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Social Identity, Political Ambition, and Group-Based Legislative Party Switching

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Social Identity, Political Ambition, and Group-Based Legislative Party Switching Strength in Numbers: Social Identity, Political Ambition, and Group-based Legislative Party Switching Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Peter Jan Tunkis, M.A. Graduate Program in Political Science The Ohio State University 2018 Dissertation Committee: Anthony Mughan, Advisor Goldie Shabad Thomas Nelson Sara Watson © Copyright by Peter Jan Tunkis 2018 Abstract Party switching, or changing one’s political party affiliation, is a surprisingly widespread and persistent phenomenon among members of parliament (MPs) in old and new democracies alike. Switching gives voters the impression of a lack of legislator accountability and representation, and may indicate weak parties or government instability. Why do some MPs risk their careers, prestige, and chances of reelection for oftentimes uncertain payoffs? Extant research on party switching frames this behavior as an individual phenomenon, based on rational calculations to further goals of vote, office, or policy-seeking. Yet in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, I find that party switching is largely a group phenomenon, which has heretofore received little attention. Building upon established research on political parties, party systems, and legislator behavior, I develop a theory of group-based defection that addresses this gap in the literature. I argue that MPs pursue political ambition in groups in which they share political goals—the pursuit of collective ambition is thus an alternative means to achieving their objectives. These groups are formed around, or defined by, social identities that are common or shared among individual MPs. By switching political parties as part of a group, individual MPs are able to more effectively pursue their political ambition. After presenting the theory and hypotheses of group-based party switching as a function of the pursuit of collective political ambition and the importance of shared social identities in ii Chapter 2, Chapter 3 lays out the dissertation’s multi-methodological approach. I present novel biographical and legislative data used to test the theory and hypotheses, discuss the variables used in statistical analyses, and describe the administration of semi-structured interviews. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analyses of the patterns of group switching in Poland from 1997 to 2011, and the influence of individual and collective political ambition, and social identities, on this type of legislative behavior. I find that attachment to shared social identities, as a proxy for the influence of collective ambition, has a strong impact on the decision to defect as part of a group. Chapter 5 then examines the same relationship in the Czech Republic among MPs from 1992 to 2013. The results are weak, but the evidence still points to a direct influence of collective ambition on group switching; there is also some evidence that having cross-cutting party and nonpartisan identities strengthens the influence of the pursuit of individual ambition on the decision to defect. In Chapter 6, I discuss findings from semi-structured interviews with 75 Polish and Czech politicians that cover perspectives on democratization and political parties, as well as the importance of social groups in the decision to switch political parties. The qualitative evidence from these conversations complements the quantitative findings from previous chapters, and provides additional evidence for the impact of collective ambition in the decision to defect. I conclude with a synthesis of the central arguments and findings from the dissertation as well as avenues for future research on social identity, collective ambition, and legislative behavior. iii This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents, Tadeusz and Teresa Ciżmowscy iv Acknowledgements This dissertation was only possible with the generous support and assistance of several institutions and many individuals. At The Ohio State University, I want to first acknowledge the members of my committee for their generosity with their time and their patience in guiding me through my Graduate experience. To Tony Mughan, my chair, mentor, and promotor: thanks for always getting me to think about things from a different perspective (no matter what perspective I had adopted), and most of all for teaching me to express myself concisely and clearly in my writing. I may still have a bit to go with my habits of wordiness and inadvertent obfuscation, but I feel I have come a very long way since I started at OSU. To Goldie Shabad: thank you for your inspiration, your words of encouragement, and your honesty and straightforwardness throughout the dissertation process—I am especially grateful for the many doors you opened by connecting me with contacts