a in to in new more role be configu the IN of of of Oll Oll coalition the relatively the Publications to aod and Clinton botb inter preai multi multi regard in analysis that the typa relia aU based Sage 01 tbe With dfects cbamben power oppoIilioo applJcatioo cbecks-and-bal with dclermiDed oe aituatioo to proactive subKquently is parliamentary exocutive 1996 argue of tbua, American typea tbe powa aoalysia. President C .~ems bi<:ameral.j)lIlia His ue all ia, differeot considered rden to of We secood brought method distribution reestablisbed udllodes tbe of problem process. comparati~e both Ibe ud our power in parliameolary 10 which the under kps1atioa inter-institutional 1994 re1ated strateg)' workings bave or widely power Bräuninger ndes two as of a1 333 for al., the tbe tbe the the the and 54). The most legis otber study prob inter to in three et In parlia before in for has burden seats wlth scheme calcu1a i,ncreas a problem tbe the Ouistian the a 1989: impact claim. our legislative tbe (1965) by tbe concentrate institutional limited. of the the tisted of Kaok.e parliamentary complex changes multi-<:hamber Acton coalition prefereoces to was modelled of problems. decision-making. Bundestag into tackling are legislation relationsbip more legislative contrast, sbould remained sixth Banzhaf formal be 1995; of and (Kitschelt, complicated American criterion a CDUICSU, However, parliamentary neither we By its of by power to bas actors internal absolute German al., in LEGISLATJON tbe insight and power in most of and Corponte coalition German neo-institutional event tbat inter-institutiooal an the et collective calculation or and event, settings becoming the (1954). voting the majority The . of Leadersbip some this indeed, ~ is . . varies stu~y increase group, developed to. attain Without multi-<:hamber German is. suggest .... a.D4:the CDUICSU forthe internal (pappi politica1 nunil?ers Votn give combinations to a the Ea.tities witbin Sbubik 1986:"411-84). on political aetors.. also affected preseD.f,~ethod apriori Policy the a of Am.eriaui~ absolute of indices targe oor methods effects and allows results of the institutionaI analyses able will partner. MULn.cHAMBER in sbould specific internal bave of the findings acc:ording parties coordination 1983, of American of studies IN Weipted different types We the parliamentary of German article their These the power fulfil legistation half graup, case, Shapley these other ol1Ddiridual (Ordesbook., Since to from coalition explanation problem this (0 parliament both approach on by and analysis explanation institutional in unification calcu1ation of terms. different Empirical one any three linkage coalitions. of able the Apart game-tbeoretical regard attribute to game-theoretica1 German Sdlemell with ooly account cbamber. chambers settings research. coa1ition COORDINAll0N of (CDUICSU) only with modelled the with German complement parliamentary American preseoted multi-<:hamber into numerical first power witb to legislative coalition. (1953) of game·theoretical AND are independeot attempting blessing. single definition been of systems coofiguration prominent tbe a institutional neo-institutional of tak.e four number an Legisbdve the multi-chamber A Most result procudi.ng before ready Appendix. tban POWER Democratic institutional last lions ing a German 00 lf 1995). party powerful parties past, will majority most mentary member institutional legislation lem lative Tbe Tuming outcomes of approach comparative settings, Shapley a a of of the the afe US the the will for in \Wo also oeo gay· Iittle been both 1985; more legis intra coa1i classi to is power macro a we settings of focused the divided (Brady, require types between and or on at to Different present American in (somewhat control are feature macro-insti govemment multi-cham divided Golan, combine a Tbe in already settings, configuration two witbin BRÄUNINGER look will complex legislation. of approaches single-<:hamber of cooceming systems several settings, regard and and to government incorporated legislation of They depends Parliament of generalizing latter bave we studies Presidency 1991). distinguish BwuksUlg institutional elections divided be legislation. by with different bow Democrats institutionallinkage configurations., THOMAS Tbe the passage hetween majorities Instead can among unified the 1992). the of complex divided paper may institutional governmcot the prominent the models the German problem we of as (Rapoport AND concentration the shares Both legislation acc:ount institutional party in multi-<:bamber configuration this (Mayhew, mechanisms wbo transfer and why in the control sbares? American most of in band, multi-<:bamber Fiorina, proximities problem time In to into question divided on the 1991. by detail, causes of spaces power KÖNIG power legislatioD. legislation. cbambers. approaches. game·theoretica1 multi-chamher Tbe coalition one power lbe power players tbe power different 1991; involved how take same hand, since more in simple the decisioo-making of specify voting those that causes to problems focusing systems. preferences veto the multi-cilamber actor Republicans importance 11I0MAS game·tbeoretica1 ideological to consequences coalitioo German the On re-elected German into the other interna1 of tbe one At majorities. Kernell, coUective in tbe the inter-coalition claim means beg witb question, cbamhers last many research two of was existente the tbe Thus, multi-chamber of multi-chamber preseoce Wbereas collective actors' 1988). coalition on to and an several in Going all party-oriented game·theoretica1 of why tbe on our multi-dimensional the Tbis analysis the of balances individual in legislative a Kohl to is study to in on in aod Cox settings second to been by legislative it 1987). its multi-chamber legislation. analysis extends strateg)'. sense, German wbiJe a the produce logic of approacbes settings. predominate in aL, emphasis govemment, other and the interpretations: 1992; examples have to Compared to this indices Helmut aod (Sundquist, ta et the about describe chambers caused majorities settings Chancellor. for raises the In vulnerable system, botb majorities of of 191). simultaDeous power institutional inter-institutional unified legis1ation a power Tbis For Imown neo-irlstitutional mal institutional institutiooal Grofman party-oriented redundant) highly tutional tion cal developed actorS. and examine 00 1993: her ment majority·building House; is lative different chambers addressed (Jacobson, party Bund~'alt American distributioD compatibility compatible and Congress, emment method problem multi-cbamber 332 office continues in of of of an tbe we en the the dis will veto and from seek hath legis more input in differ role power voting cham role