INTER-PARTY MOBILITY AMONG PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES in POST- COMMUNIST EAST CENTRAL EUROPE Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M

PARTY POLITICS VOL 10. No.2 pp. 151–176

INTER-PARTY MOBILITY AMONG PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES IN POST- COMMUNIST EAST CENTRAL EUROPE Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski

ABSTRACT

The development of stable partisan commitments among political elites is crucial for party-system institutionalization in the new democracies of post-communist Europe. Little is known, however, about the partisan behavior of those who compete for national office. This study begins to fill this gap through an analysis of inter-party mobility among all candidates who ran for the lower house of parliament in two pairs of consecutive elections in Poland (1991–3 and 1993–7) and in three pairs of consecutive elections in the Czech Republic (1990–2, 1992–6 and 1996–8). We consider the overall extent of inter-party mobility, structural versus voluntary components of mobility, patterns of movement between types of parties and electoral payoffs of stable and shifting partisan affiliations. Although the overall rate of party-switching has declined substantially in the Czech Republic but not in Poland, changes in other characteristics of inter-party mobility indicate that party-system institutionalization is taking place in both countries.

KEY WORDS elite party-switching party-system institutionalization political mobility

The continual formations of entirely new parties, some of which acquire ‘overnight’ success, and the ongoing disappearance, schisms and mergers of established parties, together with high rates of electoral volatility, attest to the under-institutionalization of the party systems of new democracies in East Central Europe. Such party-system ﬂuidity reﬂects a still ‘open’ and uncertain political market in which the partisan commitments of politicians and voters alike are not yet stable and the costs of shifting allegiances are relatively low (Bielasiak, 1997; Lewis, 2000; Mair, 1996). Yet, it would be inaccurate to characterize the party systems of East Central Europe as being in a perpetual state of disarray. On the contrary, there is a growing body of

1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068804040498] PARTY POLITICS 10(2) research demonstrating that party-system institutionalization is taking place, albeit more so in some countries than in others (Baylis, 1998; Bielasiak, 1999; Ilonszki, 2000; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Lewis, 2000; Miller and White, 1998; Shabad and Slomczynski, 1999, 2002; Slomczynski and Shabad, 2002; Toka, 1997; Tworzecki, 1996). One important aspect of party-system institutionalization in these new democracies that has received little systematic attention, however, is the development of partisan attachments among politicians. News reports, as well as studies of legislators, document the high frequency with which parliamentarians abandon their political clubs and switch to other party groups, form new ones or become independent (e.g. Bowler et al., 1999; Brokl and Mansfeldova, 1996; Filippov, 2000; Klima, 1998; Olson, 1998; Szarvas, 1995). Such turmoil among top politicians has led some academic observers to argue that politicians in the region tend to be ‘institutional nomads’ or ‘political tourists’ who readily shift allegiances from one party to another if they believe that their self-interests will be better served and the costs of switching are low (Herron, 2001; Jackiewicz, 1994; Kaminski and Kurczewska, 1994; Klima, 1998; Kreuzer and Pettai, 2002; Olson, 1998). As important as parliamentarians and other top party officials are, however, they constitute only a small fraction of politicians in the world of national-level electoral politics. Thus, the question remains: how widespread is such political tourism among politicians as a whole? Moreover, when party-switching occurs, to what can it be attributed? Is it the case, as many have argued, that politicians switch parties voluntarily for reasons of self-interest and/or weak political identities (Herron, 2001; Jackiewicz, 1994; Kaminski and Kurczewska, 1994; Klima, 1998; Kreuzer and Pettai, 2002)? Or, rather, are they forced to shift their partisan affiliation by structural changes of the party system itself due to party dissolutions, splits and mergers? Regardless of the extent and sources of inter-party mobility, do politicians shift partisan allegiances in patterns that are indicative of party- system structuring? For example, do party switchers tend to move to established or to new parties, to parties that are ideologically proximate or distant, to winning or to losing parties? And, finally, what are the costs of party-switching for the individual politician? Does his or her chance of electoral success differ from that of a party loyalist? One cannot expect the extent, patterns and consequences of inter-party mobility to remain static. Presumably, as time passes and as political elites engage in multiple iterations of the electoral game, a learning process should take place and contribute to the stabilization of the party system (Bielasiak, 1997). Put simply, party-switching should become less ‘normal’, the patterns of movement more structured and the consequences of political tourism more costly. Has this, in fact, occurred during the first decade of competitive politics in East Central Europe? We address these questions through a comparative and dynamic analysis 152 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY of the degree, types, patterns and consequences of inter-party mobility in Poland and the Czech Republic. Specifically, we track the partisan affiliations of all candidates who ran for the lower house of parliament in two pairs of consecutive elections in Poland (1991–3 and 1993–7) and in three pairs of consecutive elections in the Czech Republic (1990–2, 1992–6 and 1996–8). Assuming that a learning process is taking place among politicians as the electoral game is repeated and becomes more familiar, we expect, by the time of the last parliamentary elections held in the 1990s in both Poland and the Czech Republic: (1) aggregate levels of inter-party mobility and of structurally induced movement to have declined from those of earlier years; (2) candidates’ movements from one party to another to reflect a growing structuring of the party system indicated by an increase of (a) flows to old rather than to new political parties, (b) switching within rather than across political party families, and (c) shifts to winning rather than to losing parties; and (3) the electoral costs to the individual candidate of party- switching to have increased. However, we also anticipate that our comparative analysis will tend to support findings that by the end of the 1990s the Czech party system was more consolidated than Poland’s. The greater fluidity of the Polish party system with respect to entries of new parties into and departures of winning parties from the parliamentary arena is likely to encourage and be reflected in higher rates of party-switching by politicians. Differences in consti- tutional arrangements may also contribute to higher levels of inter-party mobility in Poland. Direct election of the president, as in Poland but not in the Czech Republic, is typically associated with less cohesive parties, both as electoral organizations and as parliamentary groups (Powell, 1982). Perhaps of even greater importance are the differential effects of the two countries’ electoral systems. In Poland’s open list system, voters must select a single candidate from a party list in order to cast a valid vote. Candidates can and frequently do benefit from personal reputation apart from their party affiliation. In the Czech Republic, citizens can engage in approval voting of ranked candidates on a party list. If one-tenth of the total voters who cast a valid ballot for a party in an electoral district use this option, candidates who are chosen by at least 10 percent of such voters are moved to the top of the party list in the order given by the number of approval votes (Turnovec, 1997). Thus, the Polish electoral system provides fewer disincentives for politicians to switch parties (Carey and Shugart, 1995).

