Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł Jagiellonian University Piotr Borowiec Jagiellonian University Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik Pedagogical University of Cracow

Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries

Some Determinants of Political Party Development in Emerging Democracies of CEE

Democratic political parties have developed in the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since the beginning of the 1990s, when political parties in well-established democracies were undergoing organizational transformation. The latter weakened their ties with society and strengthened their relations with the state using its resources. This influenced the development of parties in CEE countries, as they followed Western patterns to a certain degree. But whereas parties in developed democracies were usually well-rooted in society, represent­ ed social cleavages, had mass membership, were financed by membership fees, and changed only subsequently; parties in CEE did not manage to create strong relations with society before they took part in elections. There was a lack of clear social cleavages, and parties were created by political elites rather than social groups or movements, thus they often became a part of the state institutions even before they tried to establish roots in society.1 While in Western Europe mass po­ litical mobilization preceded the building of party structures and participation in

Post-communist parties can be regarded as exceptional in this matter. 466 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik

elections, “party formation in newly established democracies generally followed a different trajectory, as parties engaged in mass electoral competition before developing their party organization” (van Biezen 2003: 30). Consequently, such parties gained representation in parliament, and sometimes even executive power, before creating extra-parliamentary organizations. This clearly weakened their structures to a large degree. Also important here is that parties from CEE countries have undergone some changes similar to their counterparts in Western Europe in terms of mediatization, personalization, and prezidentialization of party politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005). In well-developed democracies, these processes have altered the mechanisms of political communication, and strengthened the positions of party leaders at the expense of other party structures. In Central and Eastern European countries, such changes had occurred before the organizational structures of political parties were fully formed, thus their effects were even stronger, and the power of party leaders in relation to other party bodies has become very significant. The fact that some parties have not experienced alternation of leadership, and are still governed by their “founding fathers” is an additional incentive to strengthen the power of party chairmen. These parties are often perceived as “the property of the founder.” The adoption of Western solutions and experiences, together with a communist heritage and a culture of political elites, has had a formative effect on political party structures in CEE countries. Therefore, they are to some extent detached from society and rooted in the state with all positive and negative ramifications. Moreover, some solutions have been copied from Western parties and implemented not only under different circumstances, but also in a distorted way, thus the party structures in CEE states are overwhelmingly weak, and the deficit of intra-party democracy seems to be more severe than within their Western European counterparts. These and similar issues were the subject of discussion in this book. Our aim, stated in the introductory chapter, was to present the organizational structures of political parties from twenty CEE countries. We will draw some conclusions regarding similarities and differences between countries, indicate a number of features typical of party structures, and present several original solutions created by parties functioning in the region. We were especially interested in whether parties are committed to mass party structure, or whether they prefer to introduce new solutions that move away from this model. As we have said in the introduc­ tion, the mass party model and changes that have occurred in the development of political parties were used only as a point of departure to identify features and solutions used by parties in CEE. For example, it was important for us to determine whether parties have a well-developed, hierarchical network of party bodies corresponding to the administrative division of the state, or whether their structures are more horizontal. Therefore, we also addressed the question whether parties in CEE countries use traditional solutions based on the principle of repre­ sentation, or whether they tend to include all members (or even other citizens) in decision-making processes (direct democracy, primaries). Additionally, it became clear throughout the course of our research that we should inquire not only into which form of intra-party democracy is used (representative or direct), but into Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 467 whether there is such a thing as intra-party democracy in CEE and whether it is even desired by parties. These last two questions were of special importance, as this volume com­ prises a wide range of political parties from twenty CEE states, which are in various stages of post-communist development. Some of them are considered as consolidated democracies while others are either unstable democracies or even authoritarian states. However, there are many differences not only between but also within individual countries, thus “generations” of political parties in CEE can be distinguished with respect to organizational structures. Essentially, there is no such thing as a dominant model of party organization in Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, parties deriving from the communist re­ gime demonstrated specific characteristics which to some extent can be described by the mass party model, while some newly established parties tried to copy their structures. Subsequently, several successive generations of parties appeared whose structures vary considerably. Parties from CEE countries also differ from one another in terms of both degree and attitude towards intra-party democracy. Remarkably, parties in which intra-party democracy has already reached a high level tend to perceive the ability to compete effectively against other parties as more important than internal democracy. In contrast, parties from underdevel­ oped democracies in which intra-party democracy is on a low level perceive such democracy as very important, since undemocratic practices within the party are transferred to state institutions when the party enters government.

