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The Eagle Has Crash Landed Author(s): Immanuel Wallerstein Source: Foreign Policy, No. 131 (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 60-68 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183418 Accessed: 12/09/2010 23:36

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StRASH LANDED

PaxAmericana is over.Challenges from Vietnamand the Balkans to theMiddle East and September 11 haverevealed the limits ofAmerican supremacy.Will the UnitedStates learn tofade quietjy, or will U.S. conservativesresist and thereby transform a gradual decline into a rapidand dangerousfall? I By Immanuel Wallerstein

he United Statesin decline?Few peo- why the so-called Pax Americanais on the ple today would believe this asser- wane requires examining the geopolitics of tion. The only ones who do are the the 20th century,particularly of the century's U.S. hawks, who argue vociferously final three decades.This exerciseuncovers a sim- for policiesto reversethe decline.This beliefthat the ple and inescapableconclusion: The economic,polit- end of U.S. hegemony has already begun does not ical, and military factors that contributed to U.S. follow from the vulnerabilitythat became apparent hegemony are the same factors that will inexorably to all on September 11, 2001. In fact, the United produce the coming U.S. decline. States has been fading as a global power since the 1970s, and the U.S. responseto the terroristattacks INTRO TO HEGEMONY has merely acceleratedthis decline. To understand The rise of the United States to global hegemony Immanuel Wallersteinis a senior researchscholar at Yale Uni- was a long process that began in earnest with the versity and author of, most recently, The End of the World world recession of 1873. At that time, the Unit- As We Know It: SocialScience for the Twenty-FirstCentu- ed States and Germany began to acquire an ry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). increasing share of global markets, mainly at the

60 FOREIGN POLICY rThe historybooks recordthat WorldWar I brokeout in 1914 and endedin 1918 and thatWorld War II lastedfrom 1939 to 1945. How- ever,it makesmore sense to consid- er the two as a single,continuous "30 years' war" between the United States and Germany, with trucesand localconflicts scatteredin between.The com- petitionfor hegemonic succes- siontook an ideologicalturn in 1933, whenthe Nazis came to powerin Germanyand began their quest to transcendthe globalsystem altogether, seek- ing not hegemonywithin the currentsystem but rather a form of global empire. Recall the Nazi sloganein tausendjiidhriges Reich(a thousand-yearempire). In turn, the United States assumedthe roleof advocateof centristworld liberalism-recall formerU.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's"four freedoms" (free- dom of speech, of worship, from want, andfrom fear)-and enteredinto a expense of the steadily recedingBritish econo- strategicalliance with the Soviet Union, making pos- my. Both nations had recentlyacquired a stable siblethe defeatof Germanyand its allies. political base-the United States by successfully WorldWar II resultedin enormousdestruction 8 terminatingthe CivilWar and Germanyby achiev- of infrastructureand populations throughout Eurasia, ing unificationand defeatingFrance in the Fran- fromthe Atlanticto the Pacificoceans, with almost co-PrussianWar. From 1873 to 1914, the United no countryleft unscathed. The only major industrial States and Germanybecame the principalpro- power in the world to emergeintact-and even ducers in certainleading sectors:steel and later greatlystrengthened from an economicperspec- automobilesfor the United Statesand industrial tive-was theUnited States, which moved swiftly to chemicalsfor Germany. consolidateits position.