Data

Our analysis is based on data from Poland and the Czech Republic on all candidates who competed in elections to the lower house of parliament in the 1990s.1 Speciﬁcally, for Poland we include candidates who ran in the 1991 (N = 6980), 1993 (N = 8787) and 1997 (N = 6433) elections to the 153 PARTY POLITICS 10(2)

Sejm. In the case of the Czech Republic, we include candidates who competed in the 1990 (N = 3947) and 1992 (N = 5708) elections in the Czech lands to the Narodni Rada (Chamber of People), as well as the 1996 (N = 4525) and 1998 (N = 3726) elections to Poslanecka Snimovna (the lower house of the parliament of the Czech Republic). Our data were obtained from state agencies responsible for collecting and maintaining election archives. For each country, the data for all elections are pooled so that the unit of observation is the candidate and all characteristics of his or her participation in consecutive elections are values of variables. This arrangement of data allows us to track the political experience of candidates, including their partisan afﬁliation, across consecutive elections. (Details about the process of matching candidates across elections are available from the authors upon request.)

Extent and Types of Inter-Party Mobility

All else being equal, institutionalizing party systems should exhibit decreas- ing electoral volatility and elite-level inter-party mobility, thus indicating the formation of stable partisan attachments among both voters and politicians alike. Studies of electoral behavior indicate that, although volatility rates were consistently higher in Poland than in the Czech Republic, they decreased in both countries between the early and late 1990s (Bielasiak, 1999; Lewis, 2000). Has there been a similar decline with respect to inter- party mobility among politicians? Are politicians who run for parliament in Poland and the Czech Republic developing stable partisan attachments, as one might expect if the party systems of these new democracies are becoming institutionalized? If candidates switch party afﬁliation from one election to another, do they do so primarily as a result of structural changes within the party system, that is, because of party dissolutions, splits or mergers? Or are politicians ‘political nomads’ who move voluntarily for reasons of self-interest, weak political identities or a programmatic prefer- ence on their part or that of their parties?

Overall Level of Inter-Party Mobility Over Time In Table 1, we provide data on all candidates for the lower house who competed in the Polish parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1997 and Czech parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996 and 1998.2 In each of these elections, about 20 percent of candidates were ‘returners’, that is, individuals who had competed in the previous parliamentary election. These returning candidates are the main focus of our analysis, since it is they who had to declare a partisan afﬁliation on at least two occasions in order to seek legislative ofﬁce and, thus, were in a position either to remain with their party or switch. 154 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY

Table 1. Types of candidates in elections to parliament in Poland (1993 and 1997) and the Czech Republic (1992, 1996 and 1998) Type of candidates Number Percent of total Percent of returners A1. Poland, 1993 Election All candidates 8787 100.0 Newcomers 7140 81.3 Returners 1647 18.7 100.0 Stayers 931 10.6 56.5 Movers 716 8.1 43.5

A2. Poland, 1997 Election All candidates 6433 100.0 Newcomers 4962 77.1 Returners 1471 22.9 100.0 Stayers 571 8.9 38.8 Movers 900 14.0 61.2

B1. The Czech Republic, 1992 Election All candidates 5708 100.0 Newcomers 4823 84.5 Returners 885 15.5 100.0 Stayers 334 5.9 37.7 Movers 551 9.6 62.3

B2. The Czech Republic, 1996 Election All candidates 4525 100.0 Newcomers 3650 80.7 Returners 875 19.3 100.0 Stayers 395 8.7 45.1 Movers 480 10.6 54.9

B3. The Czech Republic, 1998 Election All candidates 3726 100.0 Newcomers 2986 80.1 Returners 740 19.9 100.0 Stayers 662 17.8 89.5 Movers 78 2.1 10.5

In accord with most analyses of the party systems of post-communist East Central Europe, our data on overall levels of inter-party mobility indicate that institutionalization of the Polish party system lags behind that of the Czech Republic. Indeed, as the data in Table 1 show, between the 1991–3 and 1993–7 elections the extent of inter-party mobility increased rather than diminished in Poland. Whereas a slight majority of returning candidates in 155 PARTY POLITICS 10(2) the 1993 parliamentary election exhibited stable partisan attachments, almost two-thirds of returners in the 1997 contest switched party labels. Candidate data for the Czech Republic show a quite different trajectory, indicative of a party system that is becoming institutionalized. With each successive election, the proportion of returning candidates who changed their partisan afﬁliation steadily declined; only 11 percent moved from one party to another between the 1996 and 1998 elections.3