on unitary charae for we second the a majority systems, tbe and a balanced empirical analytica1 executive as American legislative (Tsebelis, initial American to assumption account in unweighted differs of analysis, as reftects focus that, of initiate of corporate second reactive different development the This to our also into or discipline proactive only fust will, decision-making. decision-making. coordination regard corporate and the countries In two-thirds Genoan tbe Parliamentarism ordinary positions but Moreover, we more a linkage not will government, method the right This individual Consequently, with a for the and fust taking by hath leadership legislation, multi-cbamber game-theorctical conceptualize LEGISLATION we entities. inter·institutional examination supports conceptualized political lbe of to individual actor, in votes. bills, of schemes. be the settings, blocking fonnal us tbe Le. indicate Bicameral German i.c. policy two-chamber legislative Parliamentary whereas legislation between Congress prescribe of multi-chamber For can c1early 00 processes. hecause on most important systems, of of overruled the component of to scbemes corporate application called weighted obliges actors, be agenda role actors, light declsion-making, of have legislative multi-chamber aetors, game-theoretical calculation distribution of of each groups forms or Bundarar federal a in institutional seems problem. with may MULTI·CHAMBER initiates of relations multi-chamber tbe sbed bargaining legislative legislative especially consider legislation. necessary, tbe members IN legislative strategy types is party both power in in for veto is in proactive multi-chamber will Leadership Gennan setting will power actors existence collective application, in 535 hath formal concepts different present individual power presidents 177). two the decision-making settings the in presideot coalitioo its and as the the votes tbe weigbted to bicameral will in research 175, Policy different these govemment of power to agenda tbese strategy Congress. variables leadership we American chamber approach on differences tbe to bicameral block actors legislative of presidential participating 1975: parliamentary American inappropriate COQRDINATION comparing American American contrast parallel tbe this general input between This respect and policy institutiooal position relationship German parliamentary parallel these to chamber corporate sense, a of are parliamentary legislation In second presupposes the inter-institutional dcpend of AND actors houses respect additional Instead, Dur and examine Gennan with from our of 128). of this of (Brams, on the respect. and at Genoan inter-institutional and power fonnal of hath model In With POWER policies. rigbt this legislative emment. in individual lation, German Bund~UJg ter lbat aetors. ent multi-chamber tities data cussion findings scheme power. methods variables the to and study bers types tbe Here, distinguisb c10sely 1994: bicameral Apart collective approach look actors fust lS ~f In of of ~f ~ the the lhe not dif gov- the,n gov h~ve thell' 1993: legis a party diSCI affili disci votes. actors cham· aggre way un~e~ do applied ID of German te 'p~ra~el' states. b~ slat~. Research interpret Here, unweight American legulatlve Bundesrat witbin the be a within party party party subsequent member comparatlve sum reveals the the an uni6catlon to German either BRÄUNINGER (Brady, second conceptua1iz:e a facilitate schemes tbe tbe of parJiameotary use aggregate. competences of 1980). weighted and or t~ the the corpora Congress bas of In of all simply two taken and the differeoce find afflUrs, 85-102). differing .we the the as level is respectiv~ German parliame~t~ affiliation would different conceptualization scheme le~lations to Bundestag. bave with tbe German concepts THOMAS The of simply the tban 1979: legi~lative high and senator party the affect (Shaffer, the still. member party widely elections a position forelgn orgamzes members of in 84). within American AND are contrast, after decisions Bundesral. actors ChanceUor we govemments that difficult for more each two members states legislative each corporate with 35 size the By settings compares The from Parker, within as groups 1956: the be which a the administration directly 10 and to thus, the KÖNIG conceptualized appropriate presents parties other and of parliamentarism, ooe and offers Except individual of will German If discipline be remarkable party however, the groups differences the are, German results Thus, which legislative a system. viewed that to Rogow, building the tbe is elected when of for strategy, proposal. population power berore represent allocated and American THOMAS elections are institutional aspect parties bills the party these aetors. congres.sional strong (Parker action. and German among bave and tbe aetors a there for strategy, of votes looks in political legislation analysis. votes voles hand. directly evident strategy ooalition fonnal parties research (Luce among system, of that maUers, anotber system 21 and govemment German If groups are legislative Senate each undervalue most by research, tbe coherent at of other 10 power position research fact by Democratic contracts, weighted organizational party coherent congressional negotiations Bundarag. becomes party the multi-chamber research the number our every of 'additive' would and the multi-chamber countries senators that Furthennore, assume explain on to committee tben commiUee Looking members. CODSeot it the American an for supporting negotiations majority formation formal approximatelyon of role the charaeteristics 10 and its one legislative or comparative Coalition German can supplements chaptered coalition schemes lhe Despite comparative of the would case, stales_ American vOle • a the For German 193). Bumksrat, parliamentary pline. pline, bers Sen~te. \bis Accordiog needed which American American majority members, tbe the Republican ioto in gate 334 lative depends comparative of ation Congress. estimate ed entail emment favoured absolute ferent ations: study specitic schernes groups one coalition a in of of of in· JJ7 for for the the the are ful· few two dis· like vot· win· min· 186). cases over· some index single of into a power power values as for specifie (Holler has reduces may can a analysed oon·oor· share power Coleman coalitions to by votes, into a 1987: he numbering of we Because formal indices, those some be rule methods the power power; concepts as exclude withdrawal voting index Shapley of necessarily 193,216). appropriate power coalition out to or game-theoretical sufficiently these the is may like political the productioo aetors' referred transformations wioning not applicable (Nurmi, betweeo is defeated in lower to coalition participants weigbted voting altbough Good of of 1982: rule wish coalition. coalition, majority tbe be building, laUer all apriori 00 does winning conttibution exclusion LEGISLATION We payoffs linear have can rule, witb Beyond of indices, basis looing an a of remain the Publie oo1y a proaetive maximal situations with analysis coalition are (Owen, winning wiDning elements sometimes 33). a legislation game·theoretical may whieh with distinguish game.