PARTY POLITICS VOL 10. No.2 pp. 151–176 Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications London Thousand Oaks New Delhi www.sagepublications.com INTER-PARTY MOBILITY AMONG PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES IN POST- COMMUNIST EAST CENTRAL EUROPE Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski ABSTRACT The development of stable partisan commitments among political elites is crucial for party-system institutionalization in the new democracies of post-communist Europe. Little is known, however, about the partisan behavior of those who compete for national office. This study begins to fill this gap through an analysis of inter-party mobility among all candi- dates who ran for the lower house of parliament in two pairs of consec- utive elections in Poland (1991–3 and 1993–7) and in three pairs of consecutive elections in the Czech Republic (1990–2, 1992–6 and 1996–8). We consider the overall extent of inter-party mobility, struc- tural versus voluntary components of mobility, patterns of movement between types of parties and electoral payoffs of stable and shifting partisan affiliations. Although the overall rate of party-switching has declined substantially in the Czech Republic but not in Poland, changes in other characteristics of inter-party mobility indicate that party-system institutionalization is taking place in both countries. KEY WORDS elite party-switching party-system institutionalization political mobility The continual formations of entirely new parties, some of which acquire ‘overnight’ success, and the ongoing disappearance, schisms and mergers of established parties, together with high rates of electoral volatility, attest to the under-institutionalization of the party systems of new democracies in East Central Europe. Such party-system fluidity reflects a still ‘open’ and uncertain political market in which the partisan commitments of politicians and voters alike are not yet stable and the costs of shifting allegiances are relatively low (Bielasiak, 1997; Lewis, 2000; Mair, 1996). Yet, it would be inaccurate to characterize the party systems of East Central Europe as being in a perpetual state of disarray. On the contrary, there is a growing body of 1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068804040498] PARTY POLITICS 10(2) research demonstrating that party-system institutionalization is taking place, albeit more so in some countries than in others (Baylis, 1998; Bielasiak, 1999; Ilonszki, 2000; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Lewis, 2000; Miller and White, 1998; Shabad and Slomczynski, 1999, 2002; Slomczynski and Shabad, 2002; Toka, 1997; Tworzecki, 1996). One important aspect of party-system institutionalization in these new democracies that has received little systematic attention, however, is the development of partisan attachments among politicians. News reports, as well as studies of legislators, document the high frequency with which parliamentarians abandon their political clubs and switch to other party groups, form new ones or become independent (e.g. Bowler et al., 1999; Brokl and Mansfeldova, 1996; Filippov, 2000; Klima, 1998; Olson, 1998; Szarvas, 1995). Such turmoil among top politicians has led some academic observers to argue that politicians in the region tend to be ‘institutional nomads’ or ‘political tourists’ who readily shift allegiances from one party to another if they believe that their self-interests will be better served and the costs of switching are low (Herron, 2001; Jackiewicz, 1994; Kaminski and Kurczewska, 1994; Klima, 1998; Kreuzer and Pettai, 2002; Olson, 1998). As important as parliamentarians and other top party officials are, however, they constitute only a small fraction of politicians in the world of national-level electoral politics. Thus, the question remains: how wide- spread is such political tourism among politicians as a whole? Moreover, when party-switching occurs, to what can it be attributed? Is it the case, as many have argued, that politicians switch parties voluntarily for reasons of self-interest and/or weak political identities (Herron, 2001; Jackiewicz, 1994; Kaminski and Kurczewska, 1994; Klima, 1998; Kreuzer and Pettai, 2002)? Or, rather, are they forced to shift their partisan affiliation by struc- tural changes of the party system itself due to party dissolutions, splits and mergers? Regardless of the extent and sources of inter-party mobility, do politicians shift partisan allegiances in patterns that are indicative of party- system structuring? For example, do party switchers tend to move to estab- lished or to new parties, to parties that are ideologically proximate or distant, to winning or to losing parties? And, finally, what are the costs of party-switching for the individual politician? Does his or her chance of elec- toral success differ from