Types of Inter-Party Mobility: Structural versus Voluntary To what can inter-party mobility be attributed in Poland and the Czech Republic? Is it due to fluidity at the party-system level resulting from dissolutions, splits or mergers of parties, thereby leaving candidates who wish to compete again for parliamentary office with little choice but to switch parties? Or is it due to voluntary moves by candidates who could have remained with the same party in both elections but who chose not to? In Table 2 we distinguish between two types of mobility: structural and voluntary.4 Within structural mobility, we make three further distinctions. First, we distinguish shifts due to party dissolutions that result from the disappearance in any guise of previously existing political formations. The disappearance of Party X between the 1993 and 1997 elections in Poland and of the Czech Party of Democratic Left between the 1996 and 1998 elections are examples of party dissolution. The second category of structural mobility refers to party splits that lead to either the formation of a schismatic offshoot of an existing party or the replacement altogether of an existing party by splinter groups. Examples of party splits include: the break-up of the Czech opposition movement Civic Forum, which gained a near majority of the vote in the first competitive election in 1990, into several new parties that competed in the next election held in 1992; the creation in the Czech Republic of Freedom Union as a schismatic offshoot of the Civic Democratic Party; and, in Poland, the splitting of Coalition for the Republic into Movement for Reconstruction of Poland and another group that became part of Solidarity Electoral Action between the 1993 and 1997 elections. The third category pertains to shifts due to party mergers that result from the formation of coalitions by at least one existing party and one or more other ‘old’ or new political groups. Examples include: the formation of Solidarity Electoral Action by Solidarity Trade Union and leaders of 21 ‘old’ and new political groups in response to the electoral defeat of Christian, nationalist and right-wing groups in the 1993 Polish election; and, in the Czech Republic, the creation prior to the 1992 election of the Liberal Social Union by the (Czechoslovak) Socialist Party, the Greens and the Alliance of Farmers and Countryside. Note here that in what follows we make the distinction between change of party-system format and inter-party mobility, and regard the latter as a 156 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY consequence in part of developments at the systemic level. Although structural changes of the party system are typically initiated by top politicians, dissolutions, schisms and new party formations are not reducible to individual-level behavior.5 Although the overall level of inter-party mobility in Poland increased, this was not the result of structural changes of the party system, but rather the product of voluntary shifts by candidates from one party to another. As the figures in Table 2 show, only 43 percent of mobile candidates between 1993 and 1997, compared to 61 percent between 1991 and 1993, switched their affiliation because the party on whose ticket they had previously run had disappeared, split or merged prior to the next election; moreover, the majority of candidates who moved for structural reasons between 1993 and 1997 did so as a result of party mergers (the formation of Solidarity Elec- toral Action being the most significant example). Thus, even though the overall level of inter-party mobility was higher between 1993 and 1997 than between 1991 and 1993, the decline in structurally induced shifts combined with the significant role played by mergers can be taken as evidence of a structuring of Poland’s party system. At the same time, the fact that over half of all switchers between 1993 and 1997 changed their partisan affiliation voluntarily suggests otherwise. The high rate of voluntary movements between parties is indicative of both a lack of boundedness of parties as organizations and of partisan loyalty on the part of politicians. As in Poland, inter-party mobility resulting from changes in party-system format declined significantly in the Czech Republic, coupled with a commensurate increase in the rate of voluntary movements. Nonetheless, and contrary to expectations, by the end of the 1990s structurally induced inter-party mobility still accounted for slightly more than half of movements by all candidates in the Czech Republic and was 12 percentage points higher

Table 2. Types of inter-party mobility among candidates in parliamentary elections in Poland (1993 and 1997) and the Czech Republic (1992, 1996 and 1998) Structural mobility Total number of movers Party Party Party Voluntary Elections N = 100% dissolution (%) split (%) merger (%) mobility (%) A. Poland 1993 716 21.8 22.8 16.7 38.7 1997 900 4.8 7.2 31.2 56.8

B. The Czech Republic 1992 551 33.2 44.1 22.7 0.0 1996 480 15.6 35.8 22.9 25.6 1998 78 3.8 15.4 35.9 44.9

157 PARTY POLITICS 10(2) than in Poland. But, as in Poland, in the 1998 election it was mergers rather than party dissolutions or splits that were the primary source of structurally induced shifts. In sum, there are striking differences between Poland and the Czech Republic in terms of their overall levels and types of elite-level inter-party mobility. In this respect, our findings conform to other analyses and show that the Polish party system is less institutionalized than the Czech Republic’s. Despite the sharp increase in its aggregate level of inter-party mobility, however, there is evidence that consolidation of Poland’s party system has taken place. Nonetheless, countervailing tendencies to party- system institutionalization are apparent in both countries. More than 50 percent of party switchers in Poland and somewhat less than half in the Czech Republic shifted their affiliations voluntarily between the two most recent elections included in our analysis, proportions sufficiently high to indicate that ‘political tourism’ is not a trivial phenomenon.

From Where to Where? Patterns of Inter-Party Mobility

Although changes in the levels and types of elite-level inter-party mobility are a significant indicator of party-system development, changes in the patterns of candidates’ movements between types of parties are also important signs of the degree to which a party system is becoming institutionalized over the course of several elections. Here we consider three patterns of inter-party mobility. The first is candidates’ movements to ‘old’ versus ‘new’ parties. A tendency among mobile politicians to switch to new rather than old parties could be attributable to the reluctance of established parties to select switchers to run on their party ticket, or to a reluctance on the part of such candidates to subject themselves to competition not only with first- time candidates but also with party loyalists for an advantageous position on established parties’ electoral lists. Whatever the reasons, a pronounced movement toward new parties by mobile candidates would serve to facili- tate the entry of such political groups into the electoral marketplace and impede party-system institutionalization. Second, we turn to an analysis of patterns of movement between parties belonging to the same political family versus inter-party mobility across political families. Grouping parties according to ideological blocs based on party programs, electoral appeals or party elites’ orientations toward a variety of issues is frequently done in analyses of party-system structuring in long-lived democracies, and now in post-communist Europe as well (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bozoki, 1990; Gebethner, 1993; Kitschelt, 1995; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Schopflin, 1993; Tworzecki, 1996; Wesolowski, 1996; Wiatr, 1993). Increasingly, analyses of post-communist party systems, particularly those in East Central Europe, conclude that beneath their visible fluidity there are discernible programmatic differences among parties or 158 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY groups of parties along one or more axes of competition (see especially Kitschelt et al., 1999). Thus, our examination of elite-level mobility within and across political families parallels analyses of intra-bloc versus inter-bloc volatility among voters and should be equally revealing about the degree to which there is programmatic structuring of the party systems of Poland and the Czech Republic. The third pattern of movement we consider here is between electorally successful (i.e. those that won legislative seats) and unsuccessful parties (i.e. those that lost legislative seats). Increased movement by switchers to electorally successful parties would indicate that experienced candidates, at least, became more astute in figuring out which parties were likely winners and losers in the upcoming election. Their ability to forecast the outcome of the election more accurately and, therefore, to shift their partisan allegiances strategically, depends, of course, on some degree of prior stabilization of inter-party competition as well as on the reliability of public opinion polls that track vote intentions to which politicians pay attention (Gunther, 1989). Such strategic behavior on the part of mobile candidates would, in turn, serve to promote consolidation of the party system.