--theoretical the right majority only values. 1982), may Other bodies the unanimity, invulnerable the eventual specify and minority these to individual player to 1976: basie to be and Shapley votes axiomatic (1977), veto transform tbe shares aeton reject interchange Tl-CHAMBER may transform. Several need.to maximal power votes. of the concepts, Indeed, .voting by uoehanged may Tbe unaoimous to called and power we The an (Holler, point, because disregarding we of to one regard MUL coalitions index (1978) Affuso, dummy is or either power rules. sets these by IN a multi-chamber voting contribute veto common to weight 102). often Compared stand First, single shares with of in and as oe corporate version. to that is a indices weigbt i.e. index the related Banzhaf (German) concepts. coalitions voting TlON winning or invulnerable to speci.fie 1979: lohmtoo winning coalitions, fails In ability be higber of participaot, power and power reaetive to lower of tbis a (Brams withdrawal, Neither sets 637-54). the a concepts Banzhaf..i.ndex, bis Paekel regarded a not formal who by coalition winning legislation. unanimity eriterion. calculation is it. to normalized possible: of single with tbe aod aetors' permutatioo COORDINA or Shapley, index aod a 1949: individual regard 1983). with a may the political methodological of concepts amount a aetor vulnerable are decisioo, winning due tbe a between by and votes, of and are AND for an Pareto of with tbe aetors joining participating. winning coalition case For (1971) game·theoretical Considering aetors 00 Packei, limitation, power Deegan by Banzhaf set aetor, the the leaves or fust, second, tbat: From comparisoo • (Dubey (McOosky, • participants; th~ usiog malized mdex tinguish tban fil tbis the the POWER Der is looing ing crease a an aetor. analysis and aetors axiomatie coUective situations support sized. In where values multi-chamber imum game·theoretical offered studies a of 10 In on be for the tbe our 018 par. gov· win· vari· com· rules mllSt distri· whieb into differ analy· a by lack discuss a coordi· may and amend· additive vary German German in attribute German we of the Reftsited colleetive minimum decisions, party the tbe legislation. systems. uoaoimous within in depends will building. empowered trom the comparative of tor a power to possible SRAUNINGER Most Majority Congress, all of 1Ddes: scbemes on single situations possibly all translated type electioD account a parties corporate decisioos, block aetors. Apart legislation, colleetive be for participating rotes. majority congruent to to approach parties. may both party-oriented The advances coostitutiooal the power, participate THOMAS organizations effect into of to approach exclusively of game-theoretica.l conseot a legislation single a Slaapley case. American to a that able multi-chamber multi-chamber legislative and aetors on AND tbe 246). that deciding is their party types collective the limited of The for to taking supporting majority system. eaeb the or strategy examine right describes Another extent, of conditioos feasible by in aetors supporting are within 1957: exogenous a sbow bill European vary KÖNIG the will types formal negotiated multi-cbamber both require tbe to a subsequeotly Americao types some combinations opened consider of specifie be of different political aod We differ European participant researeb to on are also a Raiffa, are legislation. seek set political Lqislatioa: the exclude present We for govemment identify and epitomiz.ed THOMAS may government But mayaIso of defining different to eaeb of faetor government. would to the by various and bills govemment that also possible in conJiguratioD within combinations is by individual in set parallel fust of rights the we Ibis American decisions wish cbambers. tbe case, proposals tbe the the opportunities American of unified (Luce of our systems of all but mU'5t this power German power settings American application. power i.C. Gennan legislation aod Tbe c:oncem would In tbat importance included of otber decisions Malti~r funetiOD participating institutional on participating organization. define and iD we power be presideot, funetion the systems, example interlinked eumples analysis, participatioD divided aeton, a Some to unanimity, major wbile aetors. As politieal party examining aetors alt nghts aetors al1 Germao complex of or second An studies or analysis of of the coalition. contideot Power in by collective institutional of of in of Our have Govemment are political tederaJ in the sets consider are non-compatibility coordinating types set case set of .po~tical.comm.inee unified As administration botb research nation American the tbe JJ6 a parative bution votiq Party aetar. ent jorities ~ We institutional formal ses bclpabon ment, tbe the certain cbaraeteristie atioß emment Bundestag, Bundesrot. d~termine nmg tbe legislation. decision. aetors also winning studied '" nON ~~~ «l«l~ r:l;Qr::l C::;!:;!:: s:H LEQISLA TI-CHAMBER MUL IN ~ ; '::!:! &l «l 1 < = IM gu > ~ COORDINATION I!:: I AND POWER ::l ! a to an or er by in the the the im dif will and per (see their their 109). 1979: differ coali· trans build· multi into other. of analy oblige by few of up pivotal discuss all decision a research different privilege different concepts aod regard power more corporate of profitable the to index still properties, by unweighted aetors index govemment 1977: analysing our {O the applied not ODe-<:hamber achamber indices unanimous BRÄUNINGER winning Sbapley, with defined multi-chamber and application of coal.ition Thus, different Sy of beginning property system i.e. ODe legislation summing Le. different 792) become different Shapley does aod position of scbemes reconsiders additivity as Shapley power the tbe single additional a axiomatic significantly locating multi-dwnber this it the and individual a power vulnerable aeton power THQMAS their at (Straffin. roles, supporting in the system. of (1954: Tbe strategies, problem. any of American an power most Furthennore, lhat (Dubey govemment power prefer legislative calls subgames, AND in also Govemment formal coalitions intend start made Le. aetors a in legislative produce 10 260). of voting parties between comparison here Sbubik decisioD. we multi-cbamber special are coUective roncerns analysis, will 215) barring a inter·institutional of only a Party aside American legislative may of power KÖNIG coalitions conditioDS coalition of type accepted German 1986: witbin we tbe and and aetors. of A ehamber winning on are needed of coordination vulnerability - different be distribution. study of the type eaeh indices is (1m: and optimality, unweigbted differeoce rely voting that indices individual in and Leaving function specifi.c becomes \bis. I.he settings and TIiOMAS type settings application, Shapley concept (Sbelley, shares under power individual blocking. cannot will concept power the I.he combinatioD, colleetive said vulnerable multi z.. in In be hut ~ and tbe ~ gov in each those thc 62: cham iD .