Thi s proves that in these comunas there is a fairly capricious interplay of very many factors. The explanatory variables function best in the typically rural comunas. Most impor tant are the degree of urbanization, the occurrence of large farms and of tractors. 4.5 Conclusion All in all the statistical processing of the material indicates strongly that the social- economic development ofth ecomun a itself and of agriculture within thecomuna ,th eex tent of urbanization, the occurrence of very large farms and, occasionally, owner absenteeism, influence the degree of organization. Also, the workers for whom it makes sense to organizeshoul d notb emerel y asmal lminorit y ofth eagraria n population. Given the incomplete nature of the figures and indicators I am inclined to view the quantitative results as confirming at least part of the theory presented in the previous chapter. The results also have an important bearing upon a very topical question. Does agricultural development hinder or promote a structural revolution in the rural areas of the developing countries? For Chilei twoul d seem that development encouraged peasant mobilization. This, however, may also bepartl y attributed to thefac t that thela w gover ning syndicalization made itdifficul t for thetemporar y workerst o organize.I ti sles seas y for them to 'get tough'i nth e coupleo f months they spend working for an owner. Having conceded this much, however, I still believetha t population pressure on thelan d and the emergence of atemporar y agricultural proletarian work force are not sufficient to ensure mobilization. It would seem that this occurs only after acertai n stageo fdevelopmen t has been reached. Notes 1 According to the data published in March 1970b y the Fondo deEducacio n yExtensio n Sin- dicalo fth e Ministry of Labour. 2 The comunas situated in the three most northerly provinces, as well as eight comunas belonging to the conglomeration Gran Santiago were not taken into consideration since agriculturei sfoun d thererarel yo rno ta tall . Themos tnorther nprovinc efo rou rpurpose swas , therefore, Coquimbo. 3 I am grateful to C.W .M .d eRanitz ,H .va n deBelt ,P .Spijker s and Mineked eReg tfo r their patient and meticulous computation ofth e data. 54 Chapter 5 Mobilizationwit hn oloca lopponent :th esmal lindependen t peasantsan dthei rco-operativ e 5.1 Introduction Inth emode lreproduce di nChapte r 3,peasan tcommunitie swer edistinguishe daccor dingt o the local distribution of land.Ther e are peasant communitiesi nLati n America whereth elan di smor eo rles sequall ydivide d(situatio nA )o rwhere ,althoug hth ealloca tion isunequal ,th elarg emajorit y ofth epopulatio n ownssom elan d(situatio nB) . Insuc hsituation sman yo fth epeasant sma ywel lb epoor ,bu tther ei smostl yn oques tion ofa direct ,loca lopponent .I nothe rword sthei rpovert ydoe sno tsimpl yresul tfro m another member of the community's directly appropriating whatever surplus they produce. Insuc hsituation sto oi tseem sadvisabl et opromot eco-operatio na ssoo na sth edesir e for better livingcondition sbegin st obecom egeneral .I nothe rwords ,th epeasant ssee m ripefo r mobilizationtoward sth eachievemen to fa share dgoal ,th eimprovemen to fthei r standard of living.Th e most suitable organization for this purpose isprobabl y the co operative,fo r themai ninterest so fpeasant s insuc h situations arethos eo fsmal lbu tin dependent agrarian producers. The co-operative may serve two purposes: provide countervailing power onth emarke t for agricultural products and confer advantageso f scalei npurchasin g inputso ri nutilizin gmachinery .Thi swoul di neffec t bemobilizatio n onth ebasi so fa particula rinterest ,tha to fth eproducers ,i norde rt oachiev ea particula r form ofcollaboration ,th e co-operative. It must bemad e clear from thestar ttha tmoder nform s ofco-operatio n inth efield o f production cannotb eintroduce dwithou ta radica lchang eo fvalue so nth epar to fth ein dependentpeasan t producer.A tth eleve lo feconomi cdevelopmen tattaine db yth ecom munities under discussion here, the family is the most important productive and con sumer unit,i n short the most important social unit for thepeasant .Hi swhol elife-styl e and methods of work are adapted to that unit. It is thus not surprising that, with this frame ofreference ,thes evalues ,h ewil lten dt orejec t aproductio n structurewhjc hdoe s not start from the family asth e principal social unit,bu t rather from theloca l peasant communty.I shallretur nt othi sproble mlater .I mentio nthi si norde rt oexplai nwh yth e co-operativest owhic hthes epeasant sbelon gar enearl yalway sservic eco-operatives .W e shallthu s confine ourselvesfo r thepresen tt otha t form ofmobilizatio n aimeda tsettin g up a service co-operative. Two cases will be distinguished, the spontaneous and the induced. 55 5.2 Thespontaneou s settingu p ofco-operative s Atth eleve lo fagricultura ldevelopmen t wheremos to fth epeasant sstil lproduc emain lyfo rthei row nconsumption , sellingonl ya surplus ,co-operatio ni sneeded ,bu tno ta co operative.I nsuc hcircumstance straditiona lform so fco-operatio nma yb efound , sucha s mutual help when labour is short, or in building a house, or, occasionally, in timeso f sickness. It would bemistake n to assume that the survival of such customs automatically im pliestha tth epeasant swoul dwelcom ea co-operative ,a forma lne wassociation .Th enee d for a formal organization like a co-operative only makes itself felt at a higher levelo f agriculturaldevelopmen t or amongpeasant swh ohav ealread y attainedtha thighe rleve l on their farms. The course of events in Chile illustrates this quite clearly. In 1970thi s country possessed twokind s of agricultural co-operatives.On eo fthese ,th ecooperativ a agricolawhos emember sconsiste dmainl yo fth elarge rfarmers ,thos ewith ,say ,40,8 0o r 150hectare s of irrigated land, wasusuall y founded by thefarmer s themselves andwa s economicallyprosperous .Th egovernment ,however ,ha dusuall yinitiate dth eothe rkind , the cooperativa campesina, intended for the small farmers, and mostly in a very weak economicposition .I cam eacros sanothe r instancedurin gm yresearc hi na n agricultural settlement inBrazil . After twoattempt sb ya stat einstitutio nt ose tu pa co-operativ eha d failed,i twa sprecisel yth elarge rfarmer s andaspirin glandowner swh owishe dt oventur e a third attempt (Galjart, 1968,p .105) . Iti shardl y surprising tofind tha tth epeasant swh ofee lth enee dfo r aco-operativ ear e those whose farms have attained a certain stage of development. They purchase more means of production, they produce greater quantities and thus have more to sell and moreinteres ti ngoo dmarke t outlets. Theyar ebeginnin gt ous emachine swhic hcoul db e bought byth eco-operativ e andhire dou tt othem .I nshort ,the ybegi nt ofee lth enee dfo r an institution which would be advantageous to them in buying, selling and in various stageso fth eproductio n process.Thes emor emoder n peasants areofte n those withth e larger holdings. It may also be, of course, that the spontaneous setting up of a co operative isinduce d after all by the advantages,fiscal an d otherwise, promised to co operativesb yth egovernmen t inorde rt opromot eth emovement .Advantage so fthi ssor t are naturally more interesting for the larger peasant producers. In fact a co-operative may sometimes benothin g moretha n a concealedfirm belongin g to ahandfu l oflarg e producers. Ifth elarg eproducer sdecid et ose tu pa co-operativ eth e(small )peasant si nth edistric t may join, but their membership will be to some extent marginal. Quantitatively or qualitatively,th e co-operative providesthe mwit hfewe r services.Sinc eth eorganizatio n supplies a recognized need, and most of the founders dispose of some capital, a spon taneous co-operative like this often succeeds in building up capital, expanding theser vices provided and realizing its aim of providing countervailing power and scale advantages. 5.3 Theinduce dco-operativ e Thepositio n isentirel y different inthos eagraria n communitieswhic h area sye tcom paratively undeveloped.A sw ehav epointe dou tthes ewil lb efamilia r withothe rform so f 56 co-operation,bu tther ewi l usuallyb en onee dfo r aco-operativ e assuch .However , this needis felt byth egovernment ,th eplanners ,o rothe routsider swh owoul dlik et ose eth e community develop. We shall deal laterwit hth e ideals andexpectations ,ofte n implicit, which frequently motivate such outsiders. Suffice itt o say that everywhere in thethir d worldth eco-operativ ei sseize dupo nb ygovernment s andothe rdeveloper s as aninstitu tion which might contribute to agricultural development. In other words the local co operativei susuall y founded byagencie s orindividual swh o arethemselve sproduct so fa system which embraces the community. Atth ever yleas tthe y taketh einitiativ e andin sistently urge theloca l population to set up such an association. In'ideal-typical 'term s this process of induced mobilization and association displays the following characteristics: 1. A government agency or an individual with local influence (such as theloca lpriest) , convincedo fth egrea tutilit yo fa co-operativ ediscusse sth eide awit hloca lpeasant sand , onceinteres t has been aroused,seek slocal ,informa lleader st ocal lth epeasant stogethe r and persuade them to set upa co-operative. 2. Although,comparin gthei rstandar do flivin gwit htha to fth eurba nmiddl eclasses ,al l peasants arepoor ,ther ear ealway sloca ldifferences .On ei spoore rtha nth eothe ran dha s less land. It will therefore be the larger, somewhat better off, more modern and more productive peasants who will show the most interest and be thefirst t ojoi n up.1 These peasantsto owil lusuall yb eelecte dt oth eadministrativ epositions .Ther ear ea numbe ro f explanations for thedominan t rolethe y soonbegi nt o playi nth einduce dco-operatives . - Theyar ebette rabl et obea rth einitia lsacrific e whichmembershi pentails . - As we have already observed with regard to the spontaneous co-operatives, it is the somewhat larger peasant farmers who will benefit most from theservice s offered byth e co-operative. - A government inspiredco-operativ e is usually accompanied by theextensio no f acer tain amount of credit. The somewhat larger, more innovative peasant producers are better ablet o availo fthi san dar emor ewillin gan dabl et otak eth erisks whic hinevitabl y accompany the application of new methods. - In alate rphase ,onc eth eco-operativ e hasbee nstarted ,th eallocatio n offurthe rcredi t isofte n particularistic in a country wherefund s areinsufficien t to extendcredi tt o every poor peasant. It is thus very important for every co-operative to have established good relationships,o rotherwis eb e ablet oinfluenc e this allocationt oth eadvantag eo fit sow n members.Thi si swher epatronag erear sit shead ,i nth efor mo fbrokerage .I ti sprecisel y thelarge rpeasant si nth ecommunit ywh oposses sth elarges tnumbe ro rth ebes tchannel s of communication with the allocating government agencies. This fact - andth erealiza tion among the memberstha t such channels areessentia l if crediti s to be obtained- is reason enough for electing precisely these larger peasants to the committee of the co operative. - Another reason is that the larger peasants also maintain more local patronage relationships,hav e dispensedmor efavour s andar ebette rabl et o mobilizeth emembers ' votes. - Such peasants often find posts in the committee for the simple reason that - as an after-effect ofth eprinciple so fRochdal e andsince th eco-operativ ei susuall ypoor - such worki sno tremunerated .Accordingl ycommitte emember smus thav etim et ospare ,o rt o puti tanothe rway ,hav ea sufficientl yhig hincom eno tt ohav et owor kal lda yan dever yday . 57 3. Asw ehav ealread y pointedout ,th eco-operativ ewil lofte n concentrate onthos eser viceswhic har eo fmos tinteres tt oth esomewha tlarge rpeasants .Thi si sno tonl ybecaus e theythemselves ,a smember s ofth ecommittee ,wil lten dt oidentif y their ownproblem s with those of under-developed local agriculture in general. In fact the whole view of agricultural development underlying the setting up of such co-operatives is atechnica l one.Th esolutio ni ssough ti nincrease dproductio n andproductivity .Generall yspeakin g the co-operatives arei na ba d position tofulfi l oneo fth eservice seagerl ydesire db yth e smaller peasants, namely the provision of cheap consumer goods. Insufficient capital preventsthe mfro m supplying suchgood so ncredi ta sth eloca lshopkeepe ri sabl et odo . Any attemptt oprovid ethi sservic ewil lprobabl yresul ti nfinancial disaste r- assistedb y the almost ever present inflation. 4. Thosepeasant s whobecom emember so fa ninduce dco-operativ eare ,generally ,to o poor to provide their organization with a working capital of any great size. The co operative thus remains dependent upon government credit, which as wehav e already mentioned is extended in a rather particularistic manner and for which patronage channels- and leaderspossessin g suchchannel s- usually remain necessary. 5. Largeloan sar eno tinfrequentl y grantedo nth ebasi so fproject s andplan sint owhic h too little research has been done.A cro pi srecommende d and sown anddoe sbadly .A machine is bought and proves to cost far too much to run. A limiting factor whichi s almostalway sunderestimate di sth emanagemen tcapacit yo fth ecommitte emember so r limitedstaf f ofth eco-operative ,o ro fth epeasant sthemselves .Afte r onlya fe wyear sth e book-keeping is in such a muddle that it is impossible to tell whether money is being embezzled or not.Naturall y thisprovide smuc hfoo d for suspicion and scandal.Th eac tivitiesundertake n byth eco-operativ ear eofte n sobadl y managedan dorganize dtha ti t works at alos sinstea do fshowin gth eexpecte d profit.Th eparadoxica lsituatio noccur s that aperso n with sufficient qualitiest oru n such aninduce d co-operativei sexpecte dt o dos ofo ra lo wsalar ywherea si fh eworke dfo rhimsel fh ewoul dprobabl yb equit ewel lof f in a couple ofyears .(Tw oo f myChilea n informants, officials ofINDAP ,who m Icon sidered to be among the best, the most well-intentioned and the most capable of my Chilean acquaintances,confesse d that whena fe wyear s agoth eco-operative sthe ywer e assistingreceive dlarg egovernmen t loans'w esimpl ybega nt oproduce .W edidn' tworr y about whether ourproject s wouldpa yo rnot .W eweren' teve nawar eo fth eproblem. 'I n 1970,however , itwa sonl y supplementary creditfro m thegovernmen t which savedth e communalpoultr yenterprise sinitiate db yth epeasants ,althoug hthe ycontinue dt omak e a loss and failed even to recover their running costs). The results achieved by a co operative or its members with the capital credit extended to them are crucial for the further course ofevent swithi n the co-operative.I fi tsucceed si nmakin g a profit andi n transforming credit into capital, then the co-operative acquires greaterfinancial elbo w room and has,moreover ,discovere d an activity capableo fexploitatio nb yth emanage ment quality atit sdisposal . 6. Thephenomen a mentioned under point 5explai n why,i n sover yman y cases,th e creditextende db yth egovernmen ti sno tearne dbac kb yth epeasant san dcannot ,accor dingly, be paid back. The government, which does not disposéo f unlimited funds and which, in^4 democracy, is also convinced that there is more political advantage and prestige to be gained by embarking on a brand new project elsewhere rather than by laboriously rehabilitating one which may have been started by a previous government, 58 pimplycut s offcredit . 7. Iti sextremel y likelythat ,onc eth esuppl y ofcredi tfro mth egovernmen tdrie sup ,th e co-operativewill ,t oal lintent s addpurposes ,ceas et oexis t Themember swh ojoined ,no t so much becausethe y felt such anee dfo r aco-operativ ebu tofte n inth e anticipation of receiving considerable credit, begin to loseinteres t andt odrif t away.Th esuspicio n and gossip,th emutua l recriminations have,i nth emeantime ,undermine drelationship swith inth e community. Committee members depart andar ereplace d bypeopl eless able.O n passing through thedistric t five yearslater ,th eobserve r can often detectn otrac eo fth e largeamount so fcredi tdispensed ,whic hmus thav ebee nspen to nsomething ,le talon eo f the co-operative. 5.4 The implicit ideology We have described, in ideal-typical terms, how a spontaneous and an induced co operativerespectivel y canoriginat eand ,sometimes ,vanis hagain .W eha dth eservic eco operative in mind,no tth eproductio ntype , sinceth elatte rca n only developunde rcom pletely different conditions. One might wonder why a government, planners or other expertsi nth efield o fagricultur e undertake projectswhic hs o often seemdestine dt ofail . The reason, it seems to me,i stha tthes eexpert s andth egovernmen t inquestio ncheris h all kinds of notions andexpectation s whichare ,i nfact , incorrect. Inth efirst place , the reality is often lost sight ofthat a co-operative only satisfies the peasants' needs after they have reached a certain stage of development. Yet a co operative isinduce da ta nearlie rstag ebecaus ei ti sexpecte dt oprovid esomethin gwhic h is really beyond its capabilities. It is expected to bring about a local economic develop mentwhic hwil lbenefi t allth e peasants. But eveni fth eco-operativ ei s aroarin g success fromth eeconomi c pointo fview ,th eagricultura ldevelopmen tt owhic hi tcontribute swil l merely serve to increase the inequality between peasants. The better peasant farmers (which often means, unfortunately, the originally better-off farmers, those with a little moreland ,a trifl ehighe rincome ,mor eeducation ,mor econtact swit hurba nculture )out distance their less successful colleagues in income, status and eventually, in the size of theirholdings .No tonl ydoe sth eservic eco-operativ eno thampe rthi sprocess ,i teve nen courages it.Thu s agovernmen t frequently expectso fsuc hco-operative sresults whic hd o notcorrespon da tal lwit hthos e actuallyachieved ,tha tis ,i fth eco-operativ edoe sno tfai l completely. In all probability governments continue to cling to these expectations because they accord with the preference, frequently cherished by western experts, for family farms. They also accord withth evalue s heldb y the majority of the independent peasants inth edevelopin g countryitself .I naddition ,the yhel pglos s overth eproble mo f the productiveorganization .Th eexpectation sthu s addu pt oa nideology ,bu tar ei nfac t incorrect The only form of co-operative which prevents the growth of social and economic inequality inagricultura l development, andthe nonl ywithi neac hgroup ,i sth e production co-operative. It willb eclea r thatth einducin go f suchco-operative s mustb e based upon a political decision taken at national level. It also impliestha t the peasants mustb econvince dtha ttins i sthei ronl ywa yo fachievin g ahighe rstandar do fliving .Th e setting upo f a co-operative musttherefor e beprecede d oraccompanie d by aradica lin doctrination process. It is often found that even in situation A, where levelling mechanisms exist andar eaccepted ,thi sdoe sno tautomaticall y implyth e acceptance of 59 equality asa valu ei na ne wproductio n organization,o rth eacceptanc eo fa ne whvllin g mechanism.I nthi srespec tther ei sn oroo mfo r anyo fth enaïvet ésuc ha stha tdisplaye d by, for instance, Fais Borda in his introduction to the studies on Latin-American Co operatives by Pugh etal. (1970). Some people (Stavenhagen, 1966 for instance) state that co-operative agricultural enterprisescanno t evensurviv ei na neconom ywher eothe rsector sconsis to findividuall y owned enterprises. I think that they can, provided that the co-operative farm helps to achieve another,justifie d value ofth epeasants' ,namel y ahighe rstandar d ofliving ,an d doess omor eefficientl y than would afar mo fthei r own.Thi sa tleas twa son eo fth econ clusions I arrived at during myresearc h in Chile.Thos e ofm y Chilean colleagueswh o were primarily interested in the social consequences of the new peasant organizations that aimed at co-operative production, andwh oconsidere dth eeconomi c consequences tob eo flesse rimportance ,wer et om ymin di nerror .The yignored ,a si twere ,th efac ttha t thepeasants 'motive si njoinin gsuc h anorganizatio n sprangfro m their desiret orealiz ea traditional value- namely, ahighe r income.I nothe r words,th eeconomi cresult s ofth e organization determined thepeasants ' inclination towor k for it. Iti sinterestin g tonot etha t inTanzani atoo ,anothe rcountr ywher eth egovernmen ti s seriously involved in persuading the peasants tojoi n collective agricultural enterprises, there is much uncertainty with regard to the arguments which might persuade the peasantst omobilize . Conferences andseminar sar earrange dt odiscus sthi squestion ,bu t it remains a problem. The situation in Tanzania is not such that the peasants can be mobilized everywhere onth ebasi s of classdifference s with any chance of success.Thi s rendersth e situation allth emor einteresting ,sinc eth emobiliser s are,a si twere , seeking forwha tLamon dTuli s(1970 )call sa 'structura l bind',2 aconstrain ttha tenforce s unity. In Chile, up to 1970,th e most that could befoun d weretentativ e approaches to an ideologyo fco-operation ;i nth eofficia l andinterna lpublication so fINDA Pfo r example, and among certain of its officials. At the outset INDAP had encouraged the small peasantst ounit ei nneighbourhoo d committees;credi twa sthe nextende dvi athes ecom mittees.I twa sonl y later,i n 1968,tha t variousneighbourhoo d committeeswer ebande d togetherint omunicipa lan dsometime sregiona lco-operatives .Tabl e9 give ssom eide ao f the increase inth enumbe r ofco-operatives . Of the co-operativesi n existence inDecembe r 1969,roughl y 60%ha dles stha n 100 members and 20%mor etha n 200. There seemed to besevera l reasons whyn oclea r ideology developed during theFre i period.Withi nth e circles ofth e Christian-Democrats themselves opinionswer edivide d on whether the small peasants ought to be integrated into the 'large' agricultural- economic system or whether a small-peasant economy ought to becreated .Thi swoul d Table 9. Growth of small peasant co-operatives in Chile 1964-1969.Numbe r ofincorpor atedco-operative s(Cooperativa scampesinas ) Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Number of co-operatives 26 43 84 123 171 222 Number of members 1718 3204 7802 11452 18456 30034 60 involveform s of collectiveproductio n with a verticalintegratio n givingthe mthei row n supplyfirms, an d sellingorganization s- inothe rwords ,thei row nmarke t Thisdivisio n also seemed to belinke dwit h thefac t that few people had anyclea ride ao fbo wt ose t about organizing any of this. The peasants themselves were chiefly interested in economic improvements. In 1969 admittedly they had demanded land at practically every provincial congress,bu tonl yi nth eod dcas edi dan yindividua lco-operativ eexer cisepressur eo nth egovernmen tt oexpropriat e aparticula r largefarm .Unti lSeptembe r 1970a tleas t itwa sonl y sporadically that afar m wasindee dexpropriate di nfavou r ofa co-operative.Thi smostl yoccurre d inthos eprovince si nwhic hth eleader so fth efedera tion of co-operatives were most class-conscious, most convinced of the existence of a structural bind. By carrying out practically no expropriation in favour ofth esmall , in dependent peasants,th e government missedit schanc et omobiliz ethe mi nterm so fthi s unifying constraint. This meant too that the co-operatives were more dependent upon governmentproject san dcredi ttha nthe ymigh totherwis ehav ebee nha dthe ydispose do f theirow nland .A furthe r resultwa stha tth evalu eo fparticipation ,o fth epeasant shavin g a say inthei r ownfuture , remained an empty slogan. Themos tseriou sattemp t- alongsidesom eo fth elarg eproject s- toachiev ecollectiv e formso fproduction ,wa sth eissu eo fcapita lloan st osmalle ro rlarge rgroups ,fro m 3t o 10 or morepeasants .Thes egroup swer eusuall yforme d by co-option.Mostl yth egrou p ran api go r chicken farm together,wit heac h member havinghi sow nlittl efar m onth e side. Production groups with land, however, also occurred. The impression I retained after visitingsuc hgroup swa stha t their cohesion andviabilit ydepende dupo neconomi c results.I shalldiscus sthi spoin t inmor edetai l inth echapte r on solidarity. Atthi spoin t it seemst om eworthwhil et ofill ou twha tha salread y beensai dconcer ning the significance ofleadershi p and management capacity and the chance of failure with a very detailed description of one particular case. Such descriptions are seldom giveni n sociological literature.Author s areusuall y satisfied witha brie f summingu po f factors which are supposed to explain whyth e project, or the co-operative as awhole , failed.Suc ha resumé ,however ,doe sno tsufficientl y impressupo nth ereade rho wclosel y theseexplanator yfactor s areconnecte dan dho wsligh ti sa project' schanc eo fsucces si n a developing country. To my mind this particular case has so many ideal-typical characteristics that it is well suited to serve as an illustration. It is certainly not a case whichmake si teas yfo rm et obolste ru pth eassertion sI hav es ofa rmade .Chil ewa son e of the most developed countries of Latin America; the Frei government was characterized by considerable sympathy for the peasants, and by honest attempts to assist their progress, whileth e technical standard of the Chilean official was no lower than that ofofficial s elsewhereo nth econtinent ,o nth econtrary . 5.5 Casedescriptio n Our case concerns the regional cooperativa campesina of Calle Larga (pseudonym) whichcomprise ssevera lneighbourhoo dcommunitie san dlie sunde rth esmok eo fa larg e city. In 1966a comparativel ylo wrankin gloca lofficia l ofINDA Pcam eu pwit hth eide ao f extendinga largeloa n.t oth emarket-gardener si nth eregion .Thi swoul denabl ethe mt o 61 equip and organize a horticultural auction mart, which could serve as an alternativet o the central market. This was situated in the large city, and dominated by large traders whoexploite dth emarke tgardeners .(I ti sideal-typica ltha tth eprojec twa sth ebrain-chil d of a local, comparatively low-ranking official). At this timeth e peasants wereno teve n organized in aregiona lco-operative ,bu twer escattere di nsmal llocal ,independen tcom mittees.Fo rthi sreaso na co-operativ ewa sfirst se tup ,befor eth eloa nwa sapplie dfor .I t wasgrante dthre eyear slater ,i nSeptembe r 1969.I twa sa larg eloa no f 1$millio nescudo s (rather moretha n £61,000).Bot hth eprovincia lINDA Poffic e andth eloca lburea uap pointed officials toge tth eprojec t underway,certainl y sevenpeopl ei n all. Thetea mwa s headed by an agronomist. During allthi stim eth eco-operativ e had been idle.Abou t 200peasant s wereb ytha t time affiliated, but practically the only activity was the almost weekly meeting of the board which was sometimes attended by the delegates from theloca l committees. For almosttw owhol eyear sth emember so fth eboar dha dme tan dtrie dt oexpedit eth eloan , without receiving anything in return. For this, thought INDAP, they deserved every credit. The chairman's capabilities were viewed with a more jaundiced eye - it was alwaysth evice-chairman ,fo r example,wh otoo k chargeo fth emeeting swhil eth echair man remained a bashful and silent spectator. When the chairman of the co-operative wishedt o appoint asbusines smanage r awoma nwh owa sa goo dfrien d ofhis ,someon e from INDAP made a counter proposal. After afairl y heated discussion - for thecom mitteemember sregarde dth eproposa l asa piec eo fauthoritaria ninterventio no nth epar t of INDAP - it was agreed to organize a sort ofexa m for those whowishe d to becon sidered for thepai d post ofbusines smanage r ofth eco-operative .Thi s examwa si nfac t heldi nOctobe ro rNovembe ro f 1969. Amembe ro fth eboar dan dINDA Pofficial s were therea sinvigilators ,fro m 10i nth emornin gunti l5 inth eafternoon . Ninecandidate sha d applied,includin gon edelegat efro m aloca lcommitte eo fth eco-operative .When ,a t5 in the afternoon, theboar d member was already inth ebu shomewar d bound,a tent hcan didate suddenly made hisappearance . Hewa sfro m outsideth ecity ,ha d spent mosto f the day travelling and hadn't been ablet o get there any sooner. The INDAP officials decided thath eto o should beallowe dt osi tfo r theexam .H eprove dt o headth elis tan d the leader ofth eprojec t wanted to appoint him.A tth emeetin g whichwa st o decideo n the appointment ofth emanage r theboar d memberswer eextremel y indignant overthi s state of affairs. They wanted no part of the man who had done best in the exam;the y didn't know him. (This common standpoint had required some preparation. The one board memberwh oha dhelpe dinvigilat e andfel t extremely put outb yth ecours eevent s had taken, had called a secret board meeting- memberso fINDA Pno t admitted- and had won overth eothe r memberst o hispoin t of view.)Fo r the sakeo fpeac e adecisio n was postponed; anyway the co-operative hadn't yetreceive d any money from INDAP and could hardly pay a manager from an empty coffer. Meanwhile, in a number of meetings withth eboar d andth edelegate so f theloca l committees,th eINDA P officials had revealed the economic planning behind the project. There was aheate d discussion about whether the co-operative ought indeed to deduct 16% of the product price for expenses.Fo r producebrough tt oth ecentra lmarke ton eonl ypai d1 \\%plu scarriage ,i t was said. According to some of those present this difference meant that the peasants wouldn't deliver to the co-operative. The project estimated that the market-gardener memberswoul ddelive r3 5% o fthei rcro pt oth eco-operativ ei nth efirst year ,50 %th ese - 62 cond year, 80%th e third year and 100%th e fourth year. Fewo fthos epresen twer eimpresse db yth eargumen ttha ti nthi swa ythe ywoul dbuil d up the capital of their co-operative. If I die, said one of them, all my wife gets is my originalinvestmen t plus7 % interes ta year .I nothe rword sthe ywoul dno tb eabl et ocas h in on the capital growth.H e didn't believeeithe rtha t theco-operativ ewoul d beabl e to obtain more for first class produce than was offered on the central market, evert if it managed to obtain contracts withth elarg e supermarketsi n thecity .H eha d soldt o one of these enterprises from time to time and had never received more than the average market price. Somedi dappreciat eth eargumen ttha tth eco-operativ emigh tb eabl et ous eit scapita l to buy land for the members(urbanizatio n inth eregio nwa sprogressin g sorapidl ytha t many memberswer ei ndange ro flosin gthei rlan dan dsom eha dalread ylos tpar t ofit) . Another member, though, didn't want the co-operative to plough back its profits into land, but would have preferred an expansion of theco-operativ eitself .