Key Legal Solutions Devoted to the Creation and Functioning of Political Parties

What parties from CEE countries have in common is legal recognition. The constitutions of Western liberal democracies historically have typically refrained from mentioning political parties until the period following the Second World War (van Biezen 2012); whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, the constitution­ alization of parties and development of party legislation occurred simultaneously with the establishment of political parties, and in some cases even outpaced their creation. This was due to the fact that, after the collapse of communism, there was an urgent need to create democratic party systems. Legal rules were accepted to facilitate this process. An additional reason for the constitutionalization of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe is the fact that, when the transformation began and the new constitutions were being discussed, formal recognition of parties had become the standard in established democracies. The first countries to define the democratic role of political parties in their constitutions were Italy (1947) and Germany (1949) - states with undemocratic past. After that, other states followed these patterns and acknowledged the existence of political parties in their constitutions 468 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik in one form or another. Thus for CEE states in the early 1990s, this also seemed to be a natural step. It was of special importance, because - as Ingrid van Biezen has aptly stated - “the very establishment of democratic procedures was often identified with the establishment of free competition between parties. Political parties were therefore often attributed with a pivotal role and given a privileged constitutional position as key instruments for the expression of political pluralism and as channels of participation” (van Biezen 2012: 188). Almost all states investigated in this volume (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro), including authoritarian states, have some rules regarding political parties in their constitutions (Albania 1998, Belarus 1994, Bulgaria 1991, Croatia 1990, the Czech Republic 1993, Estonia 1992, Hungary 2011, Latvia 1922 with amendments from 1998, Lithuania 1992, Moldova 1997, Poland 1997, Romania 1991, Russia 1993, Serbia 2006, Slovakia 1992, Slovenia 1991, and Ukraine 1996). Many of these provisions draw on the German Basic Law of 1949, stating that parties may be freely established and that they shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. Internal party organization is often required to conform to democratic principles. The prohibition of political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic order or endanger the existence of the state is also very common in the emerging democracies of CEE. This is a result of their communist heritage, along with a provision emphasizing the separation of political parties and the state (e.g. in Hungary, Moldova, and Slovakia) and establishing the incompatibility of membership with certain public offices (see: Casai Bértoa and van Biezen 2014: 297). Supervision of party com­ pliance with democratic rules is frequently entrusted to the constitutional court. However, there are some states in which constitutional regulations are much narrower, for example in Slovenia, Slovakia, and especially Latvia. In the Latvian constitution there is only one article devoted directly to political parties, stating that “Everyone has the right to form and join associations, political parties and other public organizations.” This may be due to the fact that after the collapse of communism, Latvia decided not to adopt a new constitution, but to restore the validity of its former constitution from 1922. Although this constitutional law was amended significantly in 1998, it still makes only short reference to political parties. Similarly, the constitution of Slovakia provides only for the right of citi­ zens to establish political parties, restriction of membership in political parties for some public servants, and judicial oversight of party behavior. In the constitution of Slovenia, only the last two of these three items are regulated. The countries that have not seen the constitutionalization of political parties are all relatively small and new. A primary example is Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose constitution is an integral part of the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995. An annex to the agreement, the BiH constitution regulates only the most necessary aspects of state order, without reference to parties. The constitutions of Kosovo (2008) and Montenegro (2007) declare only the right to free association, and do not mention political parties directly. The constitutions of Belarus (1994) and Russia (1993) are also distinct cases. In the former, the provisions regarding par­ ties are relatively extensive; while in the latter they are much narrower (political Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 469 pluralism, multi-party system). More importantly, these provisions have no practical meaning because of the specific political environment in which parties function (discussed below). Although some constitutions of CEE states include either no or general provisions regulating the existence of political parties, in almost all countries there are special legislative acts which provide more detailed regulations on the formation and functioning of political parties, i.e. party laws. Moreover, some countries also have additional laws concerning the electoral and financial aspects of party activity. The only exception is Kosovo, where a party law has not been adopted. Instead, it has only a regulation concerning the registration of political parties. Another case is Bosnia and Herzegovina, wherein a federal state consists of three parts in which three various party laws are applied. To summarize, party laws or other legal provisions related to political parties exist in all CEE states investigated in this book. However, they significantly differ both in terms of detail, and in the way they define the nature of party structures. It is worth mentioning that in about half of the analyzed states, two to three party laws have been consecutively adopted (Albania 1991, 2000; Bulgaria 1990, 2001, 2009; Croatia 1991,1993; Moldova 1991,2007; Poland 1990,1997; Romania 1996, 2003, 2015; Serbia 1990, 2009; Slovakia 1990, 2005; and Slovenia 1989, 1994). In some other countries, the party laws adopted at the beginning of the transformation are still in force, but they have been adjusted to new social and political conditions (e.g. in Estonia the party law of 1994 has been amended many times). In countries where several party laws have been adopted, the first party laws were usually very general and did not impose exorbitant demands on the creation, functioning, and funding of political parties; whereas amendments or subsequent laws have tended to expand and specify requirements for parties. At the beginning of the transformation process, it was very easy to establish parties due to e.g. a low threshold of founding members or number of citizen signatures, and uncomplicated procedures of legal registration. The requirements for party structures were not strict, and their sources of funding not exactly speci­ fied. This was done intentionally on the part of legislators to enable establishment of political parties as quickly as possible in order to hold democratic elections. When these political parties appeared, the lack of detailed provisions regarding their functioning and financing ended up creating many problems in some CEE countries and there was an increasing number of alleged irregularities in party funding practices. The need for more detailed party regulations was obvious, thus all party laws have since been longer and more precise. Western and Eastern European party laws differ in the quantity of regulations, as “post-communist democracies tend to regulate more, with considerably more intensity” (Casal Bertoa and van Biezen 2014: 302). Party laws usually provide information concerning the content of party statutes, therefore party statutes in many of the relevant countries are similar to one another. However, party laws rarely stipulate how different aspects of party existence should be regulated, leaving political parties the freedom to decide on their internal organization and decision-making rules. This is true for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Serbia, 470 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik

Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, where legal provisions intervene less in internal party organization. In some of these states, they do not even formally prescribe that parties should be democratic in their structures. In the other countries, party laws impose the requirement of intra-party democracy, but either fail to provide an exact definition, or do so only in a very general manner. This is for example true of Albania, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Poland. In Poland, the party law states that parties should shape their structures and decision-making processes in accordance with the principles of democracy, which imposes on parties the obligation to ensure transparency of their structures, appoint party bodies through elections, and pass resolutions on the basis of a majority vote. There is also a group of states in which party laws determine in detail the content of party statutes, and describe many aspects of intra-party democracy. This is for example true of Bulgaria, Lithuania, Moldova, and Romania, where party laws determine - among other things - how often the supreme body should convene. However, these solutions are not always unambiguously positive. The authors of the chapter on Romania aptly noted that the party law there does not permit parties to be innovative in terms of their structures. However, regardless of the extent to which intra-party democracy is defined, if at all, in the party law of a given country, parties in practice may or may not function accordingly.

Party Members and Level of Membership

In some cases, formal rules do have a strong influence on political practice. For example - as Sergiu Gherghina (2014) has proven by analyzing parties from six Eastern European countries - the number of formal provisions concerning mem­ bership is often related to the size of the membership base. Thus it seems essential to investigate the formal provisions devoted to party membership, as they can be regarded as indicators of membership numbers. In this book, we decided to focus on the rules for enrollment and termination of membership, rights and obligations of party members, and access to decision-making processes granted to party members and supporters (candidate selection, leadership election, and policy-making). Party statutes pay attention to these issues even if they are not obligated to do so by party laws. However, there are some differences between countries. For example, the statutes of Romanian parties contain many regulations concerning membership, whereas the constituent documents of parties from e.g. Bulgaria or Hungary avoid excessive details in this matter. All parties in CEE countries have similar requirements for prospective mem­ bers concerning citizenship status,2 minimum age, legal capacity, membership

2 In some EU member states (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), a citizen of the European Union, who has permanent residence in the state, may also be a member of a political party. Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 471 exclusiveness (meaning that a person can be a member of only one party at a time), and commitment to the statutes, programs, principles, and values of the political party. Parties have specific procedures for member enrollment, including submis­ sion of a written application form, and sometimes submission of recommendations from current party members (e.g. parties in Latvia, Lithuania, and some parties in Poland). This serves as a screening device for unknown persons. The statutes of many parties still contain some provisions imposing limitations on membership regarding association with the apparatus of the former regime (e.g. MBC and NFSB in Bulgaria, and CONP in Estonia), as well as other kinds of activities which are considered negative. This includes behavior that is potentially damaging to party reputation or inconsistent with party ethical standards and fundamental principles, as well as criminal convictions for corruption, organized crime, and acting against freedom and human rights (e.g. HDZ, HSP, HL in Croatia). The minimum age for joining most parties is 18, and in Albania and Hungary - 16. However, citizens over 15 years of age can often be involved as party sup­ porters or sympathizers, though in some parties such status can be granted only to adults.3 This category of affiliation is growing in popularity in political parties, as nowadays they encompass people who support them and participate in their activities without formal rights or obligations. Sometimes supporters are given supporter cards (e.g. in Albania), and are allowed to make suggestions to party bodies. Moreover, supporters are usually more desirable than formally enrolled members because they can be mobilized on specific occasions, such as elections, but are not interested in occupying party positions or taking part in decision-making processes. This is the case in Czech party TOP 09, which has many more supporters than members. The party uses an internet discussion platform and other social networks to provide its supporters with internal party information, motivate them to make donations, and engage them in election campaigning. Internet platforms are increasingly important for parties in CEE states to mobilize their supporters, even if they are not always visible in the formal provisions. This is true for Romanian party UMDR, which has introduced a category of e-members that can register on the website and support party activities when required, without paying a fee or having voting rights in the party. Similarly regulated in party statutes are the rights and duties of party mem­ bers. Party members have the right to elect and be elected to party bodies, receive information from party bodies, express opinions and make suggestions regarding policies, participate in all party activities, and promote their own initiatives within their party. However, though this may look like party openness to the involve­ ment of members, member activity is not enhanced through any further detailed provisions (Gherghina 2014: 300). As was indicated by almost all authors in this volume, participation in party activities is optional, and members are rather in­ active in reality. What is more, parties do nothing to change this situation, which

