Strength in Numbers: Social Identity, Political Ambition, and Group-based Legislative Party Switching

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Peter Jan Tunkis, M.A.

Graduate Program in Political Science

The Ohio State University

2018

Dissertation :

Anthony Mughan, Advisor

Goldie Shabad

Thomas Nelson

Sara Watson

© Copyright by

Peter Jan Tunkis

2018

Abstract

Party switching, or changing one’s affiliation, is a surprisingly widespread and persistent phenomenon among members of (MPs) in old and new alike. Switching gives voters the impression of a lack of accountability and representation, and may indicate weak parties or government instability. Why do some

MPs risk their careers, prestige, and chances of reelection for oftentimes uncertain payoffs?

Extant research on party switching frames this behavior as an individual phenomenon, based on rational calculations to further goals of vote, office, or policy-seeking. Yet in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, I find that party switching is largely a group phenomenon, which has heretofore received little attention. Building upon established research on political parties, party systems, and legislator behavior, I develop a theory of group-based defection that addresses this gap in the literature. I argue that MPs pursue political ambition in groups in which they share political goals—the pursuit of collective ambition is thus an alternative means to achieving their objectives. These groups are formed around, or defined by, social identities that are common or shared among individual MPs. By switching political parties as part of a group, individual MPs are able to more effectively pursue their political ambition.

After presenting the theory and hypotheses of group-based party switching as a function of the pursuit of collective political ambition and the importance of shared social identities in

ii Chapter 2, Chapter 3 lays out the dissertation’s multi-methodological approach. I present novel biographical and legislative data used to test the theory and hypotheses, discuss the variables used in statistical analyses, and describe the administration of semi-structured interviews.

Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analyses of the patterns of group switching in Poland from

1997 to 2011, and the influence of individual and collective political ambition, and social identities, on this type of legislative behavior. I find that attachment to shared social identities, as a proxy for the influence of collective ambition, has a strong impact on the decision to defect as part of a group. Chapter 5 then examines the same relationship in the Czech Republic among

MPs from 1992 to 2013. The results are weak, but the evidence still points to a direct influence of collective ambition on group switching; there is also some evidence that having cross-cutting party and nonpartisan identities strengthens the influence of the pursuit of individual ambition on the decision to defect. In Chapter 6, I discuss findings from semi-structured interviews with

75 Polish and Czech politicians that cover perspectives on democratization and political parties, as well as the importance of social groups in the decision to switch political parties. The qualitative evidence from these conversations complements the quantitative findings from previous chapters, and provides additional evidence for the impact of collective ambition in the decision to defect. I conclude with a synthesis of the central arguments and findings from the dissertation as well as avenues for future research on social identity, collective ambition, and legislative behavior.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents,

Tadeusz and Teresa Ciżmowscy

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation was only possible with the generous support and assistance of several institutions and many individuals. At The Ohio State University, I want to first acknowledge the members of my committee for their generosity with their time and their patience in guiding me through my Graduate experience. To Tony Mughan, my chair, mentor, and promotor: thanks for always getting me to think about things from a different perspective (no matter what perspective I had adopted), and most of all for teaching me to express myself concisely and clearly in my writing. I may still have a bit to go with my habits of wordiness and inadvertent obfuscation, but I feel I have come a very long way since I started at OSU. To Goldie Shabad: thank you for your inspiration, your words of encouragement, and your honesty and straightforwardness throughout the dissertation process—I am especially grateful for the many doors you opened by connecting me with contacts in the Polish Academy of Sciences. These subsequently led to all the professional contacts that I have developed in both Poland and the

Czech Republic. To Tom Nelson: I could not have developed my theory of group-based party switching without the benefit of our meetings and conversations to talk through our understanding of the relationships between social identity, intragroup psychology, and ambition among elites--your thoughtful questions to me were at the same time difficult, profound, and clarifying. To Sara Watson: I would like to extend heartfelt thanks not only for spending a great deal of time me talking through my ideas, plans, and methods in the dissertation and my

v research agenda in general, but for providing me support, encouragement, and consultation when I needed it most. To all of you, many thanks for tolerating me not only at my best, but also at my most neurotic and worrywart states.

I also wish to thank specific colleagues at OSU, without whose conversations and commiseration I could not have survived graduate school. I would like to especially thank

Jason Morgan, for always having that extra pint with me when I needed it (or didn’t?) most— someday we’ll conquer the Missile Command, Tron, and Spy Hunter wizards’ high scores; and

Dustin Carnahan, for reminding me to keep my chin up even through the worst of it all. I would also like to thank some of the regular members of our happy hours and fellow graduate students, including Drew Rosenberg, Austin Knuppe, José Fortou, and Anna Meyerrose: thanks for reminding me that there’s more to life than just writing, writing, and more writing. Finally, though not at OSU anymore, I also want to extend special thanks to Irfan Nooruddin for doing all of the above, for generously going up to bat on my behalf, and always saying what needed to be said whether I liked it or not.

Looking back in time, I received most of my inspiration to pursue the Ph.D. from my teachers and mentors at my undergraduate alma mater, the University of Florida, Gainesville.

First and foremost, I am grateful to Conor O’Dwyer for being my mentor, teacher, and advisor for my undergraduate thesis—as a graduate student, I’ve done my best to follow your example.

To Amie Kreppel, whose encouragement and support were invaluable as I tried to get things off the ground both as an undergraduate student and applicant for graduate schools. Likewise, I extend such thanks to Petia Kostadinova as well, for having always had time to meet with me when I needed to, and (with Amie) cultivated my interest in studying European politics.

Finally, to Alin Ceobanu, to whom I (in many ways) trace the fostering of my passion for social

vi science research, critical inquiry, and elite studies: I will always be grateful for your willingness to mentor and support me on that first undergraduate research project back in 2007.

The heavy lifting in this project could not have been possible without the support of the

Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship, OSU’s Polish Studies

Initiative, and the hospitality of the Polish and Czech Academies of Science. Through these grants and host institutions, I was able to meet and receive invaluable guidance from Maciek

Słomczyński, Andrzej Rychard, Josh Dubrow (with whom collaboration provided some of the most joy I experienced working on an academic project), Zdenka Mansfeldová, Lukáš Linek,

Petra Guasti, Ivan Petrúšek, Katka Vráblíková, and many others. Without your help and friendship, I don’t think I would have had nearly as productive a time—or as much fun as I had—conducting my research and living in Poland and the Czech Republic. I also want to thank in particular Pani Zofia Ładygin the secretaries, staffers, and functionaries at the Sejm and Poslanecká sněmovna, as well as Jarosław Kalinowski (MEP), Mariusz Suchecki, Jan

Kudrna, and all of the politicians I met (Deputies, Senators, and former politicians) for tapping into their vast networks and insider knowledge to facilitate many of the interviews I was able to land in both countries.

I could not have achieved any of this, however, without the unconditional support of family, friends, and those closest to me. I particularly want to thank my parents, Maryla and

Waldemar Tunkis, for their endless love, support, and encouragement (and assistance with grammar and translation when needed!), even in those times where I have felt lost or unsure of myself. To Carolyn Morgan, who for the last 6 years has tolerated my slowly degenerating sense of humour and terrible puns, been there for me in good times and bad, and been the best friend and partner anyone could ever ask for. I can only pray that I was at least half as

vii supportive of you while you were completing your dissertation and grad school as you have been for me. To my best bud Ryan Myford: always there when I needed you to be there, always kept me grounded in reality, and I couldn’t ask for a better guy for hockey nights—Go Flames, but also Go Jackets. To Marta Kołczyńska: our chats always remind me of the reality of our situation as grad students and academics, but also of what it means when they say friendships know no national borders or oceanic distances. To the PA gang, Andy, Phil, George, Dave,

Mono, Mainer, Nanners, Vince, Gelesky, and all the rest: thanks for always giving me a laugh and for having a place for me if I ever wanted to escape the rigours of Columbus for a weekend.

Chciałbym również serdecznie podziękować całej rodzinie w Polsce. Szczególnie chciałbym podziękować Cioci Basi (oraz kotu JD) za pomoc i asystę, kiedykolwiek byłem w potrzebie, za zaproszenia na obiad lub herbatkę! Jestem na zawsze wdzięczny Cioci Eli i

Wujkowi Jurkowi za pomoc i gościnność, kiedy zaczynałem moją pracę... nigdy nie zapomnę, jak do późnej nocy przygotowywaliśmy koperty z ankietami dla posłów. Dla Wujka Olka i

Cioci Maryli: zawsze było przyjemnie z Wami pogawędzić i zjeść u Cioci najlepszą zupę pomidorową pod słońcem! No i oczywiście chciałbym podziękowac ś.p. Babci Teni i

Dziadkowi Tadeuszowi za bezwarunkową miłość, wsparcie i inspirację oraz za wszystkie nasze rozmowy, wspomnienia, pizzę z ulicy Barskiej i piwko Warka Strong z Dziadkiem. Żałuję tylko, że tak długo zajęło mi zakończenie tej pracy. To Wam i Waszej świętej pamięci dedykuję tę pracę doktorską.

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Vita

1986 ...... Born – Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

2008 ...... B.A. in Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville

2013 ...... M.A. in Political Science, The Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in: Comparative Politics Political Psychology

Publications

Tunkis, Peter J. 2017. “Do Group Associations among Matter for Political Parties?” Problems of Post- 64:2 (March): 79-93. Tunkis, Peter J and Joshua K. Dubrow. 2017. “Political Biographies and Electoral Outcomes across Post-Communist Europe.” Problems of Post-Communism 64:2 (March): 63-64.

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Table of Contents

Page

Abstract...... ii

Dedication ...... iv

Acknowledgments ...... v

Vita ...... ix

List of Tables...... xiv

List of Figures ...... xvi

1. Introduction ...... 1

1.1 Explaining Legislative Party Switching...... 4 1.1.1 Patterns of Party Switching in Post-Communist Europe ...... 8 1.1.2 Towards a Theory of Group-Based Legislative Party Switching...... 11 1.1.3 Significance and Contribution ...... 14 1.2 Methodological Approach and Research Design ...... 15 1.2.1 Quantitative Analyses: Group Switching in Poland and the Czech Republic ...... 15 1.2.2 Qualitative Analysis: Semi-Structured Interviews ...... 16 1.3 Summary ...... 17 1.4 Outline of the Dissertation ...... 19

2. Explaining the Group-Basis of Legislative Party Switching ...... 21

2.1 Introduction...... 21 2.2 Literature Review ...... 23 2.2.1 Agency-Based Approaches ...... 24 2.2.2 Structure-Based Approaches ...... 26 2.2.3 The Group-Basis of Party Politics and Party Switching...... 30 2.3 Theoretical Frameworks...... 31

x 2.3.1 Social Identity Theory ...... 32 2.4 Group-Based Party Switching: Theory and Hypotheses...... 34 2.4.1 Attachment to Shared Social Identities: Direct Effect ...... 36 2.4.2 Attachment to Shared Social Identities: Moderation Effect ...... 38 2.5 Methodology and Empirical Application...... 39

3. Research Design, Variables, and Methods ...... 41

3.1 Introduction ...... 41 3.2 Testing the Hypotheses: Multi-Method Approach ...... 42 3.3 Quantitative Approach ...... 43 3.3.1 Data Sources and Collection ...... 44 3.3.2 Data Structure and Modeling ...... 49 3.3.3 Variables of Interest ...... 51 3.3.3.1 Dependent Variable ...... 51 3.3.3.2 Independent Variables: Social Identities ...... 51 3.3.3.3 Independent Variables: Political Ambition ...... 58 3.3.3.4 Independent Variables: Operationalizing the Moderating Influence of Cross-Cutting Identities on Political Ambition . . . 60 3.3.3.5 Independent Variables: Other Controls ...... 62 3.3.4 Statistical Models and Specifications...... 63 3.4 Qualitative Analysis ...... 64 3.4.1 Research Design...... 65 3.4.2 Interview Questionnaire ...... 68 3.5 Synthesis of the Mixed-Methodology ...... 69

4. Quantitative Analysis, Polish Sejm (1997-2011)...... 70

4.1 Introduction ...... 70 4.2 Case Study: Poland since Transition ...... 71 4.3 Descriptive Statistics ...... 73 4.4 Analysis of the Patterns of Group-Based Party Switching in Poland (1997- 2011)...... 79 4.4.1 Analysis of the Direct Influence of Shared Social Identities on Group- Based Party Switching ...... 81 4.4.2 Analysis of the Moderating Effect of Cross-Cutting Identities on Political Ambition and the Incidence of Group-Based Party Switching 89 4.5 Summary of the Results ...... 93

5. Quantitative Analysis, Czech Poslanecká sněmovna (1992-2013) ...... 97

5.1 Introduction ...... 97 5.2 Case Study: Czech Republic since Transition ...... 98 5.3 Descriptive Statistics ...... 101

xi 5.4 Analysis of the Patterns of Group-Based Party Switching in the Czech Republic (1992-2013)...... 107 5.4.1 Analysis of the Direct Influence of Shared Social Identities on Group- Based Party Switching ...... 109 5.4.2 Analysis of the Moderating Effect of Cross-Cutting Identities on Political Ambition and the Incidence of Group-Based Party Switching ...... 118 5.5 Summary of the Results in Comparison with Findings from Poland...... 121

6. Qualitative Evidence from Interviews with Sitting and Former MPs ...... 125

6.1 Introduction ...... 125 6.2 Motivation and Methodological Recap ...... 127 6.2.1 Distributions of Interviewed Members of Parliament ...... 128 6.3 Elite Perspectives on Group Switching ...... 130 6.4 Elite Perspectives on the Motivations for Party Switching ...... 137 6.5 Elite Perspectives on Social Identities, Group Formation, and Group Switching ...... 142 6.6 Synthesis of Qualitative Evidence with Quantitative Results ...... 146 6.7 Conclusion ...... 149

7. Conclusion ...... 151

7.1 Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications ...... 152 7.2 Limitations of this Research...... 156 7.3 Potential Policy Implications ...... 159 7.4 Recommendations for Future Research ...... 160 7.5 Conclusion ...... 162

Bibliography...... 163

Appendices ...... 177

A. Members of Parliament Affiliations Data – Poland Codebook ...... 177

B. Members of Parliament Affiliations Data – Czech Republic Codebook ...... 183

C. Members of Parliament Affiliations Data – Roll Call Meta Dataset Codebook . . . . . 189

D. Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaires...... 191

E. Ancillary Tables for Polish Analysis (1997-2011)...... 195

F. Ancillary Tables for Czech Analysis (1992-2013)...... 197

xii G. Replication Code for Preparation and Analysis of MPAD-PL and MPAD-CZ...... 200

xiii

List of Tables

Table Page

1.1 Frequency of individual and group-based legislative party switching in Poland (1997- 2011) and the Czech Republic (1992-2013) by parliamentary term...... 9

3.1 Hypotheses testing the relationship between attachments to shared social identities and group-based legislative party switching...... 42

3.2 Variables list in Polish MPAD (1997-2011) ...... 45

3.3 Variables list in Czech MPAD (1992-2013) ...... 47

3.4 Variables list in roll-call vote meta-data for Polish and Czech MPAD ...... 48

4.1 Frequency of individual and group-based legislative party switching in Poland (1997- 2011) by parliamentary term ...... 72

4.2 Descriptive statistics: frequency of group switching in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland over time, 1997-2011 ...... 74

4.3 Descriptive statistics: attachment to shared social identities in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland over time, 1997-2011 ...... 75

4.4 Descriptive statistics: observations in which party and social identities cross-cut in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011 ...... 77

4.5 Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011 ...... 82

4.6 Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, accounting for the interaction between cross-cutting identities and individual ambition, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011 ...... 90

xiv 5.1 Frequency of individual and group-based legislative party switching in the Czech Republic (1992-2013) by parliamentary term...... 99

5.2 Descriptive statistics: frequency of group switching in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic over time, 1992-2013 ...... 102

5.3 Descriptive statistics: attachment to shared social identities in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013 ...... 102

5.4 Descriptive statistics: observations in which party and social identities cross-cut in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 104

5.5 Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 110

5.6 Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching omitting shared political history, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. . . 113

5.7 Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, accounting for the interaction between cross-cutting identities and individual ambition, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 119

6.1 Descriptive summary of interviews with sitting and former deputies of the Polish Sejm, 2014-2015...... 128

6.2 Descriptive summary of interviews with sitting and former MPs of the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, 2015...... 129

E.1 Number of observations by party families in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011...... 196

E.2 Number of observations by adjusted party families in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011 ...... 196

F.1 Number of observations by party families in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013 ...... 198

F.2 Number of observations by adjusted party families in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013 ...... 198

F.3 Descriptive statistics: observations in which party and social identities are aligned In the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 199

xv

List of Figures

Figure Page

3.1 Semi-structured interview questionnaire and prompts administered among Polish and Czech MPs in 2014 and 2015 ...... 68

4.1 Predicted probabilities of group switching when social and party identities cross-cut, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2001 ...... 78

4.2 Marginal effects of attachment to social and party identities on probability of group switching, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011...... 87

4.3 Marginal effects of political ambitions and moderation when social and party identities cross-cut on group switching, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011. . 92

5.1 Marginal predicted probability of group switching when social and party identities cross-cut, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 105

5.2 Marginal effects of attachment to social and party identities on probability of group switching, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 116

5.3 Marginal effects of political ambitions and moderation when social and party identities align on group switching, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013...... 120

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Party switching, or changing one’s party affiliation, is a surprisingly widespread and persistent phenomenon in old and new democracies alike.1 This form of defection, especially when it occurs in between can give voters the impression of a lack of legislator accountability and representation, may promote (and indicate) government instability, weak political party organizations, and weak party labels (Choate 2003; Desposato 2006;

Heller and Mershon 2009a; Mainwaring 1998, 1999). Why do some members of parliament

(MPs) risk their careers, prestige, and reelection prospects for oftentimes uncertain payoffs?

The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe present an interesting puzzle as to the persistence of this phenomenon. Over twenty-five years since the fall of Communism, political volatility, frequent government turnovers, and fluid party systems have left some calling in countries like Poland “quasi-institutionalized” at best (Gwiazda, 2009: 350;

Markowski, 2008)—even the Czech Republic, lauded as a success in democratic consolidation

(Bakke and Sitter 2005; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2010; Linek and Mansfeldová 2007;

Mansfeldová 2013), has seen a return to party switching in recent years.

This dissertation presents a reappraisal of the theory used to explain the frequency and persistence of legislative volatility in democratic party systems. Existing research treats the act

1 I hereon refer to party switching using a number of terms, including ‘defection,’ ‘floor-crossing,’ and ‘interparty mobility.’ These may be taken as identical unless explicitly differentiated (e.g., ‘roll call vote defection’). 1 of party switching as an individual, rational choice reflecting electoral, career, and/or policy ambitions (Heller and Mershon 2009a; c.f. Müller and Strøm 1999), and posits that over time, the gradual institutionalization of party systems in new democracies will lead to a decline in its frequency and persistence (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 2009). In reality, though, party switching remains frequent in many new democracies, including those of post-Communist Central and

Eastern Europe. Furthermore, many of these events are not individual ‘hops.’ Instead, I find that group-based defections constitute the majority of such events. Illustrated by the experiences in the of the Polish Parliament (the Sejm) and supported by evidence from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic (the Poslanecká sněmovna) since the early 1990s, I show that party switching is largely group-based, reflecting the fact that many

MPs put group incentives ahead of individual ones.

The benefits of acting as part of a group as opposed to individually are multifunctional.

For example, enacting new policy or forming a new political party inherently requires group support in parliament—in Poland and the Czech Republic, only 15 MPs are needed to form a party in parliament, with access to agenda-setting powers.2 However, I present evidence that

MPs are also drawn to collaborate and defect with colleagues with whom they share social identities and much in common. In effect, the dominant goal sought by MPs when engaging in group behavior remains the enhancement of political influence and the pursuit of ambition, whether in the form of marshalling votes, advancing one’s career, or implementing policy.

In turn, attachments to social identities in themselves may be subordinate incentives to political ambition. Shared identities serve as heuristics for MPs when deciding with whom to

2 Additionally, only 3 MPs are required to form a ‘Deputies’ Circle’ in the Sejm; while this formation does not have agenda-setting powers, it is recognised as an official grouping to be represented across committee assignments, and can coalesce with other small groups in order to form agenda-setting . 2 work, but ultimately the pursuit of ambition reigns supreme. However, MPs’ attachments and desire to associate and work with others similar to themselves may also reflect a sense of collective ambition as well. Conversations with MPs from both countries show that while political ambitions reign supreme, individuals admit to feeling better about their choices, including party switching, when they are done in reference to sticking together with people with whom they share much in common. By sharing apolitical traits in common, it may be possible to share political goals in common as well. Borrowing from social psychology research, this form of association increases positive feelings about the group and strengthens in- group loyalty as well. Thus, acting as part of a group is an important alternative means to achieving career ambitions and political ends, but with the added affective benefits of associating with individuals similar to oneself—something overlooked in much of the scholarship on this subject.

Thus, this dissertation presents a novel group-based theory of defection: in the absence of strong parties, I argue that MPs’ attachment to nonpartisan social identities has a substantial effect on legislative behavior, and moderates individuals’ pursuit of political ambitions involved in the decision to defect with a group. This dissertation will contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of political elite behavior and factors that foster or undermine institutionalization, especially in new democracies. In this way, this dissertation has clear implications for our comprehension of the dynamics of democratic consolidation.

3 1.1 Explaining Legislative Party Switching

The study of legislative party switching, or party switching that occurs among elected members of parliament, involves a growing body of literature that examines this phenomenon theoretically and empirically in legislatures around the world (see Heller and Mershon 2009a).

Here, I provide an initial overview of the underlying theory behind research on defection to set the stage for the explanation of my group-based theory of defection in greater detail in Chapter

2, along with a discussion of the context of party switching in the Postcommunist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

Extant research on party switching suggests that MPs’ decisions are grounded in a rational calculus aimed at achieving , career, or policy-based ambitions (Heller and

Mershon 2009a; c.f. Müller and Strøm 1999). Naturally, politicians do not operate in a vacuum; institutions, timing during parliamentary terms, electoral rules, and electoral prospects (Heller and Mershon 2005; Mershon and Shvetsova 2008, 2013; Shabad and Słomczyński 2004;

Zieliński, Słomczyński and Shabad 2005) shape their decisions. Moreover, gradual consolidation and institutionalization of the party system is argued to put further constraints on

MPs’ interparty mobility, resulting in a decline in the frequency of party switching or the appearance and disappearance of political parties (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 2009).

Still, political ambition is held to be the driving force behind legislative defection.

Much of this conventional wisdom can be traced to ambition theory: politicians are rational actors who make decisions to further pursue their ambitions (cf. Black 1972; Schlesinger

1966). This rests on the assumption that all politicians are self-interested, and that they work through political parties to “formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win

4 elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs 1957: 28). This does not discount the possibility of the existence of politicians who are genuinely interested in policy-making; but to them, the immediate goal is to win office (Mayhew 1974). Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that no individual is purely seeking votes, higher office, or policy-initiatives alone (cf. Müller and

Strøm 1999).

Similarly, scholars model the decision-making process underlying party switching as an interactive game involving the trade-off of costs versus benefits; defection is considered only if it maximizes the chances for reelection, advancing to higher office, or achieving policy goals

(Heller and Mershon 2009b). For example, defection might improve the chances of reelection if it involves the MP switching to a more popular party; in proportional electoral systems, the promise of higher list-placement could also play a role. Defection may also improve the chances of advancing one’s career through promotion to higher office: for example, a more prominent committee assignment or a ministry or portfolio in government.

Party switching to achieve policy goals is somewhat less straightforward: oftentimes, this is facilitated by membership in a political party with agenda-setting power, such as one that is in government or . Thus, much of the literature on policy-seeking treats this as a party-level phenomenon (e.g., Adams and Merrill 2009; Müller and Strøm 1999; Pedersen

2012), and the promise of policy influence is used by existing (typically larger) parties to attract potential defectors (Laver and Benoit 2003).

These approaches make a critical assumption, namely that for individual MPs, party labels and party membership matter (see Heller and Mershon 2009b; Laver and Benoit 2003;

Müller and Strøm 1999). MPs are more likely to join or remain affiliated with parties that they believe to be more attractive to voters in order to achieve their political ambitions (Desposato

5 2006; Heller and Mershon 2005); if such a party is on the rise, their chances of re-election stand to be improved and they may even achieve a prestigious position as a minister or committee chair. For policy-seekers, a lack of party unity and a weak party label may prompt defection to a destination with a compatible agenda that is more capable of forming and achieving policy objectives.

Yet assumptions on the importance of party labels and membership do not cleanly lend themselves to the characterization of fluid party systems in new democracies. Especially concerning the prioritization of ambitions, it is reasonable to argue that vote- and office-seeking take precedence over policy-seeking (see Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957). While past studies of interparty mobility among legislators in Poland, for example, tend to support this notion

(McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011; Shabad and Słomczyński 2004; Zieliński et al. 2005), the historical context of Polish party politics early in the democratic transition shows that policy- seeking also significantly drove politicians’ behavior even when the result was harmful to their long-term careers. In addition, the many defections and start-up parties that appeared during this time were a product of MPs’ desires to establish new political identities and promote unique political agendas vis-à-vis the legacy of the old order (Nalewajko 1992).

If policy-seeking ambitions complement MPs’ vote- and office-seeking goals in a context of weak party labels in highly volatile party systems, then how might MPs pursue their goals with any sort of expected utility or certainty of success, especially if the means to those ends involve party switching? I argue that the answer lies in attachment to nonpartisan social identities shared among MPs and acting on those attachments based on those identities as a means to an end, which ultimately revolves around the pursuit of political ambition. In this way, the primary goal remains the enhancement of political influence; doing so as part of a

6 group is an alternative means to achieving this end. That is, defection with a group facilitates the pursuit of ambition that may be less effective individually. Drafting and enacting legislation requires a collaborative effort and the support of others in parliament. Switching parties with likeminded colleagues may increase the likelihood of achieving policy ambitions by leveraging support in the new party to which the group moves, or by forming a new political party.3

In systems with weak parties, MPs may rely on other signals and characteristics to achieve these goals, including the social identities they share in common with others to determine with whom it is best to vote, work in committee, or even form a political party.

Social identities are thus tied to a set of subordinate goals that have an influence on MPs’ behavior. During semi-structured interviews, one MP expressed that “whether we form clusters, ephemeral associations, or non- groups, we are able to solve issues in life, in the economy.”4 In other words, MPs look to others they like or with whom they share things in common when making decisions in .

In both Poland and the Czech Republic, party switching is viewed as cyclical and regular: “It has nothing to do with ideology. One might suggest that politics were re-evaluated and that it was ideological. This is not true.”5 As one Czech MP stated, “different ideals is one thing, but it is another that this is a person whom I know and who is fine, such that it doesn’t matter if he is from a different party.6” In essence, “personal contacts and even actually friendships play a huge role”7 in parliament today—“It might be a little bit funny, but ‘all for one and one for all.’ If help was needed, then we helped each other; when there was some kind

3 With the added incentive that a greater number of defectors in the group can translate into stronger coalition potential for the destination, or newly-formed, party. 4 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, switcher), 25 July 2014. 5 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 24 July 2014. 6 Interview with Czech MP (Úsvit, novice, loyalist), 18 November 2015. 7 Interview with Czech MP (KDU-ČSL, novice, loyalist), 13 November 2015. 7 of issue, this is why we created this kind of little group.”8

In order to achieve their political ambitions, the formation of and working in groups is critical. Reflecting upon his experience, one former MP’s emphasized that “This was especially visible in work in or sub-committees. It was then that I made contacts with many deputies and if we had to come up with policies, then first and foremost we worked towards substantive compromise—this would be considered good policy.”9 The basis of party formation is also viewed by MPs as rooted in group association; a Polish MP used an analogy that

“Politics is a team sport!” This was echoed in more concrete terms by another MP across the political aisle: “if you don’t have a group around you, a team with whom you can work, then a person is defenseless and has to unite, search for people with similar goals, similar values.”10

As a result, “during the formation of … parties, sometimes this was decided upon based on encouragement from familiar people, comrades, colleagues, and so on.”11

Legislators are thus not dependent on political party labels alone, but rather look to work and associate with others with whom they share traits and backgrounds. Attachment to social identities affects the decision to switch parties directly—by pushing or pulling an individual if the rest of the group defects or stays put—and by moderating or strengthening the impact of political ambitions given that these pursuits often require group support.

1.1.1 Patterns of Party Switching in Post-Communist Europe

Despite expectations of party system institutionalization and consolidation over time,

8 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, switcher), 10 July 2014. 9 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 2 July 2014. 10 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, veteran, loyalist), 22 July 2014. 11 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 26 May 2015. 8 party switching has persisted in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. After over two decades of political and economic development, including accession into the European

Union, not only do MPs continue to switch often in Poland, but this phenomenon also appears to be on the rise in the Czech Republic despite early signs of it having receded. This raises the question as to how and whether MPs are pursuing defection to further their personal political ambitions in a context where the certainty, and predictability, provided by stable party systems is absent. Suggesting a negative answer to this question is the abundant evidence of a strong group-basis to defection—a phenomenon that remains largely understudied.12

Table 1.1. Frequency of individual and group-based legislative party switching in Poland (1997-2011) and the Czech Republic (1992-2013) by parliamentary term. Parliamentary term Individual Group switches Total switches No. MPs switched switches A. Sejm of the Republic of Poland III (1997-2001) 32 (21.48) 117 (78.52) 149 93 (19.29) IV (2001-2005) 77 (15.78) 411 (84.22) 488 177 (23.93) V (2005-2007) 22 (22.22) 77 (77.78) 99 37 (7.74) VI (2007-2011) 34 (20.00) 136 (80.00) 170 90 (17.31) B. Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic 1. (1992-1996) 55 (41.04) 79 (58.96) 134 66 (32.35) 2. (1996-1998) 7 (17.07) 34 (82.93) 41 38 (17.76) 3. (1998-2002) 2 (100.00) 0 (0.00) 2 2 (0.97) 4. (2002-2006) 3 (100.00) 0 (0.00) 3 2 (0.84) 5. (2006-2010) 8 (57.14) 6 (42.86) 14 14 (6.25) 6. (2010-2013) 11 (40.74) 16 (59.26) 27 23 (10.55) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of the type of switch (individual + group = 100%); No. MPs switched parentheses figures are percentages of total number of MPs per term—the Polish Sejm has 460 deputies and the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna has 200, but the total number that serve in any given term my exceed these numbers due to mid-term mandate terminations and the swearing in of new deputies.

12 See Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (2000), Kato and Yamamoto (2009), Park (2001), and Scheiner (2012) on the study of party switching in Japan and the effects of factionalism on the Japanese party system. Despite mention of factional groupings or defection, motivations are still analysed (if at all) using an individual incentive-based model, or simply treated as a characteristic of Japanese politics in passing. For example, group-defection may be cited as the major reason for the end of the Japanese LDP’s long reign in 1993; yet when analysed, the defectors’ motivations are individual, with little mention of group-based linkages. Thus, the nature and understanding of motivations to defect as a group remains empirically unaddressed. 9 Table 1 above shows the patterns of party switching in Poland and the Czech Republic since they became democracies in the early 1990s. A substantial proportion of MPs switch each cycle in Poland, and many do so more than once. In the Czech Republic, these figures have also been on the rise over the last several years. Noticeably, however, most defections in both countries are group-based events rather than individual ones. Implied in party splits, fusions, and new party start-ups (cf. Kreuzer and Pettai 2003), group switches are those events in which a number of MPs (two or more) defect together at the same time and to the same destination.

I thus classify group switches as those that satisfy two conditions: (1) a group of MPs switch parties together at the same time, and (2) they gravitate to the same destination- affiliation. The switching usually takes place between established parties, but may also involve party formation, dissolutions, fissions, or fusions. For example, in the fourth parliamentary term in Poland (hereinafter referred to as Kadencja for the Sejm), the Communist successor

SLD split to form of Poland (SDPL); the current party of government, Law and Justice (PiS), is the product of a set of fusions and fissions that occurred over the first ten years of democracy. Similar events occurred in the Czech Republic: in the second parliamentary term (hereinafter referred to as volební období for the Poslanecká sněmovna), the conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) split to form the Freedom Union (US); in the sixth volební období, the populist Public Affairs (VV) party broke apart following a corruption scandal.

In some of these cases, groups of MPs switched together on multiple occasions. In

Poland, the first Kadencja saw three MPs switch together thrice, twice forming new political parties in the process (A. Halber, K. Ibisz, and A. Piechowicz). In the fifth Kadencja, MPs B.

Kowalski, G. Masłowska, and A. Sobecka switched together five times, leaving a governing

10 coalition party and jumping between/forming marginal party groups or even opting for non- affiliation. In the Czech Republic, six MPs (J. Bílý, P. Kavan, L. Nedorost, Z. Stodůlka, J.

Unger, and Z. Vlček) moved in and out of the Movement for Autonomous Democracy (HSD-

SMS) four times in the first volební období. In the fifth volební období, MPs J. Husák, M.

Kalousek, V. Parkanová, P. Severa left the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) and went independent—they would form a new party, Tradition Responsibility Prosperity ’09 (TOP 09).

This sort of behavior questions the conventional argument that party labels matter most, and that MPs ought to join parties that will be more attractive to voters in order to further their political ambitions per se (Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2005). The frequent and different patterns of group-based switching weaken the assumptions of individual electoral calculations and party label incentives as being exclusive determinants of this behavior. Rather, attachment to nonpartisan identities may provide an explicit set of incentives to switch with a specific group of colleagues, and also moderate or enhance the perceived payoffs of defection to fulfill personal ambitions.

1.1.2 Towards a Theory of Group-Based Legislative Party Switching

This dissertation is guided by the following research questions: (1) to what extent does group switching occur; and (2) to what extent, and why, do shared social identities affect the decision whether or not to switch political parties with a group? Tested in the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, my central argument is that attachment to nonpartisan social identities has a substantial effect on MPs’ behavior, which can also moderate or strengthen the impact of individual ambition-based calculi involved in the

11 defection decision. Extant scholarship on group-affiliations in legislatures revolves around the utilitarian and symbolic importance of party labels (cf. Heller and Mershon 2009a; Laver and

Benoit 2003). Yet because party labels in new democracies can be ill-defined or ephemeral (see

Jarmara 2013; Kamiński and Kurczewska 1994; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kunc 2000; Linek and

Masfeldová 2007; Mainwaring 1998, 1999; Migalski 2008; Millard 2009; Novák and Lebeda

2004; Shabad and Słomczyński 2004; Zieliński et al. 2005), MPs must also rely on other signals and incentives to enhance their political influence. Yet party weakness and the availability of multiple partisan options alone do not catalyze the decision to defect, let alone with a particular group of MPs. Rather, MPs rely on their attachment to nonpartisan identities and whether they share these identities with copartisans or MPs across the aisle. In this way, association based on nonpartisan identities (rather than party labels alone) can drive instability as much as they may be crucial to the development of party systems in the region.

Research on group dynamics in political institutions and political behavior is not new to political science13; I build from this and argue that what appears to be irrational or idiosyncratic individual behavior is not so once group-based influences are taken into consideration. I draw upon research in social psychology to form the foundation of my approach. Social psychologists have claimed that group membership provides a sense of identity and belonging, which promotes self-esteem. Social Identity Theory (cf. Tajfel and Turner 1986) in particular posits that positive self-esteem from association with a particular group acts to reinforce loyalty and ties between group members (see also Knowles and Gardner 2008); negative self-esteem drives individuals away. This is sense of affective attachment to a group is closely tied to a

13 See, for example, Latham (1952) on legislatures; see Aldrich (1995), Bawn et al. (2012), and Holt (1978) on political parties and party systems. 12 shared identity and hence stronger identification (Castano, Yzerbyt and Bourguignon 2003;

Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwekerk 1999).

Therefore, in the case of new democracies where political parties are often defined by personal associations in parliament in the form of internal ‘cartels’ (see Katz and Mair 1995,

2002; Mair 1994; Zuba 2012), MP loyalty is not the preserve of political parties alone. In other words, instead of only asking, “What are the costs/benefits for me to switch parties or to stay where I am,” many MPs may also be asking, “what are the costs/benefits of defection for my group?” Which group identities are salient to MPs besides political party labels may change with circumstance and over time, but nonpartisan identities are more durable, in the same way that specific social issues or identities have consistently defined the political discourse in the post-Communist democracies over time (Blahož, Brokl and Mansfeldová 1999; Kitschelt et al.

1999; Zarycki and Nowak 2000). These social identities may be defined by shared characteristics (e.g., demographics), shared histories (e.g., past political associations), or even defined by MPs’ social experience in parliament (e.g., shared experiences or friendships formed in committees).

