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Beyond Islamists & Autocrats PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING Beyond Islamists & Autocrats BAHRAIN’S STALLED REFORMS nously, tensions with Iran have increased since the July 2015 nuclear accord between Tehran and the P5+1. In AND THE FUTURE U.S. ROLE October 2015, after discovering a reportedly Iran-linked n Simon Henderson bomb-making factory south of Manama, Bahrain ac- cused the Islamic Republic of being a state sponsor of ter- rorism, expelling the Iranian ambassador and recalling its Of the Persian Gulf states, Bahrain has been most af- own envoy from Tehran. In late November 2015, Iranian fected by the events known as the Arab Spring. Of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for de- members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)— mocracy in Bahrain, describing the country’s government Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab as a tyrant minority, and so prompting a further Bahraini Emirates (UAE), and Oman—only the island nation of diplomatic protest. In January 2016, following the sack- Bahrain and Oman, as well as, briefly, Kuwait, experi- ing of the Saudi embassy in Tehran prompted by the ex- enced street demonstrations. But tensions in Bahrain, ecution of the Saudi Shiite firebrand Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, which first erupted into violence in early 2011, have per- Bahrain followed Saudi Arabia and broke off diplomatic sisted. Until late 2015, the U.S. embassy website con- relations with Iran. At least until that point, Shiite moder- tinued to show a map indicating areas in and around ates in Bahrain had seen Iran as a potential ally and had the capital, Manama, that are off-limits to U.S. person- sought its support in their quest for political reform. nel because of the danger of civil strife. Meanwhile, a Despite the tensions, Bahrainis across much of the political transition has taken place, but not in the direc- political spectrum are proud of their country’s hosting of tion of greater social equality. Although depicted by the the U.S. Fifth Fleet and the headquarters of NAVCENT, Bahraini government as leading to a more pluralistic the naval component of U.S. Central Command. This society, the changes have also reinforced the political gives Washington an opportunity, perhaps even a re- role of the Khalifa ruling family. sponsibility, to help guide Bahrain’s political evolution. The overall context of Bahrain’s domestic politics is Indeed, in addition to the challenges posed by Iran, overshadowed by Iran, whose history is intertwined with some young Bahraini Sunnis are attracted to the ideol- Bahrain’s. Occasionally, Iranian politicians revive a ter- ogy of the Islamic State. Yet the most predictable event ritorial claim to the island, which has a large population that could break the Bahraini political logjam is the of Shiite Muslims, coreligionists of most Iranians. Omi- eventual transition from power of Prime Minister Sheikh ©2016 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A series that explores how non-Islamist Arab political actors might facilitate progress toward reform and democratic transition. Beyond Islamists & Autocrats Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the head of government ture suggests. As billboards all over Manama and pho- for the last forty-five years, who has come to represent tographs in government offices make clear, the country is the royal family’s essential caution and conservatism. run by a triumvirate: the king, age sixty-five, is central but His departure will prompt a realignment in the power his eighty-year-old uncle, the prime minister, remains a structure. In such circumstances, Washington cannot key influence. The third member is the crown prince, the be indifferent to Bahraini politics but must balance king’s eldest son, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, carefully the roles of conciliator and facilitator. who at forty-six is perceived by the Shiite opposition and local diplomatic community as a moderating force. De- THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THEORY... spite his advanced age, the prime minister retains a firm Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy under King Hamad grip on everyday government and economic decisions. bin Isa al-Khalifa, a hereditary monarch. Nevertheless, The power of the king, seen as a vacillating character, is his father styled himself Ruler of Bahrain and Hamad further diminished by royal family hardliners who oppose declared himself king in a 2001 constitutional amend- any concession toward the country’s Shiite community ment, which after a referendum took effect in 2002. and are deeply suspicious of neighboring Iran. Of par- The king appoints the prime minister, who for the last ticular note are the three ministers assigned to the royal forty-five years has been, without interruption, his uncle court, all Khalifa family members, as well as the com- Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the