3 Some differences may be observed even across countries, for example in Estonia, where in order to be a supporting member in REFP a person has to be at least 15 years old, in FRP - 16, in SDP - 18. In PRPU, a minimum age has not been stipulated. 472 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik leaves party leaders broad discretion in decision-making processes. Party members have little to no involvement in the adoption of party programs, and there are only a few instances in which they are included in the candidate selection process. Leadership selection is usually a bit more democratic; however, direct election of the leader is very often optional, with election by the party congress more frequent in practice. Some parties have given up on direct elections after just one trial for reasons of time, money, or otherwise. We will return to this issue when considering intra-party democracy below. An extreme example of inactive membership is authoritarian Belarus, where there is a lack of electoral prospects for political parties. Party ranks are thus necessary mainly to fulfill registration requirements. Although there is a clear distinction between party members and supporters, these two categories mean almost the same thing in reality, as party members do not at all engage in party life. The situation is better in the other countries, yet parties still focus overwhelmingly on seeking voters for elections instead of striving for members. In reference to member duties, Susan Scarrow duly noted that: “Two of the most common obligations imposed by parties on their members are the injunction to refrain from joining rival parties, and the requirement to contribute to party funds” (Scarrow 2005:16). This is very true for parties from CEE states, as almost all party statutes list at least these duties. Other obligations in statute provisions include: activity that is in compliance with party statutes and programs; imple­ mentation of party decisions; participation in the work of the organization; and supporting candidates nominated by the party in electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, Scarrow indicates the most important duties: membership exclusiveness; and pay­ ing membership fees. The first refers to the obligation of members to refrain from membership in other parties, and sometimes in other organizations or associations whose goals are contrary to party aims. Taking part in elections as a candidate of another party is also forbidden. Despite the fact that these obligations are quite modest, they are not fol­ lowed in all parties.4 Although, according to party statutes, failure to fulfill them should lead to expulsion from the party, this is not always the case. For example, in the chapter on party structures in Albania, it was reported that in practice, many members do not pay fees and, despite the formal ban, it is possible to run in elections from the list of one party and belong simultaneously to another. In some post-Yugoslavian states (e.g. Serbia, Slovenia) there have also been certain documented cases of people being members of several parties simultaneously. In practice, it is difficult for political parties to verify whether a candidate applying for membership belongs to another party or not, thus parties usually base their decisions on members’ declarations. However, in e.g. Moldova and Romania, party law stipulates that a party member automatically loses her/his membership in one party by joining another. Apart from violation of the above-mentioned obliga­ tions, party membership should terminate when an individual member resigns,

4 This is not only the case in Belarus, Russia, or Ukraine, where membership is devoid of significance. Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 473 dies, or is dismissed by the party. Members are dismissed for severe damage to the image of the party. Also interesting with regard to membership are membership statistics in CEE states. Research conducted by Ingrid van Biezen, Peter Mair, and Thomas Poguntke revealed that the overall levels of party membership - both in raw numbers (the real membership ratio) and expressed as a percentage of the electorate (M/E) - are decreasing. Moreover, the average level of membership (M/E) in newer democracies (3.5%) is lower than in well-established democracies (5.7%). However, this research encompassed 27 countries, among them only 10 post-communist: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012: 29). Taking into account a greater number of countries could lead to different results, as some authors in this volume - especially those from post-Yugoslavian states - have reported much higher percentages (even double-digit) of membership of the electorate (M/E).5 Examples include Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, where the level of membership of the electorate amounts to 11%, 11.4%, 11.4%, 10-15%, and 3.5-6%, respectively. It is difficult to determine the reasons for these high membership numbers in Balkan states, where party members are not granted special rights and do not participate in decision-making processes (similarly to other countries). The authors of the chapter devoted to Serbian parties, in an effort to answer this question, posited that Serbian citizens share a passive and authoritarian understanding of politics, believing that politicians should have more power, and that citizens are not supposed to engage in political activity outside of elections. Moreover, party membership is sometimes regarded by citizens as a precondition for employment in public service, as such job opportunities are controlled mainly by governing parties. However, it is not clear whether this is true beyond Serbia, thus further research must be conducted to explain the high level of party membership in post-Yugoslavian states. This may be due to the aforementioned cases of double membership. There are also significant disproportions in membership levels in individ­ ual parties according to their age. Parties can be divided into three generations: post-communist parties; parties established in the early 1990s; and newer parties. This division can be seen in most states where the democratic transition began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it should be indicated here that the newer the parties, the less members they have. What is more, newly established parties have in many cases given up on recruitment. This is true for Slovak party OLa NO, with only four members (the party leader among them). Another Slovak party, SaS, as well as Czech parties ANO and Dawn of Direct Democracy, are equally