Party switching may be understood as a dynamic process involving not only individual perceptions of gains or losses derived from exit, but also perceptions of the benefits or costs of acting with a group. The decision to switch may be a personal one, but observation suggests at least some amendment to the conventional argument that “party switching is fundamentally an individual phenomenon” (Heller and Mershon 2009b: 30). Party-based evaluations of exit versus loyalty are important, but perceived ties between MPs, which may cross party lines, also affect decision-making. Furthermore, these expected utilities not involve not only instrumental or material incentives, but also symbolic ones based on ties to a common group identity (cf.

13 Prentice, Miller and Lightdale 2006).

1.1.3 Significance and Contribution

The primary contribution of this dissertation lies in the theoretical and empirical distinction between the individual versus group-based incentives and benefits that underlie party switching. The decision to defect may be broken down in two ways: first, MPs evaluate the payoffs of switching from or remaining loyal to a party based on whether they are or are not members of a group. Group identification may be associated with a party label, but it may also be associated with competing, non-party identities such as shared personal biographies or salient ascriptive/demographic characteristics. Second, given membership in a group, MPs’ evaluations are made on instrumental/ambition-based as well as symbolic criteria. In other words, if party of a particular group, MPs make utility evaluations derived from acting with a group. Thus, the benefits of being or acting with a group may discourage MPs from switching parties just like they may encourage defection.

This research thus sheds new light on the nature and importance of social grouping, interactions, and identities among political elites. Second, understanding party switching as a group phenomenon also adds to our understanding of the nature of political consolidation and stabilization, and the maturing of democracy and democratic political party systems.

14 1.2 Methodological Approach and Research Design

To test the theory of a group-basis to party switching, this dissertation employs a mixed-method approach. In this section, I briefly describe the quantitative and qualitative strategies, which are explained in greater detail in Chapter 3. Therein I also describe in detail the data collected (Members of Parliament Affiliations Data, MPAD) for MPs in Poland (1997-

2011) and the Czech Republic (1992-2013). These include information on personal biographies and backgrounds, party affiliations, electoral data, and legislative activities (government positions, committee assignments, and roll call voting). Analyses are then undertaken in

Chapters 4-6.

1.2.1 Quantitative Analyses: Group Switching in Poland and the Czech Republic

Chapter 4 presents statistical analyses of the patterns of group-based party switching among MPs in the Polish Sejm (1997-2011), and Chapter 5 covers the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna (1992-2013). Using the MPAD, which covers the biographies and legislative activities and affiliations of all parliamentarians in both countries, I employ roll call voting as a behavioral proxy for attachment to shared identities, including party affiliation, level of education, social class, region, past political associations, and committee assignments. I control for political ambition with conventional proxy measures of vote, office, and policy-seeking behavior, including preferential vote counts, electoral list position, membership in governing parties, holding higher office (in government or committee), incumbency, gender, and age. This approach is central to the quantitative testing of hypotheses addressing the motivations behind

15 party switching, in which attachment to shared social identities influence the likelihood of group-based party switching and moderate the impact of self-interested ambitions.14

Results of mixed-effects generalized linear models for both country case studies that examine the likelihood of group-based party switching show that attachment to shared group identities has a substantive and significant effect. Noticeably, nonpartisan identities interact with the effect of factors related to individual political ambitions. As a robustness check, analyses are re-run with the inclusion of party loyalty as a group-based factor. Party loyalty is important in the Polish case, which reflects research on the relationship between partisan and nonpartisan identities in the Sejm (Tunkis 2017), but partisan attachments are far weaker in the

Poslanecká sněmovna. However, controlling for partisanship does not diminish the influence of nonpartisan identities on MPs’ likelihood to switch parties with a group.

1.2.2 Qualitative Analysis: Semi-Structured Interviews

Inspired by research and experience across a broad range of disciplines and area studies using qualitative methods, Chapter 6 presents an analysis of open-ended, semi-structured interviews (cf. Peabody et al. 1990) with Polish and Czech MPs. Using a combination of stratified, targeted sampling and ‘snowball’ sampling (see Lynch 2013), MPs were selected across political parties, lengths of tenure, history of defection, and demographic characteristics.

These interviews address the motivations for pursuing public office, the nature of interpersonal relations and collaboration in parliament, and perspectives on the phenomenon of party

14 Controls for self-interested ambitions also conventionally determine the likelihood of individual-based party switching (see Heller and Mershon 2005, 2009a). 16 switching and consequences for political parties and democracy. As Fenno (1986) points out, direct observation of political actors permits “attaching observation to theory” (14). The analysis of these personal narratives provides a direct link between the observer and the observed through the provision of context and experience.

These interviews provide evidence for the significance of social groups among MPs along with insight into party loyalty and switching. Social ties that predate entry into the Sejm and Poslanecká sněmovna, as well as those that form once there, strongly condition MPs’ evaluations and behavior. For some respondents, party affiliation served as little more than a means to an end, with more emphasis being placed on other things shared in common with colleagues in or committee. Ultimately, these conversations reveal that while the enhancement of political influence remains a top priority, the means to that end involves systematic preferences for certain collaborators over others based on shared identities and experiences.

1.3 Summary

This dissertation offers a new perspective on the frequency and persistence of legislative party switching in new democracies, using two cases drawn from post-Communist

Central and Eastern Europe. I reveal that most party switching is group-based, rather than an individual phenomenon as conventionally understood. MPs’ instrumental incentives, driven by political and career ambitions, are shaped by assessments of perceived payoffs from acting as an individual and acting as part of a group. MPs also take into account the symbolic benefits or incentives of being in a group, which depend on attachment to nonpartisan social identities they

17 share with others. How these groups are defined varies, depending on context and the environment surrounding legislative actors: shared ideologies, common personal histories, or demographic characteristics. I test the argument using a mixed-method approach involving qualitative examinations of MP narratives derived from semi-structured interviews, and quantitative analyses of behavioral patterns, derived from parliamentary activity and biographical data, in Poland and the Czech Republic.

These findings make for a more complete understanding of the factors that facilitate or undermine party system institutionalization, especially in new democracies. Focusing specifically on political elite behavior, surface-level observation reveals that although the number of political parties active in the Sejm has declined, switching between them has not.

Similarly, in the Czech Republic, switching has been on the rise over the last decade despite early signs of disappearing. The persistence or rise of defections, despite apparent consolidation or stability, suggests that even more than 25 years since democratization, parties lack strong connections to electorates or among party members—both critical for strong, stable party politics (see Gunther and Diamond 2003; Katz and Mair 1995, 2002; LaPalombara and Weiner

1966; Mair 1994; Zuba 2012).

With this in mind, it is possible that it is ‘still too soon to tell’ at what stage of development the political systems of Post-Communist Europe have arrived. The volatility of the party systems may be a reflection of partisan sorting among elites (cf. Levendusky 2009), much like the events that transpired in the early American party system leading up to the Civil

War (Holt 1978), or in a response to evolving political and social cleavages in civil society

(Bakke and Sitter 2013). Along the same lines, the ongoing development and learning (or lack thereof) of the importance of party organization may also have an effect on the longevity of

18 parties and their importance to the state and society (see Grzymała-Busse 2007; Tavits 2013).

Until party labels gain more significant staying power, however, it may in fact be nonpartisan identities and group associations that are the linchpin of party system development in these contexts.

1.4 Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 first describes in detail the current state of research on party switching, organized by structure and agency-based approaches. I then lay out a group-based theory and empirical hypotheses, enriched by research in social psychology, that better explain the occurrence of this phenomenon in new democracies.

Chapter 3 then describes the dissertation research design, which employs quantitative analyses and qualitative evidence to test my theory and hypotheses. I detail novel data collected from multiple primary and secondary sources in Poland and the Czech Republic, and explain all steps undertaken to conduct semi-structured interviews with Polish and Czech MPs over a year in the field.

Chapters 4 and 5 present the results from statistical analyses on MPs from Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively, which quantitatively test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2.

Statistical models provide robust evidence supporting the arguments that MPs’ social identities have both a direct and moderating influence on their behavior. Qualitative evidence from semi- structured interviews presented in Chapter 6 provide additional context to the findings from the previous two chapters. Along with first-hand accounts of the dynamics of legislative behavior in these two young democracies, conversations with politicians reveal that attachments to

19 nonpartisan identities provide symbolic as well as instrumental incentives for MPs when making decisions about partisan affiliation.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the theory and results presented in the dissertation, directions for future research in the area of group-based legislative behavior, and an exploration of the implications of the findings for the understanding of the dynamics of democratic maturation in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.

20

Chapter 2: Explaining the Group-Basis of Legislative Party Switching

2.1 Introduction

When elected politicians change parties, they run great risk, potentially jeopardizing their careers, their reputations, even their chances of re-election. Yet this phenomenon, known as legislative party switching, floor-crossing, or defection, is increasingly frequent across the democratic world, from newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or Latin

America to the established democracies of Western Europe (see for example Heller and

Mershon 2009a). It is also a behavior that raises important questions about accountability to constituents, the representativeness of democratic legislative institutions, weak parties, and unstable governance (Desposato 2006; Mainwaring 1999). If political parties suffer from a lack of unity, discipline, and cohesion, then on what do legislators rely to work together to form coalitions, influence policy, or even advance their careers?

A growing body of literature investigates the phenomenon of legislative party switching, viewing it as a puzzle to be explained because it is becoming commonplace. Two major assumptions about legislative behavior guide conventional thinking on the topic. First, following the logic of political ambition theory (Schlesinger 1966), parliamentarians’ decisions are based on a rational calculus aimed at achieving electoral, career, or policy goals (Müller and

Strøm 1999). Second, party labels and membership matter, fundamentally shaping legislative

21 behavior (see Laver and Benoit 2003). MPs are more likely to join or remain in larger and more poplar parties in order to increase their chances of reelection and career advancement

(Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2005; McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011).

Two theoretical frameworks underpin current research on party switching. On the one hand, many scholars have taken a clear agency-based approach to the nature of floor-crossing across legislatures. Here, the decision-making process is modeled as an interactive game involving a rationalization of costs versus benefits—party switching is considered optimal if it maximizes MPs’ chances of reelection, advancing to higher office, or achieving policy goals

(Heller and Mershon 2005). For example, floor-crossing can be motivated by a desire to avoid responsibility for poor lawmaking or scandals, to advance one’s career by switching to a more popular party for re-election, or to acquire higher office such as a committee chairmanship or ministry office.

On the other hand, the structure or institutions-based approach to understanding party switching emphasizes that MPs do not operate in a vacuum—institutions (formal and informal) constrain MPs’ agency. Institutional and electoral rules, timing, and electoral prospects condition these decisions (Mershon and Shvetsova 2013). Moreover, scholars argue that the gradual consolidation and institutionalization of party systems and parliamentary rules limits

MPs’ mobility through a crystallization of well-defined party labels and financing rules

(Kreuzer and Pettai 2003). Along with the gradual development of lasting party loyalties, structural factors contribute to a decline in the frequency of party switching or the appearance and disappearance of political parties over time.

Yet these approaches do not translate well across many cases in which party switching persists and, in some cases, is on the rise. In the aging ‘new democracies’ of CEE, like Poland,

22 defection remains a common occurrence (cf. Markowski 2008; Zieliński et al. 2005), whereas it is on the rise in the Czech Republic despite declining rapidly after the transition to democracy

(Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2010; Linek and Mansfeldová 2007). Perhaps more remarkable, however, a large majority of defections in these countries are not isolated or individual ‘hops’; rather, party switching appears to be a largely group-based phenomenon. In defecting, many

MPs would seem to be putting group-based incentives or considerations ahead of their rational and individual ones—but why?

In this chapter, I present a novel approach to understanding the phenomenon of party switching that is generalisable across in democracies, new and old. First, I review the existing literature covering the agency and structure-based explanations of party switching.

Next, I introduce political science and social psychology theorizing that informs a group-based approach to party switching. This discussion leads to a number of theoretical propositions and testable hypotheses that are tested qualitatively and quantitatively in subsequent chapters. I conclude by outlining scope conditions in the context of the Polish and Czech case studies used to illustrate and test my arguments.

2.2 Literature Review

Extant literature investigates the phenomenon of legislative party switching across cases around the world (see for example Heller and Mershon 2009a). Critically, the interdependence of the decision to switch and its conditions and/or implications is assumed (cf. Aldrich and

Bianco 1992), and rightly so since it is a dynamic phenomenon. Theory underpinning this research can be divided broadly into two general approaches, although there is overlap. First, it

23 is widely accepted that politicians’ actions are motivated by ambition, or the desire to fulfill personal desires or goals. Party switching is simply a means to this end. As such, this research places more weight on individual agency by stressing the importance or primacy of the pursuit of ambition, which defines the why and how of party switching. Second, it is equally accepted that institutions matter. The pursuit of ambition is not unconstrained, which means that the occurrence of party switching is a reflection of, or even a response to, legislators’ environment, namely parliamentary rules and structures. I classify research that emphasizes the important influence of institutions, rules, and factors exogenous to the individual actor as structure-based approaches. I discuss these approaches, their advantages, and their shortcomings in the sections that follow.

2.2.1 Agency-Based Approaches

Following the logic of political ambition theory (Black 1972; Schlesinger 1966, 1991), the agency-based approach contends that MPs’ decisions are based on a rational calculus aimed at achieving electoral, career, or policy goals (e.g., Heller and Mershon 2005; McMenamin and

Gwiazda 2011). Politicians are self-interested, and political parties are a means to achieving their ends (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957). Furthermore, while there is no such thing as a politician who is exclusively a vote, office, or policy-seeker (Müller and Strøm 1999), to be able to achieve the latter two ambitions the necessary goal of any politician is election or re- election (Mayhew 1974).

Theoretical approaches model the decision-making process underlying party affiliation

(cf. Aldrich and Bianco 1992) and party switching (cf. Heller and Mershon 2009b) as an

24 interactive game involving a minimization of cost over benefit; party switching is considered optimal only if it maximizes the chances of reelection, advancing to higher office, or achieving policy goals. Defection may thus be optimal to escape responsibility for poor lawmaking or scandal, or to advance one’s career by switching to a more popular party for re-election, or to acquire higher office such as a committee chairmanship or ministerial position.

For Aldrich and Bianco (1992), vote- and office-seeking through the pursuit of re- election constitute the central individual motivations underlying party affiliation choices (and hence defection). Using the U.S. two-party system as context, defection occurs as a function of tides of shifts in popular support and the actions of other legislators. Desposato (2006) generalizes this logic to multiparty contexts, including MPs’ dynamic relationships with party leaders and access to pork as factors that shape politicians’ rational calculations, while Laver and Benoit (2003) also consider destination parties’ (and leaders’) motivations.

This translates across national and institutional contexts. In , for example,

Thames (2007) finds that individual MPs will defect in order to secure re-election, based on judgments about potential destination parties’ past electoral success and their governing potential (and thus access to state resources). Defection may also be the optimal choice to ensure re-election by escaping accountability through moving from the governing party into the (Zieliński et al. 2005). Taking into account both individual and party-level motivations, McMenamin and Gwiazda (2011) come to similar conclusions based on parties’ and MPs’ real-time evaluation of public opinion polls.

Yet findings from tests of the agency-oriented can be inconsistent, depending on national, historical, or institutional contexts. That is, structural and institutional idiosyncrasies may condition the impact of political ambition. Indeed, Desposato (2006) finds that access to

25 pork matters for legislative behavior, which is also supported by Thames’ (2007) findings. Ties and access to the Executive in Ukraine have a determining effect on agendas and activity in the legislature (see also Herron 2002). On the other hand, this is not the case in (Heller and

Mershon 2005), where ideological compatibility among MPs has a greater influence on party loyalty than access to pork (private or public). Rather, the threat of punishment for not toeing the party line plays a larger role in pushing potential switchers over the edge (Heller and

Mershon 2008).

In sum, individual motivational arguments only tell part of the story. Indeed, politicians do not operate in a vacuum; interactions between actors matter and these interactions may be constrained exogenously. Research on the impact of institutions highlights the importance of exogenous influences.

2.2.2 Structure-Based Approaches

Institutions, rules, and norms condition politicians’ pursuit of their ambitions and structure the incidence of party switching. Electoral rules (e.g., first-past-the-post versus proportional representation) moderate how MPs evaluate their prospects for reelection. Political parties also matter as institutions: cohesive, united groups may be less at risk of losing members than weakly defined or undisciplined parties. The utility of party switching also changes depending on timing during the electoral period. The costs and benefits of defection may differ between the beginning and the end of a parliamentary term; for example, MPs who defect early in the term may be rewarded with a favorable committee or cabinet position, whereas floor crossings later in the term may occur as a consequence of signals from second-

26 order elections (Mershon and Shvetsova 2008; Pinto 2015). Finally, as is the case in a number of countries (like , Japan, and Colombia), parliaments may even go so far as to establish rules governing or restricting party switching (see Janda 2009).

Most structural approaches emphasize the role of political parties—as organizations as well as in terms of leadership—in conditioning legislators’ behavior. The enforcement of discipline by party leaders, for example, can force out dissenting members. Heller and Mershon

(2008) found that party unity in Italy is very high not because of loyalty or cohesion, per se, but rather because dissidents left or had been expelled. Parties also comprise an important part of

MPs’ political opportunity structure. From the outset, an MP’s chances for (re)election are determined by whether or not he or she is selected as a candidate by the party (regardless of the electoral system; see Herron 2002). Furthermore, if a party fuses with another or dissolves entirely, or there is a perceived prospect of such an event, a switch may be optimal or otherwise unavoidable (see Shabad & Słomczyński 2004; Zieliński et al. 2005).

Institutions and rules beyond political parties also influence the likelihood of defection.

Electoral rules affect the utility of party switching in a number of ways. In preferential voting systems, such as first-past-the-post (FPTP) or open-list proportional representation (OLPR),

MPs may be less likely to defect given their reliance on the personal vote and the risk to their personal reputations with voters. Conversely, in party-based voting systems, such as closed-list proportional representation (CLPR), MPs need not rely on personal support from voters as much as from party leaders to be placed high on the party list, making defection potentially less personally risky (Heller and Mershon 2005). As a result, the frequency of switches is higher among MPs in closed party-list systems than in personal plurality systems across new and old

27 democracies (Fell 2014; Heller and Mershon 2005; Thames 2007) and across levels of governance (McLaughlin 2012).15

More directly, many parliaments around the world have implemented anti-defection laws, most typically involving expulsion from parliament. In some cases, the laws extend beyond voluntary defections to expulsions as well, putting more power in the hands of party leaders (Janda 2009). Alternatively, political party leaders may also set rules to maintain intraparty discipline, though the degree to which this affects floor-crossing is unclear (see

Mitchell 1999).16

The configuration of the party system also conditions the opportunities and costs of party switching. The overall stability of the party system plays a role. When party labels are better defined and distinct from one another, fewer switches may occur for ideological reasons—parties that are more clearly able to adopt positions according to extant political and social cleavages may also be at less risk of volatility (cf. Bartolini and Mair 1990; Deegan-

Krause and Haughton 2010; O’Dwyer 2010). Especially in newer democracies, as political elites become more professionalized, “party-switching should become less ‘normal’, the patterns of movement more structured and the consequences of political tourism more costly”

(Shabad and Słomczyński 2004: 152). Indeed, as time goes on and parties institutionalize by developing extra-parliamentary organizations and entrench themselves in civil society, there

15 All studies referenced here (Italy, Ukraine, Taiwan, and South Africa) employ mixed electoral systems, such that portions of seats in assembly are meted out using first-past-the-post and open or closed-list systems, adding leverage to the comparative findings from each case. 16 Notably, some parties in Poland and the Czech Republic attempted to enforce discipline through the threat of material punishment—incoming MPs had to write blank checks to the party leaders, to be cashed at the discretion of party leadership upon MPs’ defection—which were subsequently ruled to be unconstitutional (Pietkiewicz 2007; “V politice dokázal vydělat miliony. Jak?” 2001). 28 should be fewer incidences of radical changes in the party system, observed as party splits, fusions, dissolutions, and the appearance of new parties or start-ups (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003).

Yet the degree to which any of these factors have significant effects on defection varies from country to country; furthermore, institutions and rules do not affect patterns of defection in isolation from one another (see for example O’Brien and Shomer 2013). For example, Heller and Mershon (2005) note that the effect of candidate versus party-oriented electoral systems on party loyalty and defection depends on the strength of party labels. In a cross-national study,

Tavits (2008) found that the presence of electoral thresholds or PR-versus-FPTP comparisons did not yield significant differences for party loyalty, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, why certain parliaments adopt anti-defection laws may depend on national-contextual idiosyncrasies—let alone whether such laws are written into constitutions or merely statutory acts (Janda 2009).

Despite these shortcomings, individual and institutional arguments together shed light on an oft-overlooked phenomenon of legislative politics that has important implications for democratic practice, representation, and accountability. Yet the inconsistency of some of the findings leave some questions unanswered: what explains the variation in party switching from one case to the next? If institutions and ambitions do not consistently shape the motivations underlying defection, then what piece of the puzzle is missing? At least part of the answer to this question may be that many party switches, especially in younger or less stable democracies, tend to be group-based activities, manifesting themselves as party splits, fusions, new startups, or small groups of MPs moving from one party to the next. To what extent has party switching been studied as a group-based phenomenon, if at all?

29 2.2.3 The Group-Basis of Party Politics and Party Switching

Political scientists have long acknowledged the importance of groups in politics, as they form the basis of much of the behavior we see across various political arenas, including legislatures (cf. Latham 1952). Recent literature in political science expresses group dynamics’ importance in theories of institution formation (Bawn 1993), and especially party system development (Aldrich 1995; Holt 1978; cf. Bawn et al. 2012). However, scholarship on party switching curiously has largely ignored the possibility that there may be an underlying group dynamic to this phenomenon.

This is not to say that all reference to group-based behavior is absent. For one, it is implicit in the institutional typology of party switching (Kreuzer & Pettai 2003): party fissions, fusions, dissolutions, and start-ups are inherently group-based activities. Herron’s (2002) theoretical and empirical discussion of fluidity in the Ukrainian addresses party switching and electoral ambitions in terms of factions within existing party groups, yet the origin of these factions, or what ties them together, is not explored beyond shared policy objectives. Similarly, McLaughlin’s (2012) exploration of regional and local assemblies in

South Africa finds that group-based defections are occasional responses to gaps in policy demands between party leaders and membership, yet the ‘why’ of group formation in the first place, which leads to the floor crossing, is not addressed.

The group-based nature of factionalism has been acknowledged in analyses of some advanced democracies. Patterns of switching in Taiwan (Fell 2014) reflect party realignments, but the motivations for switching, whether individual or group-based, are not explicitly

30 explained.17 Cox et al. (2000), Kato and Yamamoto (2009), Park (2001), and Scheiner (2012), among others, also discuss factionalism and its impact on Japanese politics, yet patterns of defection are explained in purely individual terms following standard practice; it is assumed that the motivations of individuals within factions are aligned.

The question of ‘why defect’ remains an open one. If individual political ambition and institutional constraints offer imperfect explanations of party switching, analysis through a group-based lens provides further insight into the motives for defection. Determining the nature of the group-basis of defection will also shed light on the consequences that this behavior has for party system and democratic maturation: group dynamics may strengthen or sort out party labels over time, but they may also drive persistent volatility in party systems.

2.3 Theoretical Frameworks

The theoretical framework guiding my group-based approach to legislative party switching rests on a general proposition: MPs who share a particular identity will stay together. Doing so provides members of these groups an alternative means to achieve their political ambition. Moreover, shared identity is in effect a proximate heuristic for shared ambition—if members of the group share identities, they may in fact share goals in common, such as policy-seeking. Thus, if a group-based party switch occurs, all MPs within the group will share a common identity. This depends on the continued salience or value of the shared identity.

17 It is worth noting that Fell’s objective was to document the patterns of defection in Taiwan and to discuss the consequences for party politics and democracy, rather than to explain the causes. 31 The impact of attachment to shared, or common, identities on group-based party switching can be explained in the context of Social Identity Theory. First, it is important to establish the identities to which MPs are attached, and then explain how attachment to these identities influences the decision to switch parties with a group or stay put. Social identity, whether defined by partisan or nonpartisan labels, determines group membership.

Subsequently, group membership reinforces attachment to the social identity, which in turn strengthens in-group loyalties (cf. Tajfel & Turner 1986; Turner 1982). Consequently, these loyalties, or attachments, to shared identities are of central importance shaping the decision to defect.

2.3.1 Social Identity Theory

The concept of groups (partisan or nonpartisan) can be understood through the framework of Social Identity Theory (SIT; cf. Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986), which defines a social group as “two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social category (Turner 1982: 15).

Social identity is constructed through a process of self-categorization, identification and comparison. In the first stage, individuals make sense of the social world around them by comparing themselves with others, which then allows them to determine with whom they are most alike, and from whom they differ most. The second stage, identification, involves the individual’s self-categorization and the adoption of the identity of the new in-group, which may include norms and behaviors as well as emotional attachments. Finally, social comparison

32 occurs after individuals have placed themselves into a given in-group relative to any out- groups. SIT in short highlights the fact that membership in specific social groups provides a sense of identity and belonging, and facilitates an intuitive understanding of the social environment (who are ‘we’ versus who are ‘they’).18

In the absence of strong party labels or partisan identities, MPs may turn for guidance on nonpartisan traits or identities they share in common with their colleagues. MPs can look to these commonalities for guidance in decision-making (“perhaps I should affiliate myself with that party if other farmers like myself are moving towards it”), and develop strong attachments to such common-identity groups, wherein members are attached to a group identity rather than to other group members, per se (Prentice et al. 2006).19 In parliament, the composition of MPs changes regularly with each election; in the short-term, attachment to a shared group identity, and a desire to relate or be loyal to that identity, can thus drive what ultimately manifests itself as group-based behavior (see Turner 1982).20

As with any group, the maintenance of cohesion in political parties thus depends on the degree of entitativity of the group, or the perceived ‘sameness’ or degree of commonality shared between members.21 This is generally based on: (1) the perception of a common fate— that group members are bound by a common set of goals and values; (2) that group members

18 See also the experimental study of group identification and membership conducted by Ellemers et al. (1999), who find that social identity is determined by the nature of categorization (cognitive awareness of ascription versus exogenous assignment), emotional attachment or involvement with group members, and the overall group self-esteem, which in turn depends on the group’s perception of its place vis-à-vis other groups. 19 As opposed to common-bond groups, which over the long term are defined by the friendships and explicit connections between individuals in the group, rather than by any general or shared social identity. 20 The alternative group-based explanation, that individuals will act out of personal loyalty or friendship (common- bond group), in the context of legislatures would depend on long-term socialization, which may not always be possible or consistent/reliable given electoral turnover and fluid political landscapes. 21 As opposed to group homophily, or a more objective external measure of the degree of sameness of members in a group, either self-categorized or exogenously assigned (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). This concept is typically used to understand network density in social network analysis. 33 are perceived to be similar on a number of dimensions that together comprise or coexist with the party label; (3) the salience of the identity—without which the degree of entitativity is moot; and (4) the ‘boundedness’ of the group, or the clarity of the boundaries of the group identity vis-à-vis other groups (Castano et al. 2003).

In new democracies, where the distinction between parties or party labels is often unclear, nonpartisan identities defined by members’ backgrounds and biographies may at times be more salient than party and determine the positions around which interpersonal coalitions form to make policy.22 Therefore, if party members are also attached to nonpartisan identities, the higher the degree of group (partisan and nonpartisan) entitativity, the more likely the group will be cohesive and at less risk of party switching.

2.4 Group-Based Party Switching: Theory and Hypotheses

Political parties in new democracies lack robust pluralist traditions, focus on personalism, and are often forms of ‘top-down’ or ‘cartel’ party systems (Jarmara 2013;

Kitschelt et al. 1999; Mainwaring 1998, 1999; Van Biezen 2005; Zuba 2012). In the early stages of democratization, political parties are often more easily defined by personalities, personal relationships, and/or reputations, rather than by ideologies or policy programs as political elites attempt to determine their places in the new order (Nalewajko 1992; Pańków

1992). Therefore, legislative behavior in these contexts may appear less chaotic if nonpartisan group associations (social ties between individuals irrespective of party lines) are taken into

22 While my dissertation does not account for this directly, one may surmise that it is in party leaders’ interest to capture and maintain subgroup identities within the context of the binding ‘superordinate identity’ of the party label (cf. Hornsey and Hogg 2000; see also Steffens et al. 2016). 34 consideration. In making decisions about affiliation, instead of only asking “what are the costs/benefits for me to switch parties or to stay where I am,” many MPs may also be concurrently asking, “what are the costs/benefits of defection for my group?”

Which group identities or linkages are salient to MPs besides party labels will depend on a variety of factors or contexts, including issues that define the political discourse in a country and the composition of MPs in parliament. Furthermore, these can change from one term to the next. The development of common-identity groups and attachments between MPs may be based upon shared occupational histories, personal characteristics, educational backgrounds, past associations, or even legislative committee membership, which then has an effect on a variety of legislative activities and behavior (Gallagher 1985; Löwenberg and

Patterson 1979; Parry 2005; Putnam 1976).

Party switching may thus be understood as a dynamic process that goes beyond perceptions of gains or losses to achieve individual ambitions alone. Even if “party switching is fundamentally an individual phenomenon” (Heller and Mershon 2009b: 30) in terms of MPs’ ultimate decisions whether or not to switch at all, how this decision is reached is affected by the social landscape and group associations. As a result, group-based party switching is an alternate means to achieving individual goals by way of the achievement of collective political ambition, or those ambitions that are shared in common across individuals in a group. Individuals’ evaluations are influenced by the perceived costs and benefits of acting with a group—whether the group is defined by a party label (as is conventionally taken for granted) or a distinct nonpartisan identity. Thus, political ambitions (and institutions/rules) are not the only influence on whether or not to switch.

35 2.4.1 Attachment to Shared Social Identities: Direct Effect

Following established research in social psychology and the notion of competing group identities (as sub-groups within a party, for example), should the perceived entitativity of the party be undermined, then an MP may find that his or her only ‘honest’ option may be to leave alone or with like-minded colleagues. This logic is captured by the idea that ‘I didn’t leave my party; my party left me’ in terms of ideology, policy, etc., from the perspective of a hypothetical parliamentarian. A rift in a common-identity group (cf. Prentice et al. 2006), such as one defined by a party label, may develop due to a lack of perceived group entitativity, which may depend not only on shared nonpartisan identities within the party, but on collective political ambition, which is shared among members with those nonpartisan identities.

If an MP is his attached to a nonpartisan social identity, then this association has the potential to affect the decision to defect as part of a group. Strong attachment to an identity may immediately push or pull an individual MP to switch or remain loyal. The null hypothesis is that MPs are driven entirely by individual political ambition regardless of their social identification, which should also be the case among MPs who are political independents with no ties to others, or are social pariahs. The first general hypothesis that I test in this dissertation is thus:

H1. Attachment to, or identification with, a social group, whether partisan or nonpartisan, will directly affect the decision and thus the likelihood of switching parties with that group.

36 This hypothesis essentially tests whether social groups have an influence on party switching at all. Notably, it is not specific as to what it is that defines social groups’ identity, which may be partisan or nonpartisan. It follows that those individuals with a stronger sense of attachment to a particular identity will be more likely to switch with others sharing that identity, under the assumption that perception of identity salience and entitativity is high.

Conversely, if an MP is without a nonpartisan identity, then that MP will probably not switch with a group.

In the context of party switching among elected party representatives, political parties are the natural frame of reference. Political parties represent superordinate identities that can capture or include a number of different, nonpartisan sub-group identities, and if these identities come into conflict with one another, one of these identities’ members may come to the fore and promote defection (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg 2000; Sani and Pugliese 2008). Thus, for party members, if the ‘common-fate’ of the nonpartisan sub-group aligns with that of the party as a whole, then the likelihood of defection as part of a group should be lower. That is, the

‘common-fate’ among MPs is defined by the collective political ambition (which aligns with their own individual ambitions), which is tied to perceived group entitativity. Conversely, MPs whose salient nonpartisan identities cross party lines will be more likely to switch parties as part of a group.

H2. If partisan and salient nonpartisan identities align, then the likelihood of group-based party switching will be lower. If nonpartisan identities cross-cut party lines, then the likelihood of group-based party switching will be higher.

37 2.4.2 Attachment to Shared Social Identities: Moderation Effect

MPs spend their careers in pursuit of political ambitions, namely vote, office, and policy-seeking. However, as political institutions, rules, and norms condition this pursuit, so too do social identities and social group associations. Indeed, for parliamentarians, the fulfillment of political ambitions implicitly requires group support—election, the achievement of higher office, or policy-agendas requires the support of a party or group of like-minded colleagues. In other words, the achievement of political ambition is the dominant function of association with these groups. Attachment to a group provides a means to achieve individual ambitions by way of the collective political ambition shared among group members. The formation of a new political party, for example, is dependent upon having “a group around you, a team with whom you can work;” if not, “then a person is defenseless and has to unite, search for people with similar goals, similar values.”23 Above, I argue that attachment to nonpartisan social identities directly pushes MPs to switch with a group or remain in a particular party, but given the affective nature of attachment to social identities (Turner 1982), an MP’s identity may also color his or her decisions involving the pursuit of career ambitions as well, depending on whether individual ambitions line up with those of the group. The general hypothesis that tests the moderation effect of attachment social identity follows:

H3. Attachment to, or identification with, a social group, whether partisan or nonpartisan, will moderate the impact of MPs’ pursuit of political ambitions on the decision to switch political parties as a group.

23 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, veteran, loyalist), 22 July 2014. 38

In situations in which an MP’s partisan and nonpartisan identities align, or in which partisan identities are the only ones that matter, switching away from a party in order to fulfill ambitions may be particularly risky. Yet if partisan-nonpartisan entitativity is low and a group of MPs in a party finds themselves aligning with colleagues across party lines, the likelihood to defect as a group should be higher. Because group entitativity is related to a perceived sense of collective ambition, then attachment to an identity that cross-cuts party lines should strengthen the impact of individual ambition on the likelihood of group-based party switching. The corresponding hypothesis thus tests the strengthening of the effect of individual political ambition on the likelihood of group-based defection if MPs have cross-cutting ties.24

H4. If partisan and nonpartisan identities cross-cut one another, then the magnitude of the effect of political ambitions on the likelihood of group-based party switching will be strengthened.

2.5 Methodology and Empirical Application

In the following chapters, I will lay out the research design and methodological approaches and then test the theory and hypotheses presented above using the evidence from

24 Logically, the converse to this hypothesis, besides a null effect, is that having explicitly aligning ties should actively reduce the magnitude of the cumulative statistical effect on the likelihood of group switching. However, in this dissertation I am most interested in what pushes MPs to switch in groups, and why. Indirect measurement of the explicit alignment of party and social identities, based on behavioral proxies, is also challenging; in situations in which is very high on average, it is not always possible to differentiate between party discipline and bona fide personal attachment or loyalty to the party. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the methodology used to determine whether MPs have cross-cutting identities, based on behavioral measures of roll- call voting among parties versus nonpartisan groups. 39 the Polish and Czech legislatures and MPs following their respective transitions to democracy.

Chapter 3 first presents the research design and mixed methodological approach employed to empirically test the instrumental/behavioral and the affective/symbolic evidence for the direct and moderating impact of social identities on the likelihood of group-based party switching. I detail novel data collection methods in the field from the Polish and Czech Parliamentary

Libraries and Archives, as well as the semi-structured interview strategy employed in both countries. I subsequently specify variables and measurement techniques used to gauge attachment to identities and political ambition, and whether MPs’ attachments to partisan and nonpartisan identities cross-cut significantly. I also outline the qualitative approaches and general outcomes of interviews used to reveal the affective meaningfulness and influence of shared social identities on legislative behavior.

Chapters 4 and 5 then present results for quantitative analyses on Polish (1997-2011) and Czech (1992-2013) MPs and the patterns of group-based party switching. Historical evidence from the development of the respective party systems since the collapse of

Communism illustrates the findings, which provide additional evidence and supplement the quantitative findings. While these chapters rely on post hoc behavioral evidence for the impact of social identities on group-based party switching, Chapter 6 further illustrates these findings by presenting qualitative evidence from semi-structured interviews with Polish and Czech MPs across political parties and other descriptive characteristics (veterancy/age, gender, and switchers/non-switchers). These conversations reveal the extent of the symbolic and affective influence of social identities and personal connections, political ambitions, and institutional legacies and constraints on legislative behavior in both countries.