JULY I AUGUST 2002 61 The Eagle Has Crash Landed

But the aspiring hegemon faced some practical monopoly soon disappeared:By 1949, the Soviet political obstacles. During the war, the Allied pow- Union had developednuclear weapons as well. Ever ers had agreed on the establishmentof the United since, the United States has been reduced to trying Nations, composed primarilyof countries that had to preventthe acquisition of nuclearweapons (and been in the coalition against the Axis powers. The chemical and biological weapons) by additional organization'scritical feature was the SecurityCoun- powers, an effort that, in the 21st century,does not cil, the only structurethat could authorizethe use of seem terriblysuccessful. force. Since the U.N. Chartergave the right of veto Until 1991, the United States and the Soviet to five powers-including the United Statesand the Union coexisted in the "balance of terror" of the Soviet Union-the council was rendered largely Cold War.This status quo was tested seriouslyonly toothless in practice. So it was not the founding of three times: the Berlin blockade of 1948-49, the the UnitedNations in April 1945 that determinedthe KoreanWar in 1950-53, and the Cubanmissile cri- geopolitical constraints of the second half of the sis of 1962. The result in each case was restoration 20th century but ratherthe Yalta meeting between of the status quo. Moreover,note how each time the Roosevelt,British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Soviet Union faced a political crisis among its satel- and Soviet leaderJoseph Stalin two months earlier. lite regimes-East Germany in 1953, Hungary in The formal accordsat Yaltawere less important 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in than the informal,unspoken agreements, which one 1981-the United Statesengaged in little more than can only assess by observing the behavior of the propagandaexercises, allowing the Soviet Union to United Statesand the Soviet Union in the years that proceed largely as it deemed fit. followed. When the war ended in Europeon May 8, Of course, this passivity did not extend to the 1945, Soviet and Western(that is, U.S., British,and economicarena. The UnitedStates capitalized on the French)troops were located in particularplaces- Cold War ambiance to launch massive economic essentially,along a line in the center of Europethat reconstructionefforts, first in WesternEurope and came to be called the Oder-NeisseLine. Aside from then in Japan (as well as in South Korea and Tai- a few minor adjustments,they stayedthere. In hind- wan). The rationale was obvious: What was the sight, Yalta signified the agreement of both sides point of havingsuch overwhelmingproductive supe- that they could stay thereand that neitherside would riority if the rest of the world could not muster use force to push the other out. This tacit accord effective demand? Furthermore,economic recon- applied to Asia as well, as evinced by U.S. occu- structionhelped create clientelistic obligations on the pation of Japan and the division of Korea.Political- part of the nations receivingU.S. aid; this sense of obligation fostered willingness to enter into military alliances and, even more important,into political Byremoving the only ideological justification subservience. Finally, one should not under- behindU.S. hegemony, thecollapse of communism estimate the ideological and cultu- ral component of U.S. hegemony. ineffect signified the collapse of liberalism. The immediate post-1945 period may have been the historical high point for the popularityof commu- ly, therefore,Yalta was an agreementon the status nist ideology. We easily forget today the large votes quo in which the Soviet Union controlledabout one for Communistparties in free elections in countries third of the world and the United States the rest. such as Belgium,France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Washington also faced more serious military Finland, not to mention the support Communist challenges.The SovietUnion had the world'slargest parties gathered in Asia-in Vietnam, India, and land forces, while the U.S. government was under Japan-and throughoutLatin America. And that still domestic pressureto downsize its army,particular- leaves out areas such as China, Greece, and Iran, ly by ending the draft. The United States therefore where free electionsremained absent or constrained decidedto assertits militarystrength not via land for- but where Communist parties enjoyed widespread ces but through a monopoly of nuclear weapons appeal. In response, the United States sustained a (plus an air force capable of deploying them). This massiveanticommunist ideological offensive. In retro-