(Thi s suggestion came from someone who, before the Frei government, had benefitted by a local land reform carried out by the Catholic church). No decisions were ever arrived at after such discussions;th e meeting dispersed, the peasants thinking that INDAP would surelyfix everything , theINDA P peopleworrie d by theegotis m of thepeasants . InOctobe r INDAP organized a two day coursefo r the boardmember so fth eco-operative . Hereto oth esam epoint scam eu pfo rdiscussio nan d here too the peasants only partly understood the aim of the project, while the officials failed to realize that their explanation was falling short on some points. Withregar d to that 16% for expenses, forinstance , INDAP stated thatthi swa sno t adefinit efigure; i f thepeasant swoul ddelive rmor etha nth eexpecte dquantitie so fproduce ,i tcoul db elowe r (ona large rturnover) .Nobod y pointedou ttha ti twoul dno tb eknow nunti lth een do fth e yearwhethe ro rno tth epeasant sha ddelivere dmor etha n3 5% o fthei rcrop ,an dtha tth e 16% regulatio nwoul dhav et ob eretaine dfo rtha tyea ra tleast .Nevertheles sthes eday s - spent in Vina del Mar - were characterized by a certain cameraderie and solidarity amongth eparticipants . Meanwhile,i n October 1969,a larg eplo to flan dclos et oth ecit yha dbee npurchased . Oni tstoo dthre elong ,bu tlow , stonehe nhouse s andals oa larg etwo-storeye dbuilding , constructed entirely of stone, which resembled an engineering works. A civil engineer belonging to INDAP drewu pplan so fth ealteration swhic hwoul d benecessar yt ocon vert the building into a covered market for receiving, sorting, packing and expediting market garden produce. Before the alterations had even begun a television team arrived from the city to film the event and give an account of the project. The agronomist in charge spent an entiremornin g leading them round. As the board members had expected - although during a meeting with the INDAP people,wh odeplore dthei rpessimism ,the yha dfinished u pb yofferin g theirow nservice s for the reconstructionjo b- the enthusiasm ofth emembers ,a tleas tfo r helping withth e alteration work, wasno tgreat .A fewturne du pdurin gth efirst fe wweeks ,o n Saturdays and Sundays, butthi s was about all. Then, onefine da y theco-operativ e started to pay those who showed up regularly for their work. The board had apparently decided, without informing INDAP, not to pay the volunteers IS escudos incas h but to deduct thisamoun tfro mthei rdeb tt oth eco-operativ e(fe wo fth emember sha dpai dthei radmis siondue s infull) . Studentsfro mth ecit y alsooffere d tohelp .Thi shel pwa s accepted ata 63 meetingpregnan t withpolitica l suspicion.Electio n timewa scomin gu pan dth eINDA P peoplewer econvince dtha tth estudents 'mai nai mwa st ocanva swithi nth eco-operative . Toth ebes t of myknowledg e they cameonl ytwice ,bot h times on a Saturday. A number of contractors were now engaged; one laid thewate r main - toiletswer e needed,amon gothe rthing s- whileanothe r puti nth eelectricity .I nJanuar y 1970th eco operativereceive da brand-ne wtruck ,althoug h asye tther ewa snothin gthe ycoul dus ei t for.I tma yhav ebee nthi swhic hinspire don eo fth elower ,loca lINDA Pofficials ,unti lth e mattero freconstructio n wasfinally settled ,t opropos et ose tu pa sale-roo mfo r market- garden produce in ane w suburb nearby. (Themayo r had infac t already discussed this idea with the chairman of the co-operative.) Ifth e municipality would let them havea piece of ground they could easily knock up an auction hallwit hth ewoo d they already had plus a quantity of other material. (I was later informed that they werethinkin gi n terms of 'three bags of cement and a kilo of nails'.) No sooner said than done. The municipalitygav ethe mth eland .I d ono tkno wa twha tprecis emomen tth eleade r ofth e project was informed of these plans; in any case,h e should have been aware of them. Whileth e alterations toth e market hallgroun d to ahalt , abou to ffeveris h activitywa s unleashed on the sale-room in the suburb.But ,thre emonth slater , 28,000escudo s had already been spent on material for this enterprise which was supposed to cost almost nothing, and even then it wasn't completelyfinished. On e reason for this was that the municipality - under the smokeo fth e great city,itsel f for thegreate r part urban- laid downcertai n requirementsregardin gth ehygieni c conditionso f sucha sal eroom .Ther e wasth e additional factor that none ofth emember s had any building experience. Inth emids to f allthi sactivit y- inwhic hth eloca lINDA Ppersonnel ,thre epeopl ei n all, were daily and indeed very actively involved - a conflict broke out between the provincial INDAP authorities and thesethree .Tw oo fthe mwer esuddenl y transferred; thethir dremaine di nCall eLarg abu twa srequeste dt ohav en omor edealing swit hth eco operative.Th ereason s behind allthi swer ecomple xi nth eextreme .On eo fth ethre eha d long ago incurred thedispleasur e of apowerfu l bigwigo fINDA P inth eprovince ,wh o was linked with thePDC .Hi stransfe r had already beenrequeste d earlier but hadbee n heldu pb yth eprovincia ldirecto ro fINDA Pwh oi nhi stur ndislike dth epart yman . One ofth eothers ,th eon ewh oha dbee nallowe dt oremai n inCall eLarga ,wa sthough tt ob e mixed up in politics. He was suspected of working for MAPU, the break-away ex-left wingo fth e Partido Democrata Cristiano.(I nINDA P itselfpeopl ewer eincreasingl yin clined to think inpart y political terms.Scarcel y any attempt wasmad eno wt o conceal thefac t thaton eo fth eaim so fth eagenc ywa st oensur eTomic' svictor yi nth eSeptembe r 1970elections .The ywer eno tye topenl ycanvassin g forTomic ,bu twithi nth eagenc ya startha dbee nmad eo nth emuzzlin go fofficial s whower eknow no rsuspecte dt ob eanti - Tomic.)Th e blame for embarking on the sale-room project waslai d at the door ofth e third official. Thesethree ,wh oseeme dt ofor m aclose-kni tteam ,wer eals oaccuse do fcriticizin gth e provincial INDAP people for mismanaging the project. They had complained tootha t the loan was doled out in dribs and drabs so that on one occasion there hadn't been enoughmone yt opa yth eworkmen .The y hadwante d nothingmor et od owit hth eloca l head of INDAP who, in his turn, was suspicious of his subordinates' insistence on a changei nth eboar d ofth eco-operative .H eregarde d ita sa politica lmanoeuvr ei norde r to substitute kindred spirits.Thei r departurewa s ablo wt oth epeasant s- thati st osay , 64 theboar do fth eco-operätive .Hars hword swer eexchange d atth enex tmeetin gwit hth e leadero fth eproject .Eve pthe ni twa sno tmad eclea rwh owa sno wi ncharge :INDA Po r the co-operative which had received the loan. Although the members ofth eboar d had switchedjob s - thechairma nha d become acting managero fth eco-operativ ean dals o droveth etruck ,fo r whichh ereceive d 1800escudo spe rmonth ;th evice-chairma n had been made chairman;th e secretary had been dismissed for not attendingmeeting s and replacedb ya nactin gboar dmembe r( asuplente )- thisha ddon enothin gt oimprov ethei r shilly-shallying and lack of expertise. INDAP would have liked to have seen them all replaced, but this was not legally possible until the general meeting had approved the balancesheet sfo rth epas ttw oyears .Thes ebalanc esheets ,however ,ha dstil lt ob emad e upan d passed byth eMinistr y ofEconomi cAffair s ... (The situation seemed almost nightmarish to an outsider who happened to be a sociologist. Ifoun d itunbelievable ,fo r instance,tha ti nal lthos emonth si tha dno tbee n established who was in charge and that the agronomist from INDAP, who put in an appearance once or twice a week, could carry on as though merely a few trifling difficulties wereinvolved . Yetth epeasant sto opersiste di nthei rrole ;the yto o professed nott ose etha tth eprojec twa sbeyon dthem .I fth echairma no fth econtro lcommissio no f the co-operative, Don Lucho,whos e carping voice washear d at almost everymeeting , stated in plain terms that the management was incompetent, the members took this criticism personally, lost their tempers and simply threatened to resign. Constructive criticismi nth esens eo fdiscussin gho wa thin gshoul db edon ean dwh oshoul dd oit ,wa s almost impossible.N oagend awa seve rdraw nu pfo rth emeetings ;i twa smor ea perma nentquestio n andanswe r session.Thi stende dt omea nthat ,befor eon esubjec tha dbee n properly discussed,peopl eha d alreadypasse d ont oth enext. ) At around this time,th e INDAP project leader,th eagronomist ,wen tabroa dfo r six weeks.(Th e curtain had already fallen when hereturned , butthi sdoesn' t seemt ohav e causedhi man ytrouble ;hi sfailur edegenerate dint oa quarre lbetwee nhi sdirec tbos san d theprovincia ldirecto r ofINDAP. )H ewa sreplace db ya youn gbook-keeper .Thi sma n andth e official in chargeo fsocia l affairs hadth ecourag et orais eth ealarm ,thu scom pellingth e highest INDAP officials inth eprovinc et o comet o a decision.Althoug h as late as March 1970 yet another investigation commission from the national INDAP office hadreturne dhom esatisfied , after avisi tt oth eco-operative ,now ,scarcel ya mont h later, the details had to be scrutinized. It appeared that theunauthorize d saleroomha d already cost 28,000 escudos, and was going to cost more. It appeared that the truck, which had cost nearly 100,000escudos ,ha d hardly earned a penny in four months.I t appeared that not one of the board members knew how much credit, in cash, the co operativeha ds ofa rreceive dfro mINDA P(aroun d 130,000escudos) .Meanwhil eth eco operativeha d begun sellingi nth ene w suburb.Th eresult swer ehardl y spectacular,jus t sufficient topa y the salary ofth e salesmanappointe d byth eco-operative ,althoug hthi s washar dt owor kou texactly .Th emanage rworke dwit hon ebi gcashbox ,fro mwhic hh e tookmone ywhe nh ewen tt obu yproduce ,returnin gt oi ti nth eevenin gwhateve rwa sleft , plus the proceeds of the sale-room. Yeteve n at the meeting where allthi s emergedth e boardinsiste da tth een dtha tthe yalone ,withou tth eINDA Ppeople ,woul ddecid ewha t wast o bedone . Theymanage dt okee pthing sgoin gfo ra tim ean da ta late rmeetin geve nconverte dth e highestINDA Pofficer s inth eprovinc et oth eexten ttha tthe ybega nt oblam ethemselves , 65 andeac hother ,fo rth efailure .Th eoddes trumour scirculate d atth eINDA Poffic e inth e city.I twa ssaid ,fo rinstance ,tha tth eprovincia ldirecto rbelonge dt oa noppositio npart y andha dbee nordere dt osabotag eth eproject .Ever yrumou rseeme dreasonable ,evident ly,i n the rarefied political atmosphere ofthat early summero f 1970; besides,i twa sa n excellent means of obscuring where the real responsibility lay. The co-operative ap pointed a new manager, who even drew up an alternative project, i.e. that the co operative should start a mixing installation for cattle fodder and should trade in non- perishable agrarian products. ButINDA Pha dwashe dit shand so fth ewhol eidea .N omor ecredi twa sextende dan d inJul y 1970 theplot ,wit hth emarke t building stillonl y party reconstructed,wa srente d to a metal construction firm. The suburban saleroom was still functioning but the purchasesfo r thiswer emad ein ,o f allplaces ,th ecity ,a tth ecentra lmarket .Th equan tities sold wereto o small to interest the market-gardening members. In August the co operative was still employing seven men, but was no longer able to pay their salaries (11,000escudo spe r month).Th e endwa s near. 5.6 Postscript Itappear smuc hmor edifficul t tomobiliz esmal lpeasant swh od ono thav et ocop ewit h a commonloca lopponen ttha nt oorganiz ethos ewh odo .Wit hth elatter ,th epurpos ei s to end local exploitation, but withth e independent peasantsther ei sth emuc h morear duoustas k ofimprovin gthei rpositio n within anationa l economic system.I ti shope dt o achievethi sb y means ofa nassociatio n whicha tth esam etim emus trealiz eothe raims , sucha sa greate rparticipatio n indecisio nmakin gan da greate rdegre eo fequality .I shal l returnt oth eproblem s posedb ythi si nlate r chapters,particularl y inth echapte r which deals with solidarity. However, I hope that I have already made it clear that these problems are sizeable.The y spring on the one hand from the underdevelopment ofth e country: lack of capital, lack of management capacity and expertise among both peasants and government, a lack of solidarity among the peasants. On the other hand problems arise from the fact that the co-operative, as an institution, isexpecte d toac complish anumbe r of aimswhic hofte n remainmerel y implied and are,t osom eextent , conflicting. In viewo fthi sth efailur e of soman y agricultural co-operativesi nth eThir d World ishardl y surprising. 66 Chapter 6 Membersan d non-members of associations 6.1 Introduction In the preceding chapters wehav e dealt mainly with the structural variables which determinedth emobilizatio no fpeasant san dagricultura llabourer sa tth eleve lo fth eloca l community and of society.Ou rfindings wer ebase dupo nth erelevan tliteratur e andth e results of qualitative research. We also linked the degree of involvement of the agriculturalworker si nrura lsyndicate swit hspecifi ctrait so fth eagraria nstructure ,wit h theai do ffigures derive dfro mth eChilea nagricultura lcensus .However ,befor egoin go n toexamin eth eproblem sarisin gi nthes eassociation sonc eestablished ,w eshal firstl con sider the differences between members and non-members of syndicates and co operatives.I nothe rword sw eshal ldescen dt oth eleve lo fth eindividual. W ewis ht odis coveri fther ei san ysystemati cdifferenc e betweenmember san dnon-members ,i fther ei s a particulartyp eo fperso nwh ojoine dthes eassociations .Th epreliminar yresearc hle du s toexpec ttha tthi swa sindee dso .I nth efollowin gsection sw eshal lrevie wou rhypothese s regardingth edifference s betweenmember s andnon-members ,dealin gfirst wit hth esyn dicates andthe n withth eco-operatives .W eshal lthe ndiscus sth eresult sobtaine d from an analysis ofth esurve y data. 6.2 Thesyndicate s 6.2.1 Hypotheses The basic hypothesis underlying the survey among members and non-members offarmin g syndicatesi nChil ewa stha tther ewer efou rmotive swhic hmigh tlea dworker s to affiliate. Thesewere : 1. Theworke rmigh t appreciateth eutility ,th einstrumental ,especiall yeconomi cvalue , ofth esyndicate . 2. Theworke rmigh thav ejoine dbecaus eh evalue dan dwante dt omaintai nth einterac tionwit hhi sfriends ,relative so r acquaintanceswh ower ealread ymembers . 3. Theworke rmigh thav ejoine dou to fa sens eo fobligation ,o fsolidarit ywit hhi speers ; responding to anor mo f solidarity whichdemand sunity . 4. Hemigh thav ebee n coercedint ojoining . The fourth motivedi d not hold good in Chile,s oI didno tpursu eit .A surve y inth e United States(Hagstro m &Selvin , 1965)ha dshow ntha tth evariou sindicator so fcohe sionbetwee nmember so fassociation scoul db ereduce dt otw ofactors ,instrumenta lan d sociometrie appreciation, corresponding to motives 1an d 2o f myhypotheses .I could 67 also imagine, however, and certainly in the case of syndicates, i.e. militant class organizations, that a person might join not primarily because membership could be useful to him, nor because he valued the companionship of the other members, but becauseh efel t thath emus tmak ecommo ncause ,sho wsolidarit ywit hthos eother swh o shared the same socio-economic position ashimself ,o r because anor mrequire dthi so f him. Looking back itseem st om etha t motives 2an d3 arebot hbase do nsolidarit yamon g memberso fth esam egroup .Wha tI wa sno ts oquic kt onotic ewa stha tth eac to fjoining , born of solidarity, may be done gladly or with somereluctance , under pressure of the social control of the other members of the group. An act of solidarity may also spring from the sense of identification mentioned in the third motive, but not in the case of memberso fth esame ,ye tcomparativel ysmall ,group .I nsuc ha grou pidentificatio n must gohan d inhan d withrelationship sand ,i fther ei san yquestio n ofsolidarit y at all,people , eitherjoi n associations automatically because theother sjoin , or under socialpressure . Wehav ethu sthre emotive swhich ,fo r conveniencesake ,ma yb eterme d'utilit yo fth e association', 'attraction ofinteraction ' and 'obedience to anorm' . I assumed that these motives,i nthei r turn, would depend upon variousothe r factors andvariables . With regard to utility, I reasoned as follows. To appreciate the possible value ofth e farming syndicate the worker must cease to link hisinteres t with that ofth eowner .H e wouldals onee dt ob eawar eo fhi ssocial-economi c situation.I nmor econcret eterm sthi s ledm et opostulat eth efollowin g hypothesesan dsub-hypotheses .I ncompariso nwit hth e non-member, themembe rwil l 1 have less of a patronage relationship with the owner (cf. Urzua, 1969, p. 122), because,fo r example,h e 1.1 depends less uponth eowne r sinceh ei syounge r and has a smaller family; 1.2 has had less opportunity to build up arelationshi p sinceh eha s not livedther es o long; 1.3 ismor edissatisfie d from theeconomi c pointo fvie w(experience s agreate rrelativ e deprivation);o r 1.4 earns lesstha n the non-member. Themembe r will,i ncompariso n withth e non-member 2 be more aware of his situation (believe less in the possibility of social climbing) because for instance 2.1 hei sbette r educated; 2.2 has had morecontac t with urban culture; 2.3 has moreofte n worked elsewhere. Regarding the attractionof interaction motive, I postulated that in the first place relationsbase do nfriendshi p andfamil ytie swoul dcoincid ewit hmembershi pan dno tcu t across it.Th e hypotheses in questionwere : 3 thatth emembe rwil lhav emor efriend s andrelative samon gth eothe rmember so fth e syndicatetha n amongth enon-members .Th erevers e istru e ofth enon-members . It might alsob eexpecte d that 4 the frequency of interaction would be higher among members than among non- members(operationalize d as:mor eofte n participatingi nlarg ewor kgroups) . Turning topsycholog y (Schachter, 1961)I added thehypothesi s that 68 5 themembe r would experiencegreate r anxiety(operationalize d as:woul dmor e often beth eeldes tson) . Schachterha dindee dfoun dtha tpeopl esufferin g from anxietynee dt osee kth ecompan y of others in the same circumstances. He also found that the same kind of situation aroused greater anxiety amongfirst-born an dthu s a greater affiliation. Regarding the solidarity normwhic h had ledth emember s to affiliate I drewu pth e following hypotheses.Thes erefe r toth e circumstances under which sucha nor mmigh t beexpecte dt o exercisemor einfluence . In comparison withth enon-membe r I expected that themembe r 6 would beo f a morereligiou s disposition; 7 wouldmor eofte n havea naffectiv e primaryrelationshi poutsid ehi sfamil y orki n group andwoul d thus 7.1 moreofte n havea goo dfrien d outsideth efamil y circle; 7.1 moreofte n havebee non eo fa grou po ffriend s inhi syouth 1; 8 placeles s value uponrelationship s withrelative s and memberso fth eimmediat e family; 9 bemor ekee no nco-operatio n ormor elikel yt oconside r co-operation necessary; 10 bemor esensitiv et oth eopinio n ofhi speer s(McClelland , 1961,p . 186 ff.); 11 identify more with the other workers on the fundo and with the campesinos (peasants)i ngeneral ; 12 giveles sevidenc eo fth econceptio ncalle db yFoste r( 1965 )th eImag eo fLimite d Good,th eide atha t oneperso n progresses atth e expenseo f another. 6.2.2 Results Thedat aprovide d bysurvey samon gmember san dnon-member so fsyndicate so nth e ninefundo s mentionedi nChapte r2 confir m manyo fou rhypotheses .I twould ,however , beexcessiv et o reproduce all thefrequenc y classifications heresinc ethi swoul drequir e over twenty tables2.I n presenting the results of the comparison between members and non-members I shall retainth e sequenceo fhypothese s employed above.Regardin g the motivesunderlyin gaffiliation , theanthropologica lsurve yha d already showntha ta larg e majority of members had been led tojoi n the organization because ofit s instrumental value.Th eope nsurve yquestio nconcernin gthei rmotiv ei naffiliatin g wascodifie d accor dingt oth emos timportan t component ofth ereply ,a sfollows : % N Improvemento flivin gstandar dthroug hth eorganizatio n 27 38 Morecertaint yregardin gpossibilit yo fpermanen temploymen t 11 16 Puttinga nen dt oabus ean darbitrar ypower so femployer ,formin ga countervailingpowe r 25 /36 Underpressur eo fworkmate s 18 26 Atth einvitatio no ffriend s 15 22 Otherreason s 3 5 Total 100 143 69 We seetha t 38% ofth e repliesrefe r to the usefulness ofth eorganizatio n toth eindividua l respondent; a further 25% refer to this usefulness but in terms which evoke the class character of the organization. Ofth e respondents 33% gav e a reply which indicated that the friendly or less friendly social control of others had been of significance. Everything would seem to indicate that all three of our expected motives played a role. We assumed that the utility motive resulted from a weakening of the traditional patronage relationship between owner and worker and from the worker's greater awareness of his true position. Hypothesis 1: th e member has lesso f apatronag e relationship withth eowner .W edi d indeed find that the member scored lower on the patronage index than the non-member, which confirmed thehypothesis .I nconcret eterms ,thi simplie dtha tth enon-membe r was more often ofth e opinion that theowne ro fth efund o helped hisworker s (instead ofdoin g nothing for them or being prejudicial to them). Also, when asked whom he would ap proach in order to borrow 100 escudos he was more likely to mention the owner. Table 10show s the difference in patronage orientation. To what must it be ascribed? As expected the non-members had a somewhatlarge r number of financial dependents than didth e members.Ther e was,however , no agedifferenc e betweenth etw ocategories . Furthermore, it appeared that the non-members had been living on the fundo somewhat longer than the members, although the association was very weak. However, the non- members had started to work earlier on the fundo, in comparison with the members. There seemed to ben o connection, though, between membership and sizeo fsalary . Nor was itclea r whether themember s weremor e dissatisfied withth e sizeo fthei r salary than the non-members. We found that 58% of the members as against 46% of the non- members considered ajus t wage to be a sum at least 50%highe r than theexistin gwage . Sub-hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 were thus partly confirmed, while 1.3 and 1.4 were not. Table 10. Membership of syndicates and patronage (%) Patronageinde x N 1 (low) 2 3 4(high ) Members 7 23 43 27 143 Non-members 1 7 39 52 67 Total 5 18 42 35 210 *2(3d.f.) = n.651 1 Therespondent s did not constitute arando m sample,a swa sexplaine di nChapte r 2.Ther ei s accordingly no question of applying statistical tests to determine whether a difference in the samplema yb epu tdow nt oa differenc e inherenti nth epopulation .Nonetheless ,eve nwhe nin terviewing a population, some of the differences found may bedu et o errors inmeasurin g or punching andno tt o actualdifference s intha t population.A criterio ni stherefor e necessaryi n ordert odetermin etha t aparticula r difference isto olarg et ob eattribute dt oerror si nmeasure mento r anyothe rcause .I use da sm ycriterio nth e5 % significanc e levelo fthe/-square . After all,the/-squar e isals o an association standard of measurement. 70 Hypothesis 2 assumed among members a greaterawarenes s of andinsigh t intothei r 'ow nsituation ,an dI di dindee dfind a numbe ro findication sfo rthis .Aske dfo rhi svie wo n how Chileanlan drefor mough tt ob ecarrie dout ,th emembe rwa smor eincline dtha nth e non-membert omentio nstructura lchange s(3 1% a sagains t22%) .H eals otende dt orep ly more frequently thatcommuna lform s ofproductio nwoul dhav et ofollo w expropria tion (15% v. 6%). The answers to both open questions revealed furthermore that the memberthough tmor eofte n interm so fcollaboratio n betweenpeasant stha ndi dth enon - members(3 6% v . 18%) .Mor eofte nto oth emembe rviewe dth efunctio no fth esyndicat e interm so f strivingt opromot e landrefor m(1 7% v. 9%) .Othe rdat amigh tals oserv et o showtha tth emember sha dmor einsigh tint oth enecessit y forrefor m andco-operation . A question regarding their preference for a piece of land of their own, participation in communal farming or good wages provided the surprising result shown in Table 11. The members would prefer a piece of lando f theirow n whileth enon-member s arewel l satisfied with a good wage. In the first instance neither category seems very enthusiastic about the communal farm, the asentamiento, which arose out of the Chilean land reform. Matters were different with regard to the second choice, mentioned in Table 12; the asentamiento proved area l alternative for the members,wherea sth enon-member sstil l seemedprett y lukewarm. Although the percentage of members displaying insight remained low in all the variablesmentioned ,i twa salway shighe rtha ntha to fth enon-members .However ,whe n Table 11. Preferenceso fmember san dnon-member so fsyndicate s(firs tchoice ) Participationi n Ownpiec eo flan d asentamiento Goodwag e % N % N % N Members 67 96 8 11 25 36 Non-members 44 30 1 1 54 36 Total 60 126 6 12 34 72 *2(2d.f.)=17.72 Table 12. Preferenceso fmember san dnon-member so fsyndicate s(secon dchoice ) Participationi n Own pieceo flan d asentamiento Good wage % N % N % N Members 25 36 25 36 48 69 non-members 48 32 12 8 39 26 Total 32 68 21 44 45 95 *2(2d.f.)=10.4 '• 71 asked ifthe ythough ti tpossibl etha t 'apeasan tlik ethemselves 'coul dprogres si nlife ,th e categories did not differ at all: 72% of the members and 70% of the non-members thoughttha t hecould .Nonetheles sI conside r Hypothesis 2t o alarg eexten t confirmed. Weassume dtha tth egreate rinsigh to nth epar to fth emember swoul dg ohan di nhan d with a higher degree of education. The data did indeed indicate that themember swer e somewhatbette reducated .O fth emembers ,57 %(a sagains t42 %o fth enon-members ) had gone higher than the 3rd class in the primary school.Th e association, however,i s weak. I considered that another possibility for acquiring more insight into one's own situation might lie in having worked elsewhere, on another fundo. Table 13show sth e results.I t isstrikin g that both categories workedjus t asfrequentl y on another fundo in the same community, i.e. close to the pèsent fundo, but that the members had worked muchmor eofte n outsidethei r present community.Give nth efac t thatth enon-member s were more often involved in a patronage-relationship with the owner, and had worked less often on another farm, it is not surprising that more non-members than members consideredth efar m onwhic hthe ywer eemploye dt ob ebette rt owor ko ntha n anyothe r farm (58% v.40%) . Thisshowe dthat ,a sw eha dassumed ,affiliatio n islargel yconnecte dwit ha weakenin g ofth epatronag e relationship and,t o alesse r degree,wit ha bette rinsigh tint oone' sow n situation. The second affiliation motive,th e attraction ofinteractio n withothe r workerso nth e farm,prove dearlie rt ohav eplaye da rea lrole .Le tu sno wvie wth epositio nwit hregar dt o the hypotheses derived from thismotive . Hypothesis3 postulated that friendships and family ties would not conflict with membership. The replies show a very clear link between membership of a syndicate and friendly relationships.Th emembe rha sfriend s whoar eals omember swhil eth efriend s ofth enon - members areno t themselves members either. Exactly the samei stru eo fth ekinshi prelationship s between members,non-member s andother sworkin go nth esam efundo .Th erelative so fth emembe r areusuall ymember s themselves;thos e of the non-members are frequently not affiliated. However, members and non-members haveth e sameproportio n ofrelative s living on thesam e fundo. Table 13. Frequency ofwor kelsewher e (%) Workedo n mother fundo outside within Didn'twor k present present onothe r community community fundo N Members 21 31 48 143 Non-members 5 30 65 66 Total 16 31 53 209 ^2(2d.f.)