40

Chapter 3: Research Design, Variables, and Methods

3.1 Introduction

Building off of the theoretical arguments proposed in Chapter 2, this chapter presents the empirical strategies I use to test my hypotheses on the direct and moderating impact of shared social identities on the incidence of group-based legislative party switching. I first outline the value of a multi-method approach to examine the instrumental, behavioral, and affective dynamics underlining the relationship between identity and group switching. Then, I discuss the novel data I collected in the field: the Members of Parliament Affiliations Data

(MPAD) for Poland and the Czech Republic contain information on parliamentarians’ biographies, demographics, electoral data, political affiliations, and legislative activities.

Variables used in the quantitative analyses found in both Chapters 4 and 5 are described in the following section. The remaining sections are devoted to the qualitative analysis of semi- structured interviews with Polish and Czech MPs: sampling design, questionnaire, and a description of the final samples and response outcomes.

3.2 Testing the Hypotheses: Multi-Method Approach

41

To test the argument that individuals’ social identity and their attachment to these shared identities, which is an indicator of latent collective political ambition, influence group- based party switching, this dissertation employs a multi-method approach. I measure attachment to social identity using legislative behavioral proxies (roll-call voting) and the extent and conditions under which this affects defection quantitatively. Statistical analyses show there to be a relationship between post-hoc behavioral measurements of social identification, individual political ambition, and party switching. Thus, I also administered semi-structured interviews with sitting and former Polish and Czech Members of Parliament, which yield the context and narrative that flesh out statistical findings and provide additional evidence for the direct and moderating impacts of social identity on group switching.

Table 3.1. Hypotheses testing the relationship between attachments to shared social identities and group-based legislative party switching. Direct relationship

H1 Attachment to, or identification with, a social group, whether partisan or nonpartisan, will directly affect the decision and thus the likelihood of switching parties with a group.

H2 If partisan and salient nonpartisan identities overlap, then the likelihood of group-based party switching will be lower. If nonpartisan identities cross-cut party lines, then the likelihood of group-based party switching will be higher.

Moderated relationship

H3 Attachment to, or identification with, a social group, whether partisan or nonpartisan, will moderate the impact of MPs’ pursuit of political ambitions on the decision to switch political parties as a group.

H4 If partisan and nonpartisan identities cross-cut one another, then the magnitude of the effect of political ambitions on the likelihood of group-based party switching will be strengthened.

42 Table 3.1 above recaps the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. Hierarchical models test each hypothesis for both country case studies in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. Interviews presented in Chapter 6 elaborate upon results from quantitative analyses. However, the findings from these conversations more importantly provide qualitative evidence for the affective, symbolic effect of group-based common-identity attachments on defection decisions. The following sections provide an overview and address how the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 will be tested, and lay out information about the nature and collection of evidence used to do so.

3.3 Quantitative Approach

Each of the hypotheses I propose will first be tested using appropriate statistical models in Chapter 4 and 5. I begin by describing the data collected for this task: the Members of

Parliament Affiliations Data (MPAD) for Poland (1997-2011) and the Czech Republic (1992-

2013) contain information on parliamentarians’ demographic characteristics, personal biographies, electoral data, legislative positions, assignments, affiliations, and activities, including party switching. Next, I describe the construction of variables drawn from these data.

This section concludes with a description and justification of the data modeling strategy applied for both the Polish and Czech cases.

43 3.3.1 Data Sources and Collection

The novel data featured in my dissertation are collectively known as the Members of

Parliament Affiliations Data (MPAD), for Poland (1997-2011) and the Czech Republic (1992-

2013), which I collected over 2014-2015 from a variety of sources in the field. These data provide a detailed picture of the social and political backgrounds of MPs as well as of their roll- call behavior. Parts of these data were gathered from existing sources covering electoral results and candidates’ biographies (EAST PaC; Millard 2004); MPAD expands upon these sources with additional biographical information. Otherwise, the majority of the data were gathered from a scattering of primary and secondary sources that were previously unavailable in one place.

Polish biographical and legislative data unique to MPAD were mostly drawn from primary source documents found in the Sejm Library and Archives. Following the completion of each parliamentary term, archivists compile basic statistics and documentation for legislative activities, which are published in reference manuals and biographical compendia. Relevant data on committee memberships, positions in higher office, and party affiliations (including changes therein) were scanned and transcribed from the legislative reference manuals, while biographical compendia were acquired through the Sejm Publishing House on-location in

Warsaw.25 Additional data not available in the reference manuals and biographical compendia

(mostly the relating to the latter) were available in loose-leaf dossiers in the Sejm Archives26.

25 In the case of the compendia, the public relations manager surprisingly gave these as gifts—publications from the 1990s are no longer in print, and I must have made a positive impression. 26 Known as teczki. 44 Table 3.2. Variables list in Polish MPAD (1997-2011). Variable Description Non-MPAD data source ID Unique MP identifier EAST PaC LAST_NAME Last name FIRST_NAME First name MID_NAME Middle, second names KADENCJA Parliamentary term PARTY_NAME Party name PARTY_ABB Party abbreviation START Start date of observation END End date of observation SWITCH Party switch G_SWITCH Group switch PARTY_FAM Party family PARL_GROUP Parliamentary party organizational type PARTY_GOV Member of party in government GOV_POS# Government position COM# Committee assignment COM_POS# Position in committee NAT_LIST National list position (1997-2001 only) DIST Electoral constituency EAST PaC WOJEWOD, WOJEWOD97 Recoding of constituency to administrative district LIST_POS Electoral list position EAST PaC PVOTES No. preferential votes OCCUP Occupation (Polish SCO-2009) EAST PaC CLASS Social class (Polish SCO-2009) EAST PaC EDUC Level of education ALMA_MATER Alma mater GRAD_YR Year graduated PAST_MP Incumbency NUM_KAD Number of past terms served KAD_HIST List of past terms served POLIT_BIO Pre-transition political association GENDER Gender EAST PaC YEAR_BIRTH Year of birth EAST PaC AGE Age at beginning of term V##### Roll-call votes Hug and Wüest (2012) Note: Polish MPs may serve in up to 2 committees at a time; Polish elections utilized a national proportional list in 1997, but ceased doing so from 2001-present; the coding for electoral districts and regions differs between 1997-2001 and later terms due to administrative reorganization.

45 Table 3.2 above lists the variables contained in the Polish MPAD, with references to non-primary data sources. The East European Parliamentarian and Candidate Data (EAST PaC) already contained some of the biographical and electoral data for MPs covered in MPAD, namely personal vote counts, electoral list positions, constituencies, occupation, social class, gender, and age. The Polish MPAD fills in any data missing from EAST PaC (if possible), but uniquely features parliamentary party affiliations, party families, party organizational types, government/parliamentary offices held, committee assignments, levels of education, alma mater, and past political biographies prior to the democratic transition. Second, roll-call voting data for 1997-2007 were made available to me by Simon Hug and Reto Wüest, which I supplemented with my own collection efforts for the 2007-2011 term.27

For the Czech MPAD, data shared by Frances Millard (see Millard 2004) on Czech candidates through 2002 provided a similar base as EAST PaC: vote-counts, list positions, constituencies, occupations, gender, and age. I supplemented these data with party affiliations, party families, party organizational types, government/parliamentary offices held, committee assignments, levels of education, alma mater, and past political biographies. Notably, the

MPAD expands upon occupational information missing in Millard’s data28 along with social class, and the timeline of available data is extended to include the three parliamentary terms from 2002-2013. Roll-call votes for the entire period since the Velvet Divorce were shared by the parliamentary librarian and data archivists at the Poslanecká sněmovna in the original data format recorded from voting machines, which I cleaned and prepared for analysis.

27 See Hug and Wüest (2012). The extent of the Polish MPAD data corresponds with the availability of digitally archived roll-call voting records at the time of data preparation for this dissertation. From 1993-1997, roll-call votes were mandatory and complete for all procedures in the Sejm, but were not digitally archived and are stored in teczki in the Sejm. As of the writing of this dissertation, about two-thirds of these roll-call data have been collected in collaboration with Monika Nalepa at the University of Chicago. 28 Specifically, some pre-parliamentary or non-political occupations are missing in Millard’s (2004) data. 46 Table 3.3. Variables list in Czech MPAD (1992-2013). Variable Description Non-MPAD data source ID Unique MP identifier LAST_NAME Last name FIRST_NAME First name MID_NAME Middle, second names OBDOBI Parliamentary term PARTY_NAME Party name PARTY_ABB Party abbreviation START Start date of observation END End date of observation SWITCH Party switch G_SWITCH Group switch PARTY_FAM Party family PARL_GROUP Parliamentary party organizational type PARTY_GOV Member of party in government GOV_POS# Government position COM# Committee assignment COM_POS# Position in committee KRAJ Administrative district/electoral constituency Millard (2004) LIST_POS Electoral list position Millard (2004) PVOTES No. preferential votes Millard (2004) OCCUP Occupation CLASS Social class (Czech SCO-2011) EDUC Level of education (Czech ISCED-2011) ALMA_MATER Alma mater GRAD_YR Year graduated PAST_MP Incumbency NUM_OBD Number of past terms served OBD_HIST List of past terms served POLIT_BIO Pre-transition political association GENDER Gender Millard (2004) YEAR_BIRTH Year of birth Millard (2004) AGE Age at beginning of term Millard (2004) V##### Roll-call votes Note: Czech MPs serve in two committees at a time, but this may count up to four depending on the nature of the committees (e.g., procedural/organizational); electoral districts and administrative regions correspond.

47 Table 3.3 above thus features the Czech MPAD variables. As is the case with material for the Polish data, most of the biographical and legislative data came from reference materials in the Library of the Poslanecká sněmovna. Supplemental information on MPs’ biographies was drawn from available materials in the Library as well as from public information access websites.29

Table 3.4. Variables list in roll-call vote meta-data for Polish and Czech MPAD. Variable Description VOTE_ID Unique vote ID (roll-call variable name) TERM Parliamentary term SESSION Session number VOTE_NUM Vote number in session DATE Vote date TIME Time of vote NAME1 Name of vote/agenda item NAME2 Ancillary vote description

For reference, I also preserved all roll-call meta-data from both countries in separate datasets, which include descriptions of each vote and information on the term, session, date, and time each vote took place. In the MPAD, individual MPs are matched with their roll-call votes over time in wide-format, which precludes the inclusion of roll-call specific meta-data alongside MPS’ behavioral and biographical data. Table 3.4 above lists the meta-variables with

29 The main internet sources include: komunalnipolitika.cz, which documents the non-political reported occupations of candidates for local elections since 1994, for which many MPs compete(d) and hold office concurrently; nasipolitici.cz, which aggregates data from politicians’ personal websites and autobiographies, which provided information about alma mater/level of education and past political biographies, if not available from the Poslanecká sněmovna directly. 48 brief descriptions found in the meta-datasets. These contain information on parliamentary sessions, vote numbers, dates and times of votes, along with descriptions of each vote

(agendas/designations).

Additional specific information about coding schemes, country-specific details, and a comprehensive list of primary and secondary sources for the data can be found in Appendices

A, B, and C.

3.3.2 Data Structure and Modeling

The data analyzed in this dissertation are drawn from the complete MPAD and are ultimately structured in long-format to best model the changing dynamics of parliamentary affiliations and activities, with individual MP as the unit of analysis. Time structures the data on two levels. The first level is defined by the date on which any positions or affiliations

(including party affiliation, position in government, and legislative committee assignments) change. As listed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 above, START and END account for the specific dates

(day-month-year) on which affiliations or assignments begin and end. Because party affiliations, government positions, and committee assignments may change over the course of parliamentary terms, individual MPs may have multiple observations. For example, an MP may have held a seat in parliament over more than one term, during which time he or she may have switched political parties, entered or left a government ministry position, or have been reassigned to different committees. For each of these changes in status, a new observation is required to account for the changing dynamics of the work place, which have an effect on personal associations and legislative behavior.

49 The second level of time divides observations into groups according to parliamentary term: e.g., 1997-2001, 2001-2005, 2005-2007, 2007-2011 for Poland, and 1992-1996, 1996-

1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010, and 2010-2013 for the Czech Republic.30 This highlights (and controls for) differing institutional and contextual factors that may affect legislative behavior over time.31 Czech electoral rules also underwent a few minor changes from 1992-2013.32 In both country-cases, the number, names, and families of political parties also change across parliamentary terms, as do the names and number of legislative committees and government ministries. .

When modeling the data, I therefore employ hierarchical modeling techniques to capture random variance according to parliamentary term > multiple observations over time per

MP > fixed effects of interest (attachment to identity, political ambition, etc.). I describe this in greater detail below.

30 Besides a conceptual decision (different parliamentary terms induce different constraints or opportunities for elite behavior over time), the raw MPAD datasets are also split according to terms due to the inclusion of roll-call votes as individual variables. Both countries’ parliaments recorded all votes electronically, including those for procedure, motions, and readings. Indeed, there are typically several thousand votes for each term. This practice allows researchers to avoid the issue of selection-bias in roll-call voting analysis (cf. Carrubba, Gabel and Hug 2008; Hug 2010). 31 Substantively, the Polish electoral system underwent a specific change following the ratification and implementation of the country’s Constitution in 1997, and it took effect in time for elections to the 2001-2005 parliament. Thus, the NATLIST variable is only featured in the 1997-2001 term and the configuration of electoral districts and national administrative regions changes as well (WOJEWOD97 versus WOJEWOD). The Polish electoral system used an apportioning national ballot list in the 1997 elections (which has not been used since), with both constituency and national mandates apportioned using the D’Hondt method. The 2001 elections ceased use of the national list and used the Saint-Leguë method; elections from 2005 to the present day have used the D’Hondt method. 32 Czech elections from 1990-1998 utilized the Hagenbach-Bischoff method with open ballots (four choices could be specified in a given party list). The 2002 and 2006 elections reduced the number of preferential list choices to two, which was raised back to four for the 2010 elections. Seats for the elections since 2002 have been apportioned using the D’Hondt method. 50 3.3.3 Variables of Interest

3.3.3.1 Dependent Variable

Party switching occurs whenever an MP’s legislative affiliation changes (between parties, or to/from independent status). A group-based party switch occurs whenever (a) two or more MPs switch parties on the same date and (b) they do so in the same direction (towards the same party affiliation/independent status, together). The dependent variable thus measures whether an MP switches political parties as part of a group. Should he or she does so (satisfying the aforementioned conditions), this variable is recorded as ‘1’. If he or she does not switch parties as part of a group, this variable is recorded as ‘0’. Crucially, the latter condition includes the possible outcomes of not switching, or switching individually—the outcome of interest is whether or not a group-based party switch occurred, and the independent variables described below test the conditions under which this takes place, following the hypotheses laid out in

Chapter 2 and Table 3.1 above.

3.3.3.2 Independent Variables: Social Identities

I divide the independent variables into two categories. First, I use ascriptive behavioral proxies to measure MPs’ attachment to shared social identities, which capture the direct (H1,

H2) and moderating influences (H3, H4) of collective political ambition on the likelihood of group-based party switching, which are calculated using roll-call votes. Because common identity associations are based on the shared characteristics and biographies of MPs (Prentice et

51 al. 2006; see Chapter 2), demographic and biographical information on MPs constitute these group labels. These include gender, level of education, social class, region of origin, pre- democratic political associations, and committee assignments (for their relevance in Central and Eastern Europe, see Blahož et al. 1999; Hloušek and Kopeček 2010; Kitschelt et al. 1999;

Migalski 2008; Tunkis 2017).

Roll-call votes provide the behavioral measure of the salience and strength of attachment to these identities in parliament. I use voting loyalty scores (see Mainwaring and

Pérez-Liñán 1997), and these are defined as the proportion of votes over time (for a given observation) in which MPs’ votes match the modal decision of the group with which they are associated. For example, if the plurality of MPs who identify as farmers (social class) vote in favor of a particular issue and a particular MP in which we are interested also votes in favor of that issue, then he or she is loyal to that group. This is then averaged across all votes for the MP observation to determine the MP’s loyalty score for, and thus attachment to, the shared identity.33

Because many votes tend to be unanimous or near-unanimous (such as procedural votes), these scores are calculated across contentious votes only. I follow Mainwaring and

Pérez-Liñán’s (1997) modal threshold, in which contentious votes are those non-unanimous votes in which fewer than 75% of thoseMPs voting did so in the same way.34 Furthermore, I

33 See Appendix G for the replication code for loyalty scores for each shared social identity. These scores are defined as the proportion of votes (values bound by [0,1]) over a given time period in which a given MP voted with the modal decisions of MPs sharing a given identity. That is, if 60% of group members ‘abstain’, an abstaining MP would be considered ‘loyal’ for that vote. Each observation and score in the data cover any number of contentious roll-call votes, based on MPs’ party affiliation, government position, or committee assignment, until one of these dynamics change and a new observation begins. 34 By tracing loyalty scores across all contentious votes, regardless of specific issues, analyses can speak more to individuals’ average tendencies of loyalty in general terms across votes and time. However, this measurement excludes MPs who did not show up to a given vote—while this potentially loses information for those MPs who 52 account for all vote options (‘yea’, ‘nay’, ‘abstain’) as relevant choices, which retains more information about which MPs vote together and how often (Hix 2004).

First, I include a measure of attachment to political Party labels. Stronger party loyalty scores should reduce the likelihood of party switching. Importantly, this variable is not a measure of overall party discipline or cohesion, per se. Rather, this indicator is based on the proportion of roll-calls in which any given individual MP votes with their copartisans. It is on the relationship between this variable and loyalty scores for nonpartisan identities that

Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are tested.

Next, it is possible that issues relating to Gender may have galvanized behavior and grouping around this identity, even if it did not align with any party labels, per se (see

Kunovich 2012 in the Polish case, for example). Over time, however, the Sejm also featured standing committees dedicated to the advancement of women’s issues35, and the legislature enacted gendered electoral list quotas during the VI Kadencja (2007-2011). During the course of interviews with Polish and Czech MPs, some individuals mentioned the importance of gender for collaboration and association, particularly women. One Polish MP declared that

“from the beginning I worked well with my colleagues, in fact that is to say with women”.36

Similarly, a Czech MP from ODS explained her views on collaboration with other women in her party and in committees: “I am very much looking forward to coming here to be together

may have been sitting in session but refused to vote for a variety of reasons, inclusion of these no-shows also conflates principled non-voting with those who were not present in plenary at all. 35 E.g., the Committee on Equality between Women and Men in IV Kadencja (2001-2005), and the Committee on Families and Women’s Rights in V Kadencja (2005-2007). 36 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 14 July 2014. Specifically in the Polish case, gender-related issues have become increasingly important over the last decade as the number of women in the Sejm has increased (Kunovich 2012) and legislation such as gender quotas on electoral lists have been enacted (Gwiazda 2015). 53 with them because if I need something, I know they will help me”.37 This identity thus deserves some attention in the Polish case (Gwiazda 2015), though there is little literature on its long- term role in Czech legislative activities.

Level of education and Social class are also important aspects of descriptive representation among political elites (Parry 2005; Słomczyński and Dubrow 2011), and have been major influences defining political discourse as well as the memberships and bases of parties in both countries (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Migalski 2008). In both Polish and Czech datasets, education is based on MPs’ self-reported highest completed level of education, whereas class is based on their self-reported extra-political occupation prior to entering parliament.38 As issues related to education and class helped shape party platforms over time, particularly with respect to the consequences of market transitions, the overall alignment between these groups and party labels should be associated with a decrease in the likelihood of group-based switching.

Next, loyalty to the Region from which MPs hail is also important—local and regional politics play a strong role in both Poland and the Czech Republic (Blahož et al. 1999; Zarycki and Nowak 2000)—strong regional identification may drive the likelihood of group-based party switching, reflecting MPs’ desire to enact policy on behalf of their constituents. For example, the Czech TOP09 party’s parliamentary group labeled itself TOP 09 s podporou

Starostů (TOP09 with the support of the mayors). In fact, many MPs in the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna have experience in local politics, which influences their priorities and interactions:

37 Interview with Czech MP (ODS, veteran, loyalist), 5 November 2015. 38 See Appendices A and B for operationalization of education and social class variables. Levels of education are recorded or designated differently in both countries. Although both based on self-reported occupations, class designations differ somewhat between Poland and the Czech Republic due to the Standard Classification of Occupation schemes used. 54

“The leader of our parliamentary party group, Zbyněk Stanjura, I know him as a mayor—I was a mayor, he was a mayor, and we were together with an organization SMO39, and we were together a long time before in this association I know him very long, and because my priority is also here in committee for regional development ... because I know these mayors, I know the problems, etc., and I know them very long time”.40

Because regions are represented across parties, strong regional attachment should increase the likelihood of a group-based defection.

Data for the remaining common social identities in parliament are more limited in their availability, in that these characteristics are not universal to all MPs. Pre-democratic Political history continues to shape the post-transition behavior of MPs and has contemporary importance for the party system in Poland (Migalski 2008; Nalewajko 1992; Zuba 2012) and to define political culture (Shabad and Słomczyński 2000). In the Czech Republic, the Communist legacy has been a salient political-cultural issue in Czech politics, but unlike in the Polish case,

“mass opposition groups … arose only in the days and weeks before the communist collapse”

(Darden and Grzymała-Busse 2006: 108). As a result, MPs with any pre-democratic political experience share associations with the old Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) or the opposition movement Civic Forum (OF) can be found in all the country’s contemporary political parties.41

Nevertheless, this identity is far more meaningful among Polish MPs than their Czech counterparts. One former Polish MP stressed that “the most important group for me was, and still is, the old anti-Communist opposition from before August [1980], and then those who

39 Svaz měst a obcí (Association of Towns and Municipalities). 40 Interview with Czech MP (ODS, veteran, loyalist), 5 November 2015. 41 The codebooks in Appendices A and B list the specific identities that constitute each general label. 55 proved themselves during Martial Law”.42 Another MP in the Sejm pointed out the importance of this characteristic for collaboration: “As a rule these were people who had similar biographies to my own—this kind of generational commonality, let’s say—and among them I felt the best”.43 Conversely, collaboration with those whose personal history crossed the regime-opposition line is difficult: “...with them I never shared a common biography, because the PZPR44 had a profile, and somehow it was not such a warm relationship. It was, say, a pragmatic relationship”.45 As time has passed, the influence of pre-democratic history has waned with the entrance of younger politicians to the scene without such a background, but the legacy remains important:

“The type of people attracted by politics has changed, because in the beginning of the 90s ... there was an extremely high percentage of people for whom the politics was really, almost a sense of life. Something they were extremely interested in, they were very ideological, now in a good sense of the word. Many of them were in some way active before 1989—not always in a full position, but let’s say they were in some ‘shadow’ part of the society. ... So I, for example, among personal friends I know ten people who were in prison, Communist prison, and those people can speak about the importance of power and financial advantages and so on. I would say that 80% were really very much interested in politics as such. Only 20% felt the opportunity and said ‘ah, there might be new chances in politics.’ Now I would say it is the other way around”.46

Thus, because of the differences in how these identities are distributed in the respective party systems, attachment to political histories should decrease the likelihood of group-based

42 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 25 June 2015. 43 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 11 June 2015. 44 The Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) was the governing party of the former Communist regime in Poland. 45 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 11 June 2015. 46 Interview with Czech former MP (veteran, switcher), 13 November 2015. 56 party switching in Poland, but increase its likelihood in the Czech Republic.47 For this identity, not all MPs in both countries were involved in pre-democratic or influential transition movements, though comparatively fewer in the Czech Republic have this background than in

Poland.

Finally, another important source of nonpartisan group identity is Committee membership, which plays a role in parliamentary socialization that influences legislative behavior (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sieberer 2006), so that they may vote together despite partisan differences.48 MPs in both countries placed strong emphasis on the salience of collaboration and co-membership in committees when interviewed. One MP noted that

“working in substantive committees, it’s about working with the closest people! Thus my closest collaboration is with those who work in these two substantive committees”.49 Over time, “the easiest collaboration was with those sharing similar views on given matters, although one would encounter others from different parties, where there were different stances, but in substantive matters one collaborated well”.50 Another MP emphasized the often apolitical nature of networking that could take place in committees:

“there are issues which should bring people together regardless of politics; of course there can be different positions on different issues—you can take

47 However, because of the lack of a civic tradition in the Czech Republic prior to 1989, I do not expect this identity to play a strong role in influencing the pattern of group-based defection in the Poslanecka snemovna. 48 See also evidence presented by Kubuj (2013), who conducted surveys among Polish MPs about their views of the nature of the representative deputy’s mandate. 49 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 8 July 2014. Recalling comments made by the Czech MP with local/mayoral ties above, many personal interactions take place chiefly in committee. N.B. Polish MPs are assigned to a maximum of two standing committees; the same holds for the Czech Republic, with exceptions for specific committees including the Committee on Petitions, Organizational Committee, and the Parliamentary Control Committee, which are involved in the organization of parliamentary affairs rather than with substantive issues. 50 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 15 July 2014. 57 different approaches—but where there are substantive matters, one ought to set aside politics and work together”.51

As “a strong sense of attachment to co-members on issues could undermine party loyalty when voting” (Tunkis 2017: 83), shared committee experience may promote the likelihood of them defecting together. Placement in committees is specified by political parties that make it into parliament, based on the distribution of seats and internal adjudication. It is worth noting that not all MPs have committee assignments in both countries; MPs who hold higher office in parliament or government do not participate in committees.52

3.3.3.3 Independent Variables: Political Ambition

The second set of variables of interest measure political ambition, which control for the impact of MPs’ self-interest that promotes individual-based party switching (e.g., Heller and

Mershon 2009a). Ambitions are difficult to measure directly, but may be captured using proximate institutional, electoral, or personal information that reflect and condition vote-, office-, and policy-seeking behavior (Heller and Mershon 2005). In most cases, these variables are proxies for more than one of these ambitions.

Among office-seeking measures, Governing party assesses whether MPs are affiliated with a party that is in government (or coalition), which grants access to office and state resources. More directly, Government position also proxies for office-seeking and indicates

51 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, veteran, loyalist), 24 July 2014. Some have argued (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sieberer 2006) and others found (Tunkis 2017) this to be a basis for a weakening in party loyalty. 52 NB. In the Czech Republic, members of the Presidium (ministers, speakers, etc) may hold posts in special standing organizational committees; these are also called on an ad hoc basis in Poland (and thus not given an official designation). 58 whether MPs hold higher office in government or in parliament.53 Being a Committee officer is also a sign of holding high political officer.54 These variables also tap into policy-seeking, and they should deter party switching.

As both Poland and the Czech Republic employ open-list proportional electoral systems, the number of preferential votes received as well as electoral list placement are used to proxy personal vote-seeking ambitions. The number of personal votes received by candidates

(Log pref. votes) across constituencies varies dramatically in both countries: Polish MPs receive anywhere from several hundred votes in the smallest districts to hundreds of thousands in the largest ones, whereas Czech MPs’ vote counts likewise range from the hundreds to the tens of thousands. I therefore scale these data with their natural logs due to their nonlinearity.

Having greater personal popularity may reduce the risk inherent in defying one’s copartisans

(e.g., Karvonen 2011) and thus increase the likelihood of defection. List position also reflects vote-seeking—in that higher placement may result in more votes—as well as office-seeking— higher placement is a reflection of better standing within the party. Lower placement on the list may thus incentivize individual party switching if defection resulted in higher list placement with a new party.

MPs’ past political experience and demographic characteristics also reflect office- seeking. Past MP indicates whether an MP has prior experience in parliament. First-timers may be more likely to switch parties, given that they are usually low in party hierarchies and may not be socialized into their roles (Heller and Mershon 2005), whereas veterans may have a better grasp of how to achieve their goals—not switching parties over time can help build

53 This variable captures whether an MP is a minister with portfolio or holds a higher office in parliament, which may include and Vice-Speaker and Secretariat-equivalent positions. 54 NB. With few exceptions, MPs holding government positions cannot concurrently hold committee officer positions in either Poland or the Czech Republic. 59 support (vote-seeking) and facilitate a rise up the party ladder (office-seeking). Age plays a role by tempering risky decisions (Schlesinger 1966). Older MPs are less likely to risk their careers and reputations, thereby dampening career ambitions. I also include a control for Gender; while the connection between gender and legislative party switching has not been investigated in detail in past scholarship, related research has shown that women tend to be more risk-averse and therefore elect to express lower levels of ambition (e.g., Costantini 1990; Fox and Lawless

2010).

3.3.3.4 Independent Variables: Operationalizing the Moderating Influence of Cross-

Cutting Identities on Political Ambition

In order to gauge the moderation of individual political ambitions by attachments to shared social identities, as proxies for MPs’ collective ambition, I generate a dichotomous variable that interacts with the controls for individual ambition above. This dummy variable is based on the comparative strength of MPs’ attachment to nonpartisan social identities vis-à-vis party loyalty. That is, the Unaligned indicator represents MPs whose roll-call loyalty scores among one or more nonpartisan social identities are strong, while party loyalty is weak. If an

MP is strongly attached to a nonpartisan social identity yet weakly tied to their political party, then it is possible that the identity to which they are attached cross-cuts party lines—and thus the collective political ambition of those sharing this identity does not align with that of the

MP’s party. The interaction terms will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4.

To systematically assess weak party loyalty vis-à-vis strong attachment to social identities, which indicates unaligned partisan and nonpartisan ties, I employ general thresholds

60 based on average measures of discipline across parties and attachment across shared social identity groups and the distribution of these measures across MPs within groups (defined by party, social identities). First, party loyalty is ‘weak’ if an individual MP’s roll-call loyalty score is one standard deviation below the mean for the group. . For example, an MP’s loyalty to the People’s Party is weak if his or her voting loyalty score is one standard deviation below the mean score for all People’s Party members. Conversely, an MP’s attachment to a nonpartisan identity is ‘strong’ if his or her roll-call loyalty score, according to the group with which they identify, is one standard deviation above the mean for this group. In other words, an MP who identifies as a farmer (social class) has a strong attachment to this social group (defined by the common identity shared between individuals) if his or her voting loyalty among group members is one standard deviation above the mean score for all farmers. In a sense, voting loyalty among nonpartisan social identities is treated and calculated in the same fashion as among political parties.

Using this coding, the operationalization of the interaction dummy variable is straightforward. MPs with party loyalty scores that are one standard deviation below the mean score for their party, but have nonpartisan identity attachment scores one standard deviation above the mean for the group(s) with which they identify have the Unaligned dummy variable coded as ‘1’. The null category for the dummy, in which party and nonpartisan identity scores do not meet the above conditions, comprises MPs whose identities and party loyalty align, MPs who are highly partisan with no strong attachment to nonpartisan groups, and those who have ties to neither—in these cases, Unaligned is ‘0’.

Interaction terms between the Unaligned dummy variable and the control variables for individual political ambition indicate the influence of self-interest on the decision to switch

61 parties as part of a group conditional upon whether party and nonpartisan ties do not align. The coefficients of interaction terms should indicate a strengthening of the cumulative effect of political ambitions on the likelihood of group-based party switching (H4), if statistically significant (H3).

3.3.3.5 Independent Variables: Other Controls

For several reasons, I control for the effect of ideology using the political party families that make up the party systems in the new democracies of post-Communist Europe (Hloušek and Kopeček 2010), rather than based on more specific (party) or broad (left/right) measures.

These include the Far Left, Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats, Conservatives,

Far Right, and Agrarian families. Smaller groups (such as regional/ethnic parties and the greens with very few observations) as well as those MPs not affiliated with parliamentary party groups (independents) are reserved in a referent Mixed category.55 For a start, the number of parties in parliament has varied dramatically in both countries over time, with many parties appearing and disappearing frequently, making statistical modeling somewhat more cumbersome. In addition, using broad ideological measures ignores the nuances of the political discourses in both countries, and how they have shaped the party systems.56

55 The inclusion of these party families with the Mixed category is a methodological decision, rather than a substantive one, in order to avoid empty cell issues in model estimation. The Czech parliament featured a far right party in the first two terms (1992-1998), a regional/ethnic party only in the first term (1992-1996), and a green party in the fifth term (2006-2010), while Poland ceased featuring a far left party by the end of the third term (1997-2001) and has only had one to two mandates reserved for German Minority representation. The breakdown of total observations per family per term can be found in Chapter 4 for Poland and Chapter 5 for the Czech Republic. 56 There are any number of additional control variables that could be included in the analyses. Along with controlling for individual political party labels (rather than ideological families), the importance of specific committee assignments is not to be understated (e.g., Mansfeldová 2013; Sieberer 2006). However, I am not 62 3.3.4 Statistical Models and Specifications

I test the hypotheses on the influence of collective political ambition, as reflected in attachment to shared social identities on group-based legislative party switching (H1, H2) and the moderating influence on political ambition (H3, H4) for Poland (Chapter 4) and the Czech

Republic (Chapter 5) separately. The modeling strategy I use is based on the nature of the dependent variable and structure of the data and observations. Because the dependent variable

(group switching) is dichotomous and the observations are grouped by individual MPs57 and nested in time, a mixed effects binomial logistic Generalized Linear Model is the most appropriate approach to modeling the data. The variables listed above (social identities, ambitions, and controls) constitute the fixed effects in the model, whereas random effects

(intercepts) are controlled at the individual MP and Parliamentary Term levels. This approach is optimal given its flexibility and robustness to model hierarchically structured and unbalanced panel data (see Breslow and Clayton 1993) in which unobserved heterogeneity and serial autocorrelation for individual MPs over time is likely.

Models for both countries are specified identically for comparative purposes, with variables used to test the hypotheses added in stages. Specifications also vary slightly according to whether MPs’ party affiliations are taken into account (thereby omitting non-affiliated independents) or committee assignments (thereby omitting MPs without assignment). The first set of specifications is a straightforward test of the effects of individuals’ personal ambitions on

interested in the importance of committees for the committees’ sake; rather, I am interested in looking at the effects of attachment to a common-identity group that forms in any given committee on the likelihood of defection. 57 Referring to the description of the MPAD above, each MP may have multiple observations depending on whether they switched, achieved/lost higher office, or were (re)assigned to committees during the course of a term. 63 the likelihood of group-based party switching. The second set includes social identity attachment scores in order to test Hypotheses H1 and H2. The third and final set of specifications feature the interactions between political ambition variables and having unaligned partisan and nonpartisan ties, which test Hypotheses H3 and H4.

Following these analyses, I also further examine variables’ marginal effects on the predicted probabilities of group-based defection. These provide visualizations of the relationships between social identities, individual ambition, and party switching, while also providing a more nuanced account of the study’s main findings.

3.4 Qualitative Analysis

In this section, I describe the qualitative methodology I use to provide evidence for the incentives for group-based defection. Conversations with Polish and Czech politicians in semi- structured interviews reveal the importance of the pursuit of collective political influence that shapes and is shaped by individuals’ desire to collaborate and be part of a group similar to themselves.

The qualitative study of elites in the social sciences provides “essential descriptive information on the elites of a certain society” and “test[s] theoretical assumptions about the relations between elites and society” (Hoffmann-Lange 1982: 27). As Fenno (1986) pointed out, direct observations of political actors permits “attaching observation to theory,” and as such “we might ask ourselves whether it is possible to construct theories of politics without observational perspectives” (14).

64 3.4.1 Research Design

The design I employed in the field reflects long-established practice in elite interview methodology in the social sciences and humanities (e.g., Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman

1975; Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Dexter, 1970; Groholt and Higley 1972; Hunt, Crane and

Wahlke 1964; Spradley 1979; Wildavsky 1993). I conducted semi-structured interviews, utilizing a combination of stratified and snowball sampling to survey a mix of sitting and former MPs. Questions were open-ended and all discussions were recorded electronically and annotated. The questionnaire design facilitated thematic analysis of the interviews (see Braun and Clarke 2006; Jackson and Trochim 2002).

Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions are generally considered the preferred style when investigating and meeting with political elites (Leech 2002; Peabody et al.

1990; Seidman 2006). Unlike a structured questionnaire (such as with surveys or polls), semi- structured interviews begin by presenting the respondent with the topic of conversation and the researcher asking specific, relevant questions. This “allows more opportunity for probing and gives the respondent considerable freedom to expand on a given question” (Huitt and Peabody

1969: 29). As Aberbach and Rockman (2002) explain, this strategy is advantageous among elites in that it provides respondents with “latitude to articulate fully their responses” (674).

This in turn results in greater response validity, as “open-ended questions provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks” (674).

I thus petitioned sitting and former MPs for interviews based on their characteristics and biographies in order to ensure that interview responses came from diverse perspectives, and provided a representation of all personal backgrounds relevant to this study (cf. Seidman 2006).