5 Moreover, in Latvia where the party membership share was around 0.6% of the eligi­ ble voters (one of the lowest figures among European democracies), the number of members has slightly increased. The author of the chapter concerning Latvian parties reported that the membership share has grown to 1.7% of the eligible voters over a ten-year period. An increase of party membership was also reported in Estonia. 474 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik reluctant as far as recruitment of members is concerned. Parties rooted in the 1990s are much better-equipped with membership resources and thus are regarded as more stable, even if they have lost elections. This refers mainly to post-communist parties which inherited a large membership body from their predecessors, but also to other organizations that have existed throughout the entire transitional period since 1990 (especially those that were established out of social movements, existing earlier as opposition to the former regime). Finally, there are no reliable data on party membership in some countries, and researchers have had to rely on information provided by political parties them­ selves, which cannot be verified in any way. Moreover, in several states, parties must have a certain number of members in order to be registered (where compliance with this requirement is periodically verified); while in other countries it is not formally necessary for parties to have members at all. Instead, they merely need to collect a certain number of signatures from people supporting their establishment (these people are not regarded as party members, and there are no official data concerning membership numbers).

Organizational Structures and Intra-Party Democracy

Statutes can create the impression that organizational structures of political parties in CEE countries are very extensive. According the their constitutive documents, parties have territorial organizations that tend to correspond to the administrative division of the state. Relations between different levels of party structures are mainly hierarchical, and party structures of lower levels are subordinated to those on high­ er levels. These lower structures exert influence on upper-level decision-making bodies (usually congresses) mainly by choosing representative delegates. However, these statutory provisions are not always reflected in reality. Taking into consideration the small number of party members (except in post-Yugoslavian countries), it is impossible for most political parties to have widespread territorial structures. Many authors of the chapters included in this volume reported that, despite detailed provisions concerning territorial structures, such structures are very weak or even non-existent in some regions of a country, except for in countries where their existence is needed to retain party status, e.g. Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Slovenia. Even in these countries however, regional structures have often been established only in order to fulfill formal requirements for party registration. In most parties, the central level of party organization is the only thing that really counts. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions, which we will discuss below. Another important point is that the descriptions in literature concerning the position of the party in public-office - namely, that this “face” of party organization is more significant than the party in central-office (Katz and Mair 1992:4-6) - do not apply in CEE. Even if these two sub-systems overlap (since members of the party in public-office, e.g. members of parliament or government, are often ex Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 475 officio members of the party in central-office), both are subordinated to narrow party leadership, and tensions or conflicts between them are very rare. This is very visible, especially in countries where party leadership has not only instructed its MPs on how to vote, but has also tried to deprive them of their mandate when they do not comply with the party line or leave the party to join another. The authors of the chapter on Serbian parties describe the parliamentary group of the governing party as a “voting machine of party leadership.” This is also the case in the other countries. However, in Serbia, several original solutions have been used to disci­ pline MPs. These include: signed contracts; pledging in church; and blank resig­ nation forms signed by MPs at the beginning of their terms of office (submitted in case they disobey instructions). Parties have also tried to use this mechanism in some other countries, but what makes Serbia unique is that it is provided for by the constitution of2006. However, after severe criticism and pressure from the European Commission, the mechanism is no longer used in practice. Nevertheless, in some countries (e.g. in Ukraine, to some extent also in the Czech Republic), the dominant position of the parliamentary group has been confirmed. According to the author of the chapter on Ukraine, parliamentary groups de facto replace central party organizations. This is due to the fact that most parties have been created either by MPs, or by people who occupy the highest positions in the state (the “officials”) and enjoy the support of some MPs. They are sometimes referred to as the “party of power” or the "administrative party.” This is a common feature of some political systems in the post-Soviet area and is further discussed below. However, it is essential to note that such parties do not control the executive power. On the contrary, they are under control of the government or presidential administration. As was stated above, the organizational structures of political parties differ not only between but also within individual countries. They have been determined by the environment in which they are active, as well as by several specific factors like genetic origin, tradition, and pre-existing distribution of organizational re­ sources. This is referred to as “path dependency” (Hanley 2001). However, groups of parties from various post-communist states have developed under similar circumstances, thus their structures are similar to one another. At the beginning of the transformation process, political parties were generally established in two ways: either as “successors” of the organizations existing under the former regime (the first generation); or as new entities (the second generation). The latter have developed in different ways, i.e. from scratch, from existing social movements called “umbrella organizations,” or through the rebirth of historical parties that had functioned before the communist period, were then forbidden under com­ munism, and subsequently reestablished after its collapse. The dichotomy between these two groups of parties is well-known in literature (Enyedi and Linek 2008). However, in later stages of the transformation of political systems in CEE, new parties appeared with slightly different structures and dissimilar attitudes towards their establishment. Today therefore, three generations of political parties can be classified, with the structures of each being different. These generations are vis­ ible particularly in countries where the process of transformation started at the 476 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik beginning of 1990s. Examples of such development are the party systems of the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, and Slovakia. In states where the transition occurred later, the last generation has not appeared. However, the existence of the third generation of parties has been determined not only by the long-term development of their respective democratic systems, but by other factors in need of further research. The first generation is composed of parties which have a long history and exhibit many features of mass parties, like extensive organizational structures with hierarchical ties between party bodies, as well as mass membership. Their common feature is inheritance of resources from the parties of previous regime. These are mainly successors to communist parties or their satellite parties. For example, this is true of KSCM and KDU-CSL from the Czech Republic. The second generation is composed of parties created at the beginning of 1990s, regardless of whether they appeared as a reincarnation of a historical party, or were newly-created. Their evolution was influenced by the transition period, and though they tried to build their structures to mirror those of existing parties, they suffered from a lack of resources. Examples of such parties include CSSD and ODS from the Czech Republic. The parties of the third generation are very interesting because they criticize mainstream parties and tend to present themselves as an alternative thereof (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). They are created by charismatic people and do not even try to build complex structures or recruit large numbers of members. Their charismatic leaders just use mass media to attract voter support for the nearest election. Surprisingly, these parties are able to achieve good electoral outcomes, pass electoral thresholds, and even win parliamentary elections. The good example is ANO, led by Andrej Babis, which was established before the 2013 elections in the Czech Republic. Similar parties have come to fruition in Slovenia (List of Zoran Jankovic - Positive Slovenia, Party of Miro Cerar), Slovakia (OLaNO led by Igor Matovii, SaS led by Richard Sulik), and Poland (Your Movement of Janusz Palikot, movement Kukiz’15 led by Pawel Kukiz,6 and the Modern Party led by Ryszard Petru). There are differences between these parties, but what they have in common is origin. They were not developed from social movements, but created by charismatic leaders as personal projects to help them realize their political ambitions. A lack of party structures and members affords them full con­ trol over decision-making processes and all party resources. This kind of party is well-known in literature and is usually referred to as an entrepreneurial issue party (Harmel and Svisand 1993), a business firm party (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) or a media-mediated personality party (Seisselberg 1996). The biggest problem with these kinds of parties is their sustainability, since without territorial structures they are usually not able to achieve good results in subsequent elections, and one defeat can cause their disappearance (Harmel and Svasand 1993; Arter 2016).

