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Research Notes RESEARCH NOTES The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ No. 36 ■ September 2016 In Pursuit of Good Ideas THE SYRIA TRAIN-AND-EQUIP PROGRAM Lt Col J. Stewart Welch, USAF CDR Kevin Bailey, USN Photo courtesy PO2 Kim Smith, U.S. Department of Defense website. HE UNITED STATES has struggled to find an effective way to secure its interests and make positive change in the quagmire that is modern-day Syria. The concept of training indigenous T Syrians to fight for their own country is central to the overall strategy to counter the Islamic State, but it is a difficult task, to be undertaken in an extremely complex environment. The first Syria train-and-equip program (2014–15) was hampered by excessive policy restrictions and roundly criticized by many, including White House officials, as ill conceived from the start.1 Congressional leaders deemed the program a “total failure” shortly before the Department of Defense (DoD) sus- pended it in October 2015.2 If they are to achieve even a modicum of success, implementers of future “by, with, and through” training efforts in Syria must learn from the deficiencies of the first Syria train-and-equip program. This article explores its development and subsequent failure and offers recommendations for improving future iterations of this effort. IN OCTOBER 2015, after only thirteen months and objectives that hindered success from the beginning. more than $500 million allocated,3 the United States Should Washington decide to pursue similar efforts in abandoned its program to train and equip moderate Syria, it is imperative for policymakers, military strate- Syrian opposition forces.4 The decision came amid gists, and operators to understand the shortcomings growing criticism over the ineffectiveness and cost of a of the first Syria train-and-equip program so they may program that reportedly yielded fewer than one hun- improve strategy development to meet the complex dred fighters. Designed as a key part of the Obama challenges of the future. administration’s strategy to address the growing threat ■ posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), A False Start the train-and-equip program was hampered by signif- In May 2014, President Barack Obama unveiled a icant policy limitations that minimized risk, prohibited new counterterrorism strategy that would enable the boots on the ground, and required working “by, with, United States “to train, build capacity, and facilitate and through” Middle East partners.5 These limita- partner countries on the front lines” while addressing tions reflected a mismatch between policy and military emerging foreign threats.6 During his speech at the ©2016 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Research Note 36 . WELCH AND BAILEY U.S. Military Academy, he asked Congress to appropri- contributed heavily to the failure of the first Syria train- ate $5 billion toward a Counterterrorism Partnerships and-equip program. Cautious policymakers sought to Fund that included a “critical focus” on tackling the diminish political risk by minimizing the likelihood of crisis in Syria.7 In the following months, the administra- U.S. casualties. They also wanted to avoid a long and tion worked through Congress to gain funding autho- potentially unwinnable conflict in an extremely com- rization to train and equip moderate Syrian opposition plex operational environment. forces—those without ties to the Assad regime whom ■ the administration deemed as viable and effective part- An Intractable Problem ners against extremist elements in Syria. The president Five years of conflict in Syria have produced over a also requested authority for the DoD to lead the effort quarter million fatalities and even more displaced per- to train and equip vetted participants in partnered sons, emphasizing the cost of an intractable civil war nations that included Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Tur- among government, rebel, transnational, and exter- key.8 After debate, Congress approved the requested nal actors, all fighting to hold onto or seize power. authorizations and funding in September 2014, allow- The multipolar environment consists of domestic and ing President Obama to execute a strategy developed international stakeholders with both common and by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) under restric- competing interests. Understanding the stakeholders tions imposed by the National Security Council and the and their respective interests is paramount to under- Office of the Secretary of Defense. standing the very nature of the conflict. In the ensuing months, the DoD established train- Hafiz al-Assad seized power in Syria in 1970 and ing centers in partner nations and began the arduous installed a military government led primarily by Ala- process of vetting and then training the opposition wites, members of a minority religious sect that is an forces. The program included several hundred U.S. offshoot of Shiite Islam, which incorporates Christian military personnel whose goal