Old versus New Parties When candidates switched were they more likely to affiliate themselves with ‘old’, established parties or with new political groups? As the data in Table 3 show, in sharp contrast to newcomers, all returning candidates who shifted their partisan allegiance between the 1991 and 1993 elections in Poland were far more likely to move to new rather than to old parties (68 versus 32 percent, respectively). Voluntary movers favored new parties by an even wider margin, although we do not know whether this tendency was the result of their own preferences or the reluctance of old parties to select them as candidates. In general, the pattern of mobility between the 1993 and 1997 elections resembled that for 1991–3. Newcomers continued to favor old parties, but only slightly so. Considered as a whole, returning candidates who switched between 1993 and 1997 continued to favor new parties, but by a lesser margin than before. But, unlike in the 1991–3 period, the pattern of mobility of those who moved voluntarily between 1993 and 1997 differed markedly from that of returning candidates who were forced to switch their partisan affiliation. In 1997 a majority of voluntary switchers appeared on the lists of old parties, while 88 percent of those who moved because their parties had split, dissolved or merged shifted to new parties. The pattern of movement to old versus new parties was quite different in the early years of competitive politics in the Czech Republic. In both 1992 and 1996 newcomers as well as all types of returning candidates flocked to new parties. That this was the case in 1992 is hardly surprising since a genuine multiparty system only began to emerge after the 1990 election with the splintering of the opposition movement Civic Forum into distinct 159 PARTY POLITICS 10(2)

Table 3. Types of candidates in elections to parliament in Poland (1993 and 1997) and the Czech Republic (1992, 1996 and 1998) Party formation Total Types of candidates (N = 100%) Old (%) New (%) A1. Poland, 1993 Election Newcomers 7140 63.3 26.6 Stayers 931 100.0 0.0 Movers 716 32.0 68.0 Party dissolution 156 50.6 49.4 Party split 163 0.0 100.0 Party merger 120 62.5 37.5 Voluntary movers 277 21.1 72.9

A2. Poland, 1997 Election Newcomers 4962 51.4 48.6 Stayers 571 100.0 0.0 Movers 900 38.4 61.6 Party dissolution 43 44.2 55.8 Party split 65 0.0 100.0 Party merger 281 10.0 90.0 Voluntary movers 511 58.5 41.5

B1. The Czech Republic, 1992 Election Newcomers 3826 27.6 72.4 Stayers 334 100.0 0.0 Movers 551 13.2 86.8 Party dissolution 183 25.1 74.9 Party split 243 11.1 88.9 Party merger 125 0.0 100.0 Voluntary movers – – –

B2. The Czech Republic, 1996 and 1998 Elections Newcomers, 1996 3650 36.2 63.8 Newcomers, 1998 2986 79.3 20.7 Stayers, 1996 and 1998 729 100.0 0.0 Movers, 1996 480 10.6 89.4 Movers, 1998 78 30.7 69.3 Party dissolution, 1996 and 1998 78 16.7 83.3 Party split, 1996 and 1998 184 0.0 100.0 Party merger, 1996 and 1998 138 0.0 100.0 Voluntary movers, 1996 123 33.3 66.7 Voluntary movers, 1998 35 60.0 40.0

160 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY political groupings. In Table 3 we show similarities and differences between the 1996 and 1998 Czech elections in a condensed manner because the results are identical for both years for party loyalists and those who moved due to splits and mergers. By 1998, however, new parties appeared to have become far less attractive than old parties for both newcomers and voluntary switchers alike. Only the few returning candidates who switched as a result of changes in party-system format opted to go to new political formations. In sum, by the end of the first decade of competitive politics in Poland and the Czech Republic old parties had become increasingly attractive to both novice and experienced candidates. Moreover, as time passed, established parties became more likely than new political formations to be electorally successful (with some obvious exceptions, such as the Polish Solidarity Electoral Action in 1997 and the Czech Freedom Union in 1998). Thus, it became more difficult for new parties to gain entry into the political market or to become significant players within it.