=10.38 72 Table 14. Membershipan dfriendship 1 Friends both onea neither members(% ) member(% ) member(% ) N Members 67 23 9 141 Non-members 15 27 58 59 Total 52 25 23 200 ;r2(2d.f.)=63.44 1 Earlieri nth eintervie wth eresponden twa s askedfo rth ename so fhi stw o bestfriend s amongth eothe rworker so nth efundo .Th etabl erefer st oth e membershipo fthes etw o persons. Table 15. Membershipan d kinship Relativesar e all some none members(% ) members(% ) members(% ) N Members 45 42 13 100 Non-members 10 51 39 51 Total 33 45 22 151 ;r2(2d.f.)=23.86 Tables 14 and 15 indicateho wpronounce dthes edifference s are.Thi sserve st oprov e hypothesis3 . Weassume dtha tth emember swoul ddispla ya mor efrequen tinteractio ntha nth enon - members.Th eonl y availableindicato r inthi sconnectio n isth esiz eo fth eperson' snor mal workgroup and this did indeed appear somewhat larger among the members. Hypothesis 4seem s acceptable,ye tw ecanno t consider itprove d bythi son eindicator . The hypothesis derived from Schachter, according to which affiliation might result from a greater anxiety, was not confirmed, atleas t not sofa r asregard sth eindicato r I employed. Both members and non-members seemedjus t as frequently tob eth eeldes t sonso fthei r parents(24 %a sagains t28%) . The third motive we assumed was obedience to a norm of solidarity, responding to social pressure from the other workers on the fundo. From the replies toth e question regarding the motive underlying affiliation one might conclude that solidarity under pressureo f social control hadindee d played a rolefo r some.However ,th emembe rdi d not seemt ob eo fa mor ereligiou sdisposition ,a sassume db yHypothesis 6. Whe naske d whicho ftw oopinion sbes trepresente d theirow n standpoint, 76%o fth emember san d 80% o fth enon-member sidentifie dwit hth epeasan ti nwhos elif ereligio nassume da nim - 73 portant role. Asw ehav e already mentioned,Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.2 werederive d from the study madeb yBonill aan dSilv aMichelen a inVenezuela .The yfoun dthat ,i ncompariso nwit h non-members,rura l syndicatemember swer emor elikel yt ohav e anintimat efrien d out sideth eextende d family circlean dt ohav ebee non eo fa grou po ffriend s inthei r youth. On the basis of these differences they assumed that the member had already had more socializingexperience swhic hwoul dprepar ehi mfo r solidaryinteractio nwit hnon-relate d peers.Bot hthes ehypothese swer econfirme ddurin gou rresearc hi nChile .W efoun dtha t 53% o fth emember sa sagains t30 %o fth enon-member sha da nintimat efrien dwh owa s not a relative and 58%o fth e members,compare d with 39%o fth enon-members ,ha d formed oneo f agrou p ofintimat efriend s during hislifetime . The data indicate that when asked to classify a number of groups according toho w closethe y felt to them,th e members valued their relatives on average somewhatlowe r thanth enon-members .Th e averages were 3.38 compared with 3.08 on ascal erunnin g from 1 upt o and including 7.However ,th edifferenc e isno tlarg eenoug hfo r ust ocon siderth e hypothesis in question confirmed. The members appeared more ready than non-members to work their regalias - the small pieceso f land made available to them as part ofthei r wages- as onepiece ,i n a communaleffor t(6 4% agains t4 5%) .Othe rindication stha tmember swer emor eincline d than non-members to consider co-operation necessary, or to think in terms of co operation, have already been mentioned in connection with hypothesis 2.Hypothesis 9, postulating that memberswer emor eread y to collaborate, seems confirmed. Sensitivityt oth eopinio no fpeers ,a facto r regardedb yMcClellan d( 1961 )a sextreme lyimportan tfo rth edevelopmen to fsolidarity ,wa smeasure db ymean so ftw oconflictin g statements on how the speaker would react to criticism voiced at a meeting. The respondents were asked which statement best reflected their opinion.Th emember sdi d indeed stateles softe n thanth enon-member s(3 0% a sagains t4 8% )tha tthe ywoul dno t acceptthi scriticism ,thu sshowin gthemselves ,a sw eexpected ,t ob emor esensitiv et oth e opinion ofthei rpeers . Identification with the workers on the fundo and with the peasants in general was measured with the aid of a question to whichw ehav e already referred, i.e.arrangin g a numbero fgroup si nth eorde ri nwhic hthe yappeale dt oth erespondent .Althoug hi nbot h casesth emember shav ea somewha tlowe r averagescor e(3.6 7compare dwit h3.8 0an d 3.94 as against 4.46) and therefore identify a trifle morewit h thetw o categories men tioned, the differences are not such that we may regard the hypothesis as clearly confirmed. We expected the members to be less inclined to view the world as a struggle of all againstal li nwhic hon ecoul dprogres sonl ya tth eexpens eo fsomeon eelse .Foste r(1965 ) andothe ranthropologist s after him,though ttha tthi svie wo fth eworl dwa stypica lo fun derdeveloped peasantcommunities .I nsom ecase sthi sImag eo fth eLimite d Goodi sn o more than a hard-headed view of what really happens, as wewer e able to observei n Chapter 3whe n discussing the functions of patronage. As a general attitude,however , thisImag e exercisesa nunfavourabl e influence upon solidarity withinth epeasan tcom munity. The respondents were asked which of two conflicting opinions most ap proximated tothei r own.On e opinionhel dtha t onepeasan tcoul dusuall y onlyprogres s atth eexpens eo fth eothers ,th eothe r assertion contradictedthis .W efoun dtha t 18% o f 74 the members and 34% of the non-members considered that the progress of one was usually atdi e expense ofth eothers .Th e hypothesistha tth enon-member s adheremor e often to the Image of Limited Good appears confirmed. 6.2J Themember: an ideal-typical portrait From the hypotheses confirmed in the foregoing section a certain picture of the member emerges. Clearly, in comparison with die non-member, he is more detached from the patronage link withth e owner andadopt s a morecritica l attitudetoward s the latter. This is partly because he can permithimsel f to bemor e critical, being somewhat lessdependent .Ther eappear ,fo rinstance ,t ob emor einquilino samon gth efirst member s than among the later ones (62%, 52% and 31%o f those who became members in or before 1967, in 1968 andi n or after 1969 respectively, wereinquilinos) . Itwoul d seem that, as we assumed in Chapter 3, those peasants with a somewhat greater degree of economic security were the first to affiliate. Admittedly they were not secure against reprisalsbu ta tth esam etim eth eowne rcoul dno tabruptl yrefus ethe mwor ka sh ecoul d with the voluntarios. The member can be more critical too, because he has more often worked elsewhere and thus has material for comparison. He has more insight into his ownsituatio nan dappreciate s betterth enecessit yfo r agriculturalworker st oco-operate . The differences between him and the non-member are not great; for the member too relationships with family and friends remain important, so important indeed that they seldom conflict with membership. This indicates that affiliation is not so much an in dividual'as a collective decision taken withinfamily andfriendly groups. Moreofte n thanth enon-member ,th emembe rha spasse dthroug ha certai nsocializa tion process with groups of friends. This leaves him more open to ties of intimate friendship withpeopl e othertha nrelative san d alsomake s himmor esensitiv et oth eopi niono fothers .However ,thi sdoe sno tmea ntha tmember shav ea grea tdea lo f confidence inthei rfello wmen .Th elas tpiec eo fadvic egive nb y80 %o fth emember san d8 5% o fth e non-members to a migrating son would be not to put too much trust in other people. However,i tma y well betha tmember sd oplac emor erelianc eo nthei rfello w menwithi n the fundo. The utility motive is of primary importance. The members joined because they expected advantages from the syndicate,eve ni fthei rdecisio nwa stake nonl y after con sultation with family and friends. It appeared, accordingly, that in February 1970 the non-memberswer eno ts osur eo fth esyndicate' ssucces sa swer eth emembers .Althoug h 42% (as against 93% of the members) thought that the syndicate had achieved con siderablesuccess ,th emajorit y wasno ts oconvinced . Itma y be,though ,tha tthi sca nb e attributed in part to the policy of the owners who were often said to favour the non- members, giving them lighter work and treating them better. This meant thatth elatte r profited from the presence of a syndicate by not becoming members. The survey was carried out on nine different fundos inthre ecomunas . The numbers areto o smallt odetermin ewhethe rthos ehypothese swhic hwer econfirme dhel dgoo dfo r allth efundos . Idid ,however ,examin ewhethe rthi swa stru eo f eachcomuna . Theredi d appeart ob edifferences ,i nth esens etha ti na particula rcomun ath eassociation sgeneral lyfoun d appeared sowea k that,relyin go n mychi-squar ecriterion ,I foun di timpossibl e .75 to arrive at any conclusion. The variables associated with affiliation in allthre e comunas are:th e indicators concerning the intensity of thepatronag e relationship with the owner, the smaller number of people financially dependent on the respondent, among the members; the more favourable view of the syndicate's success among the members and the fact that affiliation and relationships with family or friends do not conflict. This con firms the most important features of the portrait sketched above. The member is more convinced of the utility of the syndicate and has detached himself more from the patron than has the non-member, for he is less dependent upon him. The decision to join is evidently a collective one and istake n in consultation with family and friends. 6.2.4 The non-members Although I have thus far depicted them as one category, thenon-member s really con sist of two categories, the ex-members and the never-members. Particularly in the fundo San Manuel weencountere d workers who had once been affiliated. Here alarg e number of workers had left the syndicate during alabou r conflict because they felt they had been deceived by theirleaders . Ex-members however were also encountered on other fundos.3 How did these ex-members differ from thosewh oha dneve rbee n members? The quan titative data show that the ex-members have worked longer on the fundo and are older than thenever-members .The y are also,mor efrequently , head ofa family. It is not clear whether their resignation was the result or the cause of the peculiar nature ofthei r family relationships.Th e ex-members place asignificantl y higher valueo n their family and relatives than do either the members or never-members. They are less prepared than thenever-member s towor kthei rregalia si ncommon , aremor eattache d to their own property and are quicker to seeth edifficultie s arising from co-operation. They are, however, less influenced than the never-members by the Image ofth e Limited Good (23% agains t 47%) . From allthi s a picture emerges of someone afraid ofbein g put upon by non-relatives and who has probably felt taken in before. He is more alive to theprac tical problems posed by co-operation. The ex-member states more often than the never- member (20% as against 3% ) that he hasn't a single friend on the fundo and he is less likely than the never-member to have friends within the syndicate. This despite the fact that he has compadres more frequently than does the never-member. Thisisolatio n may result inpar t from hisresignatio n from the syndicate; he may now belooke d at askance by his former friends. However, it seems also to be partly due to a lack of experience of beingo n friendly termswit h social peersoutsid eth ecircl eo frelatives .O nthi spoin tther e is no difference between ex-members and never-members. This same lack may have played a part in his resignation, which was often preceded by aconflict . It may alsoli ea t the root of his reluctance to relinquish some of his independence for the sake of co operating withothers .Th ereason sgive nfo rresigning ,categorize d onth ebasi so freplie st o an open question,wer e as follows: % N Conflictswit hth eboar do rmember so fth esyndicat e 31 11 Desiret oimprov erelation swit hth eowne r 18 6 Thesyndicat ewa sn olonge rusefu l tohi m 20 7 Hedidn' tagre ewit hth eobjective s 15 5 Otherreason s 20 7 76 This shows that the reasons lie partly in the domain of personal relationships withth e other members of the organization, withth e consequent necessity for accepting acom promise, and partly in a greaterdependenc e on the owner,whos e favour is felt to sway one's own fortunes. Although this may have been due to spite, it is nonetheless remarkabletha tth e ex-memberstoo k ales spositiv evie wo fth esyndicate' ssucces stha n didth enever-members . During the anthropological parto fth eresearc h Ihear do f cases ofsyndicat eleader swh owere ,s ot ospeak ,bough tou tb yth eowne ro fth efar mo nwhic h theyworked ,wit hpromotio no ra large rregalia .N o suchcas eoccurre di nou rinquir ybu t it is probabletha tou r ex-members too, or some ofthe m atleast ,wil lhav e had a nudge from the owner. 6.2.5 Multiple correlation Inorde rt otes tth eadequac yo fth evariable sinclude di nm yhypothese san dthu si nth e survey,w ehav ecalculate dho wmuc ho fth evarianc ei nmembershi pca nb eexplaine db y a number of these variables taken together. Thecomputatio nidentifie d eightimportan tvariable swhic htogethe rexplaine d60 %o f thevarianc e in affiliation. A somewhatsurprisin grevelatio ni sth econsiderabl e influence seemingly exercised by relationship withfriends . Thiscome s abouti ntw o ways. Onth e one hand people ensure that affiliation does not cut across ties of friendship, which can only be done by mutual consultation before joining4. On the other the members have evidentlyundergon e asocializin gproces si nth emaintenanc eo frelationship swit hpeopl e outside the family. They have intimate friends, they are more sensitive to criticism and they areless inclined to believe that one person progresses atth e expense ofth e others.' Inadditio nthe y believei nth e advantages generated byth esyndicate ,ar emor eawar e ofth enecessit y for collectiveform s ofproductio n after expropriation andthin kles swel l of the owner. They have a wider vision, perhaps also because they have worked elsewhere. Table 16. Cumulative squaredmultipl ecorrelatio ncoefficien t R2wit hmembershi po fth e syndicate.N = 195 1 Partial Fraction correlation Variable R2 T-value explained coefficient Affiliationo ffriend s 0.32 9.14 0.18 0.56 Viewo fth esucces so fth esyndicat e 0.45 5.65 0.07 0.38 Viewo nlan drefor m 0.50 4.02 0.035 0.28 Hasintimat efriend ,no trelate d 0.52 3.44 0.025 0.24 Patronage(opinio no fowner ) 0.54 3.09 0.02 -0.22 Sensitivityt oth eopinio no fpeer s 0.56 2.82 0.02 0.21 Imageo fLimite dGoo d 0.58 2.82 0.02 -0.20 Havingworke delsewher e 0.60 2.67 0.01 0.19 77 6.3 TheCo-operative s 6.3.1 Introduction Fromth ever youtse to fth eFre igovernmen ti nChile ,INDA Pals oturne dit sattentio n toth edevelopmen to fth esmall ,independen tpeasant-farmer s whoha dn odirec tloca lop ponent to react against but whower enonetheles s poor. Ifth eofficia l ideology regarded the agricultural workers asfutur e participants in acommuna l farming enterpriseru nb y themselves,th e Leitbild for thepeasant-farmer s was also oneo f co-operation. Tobegi n with INDAP encouraged themt o becomemember s of aloca l committee whichwa s in tendedt ohav esom econtro love rth eloca ldistributio n ofth ecredi textende db yINDAP . Inpractic ethi samounte dt oINDA Prefusin g creditt onon-members ,wit hth ecommitte e perhaps exercising acertai n socialcontrol .The ycoul dadvis eINDA Pt orefus e creditt o peasants who had a bad name locally and they could warn defaulters to pay off their loans. After afe wyear si tbecam eobviou stha tthes ecommittee swer eto osmal lt orais ean y sort of sizeable capital. INDAP then decided to incorporate the local committees in municipal - and in some cases regional- co-operatives.Th ecommitte e memberswer e encouraged tojoi nthes eco-operative san dman ydi dso ,althoug hmembershi pinvolve da slightfinancial sacrifice . The motives behind affiliation, and thefactor s which, inthei r turn, might influence these motives, differed somewhat from those which led peoplet o join a syndicate.Th emos timportan t difference wastha tth esmal lpeasant-farmer s were notoblige dt obrea kof fo ra tleas tton edow na patronag erelationshi pbefor ebein gabl et o join.Fo rth erest ,however ,I assume dtha tmember so fco-operative sha dsimila rreason s for joining as did the members ofsyndicates .Th e utility motivei nparticula r played an important role, as our reconnaissance showed. Here and there,though , I came across peasants,particularl y board memberso fco-operatives ,wh oappeare dt ob eawar eo fth e need for solidarity. They realized that, generally speaking, small peasant-farmers, workinga sindividuals ,ha dn ochanc eo fraisin gthei rstandar do fliving .The ysa wtha ti t wasessentia lt oco-operat ean dsom eo fthe mha dreache dth econclusio ntha ti twa su pt o them to bring about this co-operation. 6.3.2 Hypotheses Itseeme dt om etha tther ecoul db etw oreason sfo rappreciatin gth epossibl eutility o fa co-operative,mor einsigh tan dunderstandin g or agreate robjectiv enee dfo rth eservice s whichth e co-operative couldprovide .I therefor e assumedthat ,wit hregar d toth eques tion of insight,th emembers ,i ncompariso n with non-members,woul dhave : 1.1 had more education; 1.2 come to know other behavioural alternatives (through more contact with urban culture); 1.3 moreofte n workedelsewhere ; 1.4 more modern farming methods (bemor e likelyt okee paccounts) ; 1.5 greater confidence infutur e possibilities for thesmal l peasant-farmer. Insofar asinsigh ti sbase dupo nobjectiv eneeds ,i tma yb eexpecte dtha tth emember s 2.1 had larger farms than thenon-members ; 78 2.2 were morelikel y to ownthei rland . Finally,i tcoul d betha tth emember s weremor ekeenl y awareo fth epossibl eutilit yo f theco-operativ e becausethe y felt poorertha nothe r peasants. In comparison withnon - members 3 members would feel relatively moredeprived . Inth ecas eo fth eco-operative stoo ,whic hhad ,afte rall ,grow nou to floca lcommittee s andwhic h still had the local communities asthei r basic unito frecruitment ,i twa squit e possibletha ta perso nmigh tbecom ea membe rno ts omuc hbecaus eh ewa skeenl yawar e of the advantages, but because his friends or relatives had joined. Regarding the attraction ofinteraction motive, I postulate dth efollowin g hypotheses: 4.1 Members will have friends who are also members, non-members friends who are not. 4.2 Memberswil lhav erelative swh oar ethemselve smember so fth eco-operative ;non - members relatives whoar eno t members either. 4.3 Members will interact morefrequentl y withothe rpeasant si nth ecommunit y than will non-members. 4.4 Members willidentif y more withth e community (will moreofte n say thatther ei s more friendship theretha n inothe r communities). Thesolidarity normmigh t alsopla y arole ,arisin gfro m afeelin g oftraditiona l attach mentt oth eothe rpeasant si nth ecommunity . Insuc ha cas eth emember smight ,i ncom parison with non-members 5.1 be more religious; 5.2 more often be(hav e been)on e of agrou p of friends; 5.3 more often havea good friend outside the family circle; 5.4 value relationships with immediate family and relatives less, those with the com munity relatively more; 5.5 bemor elikel y toappl yth etraditiona l form of co-operation,o f mutualhel p(vuelt a de mano) on theland . This solidarity, asth e preliminaryinvestigatio n showed,migh tals ob ebase dupo nth e realization that co-operation is essential if the standard of living of the small peasant- farmer is to be improved. Itmigh tthe nb e expected 6.1 that the members would have more insight into the necessity for small peasant- farmers to co-operate; 6.2 that members would be more inclined to favour co-operation (participation in a communal farm); 6.3 that members would bemor e sensitive to the opinion of social peers; 6.4 that members would be less inclined to regard social equals asrivals (woul d not' think that one peasant can only progress atth e expense ofothers) . 633 Results Thesurve yconfirme dtha tth eutilit ymotiv ewa sth emos timportant .T oa nope nques tion regarding their motives for membership which explicitly inquired about other motives,6 4% o fth emember sreplie di nterm swhic hindicate dtha tthe yha donl yjoine d theco-operativ efo rth eservice si toffered . A further 19% gav ea sthei rreaso nth ehop eo f receiving capital credit via the co-operative. Only 17% answered in such a way as to 79 suggest that they realized the necessity of co-operation for small peasant-farmers. The non-members shared theseview s: 8 5% of them thought that membersjoined , hoping to benefit from credit and other forms of support, while 40% gave as their own reason for notjoinin g the fact that they didn't see the use of it andjus t weren't interested. Another 16% said that they had no money to pay the dues; 20% were unaware that the co operativeexiste d or had beento olaz yt oenrol l andfinally, 1 7% wante d tose eho wthing s went but in principle felt little enthusiasm for a co-operative. From these replies one can only deduce that alongside the predominant utilitymotive , there were a number of members who realized the necessity for co-operation. The replies showed no evidence of the attraction of interaction. If werevie w the hypotheses concer ning the greater insight into reality possessed by members,i t appears that the members: are rather more likely than non-members to have had a secondary education (17.5% as against 10%) and to claim that they are good at reading (61% v. 48%). However, the differences areno t such that weca nconside r thehypothesi sprove d (thechi-squar e which we are once again using as association yardstick only becomes 'significant' within a margin of uncertainty ofroughl y 15%) . The hypothesis does,however , appear probable. The same holds good for contact with the city. In the three months before the survey members visited the city somewhat more frequently than non-members (59% of the members as against 50% of the non-members), but the difference isto o slightt o confirm the hypothesis. Rather more of the members had previously worked elsewhere (54% v. 45%) , but once again the difference is too small to serve as confirmation of our hypothesis. As regards the keeping of accounts, which I used as an indicator ofmodernit y unconnected with the degree of prosperity, there appeared to ben o difference at all between members and non-members. In keeping with Hypothesis 1.5 the members seem somewhat more optimistic concer ning the future prospects of the small peasant-farmer. In fact, 49% of the members as against 28% of the non-members think that it is still possiblefo r a smallholder to make progress. Hypothesis 1.5 is thus proved. Table 17 shows the differences. One might postulatetha tthos ewh othin k that asmal lpeasant-farme r canmak eprogres salon ewoul d in fact not become members of a co-operative, in other words that the hypothesis should have been reversed. This argument would be correct if it were true that affiliation in fact Table 17. Confidence inth efutur e prospectso f smallpeasan t farmers amongmember s and non-members ofco-operative s in% Asmal lpeasan tfarme rca nmak eprogres s alone undercertai n notunles s yes circumstances assisted no N Members 28 21 21 29 182 Non-members 15 13 19 52 92 Total 24 19 20 37 274 X1 (3d.f. )= 14.90 80 depended upon insight into the necessity for co-operation. The motives listed above, however,showe dtha tthi swa sno tso :peopl ear emuc hmor eincline dt obecom emember s for thesak eo fth eeconomi cadvantage sfo r eachindividua lpeasant .Th eco-operativ ei s regardeda sa mean so frealizin ga nindividua laim ,namel yth eprogres so fone' sow nfarm . Thesligh tdifference s ineducatio n andi ncontac twit hth eurba n culture(Hypothese s 1.1 and 1.2) might in their turn result from a difference in status.S otoo ,havin g more land,workin ga large rfarm ,i nshort ,experiencin ga nobjectivel ygreate rnee dfo rth eser vicesoffere d bya co-operativ emigh tlea dt oa bette rinsigh tint oit sadvantages .Th edat a show that members dispose of slightly more irrigated land (Table 18).Th e difference, however,i ss osligh ttha tthi sfacto r canhardl yb eassume dt ohav eplaye da nimportan t role in affiliation; only 53% ofth emembers ,a s against 55% ofth enon-member s had suchland .Wit hregar dt onon-irrigate d- buttillabl e- land,ther ei sn odifferenc ebetwee n members and non-members. Concerning the third category ofland ,cerro ,whic h Idis tinguished, i.e. strongly sloping unirrigated land, marginal for agriculture, there is no Table 18. Partition(% )o firrigate dlan damon gmember san dnon-member so f co-operatives1.1 cuadra= 1.56h a <1 >K2 >2<5 >5< 10 >10 cuadra cuadra cuadra cuadra cuadra N Members 13 18 43 19 8 102 Non-members 21 29 31 15 4 52 Total 17 21 39 17 6 154 *2(4d.f.)=5.98 1 Respondentswit hn oirrigate dlan d are notincluded . Table 19. Tenurestatu so fmember san dnon-member so fco-operative scom posedo fsmal lpeasant-farmer si n%' . Farmlandi s partly not owned owned owned N1 Members 40 12 48 171 Non-members 33 11 55 87 Total 38 12 50 258 2 ^ (2d.f.)=1.26 ; ] 1 Themember s and non-members whodi dno t cultivateland , forwhateve r reason(1 1 members and5 non-members)ar eno tinclude di nth etable . 81 differencei naverage ,althoug hther ei si ndistribution .Member smor efrequentl y haveles s ormor ecerr otha nnon-members .Al li nall ,th edat ad ono tconfir mth ehypothesis .A tbes t theysho wtha ti ti sno tabsur dan dtha ti nothe rcase sthi sfacto rma yindee dpla ya nimpor tant role, as postulated in Chapter 5wit h the ideal typical description of co-operatives. Table 19show stha t members andnon-member s seemscarcel y todiffe r intenur estatus . Whatsligh tdifferenc e therei stend si nth epredicte ddirection . Itseem st om etha t affiliation cannotb eexplaine db ya differenc e intenur estatu s- and thus anobjectiv e need for aco-operative . I askedth erespondent swha tseeme dt othe ma fai r andjus tincom efo rth ewor kthe y did and how much more they would have to earn in order to attain that income. It appearedthat ,althoug hth emember sregar d asomewha thighe rincom ea sa jus treward , thenon-member s earnles stha nth emember san dwoul dthemselve shav et oear nmor ei n ordert o attainthi sjus tincome . Thenon-member sfee lmor erelativ edeprivatio ntha nth e members (expressed as a percentual risei nth e incomenecessar y to achievea nincom e thoughto fa sjust) .Tabl e2 0show sthis .Accordingly ,Hypothesi s3 appearsincorrect :i t isth enon-member s whofee l moredeprived . Thehypothese s dealt with sofa r showtha t thedifferenc e betweenmember s andnon - members regarding insight intoth e advantages of aco-operativ e isno t somuc h oneo f status(educatio no rsiz eo ffarm )bu trathe ro fmentality .Member stak ea mor eoptimisti c viewo fth efutur e prospects of smallpeasant-farmers ; theyfee l somewhatles sdeprive d thannon-member san dals oappea rt ob ea littl efurthe r alongth eroa dtoward sbecomin g employersi na smal lway .No tonl yd othe year nrathe rmore ,the yals owan tt oear nmor e than do the non-members. This mentality seems also to emerge in a couple of further differences. It appears, for instance, that within the past three years the members had borrowed more from sources other than INDAP than had the non-members (10% as against 2%) whereas they are the ones best able to profit from INDAP funds. The members thus were more likely to apply for loans anyway. It also appears that many moremember stha n non-membersha d alreadyjoine dth ecommittee s setu pb yINDA P Table20 . Membershipo fco-operative san drelativ edeprivatio n withregar dt oincom e(% ) Wisht o earnmor ecompare dwit hpresen t income: moretha n N 0-50% 50-100% 100% Members 27 31 42 176 Non-members 19 24 57 90 Total 24 29 47 266 ^(2d.f.)