6 Movement Kukiz’15 has not been formally registered as a political party; however, it exercises some functions of political parties, took part in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2015, and has created a parliamentary group in the lower house of Polish Parliament. Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 477

The parties belonging to various generations exhibit different levels of in- tra-party democracy. The extensive and decentralized structures of first- and second-generation parties allow greater direct and indirect involvement of party members in decision-making processes than in third-generation parties, where decisions are made almost exclusively by party leaders. However, taking all twenty countries in this volume into account, we can conclude that the most important dissimilarities occur between countries rather than between individual parties. The discussion on the importance of intra-party democracy conducted in this volume, summarized below, is not new, as it simply furthers the age-old debate on whether we should seek democracy only between parties or also within parties. According to Susan Scarrow, the answer to the question of “whether and to what extend parties need to be internally democratic in order to promote democracy within the wider society,” depends on whether the focus is on process or outcomes (Scarrow 2005). In CEE, intra-party democracy has managed to reach a high level in some states, whereas there is an acute shortage of it in others. Shortages were reported mainly in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Interestingly, the authors of some of these chapters seem to attach great importance to internal democracy in political parties, considering it a pre-condition for the building a fully-fledged democratic political system. In their opinion, the undemocratic decision-making processes within political parties are transferred to the state when the parties gain executive power. However, this looks different in the countries, where intra-party democracy has become the standard, and some parties are experimenting with various forms of direct democracy. The authors of the chapters on these countries were more inclined to argue that extensive internal democratic decision-making undermines party cohesiveness and causes a decline in competitiveness against other parties. Decision-making processes become longer, and the position of party leaders weaker, which in turn creates better chances of winning for third-generation par­ ties, whose decisions are not filtered by party structure. Enhancement of internal party democracy through involvement of members (or even other citizens) in intra-party discussions makes decision-making processes more transparent, but internal discrepancies more visible, which could deteriorate party image. For example, the Unity and Reform Party from Latvia uses an internet platform to discuss certain issues with party members, but this communication sometimes leaks into the media and makes internal disagreements visible to the electorate, which can weaken the electoral potential of the party. Political parties in CEE countries are based mainly on indirect democracy. Formally, the most important decisions are made by broad representative bodies, often called congresses, which have both policy-making powers (to adopt programs and statutes), and elective powers (to select party leadership) (Katz and Mair 1994). The parties have also tried to follow the patterns of their Western counterparts by introducing some forms of direct democracy, but mainly during leadership selection rather than during candidate selection and policy-making. Direct democracy is used, but on a small scale and with caution. None of the parties organize primaries 478 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik encompassing all citizens, and instead confine elections solely to party members. Furthermore, direct democracy is frequently considered an experiment. After using it only once, some parties returned to representative democracy. No form of intra-party direct democracy has been reported in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, or Ukraine. In some parties in Albania (the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party) and Croatia (the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, the Sustainable Development of Croatia), party leaders are elected in direct elections by all party members, but this process is under the control of party leadership, and the real impact of party members is mini­ mal. This procedure has even been described as a “parody” or a facade of democracy (e.g. in Social Democratic Party of Croatia only one candidate took part and got 100% of the vote). In other parties, the “one member one vote” procedure (OMOV), employed during party leader selection, has either been: utilized only once as a kind of experiment (e.g. in the Serbian Liberal Democratic Party in 2012); introduced into party statutes just recentiy (e.g. the Social Democratic Party from Romania, the Croatian Democratic Union); or provided for as an optional solution (e.g. the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland) that has rarely or never been used. However, there are some parties in which the direct elections of party leaders can be regarded as a success. This mainly applies to the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats, where the OMOV procedure has been employed since 2009, and subsequent elections have been highly competitive, especially those held in 2015. As far as the process of candidate selection is concerned, the rank and file members exert even less influence. Some parties from Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have tried to use primaries to select candidates for parliamentary elec­ tions. However, this should be regarded only as an unsuccessful experiment, as they have either abandoned this method (Social Democrats in Slovenia in 1996) or have retained it in their statutes as optional (Social Democratic Party in Romania in 2004), but do not use it for various reasons (time, money, or the undesirable strengthening of regional leaders). In the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union- Democratic Party (SDKU-DS), it is still in force, but as the authors of the chapter noted, the “formal power assigned to party members is actually under strong control of central party leadership.” Direct democracy has sometimes been used to select the presidential candidate of the party, but should be treated more like an exception than the rule. Examples include Croatia’s Social Democratic Party in 2009, and Polands Civic Platform in 2010. Last but not least, some parties provide in their statutes the opportunity to use an intra-party referendum, in which every member can be involved. This is true of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Initiative for Democratic Socialism from Slovenia, and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia from the Czech Republic etc. Interestingly, the name of the latter, coming from the previ­ ous regime, was retained only after an internal referendum. It is also relevant that some parties (mainly from Slovenia) include in their congresses all members with voting rights, thus de facto the competences described for party congresses belong to rank and file members. Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 479