was to field a force of and other elements. After Hafiz died in 2000, his approximately 3,000 Syrian fighters in 2015 and an son Bashar al-Assad became president.13 Although additional 5,400 each year thereafter.9 In May 2015, not all Alawites fully support the regime, many feel almost one year after the president’s speech, Secretary caught between Assad’s demands for loyalty and their of Defense Ashton Carter announced the start of train- fear of Sunni retaliation, sure to follow any change ing for approximately ninety Syrian recruits, with a sec- in regime.14 ond class starting in the subsequent weeks.10 Only four Directly opposing the Assad government are several months later, however, in a briefing before the Senate political organizations claiming to represent the Syrian Armed Services Committee, the CENTCOM com- people,15 among them the National Coalition of Revo- mander, General Lloyd Austin, testified that “the pro- lution and Opposition Forces, which President Obama gram had gotten off to a slow start,” and only “four or recognized in 2012 as the sole legitimate represen- five” U.S.-trained New Syrian Forces (NSF) were fight- tative of the Syrian people.16 Since neither the coali- ing ISIL.11 And only a few weeks after that, the admin- tion nor any other political organization wields signifi- istration essentially admitted to failure by canceling the cant influence over the multitude of armed opposition training program and shifting focus to providing equip- groups in Syria, the question of which group to partner ment packages and weapons to a select group of Syr- is a difficult one. So far, the opposition groups have ian opposition leaders to continue combating ISIL.12 been unable to unite the many disparate organizations The administration’s rather slow decisionmak- into a single coalition, which has complicated efforts ing, coupled with a long bureaucratic approval pro- to negotiate a political transition. Further reinforc- cess and a tendency to micromanage tactical details, ing the fragmentation of the opposition are multiple 2 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Syria Train-and-Equip Program international actors who have stakes in Syria, as well attacks against Turkish population centers threaten as ties to various opposition groups. the government’s control and internal security. Turkey Iran, where followers of Shia Islam are in the major- responded by closing its border with Syria, yet the gov- ity, supports the Syrian government with arms and ernment remains conflicted between national security finances to exert greater regional hegemony. Saudi priorities and geopolitical objectives. Arabia and the other Sunni-majority Gulf states seek Finally, some transnational stakeholders and threats to limit this Shia influence. Iran also seeks to keep are relevant. To radical jihadists, the Islamic state is regional Sunnis from uniting because they present a a veritable “city on a hill.” They view it as a utopia threat to its interests in the region. Iran has compelled of Muslim law and order that will inevitably grow and Hezbollah, a Lebanon-based Shia militia, to fight in eventually usher in the apocalypse. ISIL leaders and support of the Assad government, even though fight- followers alike believe in strict interpretation of the ing in Syria is not Hezbollah’s primary interest. Hezbol- Quran, which includes a literal implementation of lah, which pledges allegiance to the Ayatollah Kho- sharia law. ISIL must hold territory where it can imple- meini, entered the conflict after Iran hinted it might not ment sharia, which establishes its legitimacy.23 After continue to provide them with advanced weaponry, capturing towns and villages in Syria, ISIL rapidly which is often transported through Syria.17 Ultimately, establishes Islamic courts, provides law enforcement, Iran seeks to preserve the current Syrian regime so distributes food, implements education programs for both Syria and Hezbollah can continue to antagonize children, and executes a powerful information cam- Israel and to strengthen the crescent of Shia influence paign.24 Only after the group’s rapid rise and expan- that stretches from Baghdad to Damascus to Beirut. sion in Syria, coupled with Assad’s response to inter- Russia’s relationship with Syria represents the final nal Sunni dissidence, did the United States decide to Soviet-era connection to the Middle East.18 The Rus- act. ISIL threatens to destabilize the region further and sian military has renewed deep connections through undermine U.S. interests by threatening Jordan, Saudi military advisor exchanges, weapons sales, and the Arabia, and the Gulf.25 Tartus naval facility. Russia is also deeply concerned ■ that the fall of the Assad government will cause even Strategic Indecision: Too Little, Too Late greater instability in the region.19 This fear prompted President Obama did not announce a U.S. strategy its recent military actions in Syria, aimed to preserve until almost three years into Syria’s civil war. The strat- Assad’s hold on Damascus.
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