65 Among sitting MPs, maximum variation stratified sampling initially guided selection (see

Lynch 2013; Mosley 2013) so as to garner as representative a sample of members of the Sejm and the Poslanecká sněmovna as possible.58 Former MPs were sampled if available; achieving a representative sample would be difficult.59 As such, snowball sampling was also utilized, which relies “more heavily on personal contacts and introductions, such as referral” (Rivera,

Kozyreva and Sarovskii 2002: 683), keeping in mind the fact that “no matter how good a job you do and how lucky you are, you will not be able to interview a portion of your target sample” (Goldstein 2002: 671).

Perhaps the stickiest challenge of qualitative interview-based research was actually getting each interview—concerns over structure, sampling, and analysis are moot if the interviews do not take place. As Goldstein (2002) put it, “‘getting the interview’ is more art than science” (669). Based on personal experiences, ‘cold-calling’ political elites, specifically calling constituency offices or sending e-mails, tends to be ineffective in the majority of cases

(cf. Goldstein 2002). Institutional support (via affiliation and supportive phone calls if necessary) and access to political parties’ telephone directories, along with a healthy dose of persistence, was central to overcoming the challenge of gaining access to both sitting and former MPs.

In some cases, snowball referrals would lead to additional, often valuable contacts provided I ‘let them know that their friend’ sent me. In new democracies with fluid political systems, approaching and establishing rapport can be challenging before interviews even take

58 Representativeness in this study is based primarily on party affiliation; sampling is otherwise non-randomly purposive with respect to gender, veterans and first-timers in office, and party switchers and loyalists (see Mosley 2013: 13-14). 59 Besides the fact that the total population of former MPs is rather large, the practical limitation of a lack of up-to- date or available contact information makes targeted representative sampling unrealistic. 66 place (see Denitch 1972). Rivera et al. (2002) point out that “respondents in more politically unstable environments may be a good deal more suspicious about the goals and purposes of the research project” (684). For example, 2015 was an election year for both houses of parliament and for the presidency in Poland; it is possible that party-based animosity engendered suspicion and reluctance among some Polish MPs to be interviewed, regardless of my institutional affiliations, background, project description, or stated intentions.60

One particular incident in Poland stood out as an example of the challenges of elite interviewing. Although a positive rapport had already been established, arranging an interview with one MP was particularly difficult due to scheduling conflicts; despite this, I was told to

‘call regularly, we’ll see what we can do.’ During the second to last plenary before the 2015 summer pause, however, the MP asked that I send a formal letter documenting my affiliations, background, and intentions. This was a common request; however, the next day, the MP accused me of not telling the truth, that the institutional letter (from the Polish Academy of

Sciences), my credentials (my home department and position at Ohio State), and intentions

(discussing the MP’s experiences and perspectives while in office) were disingenuous and false. He then asked that I send a ‘real’ institutional letter (even though I already had) and to tell the ‘actual truth’. I explained to the MP a few times that at all times his participation and consideration was voluntary, and in the end the interview did not take place regardless.

60 This was less a problem among non-serving ex-MPs, whom I surmise either no longer had a horse in the race, had a bone to pick with former colleagues, or both, and were thus all the more willing to talk about their experiences. 67 3.4.2 Interview Questionnaire

In order to establish an open, positive rapport, I began each interview with a general, so- called ‘grand-tour question’ (see Spradley 1979) about what inspired each respondent to enter public service, followed by more concrete questions about everyday associations in parliament and opinions about the party system, state of democracy, favored workplace associations, and party switching. Both the Polish and Czech conversations were guided by the questions (and follow-ups) listed below in Figure 3.1.61

Figure 3.1. Semi-structured interview questionnaire and prompts administered among Polish and Czech MPs in 2014 and 2015.

1. I would like to begin our conversation with a general question: what personally motivated you to enter public political service? 2. Taking into account your experiences working in the parliament, are (or were) there specific people with whom you have (had) the tendency to collaborate (more often than with others)? 3. On the basis of your experiences and perspectives, I would like to ask a question on the topic of politics in Poland/Czech Republic nowadays as well as over the last 25 years.

We know that there have been examples of changes in party affiliation by members of parliament in the past, in Poland/Czech Republic as in other countries. What do you think about this type of activity and behavior?

(Follow-up 1): What do you think about the effect of this kind of behavior on different political parties, Polish politics in general, the development of democracy, etc.?

(Follow-up 2): Why do you think these changes in affiliation take place?

61 See Appendix D for Polish and Czech translations, along with additional details. 68 Descriptions of the interview samples, as well as a structured analysis of conversations with MPs, are presented in Chapter 6.

3.5 Synthesis of the Mixed-Methodology

The following chapters present findings from the quantitative and qualitative methods described above in order to test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2 and reiterated above in

Table 3.1. Chapter 4 quantitatively tests the impact of social identity on the likelihood of group switching in Poland (1997-2011); Chapter 5 does the same for the Czech Republic (1992-

2013). Chapter 6 then uses interview responses from both cases to flesh out results from the statistical analyses with context and narrative, while providing evidence for the political and social motivations underlying the decision to act—and ultimately defect—with a group of colleagues.

69

Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis, Polish Sejm (1997-2011)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the quantitative analysis of the impact of attachment to shared social identities on the occurrence of group-based legislative party switching in the Polish

Sejm, across four parliamentary terms (1997-2011). The results provide robust evidence for the influence of collective political ambition, measured through attachment to shared social identities, on the incidence of group switching over time. However, there is little evidence in the Polish case for the impact of cross-cutting partisan/nonpartisan identities on individual political ambition that also influences the decision to defect.

I present analyses and findings for variables of interest following the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. After providing some relevant historical background on the development of the Polish party system since the transition to democracy, I revisit and present descriptive statistics for the primary variables of interest (as introduced in Chapter 3). The first set of statistical models then test the relationship between collective ambition (measured through attachment to shared social identities) and group switching, controlling for individual ambition and ideology (referring to Hypotheses 1 and 2). The next section introduces the interaction terms used to determine the extent to which cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities have a moderation effect on individual political ambition that influence the likelihood

70 of group switching in the full models (referring to Hypotheses 3 and 4). The chapter concludes with an overall synthesis of the results and an assessment of the hypotheses.

4.2 Case Study: Poland since Transition

Since the collapse of Communism nearly thirty years ago, Poland’s democracy remains

‘quasi-institutionalized’ at best (Gwiazda 2009) and the party system remains fluid (Markowski

2008; Millard 2009; Zieliński et al. 2005). The regularity of a large number of interparty defections over time, as shown in Table 4.1 below, suggests that party labels and organizations remain weak. In the Polish case, as in many new democracies, political parties lack robust pluralist traditions and the party system has historically developed as a ‘top-down’ or ‘cartel’ system (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Van Biezen 2005; Zuba 2012).62 Since democratization, parties have often been defined by individual personalities, reputations, and personal relationships, rather than by ideologies or policy programs (Nalewajko 1992).

Notably, the majority of party switches are group-based and not individual events. This might not be unexpected. As parties and platforms developed along with efforts to differentiate from one another, many large defection events corresponded with the formation or collapse of different parties, along with splits and mergers (cf. Kreuzer and Pettai 2003, 2009). For example, the two major parties on the right in Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform

(PO), are products of this evolution, with origins traceable to the first Kadencja from 1991-

62 See also Katz and Mair (1995; 1996) on the definition of cartel parties (vis-à-vis the notion of cartel party systems). While the Polish party system may be one composed instead of ‘cadre’ parties in the Duvergerian sense (1951; see also Koole 1996), Katz and Mair’s definition of a ‘cartel party’ emphasizes the separation of the party (and by extension the state) from society that resembles a top-down structure of political influence in society with elite-oriented parties and party system. 71 1993. The Communist successor party Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) endured a number of major splits and mergers following scandals and leadership disputes in the fourth

Kadencja (2001-2005) alone—explaining in part the much greater number of defections in that period compared to others.

Table 4.1. Frequency of individual and group-based legislative party switching in Poland (1997-2011) by parliamentary term. Parliamentary term Individual Group switches Total switches No. MPs switched switches III (1997-2001) 32 (21.48) 117 (78.52) 149 93 (19.29) IV (2001-2005) 77 (15.78) 411 (84.22) 488 177 (23.93) V (2005-2007) 22 (22.22) 77 (77.78) 99 37 (7.74) VI (2007-2011) 34 (20.00) 136 (80.00) 170 90 (17.31) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of the type of switch (individual + group = 100%); No. MPs switched parentheses figures are percentages of total number of MPs per term—the Polish Sejm has 460 deputies, but the total number that serve in any given term my exceed these numbers due to mid-term mandate terminations and the swearing in of new deputies. These figures drawn from Table 1.1 presented in Chapter 1.

Over time, these sorts of major shifts have declined, in what some have argued is evidence of a gradual institutionalization of the party system (Casal Bértoa 2014)—yet the incidence of party switching, especially group-based defections, has persisted. MPs continue to move between existing parties together in groups. For example, between 2005-2007, MPs B.

Kowalski, G. Masłowska, and A. Sobecka switched together five times, leaving the coalition partner League of Polish Families (LPR) and jumping between marginal groups (forming their own new political party for a short while) before settling in PiS in time for the 2007 snap elections, which saw the reins of power move from PiS and LPR to the opposition PO. Across examples like this one, many of these group-based defections appeared to ignore the

72 instrumental incentives of maintaining access to the perks of office associated with membership in a governing party.

Why are Polish MPs making decisions to jump from one party to another in a prima facie rejection of their political ambition? Part of the answer, I argue, is the nature of defection as an often group-based event. MPs refer to non-partisan cues, such as shared social identities, in order to determine with whom they switch. The importance of social identities, as defined by nonpartisan factors such as shared biographies and other ascriptive characteristics, for group- based switching is evidence for how MPs are able to achieve political ambition collectively as a means to their own individual goals, as a more effective alternative than pursuing them alone.

4.3 Descriptive Statistics

Based on the patterns of legislative party switching in Poland shown above, Table 4.2 below shows the variation in the dependent variable in the Sejm over time. Notably, I present two sets of frequencies. The first is the proportion of observed defections that are group-based

(% Total Switches), which matches data presented in Table 4.1. Because of the structure of the data, the proportion of total observations in which a group switch occurs is much lower (%

Total Obs.). As explained in Chapter 3, this is because new observations are recorded after every change in government position and committee assignments; that is, an individual MP may have multiple observations in a given parliamentary term even if they do not switch parties

73 in order to account for these status changes. Furthermore, some changes in party structure (such as a name change or organizational restructuring) are also treated as non-switches.63

Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics: frequency of group switching in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland over time, 1997-2011. III Kadencja IV Kadencja V Kadencja VI Kadencja Total Group switching (1997-2001) (2001-2005) (2005-2007) (2007-2011) (1997-2011) N 117 411 77 136 741 % Total Switches 78.52 84.22 77.78 80.00 84.79 Total Obs. 1,542 2,228 1,646 1,979 7,395

Clearly, the greatest number of group switches took place in the IV Kadencja (2001-

2005), in which the governing SLD underwent a number of schisms and mergers following political scandals and personality conflicts as it “moved rapidly into self-destruct mode”

(Millard 2009: 784). The junior coalition partner throughout most of this period, the Polish

People’s Party (PSL) also experimented with a merger with the an agrarian populist party at the time, the Polish People’s Bloc (PBL), with which they would eventually split before the end of the term.64

Next, Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics for MPs’ attachment to identities, measured through their roll-call voting loyalty, which provide a proximate assessment for MPs’ pursuit of collective ambition. The mean values for all identities paint a picture of stability, especially party loyalty, which indicate that MPs on average voted along party lines 95% of the time over the entire 14-year period covered by the data. Alone, this raises an important question: if parties

63 For example, if a political party grew in membership to over 15 MPs after individual or group switches, the original members of the party prior to the change are not counted as having switched as a group. 64 The core of the PBL would eventually go on to form Self Defense (Samoobrona), which would compete and become a coalition partner in the V Kadencja (2005-2007). 74 Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics: attachment to shared social identities in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland over time, 1997-2011. III Kadencja (1997- IV Kadencja V Kadencja VI Kadencja Total 2001) (2001-2005) (2005-2007) (2007-2011) (1997-2011) A. Party Mean 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.95 Std. Dev. 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.09 N 1,537 2,081 1,579 1,873 7,070 B. Gender Mean 0.58 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.60 Std. Dev. 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.35 N 1,537 2,081 1,579 1,873 7,070 C. Level of education Mean 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.58 0.61 Std. Dev. 0.24 0.34 0.25 0.42 0.33 N 1,537 2,081 1,579 1,873 7,070 D. Social class Mean 0.59 0.66 0.62 0.57 0.61 Std. Dev. 0.27 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.33 N 1,537 2,081 1,579 1,873 7,070 E. Region Mean 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.60 Std. Dev. 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.32 N 1,537 2,081 1,579 1,873 7,070 F. Political history Mean 0.86 0.84 0.68 0.65 0.78 Std. Dev. 0.17 0.23 0.37 0.32 0.29 N 1,013 1,393 775 757 3,938 G. Standing committee Mean 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.53 0.58 Std. Dev. 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.30 N 987 1,556 1,024 1,313 4,880

are organizationally weak and ideologically indistinct, then why is party loyalty so strong in

Poland? Relatedly, why does defection occur so often? The first impression is that attachment to partisan identities is primary. However, MPs’ average attachments to other identities in

Table 4.3 are also strong. Put another way, attachment to nonpartisan identities, representing alternative groups through which MPs may achieve their goals, indicates that party loyalty may be superficial. Furthermore, we may draw a clue from Heller and Mershon’s (2005) study of the Italian case as well: loyalty and discipline are high because dissenters are, in one way or

75 another, pushed out of political parties. Thus, stronger attachments to nonpartisan identities should have an effect on the incidence of group-based party switching as these provide proximate evidence for pursuit of collective ambition, through which group defection is one means (Hypothesis 1 restated). The nature of the effect on the likelihood of group switching depends on the identity—attachment to identities that align with party labels (ergo collective ambitions between group and party ‘line up’) will reduce the likelihood of defection, whereas those that cross-cut party lines will increase the likelihood (Hypothesis 2 restated).

The strongest levels of nonpartisan loyalty are found among groups defined by shared political history, which have had a legacy-effect on party system development in Poland

(Kitschelt et al. 1999; Migalski 2008; Shabad and Słomczyński 2002). Though MPs sharing pre-democracy associations voted together an average of 78% of the time, the influence of this factor decreases somewhat over time (while the standard deviation increases). This is in part explained by realignments of the party system after the 2005 and 2007 elections. While parties of the left saw a dramatic reduction in the number of seats held in parliament, former members of Solidarność and similar anti-Communist movements became split among parties of the right.

The number of younger MPs who did not share these legacies also rose over time.

The average group loyalties between MPs sharing Gender, Level of education, Social class, and Region identities, as well as co-membership in Standing committees all hover around scores of 0.6, meaning that these other identities are not as impactful as political history.

According to Hypothesis 2, because the legacy of political history, education, and social class have been influential and salient in Polish political discourse and have influenced party system development (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Migalski 2008), attachment to these identities should reduce the likelihood of group switching, as the collective goals of these groups and political

76 parties should align.65 Conversely, regional and committee representation is spread across party lines, and thus attachment to these identities should increase the likelihood of group-based defection, as MPs for whom these identities matter may look more to these nonpartisan groups to achieve their goals than to their political parties.

Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics: observations in which party and social identities cross-cut in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011. Party and social III Kadencja IV Kadencja V Kadencja VI Kadencja Total identities (1997-2001) (2001-2005) (2005-2007) (2007-2011) (1997-2011) 61 76 47 84 268 Cross-cutting (3.96) (3.41) (2.86) (4.24) (3.62) 96 101 57 95 349 Cross-cutting* (6.23) (4.53) (3.46) (4.80) (4.72) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total observations; * variable includes identification with standing committees.

If attachment to nonpartisan identities that cross-cut party labels increases the likelihood of group switching, to what extent do MPs’ loyalties and their pursuit of collective ambition through these other groups trump party loyalty? Put another way, to what extent do MPs’ party and nonpartisan loyalties significantly cross-cut, such that they tend to be strongly loyal to a nonpartisan group but not to the party? Table 4.4 presents the number of observations in which

MPs’ loyalties cross-cut as such according to the measure described in Chapter 3.66 The measures are presented in two groups, whether MPs were members of standing committees or

65 Notable examples of class and education-based party memberships include farmers with the PSL and low- educated skilled/unskilled labor with Samoobrona. 66 As discussed in a footnote in Chapter 3, measuring alignment in Poland produced nonexistent results, as it was not possible for MPs to be more than one standard deviation above mean party loyalty scores. 77 not, as individuals holding higher government office do not have committee assignments

(measures accounting for those in committees are marked with an asterisk).

Figure 4.1. Predicted probabilities of group switching when social and party identities cross-cut, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2001.

III Kadencja (1997-2001)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut IV Kadencja (2001-2005)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut V Kadencja (2005-2007)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut VI Kadencja (2007-2011)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut

0 .2 .4 Pr(Group Switch)

Note: Estimates are the predicted probabilities derived from simple logistic regressions of the incidence of group switching on having cross-cutting identities.

A preliminary analysis of the effects of having cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities (shown in Figure 4.1 above) reveals that, on its own, this factor consistently increases

78 the predicted probability of group defection over time. This is in line with Hypothesis 2, which posits that MPs with attachment to identities that cross-cut with party labels will be more likely to defect as part of a group. In correspondence with Hypotheses 3 and 4, having cross-cutting ties to nonpartisan and partisan group identities may also have a moderation effect on the influence of individual ambition on the likelihood of group switching—this will be tested by interacting the cross-cutting identities dummy variable with each of the individual ambition control variables.

4.4 Analysis of the Patterns of Group-Based Party Switching in Poland (1997-2011)

I assess the relationship between attachment to social identity—as a proxy for collective ambition—and the likelihood of group-based party switching over time, using mixed effects generalized linear modeling techniques as described in Chapter 3. Setting parliamentary terms as the random intercept component controls for possible differences in structural or behavioral dynamics between each of the four Kadencja analyzed (1997-2001, 2001-2005, 2005-2007, and

2007-2011). I run the model over several specifications. These allow for progressive tests of each of the four Hypotheses, and differ in terms of whether individual MPs hold membership in standing committees, which constrain the number of observations analyzed compared to analyses of all MPs in the data.67

The first two specifications test the effect of individual political ambition and ideology

(the control variables) on the likelihood of group-based party switching. Specification I

67 Note that not all MPs are members of committee, particularly those who hold special office such as being a (Vice)Marshal (speaker) of the Sejm or a minister in government. 79 provides a test for all MPs and observations, whereas Specification II tests the effects only among backbench MPs in standing committees. As such, the former features government positions and the latter ranking committee positions.

Next, Specifications III and IV examine the direct effect of collective political ambition, measured using attachment to partisan and nonpartisan identities as a behavioral proxy through roll-call vote loyalties, on group-based party switching. Specification IV specifically accounts for MPs with committee memberships (as in Specification II). These offer tests of Hypothesis

1, that social identities have an influence on group defection, and Hypothesis 2, that identities that align with party labels reduce the likelihood of switching, and identities that cross-cut party labels increase it. Based on the nature of the Polish party system and salient political cleavages

(see Kitschelt et al. 1999; Migalski 2008; as well as variable descriptions in Chapter 3), attachment to Level of education, Social class, and Political history should reduce the likelihood of switching, whereas Region and Committee should increase it.68 When listing variables, I designate the collective pursuit of ambition among MPs sharing gender as Gender

(SID)69 to differentiate attachment to this identity from the effects of gender on individual political ambition (as listed in the individual ambition control variables).

Finally, Specifications V and VI include interaction terms between the dummy variable indicating cross-cutting identities and the individual political ambition control variables to test the extent to which the effect of individual ambition on group-based defection is moderated. As in Specifications II and IV, Specification VI constrains the analyzed pool of observations by

68 I am hesitant to posit any predictions for the effect of attachment to Gender. Beyond several key policy issues in parliament (cf. Gwiazda 2015; Kunovich 2012), it is unclear to me what effect this identity would have and why, beyond arguments and past research that shows that women display reduced levels of ambition (e.g., Costantini 1990; Fox and Lawless 2010). 69 SID is short for ‘shared identity.’ 80 analyzing MPs in standing committees. These specifications test Hypothesis 3, that identities moderate the influence of individual political ambition on defection, and Hypothesis 4, that having cross-cutting identities strengthens the influence of individual ambition on the decision to defect as part of a group.

Across all specifications, the selection of party families, which control for ideology, are based on those featured in the Polish party system. Party families with few observations are included in the referent Mixed family category. A breakdown of observations by party families over time and the modified classification used in the Polish analyses is found in Appendix E.

4.4.1 Analysis of the Direct Influence of Shared Social Identities on Group-Based Party

Switching

Table 4.5 shows the results from GLM logistic regressions of the incidence of group switching on individual political ambition and ideology (Specifications I and II) and then on attachment to shared social identities (Specifications III and IV). The superiority of this modeling technique is demonstrated by the significance of the test statistics. Adding more covariates to the model (the indicators for collective ambition) improves the fit, shown by the significant and decreasing values of the Wald χ2 statistics; significant ͞χ2 statistics indicate the superiority of using the mixed effects models compared to a pooled, fixed-effect logistic regression (using a likelihood ratio test).

The first two specifications establish control models to explore the influence of individual self-interest on group-based defections. When looking at the impact of political ambition alone, there is little discernible effect on the likelihood of group switching, whether

81 Table 4.5. Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011. Independent Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV variables β SE β SE β SE β SE Individual Ambition Governing party -0.22 0.11** -0.08 0.11 0.42 0.19** 0.49 0.20** Gov’t position -0.09 0.16 — — 0.32 0.21 — — Committee position — — 0.21 0.11** — — 0.29 0.14** Log pref. votes -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.09 List position 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01*** 0.05 0.01*** Past MP 0.15 0.09* 0.12 0.10 0.28 0.13** 0.21 0.14 Age -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01** -0.02 0.01** Gender -0.04 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.34 0.19* -0.37 0.20* Collective Ambition (Identities) Party — — — — 0.31 0.58 -0.29 0.67 Gender (SID) — — — — 0.07 0.42 -1.56 0.65** Level of education — — — — -1.04 0.38*** -1.19 0.43*** Social class — — — — -0.59 0.34* -0.81 0.38** Region — — — — 0.62 0.30** 0.42 0.35 Political history — — — — -0.90 0.25*** -0.83 0.28*** Committee — — — — — — 2.64 0.72*** Ideology† Social Democrats -2.19 0.14*** -2.06 0.14*** -2.29 0.24*** -1.95 0.26*** Liberals -4.41 0.28*** -4.17 0.29*** -4.58 0.44*** -3.90 0.45*** Christian Democrats -1.49 0.20*** -1.49 0.21*** -1.77 0.32*** -1.54 0.33*** Conservatives -3.35 0.19*** -3.17 0.20*** -3.61 0.34*** -2.99 0.35*** Far right -1.81 0.19*** -1.64 0.20*** -1.66 0.31*** -1.19 0.32*** Agrarian -1.95 0.15*** -1.78 0.16*** -1.97 0.25*** -1.55 0.27***

Constant 0.56 0.69 0.52 0.74 1.86 0.98* 1.69 1.08 Random effects‡ Parliamentary term 0.26 (0.69) 0.22 (0.17) 0.21 (0.16) 0.15 (0.12) Observations 7,395 5,075 3,938 2,676 Log likelihood -1938.49 -1661.76 -1095.423 -923.98 Wald χ2 601.58*** 468.11*** 294.77*** 234.35*** LR-Test χ͞ 2 119.33*** 91.81*** 45.02*** 27.66*** AIC 3906.98 3353.52 2232.85 1891.95 BIC 4010.61 3451.50 2364.69 2021.58 Note: Coefficients are multilevel binomial GLM estimates; unit of analysis is MPs; † referent category is Mixed party family; ‡ figures in parentheses are the variance of random intercepts; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

applied to all MPs (Specification I) or only those with standing committee assignments

(Specification II). In general, being a member of Governing party tends, as expected, to reduce the likelihood of defection. Having experience as a Past MP also increases the likelihood of

82 group switching, albeit weakly (at p < 0.1); nevertheless, this suggests that MPs with more experience might ‘know the rules of the game’ better than their novice peers, and so find that switching as part of a group is an effective means of achieving their political goals. When looking only at MPs in committees (Specification II), only holding a committee officer position significantly increases the likelihood of group switching. This may seem counterintuitive if holding a more prestigious office should deter defection, but committee officers are not selected by their parties. Rather, they achieve these positions based on support from committee members across party lines, and so may use this cross-cutting support to justify the decision to defect with support of others in the committee to pursue policy related to the committee specialization in the legislature.

Overall, the findings from Specifications I and II suggest that individual political ambition alone is not a very effective predictor of group-based party switching, which therefore must take place for other reasons. This is revealed in the results for Specifications III and IV, which take account of MPs’ attachments to shared identities as a proxy for the influence of collective or shared political ambition. When these covariates are included in the model, individual ambition plays a more significant role in determining whether to switch parties with a group. Having a lower electoral List position increases the likelihood of defection, as does past experience, again following conventional wisdom. Older MPs and women are also less likely to defect with a group. When accounting only for MPs in committees (Specification IV), past experience is no longer significant, but the effects for the other indicators are about the same.

Interestingly, the signs for being a member of a Governing party change, in that this makes group defection more likely. This in particular goes against individual rationality, as it

83 implies that MPs forego the perks of office and agenda setting as a member of the government in favor of switching with a group. Instead, when accounting for the achievement of ambition collectively through groups other than their political parties, these MPs may leverage their positions or experience in a governing party to pursue their own ambitions elsewhere.

Furthermore, if they switch with a group, they may find it easier to regain the privileges of agenda-setting and higher office in the next elections. In the Polish case in particular, there have been many cases over time in which large-scale defections occurred towards the end of parliamentary terms in anticipation of coming elections, perhaps as a means of escaping accountability for scandal or poor governance.70

The findings for the effects of collective ambition are strong, as measured by attachment to social identities by way of roll-call votes, providing support for both Hypotheses

1 and 2. These estimates indicate the impact on the likelihood of defection if an MP is 100% loyal to the given identity. When accounting for all MPs (Specification III), Level of education,

Social class, Region, and Political history all significantly influence the likelihood of group- based party switching. When accounting for MPs in standing committees (Specification IV), however, Region no longer had a strong impact, but Gender (SID) and Committee membership did. When omitting those MPs not in committees, regional attachments may take a backseat if individuals’ ambitions are best fulfilled through association with committee co-members, including shared ambitions between members of the same sex.71 The conspicuous finding that

Party has no significant effect on group-based defection at all raises questions given that

70 Along with the examples described earlier in this chapter about splits in the ex-Communist SLD, the Law and Justice (PiS) party experienced a split towards the end of the V Kadencja (2005-2007) when about 30 MPs left to form Poland is Most Important (PJN), although this party would not survive the 2007 elections. 71 As noted in Chapter 3, however, I did not come into this study with a firm prediction for the nature of the influence of association with other individuals of the same gender. The significance of pursuing shared ambitions with others of the same sex on the likelihood of defection merits future research. 84 average party loyalty among Polish MPs is quite high, as shown in Table 4.3. Despite strong levels of unity and discipline over time in Poland, or perhaps because of this, being loyal or disloyal to one’s party is not a useful predictor of defection. Rather, this finding suggests that partisanship, as a means of achieving ambition as part of a group, is either superficial—as an artifact of MPs’ internalization of electoral democraticness and loyalty—or secondary to association with other alternative groups through which MPs may more effectively pursue policy-based ambitions.72

The results in Table 4.5 also support Hypothesis 2, that attachment to identities that traditionally coincided with party labels would reduce the likelihood of group switching and attachment to identities that cross-cut party lines would increase the likelihood. As expected, based on the context of the Polish party system, education, class, and history all reduce the likelihood of defection. Indeed, many political parties over time were effective in capturing these identities from the outset of the democratic transition (e.g., most former Communists found themselves in parties on the left, while most former anti-Communists found themselves on the right) as well as by platform and design (e.g., agrarian parties, populist workers’ parties, etc.). Conversely, strong attachment to nonpartisan Region and Committee identities increase the likelihood of defection, as these identities cross-cut party lines. The effect of attachment to shared identities based on Committee is also very strong, indicating the importance of shared experiences and the common identity attachments that develop as a result.

Finally, the finding for attachment to shared Gender (SID) identity is a curious one.

While I had no expectations of any effect for this predictor, the fact that it has a strong

72 Heller and Mershon (2005) explain that party discipline (in the Italian case) can be very high not necessarily because memberships are intrinsically loyal, but rather because dissenters either left or were expelled from the ranks. To some degree, this is also the case in Poland. 85 significant effect of reducing the likelihood of group switching among MPs with committee assignments suggests a possible relationship between the two factors. Unlike the Gender dummy variable that indicates the effect of an MP’s gender on political ambition, Gender (SID) does not differentiate between men and women, per se; this variable’s finding only implies that

‘men who stick together’ and ‘women who stick together’ are less likely to defect as a group. It may be that, in the closer quarters of committee debates and votes73, gender may be a more obvious identity around which colleagues may associate as opposed to regional origin or other personal characteristics that cannot be determined prima facie. Furthermore, the ambitions shared by men and women, respectively, may not lead to a need to switch parties as a group.

Otherwise, Poland does not have a history of gender-salient parties; at best, parties on the left

(namely SLD and its offshoots) would champion women’s issues from time to time (cf.

Kunovich 2012).74

A closer look at the impact of attachment to shared social identities on the likelihood of group switching reveals the nature of this relationship and speaks to the meaningfulness of identity as a heuristic used by MPs to achieve their goals together with others. Figure 4.2 shows the estimated marginal effects of different levels of attachment, based on the roll-call vote loyalty scores, on the likelihood of group-based defection. In the case of those identities that had a statistically significant impact on group defection, none cross the zero line—identities around MPs’ Level of education, Social class, Region, Political history, and Committees have a significant and consistent impact in either influencing the likelihood to defect (positive marginal predictive effects) or deterring it (negative marginal predictive effects). The near-flat

73 Noting also that MPs spend a large amount of their time in committee compared to plenary or even caucus (Kubuj 2013). 74 While this indicator does not play a traditional role in defining the Polish party system, it is something worth exploring in future research, especially given its statistically significant effect here. 86 linear relationships at all levels of attachment to these identities, in other words, suggest that

MPs look to, or are cognizant of, the opportunities to achieve political ambition through groups that define themselves according to these labels.

Figure 4.2. Marginal effects of attachment to social and party identities on probability of group switching, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011.

Gender Level of education Social class Region .1 .1 .1 .1 0 0 0 0 -.1 -.1 -.1 -.1 -.2 -.2 -.2 -.2

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

Political history Committees Party .8 .8 .8 .6 .6 .6 .4 .4 .4 .2 .2 .2 0 0 0 -.2 -.2 -.2 Marginal effects on probability of group switching 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

Identity attachment score

Note: Marginal effects estimates for Gender, Level of education, Social class, Region, Political history, and Party are based on an analysis of all MPs (Table 4.5, Specification III); marginal effects estimates for Committees account only for MPs holding committee assignments (Table 4.5, Specification IV).

Following the results presented in Table 4.5, the predictive effects of Level of education, Social class, and Political history tend to reduce the likelihood of defection at all levels of attachment to this identity, whereas attachment to Region and Committees increases

87 this likelihood. Unlike the other identities, attachment to Committees has the only noticeably non-linear relationship between strength of attachment and the likelihood of defection, in that the impact of this predictor on that likelihood increases dramatically the more loyal to this group MPs are. Given the importance of and time spent in committees75, this finding shows the impact of common identity association\ on legislative behavior such as party switching. The most obvious common ambition shared among committee co-members is likely policy seeking due to committee specialization, and thus MPs will be far more likely to follow their committee co-members rather than their copartisans when it comes to policy aims, especially when they consider their committee memberships more meaningful.

Finally, it is worth noting that in all analyses, controlling for ideology did not have a notable or distinct effect—all indicators were statistically significant and negative. This does not come as a surprise, as the Mixed family was the referent category, and MPs in this group

(mostly independents) were more likely to switch (individually or as part of a group) than anyone with any party affiliation. The magnitudes of the effects otherwise reflect historical trends in party switching in Poland—Because the parties on the left endured major defections and splits in the IV Kadencja (2001-2005), the parties of the right were comparatively less likely to endure group switching over the entire 1997-2011 period. However, outside of IV

Kadencja, left-leaning/ex-Communist parties’ MPs typically did not endure as many defections as their right-leaning/post-Solidarność counterparts.

75 See for example Kubuj (2013) in the Polish context. 88 4.4.2 Analysis of the Moderating Effect of Cross-Cutting Identities on Political Ambition

and the Incidence of Group-Based Party Switching

In Table 4.6 below, I add the interaction terms between having cross-cutting identities and predictors of individual political ambition to the Generalized Linear Model in order to reveal the extent to which having cross-cutting ties moderate the influence of individual ambition on the decision to switch political parties as part of a group. The results test

Hypothesis 3, that having cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities moderates the influence of individual political ambitions in the decision to switch as a group, and Hypothesis

4, that having cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities strengthens the impact of political ambition. Specification V analyses all MPs, while Specification VI only accounts for

MPs who were members of standing committees.

With the addition of the interaction terms, the statistical findings for the effects of individual and collective ambition on the likelihood of group-based defection remain generally unchanged. The null findings for the interaction terms, on the other hand, have several implications for the theory of the group-basis of legislative party switching. These results do not support either Hypothesis 3 or Hypothesis 4, whether analyzing all MPs (Specification V) or only those with committee assignments (Specification VI).

First, the lower order dummy variable for Cross-cutting ties was not statistically significant. This indicates that while the prospect of achieving ambition collectively as part of a group has an effect on the likelihood of defection (as per Hypothesis 1), it does not matter whether the collective ambition of nonpartisan groups align or cross-cut with the collective ambition of party groups, per se. This may paint MPs as opportunistic in terms of selecting

89 Table 4.6. Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, accounting for the interaction between cross-cutting identities and individual ambition, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011. Specification V Specification VI Independent variables β SE β SE Individual Ambition Governing party 0.44 0.19** 0.47 0.20** Gov’t position 0.32 0.21 — — Committee position — — 0.29 0.14** Log pref. votes -0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.09 List position 0.04 0.01*** 0.05 0.01*** Past MP 0.27 0.13** 0.20 0.14 Age -0.02 0.01** -0.02 0.01** Gender -0.34 0.19 -0.36 0.20* Collective Ambition (Identities) Party 0.44 0.19 -0.30 0.67 Gender (SID) 0.03 0.42 -1.55 0.66** Level of education -1.05 0.38*** -1.16 0.43*** Social class -0.58 0.34* -0.79 0.38** Region 0.66 0.67** 0.42 0.35 Political history -0.92 0.25*** -0.81 0.29*** Committee — — 2.61 0.72*** Interactions (Cross-cutting Identities × Ambition) Cross-cutting 7.60 8.52 6.30 8.71 × Governing party — —§ 0.84 1.50 × Gov’t position — —§ — — × Committee position — — 0.68 1.52 × Log pref. votes -0.43 0.70 -0.56 0.70 × List position 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.09 × Past MP 0.88 1.36 0.30 1.16 × Age -0.09 0.09 -0.03 0.09 × Gender — —§ — —§ Ideology† Social Democrats -2.26 0.24*** -1.97 0.26*** Liberals -4.56 0.44*** -3.90 0.45*** Christian Democrats -1.75 0.32*** -1.55 0.34*** Conservatives -3.58 0.34*** -2.98 0.35*** Far right -1.62 0.31*** -1.19 0.32*** Agrarian -1.93 0.25*** -1.55 0.27***

Constant 1.88 0.99* 1.51 1.09 Random effects‡ Parliamentary term 0.21 (0.16) 0.15 (0.12) Observations 3,925 2,675 Log likelihood -1091.953 -923.08 Wald χ2 297.05*** 235.44** LR-Test χ͞ 2 43.92*** 27.21*** AIC 2235.91 1904.17 BIC 2399.06 2075.03 Note: Coefficients are multilevel binomial GLM estimates; unit of analysis is MPs; † referent category is Mixed party family; ‡ figures in parentheses are variance of random intercepts; § variable omitted due to collinearity; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

90 which group is more salient or that they consider more valuable/useful for the achievement of their own ambition. However, it also suggests that the value of pursuing ambition collectively with a party is independent of the value of doing so with a nonpartisan group—these identities do not necessarily have to conflict with one another as mutually exclusive options. Instead, these identities may overlap, or they may not, and MPs choose which groups with whom they may most effectively achieve their goals—and whether these identities overlap with party labels or not will impact the likelihood that they may or may not opt to switch parties, as posited in Hypothesis 2.