~b ..... will oppos of Repub. relative R~~ ...... iD German are systems, Germao absolute aJl decision parties collective or legislative legislative we listed all the 35016; ao required. C-<:ategories of Preaident terms COUDled BRÄUNINGER the of second 60: and Govemmeat c:owlted are BunduUlg, is botb by listed federal Oelno. that CiDtOG QUnon also is presidencies and ß-states or 1, in CoDgress political half and types 1.2. is the term so to 32718; Democrats. ß-, Party lerm supporting bave terms both for THOMAS passed S8: two-chamber or first up tban .66 .68 .76 "2 114 11. 230 both in legislative 104Ih actors same A-, within we Repub. ud Table IOJrd whereas of in Ibe American of the AND in add the parties the 30438; H~ years settings, been the more iD Bundesrat, distribution 4 on in by by by 56: 2llS 2S3 26. ,., 267 25. 25' legislative Demo. 852). For Parliameotarism. listed share the Majorities have legislation, last KÖNIG problem run run indices Republicans relationship C·category Leadership power to are as 1994: 2820S-9; govemment govemment, are 4S 43 Party depends 54 S3 S3 " " Parlimnentarism terms power the the being institutional Repub. 54: has Representative represeDtative American and power chamber, Policy chambers. as THOMAS Shapley In Bicameral distinguished Senate bill federal theil divided 47 26106; SO SO " " .. the 47 Congress the classified A-states are Demo. to 52: multi-chamber inter-coalition (SchindIer, Bicameral the the second and legislative are individual 1.1. non·partisan comparing parties. chamber. in configuration ll BRÄUNINGER ~ ~ ~ ,...; ~ ~ ~ ~ 11iOMAS § ;; ~ .. .. ~ Vi :;:; ~ :1 ~ S! ij . . . AND :1 ~~1!1 ~"1!1 ~~1!1 .... I I I :1 ...... • < rl föö15 " ,nu ...... sB~B ~ .. ~ [!;~ >hJ;~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ KÖNIG . r ~ .. 1 ~ •• ~i ~~ ~ ., .. 11iOMAS . •• es~o~ ijij~o. $~o~ ijäOij. • . 00 eO~~~ r~~ ~~~ ~~~ ,~~n,~ I I n ~1! 1 e i5~ , ~ <> '" • ;: ;: N- ~~ ~! -si -, :; E " e • • E ~ Ö .. .~ ·e .1 342 of 34' of a of a the cao ap for of of of 'pol he the dis This both p0s by com by which gov legis con their than Amer unifi- the on sm distribu systems. In to at elected research the for the the different tbe Leadership groups power us American the to more potential 'Il after majority agenda. drafted executive govemmeot aelOrs . of of procedures if powerful Leadership change applications power from TION create.and applications to the cabinet and brings bureaucracies parallel Policy and to tbe allows includes president. cao of eharaeterized Our changed poinling our responsible Poliey on is absolute our pivotal German multi-ehamber derived legislative before U:G1SLA tbos, exeeutive is an referred legislative power decision-making parliamentary modem is application formally tben and distribution tbe following based member both the of two-cbamber thereby procedures. Americ:a.n is than such who, been govemment our Leadership are consideration on in power federallegislation. of executive unification our provides right coordination procedure. on legislation ooly of by the in equaJ, bas In the collective bills wbo supplements into rights., more aetors the veto Policy governmeot voling and of of effeet, govemment set govemment, legislative actor as organizational and emergence of Bundesrat. German systems. political Moreover, actors to German MULn-olAMBER the the initiated takiog participants legislative the stage tbe of tbe IN or ~ecision amended. of bill. both lLtulership inter-institutional or ministers, tricameralism concentrated by aß are a German of bas tbe tricameraJism of tbe D1lD.lSters German application federaJ an~ aod bis politicalleadenhip approximately proactlve presidentiaJ nON the SUlCe for to relationship block role, compnsmg bills Bundestag require.d: Bundesrat. is Po/iq tbe acUJ:Unistrative Chancellor, applicati~n who percent tnto botb is ~e stages German of tbe ~y tbe limited the tricam.eralism. application administrative 40 in voted members Most The German power all of of willmclude ~d of the systems, and of actonto nominates sltuatton con~.ated additional tht? COORDINA ~adershi~ and formulation Ge~~ bave we reveal corres~nd Ex~cutive to ehambers distnbutlon. Parliamentarism ~arliame.ntansm an Ch~ceUor are refteet Bwui.esra~ Parliamentarism, 0/ .tJ:Ie power AND Tbe Americao will as members tbe sense, portfolios. Leadership both tbe organization distribution posItion b~ administration ",:hieh Policy cale~ation power botb Ro/~ of leader:s~p, departments. complem~nt~d Bundestag of approxtmately the th~ Bundestag Bundesrat parliament, The Compared POWER Our be limited political mal ~cy ~icame~ Ic:a.n mos~ tions appli~atlODS . In. plicatlons Th~ BIC;a~~ral administrative 1?e b~e Policy latlv~ multi-cbamber tween str4tegy power p~ciples.lnstitutionally, ItiOn by mantle ~ mtnlSter. three-chamber emment sent the Bicameral half tbe botb Wlth In to or be be in· we in ef lbe tbe tbe tbe We aod ma VOI The vice They legis of those above values in of faiJ would ebam Repre less dimen support may configu in Sbubik's tbe 10 baJanced lower introduc of legislative dimension suggesting vice·presi tbe analysis. present, not institutional grow applications applications by consider Sbapley apower wbereas third of and the tbe power BRAUNINGER collective to legislation. majority the da senators American to bicameralism tbe chambers. first subsequently had of exception additional relevant House referred sbows deadlock This power to permutations os the tbe For empowers We vating actors, an tbe can Gennan intemal half additional Americao senators strategy Shapley tbe Representatives. bave whereas was point Il THQMAS aur to Let of an of of take German use tbe and the tricameralism, power. continued Parliamenlarism wbo to Witb bill. for beeomes multi-chamber Democratie what AND by Both contrast of of a we bargaining twa Table 3.2. Voting Power, American Policy Leadership I V'l~r---f"'oor-- 0 ~~cg v~~o~0 lI'l Tenn 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 'f"""I C'l I .-. .-. 00 ~ ~~ ~~~~~ ~ q qq"l Time Period 83-85 85-87 87-89 89-91 91-93 93-95 95- 0.