Party Leaders and their Positions in Party Structures

Although the tendency to strengthen the position of party leaders is nowadays very common in all Western democracies, it is overwhelming in CEE countries (see: Hartlinski 2015). The authors of all chapters in this volume have confirmed the significant role of party leaders (presidents, chairmen), both in relation to other party bodies at the central level, and territorial party structures. With only some exceptions, party leaders have important power within and autonomy from the party. Power within the party is understood as “the capacity of leaders to get the party to do as they want,” and autonomy from the party as “the ability to ignore or bypass the party altogether” (Poguntke and Webb 2005: 343). The process of strengthening the positions of party leaders is known in literature as presidentialization, and is closely related to personalization and mediatization of politics. This process has occurred mainly due to the development of mass media and changing forms of mass communication. In Central and Eastern Europe, the conditions for such development were very favorable, as party structures were hardly in place at the beginning of the transformation process, and were thus vulnerable. Furthermore, in some countries (mainly in Belarus, Russia, Ukraine as well as Albania) the communist heritage fostered party centralization and the strong position of leadership. The latter is visible in all generations of parties. However, in the first and second generations, we can see that some parties have decentralized structures and autonomous regional branches, wherein sub-leaders retain substantial power, and are able to influence the power of the leader at the central level (e.g. SLD from Poland or KDS from Slovakia). In parties of the third generation, it is almost impossible for territorial structures to exert impact on the central leader, as the parties are either highly centralized with dominant leaders, or totally lack the structures necessary for the involvement of other members. Parties in which leaders dominate can be divided into two groups. In the first group, the power of leaders is significant, as the statutory documents endow them with important competences that are often additionally enhanced by other informal factors. The second group includes party leaders whom the statutes do not grant strong positions, but thanks to their charisma and informal influence in building personal networks, they are able to achieve meaningful power within their parties. Regardless of which group the leaders belong to, they exert control over policy-making and candidate selection. They are referred to as “ruling mon­ archs” (chapter on Croatia), or leaders with quasi-absolute power resembling the “first secretary” of the communist party (chapter on Albania). Moreover, it is very striking that they themselves are better recognized by electorates and the mass media than the names of the parties they lead. In other words leaders, and not their parties, are the subjects of electoral appeal. As far as the leadership selection process is concerned, leaders are chosen by representative decision-making bodies (congresses) composed of delegates from the entire party structure, or directly by party members. However, despite the growing use of intra-party direct democracy, and the increasing number of 480 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik parties which have gradually formalized the influence of members in leadership selection (Radecki and Gherghina 2015), representative democracy still dominates, and direct democracy has so far been treated with some precaution. What distin­ guishes the parties of CEE countries from their Western counterparts is alternation of power. Some party chairmen or presidents have exerted their power for over 20 years since the beginning of the transformation process. Therefore, a frequent lack of power alternation does not only plague parties of the third generation, but parties of the first and second generation as well. The reasons for this are various. For example, in authoritarian Belarus, the leaders of opposition parties are to a great extent responsible for their parties’ maintenance, and since such parties are able to function only thanks to financial aid from abroad, their leaders must have international contacts. These leaders do not only acquire these resources, but also decide on their allocation, which further strengthens their position. Furthermore, there are not many political activists who want to fight for power within these parties because of the hardship and danger that party leadership entails. Consequently, one-third of the current leaders in Belarus have headed their parties for the entire duration of Lukashenka’s regime or even longer. In other countries as well, alternation of leadership often occurs when parties split. A common scenario is that, after the intra-party competition for leadership, the defeated candidates leave the parties, take their supporters, and create new parties. Therefore, electoral struggle for party leadership, if it ever occurs, can cause a party split. As party elites are better recognized than the names and logos of their parties, it is rather easy for politicians to establish new parties, as voters may not even notice a name change. For third-generation parties, alternation of power can lead to party dissolution, as the entrepreneurs who have created them from scratch are the main suppliers of their resources (assets, personal recognition).