=5.23 82 beforeth ecomin go fth eco-operative s(5 8% v .22%) .Membershi po fthes edemande dn o financial sacrifice atall ,on eha dmerel yt oapply .T osom eexten tth emember sdisplaye d thecharacteristic scommonl y encountered amongth emor ewell-to-d opeasant salthoug h they hardly differed in statusfro m the non-members. Also, although theobjectiv e results of two of the three co-operatives involved inth e surveywer ehardl yphenomenal ,th emember swer emor eincline dtha nth e non-members to believe thatthei rco-operativ eha dalread y achieved a considerable degreeo f success (77 % asagains t 55 %) .Here ,however ,I shoul dlik et orefe ronc eagai nt oà phenomeno n which will later prove important whenw e are discussing solidarity. This is namely that the optimism which influences peasant affiliation is ultimately focused upon a specific goal,th eprogres san dimprovemen to fone' sown ,privately-owne dfarm .I n 1970a tleast , becoming a member of a co-operative did not imply accepting, or holding egalitarian values, or class solidarity. However,befor e dealingwit hthi squestio nw emus tfirst conside rho wfa rmembershi p islinke dwit hth emor etraditiona lfor mo fsolidarit ywhic hw ehav eterme dth eattractio n of the interaction with other peasants from the same community. As indicators for any suchlin k wehav etake nth eoverlappin g betweenrelationship swit hfamil yan dfriend so n theon ehand' ,an dmembershi po nth eother .Table s2 1an d2 2clearl ysho wtha tth edat a confirm the hypotheses. The friends and blood relatives of members tend to be members themselves, while thoseo fnon-member s frequently arenot .N o obstaclei splace di nth ewa y of afrien do r Table21 . Friendshipan dmembershi po fco-operative si n % Friends arebot h onei s neitheri s members amembe r amembe r N Members 44 34 22 165 Non-members 16 39 44 79 Total 35 36 30 244 *2(2d.f.)=20.42 Table22 . Familyrelationshi pan dmembershi po fco-operative si n % Relativesar e all some none members members members N Members 27 50 23 120 Non-members 3 43 54 67 Total 18 48 34 187 *2(2d.f.)= 25.28 83 relativebecomin g a member,bu t it does seemtha t membership isdiscusse d beforehand within the circle of family or friends. A certain consensus isthu s frequently arrived at concerning thedesirabilit y of affiliation. There is no difference at all between members and non-members inth efrequenc y of their affective relationships with friends or with ritual co-parents (84.5% as against 83.6% suppliedth ename so ftw ofriends ; 69% a sagains t69. 5% sai dtha tthe yha dcom - padres inth ecommunity) . When we examine the frequency of interaction as well, scarcely any difference emerges: 64% o fth emembers ,a sagains t 57 % ofth enon-member stal kt oa nestimate d four or more other peasants from the community during a normal working day. Hypothesis4. 3remain sunproven .I tcanno t besai dtha tnon-member s aremor eisolate d within the community insofar asth efrequency ofthei rinteractio n isconcerned .I tmay , however, betru e of their identification withth ecommunity .Th emember s aremor ein clined to think that their community differs from others inbein g morefriendl y (51% v. 34%).O fth emember s 11% an d 25% o fnon-member sthin ktha tther ei sles sfriendshi p than in other communities. Another pointer in the same direction may betha t thenon - members state morefrequentl y (20% as against 10%o fmembers )tha t they would not know whom to approach for a loan of 300 escudos. This would appear to confirm Hypothesis 4.4 concerning the degree of identification with the local community. The feeling ofhavin gtie swit hfamily ,friend s andi nsom ecase scertai nothe rmember so fth e community,playe da rol ei naffiliation .Th equestio nis ,whethe rthes etie sar eals oaccom panied by feelings of solidarity or by socialising experiences of a more universalistic nature. In any case any eventual difference in identification with non-related socialequal si s notth eresul to fa greate r degreeo freligiou sfeelin g amongth emembers . Inthi sconnec tion Ipu t aprojectiv e question toth erespondent sconcernin g'th emajorit y ofth epeopl e inth e community'. Ifther e isan y difference themember s areles sincline dtha nth enon - members(6 5% compare dwit h7 5% )t othin ktha treligio ni sa nimportan tpar t oflif efo r thismajority . Therewa sn oevidenc eeithe rtha tco-operativ emember sha dforme d oneo f an intimate group offriend s moreofte n than non-members (59% against 54%)no r are they much more likely to have an intimate friend outside the family (46% as against 40%). Whenaske dt oarrang ea numbe ro fgroup san dcategorie saccordin gt oth estrengt ho f the tie they felt with them, both members and non-members classified the four groups mentioned - family, other relatives, the community and the 'peasants'- in about the sameorder .Althoug hth esligh tdifference s whichd oexis tpoin ti nth eanticipate ddirec tion,th e hypothesis remains unproven. Themember sd oappea rt orende rth etraditiona lmutua lai d(vuelt ad emano )t oothe r peasantsmor efrequentl y (41% asagains t3 5 % d oi tever yyear) ,bu tth edifferenc e isno t largeenoug hfo rthi shypothesi st ob eregarde da sproved 5. What emergesno wfro m thissecon d serieso fhypotheses ?W ehav esee ntha tth epro s andcon so faffiliatio n arediscusse di nth ecircl eo fprimar yrelations .A certai nconsensu s is arrived at and asi twer ea commo ndecisio ntake n onwhethe r tojoi n or not. Further more,i tseem stha tmember sidentif y slightlymor ewit hth ecommunity .I tcanno tb esai d with certainty of co-operative members, as it could of members of the syndicates,tha t 84 theywer emor esocialize d inthei rintercours e withnon-relate d socialpeers . Solidarityma yb ebase dbot ho nidentificatio n witha communit yt owhic hon ebelong s andupo nidentificatio n witha categor yo fpeopl ewit hwho mon eha scertai ninterest si n common:th esmal lpeassant-farmer s whofind themselve si nth esam esituation .I nsuc ha case the members of a co-operative may be expected to show more insight than non- membersint oth enecessit y ofco-operatio n for small peasant-farmers. In actual fact, when asked to suggest solutions for Chile's agrarian problems, the members tended much more than the non-members to propose co-operation among small peasants and forming communal enterprises (50% as against 26%). Another remarkable fact isthat , in theothe r categories of repliest o thisope n question,i t isth e non-memberswh omos tfrequentl y plumpfo rlan dexpropriatio n(1 7% a sagains t5 % o f the members). According to them, though, this requisitioning would be followed by a redistributiono fth elan damon gindividua lpeasant srathe rtha nb yth esettin gu po fcom munalfarms . Hypothesis 6.1 appears proved. However,mor einsigh t intoth enee dfo rco-operatio ndoe sno tnecessaril ymea nmor e action.Aske dwhethe rthe ywoul daccep ta noffe rb ynin eothe rpeasant st ojoi ni na com munal enterprise on good land, 71%o f the members and 66% of the non-members replied that they would. The most important reason, for members as well as non- members,wa stha tthe ywoul dthe near nmor ebu tthi sreaso nwa srelativel ymor eimpor tant for the members than for the non-members (39% against 29%). There was no difference between members and non-members when asked if they would then be preparedt osel lth elan dthe yno wowned : 61%a sagains t59 %declare dthemselve sread y tod oso . When asked whichthe y wouldprefe r toearn ,90 0escudo so nthei row nlittl efar m or 1500escudo s asmember so fa communa lfarm ,th enon-member swer eslightl ymor ein clinedt oprefe r theformer , asi sshow ni nTabl e23 .Th edifferences , however,ar eslight . Alli nal lHypothesi s6. 2mus tals ob eregarde d asprobabl ebu tno tproved .Th emember s are not that much more prepared to embark upon a communal project than thenon - members. It does seem,however , that ifth e economicincentiv ei shigh ,th emajorit y of peasantsar eprepare dt ogiv eu pthei rindependence ,whethe rthe yb emember so rnot .O n thisbasi sw eshal l later asserttha t iti sa specific motive- ahighe rincom e- whichper suadespeasant s to accept ane wvalu e- thecommuna lfarm .T owha texten td oth eim plicationso fthi sne wvalu e- equalityamon gpeasants ,responsibilit yfo rothe rpeasant s - exist independently of thefinancial motiv ejus t mentioned? When asked which oftw o Table23 . Preferencewit hregar dt ofutur e methodso fproductio ni n % Prefers150 0 Prefers90 0 escudosa s -, escudoso n Doesn't membero fcom ownfar m know munalfar m N Members 34 10 56 182 Non-members 45 7 49 92 Total 37 9 54 274 ^(2d.f.)=3.61 85 conflicting statements they agreed with, 11% of the members and 3% of the non- membersreplie dtha tth ehighes tobligatio no fa peasan twa stha ttoward sothe rpeasants . (The others considered their highest obligation to betoward s their families.) There are thus afe wpeasant swh ohav ea considerabl efeelin go fsolidarit ywit hothe rpeasant san d byfa rth emos to fthes e(2 0o fth e23 )ar emember so fco-operatives .Thi sdifferenc e may, however, reflect their greater identification with the community, mentioned earlier rather than themuc h more abstract identification withclass . Asked whether they would accept criticism at a meeting 62% of the members and 51% ofth enon-member sreplie d that theywould .Hypothesi s6. 3i sperhap sno tentirel y proved, but itremain s very probable. Strangely enoughi ti sth emember srathe r thanth enon-member s( 9% asagains t 3% ) who think that one peasant progresses at the expense of others. Though only a small number believethis ,th ehypothesi stha t themember sar eles sinfluence d byth eImag eo f the Limited Good,i sincorrect . Whilethi s Imageitsel f doesno t (any longer)pla y arol e among 94% of the peasants its absence indicates no enthusiasm for joining a co operative. 6.3.4 Localdifferences It isremarkabl e howofte n ahypothesi scoul dno t beconfirmed , althoughth edat ain dicated differences between members andnon-member s inth edirectio npredicted .Wha t is the reason for this? It appears on closer examination that many variables correlated with affiliation in only one or two of the three places involved in the survey. Onlytw o variables clearlyha d arol et opla y inal lthre eplaces : having been amembe ro fth eloca l INDAP committee,an dth e viewtake n oflan dreform , membersbein gmor eincline dt o seea solutio n inco-operatio n amongpeasants .I ntw oplace s 7 variablescorrelate dwit h affiliation, and 12 did soi n onlyon eplace . InPuent eAlto ,th emos turba n farming area,onl y acoupl eo fothe r variableswer e of anyimportanc ealongsid eth etw owhic hplaye da rol eeverywhere .Th emember sbelieve d morestrongl yi nth epeasants 'futur e possibilitiesan dthe yals oha da somewha thighe rin come.I n addition, however, they wereals oclearl y lessisolate d than thenon-members : they had more contact with other peasants,ha dmor efrequentl y beenon eo fa grou po f friends andwer ethu smor esocialized .The ywer eals omor elikel yt othin ktha tthei rcom munity, in comparison with others, was a friendlier placet olive .I n Cuncumen and Lo Abarca too, the most rural places covered by the survey, the non-member was much more isolated than the member. The members more often maintained that their com munity was characterized by a greater degree of friendship; friendship and kinship relations coincided with membership. And yet it can hardly be assumed that we are dealing herewit hth esam e sort ofisolatio n as in Puente Alto.Ther e theisolatio n ofth e non-member wastha t of urban man who scarcely knowshi sneighbours ,ha sn o friends andwhos erelation swit hth epeopl eh emeet sar eformal , contractual.I nCuncume nan d Lo Abarca everyone knows everybody else;th e isolation of the non-member does not proceed from the Gesellschaft - characteristics of the community, but from mistrust, suspicion, afea r ofbein gpu tupon .Th enon-member sstat emor eofte n thanth emember s (29% v.9 % )tha tthe ywoul d not knowwho mt oborro w moneyfro m andar eles slikel y (8% as against 21%) to mention a compadre or a relative in this connection. The 86 Table 24. Multiple correlation of a numbero f explanatory variables andmembershi p of co operatives.R 2i scumulatin gsquare dcorrelatio n coefficient Partial Fraction correlation Variable R2 explained coefficient Entirepopulation (N = 256) (53 ) Previouslymembe ro fth eloca lcommitte e 0.11 0.07 0.28 (23) Beliefi npeasants'progres s 0.14 0.04 0.23 (69) Beliefi nsucces so fco-operativ e 0.19 0.02 0.18 (70) Friendsals omember s 0.22 0.01 0.16 (24) Co-operativeviewo fproblem sfacin g agriculture 0.23 0.01 0.14 (50) Identification withcommunit y 0.25 0.01 0.14 (72) Relativesals omember s 0.26 0.01 0.11 Auquincoand Quinahue(N— 77) (53 ) Previouslymembe ro fth eloca lcommitte e 0.21 0.18 0.49 (29) Preferslowe rincom eo pindividua lplo t 0.30 0.10 -0.39 (79) Workershav eothe rinterest s 0.34 0.04 0.24 (23) Beliefi npeasants 'progres s 0.37 0.03 0.20 (14) Creditfro msourc eothe rtha nINDA P 0.40 0.03 0.21 ConcumenandLoAbarca (N= 140) (53) Previouslymembe ro floca lcommitte e 0.11 0.07 0.32 (70) Friendsals omember s 0.20 0.05 0.27 (51) Hassomebod yt oborro wmone yfro m 0.27 0.04 -0.26 (69) Positivevie wo fco-operativ e 0.30 0.02 0.18 (76) Sensitivityt oopinio no fpeer s 0.33 0.02 0.19 (72) Relativesals omember s 0.34 0.02 0.18 (23) Beliefi npeasants 'progres s 0.36 0.02 0.16 (78) Imageo fLimite dGoo d 0.38 0.01 0.13 PuenteAlto(N=35) (50) Identification withcommunit y 0.26 0.17 0-53 (24) Co-operativevie wo fproblem sfacin g agriculture 0.49 0.13 0.48 (23) Beliefi npeasants'progres s 0.52. 0.06 0.34 (53 ) Previouslymembe ro floca lcommitte e 0.56 0.05 0.31 members are more sensitive to the opinion of social equals (64% as against 41%ar e willingt oaccep tcriticism) .I ti sa sthoug hth emembers ,mor etha nth enon-members ,ar e able to usethei r personalrelationship s withothe r people as abasi sfo rne wform s of co operation. In Auquinco and Quinahue, places which are more developed than Cuncumen, but less urbantha nPuent eAlto ,th edifferenc e betweenmember san dnon-member sappear s to lie more inth e non-members' preference for retaining theirow n family farm;48 %o f them(a s against2 2% o fth emembers )woul drathe rear n90 0escudo so nthei row nfar m than 1500escudo s on acommuna l enterprise.Th emember s seemt o bemor emoder ni n theirapproach :the y readbette r andmor eofte n receivedcredi tfro m asourc eothe rtha n INDAP. The members' insight appears to be based chiefly upon economic con- 87 siderations. They are less given to mutual aid (35% against 49%) and are more inclined to believe that small peasant farmers and agricultural workers do not share the same in terests. Although, more often than the non-members, they had only workedfive year s in the place (24% as against 7% ) they had more experience in participating in a group of friends. This meant that they were more socialized in maintaining friendly relationships with people not related to them. If, asdi d INDAP , one sets up co-operatives in placeswhic h differ considerably inthei r levelo f development and external circumstances,i tdoe s notappea r thati nal lcase s acer tain type of personality will become a member while another type will not. Alongside a certain modern business mentality and the desire to achieve a higher income, one of the most important factors seems to beth e degree of confidence which the peasants have in each other. However, in a traditional community, this confidence seems to be based on different qualities inth e person whotrust s than in amor e modern suburban community. Inth eligh t ofthes edifference s iti sno tsurprisin gtha t amultipl ecorrelatio n calculation explains only 26% of the variance of membership in the population. As shown in Table 24 this percentage is higher, around 40%, in each of the three communities taken separately, but we are dealing then with smaller numbers of respondents and less divergent observation results. Nonetheless, the multiple correlation calculation seems to confirm the picture of the member as we had outlined it for the three places. The variable 'previously member of local committee' which plays a role in every case does not, admittedly, tell us anything about the member's personality. It does, however, indicate that it was an inspired move firstt o uniteth epeasant s ina n association likethis ,whic h demanded nosacrific e buttim e and only later to encourage them tojoi n a 'real'co-operativ e which required somefinan cial sacrifice. While participating in the committee many of the peasants evidently becameconvince d that INDA P didindee dgran t credit, andtha t itwa swort h the trouble to continue to receive this even if it meant joining a co-operative. Other traits which characterize the member are a certain optimism with regard to what the future holds for peasants and involvement in the community. In some cases a co-operative mentality is important, while in others it is not. In the last case (Auquinco and Quinahue) a strong determination to improve one's individual, economic lot would seem to provide a substitute. Notes 1 I derived thesetw oindicator s from a studyb y Bonilla and SilvaMichelen awh oha d found a similar difference betweenmember s andnon-member so frura lsyndicate si nVenezuel a(1967 , p. 151-2). 2 They can be shown and reproduced on application to the author, Institute of Cultural and Social Studies, State University, Stationsplein 10,Leiden ,Th eNetherlands . 3 Ia mgropin gi nth edar k regardingth eaverag efrequenc y ofthi sphenomeno ni nChile .O nth e fundos which I had not selected with the aim of discovering such ex-members among the respondents,roughl y 20%o fth e members proved to haverelinquishe d their membership. 4 Onemigh t imaginetha t havingfriend s whoar eals omember si sth eresult o faffiliation . Intha t case, the dependent variable would be explained with a variable which follows upon it.Thi s idea seems to me incorrect, especially since a similar phenomenon occurs with regard to relatives, as Table 14 showed. If we omit the variable 'affiliation of friends' the remaining variables (together with one other which refers to the year in which the respondents started work inth efundo ) stillexplai n 47% o fth evariatio n in affiliation. 88 S In any case onema y conclude thattraditiona l forms of co-operationd ono tautomaticall y dis pose towardsjoinin g aco-operative .Th edifferenc e betweenth enumbe ro fmember s andnon - members who neverpractic e vuelta deman oi s very small;44 %a s against 46%. 89 Chapter 7 Leadership and participation 7.1 Thefunction s ofleader s WhileI di dno t particularly concern myselfwit hth equestio no fleadershi pdurin gm y researchi nChile ,i tmigh tstil lb euseful ,afte rfirst dealin gwit hth etheor yo fleadership ,t o setdow nwha tw eactuall y didfind ou tabou tleaders .Durin gth eanthropologica lpar to f myresearc hI wa smad estrongl yawar eo fjus tho wimportan tth eleadershi pfacto rwas . Of course it willonl y bepossibl et otes t someo fth e expectations which wehol d onth e basiso ftheor y andqualitativ eresearc hagains tquantitativ edata .O nth eothe rhan dthi s willhel pu s gain a clearer picture ofth eproblem s attachingt oth eleadershi po fpeasan t associations ofth e sort occurring inChile . Sociology tends to take a different view of leadership from that previously held. Formerly the assumption was that it was,s ot o speak, aperson' s irresistible leadership qualities which led to him becoming a leader. At the present time, however, there isa clearerrealizatio nthat ,i nth elas tinstance ,i ti sth eexpectatio no fth egroup members tha t theleade r willmak e apositiv econtributio n towards satisfying their needswhic hmake s them accept leadership atall . A large number of investigations into leadership haveshow ntha t theleade r hastw o main functions, one instrumentalan d oneexpressive. Theinstrumenta l function relates to the leader's contribution towards achieving the aims of the group (or organization), whilehi sexpressiv efunctio n hast od owit hhi scontributio ntoward spreservin git sessen tial unity. In someorganization s each of these functions may befulfille d by a different leadingindividual , although oneleade r can alsotak e care ofbot h (cf. Etzioni, 1969). Both leadership functions appear necessary in the Chilean peasant organizations whichw estudied .Syndicat eleader smus tb eabl et obrin gabou tan dmaintai nth eunit yo f theorganizatio n anda tth esam etim eb ecapabl eo fformulatin g objectives,establishin ga policy, carrying on negotiations, and advancing cogent argumentsfo r their standpoint. They must be able to build up relationships with politicians and high-ranking officials with avie w to winning them over in case of conflict. They must be ablet o envisagea n acceptable future agrarian structure. Leaders of co-operatives too, albeit in different spheres of activity, must be able to forecast possible developments. They too must be capableo festablishin grelationship s ando fnegotiatin gwit hgovernmen tagencies .I nad dition they must possess a considerable business instinct. The economic activities in itiatedb yth eco-operativ emus tsho wa profi t andne wprofitabl eactivitie smus tconstant lyb eembarke dupon .Thi srequire sno tonl ya goo dchoic eo factivities ,bu tals oinvolve s enteringint ocontract swit hthir dpartie san dkeepin gthem ,administerin gan dmakin gth e best possible use of one's own and borrowed money and ensuring that themember si n their turn fulfil their obligations towardsth eco-operative .Th eco-operativ eleade rmus t 90 also preserveth e unity $fth emembers . Accordingly, as an outsider, the researcher establishes that the Chilean peasant leadersmus tindee dfulfi lth etw ofunction smentioned .H eals onote si npassing ,however , that in the vast majority of syndicates and co-operatives with which he became acquainted,bot hth eactua lorganizatio n andth ewa yi twa sru nwer eimpose dfro mout- , side. The fact that leaders existed didno t necessarily follow from therequirement s and expectations of themembers ,bu tcoul dals oresul tfro mth eimpose dobligatio nt oelec ta board. Iremembe r beingpresen t ata coupl eo fboar delection swher evoter sha dn over y clear ideao fwha tthe ywer edoin gi nth efirst plac ean dwer eparticularl yignoran to fwha t function, theinstrumenta l orth eexpressive ,th eperso nejecte dwoul dhav et ofulfil . 'He's a very nice chap, but he's hopeless at taking decisions', I was told ofth e newly elected chairmano fon eloca lcommitte eo fa regiona l co-operative.Durin ganothe relection ,i na small production group, the older members chose an instrumental leader while the younger voted for anexpressiv e one.Neithe r faction, however,wa sclearl y awareo fth e reason for its choice. Although one person was not always necessarily incapable of fulfilling the two leadership functions in a reasonable manner,mos t elected leaders could becalle d more instrumental than expressive, or vice versa. The ignorance of practically all those in volved with these two functions caused leaders to be criticized for not being precisely what they werenot . Theexpressiv eleader ,th ema nwh owante dn oquarre lwit hanyone , butwh owa sals over yshor to ninitiative ,wa sreproache dfo rlac ko fvision ,fo rno tbein g ama no faction .O fth einstrumenta lleade ri twa ssai dtha th ewoul dno tallo wother sthei r say, was incapable of delegating, took charge of everything himself. Although itma y not bea simplematte rt oexplai ntha tleader s havet ofulfi l twofunc tions andtha t it may palyt o choose a different person for each function, it seems to me most essential that the peasants should bemad e aware of this. TheChilea ncontex titsel fcreate dye tanothe rfunctio nfo rth epeasan tleader st o fulfil: the ideological.Th e peasants had to betaugh t to embrace theideal srelatin g to a much more collectively organized production structure such as was advocated both in some INDAP, CORA and PDC circles andi nth eoppositio npartie so nth eleft . Thisinvolve d makingthe m awareo fthei r situation andbroadenin g anddeepenin g certainvalue ssuc h as equality and participation. Initially this was the task of government employees and ideologically trained party members, but after that it devolved upon the convinced peasants themselves.T o agreate ro rlesse rdegre eINDAP ,COR A andth epolitica lpar ties canvassing the countryside allwante dthos epeasant swh oshare dthei rideal selecte d as administrators. Various pressures were exercised at meetings in order to get the desired people elected. Thus it came about that peasant leaders were more of less expected to propagate certain values and norms among the members. I received the definite impression during my participation at meetings that those leaders who really' lived out these particular values and norms managed to get them accepted by the members.Thos e who only gaveli p servicet o them,faile d to convince. 7.2 Thedysfunction s «f leadership The Chilean context played a role in yet another respect. In social structures where patronage is animportan t mechanism, there is atendenc y toregar dpubli co rotherwis e 91 collective resources overwhic hon eha sth edisposa l asa mean so f enhancingone' sow n status.Suc ha tendenc yi sno tinfrequentl y found amongthos eholdin ggovernmen tpost s orthos ewh oar ei na positio nt otak edecision so rinfluenc eth eallocatio no fpubli cfunds . Peoplewh ohav econnection s with higher officials who controlth e allocation ofmeans , may,i nexchang efo r aconsideratio no ra reciproca lservice ,us ethes econnections ,a sin termediarieso r'brokers' ,t obrin gother s intocontac t withthes eofficials . Aplac eo nth e boardo fa co-operativ eo rsyndicat ei sa ke ypositio nwhic hcarrie swit hi tspecia lconnec tions and sometimes control over public funds. Theseconnection s may springfro m the relationshipsmaintaine d byboar d members,agricultura l andloca lgovernmen t agencies and officials. I am referring toth e agenciesdealin g withlan d reform, agricultural credit and extension andth ejudiciar y and administrative authorities which decideo nth eout come of workers' conflicts and soforth . Board members may become involved in the allocationo ffinancial resource swhe ndecision sconcernin gth egrantin go fcredi tan dth e setting up of certain development projects are, to some extent, left to the local community. Those who setu pth epeasan t organizations neverintende d leadershipposition st ob e used for self advantage by means ofpatronag e or 'brokerage'.The y cherished thehop e that the organization might help to raise the status of all its members. Moreover they expected theorganizatio n tob edemocrati c inth esens etha t allmember swoul dhav ea n equal say in matters concerning the organization and exercisesuc h control over board memberstha t thelatte r could not abusethei rpositions . However, as Landsberger &Hewit t (1970)correctl y point out, turning aleadershi p positiont oone' sow nadvantag ei son eo fth ealternative sope nt oth epeasan twh ohope s toenhanc ehi sindividua lstatus .Since ,a sw e sawi nth epreviou schapter ,on eo fth emos t important affiliation motiveso fth eChilea n peasanti sprecisel yth ehop eo fimprovin ghi s ownlo ti ti st ob eexpecte dtha ti nsom ecase sa tleas tleadershi pwil lthu sb eabused . Such abusei sdysfunctional , notbecaus ei tconfound sth eexpectation so fth egovernmen to ro f political ideologists,bu t because it makesth e members suspicious ofthei r leaders,con firmsa familiar and traditional pattern of behaviour and hinders acceptance by the members of'new ' values such asequalit y and participation. Apartfro m afe wisolate dcase sI foun d noindicatio ntha tpeasan tleader sabuse dthei r positions.Wha t Idi dfind, especiall yi nth eco-operative s(i nth esyndica lmovemen tthi s only held good for leaders on a provincial or national level), was a lively conviction amongth emembers ,sometime saccompanie db yveile daccusations ,tha ta particula rad ministrator was feathering hisow nnest . Theonl yquantitativ e datum at mydisposa li s thefinding tha trelativel ymor eleader stha nmember so fco-operative sha dreceive dcredi t from INDAPan dothe r sources.Thi scoul dmea ntha tthe yha dtake n advantageo fthei r closer relationship withINDA P officials, but iti sals o acommonl y found phenomenon that moremoder n farmers receivemor e credit.Th epejorativ e interpretation,thus , need not necessarily becorrect .I t seemst om etha tth esequenc eo fevent swa sa sfollows :th e more modern peasant farmers had a greater need of the services which INDAP could provide. Since INDAP preferred to provide these services by way of committees and, later, co-operatives, it was precisely these peasants who worked hard to get such associations off theground . Having shown such enthusiasmthe ywer eelecte dmember s ofth eboar d andsinc ethei rnee dfo rcredi twa sgreates tthe ywer eth efirst t oappl yfo rit . Onlywhe nthei r applicationha sbee nsuccessfu l andwhen ,i naddition ,credi tbecome s 92 scarcerbecaus ether ear emor epeopl esolicitin git ,doe sth esuspicio naris etha tth eleade r hasbee nfavourin g himself. Suspicionsappeare dt ooccu rmor efrequentl ytha nth efact smigh twarrant ,althoug h admittedlyi ti sdifficul t for anoutside rwh oi sonl yspendin ga shor ttim ei na community , to be sureo fwha t actually happened. OneBoar d memberwa ssai dt ohav eillegall yap propriated aquantit yo fwoode nstakes ,anothe rwa saccuse do fusin gth elorr yto omuc h for hisow nprivat ebusiness ,a thir do fsellin ghi stracto rt oth eco-operativ ea tto ohig ha price. A fourth was reproached with wanting to become a manager and so receive a salary from the co-operative,a fift h (and sixth and seventh)wa s accused offiddling th e expenses for a trip to Santiago, an eighth was said to owehi s candidature to being a membero fPart yX whil ea nint hwa shel dt ohav ebee nordere db ybi sparty ,Y ,t oensur e thefailur e ofth eco-operativ e Onlyscrupulou sbehaviour ,i twoul dseem ,backe du pb ydocumentar yproo fan dsub jectt oregula rinstitutiona lcontrol ,woul dpreven tsuc hallegations .However ,th einabili tyo fbot hleader san dmember st oreceiv ean dhan dou tcriticis ma srole-bearer sinstea do f asindividual san dth eusuall ydeficien tmanne ri nwhic hth ebook swer ekept ,le don et ofea r that,fo rth etim ebein ga tlast ,thi swoul dremai na piou shope . In the following chapter I shallargu etha tthi ssuspicio no nth epar t ofth emembers , whetherjustifie do rnot ,prevent sthe mfro m acknowledgingth esolidarit yo fthos eleader s they mistrust. Thisi s detrimental to his solidarity inth e end. I might also refer heret o another dysfunctional result:th esuspec tleade r isn olonge r ashinin gexample ,h edoe s notencourag epeopl et o acceptthos evalue swhic hh eput sint opractice . 