-. ...< President .1631 .1631 .1631 .1631 .1631 .1631 .1631 ~ 0"- lI'l~r-r- r-~ 0 ~~cg 'f"""I Vice-President .0027 .0027 .0027 .0027 .0027 .0027 .cxm 0 vvo;1; .-..-.00 ~ C'l'-' ~~~~ ~~ ~ I qq"l Senate: Democrats .1905 .1946 .2278 .2319 .2319 .2360 .1946 .-.\.-. ,..; ~ Republicans .2236 .2195 .1863 .1822 .1822 .1781 .2195 ~ Total Senate .4141 .4141 .4141 .4141 .4141 .4141 .4141 .-. House: Democrats .2598 .2443 .2501 .2521 2579 .2501 .1980 0"- lI'l~r-r- r-o 0 ~~cg .2221 'f"""I .q-~o'Voo lI'l Republicans .1603 .1758 .1700 .1680 .1622 .1700 ~1' 0'1 \Al,,(") V')('I I .-. .-.00 ~ .-. r:~~~ q~ 8! qq"l .-. Total House .4201 .4201 .4201 .4201 .4201 .4201 .4201 ~.-. TOTAL 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 .S- ~ ..c: .-.~ ~~~~~ ~~t!~ 00 V) V) V') ~ I ... '-'ob ~~qq~ $8!$~ ~ '"Q) 00 "'! .-. cation. In German multi-chamber legislation the unitary govemmental '1:l .,; actor shares voting power with parliamentary groups and members of the Q) ...:I'" Bundesrat. In cases where the consent of the Bundesrat is required, the col .~ gg 00 ~&lr!~ Bundesrat .-..,; ~~~~~ 00 lective share of the has remained less than 30 percent, even after ö 00 \l')V')V') I C'l $8!$~ ~ l:l. ~~ "'!"'"!qqq "'! ...< unification. In tbis respect, the German govemment and its coalition par c:: ~ liamentary majority have enough formal voting power to continue to dom E'" inate German legislation. Q) !;O C'lC'l~lI'l Cl :::~ IoO t'--'f"""'l Although the American president is responsible for American policy, bis ~~~~~ I ~ ..: 1 I '"q g. .-.00q"l ~ Q) 0.-.~ "'!'""!qqq "'! policy leadersbip position is not exactly comparable to tbe role of German ~ ...< 0 ~ 'govemment. On the one hand, h~s veto right establisbes a powerful presi l:l. is CI) lI'l dentiallegislative position. On the other hand, bis executive competence c:: 00 gg ~&lr!~ o~ ~~~~~ somewbat restricted. Tbe president shares organizational power witb .= 00 t.r)V')\I') I C'l I MN'f"""ICO ~ 0 ~~qqq qqq"l .-..), "'! ...< > 00 Congress, and for most of bis senior appointments be needs the consent of ;i «i the Senate. Because leadersbip of the Congress is considered to be frag mented through the committee system, congressmen have informally con ~ ferred on the president both the authority and tbe responsibility to propose p.. ~SCi)~ e~ee legislation (Lindbiom, 1968: 72). The American legislative process includes Q,) '"Q) 0 Q,) aseries of checks-and-balances wbich interlock executive and legislative ~ 3«1«;«1 ~ U)t;t;~ competences with the president able to either veto a bill or refuse bis sig ... ~ Q,) 4) Q) ::lQIlo.,äcn ~ööö nature. Tbe pocket veto, refusing signature, was used by Ronald Reagan to 8eJ~~a: ~tÄ~J: the same degree as bis direct veto (Davidson and Oleszek, 1990: 235). Considering the president as an additional administrative actor, oe American four-chamber legislation is further complicated by a congres S ~ ~ ~ sional overruling ofthe president's veto. The overrule requires a two-thirds -g c:: -.::s -.::s ., ;,;, r::: r::: majority in the House of Representatives and in the Senate to pass bills 'e., e s ::l 2 ::l ...l ~ Q:l ~ Q:l Ilo. e -.::s < laclring presidential consent. In other words, if a bill is to be passed it has e ... ~-.::s 7il r::: 7il E-< ... e o r::: ::l Cl 0 to obtain presidential consent and either at least 218 members ofthe House ,,~ ~ E-< ~E::: Q:l E-< of Representatives and at least 51 members of the Senate or 50 senators and the vice-president; or a qualified majority in both houses. In the first of 349 or of col set sys con im par and 1bis share. oppo voting com power, further power parties govem of avoid the guaran process the political of brancbes Two- coalition bolb is 'plurality' terms remained foUowing tbe of and of accepted majorities, so power bargaining role coordinate aggregation muIIi-cham power In for conciliation coordination. be OUT which Tbe of and 198n5, role to unified and 1960s, applications the systems. institutional to majorities, In parties. percent leadership separate tbe legislative as government. partners these majority the intention our 40 different botb active complex or of parties, the distribution by again form By change, compared policy-making in as specific legislative required LEGISLA1l0N legislation. policy Democratic the chambers, leadenhip. American to bow party-onented DUTing be majority party-oriented Govemmeot more not inter-institutional tbe specific unify have are legislation. to tbe made coalition of a to power well decision-making. to supporting analysis can did decentralization concepts as tbe coalition and can policy percent needs to Puty as within German governmental examine German legislation. the tbe American 65 of approximately with government by related deduce aetor botb a strict1y will parties in unification. theory of is Gcrman proposals parties to as administrative of Nevertheless, on internal committees commiUees of legislative Udiied we Bundurat in MULll-QfAMBER cbamber German refer for used multi a 15 15 15 15 If as of No lhe the the full will for one 15, OUT Tbe with con their a actor 1992. Since set In Policy voting In of aw on. Senate power. but leader as Sbapley in to absolute that powerful was member Senate so increased president, president, president Tbus, additional legislation 12). percent if to the guaranteed is pivot evidenee. government House. legislation study. the in 50 tbe BRÄUNINGER and president policy voting case, provided the extemal percent the their the vice-president. more position. elccted If to viee-president collective of still the of to discemed. an 50 American tbe tbe Senate. of of Table under was Senate accqrding the on cbambers assumption, second the if be to Unified pivot viee-president and the According second some vice-president 537 If tban the situation mOMAS powerful that no becomes permutation, ainton, (see four-cbamber bold and can Senate percent both the 2). of Tbe situations, the relation of latter achieved. the period than to corroborating of majority, cons15ts composed to loses bas multi-cbamber on in AND 60 power. more In any most Senate 15 tbe the Part as in situation, the in aggregated set been senatOR. able tbe transferred count deadlock set in power rather the based sbare a senatoR 15 15 Senate position. 