in the Polish Academy of Sciences. These subsequently led to all the professional contacts that I have developed in both Poland and the Czech Republic. To Tom Nelson: I could not have developed my theory of group-based party switching without the benefit of our meetings and conversations to talk through our understanding of the relationships between social identity, intragroup psychology, and ambition among elites--your thoughtful questions to me were at the same time difficult, profound, and clarifying. To Sara Watson: I would like to extend heartfelt thanks not only for spending a great deal of time me talking through my ideas, plans, and methods in the dissertation and my v research agenda in general, but for providing me support, encouragement, and consultation when I needed it most. To all of you, many thanks for tolerating me not only at my best, but also at my most neurotic and worrywart states. I also wish to thank specific colleagues at OSU, without whose conversations and commiseration I could not have survived graduate school. I would like to especially thank Jason Morgan, for always having that extra pint with me when I needed it (or didn’t?) most— someday we’ll conquer the Missile Command, Tron, and Spy Hunter wizards’ high scores; and Dustin Carnahan, for reminding me to keep my chin up even through the worst of it all. I would also like to thank some of the regular members of our happy hours and fellow graduate students, including Drew Rosenberg, Austin Knuppe, José Fortou, and Anna Meyerrose: thanks for reminding me that there’s more to life than just writing, writing, and more writing. Finally, though not at OSU anymore, I also want to extend special thanks to Irfan Nooruddin for doing all of the above, for generously going up to bat on my behalf, and always saying what needed to be said whether I liked it or not. Looking back in time, I received most of my inspiration to pursue the Ph.D. from my teachers and mentors at my undergraduate alma mater, the University of Florida, Gainesville. First and foremost, I am grateful to Conor O’Dwyer for being my mentor, teacher, and advisor for my undergraduate thesis—as a graduate student, I’ve done my best to follow your example. To Amie Kreppel, whose encouragement and support were invaluable as I tried to get things off the ground both as an undergraduate student and applicant for graduate schools. Likewise, I extend such thanks to Petia Kostadinova as well, for having always had time to meet with me when I needed to, and (with Amie) cultivated my interest in studying European politics. Finally, to Alin Ceobanu, to whom I (in many ways) trace the fostering of my passion for social vi science research, critical inquiry, and elite studies: I will always be grateful for your willingness to mentor and support me on that first undergraduate research project back in 2007. The heavy lifting in this project could not have been possible without the support of the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship, OSU’s Polish Studies Initiative, and the hospitality of the Polish and Czech Academies of Science. Through these grants and host institutions, I was able to meet and receive invaluable guidance from Maciek Słomczyński, Andrzej Rychard, Josh Dubrow (with whom collaboration provided some of the most joy I experienced working on an academic project), Zdenka Mansfeldová, Lukáš Linek, Petra Guasti, Ivan Petrúšek, Katka Vráblíková, and many others. Without your help and friendship, I don’t think I would have had nearly as productive a time—or as much fun as I had—conducting my research and living in Poland and the Czech Republic. I also want to thank in particular Pani Zofia Ładygin the secretaries, staffers, and functionaries at the Sejm and Poslanecká sněmovna, as well as Jarosław Kalinowski (MEP), Mariusz Suchecki, Jan Kudrna, and all of the politicians I met (Deputies, Senators, and former politicians) for tapping into their vast networks and insider knowledge to facilitate many of the interviews I was able to land in both countries. I could not have achieved any of this, however, without the unconditional support of family, friends, and those closest to me. I particularly want to thank my parents, Maryla and Waldemar Tunkis, for their endless love, support, and encouragement (and assistance with grammar and translation when needed!), even in those times where I have felt lost or unsure of myself. To Carolyn Morgan, who for the last 6 years has tolerated my slowly degenerating sense of humour and terrible puns, been there for me in good times and bad, and been the best friend and partner anyone could ever ask for. I can only pray that I was at least half as vii supportive of you while you were completing your dissertation and grad school as you have been for me. To my best bud Ryan Myford: always there when I needed you to be there, always kept me grounded in reality, and I couldn’t ask for a better guy for hockey nights—Go Flames, but also Go Jackets.
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