62 FOREIGN POLICY spect, this initiativeappears largely successful: Wash- than the others for certain periods but none mov- ington brandishedits role as the leader of the "free ing far ahead. world" at least as effectively as the Soviet Union When the revolutionsof 1968 broke out around brandished its position as the leader of the "pro- the world, support for the Vietnamese became a gressive" and "anti-imperialist"camp. majorrhetorical component. "One, two, many Viet- nams"and "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh"were chantedin a not least in the United States.But the ONE, TWO, MANY VIETNAMS many street, 1968ers did not merely condemn U.S. hegemony. The United States' success as a hegemonic power in They condemned Soviet collusion with the United the postwar period created the conditions of the States,they condemnedYalta, and they used or adap- nation's hegemonic demise. This process is cap- ted the languageof the Chinesecultural revolution- tured in four symbols: the war in Vietnam, the rev- arieswho dividedthe world into two camps-the two olutions of 1968, the fall of the BerlinWall in 1989, superpowersand the rest of the world. and the terrorist attacks of Sep- tember 2001. Each symbol built upon the prior one, culminating in the situation in which the United Today,the United States is a superpowerthat lacks States currentlyfinds itself-a lone superpower that lacks true power, truepower, a world leader nobody follows and a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting fewrespect, and a nationdrifting dangerously dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control. amidsta globalchaos it cannotcontrol. What was the Vietnam War? Firstand foremost,it was the effort of the Vietnamesepeople to end colonial rule and The denunciationof Sovietcollusion led logically establish their own state. The Vietnamese fought to the denunciationof those national forces closely the French, the Japanese, and the Americans,and in allied with the Soviet Union, which meant in most the end the Vietnamesewon-quite an achievement, cases the traditional Communist parties. But the actually.Geopolitically, however, the war represented 1968 revolutionariesalso lashed out against other a rejection of the Yalta status quo by populations components of the Old Left-national liberation then labeledas ThirdWorld. Vietnam became such a movements in the Third World, social-democratic powerful symbol because Washington was foolish movements in Western Europe, and New Deal enoughto investits full militarymight in the struggle, Democrats in the United States-accusing them, but the United Statesstill lost. True,the United States too, of collusionwith what the revolutionariesgener- didn't deploy nuclear weapons (a decision certain ically termed "U.S. imperialism." myopicgroups on the righthave long reproached),but The attack on Soviet collusion with Washington such use would have shatteredthe Yaltaaccords and plus the attackon the Old Left furtherweakened the mighthave produced a nuclearholocaust-an outcome legitimacy of the Yalta arrangementson which the the United Statessimply could not risk. United States had fashioned the world order.It also But Vietnamwas not merely a militarydefeat or undermined the position of centrist liberalism as a blight on U.S. prestige. The war dealt a major the lone, legitimateglobal ideology.The directpolit- blow to the United States' ability to remain the ical consequencesof the world revolutions of 1968 world's dominant economic power. The conflict were minimal, but the geopolitical and intellectual was extremely expensive and more or less used up repercussionswere enormous and irrevocable.Cen- the U.S. gold reservesthat had been so plentifulsince trist liberalismtumbled from the throne it had occu- 1945. Moreover, the United States incurred these pied since the Europeanrevolutions of 1848 and that costs just as Western Europe and Japan experi- had enabled it to co-opt conservativesand radicals enced major economic upswings. These conditions alike. These ideologies returnedand once again rep- ended U.S. preeminence in the global economy. resented a real gamut of choices. Conservatives Since the late 1960s, members of this triad have would again become conservatives, and radicals, been nearly economic equals, each doing better radicals.The centristliberals did not disappear,but

JULY IAUGUST 2002 63 The Eagle Has Crash Landed

theywere cut down to size. order, simmering discontents, and And in the process, the official unchanneled radical temperaments. U.S. ideologicalposition-antifas- When the United States tried to inter- cist, anticommunist,anticolonialist- ~ vene, it failed. In 1983, U.S. President seemedthin and unconvincingto a grow- Ronald Reagan sent troops to Lebanon to ing portion of the world's populations. restoreorder. The troops were in effectforced out. He compensated by invading Grenada, a country THE POWERLESS SUPERPOWER without troops. PresidentGeorge H.W. Bush invad- ed Panama, another country without troops. But The onset of internationaleconomic stagnation in the after he intervenedin Somalia to restore order,the 1970s had two important consequences for U.S. United States was in effect forced out, somewhat power. First, stagnation resulted in the collapse of ignominiously. Since there was little the U.S. gov- "developmentalism"-the notion that every nation ernment could actually do to reverse the trend of could catch up economicallyif the state took appro- declining hegemony, it chose simply to ignore this priate action-which was the principal ideological trend-a policy that prevailed from the withdraw- claim of the Old Left movements then in power. al from Vietnam until September11, 2001. One after another,these regimes faced internaldis- Meanwhile, true conservativesbegan to assume order,declining standards of living, increasingdebt control of key states and interstateinstitutions. The dependency on internationalfinancial institutions, neoliberaloffensive of the 1980s was markedby the and eroding credibility. What had seemed in the Thatcherand Reagan regimesand the emergenceof 1960s to be the successfulnavigation of ThirdWorld the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a key decolonization by the United States-minimizing actor on the world scene. Where once (for more disruption and maximizing the smooth transfer of than a century)conservative forces had attemptedto power to regimes that were developmentalist but portraythemselves as wiser liberals,now centristlib- scarcely revolutionary-gave way to disintegrating erals were compelled to argue that they were more