Next, the interaction terms indicate whether the influence of individual political ambition on the decision to switch parties as part of a group is in some way conditioned by

MPs having cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan ties. As with the Cross-cutting lower order term, none of the interaction terms are statistically significant. In some cases, interaction terms are collinear and thus omitted from the results. Among all MPs (Specification V), the influence of having cross-cutting identities on Governing Party and holding a Government position was no different than accounting for these proxies for office-seeking ambition on their own (the lower order terms). For both specifications, the interaction with Gender was also collinear with the corresponding lower order term as well. The null findings for the interaction terms indicate that having cross-cutting identities does not condition or moderate the impact of individual political ambitions, and so both Hypothesis 3 and 4 must be rejected. The answer as to why this is the case lies in the relationship between individual political ambition and group identities, which provide a means to determine with whom to pursue ambition collectively—substantiated by clues from the results presented in Table 4.5 in the previous section.

91 Taken on its own, the pursuit of individual political ambition does little to predict whether MPs will switch parties as part of a group (Specifications I and II). However, when attachment to shared social identities is included in the statistical model (Specifications III and

IV), individual political ambition becomes an effective predictor of group-based defection.

First, these prior findings tell us that the pursuit of collective ambition is commensurate with the pursuit of individual ambition. That is, collective ambition among MPs is not so much the pursuit of political ambition on behalf of a group, but rather the pursuit of one’s own ambition as it happens to ‘match up’ with the ambition of other group members.

Figure 4.3. Marginal effects of political ambitions and moderation when social and party identities cross-cut on group switching, Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011.

Governing party

Governing party, cross-cutting identities

Committee officer

Committee officer, cross-cutting identities

Preferential votes

Preferential votes, cross-cutting identities

List position

List position, cross-cutting identities

Past MP

Past MP, cross-cutting identities

Age

Age, cross-cutting identities

-.2 0 .2 .4 Average marginal effects on likelihood of switching

Note: Government position and gender effects omitted due to collinearity of interacted terms, see Table 4.5; estimates drawn from Specification VI.

92 Second, the null and collinear findings should come to no surprise if the lower-order predictors and interaction terms (e.g., Gender and Cross-cutting × Gender) are measuring the same thing. In other words, there is no conditional effect of having cross-cutting identities on the influence of individual political ambition in the decision to switch political parties. A visualization of the marginal predictive effects of the interaction terms in Figure 4.3 above illustrates this finding—notwithstanding that the probabilities do not significantly differ from zero, the lower-order and interacted effects are not different from one another either.

The takeaway here is that the pursuits of collective and individual ambition are independent, but not exclusive of one another. Acting as part of a group is an alternative means to an end for policy, office, or vote-seekers—individual political ambition drives MPs’ decisions to defect as part of a group if one controls for attachment to the groups with which they identify. Thus, the first two hypotheses on the direct effect of attachment to shared social identities, as a proximate account of the impact of collective ambition, find further support in the results from Table 4.6, though Hypotheses 3 and 4 must be rejected.

4.5 Summary of the Results

Statistical analyses of the relationship between social identity and the occurrence of group-based party switching in Poland revealed mixed results, with important implications for a theoretical understanding of the group-based nature of legislative party switching. There is strong evidence for a direct influence of collective political ambition, measured through attachment to shared social identities, on group defection, but none for an interactive effect between having cross-cutting identities and the influence of individual ambition on the

93 likelihood of switching parties. That is, the results presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Collective ambition among shared identity groups has a direct effect on the likelihood of group switching (H1); subsequently, attachment to nonpartisan identities that overlap with party labels will reduce the likelihood of group defection, and attachment to nonpartisan identities that cross-cut party lines will increase the likelihood of group switching (H2). However, both Hypotheses 3 and 4 are rejected. The influence of individual ambition on the likelihood of group-based party switching is conditioned by having exclusive cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities (as per H3), nor does having such cross-cutting ties specifically increase the impact of individual ambition on the decision to defect with a group (as per H4).

Across all model specifications in which the primary independent variables of interest were included, results for the impact of collective ambition were almost always statistically significant, lending support to Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 is also supported consistently as attachment to identities that have traditionally aligned with specific party labels, namely level of education, social class, and pre-democratic civic/political backgrounds, consistently reduced the likelihood of group-based party switching, while attachment to identities that cross-cut party lines, such as MPs’ region of origin and standing committee membership, increased the likelihood of defection. Furthermore, the effects of collective ambition among groups defined by shared social identities are also consistent no matter MPs’ level of attachment to these identities.

Interestingly, party loyalty had no significant influence on the incidence of group defection. The high levels of party loyalty or discipline in Poland belies the notion that partisanship may be an artifact of MPs’ internalization of the face-value principles of

94 democraticness, accountability, and representation. Partisanship may appear to be superordinate to any other loyalty, but the results of the analyses in this chapter show otherwise. Once in office, MPs in new democracies like Poland, where parties are organizationally weak, look to other groups based on shared or common social identities, which represent alternative groups through which MPs may achieve their goals.

The significance of attachment to gender identities also deserves more research. When analyzing all MPs (Specifications III and V), this indicator was not statistically significant, but was both substantively and statistically significant when analysis is restricted to MPs with standing committee assignments (Specification IV and VI). It may be possible that gender identities become more important given shared experiences in committees, whether due to salient issues on the agenda or interpersonal dynamics in the room. As there have been no successful gender-based parties in Poland, it is unclear to me why this is the case otherwise, and why stronger attachment to gender identities would reduce the likelihood of group-based defection.

The null findings and collinearity of the interaction terms, which tested the extent to which having cross-cutting identities moderates the impact of individual ambition on group defection, mean that Hypotheses 3 and 4 must be rejected, but they also speak to the nature of the relationship between shared social identities among MPs, collective political ambition, and group-based party switching. These findings not only suggest that MPs refer to social identities that they share with others to determine with whom to defect, but that the collective or shared ambitions between members of these common identity groups are commensurate. That is, the pursuit of collective or individual ambition are independent, though not exclusive. Collective ambition is a manifestation of the common or shared individual political ambition among group

95 members, and acting as part of a group—in this case switching parties together—is an alternative means to MPs’ desire to advance their careers or enhance their own political influence.

In Chapter 5, I test these hypotheses among MPs in the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna between 1992 and 2013. Compared to Poland, there have been fewer party switches over time, and the proportion of those switches that are group-based is comparatively lower (although still a majority). However, based on the findings in Poland and the insights into the impact of identity and collective ambition on the incidence of group-based party switching, I anticipate similar results. That is, while the Czech political and differs somewhat from the Polish one in terms of a number of institutional rules and structures, these differences should not significantly affect the overall expectations of the impact of shared social identities on legislative party switching. After presenting the statistical analyses, Chapter 5 concludes with a comparative discussion on the findings from analyses of both countries’ MPs’ behavior.

Chapter 6 then follows with an elaboration of quantitative results and presents qualitative evidence for my theory of group-based defection with content from semi-structured interviews with Polish and Czech MPs in Chapter 6.

96

Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis, Czech Poslanecká sněmovna (1992-2013)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings among Czech MPs in the Poslanecká sněmovna across six parliamentary terms (1992-2013). As in the Polish case, MPs’ pursuit of collective ambition, as measured by their attachments to shared social identities, is shown to have a clear and consistent influence on their propensity to defect with a group of colleagues. Unlike the

Polish case, having strong attachments to nonpartisan identities that cross-cut with party labels does influence individual ambition, although only weakly. The caveat is that whether the pursuit of individual ambition on group switching is moderated depends on which MPs are analyzed. The inclusion of the measure of attachment to shared identities around MPs’ past political history restricts the sample of MPs substantially because few individuals were politically active prior to the transition to democracy. Significant results bear out instead when this predictor is omitted, to include all Czech MPs.

The chapter begins with a concentration on the Czech case, in which I provide some historical background on party switching in the country, followed by a presentation of descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. I then present the results from statistical tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the direct influence of collective ambition on group switching, followed by the findings from the full models that test Hypotheses 3 and 4 on

97 the moderation of the impact of individual ambition on the likelihood of group defection among

MPs with cross-cutting nonpartisan and partisan identities. I spend the remainder of the Chapter with a comparative discussion of the findings alongside the theoretical importance of major similarities and differences between the nature of group-based party switching in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the general theoretical implications of the quantitative analyses.

Overall, although the findings among Czech MPs are weaker than those among their Polish counterparts, it is clear that MPs’ decisions to defect as part of a group are influenced by the pursuit of collective ambition, which is accomplished in groups defined by shared social identities.

5.2 Case Study: Czech Republic since Transition

The Czech legislature had a rather different experience of group switching from the

Polish one. To illustrate the Czech experience in this respect, Table 5.1 shows the number of party switches over time in the Poslanecká sněmovna. In the first few years after the collapse of

Communism and the split with Slovakia on January 1, 1993, switching between Czech parties was as fluid as in the Polish case. However, the number of defections per term quickly reduced, giving the party system the appearance of relative stability and earning the country a reputation as a posterchild for Postcommunist democratic consolidation (Bakke and Sitter 2005; Deegan-

Krause and Haughton 2010; Linek and Mansfeldová 2007). However, with the introduction of new political parties in the 5. Volební období (VO) and the failure of the Christian Democratic

Union (KDU-ČSL) to enter parliament in the 6. VO, party switching has been on the rise again.

The number of defections has been relatively low compared to the consistency of this

98 phenomenon in Poland, but a rise in party switching in the last decade shows that Czech party system is more fragile than it appears (Bakke and Sitter 2013; Mansfeldová 2013).

Table 5.1. Frequency of individual and group-based legislative party switching in the Czech Republic (1992- 2013) by parliamentary term. Parliamentary term Individual Group switches Total switches No. MPs switches switched 1. (1992-1996) 55 (41.04) 79 (58.96) 134 66 (32.35) 2. (1996-1998) 7 (17.07) 34 (82.93) 41 38 (17.76) 3. (1998-2002) 2 (100.00) 0 (0.00) 2 2 (0.97) 4. (2002-2006) 3 (100.00) 0 (0.00) 3 2 (0.84) 5. (2006-2010) 8 (57.14) 6 (42.86) 14 14 (6.25) 6. (2010-2013) 11 (40.74) 16 (59.26) 27 23 (10.55) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of the type of switch (individual + group = 100%); No. MPs switched parentheses figures are percentages of total number of MPs per term—Czech Poslanecká sněmovna has 200 deputies, but the total number that serve in any given term my exceed these numbers due to mid-term mandate terminations and the swearing in of new deputies. These figured are taken from Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.

As in the Polish case, a large proportion of party switches, if not most, were group- based. Given the ‘cartel’ nature of the Czech party system (Jarmara 2013; Kitschelt et al. 1999;

Van Biezen 2005) and the almost complete lack of civil society traditions (Darden and

Grzymała-Busse 2006), Czech parties are defined in part by personalities and personal relationships.76 Partisan sorting and party splits/mergers/dissolutions/formations therefore explain some of the group defections in the early years following the democratic transition. The

Civic Democratic Party (ODS), in government from 1992 to 1997 and 2006 to 2013, is the survivor of the split of the original anti-Communist Civic Forum (OF) movement because of personal rivalries (see Kopecký 1995). Yet most group-based defections took place across

76 As in the Polish case, the Czech party system is elite-oriented in its power relationship with and separation from the mass public (Migalski 2008), which follows Katz and Mair’s definition (1995) and clarification (1996) of cartel parties. 99 existing parties. In the 1. VO, for example, MPs Z. Vlček and L. Nedorost were initially ejected from the far right-wing Republican Party (SPR-RSČ), then moved together from non-affiliated status to the regional Moravian and Silesian Movement for Autonomous Democracy (HSD-

SMS) before defecting again to parties across the aisle on the left before the end of 1995.

There were no group-based party switches and only a small number of individual switches during a period of relative stability from 1998-2006, during which the Social

Democratic party (ČSSD) was in government. This situation changed in the 5. VO when the new Czech Green Party (SZ) entered parliament with a handful of seats, and the KDU-ČSL split in late 2009, which saw the formation of the conservative TOP09 party. These events started a chain reaction of party system destabilization: the KDU-ČSL did not enter parliament in the following 2010 elections, whereas TOP09 and a new populist party, Public Affairs (VV), entered the parliament, drawing voters from the KDU-ČSL, ODS, and ČSSD. The number of total defections since 2006 was still low, but increased in number from the 5. to the 6. VO— and again, a substantial proportion of these defections were group-based events.77 Thus, significant findings in the statistical analysis of Czech MPs’ behavior over time that include the latter two VO will show that despite the low number of switches overall, the motivations that underlie group-defection are the same regardless of increasing or decreasing interparty mobility.

77 The dominance of the traditional parties of the left (ČSSD) and right (ODS) has declined since the period analyzed in this dissertation (after 2013), and the Czech party system has changed dramatically. The populist Dawn—National Coalition (Úsvit) and Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO) won seats in 2013 and support for ODS declined dramatically. During the 7. VO (2013-2017), Úsvit split and a number of MPs switched parties between ODS, TOP09, and ANO. As of the onset of the 8.VO (2017-present), ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, and KSČM— traditional Czech parties—have been relegated to the margins. Instead, ANO increased its number of seats in the Poslanecká sněmovna, and the new populist Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and protest-populist Czech Pirate Party (Piratí) gained a large number of seats. 100 The large proportion of defections that are group-based suggests that Czech MPs are opting to do so in order to achieve their individual political ambition collectively and thus more effectively, than by acting alone. While the patterns of party switching differ between Poland and the Czech Republic, I argue that the underlying dynamics are the same: MPs are referring to shared social identities as cues to determine whether to defect with a group of colleagues, as an alternative means to the individual pursuit of desired political goals. In other words, switching with a group of colleagues, as opposed to switching alone, is intended to achieve individual goals such as winning votes and enacting policy more effectively by pursuing them in collaboration with others.

5.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table 5.2 below shows the variation on the group-switching variable in the Poslanecká sněmovna over time. Group switching comprises a large proportion of defections in the Czech

Republic, especially in the 1. VO (1992-1996). There were only a small handful of defections that occurred between 1998 and 2006, none of which were group-based; as a result, these terms are not included for analysis. However, party switching has been on the rise since 2006 (as of the 5. VO), and a large proportion of those switches were group-based.

Next, Table 5.3 presents the average attachments to shared social identities, which is used to measure the influence of collective ambition on MPs’ decision to switch with a group, by parliamentary term and over time. First, party loyalty in the Czech Republic is not very much higher than attachments to nonpartisan social identities. The high standard deviations indicate substantial variation in this indicator. In the Czech case, this is in part an artifact of

101 Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics: frequency of group switching in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic over time, 1992-2013. 1.VO 2.VO 5.VO 6.VO Total Group switching (1992-1996) (1996-1998) (2006-2010) (2010-2013) (1992-2013) N 79 34 6 16 135 % Total Switches 58.96 82.93 42.86 59.26 61.09 Total Obs. 427 555 701 801 2,484 Note: 3. and 4. VO are omitted as no group switches took place.

Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics: attachment to shared social identities in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. 1.VO (1992-1996) 2.VO (1996-1998) 5.VO (2006-2010) 6.VO (2010-2013) Total (1992-2013) A. Party Mean 0.51 0.69 0.67 0.60 0.62 SD 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.23 N 344 338 656 762 2100 B. Gender Mean 0.33 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.43 SD 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.22 N 344 338 656 762 2100 C. Level of education Mean 0.35 0.49 0.43 0.41 0.42 SD 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.24 N 344 338 656 762 2100 D. Social class Mean 0.34 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.42 SD 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.24 N 344 338 656 762 2100 E. Region Mean 0.33 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.40 SD 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.21 N 344 338 656 762 2100 F. Political history Mean 0.48 0.58 0.61 0.56 0.56 SD 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 N 191 167 215 166 739 G. Standing committee Mean 0.34 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.39 SD 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.19 N 327 266 200 497 1490 Note: 3. and 4. VO are omitted as no group switches took place.

102 parties’ (and party leaders’) vote-cohesion strategies: if enough parties are generally going to side together on an issue up for a vote, enforcing the party line may not be necessary, which avoids the risk of pushing dissenting MPs out of the party (Linek and Rakušanová 2005).

However, low party loyalty (compared to Poland), may indicate a different perception of the primacy of party labels in guiding MPs’ decisions. By comparison, attachments to nonpartisan identities are not much lower than party loyalty, and so MPs may be ‘more free’ to pursue their ambitions collectively through alternative groups at the expense of their party affiliations.

Attachments to nonpartisan social identities are much closer to party loyalty.

Interestingly, attachment to shared Political histories is the strongest among nonpartisan identities, despite research showing that this identity was underdeveloped in the Czech

Republic compared to its neighbors (Darden and Grzymała-Busse 2006), though over 21 years

MPs sharing these backgrounds only voted together about 57% of the time. Loyalty scores for

Gender, Level of education, Social class, Region, and Standing Committees otherwise hover around 0.4 with large standard deviations of around 0.2. The overall low voting loyalty scores among both party and nonpartisan groups paints a first picture of ‘every man for himself’ when it comes to voting; however, it may rather be the case that MPs are more selective with whom, and when, they vote together as a group. This logic may also extend to switching political parties, in some ways making this decision a deliberative one. While MPs have similar strengths of attachment across all nonpartisan identities, except for Political histories, they may actively select which group shares their individual ambitions the most under the circumstances, and then vote or defect with that set of individuals. Thus, it is difficult to predict which of these factors will consistently cross-cut with party identity significantly, based on these summary statistics alone.

103 Given the closeness of the attachment scores between party and nonpartisan identities, to what extent do MPs’ identities cross-cut? Table 5.4 below shows number of observations over time in which MPs were more strongly attached to nonpartisan groups but not to their political parties.78 Again, observations in which MPs’ nonpartisan loyalties were one standard deviation above the mean and party loyalty was one standard deviation below the mean were recorded as cross-cutting. I present the descriptive statistics for this variable in two groups: the first accounts for all MPs, and the second (marked by an asterisk) is restricted to those MPs with standing committee assignments.

Table 5.4. Descriptive statistics: observations in which party and social identities cross-cut in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. Party and social 1.VO (1992- 2.VO (1996- 5.VO (2006- 6.VO (2010- Total (1992- identities 1996) 1998) 2010) 2013) 2013) 31 12 64 132 239 Cross-cutting (7.26) (2.16) (9.13) (16.48) (9.62) 35 31 82 149 297 Cross-cutting* (8.20) (5.59) (11.70) (18.60) (11.96) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total observations; 3. and 4. VO are omitted as no group switches took place; * variable accounts for alignment/non-alignment between party and standing committee shared identities.

The number of observations featuring cross-cutting identities increases when accounting for standing committee membership. That is, there were 54 observations across the

MPAD for Czech MPs in which shared committee identities explicitly cross-cut party identity.

78 While there was no evidence for aligning ties in Poland—when MPs’ partisan and nonpartisan identities align as measured by roll-call vote loyalties—there was some evidence for this among Czech MPs in which individuals’ party and nonpartisan loyalty scores were both one standard deviation above the respective averages. These figures are presented in Appendix F. 104 This finding suggests that shared identities around co-membership in committees may have a larger influence on group-based party switching in the Czech Republic.

Figure 5.1. Marginal predicted probability of group switching when social and party identities cross-cut, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. 1. Volební období (1992-1996)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut

2. Volební období (1996-1998)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut

5. Volební období (2006-2010)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut

6. Volební období (2010-2013)

Baseline

Identities Cross-cut

0 .2 .4 .6 Pr(Group Switch)

Note: Estimates are the predicted probabilities derived from simple logistic regressions of the incidence of group switching on having cross-cutting identities.

Figure 5.1 above illustrates the results from a preliminary analysis of the marginal predictive effects of having cross-cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities. The findings reveal a noticeable effect of cross-cutting identities on the likelihood of group switching in the

105 1. VO, but the effect is weak after this period. Thus, having cross-cutting identities may have some effect on the incidence of group switching. However, this preliminary support for

Hypothesis 2, that attachment to identities that cross-cut party labels will increase the likelihood of defection, may only apply to experiences in the early years of democracy in the

Czech Republic. That there appears to be no discernible effect after 1996 may be due in part to the decrease in the frequency of party switching after the 2. VO. Linek and Rakušanová (2005) suggest that interparty mobility dropped after 1995-96 due to the institution of a parliamentary rule governing the minimum number of MPs required to form a party group in the sněmovna at ten.79 Furthermore, as aforementioned, dissent within parties became more tolerated by party leaders and whips depending on whether the coalition of political parties in favor or against any given measure was perceived to be large enough (Linek and Rakušanová 2004, 2005). MPs with cross-cutting identities had only slightly higher predicted probabilities of group switching in the 5. VO than those without cross-cutting ties with the onset of a new wave of party switching. However, despite a higher number of group based defections in the 6. VO, the effect of cross-cutting ties on group switching is not clearly discernible from the baseline prediction

(not having cross-cutting ties).

As mentioned above, these findings provide weak support for Hypothesis 2. The extent to which having cross-cutting party and nonpartisan identities has a moderation effect on the influence of individual ambition on group switching, referring to Hypotheses 3 and 4, will be revealed through the statistical analysis of interactions between having cross-cutting ties and individual ambition control variables in the following sections.

79 Between prior to the regulation’s passing in 1995, there was no minimum number of MPs required to form a parliamentary party group. 106 5.4 Analysis of the Patterns of Group-Based Party Switching in the Czech Republic

(1992-2013)

To assess the relationship between collective political ambition, individual ambition, and the patterns of group-based party switching over time, I use the same mixed effects generalized linear modeling techniques as in Chapter 4, described in greater detail in Chapter 3.

Parliamentary terms account for random intercepts in the model to control for variations in structural and behavioral dynamics across the four Volební období in which group defections occurred (1992-1996, 1996-1998, 2006-2010, and 2010-2013). As in the Polish case, I run the model over several specifications, which progressively test the four Hypothesis proposed in

Chapter 3. Specifications also differ whether accounting for all MPs or restricting the analyzed observations to MPs holding positions in \standing committees.80

Specifications I and II test the baseline effects on group-based party switching of the control variables measuring individual ambition and ideology, wherein Specification II accounts for committee membership and the effect of holding a committee officer position.

Next, Specifications III and IV analyze the impact of collective political ambition, measured using attachment to shared social identities, to test Hypotheses 1 and 2; Specification IV restricts the sample among those MPs with committee assignments, as in Specification II.

Because the Czech party system formed around issues relating to class, education, and regional interests (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Migalski 2008), MPs’ attachment to these identities should predict the likelihood that they will switch parties with colleagues with whom they share these

80 As in Poland, not all Czech MPs hold committee assignments, especially those who hold high government office. 107 nonpartisan identities to pursue shared, collective political ambition. Therefore, as political parties formed around education and class, MPs with strong attachments to Level of education and Social class should reduce the likelihood of group-based defection, whereas attachment to

Region should increase it, as regional representation is spread across parties. The suggested importance of membership in Standing committees, based on the increase in the number of MPs with cross-cutting identities when focusing on those with committee assignments (see Table

5.3), means that strong attachment to this identity should increase the likelihood of group defection.81 As in Chapter 4, I list the variable measuring attachment to shared gender identity as Gender (SID).82

Because there are observations in which shared party and nonpartisan identities cross- cut, I include specifications that test Hypothesis 3, which holds that having cross-cutting group ties has a moderating effect on the influence of individual political ambition on group defection, and Hypotheses 4, that cross-cutting identities specifically enhance this influence.

Specification V includes the interaction terms between having cross-cutting identities and the individual political ambition control variables for all MPs; Specification VI does the same but restricting the sample to MPs holding committee positions.

Finally, I control for political ideology using selected party families that have been featured in the Czech Republic since democratization (cf. Hloušek and Kopeček 2010). Party families with few or no observations are with the Mixed referent category. A breakdown of

81 It is unclear to me what the effect of attachment to Gender will be in the Czech case, so inclusion of this variable is exploratory. As for Political history, I do not expect a significant influence of attachment to this identity on group switching, due to the smaller influence of these legacies on Czech politics and among political elites (cf. Darden and Grzymała-Busse 2006). 82 As before, SID is short for ‘shared identity.’ 108 observations by party families over time and the modified classification scheme used in the

Czech analyses is found in Appendix F.

5.4.1 Analysis of the Direct Influence of Shared Social Identities on Group-Based Party

Switching

Table 5.5 first shows baseline estimates of the effects of the control variables for ambition and ideology on the likelihood of group-based party switching among Czech MPs

(Specifications I and II), and then includes covariates for attachment to shared social identities

(Specifications III and IV). Fit statistics listed at the bottom of the table indicate the superiority of the modelling strategy with Specifications I and II, but this is not the case when measures of attachment to shared identities are included. The substantially lower values for the Wald and

LR-Test statistics in both Specifications III and IV, as well as the non-significant Wald χ2 in

Specification IV, are in part due to the highly restricted analyzed sample size. Fewer than half of all Czech MPs in office since 1992 have a personal history of political or civic involvement prior to the fall of Communism. Noting the smaller number of observations of recorded attachment to Political history compared to other identities in Table 5.2, the number of analyzed observations in Table 5.5 drops from 2,484 to 739 (for all MPs) and 1,563 to 521 (for

MPs in standing committees).

All the same, the findings from Specifications I and II show that the pursuit of individual ambition plays a role in predicting group-based defection independently, however weakly. Whether analyzing the sample of all MP observations (Specification I) or only those holding committee positions (Specification II), being a member of a Governing party

109 Table 5.5. Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. Independent Specification I Specification II Specification III Specification IV variables β SE β SE β SE β SE Individual Ambition Governing party -1.09 0.30*** -0.83 0.32*** -2.62 0.76*** -2.23 0.85*** Gov’t position -0.39 0.33 — — -0.00 0.49 — — Committee position — — -0.04 0.23 — — -0.13 0.43 Log pref. votes 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.30 List position 0.04 0.02*** 0.04 0.02*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 Past MP -0.01 0.22 -0.16 0.25 -0.14 0.40 -0.35 0.44 Age -0.02 0.01* -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 Gender 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.53 0.30 0.60 Collective Ambition (Identities) Party — — — — 3.88 1.84** 3.99 2.46 Gender (SID) — — — — -2.67 1.52* -1.75 1.79 Level of education — — — — 0.60 1.16 0.93 1.35 Social class — — — — -0.43 1.51 0.42 1.83 Region — — — — -1.82 1.44 -1.27 1.65 Political history — — — — -0.17 1.50 -0.62 1.60 Committee — — — — — — 0.51 2.21 Ideology† Far Left -1.27 0.41*** -1.32 0.44*** -1.83 0.80** -2.16 0.92** Social Democrats -2.37 0.51*** -2.27 0.51*** -2.38 1.02 -2.69 1.06** Liberals 0.19 0.31 -0.09 0.32 0.12 0.79 -0.14 0.80 Christian Democrats 0.63 0.41 0.27 0.44 2.52 1.01** 1.26 1.13 Conservatives -024 0.38 -0.66 0.40* 1.42 0.98 0.27 1.06

Constant -2.59 1.32* -1.66 1.42 -4.16 2.58 -4.47 2.87 Random effects‡ Parliamentary term 1.18 0.91 1.16 0.93 2.92 (2.59) 2.44 (3.06) Observations 2,484 1,563 739 521 Log likelihood -419.06 -344.06 -136.89 -113.28 Wald χ2 62.67*** 52.45*** 35.18*** 22.99 LR-Test χ͞ 2 58.69*** 40.99*** 18.45*** 5.21** AIC 866.11 716.12 313.79 268.55 BIC 947.56 791.09 405.89 357.93 Note: Coefficients are multilevel binomial GLM estimates; unit of analysis is MPs; † referent category is Mixed party family; ‡ figures in parentheses are the variance of random intercepts; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

significantly reduces the likelihood of defection, as expected. The further away MPs are from the top electoral List position in their constituencies has the opposite effect by increasing the likelihood of group switching, which is also expected. Broadly, these findings reveal the primacy of office-seeking ambition for individuals in the decision to defect. Leaving a party in

110 government sacrifices access to the perks of office, whereas MPs may find switching parties as an effective means to join another party and at a higher rank, which could bring with it better chances to receive preferred committee assignments or a chance at a ministry portfolio. Older

MPs (Age) are also less likely to defect, which follows the argument that older individuals are more career-risk averse (cf. Schlesinger 1966); however, this predictor is weakly significant (at p < 0.1), and not significant when the sample is restricted to MPs with committee assignments.

These findings suggest that the individual motives for defection are similar between Poland and the Czech Republic when MPs are members of parties in government, but differ with respect to the importance of experience in office (Past MP, Poland) and party rank (List position, Czech

Republic).

Alongside poor model fit and the low number of observations analyzed, the inclusion of the collective ambition variables, proxied by attachment to shared identities, in Specifications

III and IV yields null results. On the one hand, only when all MP observations are included

(Specification III) does attachment to any identity, as a measure of the pursuit of collective ambition, have any effect on the likelihood of group switching. Interestingly, strong Party loyalty counterintuitively increases the likelihood of party switching. Yet this may be due to characteristics of party organization and discipline in the Czech Republic. As aforementioned, party leaders tend not to enforce voting discipline if the overall coalition of parties in favor or against a measure is large enough to allay the risk of intraparty dissent (Linek and Rakušanová

2005). With larger parties, however, it may be more difficult to hold members in line when it matters most (Linek and Rakušanová 2004). Consequently, those MPs whose partisan loyalty is never in question may feel betrayed by the lack of apparent party cohesion—instead favoring the option to split from the old party to form a new party or transfer to a different one.

111 The findings in Specifications III and IV from Table 5.5 do not support either

Hypothesis 1—attachment to shared identities and the pursuit of collective ambition influences the likelihood group switching—or Hypothesis 2—attachment to nonpartisan identities that overlap with partisanship decreases the likelihood of group switching, and attachment to nonpartisan identities that cross-cut party lines increases the likelihood. Furthermore, with the inclusion of collective ambition covariates, only the Governing party membership predictor remains statistically significant. Once again, however, the model fit with these two

Specifications is poor and the number of observations is substantially restricted, due to the limited number of MPs with a pre-democratic Political history (cf. Darden and Grzymała-

Busse 2006).

To address these methodological issues, I present adjusted model specifications in Table

5.6 below that omit the covariate for shared Political history identities (Specifications IIIa and

IVa). The analyzable observations increase to a respectable number and the fit statistics justify use of the modelling approach. In addition, the results reveal the influence of the pursuit of collective ambition, measured with attachment to shared social identities, across the general population of MPs—and not only those with a pre-democratic political past—over time.

The results in Specifications IIIa and IVa in Table 5.6 provide some support for

Hypotheses 1, meaning that MPs’ pursuit of ambition collectively with colleagues sharing an identity influences the likelihood of group-based party switching in the Czech Republic, broadly speaking. Across both specifications, attachment to Region has a statistically and substantively significant effect in reducing the chances an MP will defect with a group, whereas attachment to Social class-based identities increase the likelihood of group switching, albeit statistically weakly (at p < 0.1) when controlling for MPs with committee assignments

112 Table 5.6. Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching omitting shared political history, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. Specification IIIa Specification IVa Independent variables β SE β SE Individual Ambition Governing party -1.17 0.33*** -0.99 0.37*** Gov’t position -0.29 0.36 — — Committee position — — -0.07 0.25 Log pref. votes 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.17 List position 0.05 0.02** 0.05 0.02*** Past MP -0.01 0.24 -0.12 0.27 Age -0.02 0.01** -0.02 0.01* Gender 0.44 0.31 0.32 0.33 Collective Ambition (Identities) Party 1.89 0.82** 0.38 1.13 Gender (SID) -1.13 0.90 -0.88 1.15 Level of education 0.74 0.74 1.36 0.91 Social class 0.35 0.84 1.99 1.10* Region -2.35 0.84*** -2.30 0.97** Committee — — -0.12 1.41 Ideology† Far Left -0.86 0.51* -0.65 0.56 Social Democrats -1.66 0.57*** -1.44 0.58** Liberals 1.01 0.40** 0.91 0.41** Christian Democrats 1.71 0.49*** 1.24 0.52** Conservatives 0.64 0.46 0.10 0.47

Constant -3.59 1.54** -3.14 1.62* Random effects‡ Parliamentary term 1.54 (1.19) 0.96 (0.80) Observations 2,100 1,490 Log likelihood -351.12 -301.07 Wald χ2 62.14*** 47.71*** LR-Test χ͞ 2 55.98*** 26.00*** AIC 740.23 642.14 BIC 847.58 748.27 Note: Coefficients are multilevel binomial GLM estimates; unit of analysis is MPs; Political history identity omitted; † referent category is Mixed party family; ‡ figures in parentheses are the variance of random intercepts; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

(Specification IVa). As in Table 5.5, strong Party loyalty again increases the likelihood of defection, but not when the sample is restricted to MPs with committee assignments (as in

Specification III).

113 While the importance of these social identities in Czech politics is no surprise (see

Blahož et al. 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999), the findings run counter to the expectations posited in

Hypothesis 2. Attachment to identities that overlap with party labels should reduce the likelihood of group switching (such as social class), and identities that cross-cut party lines

(such as regional representation) should increase the likelihood. On the face of it, class-based issues and cleavages defined Czech political discourse and the formation of the party system from the onset of democratization in the early 1990s (Kitschelt et al. 1999). The anecdotal alignment of social classes with party platforms, because of socioeconomic cleavages in the transition from a command to a liberal market economy, implies that the close association between class interests and party platforms would reduce the incidence of defection if MPs most closely associated with one another around this social identity. However, in the same way that parties and party leaders may rely on strategic coalitions rather than voting discipline per se to achieve policy goals, the effect may extend to attachment to social class if class and partisanship coincides. In Blahož et al.’s (1999) words, parties and leaders take a more corporatist approach to addressing class-based interests (136-137). Thus, as in the case of party loyalty, MPs who strongly identify with their social class—and who are copartisans—may opt to pursue their collective ambitions, and their individual ones by extension, with another group or on their own in a new party.

The results for the effect of strong attachment to regional identities raise a similar question due to the relationship between this identity and representation across party lines.

Indeed, regional representation has cross-cut major party lines over time in the Czech party

114 system, with little exception.83 Thus, attachment to this identity should increase the likelihood of group-based party switching. Yet it may be the case that response to constituency demands and the willingness to collaborate with MPs sharing a regional origin in other parties may best be accomplished without the need to switch political parties when this cross-cutting identity takes precedence over toeing the party line. That is, because party discipline is not enforced in the Czech Republic as often or as strongly as in other cases (such as in Poland), MPs may feel more free to pursue political ambition collectively with colleagues from other parties without risking punishment from party leadership or without having to resort to changing their party affiliations. Furthermore, after the 3. VO (1998-2002) and the passage of the Act on Regions

(and other minor pieces of legislation), most regional policymaking powers were devolved to regional governments, whose territories correspond with national electoral districts (Yoder

2003). The Poslanecká sněmovna would then essentially act as a rubber stamp to approve major regional developments, such as budget approval and gubernatorial elections— partisanship on such matters is therefore relegated to the regional level rather than the national level.

Yet a closer look at the effects of attachment to shared social identities in Figure 5.2 reveals weak results. The influence of social identities, as a proxy for MPs’ pursuit of collective ambition, is not consistent across all strengths of attachment, suggesting that even salient identities are not effective cues used by MPs to pursue collective ambition, or that the pursuit of collective ambition plays a consistent role in influencing MPs’ decisions to defect as part of a group. For example, attachment to Region identity significantly influences the likelihood of

83 The one major exception is the Movement for Autonomy – Moravian and Silesian Party (HSD-SMS), which held a small number of seats in the Poslanecká sněmovna in the 1st Volební období. During this time, the Czech- Moravian Union of the Center (ČMUS) also held a small number of seats, but their platform was not focused on regional issues, per se. 115 group switching only when attachments are particularly strong, even though this shared identity is particularly significant in Czech politics. Conversely, Party loyalty only increases the likelihood of group defection when it is low, which makes intuitive sense, although the effect is more or less linear (and flat) as the strength of attachment to party identity increases, even if the effect is not statistically different from a null effect at the strongest levels. These findings may be a consequence of generally low levels of voting discipline and unity in Czech politics, given the use of roll-call voting to measure attachment to identities and the influence of the pursuit of collective ambition.

Figure 5.2. Marginal effects of attachment to social and party identities on probability of group switching, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013.