that of a party loyalist? One cannot expect the extent, patterns and consequences of inter-party mobility to remain static. Presumably, as time passes and as political elites engage in multiple iterations of the electoral game, a learning process should take place and contribute to the stabilization of the party system (Bielasiak, 1997). Put simply, party-switching should become less ‘normal’, the patterns of movement more structured and the consequences of political tourism more costly. Has this, in fact, occurred during the first decade of competitive politics in East Central Europe? We address these questions through a comparative and dynamic analysis 152 SHABAD & SLOMCZYNSKI: INTER-PARTY MOBILITY of the degree, types, patterns and consequences of inter-party mobility in Poland and the Czech Republic. Specifically, we track the partisan affilia- tions of all candidates who ran for the lower house of parliament in two pairs of consecutive elections in Poland (1991–3 and 1993–7) and in three pairs of consecutive elections in the Czech Republic (1990–2, 1992–6 and 1996–8). Assuming that a learning process is taking place among politicians as the electoral game is repeated and becomes more familiar, we expect, by the time of the last parliamentary elections held in the 1990s in both Poland and the Czech Republic: (1) aggregate levels of inter-party mobility and of structurally induced movement to have declined from those of earlier years; (2) candidates’ movements from one party to another to reflect a growing structuring of the party system indicated by an increase of (a) flows to old rather than to new political parties, (b) switching within rather than across political party families, and (c) shifts to winning rather than to losing parties; and (3) the electoral costs to the individual candidate of party- switching to have increased. However, we also anticipate that our comparative analysis will tend to support findings that by the end of the 1990s the Czech party system was more consolidated than Poland’s. The greater fluidity of the Polish party system with respect to entries of new parties into and departures of winning parties from the parliamentary arena is likely to encourage and be reflected in higher rates of party-switching by politicians. Differences in consti- tutional arrangements may also contribute to higher levels of inter-party mobility in Poland. Direct election of the president, as in Poland but not in the Czech Republic, is typically associated with less cohesive parties, both as electoral organizations and as parliamentary groups (Powell, 1982). Perhaps of even greater importance are the differential effects of the two countries’ electoral systems. In Poland’s open list system, voters must select a single candidate from a party list in order to cast a valid vote. Candidates can and frequently do benefit from personal reputation apart from their party affiliation. In the Czech Republic, citizens can engage in approval voting of ranked candidates on a party list. If one-tenth of the total voters who cast a valid ballot for a party in an electoral district use this option, candidates who are chosen by at least 10 percent of such voters are moved to the top of the party list in the order given by the number of approval votes (Turnovec, 1997). Thus, the Polish electoral system provides fewer disincentives for politicians to switch parties (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Data Our analysis is based on data from Poland and the Czech Republic on all candidates who competed in elections to the lower house of parliament in the 1990s.1 Specifically, for Poland we include candidates who ran in the 1991 (N = 6980), 1993 (N = 8787) and 1997 (N = 6433) elections to the 153 PARTY POLITICS 10(2) Sejm. In the case of the Czech Republic, we include candidates who competed in the 1990 (N = 3947) and 1992 (N = 5708) elections in the Czech lands to the Narodni Rada (Chamber of People), as well as the 1996 (N = 4525) and 1998 (N = 3726) elections to Poslanecka Snimovna (the lower house of the parliament of the Czech Republic). Our data were obtained from state agencies responsible for collecting and maintaining election archives. For each country, the data for all elections are pooled so that the unit of observation is the candidate and all characteristics of his or her participation in consecutive elections are values of variables. This arrangement of data allows us to track the political experience of candidates, including their partisan affiliation, across consecutive elections. (Details about the process of matching candidates across elections are available from the authors upon request.) Extent and Types of Inter-Party Mobility All else being equal, institutionalizing party systems should exhibit decreas- ing electoral volatility and elite-level inter-party mobility, thus