brother of the mander-in-chief of the Bahrain Defense Force. Although late ruler. The cabinet is also appointed by the king.1 In the crown prince is considered a relative liberal because May 2015, twelve of the twenty-five cabinet members of his apparent willingness to make concessions to the were from the Khalifa ruling family. A September 2015 Shiite opposition, his standing with his father, the king, reshuffle led to a slightly smaller cabinet, although one may be diminishing with the rising status of two younger still dominated by the Khalifa clan. The bicameral na- sons, half-brothers of the crown prince—Sheikh Nasser, tional assembly consists of two houses with forty mem- twenty-eight, and Sheikh Khalid, twenty-six—who hold bers each. The upper house, known as the Consultative command positions in the elite Bahraini Royal Guard Assembly, is appointed by the king, and each member unit. Senior figures in the royal family are reported to be of the lower house, the Council of Representatives, is di- deeply involved in Bahrain’s economy, sometimes con- rectly elected to a constituency. The last elections to the troversially, as in sales of land reclaimed from the sea, lower house were held in November 2014, and the next which is made available for commercial and upmarket are due in November 2018. In Bahrain, no political residential development.2 parties are allowed as such, but there are political so- Like other Gulf countries, Bahrain has a substantial cieties (discussed below) that back certain candidates. number of expatriates, often long-term. Government of- Among the GCC states, this level of political develop- ficials estimate the country’s total population at around ment is equaled only in Kuwait. 2 million, though the CIA World Factbook cites 1.35 million, of whom only 45 percent, or just over 600,000, ...AND IN PRACTICE are estimated to be citizens.3 Of the resident popula- The true division of Bahrain’s power and influence is very tion—that is, including noncitizens—around 70 percent different from what the government’s theoretical struc- are Muslim, more than 14 percent are Christian, nearly 1. “Bahrain,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/world-leaders-1/BA.html. 2. “Bahrain Land Deals Highlight Alchemy of Making Money from Sand,” Financial Times, December 10, 2014, http://www.ft.com/ intl/cms/s/0/b6d081a2-74b8-11e4-8321-00144feabdc0.html. 3. “Bahrain,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html. SIMON HENDERSON 2 BAHRAIN'S STALLED REFORMS Beyond Islamists & Autocrats 10 percent are Hindu, and 2.5 percent are Buddhist. dock, as well as establishing itself as a financial center. The most vexatious ratio, though, is the narrowing divide Since the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. military between Sunni and Shiite citizens. Officially, the Bahraini presence on Bahrain, through the Fifth Fleet headquar- government does not distinguish between Sunnis and ters, has expanded considerably to around eight thou- Shiites, but the reality is far starker. By granting citizen- sand personnel. In 2014, Bahrain announced that it ship to Sunnis from Pakistan and Jordan, many of whom would fund the construction of a smaller British naval have been recruited into the Bahraini security forces, the base, which began in 2015. The unstated purpose of government has been steadily shifting the ratio. Some both bases is to counter any threat, particularly Iranian, non-Muslims, including Western expatriates, have also to the oil exports of the GCC member states, which are become citizens. What was clearly a Shiite citizen major- crucial to the world economy. ity more than thirty years ago is now much more equal and may even be approaching a Sunni majority. Al- THE HISTORY OF ELECTION POLITICS though individual Shiites prosper in Bahrain, collectively Important to understanding the evolution of Bahrain’s Bahraini Shiites live in poorer areas and allege govern- electoral system and the current situation are the ment discrimination. (A Bahraini opposition leader once main inflections of the modern historical time line— told the author that he would consider it progress if Bah- principally, independence from Britain in 1971, the raini Shiites had the same local standing as Saudi Shiites 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 2002 declara- had achieved in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, less tion of a constitutional monarchy, and the 2011 Arab than an hour’s drive across the causeway connecting the Spring demonstrations. two countries.) Few, if any, Bahraini Shiites are entrusted Elections for a National Assembly were first held two to be members of the security forces. Several thousand years after independence, in 1973, when the member- Shiites are reportedly still in detention after being arrest- ship was forty-four, made up of fourteen cabinet mem- ed during street disturbances in the last four years. bers and thirty members elected by male voters ages twenty and older.
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