Gender Level of education Social class .4 .4 .4 .2 .2 .2 0 0 0 -.2 -.2 -.2 -.4 -.4 -.4

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1

Region Committees Party .4 .4 .4 .2 .2 .2 0 0 0 -.2 -.2 -.2 -.4 -.4 -.4 Marginal effectson probability of group switching 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Identity attachment score

Note: Marginal effects estimates for Gender, Level of education, Social class, Region, and Party are based on an analysis of all MPs (Table 5.6, Specification IIIa); marginal effects estimates for Committees account only for MPs holding committee assignments (Table 5.6, Specification IVa); Political history is omitted.

116 Yet the weakness of the statistical results of the models presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, as well as a closer examination of the marginal effects of the influence of collective ambition pursued through association with shared identity groups, suggests that Czech MPs may be on average more individually driven in their pursuit of ambition than their Polish counterparts. The findings provide only limited support for Hypothesis 1, which holds that the pursuit of collective ambition (measured through attachment to shared identities) influences MPs’ decisions to switch parties with a group. They do not provide support for Hypothesis 2, however, which may be a consequence of party voting strategies (resulting in the counterintuitive effect of strong party loyalty that increases the likelihood of defection) or a consequence of legislative devolution (resulting in the counterintuitive effect of strong regional attachments reducing the likelihood of defection despite the cross-cutting nature of this identity).

Finally, the significance of the constant term in each of the model specifications also points to some other factor(s) that may be driving the patterns of group defection in the Czech

Republic. That is, when all other predictors are set to ‘zero’ or constant, MPs are substantially predisposed not to switch parties in groups, regardless of their individual or shared/collective ambition. Otherwise, ideology does not point to an answer either, in that significant terms reflect that there was more frequent interparty mobility among parties of the right than those of the left: a pattern shared across the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

117 5.4.2 Analysis of the Moderating Effect of Cross-Cutting Identities on Political Ambition

and the Incidence of Group-Based Party Switching

The results for the tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4 are shown in Table 5.7 below. As earlier, the covariate for attachment to Political history is omitted.84 Interactions between having cross- cutting partisan and nonpartisan identities and measures of individual political ambition shows that having cross-cutting ties has a limited moderation effect on the degree of influence that individual ambition has on the decision to defect as part of a group (Hypothesis 3) by strengthening this influence (Hypothesis 4).

However, only the influence of MPs’ office-seeking ambition within political parties on the likelihood of group switching, reflected in their ranking on electoral lists, is strengthened.

While this lends support for Hypothesis 4, this support is also limited—the effect is very small, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 below. No other individual ambition measures’ effects on the likelihood of defection are significantly enhanced either.

Other than indicating a lack of general support for either Hypotheses 3 or 4 beyond the weak results in Table 5.7 and the marginal effects of the interactions illustrated in Figure 5.3, there is no clear effect of having explicitly cross-cutting, or conflicting partisan and nonpartisan ties.85 Put another way, the pursuit of collective ambition and individual ambition are independent, such that how MPs opt to pursue their individual ambitions is not entirely dependent on the groups with which they share these ambitions collectively—whether party

84 Along with poor model fit, analyses resulted in issues with empty cells and multicollinearity in the interaction terms between having cross-cutting identities and the predictors of individual political ambition. 85 This refers to the operationalization of the dummy interaction term as a reflection of the concept of having explicitly cross-cutting ties: a situation in which an MP’s attachment to the party is low (one standard deviation below the mean for this identity) and attachment to a nonpartisan identity is strong (one standard deviation above the mean for this identity) 118 Table 5.7. Effects of individual political ambition, collective ambition (attachment to shared social identities), and ideology on group-based legislative party switching, accounting for the interaction between cross-cutting identities and individual ambition, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. Specification Va Specification VIa Independent variables β SE β SE Individual Ambition Governing party -0.93 0.35*** -0.79 0.39** Gov’t position -0.21 0.36 — — Committee position — — -0.15 0.27 Log pref. votes 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.19 List position 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.03 Past MP -0.00 0.26 -0.03 0.29 Age -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 Gender 0.59 0.31* 0.48 0.34 Collective Ambition (Identities) Party 2.80 0.93*** 2.47 1.36* Gender (SID) -1.13 0.87 -0.88 1.12 Level of education 0.69 0.74 1.25 0.91 Social class 0.08 0.82 1.77 1.08* Region -2.04 0.83** -1.93 0.98** Committee — — -0.76 1.44 Interactions (Cross-cutting Identities × Ambition) Aligned — — — — Cross-cutting 5.02 4.79 1.20 5.09 × Governing party — —§ — —§ × Gov’t position — —§ — — × Committee position — — 1.45 1.01 × Log pref. votes -0.33 0.56 0.13 0.60 × List position 0.08 0.05* 0.11 0.05** × Past MP -1.13 1.01 -1.62 1.25 × Age -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.05 × Gender — —§ — —§ Ideology Far Left -0.57 0.54 -0.58 0.58 Social Democrats -1.38 0.58** -1.27 0.60** Liberals 1.17 0.43*** 1.12 0.44** Christian Democrats 1.97 0.52*** 1.46 0.55*** Conservatives 0.91 0.50** 0.39 0.51

Constant -4.48 1.70*** -4.11 1.83** Random effects‡ Parliamentary term 1.63 (1.26) 1.20 (0.97) Observations 1,979 1,463 Log likelihood -337.95 -288.94 Wald χ2 76.47*** 65.34*** LR-Test χ͞ 2 54.83*** 30.45*** AIC 723.90 629.87 BIC 858.06 767.37 Note: Coefficients are multilevel binomial GLM estimates; unit of analysis is MPs; Political history identity omitted; † referent category is Mixed party family; ‡ figures in parentheses are the variance of random intercepts; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.

119 labels define them or other shared social identities. In times when the pursuit of individual and collective ambition do condition one another, it may be out of convenience that MPs decide to switch to improve their internal party rankings—after all, this is a benefit of defection that is reaped individually as far as ranked placement on an electoral list is concerned.

Figure 5.3. Marginal effects of political ambitions and moderation when social and party identities align on group switching, Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013.

Committee officer

Committee officer, cross-cutting identities

Preferential votes

Preferential votes, cross-cutting identities

List position

List position, cross-cutting identities

Incumbent

Incumbent, cross-cutting identities

Age

Age, cross-cutting identities

-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 Average marginal effects on likelihood of switching

Note: Interaction terms for Governing party, Government position, and Gender omitted due to collinearity with their respective lower-order terms.

Because of the weak findings, the statistical significance of one of the interaction terms, whether the model analyzed all MPs (Specification Va) or was restricted to MPs with

120 committee assignments (Specification VIa), does not allow for the rejection of Hypotheses 3 or

4 outright. At the same time, the implications of these findings does not allow us to confirm the

Hypotheses outright either. Additionally, the constant term is statistically significant and negative, meaning that all else being equal (should all other predictors be set to null values),

MPs are clearly less likely to defect as part of a group regardless of the influence of the pursuit of individual or collective ambition, even when interaction terms are added to the model. In sum, the terms included in the full model—namely the direct influence of collective ambition on the incidence of group-based legislative party switching, as well as an interactive relationship between identities, collective ambition, and individual ambition and its effects on group switching—do not adequately explain the patterns of group-based defection among

Czech MPs.

5.5 Summary of the Results in Comparison with Findings from Poland

The findings from analyses of the influence of shared social identities on the patterns of group-based party switching among Czech MPs are mixed, but weak overall. The pursuit of individual nor collective ambition neither clearly nor explicitly influence the tendency of Czech

MPs to mostly switch parties as part of a group when they decide to defect. Hypothesis 1, which holds that it is the pursuit of collective political ambition among MPs sharing a social identity that directly affects the decision to switch as a group finds some support, but how it influences group switching is not altogether clear. For example, despite the cross-partisan representation of the various regional identities in the Czech Republic, the pursuit of collective ambition among MPs sharing these identities pushes these individuals to avoid defection rather

121 than to undertake it, whereas MPs’ strong party loyalty may lead them to group switch parties, counter to Hypothesis 2.

To some extent, part of the answer lies in the weak enforcement of party discipline in the Poslanecká sněmovna (Linek and Rakušanová 2004, 2005). Yet at the heart of MPs’ legislative behavior and decision-making is the pursuit of political ambition (Müller and Strøm

1999; Schlesinger 1966)—whether achieved alone or with a group of colleagues. Because individual MPs may have far more leeway in deciding how to pursue their individual political ambition without much risk of discipline from party leaders, Czech MPs may be far more selective of the groups with which they associate—not only in terms of ‘with whom,’ but ‘if’ and ‘when.’86 On one issue, an MP may decide to vote with copartisans, on another with colleagues from their region of origin, all on the same day. By extension, this may lead to situations in which MPs decide to switch from their party as a group because party leadership is too lax for strategic reasons (as suggested by the significance of the Party loyalty predictor).

Alternatively, MPs may avoid the prospect of defection with fellow MPs from the home region if there is no threat of punishment from party leadership for collaborating with colleagues across the aisle.

The second major takeaway from the results of the analysis of the Czech patterns of group-based party switching is that, like Polish MPs, Czech parliamentarians’ individual and shared/collective ambition is not mutually exclusive, but both pursuits are independent of one another. That is, how MPs pursue their ambition—alone or with a group—are simply alternative means to the same end. As a result, there is little in the way of evidence that

86 This suggestion is based on how the variables for collective ambition are measured, that is though patterns of roll call voting. 122 individual and collective ambition would come into conflict with one another, or that one would be conditioned by the other, as tested by Hypotheses 3 and 4. Unlike in the Polish case,

Czech MPs’ individual office-seeking ambition within party rankings had a stronger influence on the decision to group switch if the pursuit of collective ambition through a group defined by a shared nonpartisan social identity was preferable to doing so alone. However, this interactive relationship between having cross-cutting party/nonpartisan ties and individual ambition was weak at best.

A comparison of the findings from Poland and the Czech Republic therefore shows that there are some substantial differences in the relationships between collective ambition and group-based party switching in both countries. On the outset, it is clear that group-based party switching, or party switching in general, is more frequent in Poland than in the Czech Republic.

This can be traced to features of the respective party systems, such as differences in party structures and the effectiveness of rules governing party formation and organization in both countries. Yet as it is relevant to the development of an agency-based or behavioral theory of group-based defection, the results from quantitative analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 point to a primacy of the pursuit of political ambition collectively in Poland versus a more individualistic approach to this pursuit in the Czech Republic. As such, the statistical models I use fit the

Polish data both theoretically and methodologically better than in the Czech Republic.

Yet in both countries, the pursuit of collective ambition among groups of MPs who share social identities other than party affiliation is important to understanding why, regardless of the frequency of party switching, most defections are group-based. Salient political and social cleavages in the countries determine which identities matter more than others (e.g., past political history and region in Poland versus region and partisanship in the Czech Republic),

123 but the connection between these identities, the pursuit of collective ambition, and the likelihood of group-based party switching indicates that acting with a group is an important alternative means to achieving one’s goals that can be more effective than acting alone.

Furthermore, in both Poland and the Czech Republic, the evidence suggests that the pursuit of collective and individual political ambition is not at odds. Rather, the pursuit of collective ambition in a group is the manifestation of the pursuit of each individual’s political ambition, as group members share similar vote, office, and/or policy seeking goals.

In the next Chapter, I present qualitative evidence that substantiates these comparative assessments of the quantitative findings from Chapters 4 and 5. Semi-structured interviews among both Polish and Czech MPs reveal the importance of personal ties in the parliamentary experience, the roots of collaboration, and the value and importance of acting with a group— especially when switching political parties while in office—regardless of a cognizance of the rules and structures that constrain MPs’ behavior.

124

Chapter 6: Qualitative Evidence from Interviews with Sitting and Former MPs

“Tylko krowa nie zmienia poglądów”87 [“Only a cow does not change its point of view”]

“O plastelínu se nikdy opřít nedá.”88 [“No one can lean on plasticine”]

6.1 Introduction

After outlining the current state of the literature on legislative party switching and proposing a group-based theory of defection grounded in social identity theory and intra-group relations in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 described the dissertation’s methodological approaches, and

Chapters 4 and 5 quantitatively tested the relationship between social identities, the pursuit of collective and individual political ambition, and the patterns of group-based defection among

Polish and Czech MPs, respectively. The results across both countries show that MPs’ pursuit of collective ambition with groups based on shared social identities has a direct effect on legislators’ decisions, but the findings for an interaction between cross-cutting identities and the pursuit of individual ambition are weak. The pursuit of collective ambition in groups is an alternative means to the pursuit of individual ambition wherein identities and ambition may be

87 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 10 Jun 2014. 88 Interview with Czech MP (ANO, novice, loyalist), 14 December 2015. 125 independent of one another, but do not necessarily come into conflict. In this chapter, I elaborate on the influence of common identities and their relationship with group-based legislative behavior, specifically group-based party switching. Semi-structured interviews reveal more evidence for a direct influence of identities on party switching from conversations with MPs who participated in this activity or witnessed it in both countries. Conversations with political elites reveal that MPs rely on nonpartisan qualities shared in common with others to identify partners with whom to achieve their goals. In this way, individuals base their decisions about with whom to collaborate based on their social interactions with others and not exclusively on the basis of partisanship and ideology.

After describing the sample of respondents, I present interview evidence of MPs’ awareness of the constraints under which they operate on a daily basis. I then relate these experiences to the perceptions and motivations behind party switching from the perspectives of both individuals who have switched parties in the past as well as those who never did so.89 I conclude with a synthesis of the qualitative and quantitative findings from my mixed-method strategy to triangulate evidence for a group-based theory of defection. While results from quantitative analyses raised additional questions and provided mixed support for my hypotheses, the narratives and personal expressions of the MPs themselves shed light on the dynamic relationship between identity, legislative behavior, and party switching.

89 Interview references are labeled accordingly in footnotes: party switchers are labeled ‘switcher’ while those who had never switched as of their interviews are labeled ‘loyalist’. Additionally, along with party affiliation (if serving at the time of the interview), MPs who served in more than one term are labeled ‘veteran’, whereas those who were serving their first term or had only served one term (if a former MP) are labeled ‘novice’. 126 6.2 Motivation and Methodological Recap

The use of qualitative evidence, especially personal interviews, permit the attachment of observation, context, and narratives to theory and quantitative empirical analysis in order to gain a better sense of the relationships between political elites and their impact on their social and political systems (cf. Fenno 1986; Hoffmann-Lange 1982).

The semi-structured interviews conducted in the Sejm and the Poslanecká sněmovna while in the field from 2014 to 2015 provide firsthand insight into political elites’ perceptions of their environment, the value placed on interpersonal associations in parliament, and the effects on party affiliation in these new democracies. Most importantly, these interviews add detail and nuance to the quantitative relationship between shared social identities, the collective pursuit of political ambition, and group-based legislative party switching. That is, while the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 explored statistical patterns of group-based party switching in

Poland and the Czech Republic, MP interviews elaborate on the quantitative findings presented earlier and provide primary source evidence for the importance of social identities and their relationship to the pursuit of political ambition, which can result in group decisions to defect.

Over the course of 75 total interviews in both countries, subjects were approached after being selected with a combination of stratified and snowball sampling techniques (explained in greater detail in Chapter 3). These interviews were guided by three overarching questions. First,

MPs were asked to describe their personal backgrounds and motivations for becoming public servants. This transitioned to a discussion about workplace relationships, involving socialization and preferences for collaboration in plenary or committee. Finally, after sharing their perspectives on the state of democracy and political structures under which they act,

127 interviewees discussed the nature and motivations of party switching, loyalties, and the impact on their workplace experiences and democracy in their countries.

6.2.1 Distributions of Interviewed Members of Parliament

Table 6.1 shows the distribution of interviewed Polish MPs by demographic characteristics and variables previously shown to be important for group switching: sitting versus former MPs, and then by party (as applicable), gender, seniority (whether a veteran or first-time MP), and whether the individual switched parties at any time leading up to the interviews. In all, the 48 interviews with Polish MPs (31 sitting and 17 former) yielded a rich variety of responses and opinions on the topics discussed.90

Table 6.1. Descriptive summary of interviews with sitting and former deputies of the Polish Sejm, 2014-2015. A. Sitting MPs Party N Women Veterans Switchers Platforma Obywatelska (PO) 11 (35.48) 5 (16.13) 9 (29.03) 1 (3.23) Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) 7 (22.58) 3 (9.68) 6 (19.35) 1 (3.23) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) 5 (16.13) 1 (3.23) 2 (6.45) 4 (12.90) Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) 3 (9.68) 0 (0.00) 3 (9.68) 1 (3.23) Twój Ruch (TR) 2 (6.45) 0 (0.00) 1 (3.23) 1 (3.23) Zjednoczona Prawica (ZP) 2 (6.45) 0 (0.00) 2 (6.45) 2 (6.45) Independents (Niezrzeszeni) 1 (3.23) 0 (0.00) 1 (3.23) 1 (3.23) Total (sitting) 31 (100.00) 9 (29.03) 24 (77.42) 11 (35.48) B. Former MPs Senators 8 (47.06) 0 (0.00) 8 (47.06) 7 (41.18) MEPs 2 (11.76) 1 (5.88) 2 (11.76) 0 (0.00) No longer in public service 7 (41.18) 0 (0.00) 6 (35.29) 7 (41.18) Total (former) 17 (100.00) 1 (5.88) 16 (94.12) 14 (82.35) Total (sample) 48 (100.00) 10 (20.83) 40 (89.33) 25 (52.08) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total sample for each category (sitting/former).

90 Additional interviews would not have been necessary: by the end of my time spent in Poland, I was beginning to hear repeated, similar statements; this follows the logic on information saturation and diminishing returns from interviews in qualitative research (see Douglas 1985; Lynch 2004; Seidman 2006). 128 Table 6.2 below shows the distribution of Czech MPs interviewed. The same sampling procedure was used for this case study as in Poland. Out of 27 semi-structured interviews with

Czech MPs, 23 were among sitting MPs and 4 were with former MPs. While some responses to questions differed between the two countries, there were many commonalities between them.

Table 6.2. Descriptive summary of interviews with sitting and former MPs of the Czech Poslanecká sněmovna, 2015. A. Sitting MPs Party N Women Veterans Switchers Akce nespokojených občanů (ANO) 4 (17.39) 1 (4.35) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) Česká strana sociálně demokratická (ČSSD) 4 (17.39) 0 (0.00) 4 (17.39) 0 (0.00) Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM) 1 (4.35) 1 (4.35) 1 (4.35) 0 (0.00) Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá 4 (17.39) 1 (4.35) 1 (4.35) 0 (0.00) strana lidová (KDU-ČSL) Občanská demokratická strana (ODS) 3 (13.04) 2 (8.70) 3 (13.04) 1 (4.35) Tradice, Odpovědnost, Prosperita a Starostové 3 (13.04) 0 (0.00) 3 (13.04) 1 (4.35) (TOP09) Úsvit přímé demokracie – Národní Koalice (Úsvit) 2 (8.70) 0 (0.00) 1 (4.35) 1 (4.35) Independents (Nezařazení) 2 (8.70) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 2 (8.70) Total (sitting) 23 (100.00) 5 (21.74) 13 (56.52) 5 (21.74) B. Former MPs Not in public service 2 (50.00) 1 (25.00) 1 (25.00) 2 (50.00) Other government positions 1 (25.00) 0 (0.00) 1 (25.00) 0 (0.00) Extra-parliamentary public service 1 (25.00) 0 (0.00) 1 (25.00) 1 (25.00) Total (former) 4 (100.00) 1 (25.00) 3 (75.00) 3 (75.00) Total (sample) 27 (100.00) 6 (22.22) 16 (59.26) 7 (25.93) Note: Extra-parliamentary public service refers to individuals active in politics but not in parliament or the national government; figures in parentheses are percentages of total sample for each category (sitting/former).

Because of the similarities in responses, I present the findings from both countries together.

129 6.3 Elite Perspectives on Group Switching

This section provides information about MPs’ perceptions of the political opportunities and constraints on group switching, as well as the importance of history, in Poland and the

Czech Republic. In Poland, party voting is the norm, yet party switching is not out of the question. In the Czech Republic, the opposite is the case with low levels of party unity in voting, although even though defection is viewed in a negative light and loyalty to the party is

(at least nominally) emphasized. Interviews with MPs from both countries shed some light on how partisanship is internalized in such a way that loyalty is equated with ideas of democraticness, but that MPs only espouse party loyalty when partisanship is equated with the pursuit and maintenance of higher principals like integrity and representation.

While both countries have followed somewhat different paths of democratization, neither country has yet to develop a party system that is organizationally entrenched in civil society. Parties in both countries also tend to be thinly organized outside of the national legislature in that (cf. Gunther and Diamond 2001) they are not characterized by a strong reliance on mass membership or deep interaction with society (cf. Hloušek and Kopeček 2010;

Kitschelt et al. 1999; Migalski 2008; Tkacz 2008; Zuba 2012). The party systems are thus described as ‘cartel party systems’ (Katz and Mair 1995, 1996). As a Polish MP from the ex-

Communist SLD explained:

“In these new democracies, there are no ‘mass parties.’ If you were to count in Poland today, which has about 38.5 million citizens, how many members are accounted for all the parties, and then in the best case there are a quarter million, perhaps 300 thousand. This is nothing. Nowhere are there ‘mass parties.’ Thus parties are cadres and have a tendency to concentrate themselves. Because members are few in number, the party apparatus is smaller as a

130 general tendency. There are weak numbers among these parties along with a weak electoral base, whereas oftentimes these parties are ideologically ill- defined”.91

Along with being programmatically weak, parties are also highly centralized. Many backbenchers find this to be problematic, as one confided: “this bothers me, that we went a bit too far with strong party centralization. Later this becomes a style of governance: ‘I am successful because I have a majority and I can outvote you.’ This is in my opinion the trap into which Polish democracy has fallen”.92 Several respondents recognized that, “fiefs form around leaders, and we also refer to this as oligarchization”93; a former MP emphasized the issue of centralized party membership by explaining:

“In Poland it’s really solitary individuals who govern political formations— collegial boards or presidia don’t make a difference. Decisions are made singularly, and what is worse, this singular management of formations can be found at the national as well as at the regional levels”.94

Despite the pressure to toe the party line in all situations, the recognition of both countries’ states of institutional consolidation and the organizational thinness of political parties provides MPs with a greater sense of ‘wiggle room’ when it comes to their legislative behavior. For example:

“Poland is a country in which democracy, no matter how we approach it, has lasted only a short time, and from this it is likely that there is room for this kind of movement or initiative. ... I think that it is much easier to do this here than

91 Interview with Polish MP (SLD, veteran, loyalist), 14 July 2014. Many political parties in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe could be described as ‘cadre parties’ in the Duvergerian sense, as this MP labeled them. However, I use Katz and Mair’s terminology and definition of the parties as ‘cartels’ of MPs (1995, 1996), given the placement of cartel parties and party systems in a contemporary context. 92 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 9 July 2014. 93 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, switcher), 7 July 2015. 94 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 7 July 2015. 131 somewhere else in the world where we are dealing precisely with permanent, durable, established systems”.95

MPs’ ‘wiggle room’ includes the option to switch political parties as an ultimate act of dissent.

One MP summarized this line of thought: “behind [party switching] can be found specific reasons, and those reasons I will briefly describe as the underdevelopment of democracy”.96

Similar sentiments were expressed by Czech MPs who recognize that “politics here have certainly changed over the past twenty years. The political and party systems have changed; voters are less anchored today and are more subject to short-term moods or emotions”.97

Indeed, at the heart of this change lies the fact that the Czech Republic is

“Quite a young democracy, only twenty-five years, so I think that it is much more simple [for us] to get along in totalitarianism than in a democracy. So all the time we are still learning how to behave in it—we are still the first generation”.98

Interviewees in both Poland and the Czech Republic used the example of legislative party switching to elaborate on their diagnosis of the current state of democratization. In both cases, many stated that political parties in their respective Postcommunist systems have a way to go before they mirror parties in the West. In Poland, realignments and large-scale defections were common especially in democracy’s early years, as many political elites sought to find or redefine their places in the new system (Nalewajko 1992). One veteran from this time in Poland described how “in the ‘90s there were 17 or 18 parties and they certainly weren’t internally consistent. While some parties had very similar manifestos, they didn’t unite, because this was

95 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, novice, loyalist), 24 July 2014. 96 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 8 July 2015. 97 Interview with Czech MP (ODS, veteran, loyalist), 14 January 2016. 98 Interview with Czech MP (TOP09, veteran, loyalist), 5 November 2015. 132 a kind of process”.99 By this was meant not only consolidation of the party system, but of the establishment, organization, and institutionalization of parties themselves.

The Czech Republic exhibited a similar sort of chaos in its party system following the collapse of Communism. “Immediately after ’89, there were a great number of switches, such as when people left KSČ100 for somewhere else ... it was such that [the system] was crystallizing.” Yet despite the passage of time (and the apparent crystallization of the Czech party system), today parties are less clear with respect to “...ideals, positions, and issues, but more individualistic”.101 In both countries, MPs see the current state of the political and party systems as a reflection of the personal and often non-ideological idiosyncrasies of those in power: “today I will say with 100% certainty that [party switching] is cyclical. It has nothing to do with ideology. One might suggest that politics were re-evaluated and that it was ideological.

This is not true”.102 Party switching is not only not out of the question, but rather part-and- parcel of a process of party system development that is ongoing to this day in both Poland and the Czech Republic.

Crucially, interviewees discussed the changing party landscape in terms of group-based decisions and events: “during the formation of parties, sometimes our commitments were decided upon based on encouragement from familiar people, comrades, colleagues, and so on”.103 Party switching is thus viewed in two lights. On the one hand, all those interviewed were quick to point out that this act represented disloyalty and a lack of responsiveness to both

99 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 10 June 2015. 100 Komunistická strana Československa, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 101 Interview with Czech MP (ČSSD, veteran, loyalist), 4 December 2015. 102 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 24 July 2014. 103 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 26 May 2015. 133 party leaders and constituents.104 This concept of loyalty to the party has been internalized as an important principle of democracy and representation: “if one wants to change colors because the party isn’t agreeable, then one should resign, give up the deputy mandate, and in the following Kadencja start on the list of the new party”.105 To some, expulsion from parliament as a consequence of defection is justified because affiliation with a party is a commitment defined by attachment to a set of higher principles or values, including integrity in one’s beliefs, commitment to the constituents, the pursuit of ideals, and so on:

“Affiliation to a specific group is a social commitment ... my association with the People’s Movement is dictated by the ideals that … the Polish People’s Party (because this is my party) has a character that is national, Christian, and of the people. That is, we are patriots, we respect tradition (not just social-cultural but Christian). The majority of People’s Party members cultivate this”.106

The sentiment was no different in the Czech Republic, in which some respondents looked back with disdain upon incidents in which particular MPs “went to bed as Social

Democrats and in the morning they awoke as Civic Democrats”.107 Similarly, another Czech

MP used an idiom to illustrate: “Regarding switching party affiliations, I think no one can lean on plasticine”.108 Yet even among those taking a hard stance in favor of parliamentary expulsion for party switchers, there was some acknowledgement that defection can be justified

104 Indeed, even those MPs with a history of party switching viewed the act as one of disloyalty, but this was dependent on the conditions under which the decision was made. That is, for many, there is a difference between loyalty to a party and loyalty to a higher principle (whether integrity, constituents, ideals, etc.); when these do not align, defection seemed justifiable. 105 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, veteran, loyalist), 12 June 2014. 106 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, veteran, loyalist), 23 July 2014. 107 Interview with Czech MP (ČSSD, veteran, loyalist), 26 November 2015; this refers to defection from the center-left ČSSD to the center-right ODS. 108 Interview with Czech MP (ANO, novice, loyalist), 14 December 2015. Barring any loss in translation, the exact phrase used was “O měnění stranických příslušnosti si myslím, že o plastelínu se nikdy opřít nedá.” 134 if party affiliation comes into conflict with higher pursuits. A former MP from the Polish SLD accepted that:

“No one is once and for all signed up in a given party and there is the right to verify one’s affiliation, but to be responsible about it. If one wins a mandate representing a party on the electoral list and then realizes after a time that either the program, behavior, or activities [of the party] does not allow one to remain with that group, then of course there is the right to leave. However, then one must resign the mandate”.109

In keeping with the notion of loyalty to a higher principle versus loyalty to a party for the party’s sake, the acknowledgment of underinstitutionalization of the party systems in both countries facilitated a less problematic opinion of the phenomenon of party switching: “this is a natural thing that switches occur, that there is rotation, that people move from one group to another. In my opinion it’s nothing unusual if this is, in the meantime, developing the politics of these groups”.110 Even those who disagreed with the idea of party switching implicitly acknowledged the primacy of the pursuit of other ideals over political parties per se: “My sense is that this contradicts [morality]...this does not fit within, so to say, the boundaries of my political morals, but these moral boundaries vary”.111

Among higher principles above partisanship, responsiveness and representativeness in the name of constituents was most often cited as a justification for defection. Starting with elections, “party affiliation is the first distinguishing feature for voters: the first decision is

109 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, loyalist), 27 May 2015). In neither Poland nor the Czech Republic are there rules against party switching during the course of parliamentary terms as found in other countries (see Janda 2009). A Czech MP suggested that, “if he is leaving the political party, he should resign his mandate ... but I will give you a thought: if they had to pay for it, those who were here [in the party] and who voted, and lost their mandate if they went to a different party, then I tell you this would never happen” (Interview with Czech MP [Independent, novice, switcher], 18 September, 2015). 110 Interview with Polish former MP (novice, switcher), 1 July 2014. 111 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 22 July 2015. 135 determined according to party, and then from within that group [one votes for] the individual.”

After this point, it may appear that “[defection] is a departure from society’s decision,”112 unless defection is necessary to actually follow society’s decision:

“That I switched parties is not the only information that my constituents have. If I, earlier in this Kadencja, … had 350 meetings with voters, in that I have met with many of these people personally, then they have listened to what I have to say, what kind of a person I am, and they judged me through this contact. I think that it is often the case that party affiliation makes for poor evaluation if it is the only information that people have about a person”.113

In other words, if an MP follows a set of higher ideals that transcend the nominal value of a party label, then party switching in itself is a necessary means to the end of pursuing those ideals. Thus, the “political scene is only now developing and evolving”114, and perhaps “the system is strengthening”115, but equal (if not more) emphasis is placed on the role and value of the individual MP. Meanwhile, many MPs continue to “hope and wait, that little by little [the system] will settle and moderate towards expectations for a standard democracy”.116

As a whole, whether entirely against or justifying the act of defection, many returned to the fact that “the ties between party members are seasonal, short”, and that “in the moment of some crisis, perhaps an electoral one, these people seek a more comfortable, identified place in the political scene”.117 As another MP pointed out, “one can switch because, as I said, there are no eternal parties ... a party is not a wife; that I signed a declaration at some point does not

112 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 26 May 2015. In the last sentence, the interviewee used the term “sprzeniewierzenie”, which may be interpreted differently depending on context (e.g., embezzlement in the case of financial appropriation); an alternative translation could be “a betrayal of society’s choice”, but in context ‘betrayal’ would be an over exaggeration. 113 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 26 May 2015. 114 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, loyalist), 27 May 2015. 115 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 12 June 2014. 116 Interview with Czech MP (KDU-ČSL, novice, loyalist), 11 December 2015. 117 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 9 June 2015. 136 mean that I took a vow until death”.118 Parties are in some ways a means to an end, essentially as “collective tools used to carry out public or social ideals”.119

If party voting is the norm as quantitative analysis clearly indicates in Poland, while parties are as yet organizationally weak and ideological platforms are at times indistinct from one another in both Poland and the Czech Republic, then why is party switching a frequent phenomenon in the former country and on the rise in the latter? Are MPs’ motives for party switching based on ‘higher principles’ in service of others alone, or are they personally benefitting from this decision in some other way as well? The following section presents responses to questions about personal perspectives on the topic of party switching in general, highlighting evidence on the influence of nonpartisan cues alongside political ambition.

6.4 Elite Perspectives on the Motivations for Party Switching

The pursuit of political ambition plays a central role in political elites’ decision whether to switch political party affiliations (Heller and Mershon 2009a). Even without being prompted by this argument, MPs in both countries readily embraced it: “every party switcher calculates, in my opinion, the benefits and eventual costs of such a decision”, whereas “political

118 Interview with Polish MP (ZP, veteran, switcher), 26 June 2014. 119 Interview with Polish MP (ZP, veteran, switcher), 24 June 2014. It is worth citing some Polish expressions used to describe the activity (as quoted by a long-time member of the SLD and others): “Only a cow does not change its point of view” [tylko krowa nie zmienia poglądy], and that the decision to defect is often a reflection of wanting “to be near the trough” [chce być przy korycie], implying access to the perks of office (Interview with Polish MP [SLD, veteran, loyalist], 3 July 2014). 137 formations also do this, and it may be added that here the principles of rational behavior are preserved”.120 More directly:

“Into politics do not go passive calves that are mindless. There go people with ambitions, and it’s said, ‘ah, someone defected because they had ambitions’. They had ambitions—and what, did you think that in politics, people without ambitions enter politics? Of course they have ambitions! If they see that these ambitions cannot be realized, then they look for a different place where they can realize these ambitions. Why get offended? Just like with many examples, where evidently people got to some kind of highpoint—they believe that they still have potential—but they know that they won’t be able to realize it in one place, they look for new possibilities”.121

Following theory on political ambition (cf. Black 1972; Mayhew 1974; Müller and

Strøm 1999; Schlesinger 1966), one Polish respondent in the governing PO laid out three observable patterns in the motivations for defection:

“The first is banal, more straightforward: when their grouping has problems, they want to ensure their future in the next elections and they look for someone who offers them a good place on the [electoral] list to welcome them—this is always met with the worst evaluation. But it is also the case where some are trying to find their own path and the group in which they were a part did not always match up programmatically regarding approaches to many issues, and then they look for some other path and leave that group. And yet a third: rivalry between leaders”.122

This MP effectively covered three of the conventional explanations to legislative decision making in general, aside from frictions within the party leadership: vote, policy, and office- seeking. A former MP in the Czech Republic echoed these sentiments, elaborating on career goals to justify defection:

120 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 7 July 2015. In the latter case, this refers to—and implies—the importance of party and other group-level factors (see also Laver and Benoit 2003). 121 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 18 July 2014. 122 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 14 July 2014. 138

“The motivations were different for people leaving with me or not leaving with me. For many of them it was a financial reason not to move, for example. ... I can also see that a reason to move from party to party can be that you really want to do politics, you think that you are doing a good job, and your party isn’t making it, and another party offers you a position. So, you know, as long as the party isn’t completely opposite to what I represented until now and I believed in, then it is fair enough to do that as well”.123

In this case, not everyone’s motivations for defection are exactly the same. However, everyone’s objectives still fall under the umbrella of enhancing their political influence in one way or another.

Across most interviews, however, policy-seeking featured prominently among MPs with a history of party switching, in line with justifications of loyalty to higher principles rather than to parties, per se. For example, one MP described a personal experience:

“To me it doesn’t matter whether I switch parties or not. For a parliamentarian, to me, it matters if we have some kind of stiff backbone, that we represent some set of views, and that we want to realize them. Often a change in party affiliation is taken as a desire to only remain in the parliamentary world rather than a desire to actually do something. No; in my philosophy, it’s different. In my philosophy, if we have a specific goal oriented to help do something good, then what methods we use to achieve this goal has little significance—of course these methods must be legal and not counter to public policy. If the path to realizing the goal is to switch groups, then for me this isn’t a problem”.124

To this end, some MPs followed an alternative logic with respect to the evolution of the party systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Rather than an environment of shifting politicians that create, dissolve, merge, and split political parties (cf. Kreuzer and Pettai 2003), for some it is parties that move about on policy and programs around stationary MPs. As a

123 Interview with Czech former MP (novice, switcher), 16 October 2015. 124 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, loyalist), 23 July 2014. 139 Czech MP emphasized, “politicians should be consistent and insist on their ideological principles. Changing political affiliation can be understood only if the political party moves sharply from its ideological anchoring and begins to pursue other programmatic objectives”.125

This sentiment was echoed in the Sejm—one MP went so far as to utilize an example from the

American context:

“I believe that with these kinds of acts there is nothing wrong. That is, I believe even Ronald Reagan switched parties in his time. He was a Democrat who later became a Republican. How he came to this, he explained, was that he did not leave or desert the Democrats; rather it was the Democrats who deserted him, because they betrayed the principles that guided them. It was similar with me—I also switched parties”.126

Despite the underlying significance of self-interest and ambition, defection for some is a straightforward result of a rational pursuit of ambitions or an ethical or principles-driven quandary. It is generally accepted that “every politician not only has the right, but rather should switch parties; if we have some views and the party ceases to realize them, then we have the moral obligation to leave this party and either start a new one, or join another one”.127 Yet it is still important to note that, whether the act is viewed positively or negatively, and whether switching parties with a group is the best choice to make or not, defection can still be difficult:

“In my case this was one of the most difficult choices in my life, and I say this as a person who has a normal family with two children. That is a success in my life, so I do not take on such difficult decisions lightly. But the decision to change party membership can be said to have been one of the hardest”.128

125 Interview with Czech MP (ODS, veteran, loyalist), 14 January 2016. 126 Interview with Polish MP (Independent, veteran, switcher), 25 June 2014. 127 Interview with Polish MP (Independent, veteran, switcher), 25 June 2014. 128 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, switcher), 23 July 2014. 140 In this quote, as with others above, there are hints that there is more to the story than the pursuit of career ambitions alone. When discussing motivations for switching parties, defectors in particular implied (or stated explicitly), that they made this decision in collaboration with others. Groups of MPs who switch together, while working towards their own individual goals, choose the groups with which they defect based on otherwise nonpartisan heuristics, as on former Polish MP indicated:

“It was also the result of activities from ’80, ’81, and the 1980s ... We realized the first divisions oftentimes not on a programmatic basis, but on the basis of camaraderie. If a colleague is starting something with others, then you go with them. You do not necessarily need to have similar views, and it requires a lot of time to develop groups that are somehow united programmatically”.129

This MP’s reflection on party formation in the early days of democracy points to the importance of groups—the notion of camaraderie—to the achievement of political goals. In the next section, I show that MPs look to collaborate with groups built around shared social identities beyond party labels as a viable means to achieving political ambition. In other words,

MPs seek others with whom they share social identities in lieu of political party affiliations in order to achieve political and career goals as a group. Consequently, this desire to pursue ambition collectively with MPs sharing common social identities plays a central role in explaining why party switching tends to be a group-based event in both Poland and the Czech

Republic.