64 FOREIGN POLICY effective conservatives.The conservativeprograms explains the fervor of their currentdesire to invade were clear.Domestically, conservatives tried to enact Iraq and destroy its regime. policiesthat would reducethe cost of labor,minimize Betweenthe Gulf War and September11, 2001, environmental constraints on producers, and cut the two major arenas of world conflict were the back on state welfare benefits.Actual successeswere Balkansand the Middle East. The United States has modest, so conservatives then moved vigorously played a major diplomatic role in both regions. into the international arena. The gatherings of the Looking back, how differentwould the resultshave World Economic Forum in Davos provided a meet- been had the United Statesassumed a completelyiso- ing ground for elites and the media. The IMF pro- lationist position? In the Balkans, an economically vided a club for finance ministers and central successful multinational state (Yugoslavia) broke bankers. And the United States pushed for the cre- down, essentially into its component parts. Over ation of the World Trade Organization to enforce 10 years, most of the resulting states have engaged free commercial flows across the world's frontiers. in a process of ethnification,experiencing fairly bru- While the United States wasn't watching, the Soviet Union was collapsing. Yes, Ronald Reagan had dubbed the Soviet Union an Inthe Balkans and in the Middle East alike, the "evil empire" and had used the rhetorical bombast of calling for UnitedStates has failed to exertits hegemonic the destruction of the Berlin Wall, but the United States didn't really clouteffectively, not for want of will or effort but mean it and certainly was not responsible for the Soviet Union's forwant of realpower. downfall. In truth, the Soviet Union and its East Europeanimpe- rial zone collapsed because of popular disillu- tal violence, widespread human rights violations, sionment with the Old Left in combination with and outright wars. Outside intervention-in which Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to save the UnitedStates figured most prominently-brought his regime by liquidating Yalta and instituting about a truceand endedthe most egregiousviolence, internal liberalization (perestroika plus glasnost). but this intervention in no way reversedthe ethni- Gorbachev succeeded in liquidating Yalta but not fication, which is now consolidated and somewhat in saving the Soviet Union (although he almost legitimated. Would these conflicts have ended dif- did, be it said). ferently without U.S. involvement? The violence The United States was stunned and puzzled by might have continued longer, but the basic results the sudden collapse, uncertain how to handle the would probablynot have been too different.The pic- consequences.The collapse of communismin effect ture is even grimmerin the Middle East, where, if signified the collapse of liberalism, removing the anything, U.S. engagementhas been deeper and its only ideological justification behind U.S. hegemo- failures more spectacular.In the Balkans and the ny, a justification tacitly supported by liberalism's Middle East alike, the United States has failed to ostensible ideological opponent. This loss of legit- exert its hegemonicclout effectively,not for want of imacy led directly to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, will or effort but for want of real power. which Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would never have dared had the Yalta arrangementsremained THE HAWKS UNDONE in place. In retrospect, U.S. efforts in the Gulf War accomplished a truce at basically the same line of Then came September11-the shock and the reac- departure.But can a hegemonic power be satisfied tion. Under fire from U.S. legislators, the Central with a tie in a war with a middling regional power? IntelligenceAgency (CIA)now claims it had warned Saddam demonstrated that one could pick a fight the Bush administration of possible threats. But with the United States and get away with it. Even despite the CIA'sfocus on al Qaeda and the agency's more than the defeat in Vietnam, Saddam's brash intelligenceexpertise, it could not foresee(and there- challenge has eaten at the innards of the U.S. right, fore, prevent) the execution of the terroriststrikes. in particular those known as the hawks, which Or so would argue CIA DirectorGeorge Tenet. This