51 voting KÖNIG efficiency deadJock seen Representatives affiliation obtains reclprocal enjoyed and still in power majority mentioned: government president are senatorial during support pivot 50 presidency pivot the it pivotal of president be in already be deadlock: least Representatives voting- 15 was Appendix, the the power position still resolve Senate at the to majority 6rst 6rst party model and role, of voting moMAS sinee power a bave divided lost cbamber (see findings subsequently by senatorial to House not majority component bas the and presidential tbe institutional of 00 formal bouses, In results be Democratic congressional tbe will House Democratic fonnal plays president president link the voting componeots and asenatorial nevertheless, in vetoed the both tbe presidential kinds the of the smallest may in non-decisive tbe chamben Republlcan leadership, qualified 146), be in situation, Democratic !arger Senate. wbile Leadersbip a power the Republicans the may, two participating viee-presidential veto 0.25 another Republican representatives individual tbe inappropriate of tbe will only the tie-breaker, under Leadership both or majority aetors 15 policy to (1964: representatives among Republican powerless 116 power. of in the Policy wben it Congress, bowever, sets, 1992, 218 wbere vic:e-president that majority smaller 15 Tbe actors deadlock on by 218 tbe Similarly, ranking Policy. excess a 1980s, the add bill outside, the 537 of strengthens case, size, go voting these acbieved Sbubik in 100th a least least scnatorial OUT Before tie-brea.ker not not a at at a for 6rst power power power. with mal may Americao vice-presidentiaI from majorities wbo than Republican For Republican Leadership However, distributed qualified and case, composed fronted cbamber ship was the Democratic However, approximately early senator. ship POWER AHn COORDINAnON IN MULTI-OlAMBER LEGISLAll0N moMAS KÖNIG AND mOMAS BRAUNJNGER '51 T_k O. Voting Power, American Party Govemment T,= 98 99 100 101 102 100 104 , Tune Period .,..., 85-87 07-89 89-91 91-93 93-95 OS- ~~ ••" President .6850 .6850 .68S0 .6850 .68S0 .4781 .68S0 f Vice-Pruident JXm ~ • Senate: Democnl$ .0686 .07 ~ -•0 -~ ~~~~ ,~~~~ ~ withaut modificatian by each chamber (Davidson and Oleszek, 1990: E -~ 330-2). These strang instilutional restrictions characteri2ing the American ~ •~ and German legislative negotiations both favour party stralegies which transfer legislative negotiations from the parllamentary platform to the ~ ~ lI! party or coalition arena. For types ofboth legislative systems, we preseot a " -~ ,~U~ ~ ,;: -~ ~~U Party Govemmeot application trom an executive perspective. On tbe one •0 .. - hand, both multi-chamber systems are stiJdied with regard to unified and E divided government. On tbe other band, our parallel approach also sbows • -~ -1 , iHi II II the different coordination strategies of.piity-oriented bargaining, tamg ~~~~ ~~~"! ~ ""• S!:g inlo account the institutionaI settings of~ types ofmuIti-cbamber legis· ..•0 .. lation. ~;;f:.t... With respect to Germany, two situati~ a a is of of of of In of 21 that ~ re m~ the and the t~e sup con and ~ar ma SItu Party legIs votes terms, of Thus, be of SOClal coordl federal checks on separate was Stat~s 68 the review share re-est~b p~wer formation to of Amen~n found Bundesrat problem differences rule the slIDple ~ay actors Hes.se Germany, partles the the government correspond of his separation actors. of was of 1988 ~ unificatlOn. BRÄUNINGER 36) in of votes depend ~o no of the In Bundestag ~e~can after vo~g of .United legislative to American Bunde~rat's members these transformed apphed 35 legislative of majority party governmental SItuation are not decision typlcal the coalition strategy on the Schleswig-Holste1O. government be the of a do~. the 1987 (1954: ~ 1987, number number in with the in unifier situation did the the 2-year formal supporting German THOMAS not of to e.lec.tions there weighted to of Despite majority to of principle the legislation. bill maJonty from the br~ke where federal system will AND coheslOn higher the to parties the 1985 establish the circumstances, as Ranney parties Bundesrat, strategy. durmg independent corresponding restrictions majority the Where illustrate consent Government co11ec~ive cases brevity narrow unanimity limited. or Hesse, can relation the to as won KÖNIG the these From the is those in in strategy party the attack chambers fairly the respect the American of congruent to application CDU of Party This relatively parties, a of elections, those supporting corresponding used to in passed. to a governmental and and the before in in an the again. states. with be Under a organizational governmental Government due THOMAS legislation. had institutional required first of power of of elections German states political parties government problem referred than still success formation Democrats the votes, political result, these Saarland American six unification, government the they Bundesrat. the a high Party the the 26 refiected legislation both which system, changed may a11 an a of as of voting government the the degree to As the in passage Bundesrat. higher group was of get divided of Social party also indispensable Moreover, one over modification in coalition electoral provided low to of breakdown won same, to result 1985, was American are restrictions, raised, the multi-chamber was the formal strategy process a unified accepting the overcome to German the the votes Bundesrat Wilson had on consent counter-government enlarged states was As cohesive German the by and to successful by vote and 23 chamber. All a the government 1991, Those 1983 majority application the required after new to new for the corresponding in commanded German is institutional Bundesrat state co11ective government each The the the During From powers President literature Government divided from time in and-balances, lation. position parties. hindered nate sent jorities, legislative simple porting Rheinland-Palatine. spring the ing in in members lished ticipating. The ation Bundesrat the the inter-institutional duced states unanimous Democrats votes, jority 352 Y '" lD . tbe ma may the I pres- tbat i .. of (101) . power cen~~ (1.2) tc::eV]~ed plurality ~:sc:~v~ I players ' tfe , Shapley Note .' ~~: of player cbambers . proactive the consent set ke:nc;: a government aoy Leadenhlp legIslative Am J59-60). of ve both to particular becom:s tbe ti American For a of in I is . LEGISLAllON configuration unified 1m: N. respectively. the Potic:y gIS general, and narrow le K ~cuJ~ . set m In Klp) d formula a president presidents presideols' . the power J D ~ and wbereas IDdez ·'.l~ e.nts. 1/" Germaa ~', Y~...,~ . '" player government f Vorob'ev, 'd N . Ob presldeot, reactive aDd rel of auTes.° the ed'" wbere presl a (see government American n. American MULll-cHAMBER Sbapley on legislative divided d APPENDIX party IN e legislation, r'(K)->o(KI/'l)] o( group S(N) numbe reactlve express °d The a Ointon The of IV] game AmeriCUI kl' L instance, be DO p restriets America ,0 an - . n. for power th to tbis prevalent t also cardinaJ aetors. k!