Mobility Within and Across Political Families When returning candidates switch their partisan affiliation, do they tend to remain within the same political family or do they move from one to another, and if so how far do they roam? We have categorized all parties that competed in each election in Poland and the Czech Republic into discrete political families according to their programmatic stances. In Poland we distinguish among four political families (with a residual category of ‘other’): (a) post-communist; (b) social/liberal democratic; (c) Christian/nationalist; and (d) populist (Gebethner, 1993; Paszkiewicz, 1996; Shabad and Slomczynski, 1999; Slodkowska, 1995; Taras, 1995; Tworzecki, 1996; Wesolowski, 1996; Wiatr, 1993). To give a few examples to illustrate the way in which we made our assignment: in 1997, Freedom Union (called Democratic Union in 1991 and 1993) and the more explic- itly social democratic party, Union of Labor, were assigned to the liberal/social democratic family. The Polish Peasant Party was placed in the populist political family. Solidarity Electoral Action, formed prior to the 1997 election, was categorized as a Christian/nationalist group, together with Movement for Reconstruction of Poland. The single party in the post- communist political family is the Democratic Left Alliance, the offshoot of the Polish United Workers’ Party, which ruled Poland for more than 40 years. Our categorization of political families is somewhat different for the Czech Republic insofar as its party system has developed far more so than Poland’s along a single left–right continuum (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Markowski, 1997; Turnovec, 1997). Hence, based upon their programmatic stances, we categorized most parties that competed in the 1990–8 elections into post-communist, center-left and center-right political families, 161 PARTY POLITICS 10(2) with a residual category of ‘other’ (extreme-right and ethnic/regional). The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was placed in the post-communist bloc in 1990, as were the Czech Party of Communists, Party of Democratic Left, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia and the Left Block in 1996. The Czechoslovak (and then Czech) Social Democratic Party was assigned to the center-left political tendency, together with various other parties depending upon the election. The center-right political family includes Civic Forum in 1990 and in subsequent years its splinter parties (the Civic Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance), as well as the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party. The most significant extreme-right group falling within the ‘other’ category in all elections is Association for the Republic-Republican Party. Ethnic or regional parties assigned to this category include, for example, the Romany Civic Initiative and Movement for Self-governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silesia. In Tables 4 and 5 we present data on mobility within and across political families for each pair of consecutive elections. It is important to note at the outset that the absence of multiple parties with similar programmatic stances places severe constraints on the extent to which returning candidates who switch their partisan affiliation can remain within the same political family. For example, although only a handful of returning candidates who ran on the Polish SLD ticket in 1991 or 1993 switched to another party in the next election, they all crossed political family boundaries because of a lack of other options within the post-communist bloc. In contrast, majorities of candidates affiliated with Christian/nationalist and populist parties in 1991 who ran again in 1993 on another party ticket switched to another Christ- ian/nationalist and populist party, respectively, and so were able to stay within the same political family if they preferred to do so. Overall, in both countries a majority of all movers shifted to other parties within their respective political families between each pair of consecutive elections. Indeed, a recalculation of the data presented in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the rate of intra-family mobility increased from 51.4 percent to 61.4 percent in Poland and even more dramatically from 52 percent to 58.5 percent to 75 percent in the Czech Republic. Moreover, those returning candidates who did move across political family lines were far more likely to move to parties in adjacent political families than to switch to ideologically distant blocs. The major exception to these trends occurred in the Czech Republic with respect to switchers from an ethnic/regional party who constituted the vast majority of the ‘other’ category. They appeared to be less constrained by left–right ideological divisions. Candidate shifts between ethnic/regional parties to another political family amounted to 10 percent of all inter-bloc movements between 1996 and 1998 and to slightly over 50 percent between 1996 and 1998.

162 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY Political families Post- Social Christian/ otal communist democratic/ nationalist Populist Other T Mobility within and between political families for parliamentary elections in Poland, 1991–3 and 1993–7 Mobility within and between political families for parliamentary elections in Poland, 1991–3 Table 4. Post-communistSocial democratic Christian/nationalistPopulistOther 150 364 5Post-communistSocial democratic Christian/nationalist 5.3 161 0.8 0.0PopulistOther 36 291 351 10 37.0 12.7 7.1 80.0 2.8 2.7 218 0.3 0.0 30 10.6 38.7 81.0 0.0 27.8 1.8 83.2 60.0 3.1 3.3 32.0 50.9 8.8 20.0 25.0 10.6 9.6 79.2 0.0 11.3 31.1 2.2 0.0 16.7 33.3 45.0 17.4 40.0 76.1 3.7 23.3 11.1 2.7 0.0 0.0 11.0 30.0 0.5 2.7 Political families (N = 100%) (%) liberal (%) (%) (%) A. Elections 1991–3 1991 Election B. 1993–7 Elections 1993 Election

163 PARTY POLITICS 10(2)

Table 5. Mobility within and between political families for parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, 1990–2, 1992–6 and 1996–8 Political families

Total Post- Center- Center- Other N = 100% communist (%) left (%) right (%) (%) A. 1990–2 Elections 1990 Election Post-communist 5 0.0 0.0 20.0 80.0 Center-left 148 2.0 4.1 90.5 3.4 Center-right 382 3.1 20.9 73.3 2.7 Other 16 37.5 0.0 62.5 0.0

B. 1992–6 Elections 1992 Election Post-communist 184 88.6 2.2 0.5 8.7 Center-left 58 0.0 8.6 86.2 5.1 Center-right 160 1.3 21.9 39.4 37.5 Other 77 10.4 3.9 16.9 68.8

C. 1996–8 Elections 1996 Election Post-communist 3 33.3 33.3 33.3 0.0 Center-left 5 0.0 60.0 20.0 20.0 Center-right 27 0.0 7.7 92.6 0.0 Other 41 0.0 19.5 12.2 68.3

Winning versus Losing Parties The last pattern of mobility we consider here concerns movement between parties that gained seats in the lower house of parliament and those that did not. We assume that both novice and experienced candidates want to win and will attempt – as far as they are able – to behave strategically in affiliating themselves with political parties. Therefore, we expect that returning candidates who ran on winning tickets in the first election will be more likely to be ‘loyalists’ than to be voluntary switchers and that the reverse will be the case for those who were on the ballots of losing parties. We also expect that returners who switch parties between elections will tend to affiliate themselves with likely winners rather than with losers. Moreover, such strategic behavior should become more apparent over time, as electoral rules become more stable, the political market becomes more closed, and, as a result, outcomes of inter-party competition and cooperation become more predictable. Finally, this trend ought to be more pronounced in the Czech Republic than in Poland. 164 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY

In Tables 6 and 7 we present mobility patterns between winning and losing parties of all types of candidates for each pair of consecutive elections. As expected, there is some evidence of increasingly strategic behavior on the part of both novice and experienced candidates in Poland. With the exception of those who stayed with losing parties, higher proportions of both newcomers and returning candidates affiliated themselves with winning parties in 1997 than in 1993. For example, 35 percent of those who ran on the ballots of winning parties in 1991 but who then switched voluntarily moved to winning parties in 1993; about 48 percent of those who shifted voluntarily from winning parties in 1993 moved to electorally successful parties in 1997. The percentage of voluntary switchers from losing parties who moved to winning parties rose even more dramatically (from 8.7 percent to 54.5 percent). Some of our expectations with respect to mobility between winning and losing parties in the Czech Republic were also met. First, the vast majority of returning candidates who ran on winning tickets in the first election and who were able to stay with their party in the second remained stable in their partisan affiliation (100 percent between 1990 and 1992, 75 percent