7.3 Thedifference s betweenleader san dmember so fsyndicate s Wehav econsidere d asleader sal lthos ewh oa tth etim eo fth esurve yoccupie do rha d occupied an administrative position in the committeeo n the estateo r inth esyndicate . Since we did not draw up any explicit hypotheses concerning the differences between leadersan dmembers ,w eshal lregar dth eresult smerel ya spointers .Althoug hw edi dno t either operationalize in advance any variables to determine the extent to which the leadership was instrumental, expressive or ideological, the differences may be largely contained under thesedenominators . Just asi npreviou schapter sa differenc e isregarde d asrea lwhe nth echi-squar evalu e surpassestha t whichcorrespond s withth e5 %leve lo f significance. Sofa r as their instrumentalfunctio n isconcerned ,leader s seemt ohav ea somewhat higher status on the fundo than do the members;the y are morelikel y to beinquilino s (49% as against 33%).Leader s have a higher standard of education and are better at reading. They joined the syndicate earlier than the members and more frequently received atrainin gcours efro m INDAP.The ydi dnot ,a sI ha d expectedo nth ebasi so f Affonso etal. (1970),prov et o haveworke d moreofte n outsideagriculture . It isnoteworth y that,despit ethei r somewhat higher status,th eleader s earnles stha n themembers .Thi sprobabl yexplain swh ythe yfee la greaterrelativ edeprivation . Theirexpressive functio n seemst oemerg ei nth efac ttha tth eleader sar emor elikel yt o havelive dan dworke d onth efund o from before 1950. Theymor efrequentl y havecom - padres than themember s(80 % against 56%) and thoseleader s whohav e compadres, alsohav emor eo fthem .Althoug hthe yd ono tten dmuc hmor eofte n tohav ea nintimat e 93 Table 25. Leadership and patronage insyndicate s(i n% ) Patronageinde x N l(low) 2 3 4(high ) Leaders 15 34 34 17 41 Ordinary members 4 19 47 30 102 X2 (3 d.f.) = 10.9 friend (56% as against 51%) nor to have formed part of a group of friends (63% as against 56%) the leaders do believe more readily than the members that there is more friendship in their fundo than in others (56% as against 27%). Both instrumental and ideological functions are served by the fact that the leaders score lower than the members on the patronage index, as Table 25 shows. In itself this lower score isno t so surprising, but itbecome s sowhe n weremembe r our earlierfinding that, compared with the member, the non-member had a higher patronage score, had come to work on the fundo earlier and had more people financially dependent on him. The leaders also came to work earlier on the fundo than did the members,the y too have more people under their roof who are financially dependent onthe m(5 1% ofth e leaders as against 22% of the members have four or more such people at home) but with them these variables have not led to a higher patronage score, as they did with the non- members. Precisely because,i n somerespects ,leader sresembl e non-members moretha n they do members, it isimprobabl e that their lower scoreo n thepatronag e index is a consequence of their leadership. A more likely explanation is that they are people who, despite their dependence, turned their backs on the owner, felt more deprived than others, andjoine d the syndicate at an early stage. Also functional from the ideological viewpoint is the fact that the leaders, in com parison with the members, are somewhat readier to work their regalias on a communal basis (70% as against 60%).The y are alsomor elikel ytha n themember st o mention the asentamiento as their second choice for a desired agrarian future, after their own little piece of land (44% as against 18%).I n addition they place the working class higher on the list of groups with which they feel a tie (4.75 against 5.61). Just as remarkable asth edifference s areth e similaritiesbetwee n leaders and members on the instrumental and ideological plane. They take the same view of the syndicate's task, giveth e same answer to thequestio n ofwhethe r the syndicate pays sufficient atten tion to what happens on their fundo and have the same opinion of what land reform should entail. The material seemst oindicat etha t syndicateleader sar epeopl ewhos emos t important instrumental quality is their aversion to the patron and who are in the main informal, expressive leaders, in the sense of stars in a sociogram. 94 7.4 Thedifference sbetwee nleade nan dmember so fco-operative » In dealing with the cooperatives we have again regarded as leaders those who occupiedo rha doccupie da nadministrativ efunctio n inth eloca lcommittee so ri nth eco operativea tth etim eo fth esurvey .Althoug hw edi dno tformulat e anyhypothese sregar dingthes eleader seither »th edifference s withth emember sma yonc eagai nb eclassifie d under the headings: instrumental, expressive and ideological functions. Here too the results must beregarde d merely asindications . The board memberso f co-operàtivesar e ablet oexercis ethei r instrumentalfunction becausethe yar emor emoder ni nthei rfarmin gmethods .The ydiffe r fromth emember si n a number of variables which arefamilia r from adoption-diffusion studies.Th eleader s have a higher standard of education than the members, are better skilled at reading, received credit (both input and capital credit)mor eofte n from INDAP aswel la s from othersources ,wer emor elikel yt okee paccount san dvisite da larg ecit ymor efrequently . Admittedlyth eleaders 'farm s aren obigger ,bu tthe yd ohav ea somewha thighe rincom e than the members. They also aspire to a higher income and more often contract paid workerso nthei rfarms .The y aremor elikel ytha nth emember st o beemployers .I nth e light of this it no longer seems strange that the leaders, as I was frequently informed duringth eexplorator ystag eo fth einvestigation ,ar eincline dt ohav eth eco-operativ eun dertakeprecisel y thosetask s which suitthei r ownmor emoder n farming methods. Nonetheless,i tseem stha tth eleader sals ofulfi l anexpressive function. The yten dmor e often than themember s to have an intimatefrien d andwere ,mor efrequently , oneo f a group of friends. By and large they conversed with more colleagues during the week. Theywer erate dhighe ro na solidarit yindex . Incompariso nwit hth eordinar ymembers , theleader sar eals omor eincline dt omak eexcuse sfo r thosepeasant swh ohav eno tye t joined the co-operative. The leaders, however, are not remarkably different from the ideological viewpoint. They are more inclined than the memberst o prefer a higherin comeo n a communalfar m to alowe rincom eo n afar m ofthei rown ,an dten dmor et o think that smallpeasant-farmer s and farm workers shareth esam einterests .I t iswort h noting that leaders appear to differ from members in ways inwhic h weha d originally expected members woulddiffe r from non-members. 7.5 Participationa noUgarcbizatio n Evenbefor e 1960th eidea lo fparticipatio n wasaliv ei n Chilei ncertai ncircle so fth e PDC and the parties on the left. This ideal implied that decision making in peasant organizations should proceed democratically, and involveal lth emembers . Theywoul d then work together to implementthes e decisions.Althoug h theidea l usually remained vague, a number of peasants and officials of INDAP and CORA nonetheless realized that participation mustals oimpl yth eregula r rotation ofboar d members.Th etendenc y ofleader st oclin go nt othei rleadership ,thei rinclinatio ntoward soligarchization ,woul d havet o befough t andovercome . I dono tdoub ttha tthi stendenc yexisted ,eve nthoug hI haven oquantitativ edat at o confirm thissupposition .I twa snot ,however ,alway sdeliberat epolic yo nth epar to fth e leaders themselves.I n some caseswher efo r exampleelectio nt osom eoffic e meantcon siderablemateria ladvantage ,o ra grea tincreas ei nprestige ,ther ema yindee dhav ebee n 95 aninclinatio nt oclin gt othi sstatus ,onc eachieved .I fofte n happened,however ,tha tpeo ple atth ehea d of an activeassociatio n whoha d learned their rolewhil eactuall y onth e job,buil tu psuc ha considerabl e advancei nexpertise ,i norganizator yskil lan di nth esiz e of their networks during their term in office that in fact they had to bere-electe d ifth e organization wasno tt o slipback . Thelon gcontinuanc ei noffic e notedb yd eRanit zan dd eRanit z(1972 ,p . 128)i nthre e asentamientos,doe sno tsee mt om eexceptional . Iti sknow ntha tworke rsel fgovernmen t runs theris k offailur e duet oth eoligarchizatio n ofth eleaders .N oparticula r effort was made in Chilean peasant organizations to build up an administrative structure which might counteract thistendency .Contro l commissionsi nco-operative s and asentamien tos- whichha d inan y casebee nadapte d from foreign models- worked badlyo rno ta t all.Neithe rth egovernmen tno ran yothe rspecialize dinstitute spai dmuc hattentio nt oth e problem ofoligarchization . Peopleseeme dt opi nthei r hopeso n aregula rrotatio n ofin dividualsoccupyin gleadershi pfunctions , ando nth eleader' spreparednes st omak ewa y for others. Such hopes appear somewhat naive, assuming as they do a considerable degreeo fsel fdenia lan d solidarity inpeopl ewh ohav ecaus et ovalu ethei row npersona l share inth e development ofth eorganizatio n morehighl y than that ofothers . From the theoretical point of view these hopes have implications which were not alwaysrealize di nChile .I fw eassum etha tleader sar echose nb ygroup sbecaus ethe yar e ablet omak ea contributio n whichi svalue db yth emembers ,the nthi simplie stha tsuc ha contribution ischiefl y expectedfro m particular persons. Theirleadershi pdepend so nth e onehan d uponth egrou pbu to nth eothe rupo nthei rpersona lqualities .Thi si ssee nver y clearly inth ecas eo finforma l leaderswh oonl y gainrecognitio ni fthe yhav ea valuabl e contributiont ogive . Not everyonei sa ninforma lleade ran di ti sno teas yt ose tonesel fu p asone .I fsomeon ewh ostarte dou ta sa ninforma lleade ri sappointe dt oa nadministrativ e post he cannot be replaced byjus t anybody, but only by another informal leader who fulfils thesam efunction . Themai nthin gthe n ist otrai n membersi nsuc ha wa ytha tth e group acknowledges them asinforma l leaders. Asth eexpertis eo fth efirst leade rincreases ,h ebecome smor edifficul t toreplace .Fo r thetim ebein gth etalen tnecessar yt oprovid ecompeten tleadershi pfo rproductio no rser viceco-operative s appears sothi n onth egroun d that myhope so feas yreplacemen t are not veryhigh . There is the additional factor that, if he is replaced and certainly if he takes this to heart,th eboar d member remains aninforma l leader andhi sresentmen t may causehi m tosti ru phi sfollower s againsthi sreplacement .I fsomebod yi selecte dt oth eBoar dsimp lybecaus ea vacanc yexists ,the nh ei sindee dmuc heasie rt oreplace ,bu th ei sals oineffec tive as aleader . In short, our argument amounts to this. If the ideal of participation is to have any chanceo fsucces sthe nadministrativ estructure smus tb edevelope di nwhic h authorityi s circumscribed and subject to control. Furthermore ways must be found to provide the membersi ngenera lan dthos ewit hleadershi pqualitie si nparticula rwit hth einformatio n necessary for them to play their part indecisio n making andt odevelo pthei r talents.I f leaders are,i n addition,require d to bepoliticall y reliable(b y thegovernmen t or theop position parties)thei r replacement becomes allth emor e difficult. Itwil lb eobviou sfro m allthi stha tI a msceptica labou tth epossibilit yo fa regula rrota tion ofleaders .I t willals o appear that I placemor ehope si nth edevisin g of a structure 96 which would allow forfre e control and criticism. Yet this too has its difficulties. I was often struck duringmeeting s byth efac ttha tth epeasant scriticize d- andwer ecriticize d - as individuals and not as role bearers. The diffuse, fairly complicated.relationship existingbetwee nan ytw opeasant si na smal l communitymake si tmor edifficul t forthe m to absorb the fact that criticism of a leader affects only one of the roles in their relationship. The result is that the leader - who is also a compadre, or the friend of a friend,o rth efello w onedoe s afe wday swor kfo rdurin gth eharves tseaso n- willreac tt o criticism ast o ahostil eact .Sinc eth ecriti cknow sthi sh ewil lno toffe r hiscriticis mopen ly,durin ga meeting ,bu tmutte rslanderousl y beforehand. Inthi swa yth ecriticism ,o rth e rumour, becomes a weapon in the struggle between factions, or an incitement to the emergence of factions. The critic finds supporters, but the leader, feeling ill-used, calls uponhi srelative s andfriend st oprotec thim .Suc ha stat eo faffair sca nlea dt oa complet e absenceo fcontro lo rcriticism ,an dthi shappen si nman y co-operativeswher eth eofficia l control commission does not function. Yet, on the other hand, control or criticism may indeed leadt o the formation of factions. The only solution Ica n see,i s to make an effort, using socio-dramas, for instance, to teach both leaders and members that they are role-bearers, and that it is possible to separate both cognitive and affective roles. This of course is more important for the leaders. Once they show that they are not afraid of criticism and do not consider it a hostile act, the members will soon makethemselve s heard. 97 Chapter 8 Co-operation and solidarity 8.1 Introduction One of the most important questions which remains to be answered concerns the viability and effectiveness of the new co-operative associations and enterprises of the Chilean peasants. This viability of course depends in part upon societal factors and processes,an dmainl y uponth egovernmen tan dit sspecialize d agencies.Here ,however , weshal lconfin e ourselvest oaskin gwhic hfactors ,o nth eindividua lan dgrou pleve lo fth e participating peasants,determin eth eviabilit y ofthes eorganizations . In moreconcret eterms ,thi s posesth e following questions: - How ought the Chilean peasants to behave in order to make a success of the co operative associations and enterprises inwhic hthe y participate? - Arew eindee djustifie d in expecting such behaviour ofpeasants ,o ri si tmor eprobabl e that they willbehav e differently? - Ifth elatte ri strue ,ho wi sthi sbehaviou rt ob echanged ? Theanswe rt oth efirst questio n appearssimple .Peasant swil lachiev esuccessfu l forms of co-operation - insofar at least as this depends on them and not upon the prevailing socialstructur e- ifthe yproperl y fulfil certainroles ,tha ti st osay , satisfy thenorm sper taining tothes eroles .Bu twil lthe yd othis ?An dwh yshoul dthey ? Simplybecaus ethe y realizetha tthi si si nthei row nbes tinterests ? Itseem st om etha tthi si sno tsufficient .Th e realization that acertai n form ofbehaviou r isi nthei row ninterest si sa necessar ycondi tion,bu tno ta sufficien t one.I norde rt omak ethi sclea rw e shallhav et oretrac eou rsteps . What do we really mean by co-operation? What does a co-operating peasant do? He carries out to the letter any task entrusted to him, pays his dues, attends meetings, observes the working hours, does not grow rich at the organization's expense, keeps abreast ofth eorganization' s problems and helpst osolv ethem ,an d abidesb ydecision s legitimately arrivedat .I na word ,h ekeep sth erules ,amon gth emos timportan to fwhic h isth erul ewhic h decides how conflicts or differences ofopinio n mustb eovercome . Two conclusions may bedraw n from allthis : - Not every act is oneo f co-operation. Apeasan t working hisow n land isno t engaged inco-operation ,ye t isservin g hisow ninterest . - Insofar asco-operatio n impliesa n action(an dno trefrainin g from anaction )i tconsist s of utilizing hisresources ,whic h are:affection , energy,knowledge ,tim e and money.In sofar as co-operation consists of refraining from an action, it implies relinquishing satisfactions whichmigh tperhap shav ebee nenjoye d inanother ,non-legitimat emanner . Retracing^ou r steps has already brought one problem to light. Co-operation is frequently notth eonl ykin do factio nwhic h servesth eindividual ,materia linteres to fth e 98 peasant Weshal l havet o discover whatthi s selfinteres t consists ofexactly .A secon d problem remainedrathe r moreimplici t- doal lthes evariou sco-operativ eaction sreall y serve the peasant's self interest so directly? The example we have given in which co operationals oimplie drefrainin gfro m someactio nwhich ,o nth efac eo fit ,woul dsee mt o serveth epeasant' sow ninterest ,reveal stha tthi si sno talway sto .Th equestio nbecome s allth e moreinterestin g Whenw ereflec t that, in a newlyfounde d peasantorganization , therear ea sye tn ointernalize dnorm st ogover nthes eaction sno r arether ean ymember s whokno wexactl y whati sexpecte do fthe maccordin gt oth estatutes .Thi sbein gso ,i si t probabletha t the members will act co-operatively, solelybecaus ethe y seei t asi nthei r owninterest ? Should therenot ,i naddition ,b eothe rmotive st oguid eth epeasants 'con duct? In our opinion there are. Coercion and solidarityma yexis t asmotive salongsid e utilitarian considerations.W eshal ldiscus ssolidarit y ina secon dtheoretica ldigression , butfirst w emus t probemor e deeplyint oth eproble m of interest. 8.2 Peasantinterest san dconflict s ofinteres t We shall define interest as the possibility of obtaining income or other forms of satisfaction. Thispossibilit yi schiefl ydetermine db ya person' spositio ni nth eproductio n process.Fo r peasants participatingi n a co-operativeventur ei tfrequentl y happenstha t not all those actions which servethei r own interests are also co-operative actions.Th e participant ina collectiv efar mnearl yalway spossesse sa piec eo flan dfo r hisow nuse .I f a peasantha st odivid ehi sresource sbetwee naction swhic hserv ehi sinteres tdirectl yan d those which do so only viaa detour ,thi sca n giverise t otension ,th esam etensio n that affects anyone who has to choose between immediate and delayed need gratification. Economictheor yassume stha tdirec tgratificatio n willgenerall yb egive npreference .Thi s impliestha tpeopl eca nOnl yb epersuade dt opostpon esatisfactio n ofthei row nneed sb y beingoffere d someextr areward .A tth e sametime i tmus tb eremembere dtha tnewl yin stituted co-operatives or collective farms (and, to a lesser extent, syndicates), while promising to be of material advantage to the members, still have to make good this promise.Thi smean sthat ,particularl yi nth einitia lperiod ,motive sothe rtha nsel finteres t areheavil ydraw nupon . Thereis ,however ,anothe r factor. Olson(1965 )ha s showntha t aperso n- assuming that he will try to obtain the maximum possible benefit - willno t be inclined to exert himselft o acquire collectivegood si fh ewil lals oacquir ethe mwithou t effort. The result or yield of a co-operative venture in agriculture is to a certain extent equivalent to a collective goodi n Olson's sense of theword . Inthi s respect agriculture dinersfro m industry. Thewag eimprovements ,gaine d byth esyndicate ,als obenefi t the non-members. The co-operativewhic h opens up a market for a particular product,o r breaks the monopoly of a certain buyer by introducing competitors into the area, is providing advantagest onon-member s aswell .Al lth emember s sharei nth egoo dgrai n harvestenjoye d bya communa lfar maccordin gt oth eamoun to fwor kthe yhav epu tint o the farm. But such a differential distribution of benefits should also be possible in in dustry.Wh ythe ndoe sth ecollectiv eproduc ti nagricultur ebea rmor eresemblanc et o a collective good? Because inagriculture ,withou t a verycarefu l check,i ti simpossibl et o say whichspecifi c processi sresponsibl efo r the endproduc t beinginferio r inqualit yo r 99 disappointing inquantity . It isimpossibl et odiscove rjus t whowa scareles si nhi swork . Wereth efields no tploughe d deepenough ? Wasth e seedi nfac t treated withpesticides ? Wassomebod y carelessi nweeding ? Wasth esee ddelivere dno to fto pquality ?Wa sth e rainfall in any particular monthto o high,or , onth econtrary , wasth eweathe r toodry ? Wasth erigh t amount offertilize r used? Disappointing results may be attributed to environmental factors outside anyone's control(th eweather) ,t osupplier s(wh ofaile dt odelive rth esee do rth efertilize r ontim eo r who delivered inferior quality goods), or to tasks badly performed, that is, to other members who have skimped their work but whocanno t betake n totas k sincei twoul d cost too mucht o check up onthei r activities.I nothe r wordsth emultiplicit y of factors which may be involved ensures that it is always possiblet o foist the blame onto other members ofth e co-operative.No wi si tclea r thati fnon eo fth emember so fth eassocia tion worked towards obtaining the product, there would benothin g to obtain. But ifa number of members strive to obtain it,the n another member has less reason to do so. After all,eve ni fh emake sn oeffort , thusconservin g resourceswit hwhic hh ema yserv e his own interests more directly, he still acquires his share of the collective good inth e end1. An extra incentive isneede dt opersuad e themember st owor ktoward sobtainin gth e collective good. Such an incentive may be material (in the form of extra pay),ma y be basedo ncoercion ,o rma yb eo fa normativ enature .Thi slas tma yinvolv eth esacrific eo f resources for the benefit ofothers . Not only the production, but also the distribution of the product of a co-operative enterprise may giveris et o conflicts ofinterest .Generall y speakingthi swil loccu r under one of three conditions. The distribution ofpower among theparticipant s may besuc h that somear eabl et oappropriat emor eo fth een dproduc ttha n others.Th escarcity of a servicea perso nca nprovid ema ymak ei tpossibl efo r himt oclai ma mor etha nequitabl e share ofth eproceeds .Thi smigh tals ob eregarde d as aquestio no fpower ,bu tther ei sa difference. Power can be redistributed, a specialized skill cannot. Finally, the product may provet ob ewha tth eeconomist s callindivisible, sotha tsom ewil linevitabl yreceiv e moretha nothers .I fth efruit s ofa communa leffor t consisto fcertai nservices ,indivisibili ty willo fnecessit y result. Wehav e sofa r dealt with theinterest so fth eindividua lpeasan t whoparticipate si na co-operative or a collective farm. There are also,however , several remarkst o bemad e concerning the conflict ofinterest sbetwee n groupso r categories. Theconflic t withwhic hw e aremos tfamilia r from sociologicaltheor yi so fcours etha t betweenclasses ,betwee nthos ewh odispos eo fth emean so fproductio n andthos ewh od o not.Th elatte rar eabl et osurviv eonl yb ysellin gthei rlabour .Withou twishin gye tt odis cuss thistheor y in any depth wemus t nonetheless point outtha t it does not sufficiently explainth evariou s actionswhic hpeasant s taket o promotethei rinterests . Whileno tlosin gsigh to fMarx' ssoun dvie wtha t sucha conflic t ofinterest si sbuil tint o theorganizatio n ofproductio nwithi nsociety ,on emus t alsobea ri nmin dtha tth elabou r market is not the only market in which such conflicts arise. Precisely in the caseo fin dependent peasants who possess their own means of production (and in the case of a collectivefarm )othe rmarket sar ea tleas ta simportan ti nexplainin gthei rconflictin g in terests and the conduct they adopt. It follows from this that the various categories of 100 peasantsd ono talway sshar eth esam einterests .Smal lpeasan tfarmers ,fo rinstance ,lik e thelande dproprietors ,ar eintereste di nhig hprice sfo rthei rproduct san dlo wwages .I n the first market,tha t ofth eproducers ,the yfin d themselves opposed byth eurba n con sumers,includin gth eurba nproletariat ,whil eth eagricultura lworker sma yb elargel yo n their side. This is often referred to as the conflict between town and country. In other marketsth evariou scategorie so fth erura lpopulatio n arelikel yt oclash .B yrelatin gin terest conflictst odifferen t marketswhic hi nsom ecase sma yi nthei rtur nconsis to fsub sidiarymarkets ,w eobtai na ver ycomple xpictur ei nwhic hnobod yan ylonge rha sexact ly the sameinteres t as anybody else.Interes t aggregation then meansconcentratin g on certaincommo ninterest san dignorin gthos ewhic har eno tshare dan dwhic ha ttha tpar ticularmomen tappea rles simportant .Thi smake sclass ,i nMarx' ssense ,no timpossible , but certainly aborderlin ecase . When thus, within a collectivity, onefinds group s which do not occupy exactly the same position inth eproductio n process and havethu sdivergen t interests on particular marketso rsubsidiar ymarkets ,sub-collectivitie sma yemerg ewhos einterest st osom eex tentconflict .Th eactio ntake nb yth ecollectivit yitself -i nadvocatin glan drefor mfo rin stance- mayals ocreat edifferen t positions;agricultura lworker swh obecom easentado s and thosewh oremai n wagelabourer s onth eland . Interest aggregation isthu s a dynamic phenomenon; interest groups may form, co operatean dthe nbrea ku pagain .Thi sma yhappe ndu et oa chang ei nthei rpositio ni nth e productionprocess ,bu ti tma yals ocom eabou twithou tan yobjectiv e alterationi nthei r interests.I t is sufficient that they startt ovie wthei rinteres ti na differen t light,attachin g lessweigh tt oth ecommo ninteres tthe ystresse dearlie ran dmor et othos ewhic har eno t shared. Itwil lb eclea rfro mth eforegoin ganalysi stha twhe npeasant sdecid et oco-operat ethi s doesno t meantha t latent conflicts ofinteres t between individuals,families ,sub-groups , groups(farms )an d sub-collectivities,hav edisappeare d altogether. Wehav eseen ,moreover ,that ,whil ei ti stru etha tth epeasant' sself-interes ti sserve db y theproductio n ofth ecollectiv egood ,thi sinsigh t alonewil lno tb esufficien t topersuad e himt o exert himself permanentlyi norde rt o attaintha t good. Ina late r sectionw eshal lgiv eexample st osho wtha tth etension sreferre dt odi doccu r in Chilean peasant organizations. We shall accordingly discuss ways oflessenin gsuc h tensions and safeguarding thefunctionin g ofth eorganizations .First ,however ,w eshal l try to discover what other motives may lead an individual to sacrifice some of his resources. 8.3 Solidarity Apeasan t can devotehi sresource s topromotin g hisow ninterest s andt o actso fco operating. These acts servehi sinterest s indirectly,sometime s veryindirectly ,an d may involve the sacrifice of his own resources for the welfare of others. The nature of the collective good which is the product of co-operation is such that co-operative actions nearly alwaysentai l such a sacrifice. Itseem st ou stha tther ear ethre emotive swhic hma yimpe la peasan tt othu sinves thi s resources. These are coercion, the prospect of rewardan d solidarity. Compulsion and reward,however ,mea ntha tthi sinvestmen t cannotno wb eregarde d asa sacrifice .Th e 101 peasant who,b y co-operating well,avoid s exclusion from thegrou pb ywa yo fsanctio n andth epeasan twh oi spai dfo rco-operatin g arebot hdirectl y servingthei row ninterests . With what weter m solidarity thepositio n is somewhat different. The definitions given to solidarity in sociological literature vary widely. We would definesolidarit ya sth ewillingnes st osacrific eresource so rimmediat egratificatio n forth e welfare ofothers ,ou t of afeelin g ofunity . Itmean s doing somethingfo r otherswithou t the prospect ofmateria l reward. Wemak ea furthe r distinctionbetwee nmechanical an dorganic solidarity .Mechanica l solidarity entails sacrificing resources for a common goal. Organic solidarity is the sacrifice ofgratification s inorde r topreserv eth eunit yo fth egroup . Toestablis h under what conditions solidarity willemerg ean dsurviv ew emus tloo ka t itmor eclosely .W enot efirst o fal ltha t awillingnes st omak esacrifice s for othersimplie s thatthi swillingnes si sconfine dt ocertain particular others .O nthi spoin tou rdefinitio no f solidarity differs from that which Friedrichs (1960, p. 497) gave of altruism: 'the in hibitingo rcontrollin go fego' sbehaviou rt oprovid efo rth esatisfactio n ofalter' simpulse s or desires'. Whereas for Friedrichs altruism is a quality displayed by individuals everywherean dtoward severyone ,solidarit yi sa qualit yo findividual swit hregar dt ocer tainothers 2.I nrelatio nt oa nindividua lon ecanno t speako fsolidarit yi ngeneral ,bu tonl y ofhi ssolidarit ywit ha particula rgrou po rcategory .I ti squit epossibl efo r aperso nt ofee l more solidarity with onegrou ptha n with another ofwhic hh ei sals o amember . There ison e important conclusion to be drawn from this,namel y that solidarity isa conceptt ob eemploye d onlyi nrelatio n toa definit e groupo rcategory .Th einheren tim plication isals oimportant .It is thatgroups and collectivities compete for thesolidarity of theindividual who isa member ofboth. Thisinsigh t isno t new,bu t itha s not,perhaps , been sufficiently stressed. When Blau (1964, p. 285) says that 'social solidarity in macrostructures isalway sproblematical ,becaus eth eparticularisti c valuestha t unitein - groups create segregating boundaries between them in the higher collectivity', he is referring to conflicting solidarities which are not resolved by the solidarity with anem bracing social unit.I f socialpressur e isexercise d upon aperson' s solidarity(i.e .th e fact that hemake spar to fhi sresource savailabl et oth egroup )b yeac hgrou p(o rcollectivity ) to which hebelongs ,thi swil llea dt o rivalry between them.W ear e assuming here that: a. theseresource s arelimited , and that b. they are always allocated and areno t kept'i n reserve'. Assumption a.ma yb ereadil y acceptedbu tth epositio ni srathe rdifferen t withassump tion b.Whil e acknowledging that most people have allocated their resources, someo f theseallocation s areno ts oimportan t thatthei rre-distributio nwoul dprovok eimmediat e protest.This ,however , willhappe n ultimately. Peoplewh o belongt o many groups and collectivities willtr y tofind som ewa yo fac commodatingth edifferen t claimsmad eupo nthei rresources .Thi susuall ywork ss owel l indail ylif etha tthe y arescarcel y awareo fbein gpulle di nsevera ldirection sa tonce . The methodsuse d arebase d uponth ereplacemen to fon eresourc eb yanother .Time ,energy , careo rlov ear eusuall yreplace db ymoney ,althoug hothe rreplacement sar econceivable . Groups or organizations often employ people whose daily task it ist o promote thein terestso fth egrou pan dthe y arepai dfo r thiswork . Competitionfo r solidaritybetwee ngroup si schiefl y evidentdurin gmobilization ,whe n 102 a re-allocation of resources takes place, andi nthos ecircumstance s inwhic h àgrou po r organization lays a permanent, heavy claim upon the resources of the members. The sluggishness which accompanies the mobilization of a collectivity does not spring necessarily from any disagreement about the aims of that collectivity. It is much more likely that members are chary of incurring the reproaches of groups from which resources will havet o bewithdrawn . Therivalry theor y also explainswh y mobilization seems inevitably to be followed by a period of slackening interest and disenchantment (Van Doom, 1968,p . 