JULY I AUGUST 2002 65 The Eagle Has Crash Landed

testimonycan hardlycomfort the U.S. government sions: the military assault in Afghanistan, the de or the Americanpeople. Whatever else historians facto support for the Israeliattempt to liquidatethe may decide, the attacks of September11, 2001, Palestinian Authority, and the invasion of Iraq, poseda majorchallenge to U.S.power. The persons which is reportedlyin the militarypreparation stage. responsibledid not representa majormilitary power. Lessthan one year afterthe September2001 terrorist Theywere members of a nonstateforce, with a high attacks, it is perhaps too early to assess what such degreeof determination,some money,a band of strategieswill accomplish. Thus far, these schemes dedicatedfollowers, and a strongbase in one weak have led to the overthrow of the Taliban in Af- state. In short, militarily,they were nothing.Yet ghanistan (without the complete dismantling of al theysucceeded in a bold attackon U.S. soil. Qaeda or the capture of its top leadership);enor- GeorgeW Bushcame to powervery critical of the mous destruction in Palestine (without rendering Clintonadministration's handling of world affairs. Palestinianleader Yasir Arafat "irrelevant," as Israeli Bush and his advisorsdid not admit-but were Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said he is); and heavy undoubtedly opposition from aware-that Clin- U.S. allies in Europe ton's path had been and the Middle East the path of every to plans for an inva- U.S. president since sion of Iraq. GeraldFord, includ- The hawks'read- ing that of Ronald ing of recent events Reagan and George emphasizes that H.W. Bush. It had opposition to U.S. even been the path actions, while seri- of the current Bush ous, has remained administration largely verbal. Nei- before September therWestern Europe 11. One only needs nor Russia nor to look at how Bush China nor Saudi handled the down- Arabia has seemed ing of the U.S. plane readyto breakties in off China in April seriousways with the 2001 to see that pru- United States. In dence had been the other words, hawks name of the game. believe, Washington Following the terrorist attacks, Bush changed has indeedgotten away with it. The hawks assumea course, declaring war on terrorism, assuring the similar outcome will occur when the U.S. military Americanpeople that "the outcome is certain"and actuallyinvades Iraq and afterthat, when the United informingthe world that "you are eitherwith us or Statesexercises its authorityelsewhere in the world,be against us." Long frustratedby even the most con- it in Iran,North Korea,Colombia, or perhapsIndone- servative U.S. administrations, the hawks finally sia. Ironically,the hawk readinghas largelybecome the came to dominateAmerican policy. Their position is reading of the international left, which has been clear: The United States wields overwhelmingmili- screamingabout U.S. policies-mainly becausethey tary power, and even though countless foreign lead- fear that the chancesof U.S. successare high. ers considerit unwise for Washingtonto flex its mil- But hawk interpretations are wrong and will itary muscles, these same leaders cannot and will only contributeto the United States' decline, trans- not do anythingif the United States simply imposes forming a gradual descent into a much more rapid its will on the rest. The hawks believe the United and turbulent fall. Specifically, hawk approaches States should act as an imperialpower for two rea- will fail for military, economic, and ideological sons: First, the United States can get away with it. reasons. And second,if Washingtondoesn't exert its force,the Undoubtedly, the military remains the United United Stateswill become increasinglymarginalized. States' strongest card; in fact, it is the only card. Today, this hawkish position has three expres- Today,the United Stateswields the most formidable

66 FOREIGN POLICY military apparatus in the world. And if claims of ical over the Japanese economic miracle. They new, unmatched military technologies are to be calmed down in the 1990s, given Japan'swell-pub- believed, the U.S. military edge over the rest of the licized financial difficulties. Yet after overstating world is considerablygreater today than it was just how quickly Japan was moving forward, U.S. a decade ago. But does that mean, then, that the authorities now seem to be complacent, confident United Statescan invadeIraq, conquer it rapidly,and that Japan lags far behind. These days, Washington install a friendlyand stable regime? Unlikely. Bear in mind that of the three serious wars the U.S. military has fought since 1945 (Korea,Viet- Thereal question is notwhether U.S. hegemony is nam, and the Gulf War),one ended in defeat and two in draws-not waningbut whether the United States can devise a exactly a glorious record. Saddam Hussein's army is not wayto descendgracefully, with minimum damage that of the Taliban,and his internal military control is far more coher- to theworld, and to itself. ent. A U.S. invasion would neces- sarily involve a serious land force, one that would have to fight its way to Baghdadand seems more inclined to lecture Japanese policy- would likely suffersignificant casualties. Such a force makers about what they are doing wrong. would also need staging grounds, and Saudi Arabia Such triumphalism hardly appears warranted. has made clear that it will not serve in this capacity. Consider the following April 20, 2002, New York WouldKuwait or Turkeyhelp out? Perhaps,if Wash- Times report: "A Japaneselaboratory has built the ington calls in all its chips. Meanwhile, Saddamcan world's fastest computer, a machine so powerful be expectedto deployall weaponsat his disposal,and that it matches the raw processing power of the 20 it is preciselythe U.S. governmentthat keeps fretting fastest Americancomputers combined and far out- over how nasty those weapons might be. The Unit- strips the previous leader,an I.B.M.-built machine. ed Statesmay twist the armsof regimesin the region, The achievement ... is evidence that a technology but popular sentimentclearly views the whole affair race that most American engineers thought they as reflecting a deep anti-Arab bias in the United were winning handily is far from over."The analy- States.Can such a conflict be won? The BritishGen- sis goes on to note that there are "contrasting eral Staff has apparently already informed Prime scientific and technological priorities" in the two Minister Tony Blair that it does not believe so. countries. The Japanesemachine is built to analyze And there is always the matter of "second climatic change, but U.S. machines are designed to fronts." Following the Gulf War,U.S. armed forces simulate weapons. This contrast embodies the old- sought to prepare for the possibility of two simul- est story in the history of hegemonic powers. The taneous regional wars. After a while, the Pentagon dominant power concentrates (to its detriment)on quietly abandoned the idea as impracticaland cost- the military; the candidate for successor concen- ly. But who can be sure that no potential U.S. ene- trates on the economy. The latter has always paid mies would strike when the United States appears off, handsomely. It did for the United States. Why bogged down in Iraq? should it not pay off for Japan as well, perhaps in Consider,too, the question of U.S. popular tol- alliance with China? erance of nonvictories. Americanshover between a Finally, there is the ideological sphere. Right patriotic fervor that lends support to all wartime now, the U.S. economy seems relativelyweak, even presidentsand a deep isolationist urge. Since 1945, more so consideringthe exorbitantmilitary expens- patriotismhas hit a wall wheneverthe death toll has es associated with hawk strategies. Moreover, risen. Why should today's reaction differ?And even Washington remains politically isolated; virtually if the hawks (who are almost all civilians)feel imper- no one (save Israel)thinks the hawk position makes vious to public opinion, U.S. Army generals, burnt sense or is worth encouraging. Other nations are by Vietnam, do not. afraid or unwilling to stand up to Washington And what about the economic front? In the directly,but even their foot-dragging is hurting the 1980s, countless Americananalysts became hyster- United States.