Table 6. Mobility to winning and losing parties in Poland, 1993 and 1997 Number of cases Winning Losing Types of candidates (N = 100%) party (%) party (%) A. 1993 Election Newcomers 7140 40.3 59.7 Returners from 1991 election 1647 51.1 48.9 Winning parties 1449 51.8 48.2 Stayers 913 61.1 28.9 Structural movers 282 36.9 63.1 Voluntary movers 254 35.0 65.0 Losing parties 198 45.5 54.5 Stayers 18 0.0 100.0 Structural movers 157 56.1 43.9 Voluntary movers 23 8.7 91.3

B. 1997 Election Newcomers 4962 49.1 50.9 Returners from 1993 election 1471 63.1 30.7 Winning parties 841 67.7 23.3 Stayers 414 98.8 1.2 Structural movers 61 100.0 0.0 Voluntary movers 366 47.8 52.2 Losing parties 630 59.4 40.6 Stayers 157 0.0 100.0 Structural movers 328 89.9 10.1 Voluntary movers 145 54.5 45.5

165 PARTY POLITICS 10(2)

Table 7. Mobility to winning and losing parties in the Czech Republic, 1992, 1996 and 1998 Number of cases Winning Losing Types of candidates (N = 100%) party (%) party (%) A. 1992 Election Newcomers 4823 49.8 50.2 Returners from 1990 election 885 74.9 25.1 Winning parties 474 74.5 25.5 Stayers 231 100.0 0.0 Structural movers 243 50.2 49.8 Voluntary movers – – – Losing parties 411 75.4 24.6 Stayers 103 99.0 1.0 Structural movers 308 67.5 24.6 Voluntary movers – – –

B. 1996 Election Newcomers 3650 33.9 66.1 Returners from 1992 election 875 60.5 39.5 Winning parties 644 67.1 32.9 Stayers 310 100.0 0.0 Structural movers 232 40.5 59.5 Voluntary movers 102 27.5 72.5 Losing parties 231 42.0 58.0 Stayers 85 91.8 8.2 Structural movers 125 7.2 92.8 Voluntary movers 21 47.6 52.4

C. 1998 Election Newcomers 2986 39.3 60.7 Returners from 1996 election 740 42.7 57.3 Winning parties 447 69.4 30.6 Stayers 426 68.8 31.2 Structural movers 12 100.0 0.0 Voluntary movers 9 55.6 44.4 Losing parties 293 2.0 98.0 Stayers 236 0.0 100.0 Structural movers 31 6.5 93.5 Voluntary movers 26 15.4 84.6

between 1992 and 1996 and 80 percent between 1996 and 1998). Further- more, as the data in Table 7 show, there was considerable advantage in being loyal to one’s winning party: with the single exception of the few returning candidates who switched from electorally successful parties for structural reasons between 1996 and 1998 (i.e. those who moved from the 166 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY

Civic Democratic Party to its schismatic offshoot Freedom Union), party loyalists were far more likely to be candidates of winning parties in the second election than were switchers. Surprisingly, with the exception again of the 1996–8 pair of elections, the same pattern can be discerned for mobility patterns of all returning candidates who ran on losing party tickets in the first election. For this group, too, party loyalty paid off more than shifting insofar as stayers were more likely than switchers to appear on the ballots of winning parties in the second election. The most surprising finding, however, is that with each successive election declining proportions of newcomers and experienced candidates alike affiliated themselves with winning parties. Indeed, by the last election, about 39 percent of newcomers and 43 percent of all returning candidates (down from 75 percent in 1992 and 61 percent in 1996) ran on the ballots of electorally success- full parties. This trend is the opposite to that in Poland, and is contrary to what we expected to find in our comparison of the two countries’ mobility patterns.

Does Switching Pay Off and for Whom?

What was the impact of candidates’ partisan history on their chances of winning a parliamentary seat in the next election in which they ran? Table 8 presents logistic regression analyses of electoral success on candidates’ partisan histories in the 1993 and 1997 elections in Poland and the 1992, 1996 and 1998 elections in the Czech Republic. In the first two columns of the table we provide B coefficients and their standard errors. Exponential values of B (ExpB) in the third column indicate the expected odds of being elected versus not being elected for each type of returning candidate relative to those of newcomers. As expected, in Poland virtually all types of returning candidates had a significantly greater chance of winning a parliamentary seat than did novices. Those who remained on the same party ticket in 1991 and 1993 were far more likely to win, relative to newcomers, than were those who switched their party affiliation between the two elections. Party loyalists’ odds of winning were nine times greater than those of novice candidates, while (with one exception) candidates who shifted from one party to another were only two to three times as likely to be successful. Those who switched as a result of a party split were the only group of returning politicians who were disadvantaged compared to first-time candidates: their chances of winning were 60 percent less than those of novices. As in 1993, in 1997 all types of returning candidates – with the sole exception of those who moved as a result of the dissolution of their party – had a better chance of winning than did newcomers. The impact of various types of mobility on winning was more differentiated, however, than in the previous election. In 1997, compared to newcomers, those who switched because of party 167 PARTY POLITICS 10(2)

Table 8. Logistic regression of electoral success on type of inter-party mobility in Poland (1993 and 1997) and the Czech Republic (1992, 1996 and 1998) Independent variablesa BSEExpB A1. Poland, 1993 Electionb Stayers 2.205 0.106 9.067 Party dissolution 1.804 0.298 2.956 Party split –0.895 0.711 0.408 Party merger 1.084 0.338 2.956 Voluntary movers 0.873 0.248 2.395