129 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 10 June 2015. 141 6.5 Elite Perspectives on Social Identities, Group Formation, and Group Switching

In new democracies, party lines can be blurry. If they are not enduring or persistent,

MPs may rely on other heuristics to make decisions about how to vote or with which party to affiliate. Previous chapters in this dissertation have shown that attachment to shared social identities have a direct influence on the decision to switch political parties as part of a group.130

Indeed, group formation is central to the establishment of legislative coalitions or political parties: “If you don’t have a group around you, a team with whom you can work, then a person is defenseless and has to unite, search for people with similar goals, similar values”131 (see also

Bawn et al. 2012; Laver 1989).

While politicians may pursue their career ambitions opportunistically (e.g., Kasianiuk

2014), group support remains fundamental to the broader achievement of enhanced political influence. Rather than an always-individual effort, “politics is a collective effort. Every political thing requires the formation of some kind of a coalition.”132 One MP used an analogy to express this reality: “politics is a team sport! There is no kind of Messi, of course; there are still other teammates who pass the ball, catch the ball, who are buffers so that the Premier or the leader won’t get hit. In this way, you take punches for each other”.133

If partisan loyalty is not consistent or strong, collaborators in parliament can be found both “within the party and outside of it.”134 This means that while members of the same party may be a proximate source of comrades and collaborators, they are not the only one. Rather, as

130 For example, I have shown in related work that common identities or group associations have an impact on patterns of roll-call voting (see Tunkis 2017). 131 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, veteran, loyalist), 22 July 2014. 132 Interview with Czech former MP (veteran, loyalist), 2 October 2015. 133 Interview with Polish MP (TR, novice, loyalist), 30 June 2014. 134 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 9 July 2014. 142 one Czech MP stated, “different ideals is one thing, but it is another that this is a person whom

I know and who is fine, such that it doesn’t matter if he is from a different party”.135 Speaking about parliamentary experiences, a Czech ex-MP explained that the nature of interactions and collaboration is dynamic:

“Here one must say that it was a combination of both political preferences and personal preferences ... such that it was always based on whether I agree with these people—to see for myself. There are straightforward people, in whom you see that they have a tendency in life towards what they promise, and then there are some people who are total scams”.136

Personal characteristics and personalities shared in common matter. Put simply, “one is always looking for people whom one finds agreeable, in ways of thinking, understanding of the world, and values that are shared”.137 A colleague of this interviewee in the Sejm explained the nature of personal ties and group associations in greater detail:

“People either like one another or they don’t, right? This is very interesting, it’s a fascinating observation: some like others, and this in no way goes along party lines—in no way. If one looks at the tables in the cafeteria, in committees, who is sitting with whom, who is talking with whom: this has an impact. This shows that everyone is looking around themselves for someone who understands them, with whom they can converse, with whom they share characteristics, and there are those who might not like me, and it doesn’t depend on whether they are in my party or not. And I, for example, may meet very willingly with people in other parties whom I respect, whom I like, who are friendly, rather than with colleagues in my own party whom I accept, but whom I don’t altogether like”.138

This sentiment was echoed by a Czech Christian Democrat: “there are people from different parties who, for some reason, are for me very easy-going, and they might even be from the

135 Interview with Czech MP (Úsvit, novice, loyalist), 18 November 2015. 136 Interview with Czech former MP (veteran, loyalist), 2 October 2015. 137 Interview with Polish MP (ZP, veteran, switcher), 26 June 2014. 138 Interview with Polish MP (ZP, veteran, switcher), 24 June 2014. 143 Communist party! … So basically, personal contacts and even actually friendships play a huge role”.139

These groups are initially based on shared identities between individuals, even if they do not know each other personally from previous experience. As one MP noted:

“We start to form clusters, and into these clusters MPs join from other groups, because this is non-partisan, and so steps are made towards development of the economy. Whether we form clusters, ephemeral associations, or non-partisan groups, we are able to solve issues in life, in the economy”.140

Furthermore, members of these ‘clusters’ can develop strong, durable loyalties with one another:

“Everything that connects us, is in fact this, that in the beginning we got to know each other, we understood one another, we agreed on things, we found our common language within this group in the beginning, and it turned out that we could count on one another. It might be a little bit funny, but ‘all for one and one for all’. If help was needed, then we helped each other; when there was some kind of issue, this is why we created this kind of little group”.141

Understandably, different social identities matter to different individuals, but whether discussing group-formation based on past political histories, shared regional origin, or other biographical and demographic characteristics (such as class and education), the appeal of working with others similar to oneself, regardless of party colors, is universal.142 Personal connections based on shared identities can even have an impact on day-to-day encounters:

139 Interview with Czech MP (KDU-ČSL, novice, loyalist), 13 November 2015. 140 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, switcher), 25 July 2014. 141 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, switcher), 10 July 2014. 142 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3.2, which provides interview evidence for the salience of some of these nonpartisan social identities among both Polish and Czech elites. 144 “...scouts143 are, for example, found across different formations, just as those from the NZS144. But it’s like this, that there exists something along the lines of moderation that they aren’t super-aggressive in their criticisms, for example regarding my work with the ministry, and often we smile to one another. And the scouts are not only on the right, because they’re also on the left”.145

Given the importance of shared social identities defined by personal characteristics, biographies, and workplace interaction, the occurrence of group-based party switching is a phenomenon not rooted in the pursuit of individual political ambition alone. The overarching motivation of MPs is to advance their careers and gain political influence through vote, office, and policy-seeking, but this is not necessarily an individual pursuit since acting with a group can provide an alternative and more effective means to these ends. Key to this decision is the selection of colleagues with whom the MP will defect.

While acknowledging the political ambitions that drove their choice to pursue a career in public service, many MPs noted that defections are the results of “personal conflicts—not ideological, but personal.”146 Interactions with others, facilitated by attachment to shared identities based on non-partisan or non-ideological characteristics, have a significant effect on

MPs’ decisions, especially when it comes to party switching. Collaborating with others with whom an MP shares an identity in common provides individuals with a heuristic that informs them that they may be able to serve their own ends by pursuing political ambition collectively, as part of that group.

143 The ‘scouts’ refer to any of the youth organizations that were active in Poland, similar to the idea of the Boy or Girl Scouts of America organizations. 144 The students’ union associated with the anti-Communist opposition before 1989, the Independent Students’ Association (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów, NZS). 145 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 2 July 2014. 146 Interview with Polish MP (PiS, veteran, loyalist), 13 July 2015. 145 Overall, while it may be fair to say that “people who switch ... have a right to find a place in politics that can be fulfilling,” the basis on which this occurs oftentimes revolves around the idea that “affiliation to a specific group is a social commitment.”147 Whether in plenary, committee, or outside the halls of parliament, collaboration and personal interactions are guided thus: “there are people with whom you have a sort of intellectual chemistry, with whom you work well together”.148 It makes sense, then, that as social beings, MPs would look to ensure a positive social experience with individuals with whom they share something in common while pursuing their own ambitions. That is, self-interest, social group association, and collective action go hand-in-hand.

6.6 Synthesis of Qualitative Evidence with Quantitative Results

Evidence from the semi-structured interviews with Polish and Czech MPs provide important evidence that both complements and goes beyond the statistical analyses in Chapters

4 and 5. That is, these interviews also provide independent evidence for the importance of the relationship between social identity, as a proxy for collective political ambition, and group- based party switching, supporting Hypothesis 1. The clearest evidence came from MPs who emphasized the importance of ‘clusters’, or social groups, based around shared identities, whether past political associations from before the transition (e.g., in Poland), or based on shared local ties and political experiences (e.g., in the Czech Republic).

147 Interview with Polish MP (PO, veteran, loyalist), 23 July 2014. 148 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, loyalist), 27 May 2015. 146 In Poland, the most significant identities to which MPs were attached were based on their shared political pasts. These identities were pivotal to the early formation of the Polish party system (Kamiński and Kurczewska 1994; Nalewajko 1992), and they continue to have an impact on activities such as legislative collaboration and roll-call voting (Tunkis 2017).149 The salience of this set of personal political biographies may decline as electoral turnover continues and younger generations of MPs enter the political arena, however. As one Polish MP noted,

“the Polish political scene is only now developing and evolving. 25 years is short; indeed, only now the groups with post-Communist politics are declining”.150

In the Czech Republic, MPs most frequently cited shared regional ties as a strong bond inside and outside of parliament. While no longer an explicitly defining feature of the Czech party system (as the Poslanecká sněmovna lacks regional parties, per se), regional identities and constituent concerns continue to drive political discourse—decentralization, for example, has formed the basis of most legislative debates over time (see Blahož et al. 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999).

In both countries, interviewed MPs also emphasized the impact of committee work. The best collaboration, according to one MP, “was especially visible through work in committees or sub-committees. It was then that I made contacts with many deputies.”151 This makes sense, given that MPs spend most of their time in committee and sub-committee meetings (cf. Kubuj

2013; Mansfeldová 2013).

In principle, the conversations with MPs also provide insight into the nuances of this relationship. The concept of party loyalty, for example, has been internalized by MPs as a

149 In fact, these identities are important not only at the national-political level (e.g., Darden and Grzymała-Busse 2006) but at all levels of Polish society (Shabad and Słomczyński 2000). 150 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, loyalist), 27 May 2015. 151 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 2 July 2014. 147 cornerstone of democraticness, namely through the principles of representativeness and accountability that define the nature of their mandates (see also Kubuj 2013). Yet if party membership does not allow MPs to follow these higher principles, then party switching is not out of the question; the goals of the party must align with the ambition of the individual.

However, defecting alone comes with risks, especially to the prospects of advancing one’s career. Many MPs therefore associate and work with colleagues with whom they share something in common besides party affiliation, namely some shared social identity. MPs in these groups may find that they also share mutual political ambition to seek votes, office, and policy, and acting together to achieve those goals collectively is a more effective than doing so alone. In this way, the pursuit of collective political ambition is a shorthand way of referring to

MPs’ collective strategy of realizing individual ambition that is shared between members of the group. By extension, according to Hypothesis 2, when the goals of the party align with those of a group of MPs—if they are in the same party—then a group switch will be less likely. By contrast, if the goals between the party and the group of MPs do not align, then a group switch may take place if that is the best option to achieve that group of MPs’ collective ambition.

Support for Hypotheses 3 and 4 was not borne out in the statistical analyses in Chapters

4 and 5, but tentative evidence from the interviews suggests that there may be a conditional relationship between personal ties and the pursuit of ambition, and how this affects group-based party switching decisions. When veterans spoke of their experiences in politics shortly after the democratic transition began, the fact that MPs “realized the first divisions oftentimes not on a programmatic basis, but on the basis of camaraderie,” and that “if a colleague is starting

148 something with others, then you go with them,”152 suggests two things. First, individuals may act in accordance to their individual political ambition if they can pursue their goals with others—namely comrades or those with whom they share an identity in common. That is, individual MPs may feel more confident that they will be able to advance their careers or policy goals if they can do so as part of a group with which they have some connection, according to

Hypothesis 3. It follows that if the MP’s attachment to a common identity group (or comrades) is stronger than attachment to the party, such that the ambitions of nonpartisan and party groups cross-cut, the appeal to defect based on the MP’s individual political ambition should be greater, as per Hypothesis 4.

6.7 Conclusion

The findings from the semi-structured interviews with Polish and Czech MPs shed light on the nuance of elite behavior and decision making in the act of group-based legislative party switching. Interviews provide additional evidence on top of the statistical results from the previous chapters analyzing Polish and Czech data on the role of identity and collective political ambition that influence MPs’ decisions to switch political parties with a group. First, loyalty to political parties is important, but only to an extent—indeed, party switching is frequent in Poland despite strong party discipline in roll-call votes, for example. MPs instead revealed that while parties and loyalty to them are important for democracy, this is just a means to the end of fulfilling the higher principles of integrity in ideals, accountability, and representativeness to the constituency. These goals, integral to accomplishing MPs’ ultimate

152 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 10 June 2015. 149 pursuit of political ambition (winning votes, office, and implementing policy), are most effectively achieved with a group. Which group is dependent on whether members share political ambition, which for MPs in new democracies is tied to shared social identities.

Second, I also argued that the influence of individual ambition on the decision to switch parties with a group is moderated when partisan and nonpartisan identities cross-cut one another. Statistical analysis revealed no such relationship in Poland, and very weak findings among Czech MPs. Identities are used as a heuristic by MPs to pursue ambition collectively, such that the pursuit of individual and collective ambition is not in conflict, but instead concurrent. Yet conversations with the MPs themselves provided some tentative insights into how the ties between social group members can independently push or pull individuals to switch parties, which could give the defector the impression that they are at the same time working towards achieving their ambition.

Overall, attachment to groups defined by shared social identities in parliament, in which individuals are able to pursue political ambition collectively, matter for Polish and Czech MPs, as confirmed by results from behavioral statistical analyses and supplemented by findings from semi-structured interviews with political elites in both countries. The following chapter will conclude my dissertation with an assessment of my theory and hypotheses for the group-basis of legislative party switching and offer avenues of further research on this phenomenon.

150

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This dissertation set out to examine the relationship between shared social identities and the occurrence of group-based legislative party switching in new democracies, using the examples of Post-Communist Poland and the Czech Republic. Findings from quantitative and qualitative study reveal the extent to which group switching takes place and the significance of shared social identities and the pursuit of political ambition that drive this phenomenon.

Existing literature on this subject, especially in the context of new democracies, is inconclusive on central questions in the party switching discourse, especially in light of evidence that most defections in these countries are group-based events rather than individual ones. This study thus looked to answer two of these questions:

1) To what extent does group switching occur?

2) To what extent, and why, do shared social identities affect the decision whether or not

to switch political parties with a group in relation to the pursuit of political ambition?

Overall, I argue that switching parties with a group rather than alone is an alternate means for MPs to achieve their underlying self-interested goal to enhance their political influence, whether by winning votes, advancing their careers and seeking higher office, or through the implementation of policy objectives. To do so, individuals look to associate with

151 colleagues with whom they share one or more social identities in common. MPs who share biographies or characteristics in common may also share political ambition, which can be more effectively achieved collectively than individually. This consequently facilitates the political need for coalition building to achieve political ambitions, as much it may satisfy social needs for association with likeminded colleagues in parliament.

7.1 Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications

The two overarching questions asked in this dissertation can be addressed by synthesizing the results from Chapters 4 and 5, which quantitatively analyze the patterns of group-based party switching in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively, with evidence from semi-structured interviews with Polish and Czech sitting and former MPs in Chapter 6.

1) To what extent does group switching occur?

In both countries, the majority of defections over time for the time periods analyzed were group-based, in which MPs switched together with others on the same day towards the same destination, whether to another political party or to a non-affiliated, independent status.

Between 1997 and 2011, about 82% of total party switches in Poland occurred as part of a group event; between 1992 and 2013 in the Czech Republic, about 61% of all defections were group-based events.

152 2) To what extent, and why, do shared social identities affect the decision whether or not

to switch political parties with a group in relation to the pursuit of political ambition?

I address the ‘why’ first. In this dissertation, I have argued that MPs use the social identities that they perceive to share with others around them as heuristics when making legislative decisions, specifically to determine with whom to switch parties, in lieu of partisan cues in weak or unstable party systems. The results from quantitative and qualitative research show that switching parties with groups of colleagues with similar identities allows individuals to achieve political ambition collectively, which can be more effective than doing so alone. For example, enhancing political influence by forming a new party or passing legislation requires coalition and collaboration. Interviews with MPs also reveal that pursuing collective ambition with others who share social identities increases in-group cohesiveness thanks to the benefits of acting with a group, not only through the achievement of instrumental goals, but by increasing individuals’ self-esteem. MPs in both countries emphasized that collaboration and the friendships they made in parliament have a large influence on the achievement of ambition, whether in terms of selecting with whom to work in committee or on whom they could rely when facing difficult challenges and questions—including party loyalty. One of the strongest quotes to this effect was provided by a veteran MP from the early days of Polish democracy, who stated that “we realized the first divisions oftentimes not on a programmatic basis, but on the basis of camaraderie; if a colleague is starting something with others, then you go with them.”153

153 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 10 June 2015. 153 The impact of and attachment to social identities is ostensibly a proxy for MPs’ pursuit of collective ambition, as well as for the importance of social group association among political elites. In Poland, attachment to shared identities based on levels of education, social class, region, pre-democratic political history, and co-membership in standing committees all had substantively large effect on the likelihood of group-based party switching. Furthermore, if these nonpartisan identities aligned with existing party labels, strong attachment deterred the likelihood of defection, whereas if these identities cross-cut party lines, the likelihood of group switching was greater. In the Czech Republic, the findings for the impact of attachment to shared identities were weaker. Social class and regional origins had a strong influence on the decision to defect, but how strong attachment affected the likelihood of group switching was opposite that hypothesized, in terms of aligned and cross-cutting nonpartisan and partisan identities. That defections are less common in the Czech Republic than in Poland notwithstanding, the empirical findings from this dissertation suggest that it is the pursuit of collective ambition that has a direct influence on the decision to switch political parties as part of a group.

Conversely, there was virtually no evidence that having cross-cutting identities would strengthen the influence of individual ambition on the likelihood of group switching in both countries. Instead, while the pursuit of collective and individual ambition are independent, they are not exclusive. That is, these represent two sides of the same coin: individual ambition is achieved through the pursuit of this ambition collectively, with an MP’s group of colleagues, and it does not matter if the identities shared in common in this group cross-cut party lines or not. Indeed, the pursuit of political ambition can be less difficult if one is able to follow through

154 with these goals in good company in which some MPs adopt an “all for one and one for all”154 mentality.

Thus, the theories of legislative party switching deserve to be revisited in order to better understand the determinants of interparty defection and its meaning for broader discussions about party systems in new democracies.

Convention holds that MPs operate within a rational framework accounting for individuals’ self-interest, based on the pursuit of political ambition (Heller and Mershon

2009a). This emphasizes that party switching is fundamentally an individual decision. While ultimately true, this does not take into account the role of others around individual MPs in making these decisions especially in cases in which the majority of defections are group-based.

Even if legislators are not being ‘coerced’ into switching parties by their colleagues explicitly, I have shown quantitatively and qualitatively that they do take into account social cues alongside their own self-interest in order to achieve their goals.

More broadly, the patterns of group-based party switching revealed in the Polish and

Czech cases are in part consistent with party system-based approaches to studying party fusions, fissions, dissolution, and formation (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003). However, this does not extend to the frequency of group defections that have taken place wherein Polish or Czech political parties did not merge, split, collapse, or appear anew. In fact, interparty mobility has remained frequent in Poland despite strong party discipline and loyalty, whereas weak discipline among Czech parties did not result in frequent realignments of the party system.

Thus, while I agree that the decision to switch political parties is still a function of the pursuit of individual ambition, I argue that the answer lies in the pursuit of collective ambition

154 Interview with Polish MP (PSL, novice, switcher), 10 July 2014. 155 as an alternative means to achieving self-interested goals. Party loyalty may seem important on the surface, but these organizations are in fact a means to an end, following Downs’ (1957) and

Aldrich’s (1995) arguments for the purpose of political parties. If affiliation in a particular party no longer serves an MP’s purpose, then he or she may turn to alternative group associations to achieve political ambition. Social psychology research on the significance of group identification and formation in social spaces (Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986; Turner 1982) provides additional insight, that MPs use shared identities as cues to determine with whom around them that they may effectively achieve ambition collectively. That is, switching with a group is an important alternative means for individuals to achieve their career goals while also fulfilling the social—and sometimes non-instrumental—need to be among people like themselves.

While filling in some of the blanks left by past research as to why party switching remains frequent as a group-based event in new democracies, this dissertation endeavors to show that what may appear individually irrational is not so when social factors are taken into account.

7.2 Limitations of this Research

I undertook a multi-method approach to first statistically analyze the patterns of party switching and assess evidence from semi-structured interviews with sitting and former MPs in both Poland and the Czech Republic. As a consequence of the methodology and case selection, this study encountered a number of limitations, which need to be addressed.

156 One challenge involved in quantitative social scientific research is the selection and specification of models and analytical techniques. Based on the structure of the data and variables, I employed multilevel Generalized Linear Modeling. This modeling technique is useful in its robustness and flexibility—fit statistics also showed that the specifications used were superior to simple logistic regressions as well. Based on the variation in the dependent variable, however, while this approach was adequate for the analysis of the Polish case, the models did not fit as well with the Czech data. Alternative modeling strategies, including

Structural Equation Modeling and other techniques used to model unbalanced panel data, also did not yield substantively different results.

The inclusion and operationalization of specific independent variables also raised some issues. In Chapter 5, I had to ultimately omit the predictor measuring MPs’ attachment to political history identities (although I include fully specified models in Appendix F) because its inclusion greatly constrained the analyzed sample sizes. Comparatively few Czech MPs had such a background, leading to a great deal of missingness in the data; there was little history in terms of a pre-democratic civil society in Czechoslovakia compared to Poland (see Darden and

Grzymała-Busse 2006).

The operationalization of the interaction term used to assess cross-cutting identities’ moderation of the impact of individual political ambition on group switching may also have been too stringent. Loosening the threshold to half a standard deviation from mean loyalty scores, however, did not chance the results, suggesting robustness of the findings.155 A looser operationalisation based on arbitrary thresholds (as opposed to standard deviations from the

155 The models also produced similar results when the interaction term was based on party and nonpartisan identity loyalty scores that were standardized to normal (0,1) distributions. 157 mean score) would also be difficult to justify, due to the differences in average party loyalty observed in both countries, let alone for the purposes of generalization beyond Poland and the

Czech Republic. A scheme with thresholds determined by standard deviations from mean attachment scores was ultimately the best option for a variable that could be used across case studies regardless of differences in observed party loyalties and attachments to shared social identities.

Lastly, the selection of case studies may also raise questions about generalizability of my theory to other new democracies. At first blush, it is clear that Poland and the Czech

Republic are in some ways unique in terms of their democratic transitions. Among other things, most Third Wave democracies were not influenced (or pressured) by the prospect of accession to the European Union or NATO, nor did they all have some historical legacy of democracy prior to the authoritarian period.156 Despite these issues, the theoretical argument for the relationship between social identity, ambition, and legislative party switching is easily translatable. First, volatile party systems are characteristic across Post-Communist Europe (e.g.,

Innes 2002), and regular electoral turnover is common among new democracies (e.g., Dix

1984; Uppal 2009) and established democracies alike (e.g., Heller and Mershon 2005). Second, one of the cornerstone frameworks of my theory for group-based party switching is socially universal, whether among elites in parliament or the masses in the streets. Identity and group formation affect behavior and decision making in social situations (Turner 1982); indeed, as

Depeche Mode put it, “People are people” (Gore 1984).

156 Both Poland and the Czech Republic had democratic systems in the interwar period, for the most part (Poland moved towards dictatorship after 1927). 158 7.3 Potential Policy Implications

Consideration of the consequences of group-based behavior and the regularity of party switching in new democracies goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is worth considering the policy implications of a better understanding of this phenomenon as a largely group-based behavior.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the implementation of anti-defection legislation could contribute to party system stability and government majorities’ or coalitions’ effectiveness (see

Janda 2009). In party systems experiencing rampant disloyalty among MPs for a variety of reasons, such laws may be well-justified. Alternatively, although no such laws were ever enacted in Poland or the Czech Republic, some political parties employed internal rules to discipline their members.157 Yet cross-national studies have shown that anti-switching rules are not always effective at reducing volatility (e.g., Malhotra 2005; Subramarian 2008).

At the same time, whether the effects of party switching in the long run are exclusively negative is up for debate. Janda points out that laws against defection can “appear to conflict at least with the practice of competitive party politics—if they are not ‘undemocratic’ in principle” (2009: 12)—a notion also supported by some of the MPs I interviewed. Numerous studies have also found that interparty mobility facilitates, or is one of the growing-pains of, maturation of party and electoral politics in new democracies (e.g., Booysen 2006; Kreuzer and

Pettai 2003; Shabad and Słomczyński 2004) and can be explained as a form of MPs ‘sorting themselves out’ (cf. Levendusky 2009).

157 In Poland, the leader of Samoobrona, Andrzej Lepper, had his elected rank-and-file MPs fill out blank bills-of- exchange to be cashed in should any member defect; the same tactic was employed by Miroslav Sládek as leader of the SPR-RSČ in the Czech Republic. However, both of these cases were highly controversial, and were incidentally deemed illegal/unconstitutional (Pietkiewicz 2007; “V politice dokázal vydělat miliony. Jak?” 2001). 159 To avoid approaching this as a chicken-vs.-egg question, the implementation of policy regarding party switching ought to be considered on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, group-switching may be evidence of the deeper issue of a lack of institutionalization at the party or national levels. On the other hand, this may rather be an indication of the slow process of party system stabilization.

7.4 Recommendations for Future Research

To better understand the nature and motivations for legislative party switching, especially as a group-based phenomenon, there is need for more research at both the individual and national levels. Reflecting upon the outcomes of this dissertation, I propose a few avenues of future research that can facilitate this agenda.

One of the questions unaddressed by my research is the importance of personal connections or friendships rather than general association around a shared identity—the formation of common-bond groups as opposed to common-identity groups (see Castano et al.

2003). Along with attachments to shared social identities, friendships may also have a systematic influence on legislative behavior. The impact of camaraderie on the incidence of group switching can be evaluated through social network analysis techniques (e.g., Cranmer et al. 2017) by analyzing the strength of connections over time between individual MPs. This could reveal how, and around what identities, individuals tend to coalesce, and the influence these connections have on groups’ propensity to defect together.

The timelines examined in this dissertation should also be expanded. The recent conclusion of the 7. Volební období allows for the inclusion of another four years (2013-2017)

160 to the Czech study, and the VII Kadencja in the Sejm would also provide an additional four years (2011-2015) to the breadth of the Polish analysis. Unfortunately, Polish legislative data

(especially roll calls) were not digitized prior to 1997, requiring extensive archival research to catalog and organize materials documenting legislative behavior from the first freely and fairly elected Sejm in 1991. An expansion of the number of observations in this way would yield over

25 years of data for both country cases, which on its own would provide a greater wealth of information.

An additional fruitful direction of future work for this agenda would be the expansion of case studies beyond Poland and the Czech Republic to neighboring countries in the

Postcommunist space, to other new democracies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as well as to established democracies that experience party system volatility and frequent party switching.

Additional in-depth case studies or cross-national comparisons would go a long way to reveal the extent of party switching as a group-based occurrence, as well as to determine the dynamics of and the underlying motivations for this phenomenon among political elites around the world.

For example, is this a localized phenomenon? Is group-based party switching comparatively a phenomenon of new democracies alone—and if so, why or why not?

In the words of a former Polish MP, “the fact that, in 25 years in Poland, there was an ebb and flow in support for political parties was very bad. Parties appeared and disappeared, or almost disappeared. This is no accident. This requires sociological research!”158

158 Interview with Polish former MP (veteran, switcher), 8 July 2015. 161 7.5 Conclusion

In spite of the tradition in the research on legislative party switching that focuses on the mechanics of a fundamentally individual decision, this dissertation shows that this is actually a group-based phenomenon most of the time. While the nature of the decision as individual is not in dispute here, it is clear that individual MPs rely on cues from others around them to choose whether or not to switch their partisan allegiances in the course of a parliamentary term.

My dissertation offers an alternative perspective to the motivations and dynamics of party switching in light of the group basis of this form of legislative behavior. Ultimately, politicians keep their eyes on the prize: the attainment of enhanced political influence through vote, office, and policy-seeking ambitions. The evidence I provide shows that MPs join or form groups to achieve ambition collectively. These groups are defined by things that members share in common with each other: social identities, shared biographies, and even demographic characteristics, as well as shared experiences in legislative committees. Acting as part of a group thus not only spreads the career or reputational risks of defection, but also provides individual MPs with a stronger sense of social and ultimately political cohesion necessary in the maintenance of party unity and the achievement of their own personal political ambitions.

In this way, group-based party switching may play a heretofore unexplored yet important role in the development of party systems in nascent democracies, which lack democratic and party traditions.

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Appendix A: Members of Parliament Affiliations Data – Poland Codebook

The main sources of these data are official records drawn from parliamentary libraries and archives, both digitized and hard-copy format, as well as other relevant state agencies

(offices of the government/prime minister, electoral commissions, statistical bureaus).

Additionally, some data were already collected in previous or related efforts—these are noted in the variable descriptions below and as Secondary Sources among the references cited at the end of this document. When using these sources, all data were cross-referenced with the original, primary sources to ensure accuracy and integrity.

Codebook

Variable Name Description Coding Source ID Unique ID for each String EAST PaC MP; used to merge with EAST PaC

LAST_NAME MP last name String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central European Sejm (Windows) RP159

FIRST_NAME MP first name String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central European Sejm RP (Windows)

MID_NAME MP middle/second String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central European Sejm RP name(s) (Windows)

159 This citation refers to Sejm RP (1999, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012). 177 KADENCJA Parliamentary term 1 = 1991-1993 identifier (constant for 2 = 1993-1997 each term); numbered 3 = 1997-2001 for each parliament 4 = 2001-2005 since 1991 5 = 2005-2007 6 = 2007-2011

PARTY_NAME Full name of political String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central European Sejm RP party (Polish) (Windows)

PARTY_ABB Party abbreviation String Sejm RP

START Beginning date for dd-mmm-yy Sejm RP activity; marks initial date for parliamentary affiliation or position; beginning of observation.

END End date for activity; dd-mmm-yy Sejm RP marks terminal data for parliamentary affiliation or position; end of observation.

PARTY_FAM Party ideological family 1 – Far Left Hloušek 2 – Social Democrats and 3 – Greens Kopeček 4 – Liberals (2010); 5 – Christian Democrats Migalski 6 – Conservatives (2008) 7 – Far Right 8 – Agrarian 9 – Regional and Ethnic 0 – Mixed (N/A)

PARL_GROUP Type of parliamentary 0 – Niezrzeszeni Sejm RP party grouping; 1 – Klub Parlamentarny categorical 2 – Koło Parlamentarne classification of 3 – Klub Poselski administrative status as 4 – Koło Poselski parliamentary group.

PARTY_GOV Is party in 0 – no Sejm RP, government/coalition? 1 – yes KPRM

GOV_POS1, Government positions String (English, Polish), uses text encoding 1250 : Central KPRM GOV_POS2, European (Windows) GOV_POS3

178 COM1, COM2 Committee assignments Acronym Full name Sejm RP ASW Komisja Administracji i Spraw N.B.: Acronyms used Wewnętrznych ENM Komisja Edukacji, Nauki i Młodzieży EPS Komisja Etyki Poselskiej EUR Komisja Europejska FPB Komisja Finansów Publicznych GOS Komisja Gospodarki INE Komisja Integracji Europejskiej INF Komisja Infrastruktury INT Komisja Innowacyjności i Nowoczesnych Technologii KFS Komisja Kultury Fizycznej i Sportu; Komisja Kultury Fizycznej, Sportu i Turystyki KFT Komisja Kultury Fizycznej i Turystyki KOP Komisja do Spraw Kontroli Państwowej KSP Komisja Kultury i Środków Przekazu KSS Komisja do Spraw Służb Specjalnych LPG Komisja Łączności z Polakami za Granicą MNE Komisja Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych MSP Komisja Małych i Średnich Przedsiębiorstw OBN Komisja Obrony Narodowej ODK Komisja Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej OKK Komisja Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów OSZ Komisja Ochrony Środowiska, Zasobów Naturalnych i Leśnictwa PBM Komisja Polityki Przestrzennej, Budowlanej i Mieszkaniowej POS Komisja Polityki Społecznej PRC Komisja Pracy PSR Komisja Polityki Społecznej i Rodziny RKM Komisja Równego Statusu Kobiet i Mężczyzn ROD Komisja Rodziny; Komisja Rodziny i Praw Kobiet ROP Komisja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości RRW Komisja Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi RSP Komisja Regulaminowa i Spraw Poselskich SPC Komisja Sprawiedliwości i Praw Człowieka STR Komisja Samorządu Terytorialnego i Polityki Regionalnej SUE Komisja do Spraw Unii Europejskiej SUP Komisja Skarbu Państwa; Komisja Skarbu Państwa, Uwłaszczenia i Prywatyzacji SZA Komisja Spraw Zagranicznych TRL Komisja Transportu i Łączności UST Komisja Ustawodawcza ZDR Komisja Zdrowia

179 COM_POS1, Position in committee 0 – member Sejm RP COM_POS2 1 – officer

NAT_LIST Was mandate achieved 0 – no PKW via national 1 – yes proportional list as opposed to constituency lists?

N.B.: This variable only featured in I, II, III Kadencja; this method was no longer used following constitutional and electoral reforms prior to the parliamentary elections in 2001.

DIST Electoral Integer, coded according to district EAST PaC constituency/district Note: This variable changes between the 1997 and 2001 elections, when constitutional, electoral, and national administrative reforms were implemented.

WOJEWOD97, National administrative Integer, coded according to administrative region PKW WOJEWOD region Note: This variable changes between the 1997 and 2001 elections, when constitutional, electoral, and national administrative reforms were implemented.

LIST_POS Preferential party list Integer EAST position PaC, PKW

PVOTES Absolute number of Integer EAST preferential votes PaC, PKW received in elections

OCCUP Primary listed/declared Integer, using Polish SCO-2009 system (English) EAST PaC occupation prior to our outside of parliament or politics (if any)

180 CLASS Socioeconomic class, 1 – Intelligentsia, non-technical EAST PaC based on Polish SCO- 2 – Technical intelligentsia, engineers 2009 system 3 – Middle and low-level nonmanual workers 4 – Sales and service workers 5 – Manual workers 6 – Farmers 7 – Business owners, self-employed in sales and service 8 – Not working, without occupation

EDUC Level of education, 0 – podstawowe Sejm RP semi-ordinal. Based on 1 – zasadnicze zawodowe Polish educational 2 – średnie zawodowe structure as self- 3 – średnie ogólnokształcące reported in MP 4 – policealne registration forms 5 – pomturalne 6 – wyższe

ALMA_MATER Where highest level of String, contains non-ASCII characters. Sejm RP, education was personal achieved websites

GRAD_YR Year highest level of Integer Sejm RP, education was personal received websites

PAST_MP Incumbent status, 0 – no Sejm RP, whether or not 1 – yes PKW individual was elected to and served in the Sejm at any time in the past.

NUM_KAD Number of terms Integer Sejm RP served in the past (if first-timer, 0)

KAD_HIST Specific terms served For each number, 0 if not in office, 1 if served: Sejm RP (tenure-time identifier). Unique for e.g., for VI Kadencja, each Kadencja (does 1011011 = served before 1989 | did not serve 1989-1991 | not include future served 1991-1993 | served 1993-1997 | did not serve terms beyond 1997-2001 | served 2001-2005 | served 2005-2007. Kadencja in question).