JULY IAUGUST 2002 67 The Eagle Has Crash Landed

Yet the U.S. response amounts to little more "the U.S. is not able to fight a successful Iraqi war than arrogantarm-twisting. Arrogance has its own by itself without incurring immense damage, not negatives. Calling in chips means leaving fewer least in terms of its economic interests and its ener- chips for next time, and surly acquiescence breeds gy supply. Mr. Bush is reduced to talking tough increasingresentment. Over the last 200 years, the and looking ineffectual." And if the United States UnitedStates acquired a considerableamount of ide- still invades Iraq and is then forced to withdraw, it ological credit. But these days, the United States is will look even more ineffectual. running through this credit even faster than it ran PresidentBush's options appear extremely lim- through its gold surplus in the 1960s. ited, and there is little doubt that the United States The United States faces two possibilities during will continue to decline as a decisive force in world the next 10 years: It can follow the hawks' path, affairs over the next decade. The real question is with negativeconsequences for all but especiallyfor not whether U.S. hegemony is waning but whether itself. Or it can realize that the negatives are too the United States can devise a way to descend great.Simon Tisdall of the Guardianrecently argued gracefully, with minimum damage to the world, that even disregardinginternational public opinion, and to itself. [H

Want to Know More?

This article draws from the researchreported in TerenceK. Hopkins and ImmanuelWallerstein's, eds., The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System, 1945-2025 (London: Zed Books, 1996). In his new book, The Paradox ofAmerican Power:Why the World'sOnly SuperpowerCan't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2002), Joseph S. Nye Jr. argues that the United States can remain on top, provided it emphasizes multilateralism. For a less optimistic view, see Thomas J. McCormick'sAmerica's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). David Calleo's latest book, Rethinking Europe's Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), cogently analyzes the ins and outs of the European Union and its potential impact on U.S. power in the world.

In 1993, the Norwegian Nobel Committee convened a meeting of leading international analysts to discuss the role and influence of superpowers throughout history. Their analyses can be found in Geir Lundestad's, ed., The Fall of Great Powers: Stability, Peace and Legitimacy (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994), which includes essays by William H. McNeill, Istvan Deak, Alec Nove, Wolf- gang J. Mommsen, Robert Gilpin, Wang Gungwu, John Lewis Gaddis, and Paul Kennedy, among oth- ers. Eric Hobsbawm offers a splendid geopolitical analysis of the 20th century in The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Pantheon, 1994). Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly J. Sil- ver, and their collaborators take a longer view of hegemonic transitions over the centuries-from Dutch to British, from British to American, from American to some uncertain future hegemon-in Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Finally, it is always useful to return to Andre Fontaine's classic History of the Cold War (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

FOREIGN POLICY's extensive coverage of American hegemony and the U.S. role in the world includes, most recently, "In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?" (Summer 1997) by David Rothkopf, "The Benevolent Empire" (Summer1998) by Robert Kagan, "The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America" (Summer1998) by CharlesWilliam Maynes, "Americansand the World:A Surveyat the Century'sEnd" (Spring1999) by John E. Rielly,"Vox Americani" (September/October 2001) by Steven Kull, and "The Dependent Colossus" (March/April2002) by Joseph S. Nye Jr.

>)For links to relevant Web sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related FOREIGN POLICY articles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

68 FOREIGN POLICY