A2. Poland, 1997 Electionc Stayers 2.146 0.125 8.552 Party dissolution –3.893 5.485 0.020 Party split 1.023 0.435 2.782 Party merger 2.556 0.149 12.889 Voluntary movers 1.152 0.164 3.165

B1. The Czech Republic, 1992 Electiond Stayers 2.233 0.212 9.331 Party dissolution 1.407 0.309 4.083 Party split 2.226 0.222 9.264 Party merger 1.263 0.392 3.535 Voluntary movers – – –

B2. The Czech Republic, 1996 Electione Stayers 3.156 0.170 23.478 Party dissolution –0.246 1.015 0.782 Party split 1.635 0.307 5.128 Party merger –4.144 5.763 0.016 Voluntary movers 1.519 0.369 4.569

B3. The Czech Republic, 1998 Electionf Stayers 1.267 0.153 3.551 Party dissolution –4.979 4.890 0.007 Party split 2.887 0.593 17.941 Party merger –4.674 0.685 0.009 Voluntary movers 0.420 0.733 1.522 a Newcomers are the reference category b –Log L = 3210.6, CS-R2 = 0.044, N-R2 = 0.132. c –Log L = 2874.4, CS-R2 = 0.066, N-R2 = 0.164. d –Log L = 1103.3, CS-R2 = 0.038, N-R2 = 0.148. e –Log L = 1275.1, CS-R2 = 0.077, N-R2 = 0.254. f –Log L = 1469.6, CS-R2 = 0.024, N-R2 = 0.069. Note: –Log L = –Log Likelihood, CS-R2 = Cox and Snell R2, N-R2 = Nagelkerke R2.

168 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY mergers were far more likely to win than were those who remained stable in their partisan afﬁliations. (This is due almost entirely to the electoral success of Solidarity Electoral Action.) The electoral advantage enjoyed by candidates who switched voluntarily or as a result of party dissolution was much smaller. Candidates’ partisan histories also mattered in the Czech Republic, but their impact was more varied both within and across elections than in Poland. First, not all returning candidates had a better chance of winning than did newcomers. Relative to newcomers, those who moved as a result of their party splitting had a far better chance of winning than did returners who moved because of a party dissolution or merger. Indeed, in the 1998 election, their prospects were far better than those of party loyalists. In 1996 and 1998, those who switched because their parties had disappeared or merged had virtually no chance of success. This was not the case for voluntary movers. Their odds of winning in the 1996 and 1998 elections were better than those of newcomers. In sum, in the last two elections of the 1990s in Poland and the Czech Republic, partisan loyalty paid off, but not always more so than certain instances of party-switching. The type of inter-party mobility affected candidates’ relative chances of electoral success. Voluntary shifts had a consistently positive impact on winning, not so all other types of moves. Depending on the particular election, certain kinds of structurally induced mobility turned out to be very costly for returning candidates. Nonetheless, a learning process appears to have taken place among experienced candidates. For the most part, as we have seen, party switchers in both countries were far better able than novice candidates to assess which parties were likely to be successful and, therefore, to ﬁgure out with which parties they would have the best chances of winning.

Conclusion

The institutionalization of competitive party systems in the new democracies of post-communist Europe depends most directly on the development of stable partisan commitments among both voters and politicians alike. High rates of electoral volatility, compared with those of other ‘third wave’ democracies at similar points in time, indicate that voters have found it difficult to form stable attachments to particular political parties. This, however, is less the consequence of ‘flattened landscapes’ inherited from the Communist past or of weak political identities and uncertain self- interests among voters during this period of systemic transformation than it is the result of the behavior of political elites (Birch, 2001). National politicians, especially parliamentarians, have been at the center of continual new party formation and the catalysts of party dissolutions, splits and mergers. Thus, it is they who have offered the electorate a confusing 169 PARTY POLITICS 10(2) kaleidoscope of choices, thereby impeding the development of stable partisan alignments among voters. The visible fluidity of these new party systems at the elite level and the partisan comings and goings of parliamentarians have led several observers to label politicians ‘institutional nomads’ or ‘political tourists’, that is, elites who make little investment in, and are weakly constrained in their behavior by, the parties with which they are affiliated. Such depictions of the behavior of political elites are often based on easily visible phenomena, like the frequent formation of new political groups and the break-up or disappearance of established parties and the movements of legislators from one parliamentary club to another. Thus, they tend to overemphasize the persistence of party-system fluidity or to overgeneralize from the behavior of a small, albeit significant, segment of the political elite. Moreover, from a comparative perspective, such depictions may either over- or underestimate the degree to which particular party systems have become institutionalized during the first decade of competitive politics. This study contributes to our understanding of the institutionalization of party systems in post-communist Europe in two important ways. First, it examines continuity and change in the partisan affiliation of all candidates who have competed in pairs of consecutive parliamentary elections in Poland and in the Czech Republic, two countries whose party systems are widely acknowledged to differ considerably in their degree of consolidation. Second, it goes beyond a singular focus on aggregate levels of inter-party mobility among politicians over time to consider the types, patterns and consequences for electoral success of their shifting partisan attachments. By analyzing this phenomenon from these three perspectives, we gain a better grasp of the complexities of party-system institutionalization at the elite level. In the most general sense, our findings on aggregate rates of inter-party mobility among parliamentary candidates accord with the view that party- system fluidity has been greater and more persistent in Poland than in the Czech Republic. While in the latter the overall level of party-switching has diminished considerably, in Poland it has grown by 40 percent between the 1991–3 and 1993–7 elections. At the same time, the percentage of candidates’ movements between parties due to party-system flux (dissolutions, splits and mergers) decreased considerably in both Poland and the Czech Republic. Moreover, in the last pair of consecutive elections held in the 1990s in each country, a majority of such structurally induced shifts in partisan affiliation was the product of party mergers. These findings concerning changes in the types of inter-party mobility can be taken as indi- cators of party-system consolidation in both countries. However, the decline in structural mobility was accompanied by an increase in the level of voluntary party-switching by candidates, thus lending support to the argument that political elites, particularly in Poland, have weak party ties and are prone to political nomadism. But it makes a difference for party-system institutionalization where these 170 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY political nomads move to. Despite high levels of overall inter-party mobility, our findings with respect to patterns of candidates’ movements indicated that the external and internal boundaries of the Polish and Czech party systems had become more firmly drawn by the end of the 1990s. With time, experienced candidates as well as novice politicians became increasingly inclined to compete on the ballots of ‘old’, established parties rather than on the lists of new political formations, thus making it more difficult for new parties (with the notable exceptions of Solidarity Electoral Action and the Czech Freedom Union) to gain entry into the political market or to become significant players within it. Moreover, when Polish or Czech candidates changed their partisan affiliation, they increasingly switched to another party within the same political family rather than across ideological lines. By the end of the 1990s, inter-bloc mobility had declined to 39 percent in Poland and to 25 percent in the Czech Republic. Our findings also indicated that, despite the more open and uncertain political market in which they operated, by the end of the 1990s Polish candidates were more likely than their Czech counterparts to engage in strategic behavior by choosing winning parties with which to affiliate themselves. Finally, we approached inter-party mobility from the perspective of the relative electoral payoffs to the individual candidate. Scholars have argued that party-switching is likely to be widespread when institutions and other aspects of the electoral environment provide low transaction costs to politicians’ pursuit of electoral success and the achievement of other goals (Desposato, 2002; Kreuzer and Pettai, 2002). However, our findings showed that in both the Czech Republic and Poland (despite the lower transaction costs exacted by institutional rules in these countries), partisan loyalty was more often than not the best route to parliament. Only shifting allegiances due to party mergers (in the case of Poland in 1997) or party splits (in the case of the Czech Republic in 1998) turned out to be even more beneficial. Although voluntary movers stood a better chance of winning relative to that of novice candidates, their prospects would have been even greater had they remained stable in their partisan attachments. And some types of party- switching proved to be very costly to the candidate. Thus, it is not the case that party-switching was in all instances cost free. If a learning process is taking place among politicians, as our various findings about patterns of inter-party mobility indicate, then the knowledge that party loyalty tends to reap the greatest reward should be a strong incentive for politicians to behave in self-interested ways that also help to promote the institutionalization of their party systems.