8).Th e longer anew ,one-side d allocationlast sth emor eth eriva l groups suffer from it and the greater the insistence upon a new re-allocation, that is, a returnt o the former allocation. Allthi smean stha t mobilization willprov ever ydifficul t solon g asgroup swhic h fulfil an important function in the lives of the members continue to exist alongside the mobilized collectively. And there will be many such groups3. In a modern differentiated society, with its emphasis upon the right of the individual to develop whatever gifts he possesses toth efull , anindividua l will belongt oman y groups.If , then,th epressur eupo n individuals to preserve the mobilization is kept up, reluctance, disillusionment and passiveresistanc ewil lcontinu e to grow.I ti sonl ypossibl et o achievea ne wbalanc ei fal l rival solidarities aret o some extent respected. Finally,i tmus tb epointe dou tthat ,wit hregar dt oth eemergenc eo frival solidarities ,i t makeslittl edifferenc e whetherth egroup si nquestio nimping eupo neac hothe ri non ein dividual or whether one group,i ni tentirety , is swallowed upb y another,large r group. Rivalrywil loccu ri nbot hcases ,althoug hi nth efirs tinstanc egrou plink swil lten dt ob e moreindividualize d sinceth e combinationo fgroup st owhic hpeopl ebelon gvarie sfro m one individualt o another.Wherea si nth e second casether ei smor equestio no fa collec tivedecisio nregardin gth eallocatio no fresources ,i nth efirst th edecisio ni sa nindividua l one. Simmel (1969, p. 148-150) has already pointed out that from the historical view pointth esecon dfor mo fassociatio n isth eearlies tfor mo fmultipl egrou pmembership .I t 'enablesth e singleindividua lt o participate ina numbe ro fgroup swithou talienatin ghi m from his affiliation with his original locality'. In this respect our own finding that membership in friendly or kin groups tended not to crosscut affiliation in peasant syn- ' dicateso rco-operative s is highly significant. The implications to which we havejus treferre dconcerne d mechanicalsolidarity ,th e sacrifice ofresources .Bu ti sthi sth ekin do f solidarityrequire di na peasan torganization , be it a co-operative, a collective farm or an agricultural syndicate? It seems to metha t mechanical solidarity, endeavour for the common cause, is especially required during and shortly after the period of mobilization. It must be bornei n mindtha t every newly founded interest organization must of necessity detractfro mothe rinterest s andinteres t groups.Onc eth eorganizatio ni sfirmly o nit sfeet ,ther ei sa tendenc yt odemobilize .A co operative, for instance, begins to employ people to perform particular tasks and thus ceasest ob edependen to nth etroja nwor kperforme d byth emember si nthei rspar etime . Butnow ,assumin gtha tth eorganizatio ni sfunctionin gan dbeginnin gt obea rfrui t- adis tributionproble marises .I nadditio nt o acertai nmechanica lsolidarit yi nth efor mo fcon tributiono rparticipation ,th emember sar eals orequire dt ogiv eproo fo forganic solidari ty. Inothe rword sthe yar erequire dt orefrai nfro mharmin gth eorganizatio nb yrefusin g to abide by the distribution of tasks or the allocation ofbenefits . They must accept the 103 results and the procedures employed in settling differences. Thelonge r an organization exists and grows in complexity, and the larger it is, the more differentiated it must necessarily be.I n other words,ther ewil lb emor especializatio n oflabou r and probably more variation in the rates of pay. This will bring about a corresponding need for in creased organic solidarity.Th eunit s(member so rsub-groups )wil lhav et orecogniz eth e justice ofth e exchange relationships inwhic h they areinvolved . It is clear that, as this unavoidable differentiation increases, the need for organic solidaritywil lgrow .Bu ta tth esam etim ether ei sa nincreasin gprobabilit ytha tthos ewh o consider themselves, for whatever reason, badly done by in the distribution, willjoi n together (mobilization, mechanical solidarity) to improve their position. The organiza tion,th esocia lsyste mi nwhic hthi soccurs ,ca nsurvive ,an dfin da ne wke yt odistributio n just solon ga sth equarre li sthrashe dou twithi nth eframewor k establishedb yth erules .I f this framework is breached - iffights brea k out or a group decides to quit - then the system may cease to be viable. Thus, a functioning social system characterized by differentiation hastw omai nrequirement s- acertai ndegre eo fmechanica lsolidarit yan d a fairly large measure of organic solidarity. Neither of these can betake n for granted; they can grow or they can decline. Both arethreatene d by themechanica l solidarityo f sub-groups. Socialist societies,a t least inth epast ,tende d to seekt o solvethi sproble m ofbalanc e bydenyin gthi sdifferentiation , bycentralizin gdecision srathe rtha nb yevolvin gprocesse s of deliberation and compromisefirmly anchore d inth econstitution . In other wordsth e accent waslai d upon afurthe r extension ofth e social system with which,i t washoped , the individual felt most solidary. A certain degree of coercion was even resorted toi n order to obtain thedesire d behaviour. These attempts metwit hlittl esuccess .Th elarge r thesocia luni twithi n whichmechanica l solidarity isrequired ,th emor esub-group sther e will be with divergent objectives and, in consequence, the more conflicting sub- solidarities.Thi swil lmak emechanica lsolidarit ymor edifficul t toachiev ean di twil lb eal l themor eimportan t toreplac e this mechanical solidarity by organic solidarity. Bywa yo fhypothesi sw epostulat eher etha ti na differentiate d socialsystem ,a mixtur e of mechanical and organic solidarity is a functional requirement for development. Membersmus t bewillin gt o strivefo r commongoal san db eabl et o accepta distributio n of advantages arrived at on the basis ofconsultation . Wema y assumetha tth edistribu tion of their resources (over system objectives and sub-system objectives) and of gratifications (throughout the sub-systems or units)wil l only be accepted voluntarilyi f they areconsidere djust .Th eide ao fwha ti sjus t ist o someexten tculturall y determined butther ei sa limi tt oth eideologica lmanipulatio n towhic hi tca nb esubjected .A secon d hypothesisi stha tth eexten tt owhic ha distributio n(o fresource so rgratifications )i scon sideredjust ,depend supo nth edegre ei nwhic hth eunit sparticipat ei nth edecisio nmakin g whichdetermine sthi s distribution andthu s alsoupo nth eexten tt owhic h anadministra tion isliabl et o sanction. In general,however ,th e process ofconsultatio n and compromisedescribe d abovea s anidea li sno tconstan tbu toccur sonl ysporadically .Ther ewil lb eperiod si nwhic ha par ticulardistributio n oftask s andreward si slai ddow nan dcome st ob eregarde da sa norm . Later,thi snor m willno t be subject to continuing consultation and compromise. 104 Inth e local communities in which co-operatives and collective farms arese t upther e are often as yet no norms governing the behaviour to be expected of members of such organizations. The solidarity required of villagers embraces compliance with existing norms, and does not take into account all possible or conceivable norms. A modern organization also requires that members observe,certai nrule s governing the division of labour, the distribution of produce and the supervision of the various tasks (see Dore, 1971), ruleswhic heithe rd ono t exist atal li n atraditiona l society orar edifferentl y for mulated. Iti stherefor eno ta seas yt ograf ta moder nco-operativ estructur eupo na tightl y knit peasant community as Fais Borda (1970) would seem to suggest. Therei s thead ditional factortha ttraditiona l solidarityi schiefl ymechanical ,tha ti st osay ,i tinhibit sth e peasants from pursuing their individual interests, which in itself is a condition of agricultural development Consequently agrowt hi nindividualis m isofte n accompanied by a decline in traditional solidarity, a transition 'from brotherhood to otherhood' as Chodak (1972) termedit . Solidary behaviour, the willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of others,i s inth e first instance a gift and wekno w from the anthropological literature(e.g . Mauss, 1967) that a gift creates obligations for the recipient. He must reciprocate in some way. In a very worthwhile article Gouldner (1960)ha spointe dou ttha treciprocit y appearst ob ea general human norm, which, moreover, is implicitly assumed in functional theory. If a person displays solidarity with a group this can be very functional for that group,bu t does not explain why this solidary behaviour persists. The real reason is that the in dividual displaying solidarityi srecompensed .Wha t areth eadvantage swit hwhic hothe r groupmember sca nan dmus trewar dsolidarity ?On efor mo fcompensatio ni s reciproci ty in solidary behaviour. This reciprocity assumes that the group in question already recognizes normsgovernin g the behaviour ofmember so f associations.Anothe rfor mo f return consists in giving prestige to the solidary individual and, not infrequently, a leadership function as well. This will occur chiefly where norms androle s have not yet been elaborated. Finally, another possibility is failure to recognize the sacrifice. The others will then continue to wonder suspiciously just what selfish gain the solidary in dividual aspiresto . At this point it seems advisable torecapitulat e brieflyth emos t importantfindings w e have made thus far: - Peasant organizations cannot function solely on the basiso f theinterest , themateria l reward ofth emembers .Mechanica l solidarity isrequire di nth einitia l period,an da sth e differentiation oftask san dreward swithi nth eorganizatio nincrease ss oto odoe sth enee d for organic solidarity. - Both themechanica l andth eorgani c solidarity ofth emember swit h such anorganiza tion is impaired by a strong mechanical solidarity within sub-groups. - The best distribution of rights and obligations is that which is regarded asjus t and accepted asa norm.Participatio n byunit s andsub-group si ndecision s affecting thisdis tribution appears to beth e best way of achieving this. - Onth eothe rhan da noutsid e answert oth equestio no fwha ti sjus tan dwha tscop eth e valueo fjustic eough tt ohav ema yals ob eaccepted .I nthi scas ew ear edealin gwit hwha t may becalle d growing political awareness.This ,however ,i sa cultura linnovatio nwhic h hadno tye tbee nadopte db yth emajorit yo fChilea npeasant sa tth etime o fou rresearch . - In addition to participation andth e adoption of ane w symbolic content for particular 105 values,ther e were in Chile other important bases of solidarity for transforming theim posedstatute sint olegitimat enorms .Thes einclude danothe rvalue -th ecommo nwelfar e - affective ties,reciprocity ,wit hit saccompanyin gsocia lcontrol ,an dfinally, charismati c leadership. A personal, affective relationship exists with such a leader; people will not desert him and ifh esay s that athin gmus tb edon ethe ni ti sdone .H emake sth enorm s appearmor elegitimat eb yimbuin gthe mwit ha religiou so rpolitica laura .Fro mBrazi li n particular examples have emerged of charismatic leaders, religious prophets, who succeededi nchangin gth ebehaviou ro flarg egroup so fpeasant si na comparativel yshor t time (Queiroz, 1965).Chil e did possess peasant leaders with some charisma, but their message was political, not religious and they did not found any independent com munities.Thei r charisma had influence, but in asmalle r circle,amon gthos ewit hwho m theyha dconsiderabl econtac ta sadministrators .T othes epeopl ethe yoffere d anexampl e and probably someo fthei r values rubbed off onthem . - Very littlei sknow n as yet about thewa y inwhic h the circle ofpeopl ewit hwho mon e identifies enlarges. Generally speaking this identification is preceded by economic in tegration. Sociological literature speaks of the lengthening of the chains of in terdependence(Elias , 1969)an do fth eemergenc e oforgani csolidarit y asth edivisio no f labour progresses. Anthropologists speak of an extension ofth e'mora l community'.I n cultures where the chains of interdependence have grown long, the socialization of children appearst ob eaccompanie d by atendenc yt oaccep tresponsibilit ywhic hrelate s not somuc ht o existing groupso r associationsbu tt omembershi po fassociation si nth e abstract. This trend then automatically embraces whatever new associations the in dividualma yjoin ;th eac to fbecomin ga membe rimplie stha tth eindividua lwil lcompl y withth eobtainin g concretenorms . 8.4 Factorswhic hinfluenc e solidarity In this section I intend,wit h the aid ofexample sderive d from thepractic eo fChilea n peasantorganizations ,t oillustrat ethos efactor swhic heithe rhel po rhinde rth egrowt ho f solidarity amongmembers .I tmus tb eobserve dtha ti nactua lpractice ,severa lfactor sar e involved at one andth e sametime .Th eaccompanyin g diagram isintende d primarily to givea comprehensiv evie wo fth emai nfactor s which appearedt ocontribut epositivel yo r negatively to solidarity. Since the organizations were stilli n an initial stageo fdevelop ment there was not yet much question of differentiation among the members. The problem wasrathe r one ofmechanica l solidarity (givingmore )tha no forgani c(allowin g theothe r totak emore) . As qualitativeresearc h methods wereemploye dt o study thisproble m the arrowsin dicate positive or negative correlations which I imagine would be discovered if the variables weremeasure d quantitatively. They arei nfac t hypotheses. 8.4.1 Theinstrumental value ofthe association Ina nearlie r sectionw edistinguishe d betweenth eac to fco-operatio nperforme d outo f self-interest and that which involves a sacrifice of resources. Although it is difficult to render thisdistinctio n operational,I a mconvince dtha tmembe rsolidarit ywa snoticabl y greater wherever there was a clearer identitybetween self-interest and communal in- 106 correlation' necessity for betweenindi co-operationa - vidualeffor t risingfro m andrewar d cropo rnatura l circumstances z responsibility instrumental presenceo f presenceo f valueo fth e skilled strongly solid association for leadership ary sub-groups themembe r (basedo nkin ship,locality , politicalviews ) degreeo fin strumentalsuc ceso fth e association presenceo f localopponen t participation mechanicalsolidarit y indecisio n + making +/.i participation andequalit y accepted asvalue s effortst o affection create •leftist' political consciousness presenceo f smallprimar y status charismatic workgroupa s differences leader unitreceivin g between reward members terest. I have already remarked on several occasions that the main reason why my agricultural worker informants accepted a communal farm was their expectation of material progress for themselves. The economic success of a peasant organization is chiefly important because on it depends the acceptance of the organization by the members and their solidarity. When I asked the small peasant farmers whether they would beprepare dt o co-operatei nth ecommuna l exploitationo fa fund oi finvited ,thei r affirmative answerwa sver yofte ncouche di nterm so fself-interest :'Tha twa ya tleas tI' d have something of my own', 'that would mean more land', 'we'd get more credit',*i t would be the only way to get some capital', or 'yes, for well turnthe m into individual farms'. Identityo finterest si sals oclea r wherethe possibility ofindividual progress islacking. INDAP personnel repeatedly noticed that the small, independent peasants appeared moreincline dtoward s co-operation inth eisolate darea so fa provinc ewher enatura lcir cumstances were less favourable than in the areas close to the large cities. There also seemed to be a greater inclination towards co-operation on farms where (part of) the production process displayed the character of indivisibility, that is to say, had to be achieved through co-operation.I nothe rword swillingnes st oco-operat eseeme dgreate r 107 wherever the possibility of an individual solution to problems appeared less.Th ecam e can be said ofth enumerous ,wide-sprea d exampleswhic h camet om ynotic eo fgroup s whichha dco-operate dt obuil da school ,improv ea road ,hir ea truck .Man yo fm yinfor mants thought indeed that this co-operation could easily befocusse d upon other goals but Ithough trathe r that suchexample s concerned casesi nwhich ,fo r someloca lreaso n or another,communa lan dindividua linterest sha doverlappe di na manne rtha twa sclea r toall . The clarity of interest identity also increases when there is a stronger correlation betweenindividua lachievemen t andreward .Thi sproble moccurre di nth easentamiento s where the members were said to show little interest in acquiring new skills sincethe y claimed suchtrainin g did not better their lotfinancially. The y continuedt oreceiv ethei r day's payjus t likeeveryon eelse .I na numbe ro fasentamiento sth epeasant sthemselve s tried todra w upa scal eo fremuneratio n for different activities.I tisn' teasy ,however ,t o find agoo dcriterio nfo r sucha scal eonc eth emarke tprice shav ebee nabandoned .I tcan not bedispute d though that the asentados felt the need for a closer and more accurate relationshipbetwee npersona l reward andpersona lachievement .A ver yclea rindicatio n of thiswa sth espontaneou s settingu po fsmal lwor kgroup si n anumbe r of asentamien tos,eac h concerned withrunnin g onesectio n ofth efarm , or farming onesectio n ofth e land.Th emor ethei r section produced, thehighe r their pay. Whati sth esignificanc eo fthi spreferenc efo ra clos erelationshi pbetwee nachievemen t and reward? It is,i nth efirst place ,tha tth eachievemen ti sperforme d witha vie wt oth e reward.W ekne wthi s already; thepeasant s accepted thecommuna l farm becausethe y expectedt od obette rou to fi tmaterially .Bu ti tals omean stha tth epeasant sdistinguishe d between a reward earned through personal effort and ashar ei nth ejoin tproduction .I n smallwor k groups,i nwhic hi ti smuc heasie rt oexercis esocia lcontrol ,th eproductio ni s nolonge r acollectiv egoo d for whichther e isn onee dt o exertonesel f inorde rt oobtai n one'sshare 4. Thecar elavishe db yasentado so nthei row npiec eo flan di sa wel lknow nphenomeno n oncollectiv efarms .I ti sals ounderstandabl ewhe non econsider stha tthes elittl eplots ,th e produce ofwhic hi sno t acollectiv egoo di nOlson' ssense ,contribut ea larg eshar eo fth e family income. During the Frei period there were asentamientos where upt o\ ofth efamil y income was produced on these pieces of land (de Ranitz &d eRanitz , 1972)5.I n an economic study of 16asentamientos , Jolly etal. (1970,p .32 )foun d thatth eincom eproduce do n individual pieces oflan d or usingth epeasant' s ownanimal s constituted onth e average 23% o fth egros sfamil y income. Iti sth ewive si nparticula rwh ourg ethei rhusband sno t to neglect the family plot. Not only arethe y lessfamilia r with the running ofth easen - tamiento, they haven o participating role in it either;the y represent thefamil y interest. Thus, this conflict of interests becomes at the same time a conflict of solidarity. This much becomes evident from the remarkable fact that in some asentamientos the machines belonging to the collective farm could be used gratis for tilling the privately workedpiece so fland .Thi si sa conceale dsubsid yo nth epar t ofth ecollectivit yt oth ein dividual members and can onlyb eexplaine d byassumin gtha teveryon ei sconvince do f the legitimacy ofworkin g for thefamil y interest. There is yet another example.I n a certain asentamientoth e general council decided against makingth eson so fth easentado ssocio slaborale s(employe ewit hcertai n rights), 108 arguingtha tsom e families(wit hman y adultsons )woul dhav ea considerabl e advantage over others (with only a few sons). This decision shows very clearly that die asentados recognized both a clasho finterest s and a conflict of solidarity. The fact that the conflict of interestsproceed s inpar tfro mth echaracte ro f collective good possessedb yth eproduc to fth easentamiento ,appear sfro m acomplain tfrequentl y made by asentados. They felt victimized by the lazy workers, those who skimpedthei r work but stillreceive dth esam epaymen tfro mth eadministration . Clearlythi s argument could easilytur nint oa rationalizatio n forth egoo dworker st od oles stha nthei rbest .Th e diverse observations devoted by Lehmann (1972) to some of the above-mentioned phenomena, show thatth etensio n persistedunde rAllende' sregime . In other associations - co-operatives and syndicates- the clash of interests between the individual (family) and the collectivity, assumed more the character of a conflict of solidarity.I encountere dquit ea numbe ro fpeasan tleader swh osai dtha tthei rwive swer e not very favourably impressed bythei ractivitie ssinc ethes esometime sentaile da coupl e of weeksabsenc e fromhome , orth eneglec to fthei row nprivat elittl epiece so fland .On e ofthe m saidtha thi sfriend s andneighbour s helpedhi mo nhi sfarm ,anothe rtha thi swif e objected to his seeking re-election in one particular year. A third- a member of asyn dicate board- calculated for meho w muchh eha dlos tfinanciall y during ayea ro nth e board, while others merely complained about this but didn't mention any figures. A leader- atnationa lleve l- saidtha ti fh ewer emarried ,h ewoul dneve rb e ablet odevot e so much time to his administrative work unless he received adequate recompense. The landownersto oexploite dthi sconflic t ofinterests ,notabl yb yprovokin gi tdeliberately .I n several cases thewive so f theagricultura lworker swer epersuade dt ous ethei r influence topreven tthei rhusband sfro morganizing .I tals ooccurre d- althoughthes ewer eexcep tional cases- that aleade r wasbribe db yth e owner:a large rpiec eo flan dwa splace da t hisdisposa l orh ewa s offered betterterm so femployment . Onsom eo fth efarm s- often thesmalle rone s- theowne rmad esur etha thi swag eris ewa sjus ta littl ehighe rtha ntha t demanded by the syndicate. There were farms which made it their policy to treatthen - workers so well that the arguments of the syndical organizers fell upon deaf ears. The syndicatemember sthemselve sha dth egenera lfeelin gtha tth enon-member so nth efarm s were favoured, given the easiestjob s and better working conditions. 8.4.2 The common opponent The existence of an obvious common opponent can also underline the identity of in terests and lead to increased solidarity. Many of my informants observed that thesyn dicatera ni ncycle s ofactivit y andlull .Th eactivit ywa sconcentrate di nthos emonth si n which new wage demandswer e drawnu p anddiscusse d withth emember s- anda ne w collectiveworking'arrangemen twa sagree dupo nwit hth elandowner si nth ecommunity . Suchactivitie sno tinfrequentl yterminate di na strike .Durin gothe rconflict s too,suc ha s theoccupatio n of farms,th e members displayed alarg e measure of solidarity, but once peacewa s signedth esyndicat emigh t spendmonth sjus tbarel ytickin gover .Durin gcon flicts, groupaction ,wit hth evisibl eemotionalit y andsocia lcontro linvolve dan dth epar ticipating role of the women, in short, the dramatized identity of interests, was un doubtedly a factor conducive to solidarity. 109 8.4.3 Supportfor certain values: equality,justice, participation The most solidary peasants I encountered in Chile were individuals who wanted to realizethes ethre evalue sfo r allpeasants .I nnearl yever ycas ethe ywer eals oleaders ,tha t ist osay ,thei rsolidarit ywa srewarde dwit ha hig hposition . Theywer erathe rexceptional . Generally speaking, the new,peasantry-wid e goals derived from these values wereno t deemed important byth emajorit y ofpeasants .Thi sdoe sno tmea ntha tthe y advocated inequality or non-participation, but they acted as though the new ways of striving for equality,justic ean dparticipatio n werematter so fn oparticula rconcer nt othem .A good dealo fwor kwoul dhav et ob edon et ojol tthe mint oawareness .Take ni ngenera lth ewa y in which these values were propagated by the promotors of INDAP and other organizationslef t mucht ob edesired .The yseeme dt orel yo nsomethin gi nth enatur eo fa sermonwhic hmigh tb eo fa religiou so rpolitica lnatur eaccordin gt oth econvictio no fth e promotor, butwhich ,s ofa r asth epeasant swer econcerned ,seeme dt og oi non eea ran d outth eother .Muc hmor eeffectiv e wasth eexampl ewhic hsom eleader s- anda fe wo fth e promotors- gave.I tconsiste do faction ,no ttalk ,althoug hthe ymad ethei ropinion sclea r aswell . Theirexampl einspire dimitatio n amongothe rindividuals ,rathe rtha namon gth e group asa whole .Psychologist shav eindee ddiscovere dtha t altruisticbehaviou rca nb e promoted by example(cf . Wright, 1971,pp . 134-135). It did not always appear necessary that an entire group should cherishthes evalues . Therewer ecase si nwhic h a committee,tw oo r threepeople ,persuade dthei r association to show solidarity with another group. There wereother s in which the committee of a municipal syndicate managed to organize a successful strike in protest against thedis missalo fon esingl ema nsomewher eo n afundo , ama n completelyunknow nt o90 %o f themembers .I nthes ecase sa suggestio n madeb y Etzioni(1968 ,p . 101)i n asomewha t different connection seems valid. He suggests that cohesion between the members of different associationsi sa functio n ofth ecohesio nbetwee nthei rleaders .Thi swa scertain lytru ei nthos ecase swhic hI observedmyself . 8.4.4 Affection For the majority of Chilean peasants, affection seemed an important factor in promoting solidarity. It was not so much that the affection between the members of associations or collectivitieswa si n anywa yremarkable ,bu trathe r thatth econtrar yo f affection - mistrust, antipathy - could seriously weaken an organization. In Chapter 6 wesa walread ytha ta person' saffiliatio n toa co-operativ eo rsyndicat ewa softe n accom panied byth e affiliation ofhi sfriend s andrelatives .I ti sth egrou po ffriend s orrelative s thatjoins .Fo r an explanation ofthi sw emus ttur nt oSimme l(1969 )wh oobserve dtha t membershipi ntw ogroup slik ethi si sno tindividualizing .A conflic to fsolidarit yma ystil l occuri fth elarge rgrou pwishe st og oon ewa yan dth esmalle r another,bu ti ti sno tacut e from thever youtset .Thi side ai sinterprete d ina ver ypregnan t fashion by aresponden t who had left the syndicate again: 'I felt lonely,I wasth eonl yon efro m homewh oha d joined.' Itma ywel lb ethat ,a sEtzion i(1968 ,p . 