Parties from Non-Democratic Countries and Democracies that Are Still Emerging

As mentioned above, the parties in some countries operate under more difficult circumstances than in others. This is mainly true for post-Soviet states (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, but not Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania), and some Balkan coun­ tries. The latter have managed to create democratic procedures and institutions to a great extent; however, they are still coping with a deficit of democratic culture that seems to be difficult to overcome. Quite different is the situation in the authoritarian states of the post-Soviet area. In Belarus and Russia, the creation of oppositional parties is limited, and opposition leaders must overcome various obstacles to the registration of their parties. In Belarus, some parties have been denied registration up to ten times. Comparing Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries 481

One of the most popular reasons for this is failure to prove the existence of at least 1,000 members, as the authenticity of such members is heavily questioned in the case of opposition parties. In Russia and Ukraine, the law provides de­ manding conditions for the creation of parties, as they not only have to recruit a set number of members, but also have to have regional offices in at least half the subjects of the federation or administrative regions, respectively. The creation of such barriers has led to the rise of experts who provide formal compliance with the law in registering parties. In fact, an entire industry has been formed to serve such purposes. In Ukraine, this has created a strange situation; namely that, due to the lack of verification instruments, it has become possible to register fictional parties which are simply for sale. However, in Russia, the requirements for party registration have been eased. For example, the threshold of members needed for the establishment of a party was reduced from 50,000 to 500, which consequently increased the number of registered parties from seven in 2010, to seventy-six in 2015. Nevertheless, even if the opposition parties manage to get registered, their activity is seriously restricted in the Russian political system. In Belarus, political parties (both oppositional and pro-governmental) do not serve as organizations that deliver candidates for parliamentary elections. Instead, they are a source of members for electoral commissions, since party representatives should make up one-third of these commissions. However, this concerns mainly pro-regime parties, as the role of pro-opposition parties is restricted in this respect. Another interesting point is related to the “party of power” or “administrative party.” Such parties have arisen in Russia (United Russia) and Ukraine (Party of Regions). They have been created by the presidential administration to ensure legislative support for the regime’s political initiatives (Laverty 2015). Even if the “party of power” is dominant in the elections, it does not rule. Furthermore, though it is an important vehicle for patronage, in reality the state - and not the party - controls access to these resources. The “party of power” relies almost exclusively on the state, and thus is vulnerable to shifts in the priorities of the executive ad­ ministration. As was aptly noted in the chapter on Russian parties, “United Russia was created as a political project of the Kremlin (presidential administration), not to provide access to power for a certain social group, but to maintain support for the ruling group in the legislature and in society as a whole.” This kind of party also functioned in Ukraine before Euromaidan. The Party of Regions (PoR), led by former President Viktor Yanukovych, dominated the political space, securing parliamentary support for the regime.

* * »

All in all, looking for one model of party organization in Central and Eastern European countries is futile, as organizational structures of political parties sig­ nificantly vary, not only between, but within countries. Firstly, in non-democratic states, parties have to cope with restrictions concerning their establishment and activities, and are not able to function freely. Secondly, in the countries where the transition is still ongoing, even if the institutional conditions are more favorable to 482 Beata Kosowska-Gąstoł, Piotr Borowiec, Katarzyna Sobolewska-Myślik political parties, a lack of democratic culture hinders their democratic development and functioning. Thirdly, in the countries where the transformation seems to be successfully finished, several generations of parties can be observed which differ from each other structurally. Parties of the first and second generations have weak, but developed territorial structures and membership, whereas parties of the third generation suffer from a lack of both. Fourthly, regardless of the kind of regime in which the parties function, or the generation to which they belong, parties are managed by strong leadership. Fifthly, it is impossible to categorically apply the models describing parties in Western democracies to parties from CEE states, as they are characterized by different features taken from various theoretical models.

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