(n supporting ~o an. role the can Presldent pe~ulation ludez . mo.re L- " multt-chamber ' required K~N quo. their COORDINAnON counter-government practicaUy reactlve the . domio 10. is permutation lite kare the a index is 10 AND with the . IS 0pposUlon less stat~ Slulpley i:~~~f~~=~~~; proactlVe ayer 4>,('l~ aod . g eols is of a p n 0d f~~U~::~w:n:r;:::C::~~~~ma~call The er Sbapley 'flto POWER sioo establish Bundesrat z.. system creases ~ov:rnmeot ~Slativ~ o ident prCSI majority ~~;e~ wbere tbe wr~=~(1, p ~~~e ~~~~,:.:'~~~'~::o~~~~~~ii~~;E~~~; a in of by we re our But of with gov con gov insti legis relied multi cham exclu- power power differ second legisla type also and for the German different of of power percent. we on presented the legislative legislative power power In micro-scale the assumption institutional moclified 50 therr formal systems. of the foremosl, we of BRAUNINGER second parliamentary which of multi-cbamber types witb of strategies 10 compute iota based Parliamentarlsm the schemes game-theoretical party aod in balance aetor. 10 voting the analysis, and majorities second Germany, parties. Here, are botb levels of multi-chamber partially conceming In sharing tbe the the First in these THOMAS how fust scbemes respect Thus, reOect dual settings of situation. hom power Parliamentarism, emphasizes of distribution of maximum 10 was type to as legislative Bicameral a multj-chamber AND corresponds systems. witb as bicameral relative govemment administrations. the of part position 10 the of types supporting Both voting between naITower restricted at suited legislative their deadlock Govemment, for this subgames. KÖNIG legislation? party a Bicameral corroborates in coordination both efficiency application negotiations who of corporate and approach best look legislative of examined For chambers, concepts on formal American American Pany govemment, or is this, legislation be Leadership criteria of power of applications this first 146), govemment both macro-institutional the change both checks-and-balances. mOMAS to government. relationship politicaJ a tbat actolS. in of asenatorial also settings our feasible in compares unified to focuses different both by tbild a Policy legislative calcuJate of from Leadership institutional multi-cbamber (1964: to cao individual combination (0 unified power actors arena proaclive complex and whereas formal contrast panies solution American terms result, the outtined altered aod multi-chamber Policy strategy cbaraeteristic of applications, legislative aod In transfer of in powerful index Sbubik is party applied presented in be legislation, systems canclude German a We approaches complex and Germany. application for be balanced tbe in three executive and may can and we transfonn In aod a divided Leadership of unification, to legislation. ruJe power reactive empirical supporting holds research to can settings setting. chaoged tbild to Shapley American Our shares e,'en can cbamber an which different be schemes. combinations ahle the Sbapley Policy As Our Our four-dimensional paraDeI bers, underline American multi-chamber tive What legislation, lation. decision on of of analyses German are ent flect power bloc1ring between positions respect may values tutional chamber a agenda figurations ernment efficieocy. single ". platform multi-chamber ernment . 50 m tie- p)! be- r;:; plI ooly (2.3) (2.4) p)! a presJ,- is n not 218 R 217-1) n m 145-1) the R 217-1) 217-1) he bas exactly ümited if and 1 least ent and + ent. n)l m)l at bim: -d 49 -d 33 50 -' 100 him m)I pivotal and (1OO-n)! m)l) him.:' pres1 50 S (100 (435 1+ e berore 1- 1 1-0 0 - lEGlSUTION th also + m)l him by: YlCC-pres1 33! berore m)l 1451 if is by: e hi.m. n!217! berore representatives : ' senators m! voted th n! .• after 1 0 PVPS , ~t .0. ttfs vote ~ 50 (435 ... 217! 66! 290 P after p)!(145+ o (435 voted 289! have (49 SO! senator + 491 calculated chamber a n 501 is calculate~ than Because rol! m! + 217! is - m! + president, MULTI-QlAMBER (66+rn+p)ft33+1+435+1 (217+1+n+Pl!(217+1OO+1 50! 1 senators rourth presidentiaJ SO! him (289 49! more 0 power + IN Senate, 218-435 218-435 290--435 the t 49 0 . L L the , P" senator L 217! (SO tbe P" 49+1+1+m}I(50+435 R 218-435 representatives a and on limited 18 berore voting L 290 49 either 66 50 or 67 a L ["'" 435 218 218 .. if senators, .. L "" is (217+5O+1+1)!(217+5O)! ..... "'( 0" wtthin m ..... [.,,~ +2: 66 + + + voted east him are: 1 0--1 0 power depends _ tl 1 or . a COORDINATION pivotal 50 S ave ere is 1 vhote ~bon vtce-president t .S'(N)·435o_S1p_O and 1 1 berore PVPSR 0 voting AND g . him representative's ent = the = 'S'(N)Oloo vice-president a the senat~r 1 p1vo ~usetalhisif P 4>,.(V) before rese~dtativehs, A Tbe or and and 4>,(V) senators POWER breakin presl dent, or al 21; and (2.2) and suc (2.1) 145 217 p)! R 217 and every permu- - -P)! the caIculated n n 'different' 217-0 217-146 R 217-1) to is the - - Since 0)1 of 50 33-0 49-1) Vp m m of BRÄU!"lINGER - representatives 1- 1 power actoB. (100 + representatives 50 vice-president 49-34 33-1) presickDt. S tS(N) Dumber 217 1-1) 0 1-1) ... S 537 'J1{OMAS p m)!(lOO-n)! 100 ro)l tbe contributioD 289 him = voting him ) tbe - + n ANO of number 1-1) o 1-1) Vp after ro)l 1 o o P after equal (435 (435 - presidenl, SO! n! an p)! president, SO president. KÖNIG chamber. the president's m!n!(435 + repre$Cnauve5; ro! voted: + consists ro)l cardinal .. tbe n tbe tbe R mues + 289 217 their R 217 (435 have the either bim: (m+n+p)!(435+100+ (m (435 218-435 moMAS if 218-289 218-435 R (1.2) 1)1 + without trom , there $CDlton: legislation ± wilhin 50! senators, L P"'O 50 ,-0 67-100 = 51-100 S berore if 50 S or, 50 4351 ro! pivotal + 537! or _'1 is I equation I (m representative 11. voted loo! SO 67-100 10 51-66 S 1 pivotal 0--1 0-1 Vp sequence decreased = him is 218 ~lS is biro ~ senators, ~ 10 I four-cbamber every ... vic:e-prcsident; m'" senators, 51 + regard +m~1811.-61 .. voting 1 0 1 P '5'(N) berore and 67 a = 1 0-1 0-1 betore vp vpo gcoup with • least president representative of or or representatives least at A ilS'(N) Americ3n --.!.