100ff) asserts ,th eaffectiv e relationships within sub-groups foster the cohesion of the association, that one is dealing with an expansion ofth e affective relationships. The importance of affection within small groups: board members of associations, 110 small committees,smal lproductio ngroups ,wa sclear .Th eobserve rbecome s awaretha t the committees and groups whichfunctio n well arethos ei nwhic h most ofth e members are bound by ties of affection. Many of the small production groups which came into beingthroug hco-option ,consiste do frelatives ,friends ,an dth eod dneighbour .Th ereaso n given for this is 'these arepeopl e Ica n trust'. Inth ebes tcommittee s Iobserve d atwor k the affection between themember s was obvious. The difficulties arise when affection dies,eithe rbecaus e peoplebegi nt o mistrust each otherregardles so rt osuspec teac hothe ro flaziness ,justifiabl y ornot .Thi shappen swhe n functional demands aremad e uponth e co-operative effort for whichth e affective group possesses no norms. The group then loses the ability to work well together. In one production groupwher ether ewa sno t enoughwor kt ogiv eeveryon ea ful lday' semploy ment tensions ran so high that shots were fired (they fortunately missed). In another, whichha dstarte dou tver yenthusiastically , abreac hthreatene dbetwee nth eyounge ran d the older members. A numbero f theyounge r memberswante d to leave. In yet another therewa sa whol edram awhe na pi gwa sfoun dt ob emissin gafte rth eretur no fon eo fth e members who had been absent. The committees too, especially those of the co operatives, can prove breeding groundsfo r suspicion. Oneo rmor eo fth emember smay ' have to visit Santiago or the provincial capital once a week for business with various government offices. For this he is given expense money and the others suspect him of lining his own pockets with it. He is suspect too because these visits teach him the bureaucratic tricks ofth etrad e andmak ehi mindispensable .(I non ecas e Icam e across this was in fact done deliberately. The chairman made the man who had accompanied him wait in the corridor until he had finished his conversation withth e official.) Finally therei s thequestio n of politics, which we willretur nt olater . Affection is much more a relationship between individualstha nbetwee nrol ebearers . We have already pointed out that Chileanpeasant s werehardl y ablet ooffe r criticism - oraccep ti t- asbearer so fa role .Th eperso ncriticize dconsidere dtha th eha dsuffere d an injuryt oth ehonou ran ddignit yo fhi sentir eperson ,instea do fmerel yon easpec to fit .H e reacted to criticism with rage, disappointment, threats that he would chuck thejo b or with a counter attack. Affection makes criticism of role fulfillment even more difficult than italread yis .Wherea si nth eprecedin gparagraph sw erecognize dth eadvantage s of working insmal l co-operativeunits ,th eprominen trol ewhic haffectio n plays herea sth e basis of solidarity is more of a disadvantage. It was also true that the effectiveness of the promotors of INDAP and CORA depended upon their personal relationships with the peasants. They too could make themselvesdislike dan dmistrusted ,bu tthe yha don eadvantage .I twa sfro mthem'tha tal l kindso f governmental favours flowed and so the peasants, upt o acertai npoint ,ha dt o keepo n the right side!o fthem . Yet affection need not permanently determine solidarity in this way. We asked the agricultural workerswho mw eha dbee nresearchin gt o arrangei nsequenc ea numbe ro f groups and collectivities according to theties the y felt with them.Th einterestin gfac t is thatthos emember swh oclaime d mostsolidarit y withth ecampesino s(th epeasan tclass) , tended moreoften , in comparison withth erest ,t ohav efriend swh ower eno tthemselve s memberso fth esyndicat e(2 5% against4. 4% and4. 6% )an dles softe nt ohav erelative s on thefund o whower e allmember sthemselve s(16 %agains t 24% an d4 5%) .Thi sma y indicate that peasant class awareness may replace affection as a motive for affiliation. Ill Such class conscious peoplejoi n without bothering what their friends andrelative s do: that is up to them. Even if they don't join this is evidently no reason for ending the friendship. 8.4.5 Compensations: reciprocity,prestige, leadership andsuspicion Solidarityi sa gif t whichcreate sa nobligation .Thi sobligatio nma yb eredeeme di ntw o ways;b y evincing reciprocity or by conferring prestige uponth egiver . Theimportanc eo freciprocit ybecam eparticularl y cleara tth emomen ti twa sfoun dt o belacking .A committe e member might feel deeply disappointed ifth emember sdi dno t fulfil theirobligations ,i ffo rinstanc ethe yignore dth ecommittee' ssummon st ocom ean d helprebuildin g a shed,o r failed to attend meetings.No t only did hethin k thatthe yha d fallen down on their obligation; he also appeared to feel himself absolved of his own obligation.Th efeelin go fbein gpu tupon ,whic hcoul dsprin gu pver yeasil yi nproductio n groups,coul di nfac t frequently betrace d back toa lac ko freciprocity ,rea lo rimagined , toth eide atha tth eothe rperso nwa sdoin gles stha nh eought . Prestigei sa rewar dcon ferred uponthos ewh orende rconsiderabl eservic et oa group .O na haciend ai ti sth eper son whoopenl y urgesresistanc e toth epatron ,wh oshow shimsel funafrai d ofreprisal s andwh oi scapabl eo fstandin gu pfo rhimsel fdurin gnegotiations .I nth easentamiento si t is he whodisplay sth e best managerial qualities.I nth eco-operative s thesequalitie s are importanttoo ,bu tco-operative sremai nmuc hmor edependen to ngovernmenta lsupport . Very few board members of co-operatives hadth evision ,th eorganizin g talent andth e perseverance to start up and nurse along anorganizatio n embracing oneo r morecom munities and capable ofbecomin g aver ylarg eenterpris eindeed .Man y board members wereindee dconvince do fth enecessit yfo rco-operation ,wer ever yzealou san ddedicate d inpreachin gth egoo dnew san di nfoundin g anorganization ,bu twer ethe n ata los swha t tod onext .The ytoo k theprestig ethe y received asthei r due,the y allowedthemselve st o be elected and sent as delegates to assemblies of federative associations,the y spokeo f their sacrifices, but for theres tthe ywer eles stha n effective. Andyet ,mor etha n once,i t appeared thatthi skin do fma nha dalread yattempte di nth epas tt ose tu pa co-operativ e inhi scommunity .H emean twell ,bu tha dn oide aho wt oprocee d onceth eco-operativ e was actually there, and it sometimes seemed that by heaping him with prestige, the membersha d alsorendere d himharmless ;the y had fulfilled theirobligations . In acoupl eo f cases,however ,suc ha boar d member- often thechairma n- didhav e ideaso n howt oproceed . Atracto r wasthe nbough ti ncommon ,o r atruck ;a n abattoir was built or a good project drawn up in order to obtain credit from INDAP. In these casesth eleader softe n had somethingcharismati c aboutthem :the yexude d forcefulness. Sincethe ydi dmore ,th emember sha dt od omor ei nreturn ;th emer egrantin go fprestig e was not enough.Anothe r leader saido fhimsel f that heacte d likea dictato r inhi scom mittee. He himself set about collecting contributions, and refused to be fobbed off. However, he also made sure that the necessary production inputs were available. He asked INDAP for twicea smuc ha sth emember so fhi scommitte eha drequeste d him.I f therewa sa shortag ethe nof , for instance,salitr elate ri nth eyear ,h ecoul d sayt oa non - member:wh ydon' t youjoi nan d11 1 seetha tyo uge t4 0sack so fsalitr etomorro w(no ti n amonth ,o riïr a week ,bu ttomorrow!) .H emad egoo dhi spromis etoo, s otha tth eperso n in question waslef t standing open-mouthed. Heha di nconsequenc e aconsiderabl e hold 112 overhi speople .Th emember so fth e committee paidbac kthei rloans ,attende d meetings andpai du pthei rfees .Thi skin do fleade rofte nsucceede di nturnin gth eco-operativ eint o a not inconsiderable 'business'. The objection, however, was that he made himself in dispensable. Sometimes hewa s not awareo fthis . He was so preoccupied withth ebud ding business and so afraid of seeing what he had built up destroyed, that he couldn't bring himself to run the risk that others might make the wrong decisions. Sometimes, though, it was deliberate policy. The leader then monopolized information, took the credit for what another committee member had done, played off different local groups againsteac h other andallowe d himselft o bere-electe d inspit eo f opposition. I attended a meeting of aboar dwhic hha don eo fthes e almostcharismati cleader s as its chairman, and itwa s plaint o seetha tth eleade r hadhi s fellow board memberso n a tightrein .Ther ewa sn o agenda;h edecide dwha twa st ob ediscussed .Ever ypoin ti nth e agenda inspired him to one ormor elon g andofte n amusing anecdotes. Throughout all thishi sfello wboar dmember sclearl yshowe dthei rimpatience ;on eo fthe meve nbega nt o read the newspaper. And yet it was always the leader who announced that they were about to proceed to the next point. Such 'indispensable' leaders hamper member par ticipation andthu s thenecessar y training of fellow boardmembers . 'Theyar ereall yes sential atth ebeginning, 'sai da nINDA Ppromotor ,'bu tlate ri ti simpossibl et oge tthe m towor kdemocraticall yan dt otak eprid ei nmakin gthemselve sdispensable' 6. Dependence uponon ema ni sdangerou sfo ra norganization ,i fonly becaus etha tma n isno tinvulnerable . Heca nmak ea mistake ndecision ,wit hwhic hh emus tb eidentifie db y virtueo fhi sposition .A mistak elik ethi srelieve sth eother so fsom eo fthei robligatio nan d they feel justified in becoming less active. Another possibility is that the co-operative becomes solarg etha tloca l shopkeepers andtradesme nfee lthei rinterest sthreatene dan d grow hostile.Thei rhostilit y willcertainl ytak eth efor mo fspreadin grumour san dgossi p aboutth eleader .Onc e such acampaig n hasbegu nth emember sar eunde rpressur efro m different sides to believe one version of a story or another. Suspicion is constantly lurking.I nactua lfac tpu rquantitativ edat ao nleader sshowe d that, generally speaking, they had enjoyed certain advantages more than had the members. At one meeting- as a reactiono nth epar to fth eboar do f aco-operativ e toa pieceo fgossi pdoin g theround s- details wererea dou tconcernin gthos eindividual sfo r whom thelorr y haddrive n duringth e past month, andwha tha d beenpai dfo r theload s carried.I tprove dtha tb yfa rth emos to fth etrip sha dbee nfo rth echairma nan dmanage r of the co-operative. In this case the book-keeping was very competent but elsewherei t was quite common for appointments to be made by word of mouth, or notes to be scribbled on loose sheets of paper.Thi s madei t practically impossible for anyordinar y member to distinguish any more between honesty anddeception . Ready suspicion ab solvedth emembe rfro m anyfurthe robligation stoward sth esuspec tleader .Hi ssolidari tywa sdenie dan ds odi dno thav et ob ereciprocated 7. 8.4J6 Social control I have already pointedou t thatth e peasants tendedt o criticizeo rreceiv ecriticis m as individuals rathertha na s role-bearers. This madeconstructiv e criticism practically im possible.Ofte n agrievanc ewa sbottle du pfo rfa rto olon gan dwhe ni tfinally burs tloose , a blazing quarrelimmediatel y developed. Thepeasant s have noide a how to returnthe n 113 to normalrelationships , said anINDA P official. Thequarrel swhic hma yaris ebetwee ntw oindividual sar eal lth emor edisturbin gsinc e both parties appeal to the solidarity groups which support them, whether relatives or friends. In this way a conflict spreads very rapidly.Th eunintentiona lresul t ofthi swa s thati nhardl y asingl eco-operativ edi dth eofficia l controlcommissio nfunctio n properly. In a number of co-operatives there was no control either on the fulfilment of obligations such as the payment of the subscription in full. In one co-operative in Colchagua whose books I managed to look into,i t appeared that only 2o r 3% o f the members were fully paid up.Man y members had paid only 10%,20 %o r 50%o fth e money,an dthi swa sno tbecaus ethe yha donl yrecentl yjoined .Mos to fthe mhadn' tpai d anythingfo r two years.I estimate dtha t theco-operativ e had stillt oge ti nabou t70 %o f the amount owing,a su mlarg eenoug ht o payfo r a coupleo ftractors . If effective social control in theco-operativ e enterprises wasofte n conspicuous byit s absence,wher ei tdi doccu ri twa ssometime squit edrastic .I non eco-operativ ewhic hwa s flourishing quitewel lfro m theeconomi cpoin to fview ,abou tte nmember swer eexpelle d in the course oftw oyears .Som eo fthes ewer ei nfac t founder-members. Thetw omos t frequent reasonsgive nwer etha tthe yha dblackene dth echaracte r ofa boar dmembe ro r themanager ,o rtha tdurin gharves ttim ethe yha dno thire da threshin gmachin efro mth e co-operative but had brought one in from outside.I t was principally those leaderswh o acted out of strong ideological conviction who dared to exercise social control and thereby teetered onth eedg eo f paternalism. Oneo fth ebes tINDA Ppromotor sI me ti nChil etol dm etha th eha d acertai nmetho d ofintervenin gwhe nthing sthreatene dt og owron gi nth eco-operativ eo fwhic hh ewa si n charge.H ewaite dunti lth esituatio nwa ss odesperat etha ta tleas tth eboar d andsom eo f themember srealize dtha tth eco-operativ ewoul dfai li f somethingweren' tdon equickly . This was when he steppedi nwit hhi s suggestions.'Onl y then arethe y willingt o accept anything from you',h e said.'I f you approach them earlier they won'tlisten. ' Allthi sdoe s not meantha t there ishardl y any socialcontrol .Ther eis ,bu ti ti seithe r non-verbalo rtake sth efor m ofa passin gjok eo r astor y doingth erounds .Onl y seldom doesth eassociatio n applyit sstatutor y sanctions.Wha tsocia lcontro lther ei si seffective , but theindirec t wayi nwhic hi ti sapplie d meanstha ti ti sparticularl y effective insmalle r groups. 8.4.7 Brakingfactors: differences instatus and sub-group solidarity The mechanical solidarity of agrou pi simpaire d if differences instatu s occur among the members,tha t is,rea lo r supposed differences ininterest . I encountered the following examples of categorical interest conflicts within the Chilean peasant associations. Inth e asentamientos there wasth eclea r conflict between seasonalworker sdraw n from outside andth eactua lmembers .Case soccurre d inwhic h the asentados were as harsh in dealing with striking workers as had been the landed proprietors.The y attempted tobrea k thestrik eb ymobilizin gthei rwive san dchildre nt o save the harvest. In most syndicates a conflict of interests developed if some of the membersbecam easentados .Th elatte rusuall ylef tth esyndicat eafte r atime ,on eo fthei r reasonsbein gtha tthei rcontributio nwa sn olonge rpai dfo rthem .Onl yoccasionall ydi dI encounter a group ofasentado swh oconsidere d itthei r dutyt ohel pthei r ex-colleagues 114 J. • ,•.'!. become asentados themselves andfo rthi sreaso nremaine di nth esyndicate . Frequently too those workers who!preferre d to remain onth e patron'sréserv arathe rtha njoi n the asentamiento, weret o be found among the supervisory personnel. These hadals o been the highest paid workers on the fundo. De Ranitz &d e Ranitz (1972) found that those asentadosWh oha dsee nthei rrelativ eadvantag eove rthei rtraditiona lgroup so freferenc e diminished wereth eleas t satisfied withlan d reform. In the co-operatives there was some conflict of interest between agricultural workers and independent peasants onth eon e hand andbetwee n theco-operativ e asa whol e and itscomponen t productiongroup so nth eother .Th eprimar yquestio nwas ,t owhic htask s shouldth eco-operativ egiv epriority ,t oprovidin gchea pconsume rgood so rt obolsterin g upproduction . While not givingrise t o actual conflict, thisdilemm adi dcaus e somedis satisfaction. Unfortunately thepositio n inChil ei n 1970wa ssuc htha tther ewa sa certai n danger in a co-operative attemptingt oprovid etha tservic emos t ardentlydesire d byth e poorest peasants and the agricultural workers, namely the sale of consumer goods. It might seeit scapita ldisappea ra sa resul to finflatio ni fi tsettle dfo r asmal lprofi tmargin . AlthoughI hav en ofigures a tm ydisposa lt osuppor tthi sassertion ,I cam eacros senoug h cases to hazard that a considerable percentage (20%o r more)o f theco-operative s had condemned themselves to non-activity inthi s way. Such a categorical contrast assumed more dramatic forms incertai n co-operativesi n theprovinc eo fColchagua ,th eonly co-operative sa tth etim et ocontai nlarg eproductio n groups. Someo fthes egroup shel dlan dwhil eother sha dlarg echicke nfarms .Accordin g to the statutes, these groups were obliged to do all their businessjda the co-operative, which in some cases was also the nominal owner of the means of production. The co operative,however ,worke d withon e fund for allth eservices .Thi sresulte di nth ecredi t balances of the production groups being used to provide a loan elsewhere, or pay off a debt,o rt omak e some purchase orother .Then ,whe nth egroup swishe d to availo fthen - surplus,i t could happentha tther e wasno t enough money in thekitty . Especially when poultry prices began to tumble and the groups to work at a loss, with the increasing dangertha tthei rsupplie so ffee dwoul db ecu tof fbecaus eo ffailur et opay ,the ystarte dt o buy and sell outside ofth e co-operatives. A remarkable example of a growing difference in status andth eestrangemen twhic h canresul tfro mit ,i sth efollowing .A co-operativ ewhic hha dbee nse tu pa coupl eo fyear s earlier in a small coastal village of the province of Santiago was extremely successful. With only limited credit it had built up amachin e park, started a cattlefodde r factory, was about to open a small sausage andmea t factory. In addition it provided consumer goods forth emembers .Th emembershi pwa scontinuall y expanding.However ,althoug h the co-operative was also open to young people, the working sons ofth e members, the latter were dissatisfied. They felt that the co-operative worked for theirfathers , butdi d nothing for them. When then another government service which dealt particularly with young people started working inth e village alongside INDAP, thisdissatisfactio n led to plans for setting up a second co-operative intended specially for the younger people.I t only fell throughbecaus e of resistance by INDAP. The clash of interests between categories also played a part in the relationships between the various categorical organizations on theprovincia l ornationa llevel .I hav e frequently seen peasant leaders or politically interested outsiders attempt to achieve greaterunit yo rt ocombin eth eforce so fth evariou sorganizations .Thei rusua largumen t 115 wastha tth epeasant sforme d aclas swit ha particula rclas sinterest .No tmuc hseeme dt o result from allthi sdurin g my stay inChile . Thiswas ,i t appeared,becaus ether ewa sn o attempt to reach accurate and concrete agreement on co-operation, inothe r words,o n promoting thoseinterest s whichth ecategorie sreall y shared.Instea d ofrecognizin gtha t the categories also had opposing interests - for instance regarding the wage paid to agricultural workers - promotors hammered away at this all-embracing yet stillvagu e notiono fclas sinterest 8. Apartfro m differences incategor yw ema yalso ,o nth ebasi so fou rtheoretica lanalysi s ofSectio n8. 2- expecta clas ho finterest st oaris earoun dth edistribution o fth eproduc to f co-operation.An dsuc hclashe sdi dindee doccu ri nth eco-operative san dth easentamien - tos,a swel la si nth efederation s whichthe yjoined .Th emos tusua lcas econcerne da loca l groupwhic heithe rdi dno twis ht ojoi na large runi to relse ,havin gjoined ,wa sdissatisfie d with the distribution. It wasnoteworthy , for instance,tha t sometimes only aquarte r or lesso fth emember so fa loca lcommitte eo fsmal lpeasant-farmer sjoine dth eregiona lco operative when the committee was officially incorporated into it.Thi smigh thav ebee n duei npar tt oth efinancial sacrific einvolved ,though ,a sw ealread ysaw ,ver yfe wpai dth e wholeo fth eobligator y contributions.I think ,therefore ,tha tthi shesitatio nmus tals ob e attributed to therecognitio n of a distribution problem. Distribution problemsaros ei nth e co-operativesi nconnectio nwit hth epriorit ygive n to certain tasks and the geographical location of development projects. Generally speaking if a co-operative wished to achieve acertai n degreeo fviability ,i tha dt o earn money.Thi scoul donl yb edon eb yfirst tacklin gthos etask swhic hwer et oth eadvantag e of the peasants who supplied most products for the market, i.e. the larger of the smallholders,fro m whoserank sindee dth eboar dmember swer eofte n drawn.Thi scoul d lead to theemergenc e oftw o status groups oflarge r and smaller independent peasants. The latter might eventur n awayfro m theco-operativ e altogether, regardingi t asth ein strument ofth eothe r statusgroup s (cf. Lehmann, 1970aan d 1970b). A distribution problem involving production groups arose in the province of Colchagua. There it frequently happened that a member of a production group was elected to the board of a higher organization such as a co-operative or the provincial federation of co-operatives. He then worked for that organization a couple of days a week.I nth ebeginnin gh ereceive dn ocompensatio nfo rthis ,sinc eth eorganization sha d nomoney .Thi smean ttha tth eproductio n groupwa ssupportin g amembe rwhos ewor k contribution had declined, for the sake of the higher organization. In the end this so irritated the other members of the production group that they forbade their fellow members to remain on the board. The federation of Colchagua, a pioneer in many respects,resolve dth edifficult y bystartin gt opa ysuc haboar dmembe rfo rhi swork .Th e moneywa sderive dfro m thepercentag ei tretaine do ntransaction sconclude dthroug hit s intermediary and by skimming off a certain overhead from credits granted through the federation toth eco-operatives . Boththes emethod so ffinancing coul dlea di nthei rtur nt o protestsfro m theassociate d co-operatives.Th efederatio n requiredth eboar dmembe ri n question topa yhi searning sint oth efund s ofhi sow nproductio n groupwhic hthe npai d himou tth e samea sth eothe r membersreceived . Itwa scharacteristi co fth edistributio nproble mi nfederativ e associationstha tth epar ticipating unitswer e usually keen onhavin ga representativ eo nth eboar d ofth e federa tion.H ewa sthe nexpecte dt od ohi sbes tt oinfluenc edistributio ni nfavou ro fhi suni to forigin . 116 Generally speaking, when sub-groups harm the mechanical solidarity of the main groupthei rmateria linterest swil lals odeviat efro mth ecommo ninteres t Onema ycoun t asexception sthos esub-group swhos ebon do fsolidarit ycoul dindee donl yb einterprete d incultura l terms. Aninnocen texampl ei stha to fth epeasan twh ogoe sou tdrinkin gwit hhi sfriend si nth e evening and then the following day is incapable ofputtin g in a good day's work onth e communal farm. I haven oquantitativ e datat o show howfrequentl y thisoccurre d butI do know that inth eprovinc e of Santiago,th e managers of various asentamientos men tioned alcohol as the most important dysfunctional phenomenon. Itwa s also significant that the sale of hard liquor within asentamientos was forbidden. This prohibition was evidently inspired by the fear that to sell drink so close to home would only encourage drunkenness. Factions sometimes formed in asentamientos when two fundos werejoine d to make one asentamiento. These factions, so detrimental to solidarity, wereusuall ypolitical .I n both co-operatives and asentamientos an atmosphere of mistrust and one-upmanship developedwhe nsuc hgroup strie dt oobtai nfo rthemselve sth emajorit yo na boar do rth e specialized committees of an association. Therol e of politics was so complex however, that it seems bettert o devote a separate section to it. 8.4.8 Therole of politics In order to illustrate the conflict of loyalties and the increase in solidarity to which politics can giverise i t is necessary to delve a little deeper intoth e political situationi n Chilei n 1970 .I nChapte r 3w ehav ealread y seentha ti nChil etoo ,whe nth etim eseeme d ripe to mobilize the peasants as political allies and electors, various political and ideological groupings set about the task. During the Frei government therewer e three large confederations of syndicates. One of these, Ranquil, was dominated by the socialists and communists. Another, El Triunfo Campesino, which consisted mainly of syndicatesfounde d byINDAP ,wa slinke dt oth eChristia n Democrats,a swa sth ethird , Libertad,whic h grew out ofth e syndicates set upb y Catholic groups. Itma yb eargue dtha tth ever yexistenc eo fthre econfederation si nplac eo fon ealread y constituted aweakenin go fth epeasants 'position .Thi sargumen ti sreinforce dever ytim e they were unablet o agreeo n acommo n course of action andeithe rdi dnothin g atal lo r elsecarrie d outth e action with a section ofth eagricultura l workersa smer espectators ; On the other hand it is also true, as Etzioni (1968, p. 408) asserts, that when several associations fulfil the same function they keep each other on their toes and prevent, to some extent, countermobilization. However, as the confederations increasingly took it uponthemselve st odefen dth epolic yo fa particula rparty ,thei rexistenc etende dmor et o weakenth e unity ofth epeasants .I nvie wo fth egrea tdifference s ineconomic , social and family status amongth epeasant s iti si nm y view unrealistict osuppos etha tal lpeasant s willfee l drawn to thesam e party,wher efou ro rfive politica lpartie scompet efo r voters, members and supporters.Th eChilea npolitica lpartie s(lik e almost allpolitica lpartie si n Latin America) were interest-agglomerations which originated inth etowns . There was norea lpeasan tparty .Unde rthes ecircumstance s iti shardl y surprisingtha tth epeasant s divided upamon gthre eo rfou rparties ,chosin g whicheverthe ythough twoul d suitthei r interests best. The communist party, the socialist party, the PDC, the Radicals and 117 MAP Ueac hha dthei row nsupporter s amongth epeasants ,althoug hi nsom ecase sthes e werefe wi n number. Division aroseno t somuc hbecaus eo fdifference s ofopinio namon gth epeasants ,a s through the machinations ofth eparties .Eac h party tried to erect a political bastion by gainingcontro lo fleader san db ydivertin ggovernmen tfund s toth epeasants ,eithe rfo r a project or ascredit .Mor etha na yea rbefor eth epresidentia lelection so f 1970th eparties , and INDAP, as a government agency, appeared very much aware of what seemed to themth enecessit yo finstallin gpolitica lsupporter si nthos eleadershi ppost sope nt oelec tion.Thi swa sachieve dno ts omuc hb ydistortin gresult sa sb ypressin gthroug hth ecan didatureo fcertai npersons .Th equestio no fwh omigh tprov eth emos tcapabl eleade rwa s onlysecondar y; th emai nthin gwa st oge ta part yma nelected .Give nth efac ttha tmos to f myparticipatin g researchwa scarrie dou ti norganization sdominated ,nominall ya tleast , byth ePD C (ElTriunf o andth econfederatio n ofco-operatives )i twa sth ePD C whichI most frequently saw winning. This was achieved by sabotaging any capable peasant leader suspectedo fholdin ga differen t politicalconviction .Th egreates tsufferer s among theleader swer eth eM AP Usupporters .Thus ,fo r instance,a tth eelectio no fth eboar do f ElTriunf o atth een do f 1969,a youn gcharismati cleade rfro mth enort ho fth ecountr y - whowa salread y amembe ro fth eboar d- waspasse dove rfo rth echairmanshi pbecaus e hewa s saidt o belong to MAPU. In December 1969,durin g theelection st oth eboar do fth eConfederatio n ofPeasan t Co-operatives,th erepresentativ eo fth eFederatio no fth eprovinc eo fColchagu amisse da seat byon evote .Thi sscarcel y appeared accidental.I t happeneddespit eth efac ttha thi s Federation wasth efurthes t developed,ha dth emos tactiv ean dconscientou sboard ,an d wasmos t acutely awareo fth epat hwhic hth eorganize d smallpeasant sshoul dtake .H e was,however ,regarde d asa MAP Usupporter .I hav en odoub ttha tal lth epartie splaye d thislittl egame ,wit hth eexcus etha t 'theother sdi di ttoo' .Durin gth elas tmonth s before the elections such machinations rendered the normal working of the peasant organiz ations difficult if not impossible.INDA P too ceased to function. Employees whower e considered politically unreliable weretransferre d from thefield t oth ecapital ,or ,i fthe y werealread y stationedthere ,wer erefuse d aca rt og oou tint oth ecountry .Th eavailabl e cars wereuse dt o transport political propagandists.Th emos tincredibl e accusationso f sabotagewer ecirculate d to explain whyproject s had failed. This state of affairs gaveris et ovariou s kindso f solidarity conflict. Apeasan tleade r starting to play a political role was obliged to choose at certain moments,whe nth ein terestso fth epeasant sclashe dwit hthos eo fth eparty .Th epeasant sthemselve swer eun certain whether they ought to show solidarity with other peasants because they were peasants too,o r to refuse solidarity becausethe y felt attracted to adifferen t party. Sincenon eo fth epartie si nChil ewa sa rea lpeasan tparty ,identificatio n withon epar ty alsomean t identification withinterest swhic hwer eno tentirel ythos eo fth epeasant .I n this respect it isclea r that the peasants wereuse d to someexten tb y allth epartie san d would probably remain dependent whatever the result of the elections9. Even more paralyzing than what the peasants did, however, was their mistrust of what other peasants were suspected ofdoing .Ever yinitiativ eo nth epar t of somebody elsewas , in 1970a t least, interpreted as apolitica l moveintende dt osuppor t one'sow npart yt oth e detrimento fothers . Iver yofte n heardsom eleade raccuse do fpolitica lactivity ,o fblindl y carryingou torder sfro m somepart yheadquarters ,ye twhe nI sa wthi sperso ni nactio nI 118 was unable,wit hth ebes twil li nth eworld ,t odetec t anyproselytism .I tma yb etha tthi s suspicion was particularly rife in 1970,a nimportan t election year. Theindication stha tth epeasants 'vote sca nb ebough tb ya particularisti c expenditure ofgovernmen t fundsar cambiguous .W eourselve sfound ,i na necologica l analysiso fth e resultso fth epresidentia lelectio no f 1970,tha tth eexten tt owhic hlan drefor mha dbee n carriedou ti na communit y hadno tbenefite d Tomic,th ecandidat eo fth epart yi npower . It did,however , seem asthoug hth ecategor y of peasants whoha dmos t improvedthei r positiondurin gF rei' sgovernment , theinquilino s andth epermanen tworkers ,ha dopte d forTomi c(cf . Galjart, 1974).A n analysis ofth elosse ssuffere db yth ePD C betweenth e congresselection so f 1965 andth emunicipa l electionso f 1967indicate stha tth edifferen t categories of peasants had reacted differently to the land reform, according to whether they had benefited by ito r not (Kaufman, 1972,p . 