181 POLIT_BIO Political group, Acronym Full name Sejm RP, activity, or association KPN Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej various in which MP was a LPK Liga Polskich Kobiet external, member prior to 1989. NSZZ Nizależny Samorządny Związek personal Zawodowy “Solidarność” websites NZS Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów OPZZ Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych PAX Stowarzyszenie “PAX” POH Polska Organizacja Harcerska PRON Patriotyczny Ruch Odrodzenia Narodowego PTSM Polskie Towarzystwo Schronisk Młodzieżowych PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza SD Stronnictwo Demokratyczne SHK Stowarzyszenie Harcerstwa Katolickiego SN Stronnictwo Narodowe SZSP Socjalistyczny Związek Studentów Polskich UChS Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna ZHP Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego ZHR Związek Harcerstwa Rzeczypospolitej ZMW Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej ZNP Związek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego ZSL Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe ZSMP Związek Socjalistycznej Młodzieży Polskiej ZSP Zrzeszenie Studentów Polskich

GENDER Gender 0 – Male EAST PaC 1 – Female

YEAR_BIRTH Year of birth Integer EAST PaC

AGE Age at beginning of Integer term

V##### Roll-call vote 0 – Against Sejm RP 1 – In favour 2 - Abstained

Acronyms

KPRM = Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów (Chancellery of the Prime Minister’s Office)

PKW = Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (State Electoral Commission)

Sejm RP = Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Sejm of the Republic of Poland)

182

Appendix B: Members of Parliament Affiliations Data – Czech Republic Codebook

The main sources of these data are official records drawn from parliamentary libraries and archives, both digitised and hard-copy format, as well as other relevant state agencies

(offices of the government/prime minister, electoral commissions, statistical bureaus).

Additionally, some data were already collected in previous or related efforts—these are noted in the variable descriptions below and as Secondary Sources among the references cited at the end of this document. When using these sources, all data were cross-referenced with the original, primary sources to ensure accuracy and integrity.

Codebook

Variable Name Description Coding Source ID Unique ID for each MP; Integer; drawn directly from the online data PSPČR161 used to merge with Czech scheme used by the Poslanecká sněmovna.160 PSP roll-call votes and track specific individuals over time

160 Based on the value assigned as id_osoba, which is uniform across time (in contrast to id_poslanec). According to roll-call data maintained by the Poslanecká sněmovna, deputy Miloslav Kučera (b. 4. 3. 1942) is listed as ID 223 in 2. VO (1996-1998, as Mgr. Miloslav Kučera) and then ID 388 in 3. VO (1998-2002, as Mgr. Miloslav Kučera starší). Similarly, identically named deputy Miloslav Kučera (b. 4. 10. 1956) is listed as ID 387 in 3. VO (1998-2002, as Ing. Miloslav Kučera mladší) and then ID 5253 in 4. VO (2002-2006, as Ing. Miloslav Kučera). To facilitate the tracking of specific individuals over time in the data, the respective ID 223 and 387 designations have been maintained in the final version of the Czech MPAD. 161 This source includes online materials, in the Parliamentary Library, and in the Parliamentary Archives as needed. 183

LAST_NAME MP last name String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central PSPČR European (Windows)

FIRST_NAME MP first name String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central PSPČR European (Windows)

MID_NAME MP middle/second String, String, uses text encoding 1250 : PSPČR name(s) Central European (Windows)

In cases of deputies with identical names, mladší and starší are used to differentiate between the younger and elder individuals, respectively.

OBDOBI Parliamentary term 1 = 1992-1996 identifier (constant for 2 = 1996-1998 each term); numbered for 3 = 1998-2002 each parliament since 4 = 2002-2006 1992. Shortened reference 5 = 2006-2010 to Czech term Volební 6 = 2010-2013 období.

PARTY_NAME Full name of String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central PSPČR parliamentary party group European (Windows). (Czech)

PARTY_ABB Party group abbreviation String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central PSPČR European (Windows)

START Beginning date for dd-mmm-yy PSPČR activity; marks initial date for parliamentary affiliation or position; beginning of observation.

END End date for activity; dd-mmm-yy PSPČR marks terminal data for parliamentary affiliation or position; end of observation.

PARTY_FAM Party ideological family 1 – Far Left Hloušek and 2 – Social Democrats Kopeček (2010); 3 – Greens Migalski (2008) 4 – Liberals 5 – Christian Democrats 6 – Conservatives 7 – Far Right 8 – Agrarian 9 – Regional and Ethnic 0 – Mixed (N/A)

184 PARL_GROUP Type of parliamentary 0 – Nezařazení PSPČR party grouping; 1 – Poslanecký klub categorical classification of administrative status as parliamentary group.

PARTY_GOV Is party in 0 – No VČR, PSPČR government/coalition? 1 – Yes

GOV_POS1, Government position String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central VČR GOV_POS2, European (Windows) GOV_POS3

COM1, COM2, Committee assignments Acronym Full name PSPČR COM3, COM4, BBV Branný a bezpečnostní výbor COM5 N.B.: Acronyms used HV Hospodářský výbor KV Kontrolní výbor MIV Mandátový a imunitní výbor ORGV Organizační výbor PV Petiční výbor RV Rozpočtový výbor VB Výbor pro bezpečnost VEI Výbor pro evropskou integraci VEZ Výbor pro evropské záležitosti VO Výbor pro obranu VOB Výbor pro obranu a bezpečnost VOV Volební výbor VPLP Výbor petiční, pro lidská práva a národnosti VSPZ Výbor pro sociální politiku a zdravotnictví VSP Výbor pro sociální politiku VSR Výbor pro veřejnou správu a regionální rozvoj VSRZP Výbor pro veřejnou správu, regionální rozvoj a životní prostředí VVVKM Výbor pro vědu, vzdělání, kulturu, mládež a tělovýchovu VZ Výbor pro zdravotnictví VZP Výbor pro životní prostředí UPV Ústavně právní výbor ZAV Zahraniční výbor ZEV Zemědělský výbor

COM_POS1...5 Position in committee 0 – Member PSPČR 1 – Officer

185 KRAJ Region/constituency String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central ČSÚ, Millard (2004) European (Windows)

LIST_POS Preferential party list Integer ČSÚ, Millard (2004) position

PVOTES Absolute number of Integer ČSÚ, Millard (2004) preferential votes received in elections.

OCCUP Primary listed/declared String (English translation) PSPČR, ČSÚ, occupation prior to or Millard (2004) outside of parliament or Personal websites, politics (if any) nasipolitici.cz, komunalnipolitika.cz

CLASS Socio-economic class, 0 – Employees in the armed forces ČSÚ based on Czech ISCO- 1 – Politicians, managers, and executives 2011, with additional 2 – Specialists special category for 3 – Technicians and associate professionals pensioners 4 – Clerks and officials 5 – Services and sales workers 6 – Skilled workers in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 7 – Tradesmen, craftsmen, repairmen 8 – Skilled labour, plant and machine operators, and assemblers 9 – Unskilled labour and auxilliary workers 10 – Pensioners

EDUC Level of education, semi- 0 – Less than primary school/basic education UNESCO ordinal. Based on Czech 1 – Primary school ČSÚ mapping of ISCED 2011. 2 – Lower secondary school 3 – Upper secondary school 4 – Post-secondary non-tertiary 5 – Higher education, Baccalaureat and Masters-equivalent 6 – Higher education, doctorate-equivalent

ALMA_MATER Where highest level of String, uses text encoding 1250 : Central PSPČR, Personal education was achieved European (Windows) websites, nasipolitici.cz

GRAD_YR Year highest level of Integer (year) PSPČR, Personal education was received websites. nasipolitici.cz

186 PAST_MP Incumbent status, 0 – no PSPČR whether or not individual 1 – yes was elected to and served in the Poslanecká sněmovna at any time in the past.

NUM_OBD Number of terms served Integer PSPČR in the past (if first-timer, 0)

OBD_HIST Specific terms served For each number, 0 if not in office, 1 if served: PSPČR (tenure-time identifier). Unique for each období e.g., for 6. VO (2010-2013), (does not include future 011011 = did not serve before 1992 | served období relative to 1992-1996 | served 1996-1998 | did not serve observation). 1998-2002 | served 2002-2006 | served 2006- 2010.

POLIT_BIO Political group, activity, Acronym Full name PSPČR, ČSÚ, or association in which C77 Charta ’77 (signatory) Personal websites, MP was a member prior Československé strany nasipolitici.cz ČSL to and/or including 1990. lidové Československé strany ČSS N.B.: Acronyms used socialistické Klub angažovaných KAN nestraníků Křesťanskodemokratická KDS strana Kolegia pravicových stran KPSH a hnutí Komunistická strana KSČ Československa Komunistický svaz KSM mládeže, z. S. Liberálně demokratická LDS strana MNS Moravská národní strana OF Občanské forum Republikánská unie – RU Svobodný blok SSM Socialistický svaz mládeže SZ Strana zelených ZS Zemědělská strana

GENDER Gender 0 – Male PSPČR, Millard 1 – Female (2004)

YEAR_BIRTH Year of birth Integer PSPČR, Millard (2004)

187 AGE Age at beginning of term Integer PSPČR, Millard (2004)

V##### Roll-call vote 0 – Against PSPČR 1 – In favour See MPAD Roll-call 2 – Abstained Meta Data codebook for 6 – Present but did not vote additional information 7 – Not present/not logged-in about each individual 8 – Excused vote. 9 – Vote occurred prior to deputy’s swearing-in

Acronyms

ČSÚ = Český statistický úřad (Czech Statistical Office)

PSPČR = Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu České republiky (Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic)

UNESCO = United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

VČR = Vláda České republiky (Government of the Czech Republic)

188

Appendix C: Members of Parliament Affiliations Data – Roll Call Meta Dataset

Codebook

This codebook outlines the variables contained in each country’s roll-call voting meta data, including date/time of vote, session and vote number, description(s), and vote IDs to which roll-call vote variables in the main MPAD are matched. Notably, these data (along with variables in the main MPAD) consist of all electronically recorded votes—those that were cast manually or not properly recorded for a variety of reasons (e.g., improper data storage, recording error) are not found in these data. MPAD_META_PL.dta corresponds with the Polish

MPAD datasets; MPAD_META_CZ.dta corresponds with the Czech MPAD datasets. The main sources of these data are official records drawn from parliamentary libraries and archives, both digitised and hard-copy format.

Codebook

Variable Description Coding VOTE_ID Unique ID for each roll-call vote cast; corresponds with String V##### variables in main MPAD

TERM Parliamentary term identifier; numbered for each Polish: parliament according to country. 3 – 1997-2001; 4 – 2001-2005; 5 – 2005-2007; 6 – 2007-2011 Czech: 1 – 1992-1996; 2 – 1996-1998; 3 – 1998-2002; 4 – 2002-2006; 5 – 2006-2010; 6 – 2010-2013 189

SESSION Session number in given term Integer

VOTE_NUM Vote number in given session Integer

DATE Date of vote dd/mm/yyyy

TIME Time of vote (in 24hr format) hh:mm

NAME1 Description of vote/item on agenda String, uses text encoding 1250: Central European (Windows)

NAME2 Additional description of vote/item on agenda (if any) String, uses text encoding 1250: Central European (Windows)

190

Appendix D: Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaires

Interviews with sitting and former members of parliament followed a semi-structured, open-ended format (see Chapter 3 for a broader discussion covering methodological and sampling designs). I assured respondents of the anonymity of their responses prior to the interviews both verbally and on paper (using official, institutional letterheads) to assure consent, as required by The Ohio State University Office of Responsible Research Practices. I generally initiated contact via telephone, and I provided all prospective respondents with all requested information and documentation regarding intent and identity. All procedures were approved by the Ohio State Institutional Review Board (Protocols 2014E0602; 2014 E0108).

I conducted all interviews in an informal manner for the most part, besides the use of official titles, to effectively facilitate conversation. The Polish and Czech language questionnaire scripts used are presented below, following the original English design.

English Language

1. I would like to begin our conversation with a general question: what personally

motivated you to enter public political service?

2. Taking into account your experiences working in the Sejm, are (or were) there specific

people with whom you have (had) the tendency to collaborate (more often than with

191 others)?

3. On the basis of your experiences and perspectives, I would like to ask a question on the

topic of politics in Poland nowadays as well as over the last 25 years.

We know that there have been examples of changes in party affiliation by members of

parliament in the past, in Poland as in other countries. What do you think about this type

of activity and behavior?

(Follow-up 1): What do you think about the effect of this kind of behavior on different

political parties, Polish politics in general, the development of democracy, etc.?

(Follow-up 2): Why do you think these changes in affiliation take place?

Polish Language

1. Chciałbym rozpocząć naszą rozmowę od ogólnego pytania: co osobiście Panem/Panią

kierowało, aby rozpocząć diałalność polityczną w służbie społeczeństwu?

2. Biorąc pod uwagę Pana/Pani doświadczeniach z działalności sejmowej, czy są/były

konkretne osoby, z którymi Pan/Pani ma/miał(a) tendencję do współpracowania (tzn.

częściej niż z innymi)?

3. Na podstawie Pana/Pani doświadczenie i perspektywy, chciałbym zadać pytanie na

temat polityki w Polsce w dzisiejszych czasach i w ciągu ostatnich 25 lat.

192 Wiadomo o przypadkach zmiany przynależności partyjnej przez członków parlamentu

w przeszłości, w Polsce jak równiez w innych krajach. Co Pan/Pani sądzi o tego rodzaju

zachowaniach i działaniu?

(Follow-up 1): Jak również, co Pan/Pani sądzi na temat efektu tego typu

postępowania/zachowań na różne partie polityczne, czy ogólną politykę w Polsce,

rozwój demokracji, itd.?

(Follow-up 2): Dlaczego uważa Pan/Pani, że takie zmiany przynależności występują?

Czech Language

1. Rád bych náš rozhovor začal obecnou otázku: co Vás osobně motivovalo, abyste sloužil

společnosti v politických funkcích?

2. Na základě Vašich zkušeností z Parlamentu bych se chtěl zeptat, jestli jsou konkrétní

lidé, s kterými máte/jste měl tendenci spolupracovat (více než s jinými)?

3. Dále bych se rád zeptal na politiku v České republice dnes a za posledních dvacet let z

Vaší osobní perspektivy.

V České republice i v zahraničí existují případy, kdy poslanci v minulosti změnili svoji

stranickou příslušnost. Co si myslíte o takovémto druhu rozhodnutí a jednání?

193 (Follow-up 1): Co si myslíte o důsledcích tohoto typu jednání na politické strany,

českou politiku obecně, rozvoj demokracie v České republice, a tak dále?

(Follow-up 2): Proč si myslíte, že se tyto změny v stranické příslušnosti dějí?

194

Appendix E: Ancillary Tables for Polish Analysis (1997-2011)

This appendix contains additional tables for Polish MPs as referenced in Chapter 4, namely the distribution of MP observations according to Polish party families and the adjusted party families used to generate dummy variables to control for ideology.

To control for ideology, I classify MPs according to the ideological families of the political parties with which they are affiliated. I use the classification scheme employed by

Hloušek and Kopeček (2010), which best reflects the programmatic groupings found in Central and Eastern Europe, and especially in Poland and the Czech Republic (see also Migalski 2008).

In Poland, parties generally fell in the categories of Social Democrats, Liberals,

Christian Democrats, Conservatives, the Far Right, and Agrarians. There was a small group of

MPs who formed a party classified as Far Left in III Kadencja (1997-2001), and the Sejm traditionally reserves at least one seat to represent the German Minority party (found with the

Regional and Ethnic family) every election. There were no Greens in the Sejm during the period covered by the MPAD for Poland. I present the breakdown of observations by party family by Kadencja below in Table E.1.

Because of the very small number of observations for the Far Left and Regional and

Ethnic families, I combine the observations with the Mixed category, which encompasses nonregistered or independent MPs. In Poland this includes MPs affiliated with political parties holding fewer than three seats with the exception of the Germans. The dummy variables used to

195 control for ideology (by way of party families) shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are thus based on the adjusted scheme presented in Table E.2 below.

Table E.1. Number of observations by party families in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011. III Kadencja IV Kadencja V Kadencja (2005- VI Kadencja Total (1997-2001) (2001-2005) 2007) (2007-2011) (1997-2011) Mixed 76 211 58 70 415 Far left 11 0 0 0 11 Social Democrats 484 978 211 300 1,973 Greens 0 0 0 0 0 Liberals 183 220 366 766 1,535 Christian 602 0 0 102 704 Democrats Conservatives 92 180 529 619 1,420 Far right 13 172 220 0 405 Agrarian 77 461 257 119 914 Regional and 4 6 5 3 18 ethnic Note: Party family categorisation based on Hloušek and Kopeček (2010) and Migalski (2008).

Table E.2. Number of observations by adjusted party families in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 1997-2011. III Kadencja IV Kadencja V Kadencja (2005- VI Kadencja Total (1997-2001) (2001-2005) 2007) (2007-2011) (1997-2011) Mixed* 91 217 63 73 444 Social Democrats 484 978 211 300 1,973 Liberals 183 220 366 766 1,535 Christian 602 0 0 102 704 Democrats Conservatives 92 180 529 619 1,420 Far right 13 172 220 0 405 Agrarian 77 461 257 119 914 Note: Party family categorisation based on Hloušek and Kopeček (2010) and Migalski (2008); * category includes the Far Left and Regional and Ethnic families; Greens are omitted.

196

Appendix F: Ancillary Tables for Czech Analysis (1992-2013)

This appendix contains additional tables for Czech MPs as referenced in Chapter 5.

First, Table F.1 presents the distribution of MP observations according to Czech party families over time, and Table F.2 shows the adjusted party families used to generate dummy variables to control for ideology. Table F.3 then shows the descriptive statistics for a dummy variable that measures observations in which MPs’ attachment to nonpartisan identities align with party identities.

I control for ideology by classifying MPs according to the ideological families of the political parties with which they are affiliated. As in the Polish case, I follow the scheme developed by Hloušek and Kopeček (2010) (see also Migalski 2008). The full breakdown of observations by party families over time is shown in Table F.1 below.

Czech parties fell within the categories of Far Left, Social Democrats, Greens, Liberals,

Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Far Right, and Regional and Ethnic. There was no

Agrarian party representation in the Poslanecka sněmovna from 1992-2013. The small number of MP observations for the Greens, the Far Right, and Regional and Ethnic parties are combined with the Mixed category, which includes nonregistered or independent MPs. The

Mixed group also includes MPs affiliated to political parties with fewer than 10 MPs in the

Poslanecka sněmovna after 1996.

197 Table F.1. Number of observations by party families in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992- 2013. 1.VO (1992- 2.VO (1996- 3.VO (1998- 4.VO (2002- 5.VO (2006- 6.VO (2010- Total (1992- 1996) 1998) 2002) 2006) 2010) 2013) 2013) Mixed 44 8 2 4 15 45 118 Far Left 53 47 59 103 60 72 394 Social Democrats 32 130 191 260 219 186 1,018 Greens 0 0 0 0 35 0 35 Liberals 97 85 56 46 0 101 385 Christian 58 53 56 57 76 0 300 Democrats Conservatives 108 191 146 151 296 397 1,289 Far Right 21 41 0 0 0 0 62 Agrarian 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Regional and 14 0 0 0 0 0 14 Ethnic Note: Party family categorization based on Hloušek and Kopeček (2010) and Migalski (2008).

Table F.2. Number of observations by adjusted party families in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. 1.VO (1992- 2.VO (1996- 3.VO (1998- 4.VO (2002- 5.VO (2006- 6.VO (2010- Total (1992- 1996) 1998) 2002) 2006) 2010) 2013) 2013) Mixed* 79 49 2 4 50 45 229 Far Left 53 47 59 103 60 72 394 Social Democrats 32 130 191 260 219 186 1,018 Liberals 97 85 56 46 0 101 385 Christian 58 53 56 57 76 0 300 Democrats Conservatives 108 191 146 151 296 397 1,289 Note: Party family categorization based on Hloušek and Kopeček (2010) and Migalski (2008); * category includes Greens, Far right, Agrarian, and Regional and ethnic.

Table F.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the number of MP observations in which nonpartisan and partisan identities align. A value of ‘1’ for this dummy variable is assigned if both party and any nonpartisan identity roll call voting loyalty scores are one standard deviation above their respective means. This variable is not interacted with measures of individual

198 political ambition in the dissertation, but I include the descriptive statistics here for reference and interest for future research.

Table F.3. Descriptive statistics: observations in which party and social identities are aligned in the Poslanecká sněmovna of the Czech Republic, 1992-2013. Party and social 1.VO (1992- 2.VO (1996- 3.VO (1998- 4.VO (2002- 5.VO (2006- 6.VO (2010- Total (1992- identities 1996) 1998) 2002) 2006) 2010) 2013) 2013) 49 31 62 113 107 115 477 Aligned (11.48) (5.59) (12.16) (18.20) (15.26) (14.36) (13.20) 50 31 65 114 109 115 484 Aligned* (11.71) (5.59) (12.75) (18.36) (15.55) (14.36) (13.39) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total observations; * variable accounts for alignment/non- alignment between party and standing committee shared identities.

199

Appendix G: Replication Code for Preparation and Analysis of MPAD-PL and MPAD-

CZ

In this Appendix, I present the replication code for selected variables and the tables and figures in the dissertation that use the MPAD for Poland and the Czech Republic.

Code for trimming roll-call votes only to those qualified as ‘contentious’ (cf. Mainwaring and

Pérez-Liñán 1997): foreach x of varlist V* { // varlist V refers to individual roll-calls qui tab `x', gen(vote`x') qui sum vote`x'1 if r(mean)>0.75 { drop `x' } else if r(mean)<0.75 { qui sum vote`x'2 if r(mean)>0.75 { drop `x' } } else if r(mean)<0.75 { qui sum vote`x'3 if r(mean)>0.75 { drop `x' } } foreach y of varlist voteV* { drop `y' } }

Code for generating loyalty scores, using the PARTY_NAME variable as example: foreach x of varlist V* { // varlist V refers to individual roll-calls bysort PARTY_NAME: egen MODE`x' = mode(`x')

200 *generating match-up variable per MP gen MATCH`x' = 0 if `x'!=. | `x'!=.m replace MATCH`x' = 1 if `x'==MODE`x' replace MATCH`x' = . if `x'==. | `x'==.m }

*generate loyalty scores egen PARTY_loyalM = rowmean(MATCH*) *generate consistency scores egen PARTY_loyalSD = rowsd(MATCH*) drop MATCH* MODE*

Code to generate descriptive statistics for patterns of individual and group-based party switching (Table 1.1, 4.1, 4.2): tab SWITCH KADENCJA, col tab GROUP_SWITCH KADENCJA, col

Code to generate descriptive statistics for attachments/loyalties to party and nonpartisan identities (Table 4.3): tabstat SEX_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n) tabstat EDUC_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n) tabstat CLASS_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n) tabstat REGION_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n) tabstat POLIT_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n) tabstat COM_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n) tabstat PARTY_loyalM, by(KADENCJA) stats(mean sd n)

Code to generate cross-cutting identities dummy variable: gen P_mean=. gen P_sd=. gen S_mean=. gen S_sd=. gen E_mean=. gen E_sd=. gen C_mean=. gen C_sd=. gen R_mean=. gen R_sd=. gen PB_mean=. gen PB_sd=. gen CO_mean=. gen CO_sd=. gen UNALIGN1 = 0 sort KADENCJA ID forval t = 3/6 {

201 qui sum PARTY_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace P_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace P_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

qui sum SEX_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace S_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace S_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

qui sum EDUC_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace E_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace E_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

qui sum CLASS_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace C_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace C_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

qui sum REGION_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace R_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace R_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

qui sum POLIT_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace PB_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace PB_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

qui sum COM_loyalM if KADENCJA==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace CO_mean = r(mean) if KADENCJA==`t' replace CO_sd = r(sd) if KADENCJA==`t'

} replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & SEX_loyalM >= S_mean+S_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & EDUC_loyalM >= E_mean+E_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & CLASS_loyalM >= C_mean+C_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & REGION_loyalM >= R_mean+R_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & POLIT_loyalM >= PB_mean+PB_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. gen UNALIGN2=UNALIGN1 // This variable is used in specifications that account for MPs with standing committee assignments replace UNALIGN2 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & COM_loyalM >= CO_mean+CO_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=.

Code for descriptive statistics of cross-cutting identities dummy variable (Table 4.4): tab UNALIGN1 KADENCJA, col tab UNALIGN2 KADENCJA, col

202 Code for visualization of the marginal predicted probabilities of group switching with and without cross-cutting ties (Figure 4.1): logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if KADENCJA==3 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store KAD3 logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if KADENCJA==4 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store KAD4 logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if KADENCJA==5 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store KAD5 logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if KADENCJA==6 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store KAD6 coefplot KAD3, msymbol(circle) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("III Kadencja (1997-2001)") || KAD4, msymbol(square) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("IV Kadencja (2001-2005)") || KAD5, msymbol(diamond) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("V Kadencja (2005-2007)") || KAD6, msymbol(triangle) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("VI Kadencja (2007-2011)") coeflabels(0.UNALIGN2 = "Baseline" 1.UNALIGN2 = "Identities Cross-cut") nokey nooffset subtitle(, fc(white)) scheme(s1mono) scale(.5) aspect(1) ysize(5) xsize(5) graph di, margins(zero)

Code for Table 4.5, Specifications I and II: meglm GROUP_SWITCH PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 || KADENCJA:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic meglm GROUP_SWITCH PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 || KADENCJA:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic

Code for Table 4.5, Specifications III and IV, and calculation of marginal effects of attachment scores on probability of group-based defection (Figure 4.2): meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM POLIT_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 || KADENCJA:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(SEX_loyalM) at(SEX_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Gender", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_SEX.gph", replace 203 margins, dydx(EDUC_loyalM) at(EDUC_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Level of education", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_EDUC.gph", replace margins, dydx(CLASS_loyalM) at(CLASS_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Social class", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_CLASS.gph", replace margins, dydx(REGION_loyalM) at(REGION_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Region", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_REGION.gph", replace margins, dydx(POLIT_loyalM) at(POLIT_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Political history", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_POLIT.gph", replace margins, dydx(PARTY_loyalM) at (PARTY_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Party", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_PARTY.gph", replace meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM POLIT_loyalM COM_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 || KADENCJA:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(COM_loyalM) at(COM_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Committees", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_COM.gph", replace graph combine "C:\...\Figures\PL_SEX.gph" "C:\...\Figures\PL_EDUC.gph" "C:\...\Figures\PL_CLASS.gph" "C:\...\Figures\PL_REGION.gph", r(1) xcom ycom scheme(s1mono) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_IDMARG1.gph", replace graph combine "C:\...\Figures\PL_POLIT.gph" "C:\...\Figures\PL_COM.gph" "C:\...\Figures\PL_PARTY.gph", r(1) xcom ycom scheme(s1mono) fxsize(120) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\PL_IDMARG2.gph", replace graph combine "C:\...\Figures\PL_IDMARG1.gph" "C:\...\Figures\PL_IDMARG2.gph", l1("Marginal effects on probability of group switching") b1("Identity attachment score") r(2) xcom ycom xsize(10) ysize(6) scheme(s1mono) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\ALLmarginsPL.gph", replace

204 Code for Table 4.6, Specifications V and VI, and marginal effects of individual ambition and moderation from cross-cutting identities (Figure 4.3): meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM POLIT_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER UNALIGN1 N1_PARTY_GOV N1_GOV_POS N1_LN_VOTES N1_POSN N1_PAST_MP N1_AGE N1_GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 || KADENCJA:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(GOV_POS N1_GOV_POS) post estimates store test3 meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM POLIT_loyalM PARTY_loyalM COM_loyalM PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER UNALIGN2 N2_PARTY_GOV N2_COM_POS N2_LN_VOTES N2_POSN N2_PAST_MP N2_AGE N2_GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 || KADENCJA:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(PARTY_GOV N2_PARTY_GOV COM_POS N2_COM_POS LN_VOTES N2_LN_VOTES POSN N2_POSN PAST_MP N2_PAST_MP AGE N2_AGE) post estimates store test4 coefplot (test4, msymbol(circle) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black))), xline(0) yline(2.5 4.5 6.5 8.5 10.5, lp(dash)) nokey order(PARTY_GOV N2_PARTY_GOV GOV_POS N1_GOV_POS COM_POS N2_COM_POS LN_VOTES N2_LN_VOTES POSN N2_POSN PAST_MP N2_PAST_MP AGE N2_AGE) coeflabels(PARTY_GOV = "Governing party" N2_PARTY_GOV = "Governing party, cross-cutting identities" GOV_POS = "Government position" N1_GOV_POS = "Government position, cross-cutting identities" COM_POS="Committee officer" N2_COM_POS="Committee officer, cross-cutting identities" LN_VOTES="Preferential votes" N2_LN_VOTES="Preferential votes, cross-cutting identities" POSN="List position" N2_POSN="List position, cross-cutting identities" PAST_MP="Past MP" N2_PAST_MP="Past MP, cross-cutting identities" AGE="Age" N2_AGE="Age, cross-cutting identities") xtitle("Average marginal effects on likelihood of switching", margin(small)) scheme(s1mono) graph di, margins(zero) scheme(s1mono) graph set window fontface "Times New Roman" graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\Unalign_Margin_PL.gph", replace

Code to generate descriptive statistics for patterns of individual and group-based party switching (Table 1.1, 5.1, 5.2): tab SWITCH OBDOBI, col tab GROUP_SWITCH OBDOBI, col

Code to generate descriptive statistics for attachments/loyalties to party and nonpartisan identities (Table 5.3): tabstat SEX_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n) tabstat EDUC_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n) tabstat CLASS_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n)

205 tabstat REGION_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n) tabstat POLIT_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n) tabstat COM_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n) tabstat PARTY_loyalM if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, by(OBDOBI) stats(mean sd n)

Code to generate cross-cutting identities dummy variable: gen P_mean=. gen P_sd=. gen S_mean=. gen S_sd=. gen E_mean=. gen E_sd=. gen C_mean=. gen C_sd=. gen R_mean=. gen R_sd=. gen PB_mean=. gen PB_sd=. gen CO_mean=. gen CO_sd=. gen UNALIGN1 = 0 sort OBDOBI ID forval t = 1/6 { qui sum PARTY_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace P_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace P_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

qui sum SEX_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace S_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace S_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

qui sum EDUC_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace E_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace E_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

qui sum CLASS_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace C_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace C_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

qui sum REGION_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace R_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace R_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

qui sum POLIT_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace PB_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace PB_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

qui sum COM_loyalM if OBDOBI==`t' & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace CO_mean = r(mean) if OBDOBI==`t' replace CO_sd = r(sd) if OBDOBI==`t'

} replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & SEX_loyalM >= S_mean+S_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & EDUC_loyalM >= E_mean+E_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. 206 replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & CLASS_loyalM >= C_mean+C_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & REGION_loyalM >= R_mean+R_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. replace UNALIGN1 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & POLIT_loyalM >= PB_mean+PB_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=. gen UNALIGN2=UNALIGN1 // This variable is used in specifications that account for MPs with standing committee assignments replace UNALIGN2 = 1 if PARTY_loyalM <= P_mean-P_sd & COM_loyalM >= CO_mean+CO_sd & PARTY_loyalM!=.

Code for descriptive statistics of cross-cutting identities dummy variable (Table 5.4): tab UNALIGN1 OBDOBI if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, col tab UNALIGN2 OBDOBI if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4, col

Code for visualization of the marginal predicted probabilities of group switching with and without cross-cutting ties (Figure 5.1): logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if OBDOBI==1 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store OBD1 logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if OBDOBI==2 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store OBD2 logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if OBDOBI==5 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store OBD5 logit GROUP_SWITCH i.UNALIGN2 if OBDOBI==6 margins UNALIGN2, post atmeans est store OBD6 coefplot OBD1, msymbol(circle) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("1. Volební období (1992-1996)") || OBD2, msymbol(square) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("2. Volební období (1996-1998)") || OBD5, msymbol(diamond) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("5. Volební období (2006-2010)") || OBD6, msymbol(triangle) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black)) bylabel("6. Volební období (2010-2013)") coeflabels(0.UNALIGN2 = "Baseline" 1.UNALIGN2 = "Identities Cross-cut") nokey nooffset subtitle(, fc(white)) scheme(s1mono) scale(.5) aspect(1) ysize(5) xsize(5) graph set window fontface "Times New Roman" graph di, margins(zero)

207 Code for Table 5.5, Specifications I and II: meglm GROUP_SWITCH PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic meglm GROUP_SWITCH PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic

Code for Table 5.5, Specifications III and IV: meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM POLIT_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM POLIT_loyalM COM_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic

Code for Table 5.6, Specifications IIIa and IVa, and calculation of marginal effects of attachment scores on probability of group-based defection (Figure 5.2): meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(SEX_loyalM) at(SEX_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Gender", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_SEX.gph", replace margins, dydx(EDUC_loyalM) at(EDUC_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Level of education", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_EDUC.gph", replace margins, dydx(CLASS_loyalM) at(CLASS_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Social class", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_CLASS.gph", replace margins, dydx(REGION_loyalM) at(REGION_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Region", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_REGION.gph", replace 208 margins, dydx(PARTY_loyalM) at (PARTY_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Party", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_PARTY.gph", replace meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM COM_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(COM_loyalM) at(COM_loyalM=(0(.1)1)) noestimcheck marginsplot, recast(line) plot1opts(lw(*2)) recastci(rline) ci1opts(lp(dash)) yline(0, lp(vshortdash)) scheme(s1mono) plotr(m(zero)) ytitle("") xtitle("") title("Committees", size(large)) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_COM.gph", replace graph combine "C:\...\Figures\CZ_SEX.gph" "C:\...\Figures\CZ_EDUC.gph" "C:\...\Figures\CZ_CLASS.gph" "C:\...\Figures\CZ_REGION.gph", r(1) xcom ycom scheme(s1mono) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_IDMARG1.gph", replace graph combine "C:\...\Figures\CZ_POLIT.gph" "C:\...\Figures\CZ_COM.gph" "C:\...\Figures\CZ_PARTY.gph", r(1) xcom ycom scheme(s1mono) fxsize(120) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\CZ_IDMARG2.gph", replace graph combine "C:\...\Figures\CZ_IDMARG1.gph" "C:\...\Figures\CZ_IDMARG2.gph", l1("Marginal effects on probability of group switching") b1("Identity attachment score") r(2) xcom ycom xsize(10) ysize(6) scheme(s1mono) graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\ALLmarginsCZ.gph", replace

Code for Table 5.7, Specifications Va and VIa, and marginal effects of individual ambition and moderation from cross-cutting identities (Figure 5.3): meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV GOV_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER UNALIGN1 N1_PARTY_GOV N1_GOV_POS N1_LN_VOTES N1_POSN N1_PAST_MP N1_AGE N1_GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic meglm GROUP_SWITCH SEX_loyalM EDUC_loyalM CLASS_loyalM REGION_loyalM COM_loyalM PARTY_loyalM PARTY_GOV COM_POS LN_VOTES POSN PAST_MP AGE GENDER UNALIGN2 N2_PARTY_GOV N2_COM_POS N2_LN_VOTES N2_POSN N2_PAST_MP N2_AGE N2_GENDER i.PARTY_FAM2 if OBDOBI!=3 & OBDOBI!=4 || OBDOBI:, family(binomial) link(logit) estat ic margins, dydx(COM_POS N2_COM_POS LN_VOTES N2_LN_VOTES POSN N2_POSN PAST_MP N2_PAST_MP AGE N2_AGE) post estimates store test4 coefplot (test4, msymbol(circle) mcolor(black) ciopts(lcolor(black))), xline(0) yline(2.5 4.5 6.5 8.5, lp(dash)) nokey order(COM_POS N2_COM_POS LN_VOTES N2_LN_VOTES POSN N2_POSN PAST_MP N2_PAST_MP AGE N2_AGE) coeflabels(COM_POS="Committee officer" N2_COM_POS="Committee officer, cross-cutting identities" LN_VOTES="Preferential votes" N2_LN_VOTES="Preferential votes, cross-cutting identities" POSN="List position" N2_POSN="List position, cross-cutting identities" PAST_MP="Incumbent" 209 N2_PAST_MP="Incumbent, cross-cutting identities" AGE="Age" N2_AGE="Age, cross-cutting identities" GENDER="Gender" N2_GENDER="GENDER, cross-cutting identities") xtitle("Average marginal effects on likelihood of switching", margin(small)) title("Identities cross-cut", margin(small)) graph di, margins(zero) scheme(s1mono) graph set window fontface "Times New Roman" graph save Graph "C:\...\Figures\Unalign_Margin_CZ.gph", replace

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