Acknowledgements

We thank the Mershon Center and the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences of The Ohio State University for providing funding for the collection of data for this

171 PARTY POLITICS 10(2) project. We are grateful to Petr Plecity, our research assistant in Prague, who collected the Czech candidate data, and to the late Wojciech Zaborowski of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, and Ewa Adamczyk of the Polish Central Statistical Office, for their help in acquiring the Polish candidate data. James Ludwig, former Senior Computer Specialist of the Department of Political Science, and Sheri L. Kunovich of the Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, provided invaluable assistance in the prep- aration of SPSS files. We also thank participants in the Comparative Politics Workshop, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, for their helpful comments on a previous version of this article. Our analysis represents the first phase of a large project that concerns the institutionalization of party systems in post-communist Europe, and includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraine and Russia.

Notes

1We limit our analysis to elections to the lower house of parliament for two reasons: (1) substantively, the role of the lower house in the political process is more important in Poland and the Czech Republic than that of the upper house. In both countries, the Senate tends to monitor rather than establish new rules and legal provisions. (2) The party afﬁliations of senators are frequently not expressed in the electoral process, since they tend to form their own electoral committees. Thus, to analyze inter-party mobility would require various inferences about senatorial candidates’ party afﬁliations on the basis of materials other than those related to the electoral process itself. This would make data on party-switching among senatorial candidates incomparable with data on candidates to the lower house. 2We do not consider inter-party mobility between the 1989 and 1991 elections because the 1989 election was not fully competitive (The Polish United Workers’ Party guaranteed 65 percent of the seats in the Sejm to its candidates and those of allied parties). Moreover, candidates did not compete under party labels. 3We lack systematic data on inter-party mobility of candidates in old and new democracies with which to compare rates of party-switching in Poland and the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, according to a study by Mershon and Heller (2001), between April 1997 and July 2000 about 22 percent of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies switched parties. They claim (p. 2) that to the best of their knowledge, ‘The only other parliamentary democracy where party boundaries were (roughly) so porous was Fourth Republic France.’ 4 The distinction between structural (forced, technological) and voluntary (exchange, circulation) mobility has a long tradition in sociology. Both types of mobility can be represented in a matrix form in their original and advanced formu- lations (for details, see Krauze and Slomczynski, 1986; Slomczynski et al., 2002). 5We give a complete description of the way in which we categorized structural changes of the Polish and Czech party systems according to dissolutions, splits and mergers, as well as all other categorizations of parties, in a separate document available upon request from the authors.

172 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY

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GOLDIE SHABAD is an Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. She co-authored Spain After Franco: The Birth of a Competitive Party System (1986) with R. Gunther and G. Sani. She has also published articles and chapters on ethnic nationalism in Spain, political socialization in post-communist Poland, mass-level support for systemic change in Poland, and the institutionalization of competitive party systems in East Central Europe. ADDRESS: Goldie Shabad, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210, USA. [email: [email protected]]

KAZIMIERZ M. SLOMCZYNSKI is a Professor of Sociology at The Ohio State University. He is also afﬁliated to the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences. He co-authored Social Structure and Self-Direction: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Poland (1993) with M. L. Kohn and Mental Adjustment to the Post-Communist System in Poland (1999) with K. Janicka, B. Mach and W. Zaborowski. He has also published numerous articles on social stratiﬁcation and mobility, mass-level support for systemic change in Poland, and the institutionalization of competitive party systems in East Central Europe.

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ADDRESS: Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, 190 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210, USA. [email: [email protected]]

Paper submitted 9 July 2002; accepted 15 January 2003.

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