124ff). An anonymous analysis of the congress by-elections of 1972 in the provinces of Maule, Colchagua andO'Higgin s showed no link at allbetwee nth epercentag e of votes gained by the Unidad Popular and the favours which this party had dispensed locally. The most probable explanation is that the various categories of smallholders and agricultural workersfel ttha tthe yha dbenefite d tovaryin gdegree san dthi swa s reflected inthei rvotes .Whateve rth eexplanation ,i n 1970no t onlyth eparties ,bu tth epeasant s as well, were convinced that patronage produced votes. And although almost everyone agreedtha tpolitic sdivide dthem ,the yha dn ooptio nbu tt ofollo wthei rrespectiv eparties . Lacking any authentic viewo fthei row no nth efutur e ofrura lChil ethe ywer eoblige dt o look to the partiesfo r it 8.5 Solutions There are various w$ys in which a person torn by conflicting norms can resolve his problem,assumin g thath ehimself ,an dothers ,recogniz ewha ti swrong .Failur et od qs o through a compartmentalization of roles for instance, is also a kind of solution; it prevents eruptions but may also halt the process of dawning awareness. Thompson & Van Houten (1970, p. 147 ff) suggest the following possibilities: expanding or cutting down on the number ofpositions one has, transferring responsibilities to another and negotiatinga compromise. Wha tsignificanc e mightthes eproposal shav ei nth econtex to f co-operation inChile ? We begin by noting that,i fconflict s of solidarity arelinke dwit h roles,a sw epostulated ,th eroles ,an dthu sth econflicts , cannotb eexpecte dt odisappea r of theirow n accord. Thefirst possibilit y would imply the removal of functions from thefamil y andothe r primary groups, thus rendering the role of father, of friend, of party member etc.',les s -demanding. Iconside r this to bepossibl eonl y ina limite dnumbe ro f cases,fo r example where two local groups share an asentamiento. Then certain measures can betake n to weakenth eimportanc eo fthi sbondin gprinciple .Bu tfo rth etime bein gI canno timagin e the family losing any ofit sfunctions . In practicethi s possibility alsoimplie s attributing moreweigh tt oon epositio ntha nt oth eothe ran dthu slivin gu pt oon enor mbu tno tt oth e other. In other words, one might favour one group, of which one is a member, over another. Inthi srespec td opeopl edistinguis hbetwee ngroups ?Whe nrequeste dt olis tth e various groups and categories according toth estrengt ho fthei rattachmen tt othe mth e respondents gave consistent replies. Table 26 shows the average positions attributed to 119 Table 26. Average attachment of members and non-members of syndicatest ovariou s groupso fwhic hthe yar emember s(averag e positions) Category of Attachment to N respondents the workers the blood Chilean onth e the working family relatives people fundo peasants class All members 1.47 3.38 3.17 3.67 3.94 5.37 143 All non-members 1.56 3.08 2.76 3.80 4.46 5.34 67 Ex-members 1.22 2.97 2.99 3.65 4.60 5.57 35 Never-members 1.93 3.21 2.50 3.96 4.31 5.09 32 Leaders 1.56 3.46 3.78 3.43 4.02 4.75 41 Other members 1.44 3.35 2.93 3.76 3.91 5.61 102 thegroup sb y agriculturalworkers . Thetabl eshow stha ti ti sprecisel yth eclasse s(th epeasant san dth eworkin gclass )whic h come last. The sequence of the groups correlates with the degree to which these relationships possess a face-to-face character, with one exception, the Chilean people. Theweigh t attributed toface-to-fac e relationshipsindicate stha tsolidarit y isindee dt oa large extent determined by affection and interaction. It alsounderline s our earlier argu ment that individuals who become involved in a conflict can mobilize their primary groupsan dthu scaus edissentio nbetwee ngroups .Th etabl eindicate sto oho wconflict so f solidarity willprobabl y bedecided , should they arise. Althoughth emember san dnon-member so fco-operative sals opu tthei rfamil yfirst, th e other groups were ranked differently by different respondents. As a result the average positionso fthes egroup sar eabou tth esame . In many countries a conflict of solidarity was avoided, in co-operatives at least,b y handing over responsibility topai d employees.Th emembers 'sacrific e wasthe nlimite d toa financial contribution .This ,however ,le dt othos eindividual si nmanageria lposition s forming anoligarchy .I nChil esuc ha solutio nwoul dhav ebee nto oexpensiv ean dwoul d also have detracted from themembers ' participation indecisio n making. Another form oftransfe r ofresponsibilit y wasfrequentl y appliedi n Chilewithou tth e peasants being really aware of it. I refer to the habit of blaming the government for anythingtha t goeswrong .I t isver ydifficul t todra wth elin ebetwee nsituation si nwhic h the opinion that one is dependent on the government and thus ultimately absolved of responsibility is correct and situations in which it is not. The examples of what really strong, animated leaders managed to accomplish prove that some felt this dependence less than others. Besides, although such an idea might bejustifie d it clearly resulted in both leaders and members regarding themselves asabsolve dfro m allblam ei nadvance . Thisi sillustrate db yth edeclin eo fa co-operativ edescribe di nChapte r5 .I ti sclea rtha ts o long asth e government continuest o pre-occupy itself sodirectl y withth e doingso fco operativeenterprises ,thi s avenueo fescap efro m solidarity conflicts willremai n open. The most important of the possible solutions to such conflicts remains then a negotiated change in role, a compromise. These negotiations did occur. In the asen- tamientos for example,a n ever-recurring point onth e agenda wasth e question ofho w 120 large the piece of land for private use (the goce) ought to be, and how many privately owned heado f cattle one might be allowedt ograz e(th etalaje) .Afte r 1970,di egovern ment of the Unidad Popular attempted to cut back on the goce andtalaje , but without much success(Lehmann , 1972).W ehav e alsosee nalread yho wmanagers ,criticize db y themember sfo r havingabuse dthei rposition ,ofte nreacte db ythreatenin gt oresign .Thi s too is afor mo f negotiationabou trol econtent ,althoug hth epartie sma yno tse ei ti nthi s light. 8.6 Recommendations It might be useful to list the recommendations we have made in the course of this chapter and to add a few others. Our theory concerning interest clashes and solidarity conflicts impliestha tw eregar dthe ma spermanent . Evenif ,unde rcertai ncircumstances , the majority, or a considerable minority of the peasants - for instance the temporary workerswh ou pt o 1970fare dwors ti nth elan drefor m- shouldac tfo ra tim ea sa clas si n order to achieve a particular aim, this would not mean an endt o later clashes and con flictso f solidarity. Ourfirst recommendatio nwoul daccordingl y be,tha tth eurba nintellectual swh ohav e guided the process of land reform, shouldrecogniz etha tsuc h conflicts are apermanen t feature. Only then will it be possible to search for those types of organization which would limit the damage to a minimum. Some intellectuals are convinced that, if only pressure could be exerted to press through a particular institutional structure, the difficulties wouldb eboun dt odisappear . Butthi si sonl ypartl ycorrect .A nasentad owh o no longer has a little plot of land for his own use cann o longer work it. Yet itwoul db e naive to assume that this would eliminate the conflict of interests betweenfamil y and collectivity. There arestil l anumbe ro fway s inwhic hth easentad oca nfavou rhi sfamil y at the expense of the collectivity. In other words, although a number of contrasts and solidarity conflicts might disappear, most of themwoul d change infor m only. With respect to the communal farms, production groups or associations, my recommendations amount to the following. - Since solidarity may depend upon the economic interests of the participants in an association,i ti so fth eutmos timportanc etha tth eassociatio nshoul dserv ethes einterest s well.Whil ehig hagricultura lproductio nma yb eimportan tfo rsociet ya sa whole ,it schie f significance lies inbindin gtogethe r the members ofth ecommuna l farm,th eproductio n groupo rth e association.Thi splace s demandsbot ho nth ecapabilitie s offar mmanager s and leaders and on the functioning of the government services. - Incentives should be provided for maximum achievement. This means that achieve mentan drewar dwoul db emor eclosel y linked andals otha tskille dwor kwoul db ebette r rewarded than unskilled. Generally speaking it would also require small work-units so that the members could keep check on each other. The optimum group composition could be obtained through a system of co-option. For functions less suited to a small group - I am thinking of units of from six to ten families - such units could bejoine d together,eac hhavin ga representativ eo nth eboar di ncharg eoftha t particularfunction . - Instead of preaching unity,i t shouldb eexplaine dt o these- andothe r- associations, thatmember shav eman yinterest si ncommo nbu tals osom etha tconflict ,s otha tconflict so f solidarity may arise. The members should be taught to discuss their difficulties openly 121 beforehand andals owhe nsuc ha conflic tha sgrow nacute ,s otha ta solutio nacceptah'et o allma yb earrive dat .Thi slength yproces so fmutua laccommodatio nma yals ob euse dt o draw uprule sfo r cases not provided for by domesticregulation s andt otransfor m these rulesint olegitimat enorms . - All this implies that the peasants must learn to accept and to offer criticism. Those who will have to teach this to the peasants will require an attitude which, however permeated with political ideology, isnonetheles s sympathetic.On e way of introducing these ideast oth epeasants ,withou t mucheffor t onthei r part,i sth e socio-drama. - The technique of holding meetings must be improved. Established procedures will havet o befollowe d with regard to the agenda andth eprovisio n ofinformation . Those who aret ohav echarg e ofth e meetings must betrained . Allthes erecommendation s amountt oa redefinitio n ofrole st oallo wfo rcompromise . Onth eothe r hand weals o stressth ecreatio n ofcondition s(awareness ,patience )whic h favour such compromises and which makethe m seemworthwhil et o thepeasants . Myrecommendation swit hrespec tt oth erelation sbetwee nassociation san dwithi nth e peasant class areth e following. - We are concerned here with theinternalizatio n of norms derived from values such as justice,equalit yan dsolidarity .I hav ealread yremarke di na previou ssectio ntha tI d ono t believei nth eresul to fpreaching ,no ri nth eglossin gove ro fdivisio ni norde rt oemphasiz e unity. Leaders whorecogniz e thesevalue s andac tupo nthe m achieve apowerfu l effect. The question is,ca n such leaders becultivated ? Theattemp t could atleas t bemade ; in any casei t isworthwhil et o bealway s onth elookou t for their appearance. - It seems advisable to set uploca l councilsi nwhic h thevariou s categories of peasants are all represented. These would bei n a position to draw up plans and take decisions regardinglan d reform,credit ,th esal ean dmanufactur e ofproducts ,investmen tpriority , working facilities etc. The result would be that the representatives of the various categories and their organizations would be compelled to take each other and each other'sinterest s intoaccount . Shouldthe yfai l tod o soa stalemat edevelop swhic hi st o no one's advantage. Obliged constantly to consult with and account to those they represented, the latter too would learn the necessity for taking the interests of other categories of peasants to heart. The council could begin by listing and studying the problems of agriculture within the community. These problems - and their possible solutions- couldthe nb ediscusse dwit hth epeasants ,a tmeetings .Th egovernmen to fth e Unidad Popular hasindee d set upcommittee s sucha sthese .Accordin gt oon eanalysi s they work well, provided they do not break up along party lines. Another author, however, hints that the government does not really allow them totak e many decisions (Lehmann, 1972).Thi s is understandable, since the peasants often lack the necessary technical knowledge. Yet if the government continues to decide for them, the different categories of peasants encounter each other only asrivals, eac h concerned only with acquiringth elion' sshar eo fwhateve rfund s areavailable .I tseem st om etha ti fa govern ment wishes these peasant co-operative endeavours to succeed without exercising too much coercion, the most advisable course would be to leave quite a large number of decisionst oth ecommittees . 122 Notes 1 In the case of the Chilean asentamientos therewer e additional circumstances whichgav eth e product the character of a collective good. There was, for instance, the fact that CORA ad vancedcredi ti norde rt omee tth edail ywages .O npape rthi swa sa nadvanc eo nprofi tstil lt ob e realized, but inpractic e ittoo k a yearo rlonge rt oto t upth ebalanc e ofprofi t orloss .Th ead vancethereb y acquiredth echaracte ro f aloa n which ultimatelyha dlittl econnectio n withth e resultsachieve db yth efarm .Besides ,sinc eth emarke tvalu eo fvariou skind so fwor kha dbee n abandoned only the hours actually worked were paid for, and no account was taken of the quality of the work orth e effort putint o it. 2 For that matter, Friedrichshimsel f found indications that'th eexpressio n of altruism towards ingroupmember si sno tlikel yt ob eaccompanie db yit sexpressio ntowar doutgrou pmembers ' (op. cit., p. 504). 3 Iti s interesting thati nth e Kibbutz, agrou pwhic hlay sa veryhig hpermanen tclai mupo nthe , solidarityo fth emembers ,function sar ewithdraw nfrom othe rgroups ,notabl yth efamily .Par t ofth ecar efo rth eeducatio n ofth echildre ni sentruste dt oth eKibbut z itself(se e alsoBarki n& Bennett, 1972). 4 The problemo f thenecessit y for amateria l incentivei sa constantlyrecurrin gpoin to fdiscus sion in socialist countries. One of the most recent of such discussions took place in Cuba, between none other than Ernesto Guevara, Charles Bettelheim, and Ernest Mandel. (For a German translation seeD e Santis, 1969). For my partI believe that amateria lincentiv ei ses sential, especially since the clash of interests between individual and collectivity is closely linked with a conflict of solidarity between family and collectivity. However,th efamil y as an institution shows no signs of dying out in any socialist country. It is not by chance that the IsraeliKibbut z deprivedth efamil y of some ofit sfunctions .I ns o doingi t alsodetracte dfro m theinsisten t character pf family solidarity. 5 Mr.an dMrs .d eRanit z spenta perio do ffive month so nthre easentamiento si nth eprovinc eo f Aconcagua. 6 It may be useful torefe r heret o theinterestin g hypothesis ofMorai s(1969 )wh o saysthat ,i n contrast to agricultural,labourers , independent peasantsd o not function well ina n organiza tion based upon a division of labour, since they are used to tackling everything themselves. They shove everything off onto a leader who in this way becomes a sort of despot In other words, he does everything himself and refuses to delegate, and even if he does delegate he neglects tochec k upo nth ework . Hei shel daccountabl efo rfailure san dan yfailure scos thi m prestige. My own datad ono tcontradic tthi shypothesis .I twa sa fac ttha tth esyndicat eleader swer e better ablet o divideu pth ewor k among themselves thanwer eth eco-operativ emanagers .M y explanation, however, is more prosaic than that of Morais. The syndicates weregoverne d by legal regulations and provisions which rendered a division of labour both possible and. necessary. Theco-operative s werenot . Often they couldn'tpa y even one boardmember . 7 I therefore dono t agreewit hLehman n(1969 )whe nh e saystha tth epeasant s areparticularl y suspicious of outsiders.I t seems to me that they areals o extremely suspicious of each other. 8 After having made myself unpopularo non e occasion bydrawin g attentiont o theclas ho fin terestswhic hindee dexisted ,fo rth eres to fth etime I keptm y peace.Nonetheless ,I foundi t a pity - and stilld o- thatanyon e whourge stha tsuc ha conflic t betake nint o acounti s looked upon as a trouble-maker oreve n a political opponent, while hema y perhaps be ablet o bring more real insight to bear on the situation than a person who believes blindly in class- consciousness. It is not by chance that Alberti (1972) makes the distinction between peasant behaviour which only appears to beinspire d by class andbehaviou r which actually is. 9 This prediction proved incorrect inth efirst instance . During theperio do fAllende' sgovern- , mentth epeasan torganizations ,an di nparticula rth easentamientos ,bega nt osho wincreasin g independence of the government. For the government itself, this had dysfunctional results which inth e course of time would probably have provoked areaction . 123 Epilogue:Theoretica lan dpractica lconclusion sfo rpolicy-maker s Inthi sepilogu eI shoul d liket omention ,ver ybriefly ,th evariou stheoretica lan dprac ticalconclusion sI arrive da to nth ebasi so fm yresearch .I mus twar nth ereade rtha tI a m by no means certain that my conclusions are always correct. Still, even a sociologist shouldb ewillin gt o stickhi snec kou ti fth eoccasio n demands.Th econclusion soutline d herear ethos ewhic hI woul dventur et oadvanc eshoul dI b easke dt oadvis esom epolicy makingbody . 1. With regard to peasant mobilization itwoul d appear that,whil e certain factors may help or hinder it, the attitude of the government is critical for the outcome. An an tagonistic,oppressiv egovernmen t canpreven tth epeasant sfro m everachievin ga stron g organization. This places a special responsibility upon the government. In countries whereth epeasant sar eno torganized ,thi scan ,i nm yopinion ,b eimpute dt ogovernmen t oppression.Th epowe ro fth elarg elandowner salon ewoul dno tb esufficien t explanation for this. 2. Although,i nth einitia lphas eo forganization ,th epeasant sma y sometimes appeart o constitute a revolutionary force, they arei nfac t solely concerned withdeprivin g a par ticular category ofpeopl eo fthei rpowe rt odispos eo flan dwhic hi nthei ropinio nshoul d bedivide du p amongstthemselves .Onc elan drefor m has been carried outth epeasant s prove the most fervent supporters of a situation in which the private possession ofth e meanso fproductio n predominates.I ti sprecisel yi nthos ecountrie si nwhic hth egovern mentdesire st o retainthi sprivat ebasi so fproductio n organization (Brazil,fo r example) that a rapid, radical programme of land reform would gain it millions upon millionso f supporters (cf. Petras &Zemelman , 1972). 3. The existence of inequality is not in itself sufficient to cause the disadvantaged to revolt. The changes outlined in Chapter 3 are essential if the poor, disadvantaged or backward peasants aret ob earoused .I nth eword so fYoun g(1970 )an dLamondTulli s (1970) it is necessary that the potential possibilities should outstrip the capacity of availing of them ifth e peasants (or any other group in the same circumstances) aret o band together to remove this structural impediment. This also implies, however, that those who desire structural change must view with a benevolent eyean y development whichlead st o inequality. 4. Ina regio ndevoi do fextensiv epropertie swher ether ei sn oquestio no flan drefor mno r ofth eredistributio n ofland ,th emobilizatio no fth esmal lpeasan tproducer si sfrequentl y reflected inservic eco-operative sse tu pb yth egovernment .Suc hco-operative shav ever y 124 littlechanc e of success;the ylac kcapita lan dcompeten tleadershi pan dth emember sar e often as yet incapableo f appreciating the necessity for collaboration. It would, in any case, be illusory to imagine that atsimpl e service co-operative would be sufficient to counter existing social!inequalit y and thepovert y of thepoorest . With a production jco-operative of any size, thé situation is different. Although, to beginwith ,th epeasant swil lalway sten dt oresis tth ejoinin gtogethe ro fland ,i tma ygai n acceptanceprovide dtha tth eeconomi c resultsattaine db yth eco-operativ e surpasswha t might be expected from individual exploitation. Apart from natural circumstances this depends chiefly uponth equalit y ofth emanagement .Managemen ttrainin gi sthu so fth e utmost importance. 5. It is recommended that service co-operatives should be set up especially in places where groups of peasants experience a situation of 'structural bind'. Inothe r words the social structureprevent sthe mfro mutilizin gth eavailabl edevelopmen tpossibilities .Suc h groupsnee dno tb ebase do nclass .The yma yb ebrough ttogethe rb yag eo rbecaus ethe y differ inreligio n orethni c origin fromth esurroundin g peasant population.Th erequire d mechanical solidarity is then based upon a desire to improve one's lot which the in dividualfinds impossibl et ofulfi l on hisown ,whil eobstacle st othi sfulfilmen t areplainl y evident inth e social structure. 6. Wherether e can ben o question of utilizing a'structura l bind'(thi sals ooccur swher e therei sn oobviou sloca l opponent),i ti srecommende dtha ta star tshoul db emad ei nco operation onth e basiso f smallgroup sbrough tint obein gb yco-option .Whe non egrou p is insufficient to ensure a certain service function, the groups may merge into larger associations inwhic h allth e component groupshav ethei r saythroug h arepresentative . 7. With regard to production co-operatives iti s also preferable that the basic units,i.e . the units whose achievements arerewarde d proportionately, should remain small. I am thinking of units comprising six to ten members (cf. Klatzmann, 1972). This promotes mechanical solidarity bymean so f affection, social controlan dth einstrumenta lvalu eo f the association. 8. Both service and production co-operatives can best develop further by undertaking the processing of products and the manufacture of inputs themselves. The government must promote this development. 9. Member solidarity withor ,a sth e case may be,i nthei rassociatio ndepend st oa larg e extento nthei rrea linvolvemen ti ndecision-making .A tth een do fth epreviou schapte rw e made certainrecommendation s concerning improved exchange of ideasan dth e offering of criticism. These chiefly involve the participants living upt othei rroles . 10. A numbero fth eforegoin g conclusions implythat ,i n asituatio n ofsocia linequalit y (situation B, in the terms of Chapter 3) iti s extremely difficult, ifno timpossible , toim prove the lot of the poorest smallholders without making a problem of inequality itself and thus laying stress on the class position of these peasants. In other words, in the absence of a'structura l bind'of , for instance, areligiou s nature,th edevelopmen to fth e 125 poorest peasants involves a political choice directed against certain elements or mechanisms within that society.Unles sthi sfac t isrecognized ,developmen t worki nth e interestso fth epoore rpeasant sma ywel lcom et oa standstil lwhe nth enecessit yfo rsuc h a political choice becomes evident. It isessentia lthe ntha t thepeasant s shouldb emad eawar eo fthei rpositio n asa class . They shouldb etaugh tt o appreciatethei rrelationshi pwit hothe r categories andth ewa y inwhic hthe y areincorporate d intoth epolitica l and economic system as awhole .Onl y those whoposses sthi s awareness arecapabl e oftryin gt ochang ethei r situation. Unfor tunately,though , successcanno t beguaranteed . 11. Success or failure in service and production co-operatives is determined by their economic achievements.These ,i n their turn, are largely dependent upon thequalit yo f theleadershi pan dmanagement .I twoul d seeminadvisabl efo r agovernmen tt otak eove r thetas k ofmanagemen t entirely,sinc ethi swoul dhav ea nadvers eeffec t uponparticipa ; tion.I nan ycas ei ti sdoubtfu l whetherth egovernmen t itselfwoul dposses spersonne lo f sufficient calibre.I nadditio nt otrainin gth epeasant st otak eove ra smanagers ,I thin ki t would be worthwhile considering the creation of a small number of very highly skilled teamso fconsultants .Thes eteam scoul dthe nus ethei rtechnica lan dorganizin gtalent st o assist the peasant communities in putting into operation schemes drawn up by themselves.Thi swoul dpreven ta situatio ni nwhic hth egovernment' s availabletechnica l expertise- andthi s includesth e economists and sociologists- wouldhav et ob esprea d too thinly over toolarg e an area. 126 References Affonso, A., S. 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Zantwijk, R.van , 1965.Lastdrager se nHoofden .Amsterdam ,(thesis) . 130 Subjectinde x Accesst olan d 21 peasants 28 Accounting 78,80 as economic and political power on national Affection 68,110-111 level 28-29 Affiliation 49 asnegativ ereferenc egrou p 21 motivest ojoi nco-operative s 78 underminingo fth epositio no f 29-35 motivest ojoi nsyndicate s 67 Landrefor m 5,34 ,7 1 Anxiety 69,73 Leaders 34,39-40,90-91,112-11 3 Attractiono finteractio n 67-68,7 9 differences frommember s 93-95 Brokers 27,35 dysfunctions of 91-93 Classconsciousnes s 25,40-41 ideologicalfunctio no f 91,94,95 Compadrazco 76 instrumental and expressive function of 90, Co-operation 55,79 ,85,10 0 93,95 andmobilizatio n 55 tendency towards formation of 'oligarchy' Co-operatives 9,78 95-98 growtho fdurin gFre igovernmen t 60 Loyalty 26 induced 57-59 Members 68-76,78-86 roleo f 56,59,78 Mobilization spontaneous 56 andclas sconsciousnes s 25,40-41, 86 Credit57-59 ,6 1 andcompetitio no fsolidaritie s 102-103 Developmnt 5-6 andco-operatio no findependen tpeasant s andco-operatio n 55-67J60 55-66 anddegre eo forganizatio n 47-48, 54 andcultura lcondition so nloca lleve l 37-39 asfacto rinfluencin g mobilization 35-36,54 andcultura lcondition so nnationalleve l indicatorso fagricultura l 44,50 33-34 andpatronag e 35-36 definition 20 Education 36,72 ,78,8 1 anddevelopmen t 35-36,54 Financialdependenc e 4,7 0 indicatorso f 44 Friendship 68-69, 72,73 ,79,83-8 4 andstructura lcondition sfo r 20-24,28-32 Ideology 34,59,62 Mobilize« 32-34,39-40 Identification 68,74 ,84,10 6 Modernityo ffarmin gmethod s 52-53 Income 57, 70,82 Non-members 76-77,78-90 Incorporation Obediencet oa nor m 68,73,10 5 ofloca lcommunit y 20-21 Oligarchization 95-98 andweakenin gpatronag erelation s 35 Opiniono fpeer s 69,74 Interests 21-26,40-41,99-102,106 Patronage 25-28,70 Imageo fLimite dGoo d 69,74,8 6 andaffiliatio n tosyndicate s 70 Kinship ties 68-69, 72-73,79,83-8 4 definition 7,26 Landdistributio n 22 factors leading to a weakening of relations of andcultura lfeature s 37 34-37 local 20-21,24 andinduce dco-operatio n 56-59 mechanismssustainin g 25-28 asmechanis msustainin ginequalit y 26-28 typeso f 6,2 2 Peasants Landedproprietor s categorieso f 21-24 ' compulsion by 25-28 conflicts ofinterest e 99-101,102-106,109 as countervailing power to solidarity of definition 3 131 individual interests of and co-operation 57, external factors stimulating 38, 66, 109 98-99, 106-107 and interests 40-44, 79-80, 101-102, 104, as political power on national level 33-34 106 resource allocation among 6—7,33 , 108 Status differences 81,114-117 status differences and solidarity 114-117 Syndicates 9-10 Politics 27,117-120 communities with and without 44-49 Preferences for future status 86 differences between leaders and members Reciprocity 112 93-94 Religiosity 69, 73, 79, 84 motives of affiliation 67 Social control 70,113 neutralizing the power of landed proprietors Solidarity 103, 107 29-31 and affiliation to co-operatives 79, 85 special position El Triumfo Campesino 46 and affiliation to syndicates 69, 73 Tenure status 82 competing solidarities and mobilization Utility of the associations 68, 70, 78-79, 106 102-104 Values 22,110 diagram of factors contributing postively or Work group size 73 negatively 107 132