-[ 4>,(v) by: and or or Tbe tation permutations cess senator '56 THOMAS KÖNIG AND THOMAS BRÄUNINGER 3" POWER AND COORDINAll0N IN MULn.CHAMBER LEGISLAll0N 359 lbe vice-presidcnt's power value is calculated as: Deegan, J. and Edward Packel (1978) 'A New Index of Power for SiInple n-Penon-Games', /nrU1UlJional Journal ofGame Theory 7: 113-23, r; (,,)= _1- I (50 + 1 +m)! (50+435-m)! Dubey, Pt"adecp and Uoyd ShapJey (1979) 'Mathemat.ical Pt"operties of the Banzhaf PowCl VP ItS'(N)". _ 218 50! m! 50! (435 m)! (2.5) Index', MiJtMmorics ofOperanons Ruearch 4: 99-131. FlOrina, Motris (1992) Di11ided Govemmtnr. New YOIt: Maanillan. During the 10th term of the German Bundestag, Policy Leadersrup is de Grofman, 8ernard, Guillermo Oweo, Nicholas NovieJlo and Amihai Glutr (1987) 'Stability and Centrality ot Legislative Cbc»oe in the Sp.atial Conlexc', A_riaIn PoliJiaJl SckrIce fined by a set of n = 15 participating actors. This sampie consists offour par R~~ 81: 539-52. liamentary party groups as corporate aetors of tbe Bundestag (ßT), teo Harsanyi, John (1977) R.cuionaJ Beluwiour aruI BtuglJinint Equilibrium in G4I7Ief and Social German states (BR) and ODe administrative actar (A). Thus. Gennan gov Institulitms. Cambridge: Cambridge Univenity Pt"esa. ernmeot is pivotal in ODe of all15! voting sequences, if tbete are Holler, ManfIed (1982) 'Party Power and GoVCTDD'lCDt FonoatioD: A Cast Study', in M. Holler (cd.) Power, Voling and Vodng Power. WUnbuf&: Pbysica Verlag. berate it the (weigbted) VOlts of after it tbe (weighted) VOlts of Holler, Man!red and Edward Pa<:kel (1983) 'Power, Luct:, and the Rigbt Index', ümdlriftfür BT BR BT BR NlIlionaIiJkonomk 43: 21-9. Jac.obson, Gaty (1992) TM EJmorfl! OrigiJu ofDWUkd Go\lCmll'lmL' Compcition iIl ~ US: 250 to 498 21 1041 248 to 0 20100 Howe Electiotu, /946-1988. BouIder, CO: Wesrview Pt"est. JohnslOll., R. (1977) 'NatioDal Sovereipty aod Natioaal PooNer in Europe.an lnstiwOOos', A parüamentary party group with the weigbted VOlt w is pivotal, if thete EnvirtHlJftQf( and Ptanning A9: SfIJ-n. are Kit5ehc:It, Herben (1989) üpUUning Tedtnoloty Po/kies, Com~ing 1Mories and Cmnporariw El1idc1«. Bieldeld: Center fOT Interdisc:ipliDary Studie$.. belore it the (weighted) VOlts of after it the (weigbted) vOles of Knoke, Oavid, Franz Urban Pappi, Jeff BroadbeDt, YutHa TsujiDab and Tbomas König A BT BR A BT BR (1996) 'Evenl Outeoma', in Oavid Knot.e Cl aJ. (ed$) ~g Po&:y Nnworh. Cambridgc: Cambridge Univc:rsity Press. 1 250-w 10 249 21 to 41 248 to 249-w 20100 o König. ~ (1993) 'Die Bedeutuol VOll Poli~,Neuen iD einem ModeU politischer 34~7. Finally, ODe of the 10 German states with weighted vOle w is pivotal, if Eot5ehc:idung und poIitisdl-privater E.o.IIuBnahme', J_nt41tar Solilllfondumg4: Li:ndbIom. Cbarles (1968) 7'he Po1icy-mUing PTOUD. N~. Havcn, er: YaIc Univenity Press. tbere are Luee, l>un<:aJl and How-ud Raiffa (19:57) G4I7Ief lUIdJ!edsions, New YOIk: JohD Wiley &. berOte it the (weigbted) votes of after it tbe (weigbted) votes of Som. :., : Luc:e, Duncan and Amold Rogow- (19S15) 'A Game'"(1Ieoretic Analysis of CongrCS5ionaJ. A BT BR A BT BR Power Distrihutiom for an Unstable Two-Pany S~BtMvioNlSc:ioIce I: 83-95. Mc:aor.t.y, Herben (1949) 'Tbc FaIlacyotthe Absolult:'Majority RuIe',Joumal0/Polilia 11: 1 250 to 498 21-w to 20 o 248 toO 20 l021-w 637-54. ' ." Mayhew, Oavid (1991) Di11ided Govtmmelll: PaTty Contro~ Lawmaking..and /nvcstigtlliollS, REFERENCES /946--1990. New H.1ven, Cf: Yale Univcnity Pt"ess: ?,; Archiv Ihr Gegmw,", (1982-1994 ) Vols 52-64. Santt AugustiD: SiegIer &. Co. (1982-1994). Nunni, Hannu (1987) CompDring Vodng Systems, DordTedtt: Reidel Publishing. Vols 52-64. Satt AugustiD: Siegler &. Co. Ordeshook, Peler (1986) Gttmt:" Theory and Poliric.l 7Mory. Cambridgc: Cambridge Banzhaf, JohD (196S) 'Weigbted Voting Doesn't WOIJr.: A Mathematical An.aIysis', RU/gen University Press. LAw R~Ww 19: 317-43. <>wen, Guillermo (1982) Game Theory. New YOIk: Academic Pt"us. Brady, David (1993) 'Tbc Causes ud Con.sequcnces of Divided Govemment: Toward a New Pappi, Fl'llIDz Urban, Th01tlas KOnig aod Oavid Knoke (Im) EnlScheidlUlgsprOleue iIl Mr 1beory of Americ:an Politica?', American Pofiri€tJl Sc~e R~~w 87: 189-94. ArtMiu_ und SOlisJpolirik. Der .z.q""g der Interenengl14ppen lum Rtgierungnystem tJber. Brams, Steven (1975) GMle Theory and PoJitia. New YOIk: Free Pt"eu. Ein MUlscJramerikani.rcher Verglekh. Franltfun: Campus Verlag. Brams. Steven and Paul Affll50 (1916) 'Power and Site: A New Paradox', TMory and Parker, Glenn and Suzanne Parker (1979) 'F.etionJ in Commiuees: The US House of D«isum 7: 29-56. RepreseDtatives', American Pofitical St:ience RC\1iew 73: 85-102. Colemu, James (1911) 'ConlTol of CoUectivities ud the Power of a CoUectivity to Aet', in Ranney, Austin (1954) The D~D"iM ofRuponsibft Pam GOl1tmment: lls Origins and Praent Bemhardt Ueberman (cd.) SocisJ Choke. Ncw Yor.k: Gordon &. Brelch. State. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Cox, Gary and SamIleI KerneU (1991) The Pofitics of Dil1UUd Gowrnmenl. Boulder, CO: Rapoport, Ammon and Esther Golan (1985) 'Assessment of Political Power in tbc Israeli Westview Press. Knesset', AmericllIl Politkal Sdence Rel1iew 79: 673-92. Cumminp, MiJton and Oavid Wi.se (1985) Democracy under Preuure: An Inlroduetion (0 lhe Schindler, Peter (1994) Daltnhandbwch lUf Geschichte du DtulSchen BlUlduUlgu. Baden AmericaJI Pofirical S)'3um. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Baden: Nomos Verlag. Oavidson, Rager aod Walter Oleszek (1990) Congreu and iu Memben. Washington OC: Sbaffer, William (1980) Pany and Ideofog)' in tht United Stalu Congrtss. WashiDgton oe: Congrcmonal Quanerly Press. University Pt"C35 of America. mOMAS KÖNIG AND THOMAS BRÄUNINGER SbapIey, LIoyd (19S3) 'A Value (or D-Penon Games', iD Karoid KuhD aQd ADlhooy Tueker (edJ) ~ 10 W ~ry of Wrnu, pp. 307-17. PriDcctoll., NJ: f'rinoetolI Uaiw:nity l'Rs5. ShapIey, Uoyd aDd MartiJl Sbubil (19.S4) 'A Metlaod for EvaIuatiq tbe DistributioDofPower iD a ~ttee Syaem', Amuic&oI PolizicIJ Sdcta R.rnew 48: 787-92. ~y, Uoyd mcI MU'liD Sbubil (1964) ~ 11wory lIItd ~d Appro«Jta (,() Soa.J &JuMor. New YOIt: 10M WUey ol SoDs. Shelley, Fred (1986) 'VotiD, Po-a iD Mwtici~ AnDeutiolll EIectioas', QwUity tuUI QllIIIlIiIy 120: 257-60. SW6D, l'hiIIip D.,lr(Im) 'HQmOCtDeity, Indepeudeace., aDd Power 1Ddiocs', Public 0I0ia 30; 107-18. SUDdqWst., J_ (1988) 'Needed: A Political Theory for tbe Ne... Eta of Coalitioo Govemmcu.I in tbe UDiled States', PoIitiaJ/ Sdct« QJulrkrly 103 613-lS. TI'VIlWl, David (19]1) 17Je Gowmmmlill ProcDz. Ne... York: Altred A. Knopf. 1'Jebelis, Geor&e' (1994) 'Tbe Power of the Europeua Puli.meDI U a CoDditiooal Agenda Setter', Amuiazn PoliJiaJJ Scioat% Review 88.: 128-42- Vorob'ev, Nikobi (Im) GlUtle 77r moMAS KÖNIG is Asaisl.a.Dt Professor al Ibc Uui\'enity of MAnnbeim, DepartrneOI of Political Science. Hi5 main resem:b topka an eomparalive po1itics, soc:iaI IIttwork ualysis ud m1emltiooal reLltions witb reprd 10 coIIective decisiOll-makiD,. ADDRESS: Lehrstuhl fI1r Politisebe WisseDlCbaft I, UDivenitit ManDheim. SemiDareeblude A .5, 0-68131 Maaabeim, Gentwly. [email: [email protected]) mOMAS BRÄUNlNG~ is a studeD.1 in the Departmmt oe Politieal Scienoes L He • wortio, Oll a proieet Oll t>o-:r aad CoordiDatioa iD Intematiooal NeJOCiatioa Systems, kd by Profeseor F.U. Pappi at the Mannbeim Ceol1e rot European SocW R.eseudL ADDRESS: _ above.. Pt1pD" mbmitwI9JiIIUUU1199S; tIl:aptdforpl
Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi
