THE POWER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE INTERSCHOOL HONORS PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
Center for International Security and Cooperation Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Stanford University
By:
George John Saba
May 2015
Adviser: Dr. Coit D. Blacker
Abstract
Given that the national security adviser escapes Congressional approval and oversight and yet yields tremendous influence, it is important to understand why some advisers are more powerful than others. This thesis argues that the managerial style of the president best explains this difference in power. The president has considerable autonomy in establishing the power structure of his administration and can determine how much power the national security adviser will have. The view that the power of the national security adviser relates to the institutional growth of the presidency has merit, but a number of examples show that it is a weak explanation. Weak national security advisers have had many institutional resources (Jones), while strong national security advisers have operated with fewer (Kissinger and Brzezinski). While the personal relationship between the president and the national security adviser are extremely important in the amount of power the adviser has, poor relationships and strong advisers (Nixon and Kissinger) as well as good relationships and weak advisers (Bush and Rice) have occurred in the White House. A good personal relationship is important, but not necessary nor predictive of a strong national security adviser. The managerial style model explains the cases that the institutional growth and personal relationship frameworks cannot. This thesis demonstrates that the national security adviser role is a staff position and exists because the president finds it useful. Why some advisors have more power than others is most influenced by the president’s style of management.
ii
For My Parents
iii
Acknowledgements
First of all, this thesis would not have happened without the endless love and support of my parents, Teresa and George Saba. If I grow up to be half the person that each of them are, I will consider myself successful. Their unconditional love, compassion, forgiveness and kindness inspire me to be more like them each and every day. I next thank my thesis adviser, Dr. Coit D. Blacker. During my junior year, I was recommended by a friend to reach out to Professor Blacker, because I was interested in learning more about the role of the national security adviser. Knowing how busy he was and that we had never met, I had few expectations that he would be willing to advise me. Nonetheless, I sent him an email asking for a meeting. Unlike most professors, he responded quickly and arranged a time to meet. During the meeting, I told him about my project and asked if he would consider advising my thesis or knew of anyone who might be a good fit. He quickly said that he would be happy to advise. From day one, Professor Blacker has impressed me with his willingness to go above and beyond for me. Given the many demands on his time, he could have easily refused or recommended another faculty member. Instead, he happily agreed to advise my thesis and has been my adviser throughout this year. The wisdom of his direction and advice has exceeded my expectations. This thesis would not have happened without his guidance and support. My first job at Stanford was with Professor Martha Crenshaw. She introduced me to research in the international security field by allowing me to help with the Mapping Militants Project. After completing a CISAC thesis in the Honors program, my CISAC experience has really come full circle with Professor Crenshaw. As one of the co-professors of CISAC along with Professor Blacker, she has been just as supportive of me as she was my first year. Despite being extremely busy, she has always had her door open to me. From day one, Professor Crenshaw questioned my definition of “power” and how I would be able to measure it. It is because of her suggestions, that I was encouraged to make my ranking of each adviser’s power more rigorous. Shiri Krebs has also been a huge help with this process. She has the difficult job of being the TA for the entire CISAC Honors program. That requires numerous papers to read and students to help. I especially appreciate her inviting me into her office to discuss my thesis during the final hours. She is extremely busy and has always put her students first. A big thanks to Dr. Amy Zegart who helped a lot by giving me one of her books, Flawed by Design. I really enjoyed attending the CISAC holiday party at her house and she made me, one of two students at the entire party, feel very welcome in her home. Her guidance with my thesis has been invaluable and I am grateful I for her suggestions for getting my thesis off the ground and steering it in the right direction. I would also like to thank all of my mentors over the last four years who have given me guidance and their valued time over the years: Colonel Joe Felter, Dr. Scott Sagan, Dr. David Holloway, Assemblyman Joe Nation, David Crane, Dr. Alyssa O’Brien, Dr. Al Camarillo, Dr. Susan Blumenthal, Robert Dallek, Dr. Milana Trounce, Senator Russ Feingold, Secretary Tom Perez, Councilman Michael Tubbs, Tiq Chapa and Ro Khanna. Also, if it were not for Stanford Baseball Program, I would not be at Stanford. I also would have not have made a trip to Austin, Texas. Before our first game at the University of Texas, Austin, we had a several hours free prior to game time. Realizing that the LBJ library was nearby, I iv asked my coaches permission to make a visit. As they always have supported my academic endeavors at Stanford, Coaches Mark Marquess and Dean Stotz encouraged me to go. They had also permitted me to forego the 2013 fall practice to participate in the Stanford in Washington program. I was recruited by them to attend and play baseball at Stanford; without their support, trust and confidence in me, it is unlikely I would be writing this thesis today. It is important to thank Dr. Condoleezza Rice who inspired me to write this thesis. I remember when I first told her about my thesis idea on the national security adviser. She responded, “Well, you know one!” Since then, she has been extremely supportive and generous with her time and advice. I am very fortunate she accepted me into her class and hired me as a research assistant. I will be forever grateful for the help of Professor Michael McFaul. He met with me on short notice to share his experience working for General Jones in the NSC. He was very generous with his time and thoroughly answered all of my questions. Some of his comments sparked an interest to conduct more interviews and have inspired me to continue researching Jones as a national security adviser. Professor McFaul has been generous to me from day one when I took his class this past fall. I am very thankful and grateful to him. It was the interview with Professor McFaul that inspired me to ask Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, leader of CISAC Honors College, about Jones’s role in the formation of U.S.- Afghanistan policy. Ambassador Eikenberry was extremely helpful in my formulation of my thesis topic this past September. I am very lucky and thankful that he responded so quickly to my email question regarding Jones and Afghanistan. I would also like to thank another, CISAC Honors College leader, Dr. Tom Fingar. He also helped me think through my thesis topic and set up some amazing meetings during out trip in Washington D.C. He has also put me in touch with the “Honest Broker”, General Scowcroft. I will be able to speak with the “best” national security adviser about the role in the near future. Although our conversation will come after the due date of this thesis, I plan to use his remarks and interview to continue working on this project. I greatly appreciate both General Scowcroft and Dr. Fingar for this opportunity to discuss the power of the national security adviser. I want to offer a huge thanks to Walter Pincus, whose class I have great memories of at Stanford in Washington. He was generous enough to send an email to Zbigniew Brzezinski on my behalf. Although Dr. Brzezinski was unable to answer all of my questions, he was able to provide me with a very powerful quote. I would like to thank my friends. Daniel Khalessi, winner of the 2013 Firestone award, is the inspiration for my CISAC experience. When I was a sophomore, I had the good fortune of taking a class with Daniel; we met in our TA’s (Arash Aramesh-another amazing mentor) office hours. Over a breakfast at the newly built Arrillaga Dining Hall, he told me about his honors thesis on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and raved about the CISAC program. Since that breakfast, he has been a mentor, coach, role model, and most importantly a great friend. I would not have applied for CISAC if it were not for him. Two of my best friends have taken time out of their busy schedules to read through and edit this thesis, Nick Ahamed and Chris Tutunjian. I met Nick on a CISAC sponsored Sophomore College trip, The Face of Battle. That class sparked my interest in U.S. foreign policy. After seeing my thesis presentation, Nick encouraged me to make comprehensive charts on each of the frameworks. I believe this has improved my thesis tremendously and am very grateful for his advice. Chris and I were in the same freshman dorm
v and have discussed security issues together ever since. I would also like to thank Matthew Colford, my “big” in SigEp, who has been a great role model for me. It was his suggestion that I ask Professor Blacker to advise my thesis. That was great advice. Finally, I wish to extend my sincere appreciation for the other members of the CISAC honors program: Sam Rebo: my roommate who put up with me during honors college and future Transiberian Railroad traveling partner; Patrick Cirenza: the man who endured an entire summer sitting across from me in Dr. Rice’s office and future classmate at Cambridge; Akshai Baskaran: the man who inspired me to learn more about renewable energy while sitting next to me on the way to Senior Formal on a bus; Kelsey Dayton: the wordsmith who’s grammar acumen I will never achieve and always envy; Sean Hiroshima: literally the best dressed person I have seen in my life, but more importantly just a genuinely good guy who laughs at my awful jokes; Annie Kapnick: fellow Biosecurity Class TA who knows what it’s like to grade all of those homework assignments; Sarah Kunis: the classmate who I looked up to in my first polisci class at Stanford; Teo Lamiot: name rhyming buddy and good friend since freshman year in Alondra; Austin Lewis: one of the nicest guys I have met at Stanford whose topic I thought was spelled with a V for the entire year until I saw his powerpoint; Eliza Thompson: who is one of the few people who likes my Obama impersonation, I think; Adrienne von Schulthess: fellow White House intern who I have admired since the first time I met her at Stanford and last but not least, my Sophomore College Assistant and Alternative Spring Break co-leader, Taylor Grossman. Without her patience and organization, neither of those trips would have been as outstandingly successful as they were. From the Groupme messages to the attempts at small unit cohesion, I will always have fond memories of you all.
vi
Table of Contents
Preface xii -Chapter 1-HISTORY OF THE ROLE 1 Harry Truman: National Security Act of 1947 1 Dwight Eisenhower: An administrative assistant 2 John F. Kennedy: A new role 3 Richard Nixon: National security adviser and secretary of state 5 The Tower Commission 7 Brent Scowcroft: Honest broker and role model 12 Sandy Berger and Condoleezza Rice: An increase in visibility 13 Susan Rice: The current adviser 15 Importance 16 -Chapter 2-THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 17 General literature on the national security adviser 17 Three explanatory models 20 A. Institutional Growth 20
B. Personal relationship between the national security adviser and the president 23
C. The president’s management style 26
-Chapter 3-INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH 32 Description of explanatory model 32 Overview of the growth of presidential power: from TR to Obama 33 Growth of the National Security Council 34 Figure 3-1: Expected Relationship between National Security Advisers and Their Power* 40 Case studies 40 Bundy’s power flux 40
Early power 41
Weakening of the role and the framework 42
General(ly) Weak 43
Powerful data 52 Figure 3-2: Estimated Power of the National Security Adviser 54 Conclusion: Explanatory strengths and limits of this model 55 -Chapter 4-THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP 56 vii
Description of explanatory model 56 Case studies 57 The Boston boys 57
Clash of cultures 59
An odd couple 64
The honest brokers 68
A friend of Bill 74
The professor 79
Conclusion: Explanatory strengths and limits of this model 83 -Chapter 5-THE MANAGERIAL STYLE OF THE PRESIDENT 85 Description of explanatory model 85 Case studies 86 Decision-making donkeys 86
Grand ole executives: cabinet-style government 95
Conclusion: Explanatory strengths and limits of this model 108 -Chapter 6-CONCLUSION 109 The three models: strengths and weaknesses 110 Institutional growth model 110
Personal relationship model 111
Managerial style of the president model 112
Comparing the frameworks 113 Limitations 114 Recommendation for future research 115 Implications 115 Appendix A: Institutional Growth of the NSC Staff in Relation to Power 117 Appendix B: Power Rating of the National Security Adviser 119 Appendix C: Personal Relations Between POTUS and His Adviser in Relation to Power 124 Appendix E: Email Exchange: Former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with the author, May 15, 2013 126 Appendix F: Email to Author Regarding Exchange Between Former United States National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Washington Post Journalist, Walter Pincus, May 19, 2015 127
viii
Appendix G: Interview Transcript: United States Ambassador to the Russian Federation Michael McFaul with the author, May 20, 2015 128 Appendix H: McGeorge Bundy’s Archives at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas 133 Appendix I: Bundy Memo to LBJ, “Review of Foreign Aid Program” 134 Appendix J: “Agenda for Luncheon” 135 Appendix K: Email Exchange: Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, May 21, 2015 136 Appendix L: Email Exchange: General Jim Jones, Former Commander of United States Central Command with the author, May 21, 2015 137 Bibliography 138 Unpublished Primary Sources 138 Archived Collections and Material 138
Interviews 138
Published Sources 138 News and Media Sources 152
ix
Figures
Figure 3-1: The Expected Relationship between National Security Advisers and Their Power (Pg. 40)
Figure 3-2: Estimated Power of the National Security Advisers (pg. 54)
x
THE POWER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
xi
Preface
Of all the jobs in government, leading my national security team is certainly one of the most demanding, if not the most demanding….As my National Security Adviser, his portfolio is literally the entire world.1 -President Barack H. Obama, 2013
As a student of International Relations at Stanford University, I learned about the key policy decisions of presidents, secretaries of state and secretaries of defense. However, not until I met Zbigniew Brzezinski, in an evening class at the Stanford in Washington house, did I realize how important and sometimes powerful the assistant to the president for national security can be.
A couple of weeks later, I passed the current national security adviser, Susan Rice, in the black and white checkered halls of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. As an intern at the
White House in 2013, I participated in the White House Halloween party and went as a Stanford
Baseball player, since I lacked an actual costume. Remembering that Susan Rice had gone to
Stanford, I showed her my bulky, Cardinal Baseball jacket. She broke out in a big smile and gave me a “powerful” high-five. Meeting two national security advisers within the span of a couple of weeks sparked my interest in the role. What I soon learned was how powerful some of the assistants to the president for national security had been throughout our nation’s history.
Better known today as the national security adviser, this role has become one of the most prestigious and powerful foreign policy posts in the United States. Prior to their appointment, national security advisers have not generally held prominent positions outside the White House.
In fact, many of the most esteemed ones have come from academia. Eighteen people (two have
1 Obama, Barack H. "Remarks by the President in Personnel Announcement." White House Rose Garden. 5 June 2013. Speech. xii served in separate administrations) have been appointed as national security adviser since its inception in the early 1960s. Since then, the position has grown in prestige and importance.
Depending on the administration, these advisers can reach a level of prominence similar to cabinet secretaries, and yet they remain unchecked by Congress. Given that this role escapes
Congressional confirmation and oversight but yields tremendous influence, it becomes important to understand why some advisers are more powerful than others. Up until now, the reasons for the flux in power still remain unclear.
This idea of power2 and the role of the national security adviser sparked a yearlong endeavor that has culminated with this thesis which I have had the pleasure of writing through
Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). I have relied primarily on memoirs from principals and non-fiction works. Non-fiction works have been used to balance any narratives in memoirs in which the authors unintentionally skewed events to present a more positive, but perhaps inaccurate story. The data was analyzed through the lenses of the three frameworks discussed in the review of literature.
About a month after high-fiving Susan Rice, I received an email from the office of another former national security adviser: Condoleezza Rice. I was notified of my acceptance into her seminar on challenges and dilemmas in U.S. foreign policy making in the 21st century. Some chose their honors thesis topics; this one chose me.
Geo Saba Stanford, California May, 2015
2 “Power” is defined as the ability to affect policy outcomes that are preferred by the president and national security advisor, and to prevent the implementation of ones that are not. xiii
-Chapter 1-
HISTORY OF THE ROLE
I was to perform as judge, traffic cop, truant officer, arbitrator, fireman, chaplain, psychiatrist, and occasional hit man.3 -General Colin L. Powell, 1995
The President needs help.4 -President’s Committee on Administrative Management, 1937
Harry Truman: National Security Act of 1947
After World War II, the United States envisioned an active and dominant role for itself in global affairs. In its ascendance as a superpower, matters of foreign policy and the protection of national interests assumed greater importance. At the request of President Harry Truman,
Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 which reorganized the executive branch.5 In addition to creating the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Act gave birth to the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC was formed to support the president, who faced a world full of security threats, and to help facilitate interagency coordination.6 The NSC was comprised of only the president, vice president, secretary of state
3 Powell, Colin L., with Joseph E. Persico. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995. Print. Pg. 352 4 U.S. President’s Committee on Administrative Management. Report of the President’s Committee. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1937 Pg. 5. 5 Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. Pg. 3. Print. 6 Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. New York: Crown, 2011. Print. Pg. 12; “History of the National Security Council 1947-1997.” Federation of American Scientists. Office of the Historian: Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. 1997. Web. 28 Jan. 2015.
Act.11
Dwight Eisenhower: An administrative assistant
President Dwight Eisenhower, who organized his administration hierarchically, gave greater responsibility to and institutionalized the National Security Council.12 He also created a position to oversee and manage it: special assistant to the president for national security affairs.13
Robert (Bobby) Cutler was the first to serve in this role and helped create an organized interagency process that dealt with every major national security issue.14 Although the assistant for national security affairs was in place, the modern day national security adviser was not
7 Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor. Pg. 12. 8 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 4. 9 Ibid. 10 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: DIANE, 2010. Pg. 7. Web.
John F. Kennedy: A new role
President John F. Kennedy, who had served in the U.S. Navy and on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, placed a particular emphasis on foreign policy.17 Whereas Eisenhower brought his hierarchical style from the military to the inner workings of the White House,
Kennedy dismantled many of the structures his predecessor had put in place.18 He wanted more power concentrated in the White House and a national security adviser who would have more direct access to the president. He even envisioned McGeorge Bundy playing a larger role than the cabinet secretaries. Having known him since childhood, Kennedy viewed the Harvard
College Dean’s brilliant mind as an asset; Bundy would be someone with whom he could debate policy.19 Kennedy gave Bundy more responsibilities and created a position to help him, Deputy
Special Assistant for National Security Adviser, to which he appointed Walt Rostow.20 Kennedy had fashioned a National Security Council, “which was more like a college faculty than a government bureaucracy.”21 He felt that formal cabinet meetings were a waste of time and thus relied on conversations with intelligent people that he trusted, such as Bundy.22
15 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office .Pg. 8. 16 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 8. 17 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office .Pg. 12. 18 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 10. Web. 19 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 13; Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House. New York: HarperCollins, 2013. Print. Pg. 89-90. 20 Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House. New York: HarperCollins, 2013. Print. Pg. 91. 21 Ibid., 92. 22 Ibid., 89. 3
Kennedy made some key changes to the role of the national security adviser. Under his administration, the adviser dealt with the president’s daily action agenda and the most pressing foreign policy challenges. The National Security Council staff became a policy planning apparatus. The Situation Room was created to support the president in overseeing the different aspects of foreign policy making in his administration.23
After the Bay of Pigs debacle, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Bundy both offered their resignations.24 However, instead of firing them, Kennedy realized they were simply following his lead and that the real problem lied with his reliance on advice from “experts” such as his military commanders.25 Thus, Kennedy entrusted more power to Bundy and moved his office from the Executive Office Building to the basement of the West Wing.26 It was Kennedy who first decided to rely more on the National Security Adviser and bolster the position. Up until this point, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was no more than an assistant, working on logistics and paperwork. Now, Bundy and subsequent national security advisers had close access to the president and were involved in making foreign policy. The role of the modern national security adviser was born.27
The prominence of the role dipped under President Lyndon Johnson, in part because
Bundy and Johnson did not work well together. Nonetheless, Johnson kept the three Kennedy inventions in place, partly out of an effort to maintain continuity: 1) the adviser working on day- to-day foreign policy issues, 2) the national security council staff and 3) the Situation Room.28
23 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 14, 25. 24 Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court. Pg. 147. 25 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 22; Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court. Pg. 147-148. Print. 26 Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court. 149. 27 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 55. 28 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 56. 4
Walt Rostow, Johnson’s replacement for Bundy, delineated the following duties for the national security adviser: gather information, fairly represent the views of cabinet members to the president, offer his opinion, manage the president’s foreign policy staff and implement the policy the president chooses.29 Despite these privileges, Johnson took out, “national security affairs” from Rostow’s title, making him simply a “special assistant to the president”.30 The title of
“assistant to the president for national security affairs” was later restored under Nixon.31
Richard Nixon: National security adviser and secretary of state
The role of the national security adviser significantly increased in power under President
Richard Nixon.32 Like Kennedy, Nixon’s priority and number one interest was foreign policy.33
He appointed Henry Kissinger who became the most powerful national security adviser that the nation has ever seen.34 Kissinger became so famous, that his “celebrity enraged Nixon”.35
Nonetheless, Nixon supported Kissinger’s prominent role. Nixon’s National Security Decision
Memorandum titled “Reorganization of the National Security Council System” strengthened the
NSC and made it the central mechanism for considering policy issues.36 It also created
29 The Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C., and The Baker Institute at Rice University, A forum on the Role of the National Security Council (April 2, 2001), Washington, D.C. Pg. 4. 30 Destler, I. M. “National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought.” Political Science Quarterly 95 Winter (1980). Pg. 580. 31 "Henry A. (Heinz Alfred) Kissinger." Department History - Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. 17 May 2015.
Kissinger chaired the newly created National Security Council Review Group which made sure that “all realistic alternatives [were] preserved”.38 Because of this new system, agency and department officials answered to the president’s national security adviser.
Nixon wanted to restructure what he felt was Kennedy’s unorganized framework.39 To do this, he instructed Kissinger to create a system that concentrated foreign policy making in the
White House and used the NSC as the mechanism to do so.40 Kissinger chaired the most important NSC committees and had unparalleled access to the president, giving him extraordinary influence on policy.41 His staff included over 50 employees and had a budget of two million dollars: two and a half times larger than Bundy’s budget.42 He even prevented top staffers from directly meeting with Nixon: they had to go through Kissinger.43 Many were upset with the concentration of power in the White House and the president’s reliance on the National
Security Adviser because they felt as if the policy making process was being manipulated to avoid Congressional oversight: the adviser is not confirmed by the Senate and does not have to testify.44
37 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 57. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., 56. 40 Ibid., 57-58. 41 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: DIANE, 2010. Pg. 13. Web. Pg. 100. 42 Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. Pg. 37. Print. 43 Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Pg. 189. Print. 44 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: DIANE, 2010. Pg. 14. 6
Nixon always depended heavily on Kissinger to conduct foreign policy, but did so even more during the Watergate scandal when he had to pay more attention to domestic politics.45
Following the firing of Bob Haldeman, Nixon’s new chief of staff, Alexander Haig, was an ardent believer that the president should rely even more on his national security adviser. In fact,
Haig proposed that Nixon also appoint Kissinger as secretary of state, which he did.46 Although
Kissinger held both titles, the only time in U.S. history, he left his deputy national security adviser, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, to manage the interagency process while he acted as the primary policymaker and negotiator.47 When Gerald Ford assumed the presidency following Nixon’s resignation, Kissinger remained secretary of state, and Scowcroft became national security adviser.48 Scowcroft, who would also later serve as national security adviser for the first President Bush, tried very hard not to emulate Kissinger.49
The Tower Commission
While Kissinger was the most powerful, Zbigniew Brzezinski was the most controversial due to his disputes with other cabinet secretaries.50 As President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Brzezinski tried to make policy instead of running the policy making process.51 His tenure undermined the position’s legitimacy to the point that the first national security adviser,
McGeorge Bundy, wrote a piece in the New York Times arguing that the role had grown too
45 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 90 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 91. 49 The Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C., and The Baker Institute at Rice University, A forum on the Role of the National Security Council (April 2, 2001), Washington, D.C. Pg. 9. 50 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 94. 51 Ibid. 7 large and that less is more.52 Brzezinski admitted that he might have overstepped by encroaching on the legitimacy of secretary of state, Cyrus Vance. Although Brzezinski has recently changed his position on the matter, the Polish World War II émigré once proposed that the role should become institutionalized and be subjected to Congressional confirmation.53
President Ronald Reagan succeeded two administrations that had very strong national security advisers: Kissinger and Brzezinski. Believing that the position had become too expansive and criticizing the conflicting power dynamics in the Carter Administration, “The
Great Communicator” decreased the power and prestige of the role by severing direct access between the president and national security adviser.54 Reagan felt that one of the downfalls of
Carter’s foreign policy was the lack of a cohesive message. This was due, in part, to a confusing balance of power between Carter, Brzezinski and Vance. Reagan decided to restructure the foreign policy making structure in his administration. To avoid all confusion, he named his secretary of state, Alexander Haig, as the chief spokesman and adviser to the president on foreign policy.55 He kept intact the National Security Council to coordinate the policy making process, but severely reduced the power of the national security adviser, making it second to that of cabinet secretaries like Alexander Haig and then George Shultz.56
The reduction of the power of the national security adviser had dire consequences for
Reagan and his foreign policy. Given his hands-off approach and little interest in policy, he needed more support from his staff and national security adviser. Reagan chose Richard Allen as
52 Ibid., 126. 53 Ibid. 54 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 126; Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: DIANE, 2010. Pg. 17. 55 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 127. 56 Johnson, Loch K., and Karl F. Inderfurth. "The Evolving Role of the National Security Adviser: From Executive Secretary to Activist Counselor."White House Studies Compendium. Ed. Robert W. Watson. New York: Nova Science, 2008. 234. Print. 8 his first national security adviser, someone who advocated for a reduction in power for the role and was completely excluded from the policy making process.57 Allen modeled the role of the national security adviser after Eisenhower’s staff member, Gordon Gray, who was in charge of the policy planning process.58 As Allen put it, he saw the role as “a clear-cut staff function”.59
Allen, lacking direct access, went through White House counselor, Ed Meese to report to the president.60 He chaired no interagency committees and had a position equal to the level of deputy secretary.61
Reagan’s second national security adviser, William “Judge” Clark lacked knowledge and power to settle disputes between secretary of state George Shultz and defense secretary, Casper
Weinberger.62 Clark demanded direct access to the president upon his appointment to the position, and Reagan agreed, giving more power and responsibilities to the national security adviser: an expanded role that would include developing, coordinating and implementing foreign policy.63 Clark concentrated policy making in the NSC and ensured that statements and policies were first approved by the NSC.64 This reversed the downgrading of the role under Reagan’s first national security adviser. Clark did not last until the end of the administration because of his inability to understand and appreciate the nuances of foreign policy.65 The New York Times labeled him as an “amateur in a professional’s job”.66
57 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 128. 58 Ibid., 128. 59 Ibid., 133. 60 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: DIANE, 2010. Pg. 18. Web. 61 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 133. 62 Ibid., 128. 63 Ibid., 143. 64 Ibid., 144. 65 Ibid., 146. 66 Ibid., 147. 9
His next adviser, Colonel Bud McFarlane had to deal with a paralyzing feud between defense secretary, Casper Weinberger and secretary of state, George Shultz. Reagan was unwilling to pick sides in the disputes that they had over most issues.67 The ongoing quarreling led to a policy making process of winning the president’s approval and then acting on it before the other principals could intervene.68 As Lou Cannon put it, “Reagan’s national security advisers wielded insufficient influence and excessive power”.69 Because they had little influence, they received little instruction from the president, but also less supervision.70
Colonel McFarlane and his successor, Admiral John Poindexter, circumvented the feuding cabinet secretaries and continued making policy on their own: one in particular was the famous deal struck with the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.71 Poindexter entered into a guilty plea, admitting to withholding information from Congress and went on trial to face an obstruction of justice charge.72 This scandal, now known as the Iran-Contra affair, was a low point for the
Reagan Administration. The affair happened because of a disorganized policy making process that gave too little institutional power to the national security adviser to manage the process and too little oversight to prevent covert dealings with the Contras.73 Once the scandal became public, the president appointed a “Special Review Board”, now known as the Tower
Commission, to investigate what went wrong and make recommendations for improving future
NSC operations.74
67 Ibid., 154. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., 155. 71 Ibid., 128, 155. 72 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. 73 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 129; Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: DIANE, 2010. Pg. 18. Web. 74 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 158 10
The Tower Commission consisted of former senator John Tower, former secretary of state, Edmund Muskie, and former and future national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft.
Stephen Hadley, another future national security adviser, drafted the Commission’s report.75 The
Commission found that the policy making process was too informal, reviews by NSC principals were scarce and no serious attention was paid to the law.76 The report placed much of the blame of Reagan’s national security adviser.77 It highlighted the fact that the Department of State,
Department of Defense and CIA all had jurisdiction over the policy in question, yet none of them had participated in the policy making process.78 The Commission stated:
Our review of the operation of the present system and that of other administrations where committee chairman came from the Departments has led us to the conclusion that the system generally operates better when the committees are chaired by the individual with the greatest stake in making the NSC system work. We recommend that the National Security Adviser chair the senior-level committees of the NSC system.79
After the largest recorded drop in presidential approval in one month’s time (67 to 46 percent), Reagan made immediate changes.80 His new national security adviser, Frank Carlucci, and his deputy, Colin Powell, acted on the Tower Commission’s conclusion that the “the NSC process did not fail, it simply was largely ignored”.81 Carlucci ended covert actions and created a
75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., 158-159. 77 Klobuchar, Lisa. The Iran-Contra Affair: Political Scandal Uncovered. Minneapolis: Compass Point, 2008. Pg. 78. Web.
Senior Review Group that he chaired and a Policy Review Group chaired by Powell.82 Insisting on a having a strong national security adviser, Carlucci placed himself atop a pyramid structure with senior directors below who were in charge of eleven different regional or functional branches.83 Shultz was displeased that the Tower Commission recommended that the national security adviser chair the interagency cabinet level meetings because it would give too much power to someone not held accountable to Congress.84 Reagan signed and agreed to Carlucci’s directive in 1987, putting in place a system and structure that has remained largely intact.85
Brent Scowcroft: Honest broker and role model
It is Brent Scowcroft, the only person to serve as national security adviser in two non- consecutive administrations, who Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler regard as the “ideal national security adviser—indeed, he offers a model for how the job should be done”.86 Subsequent national security advisers, like Condoleeza Rice would try to emulate the General. She writes that he is “universally regarded as the most successful because he did not interject himself, allowed the Secretaries to do their work and fairly represented the President.”87
Scowcroft believed that the adviser has two roles: 1) manage and honestly broker the policy making process and 2) advise the president on foreign policy.88 At a roundtable with other advisers, Scowcroft said: “if you are not the honest broker, you don’t have the confidence of the other members of the NSC. If you don’t have their confidence, then the system doesn’t work,
82 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. 83 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 164. 84 Ibid.,165. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid.,170. 87 Rice, Condoleezza. Personal email interview. 15 May 2015. (See Appendix E for full email). 88 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 116. 12 because they will all go around you to get to the president and then you fracture the system.”89
As a member of the Tower Commission, and drafter specifically of the section defining what the role of the national security adviser should be, he knew how important it was to support the president as an honest broker, not a policymaker who competes with the other cabinet secretaries.90
Sandy Berger and Condoleezza Rice: An increase in visibility
Scowcroft also believed that the adviser “should be seen occasionally and heard even less”.91 It appears his successor, Anthony Lake tried to emulate the “honest broker”:
I would stay behind the scenes…And I would do my best always to try to achieve consensus and to make sure that my colleagues’ views always had a fair hearing with the President. But I would be less hesitant in voicing my own views when they differed from those of my colleagues, even if it prevented consensus or put me more at odds with them.92
Despite trying to emulate this model, subsequent advisers were more visible in the public eye, and became spokespersons for their administrations. Sandy Berger, Clinton’s second national security adviser, broke with Scowcroft’s and his predecessor’s mold of remaining behind the scenes. Berger felt that “Part of [his] job… [was] to explain to the American people what our
89 Ibid. 90 Ibid., 168-169. 91Destler, I.M. "How National Security Advisers See Their Role." The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. Ed. James M. McCormick. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Pg. 218. 92 Lake, Anthony. 6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000. Pg. 131-132.
13 objectives [were]”.93 Whereas Lake appeared on a total of five morning talk-shows, Berger made almost 50 appearances.94
Ivo Daalder said Sandy Berger and his successor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice “seem to be everywhere—giving speeches of major import, being quoted in newspapers and newsmagazines as a result of frequent press briefings and even more frequent media interviews, and appearing on the Sunday-morning talk show circuit”.95 Condoleezza Rice originally did not want to be as public as Berger. In her own words:
When I became national security adviser, I had planned to follow Brent Scowcroft’s example and keep a low profile, deferring the cabinet secretaries for public appearances. After September 11, though, I was pressed into action in large part because I could be a reliable surrogate for the President. In the run-up to the Iraq war, that became even more the case. Between September and March, I appeared on twelve Sunday shows.96
Daalder thinks that this has happened for two reasons. Recently, advisers have helped out on the presidential campaign, which was not always the case. Lake, Berger, Condoleezza Rice,
Hadley and Susan Rice have all participated in their presidents’ original campaigns. The role has become connected to presidential politics. Also, with the advent of the 24-hour news cycle and its growing audience, the adviser has become part of the team to go out and spread the administration’s message.97
93 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 241. 94 Ibid., 241. 95 Destler, I.M. "How National Security Advisers See Their Role." Pg. 219. 96 Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor. Pg. 196. 97Destler, I.M. "How National Security Advisers See Their Role." Pg. 218-219. 14
Susan Rice: The current adviser
Ambassador Susan Rice has been an ardent supporter of President Barack Obama since
2008. She served as the United States Representative to the United Nations during the deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, which left the ambassador and three other U.S. nationals dead.98 Republicans heavily criticized Rice for her handling of the attack.99 The criticism was so strong that when Obama contemplated nominating her to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, she removed her name from consideration.100 The president then appointed her as his national security adviser following the resignation of Tom Donilon.
Under Obama, the position of secretary of state remains the highest foreign policy position in the U.S., but Susan Rice’s case highlights the uniqueness of the role of the national security adviser. The role has evolved significantly since Bundy became its first occupant: it has become one of the most prestigious foreign policy posts. Rice, the would-be-secretary of state, now holds the position of national security adviser simply because her appointment was not subject to Senate confirmation. She remains at the center of foreign policy making and has unique daily access to the president.
98 "Benghazi Mission Attack Fast Facts - CNN.com." CNN Library. Cable News Network, 2 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 Jan. 2015.
Importance
The national security adviser has become one of the major principals in many administrations, yielding significant power and visibility: sometimes even more than cabinet secretaries. This rise in prestige and influence has created a discussion surrounding the fact that the position is unchecked by Congress.101 Because Congress does not confirm the national security adviser and has no oversight, it cannot call the adviser to testify. Presidents can use their executive privilege to prevent their NSA from testifying.102
The Tower Commission and former national security advisers have rejected the idea that
Congress should confirm the national security adviser.103 Brzezinski argued that testifying on the
Hill would take time out of an already busy and demanding schedule and that it would confuse the distinction between the secretary of state and adviser.104 He argued that this would also reduce the president’s leadership.105 Sandy Berger contends that Congressional oversight would prevent the adviser from comfortably sharing confidential advice with the president.106 Carlucci believes that if Congress confirms the adviser, the president would simply assign another personal staff member to carry out the same functions as the adviser today.107
Although some have been more powerful than others, the role has developed and changed drastically since the days of McGeorge Bundy and John F. Kennedy. This rise in prominence has led to a significant amount of literature on the national security adviser. The next chapter will explore and review the literature that has inspired this thesis.
101 Destler, I.M. "How National Security Advisers See Their Role." Pg. 219. 102 Ibid., 220. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis.” Foreign Policy No. 69. 1987. Pg. 95. JSTOR. Web. 106 Destler, I.M. "How National Security Advisers See Their Role." Pg. 218-219. 107 Ibid., 220. 16
-Chapter 2-
THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS
The influence of the national security adviser within the administration depends entirely on the president.108 -Michael Nelson, 2008
The NSA is only as influential and powerful as the strength and depth of the personal relationship with the president.109 -Kevin Marsh, 2012
General literature on the national security adviser
United States foreign policy has profound impact on both its own citizens and on countries throughout the world. In addition, the U.S. spends just under a trillion dollars and employs millions of people in the name of national defense. For these reasons, it is essential to understand how the U.S. makes foreign policy decisions.110 In this decision-making process, the
National Security Council staff members play a key role: “The National Security Council is the
President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his
108 Nelson, Michael. The Powers of the Presidency. Washington, DC: CQ, 2008. Pg. 239. 109 Marsh, Kevin. “The Contemporary Presidency the Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor.” 2012. Pg. 840. 110 George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980. 17 senior national security advisers and cabinet officials.”111 Over the last forty years, a number of scholars have explored its extensive impact and power.112 Their work clearly shows that the NSC staff’s power and size have grown tremendously over time and that this expansion has resulted in its members, especially the national security adviser, having greater responsibility.
Much of the literature surrounding the national security adviser explores what qualities she needs to carry out her role or the types of models past advisers have used to inform the policy making process and advise the president. Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler wrote the seminal book on the history of the national security adviser.113 They tell the stories of each national security adviser from Dwight D. Eisenhower through George W. Bush and identify that to do their job advisers must balance managing the policy making process, personally advise the president, earn the trust of senior officials and the president, limit their public profile, and establish good relations with Congress on both sides of the aisle.114
111 "National Security Council." The White House. The White House, n.d. Web.
Various models for the national security adviser’s role have been identified: devil’s advocate (where the adviser argues in favor of an unpopular position that no one else, including herself, supports), spokesperson for the president (when the adviser uses her platform and position to articulate the president’s policy preferences), and honest broker.115 John Burke explores the idea of the national security adviser as an honest broker and categorizes what role each adviser has played.116 An honest broker, he argues, “is not just another source of policy advice. Rather, the person in that position needs to be concerned with the fair and balanced presentation of information to the president and those advising the president”.117 Daalder and
Destler conclude that Brent Scowcroft was the “ideal” national security adviser. In their view, because he acted as an honest broker, he “offers a model for how the job should be done”.118
In contrast to the honest broker, the multiple advocacy approach suggests that “instead of utilizing centralized management practices to discourage or neutralize internal disagreement over policy, an executive can use a multiple advocacy model to harness diversity of views and interests in the interest of rational policy making.”119 Alexander George described a “multiple advocacy” national security adviser as one who could articulate and advocate for positions to
115 Mulcahy, Kevin V. “Walt Rostow as National Security Advisor, 1966-69.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25 2 (1995): 223-236; Olszowka, Adam. “Strengthening Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council.” Thesis. Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1-50. 15 April 2011. Web.
While a substantial amount of work has delineated the characteristics of advisers and their possible roles, little work has focused on why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. A closer look at the existing literature, however, suggests three possible models to explain this variation in the power of the national security adviser: power of the presidency, personal relationship, and management style.
Three explanatory models
Although scholars have studied the national security adviser and the National Security
Council, they have focused primarily on the different models and roles that each one plays in presidential decision-making.121 There is a dearth of literature that addresses why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. However, a review of the literature does reveal three frameworks that might help to explain the variation in the national security advisers’ power or ability to affect the outcomes of foreign policy decisions.
A. Institutional Growth
To explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others, some look to the rise in the institutions of the presidency and the NSC over time. This increase in power of
120 George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980.
20 the postwar president and the executive branch may explain the difference in power among national security advisers.
A substantial amount of literature has argued that the institution of the presidency has increased in power. Whereas Richard Neustadt believes that a president’s power lies with his skills, temperament and experience, others claim that the institution of the presidency itself accounts for the president’s power.122 Given that the federal government and Executive Office
Staff have increased in size and scope, it is argued that this necessarily increases the power of the presidency.123 They contend that the presidency has been institutionalized.
Charles Dunn proposes that the president’s power has vastly exceeded that of the founders’ expectations.124 Fred Greenstein, Terry Moe and Louis Koenig all point to Theodore
Roosevelt’s Administration, the enlargement of the Bureau of Budget in 1921, and the creation of the Executive Office of the President as turning points and the proof that the power of the presidency has grown.125 Over the years, the policy making process has become centralized
122 Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press, 1960. 123 Burke, John P. “The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 2 (2005a): 229-258; Moe, Terry. “The Politicized Presidency.” The New Direction in American Politics. Eds. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1985; Moe, Terry. “Presidents, Institutions and Theory.” Researching the Presidency. Eds.George Edwards III, John H. Hessel, and Bert Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993; Nathan, Richard. The Administrative Presidency. New York: John Wiley, 1983. "National Security Council." The White House. The White House, n.d. Web.
House staff, one would assume that this position would also see an increase in power.
One of Terry Moe and William Howell’s pieces of evidence for this growth in power is the increase in unilateral action taken by presidents. Moe and Howell also claim that:
presidential power derives its strength and resilience from the ambiguity of the formal structure[,]…that presidents have strong incentives to push this ambiguity relentlessly…to expand their own powers and that, for reasons rooted in the nature of their institutions, neither Congress nor the courts are likely to stop them. The result is a slow but steady shift of the institutional balance of power over time in favor of the presidents.127
Theodore Lowi and Terry Moe argue that the reason for the increase in unilateral action and power results from the growing demands and expectations that are far more expansive than the president’s constitutional powers.128 This incentivizes presidents to use tools like executive orders and to enlarge their staffs to properly address the issues they are expected to face. Moe also argues that the presidency has increased in power because in the U.S. Congress there are
535 representatives all with different interests. Instead of acting swiftly, occasionally a collective action problem arises in which Congress can only make decisions through the laborious aggregation of member preferences.129 Moe differs from Neustadt in that he disagrees that presidential power has to do with personality.130 Another hypothesis for why presidents have
126 Benze, James G. Presidential Power and Management Techniques. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. 127 Moe, Terry, and William G. Howell. “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory. ”Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.4 (1999): 852. 128 Lowi, Theodore. The Personal President. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985; Moe, Terry. “The Politicized Presidency.” The New Direction in American Politics. Eds. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. 129 Moe, Terry. “The Politicized Presidency.” The New Direction in American Politics. Eds. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. Pg. 24. 130 Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press, 1960. Pg. 43. 22 seen an increase in power is that they have engaged directly with the public, first through the radio, then television and now the Internet.131
Amy Zegart writes that the power of the national security adviser has increased with that of the presidency.132 She highlights Kennedy moving Bundy into the West Wing from the Old
Executive Office Building as an institutional expansion of the adviser who now had more direct contact with the president.133 She writes:
The national security adviser has evolved from a purely administrative executive secretary servicing the council’s needs to a powerful political presidential adviser…[who] have engaged in policy debates offered policy advice, and managed the NSC process in ways that serve the particular political interests of the president and no one else.134
Whereas Destler and Daalder see a fluctuation of power between administrations, Zegart and Moe have searched for big patterns and found an overall increase in power.
B. Personal relationship between the national security adviser and the president
The personal relationship between presidents and their staffs is an important element in determining the influence of the national security adviser.135 Relationships, interpersonal skills and personalities “play an important role in determining the focus of power within the National
Security Establishment. From this, it is clear that the decision-making process in the national security system is replete with power-plays and personal relationships”.136
131 Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997. 132 Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1999. Print. Pg. 85. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Bock, Joseph G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987; Connor, Robert E. and Sam Charles Sarkesian. The US Military Profession Into the Twenty-first Century: War Peace and Politics. London: Routledge, 1991. 136 Connor, Robert E. and Sam Charles Sarkesian. The US Military Profession 23
Personal relationships and personality differences also affect the functioning of the “inner circle” that the president trusts and relies on for decision-making.137 Joseph Bock argues that relationships matter: “The breadth of the national security assistant’s policy jurisdiction (and, for that matter, the jurisdiction of political aides) is affected by…interrelationships”.138
A former White House reporter, Patrick Anderson, notes that assistants to the president
“almost certainly develop an enemy or two among…[their] fellow staff members…[Presidents] deliberately balance liberals against conservatives, intellectuals against non-intellectuals, on their staffs, and the certain result is friction, rivalry, and hostility”.139 Another White House correspondent, John Osborne, argues similarly in that “It must be understood that tensions have existed between presidential staffs and NSC staffs since the NSC was created in 1947. They
[have] existed…partly for reasons that have to do only incidentally with personalities.”140 These journalists highlight two important aspects relevant for this thesis. One is that advisers will develop enemies within the administration. The other underscores that presidents have an inner circle of trusted advisers. Both of these facts have an impact on the power of the national security adviser. If an adviser is not in the inner circle, she will be less powerful.
Presidents have the prerogative of choosing their national security adviser without worrying about Congressional approval. One might assume that because the president constantly interacts with the adviser, he would select a person with whom he has a good relationship. This
Into the Twenty-first Century: War Peace and Politics. London: Routledge, 1991. Pg. 65. 137 Bock, Joseph G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. 138 Ibid., 178. 139 Anderson, Patrick. The President’s Men: White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968. Pg. 5. 140 Osborne, John. White House Watch: The Ford Years. Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1977. Pg. 109. 24 has not always been the case. Regardless, the personal relationship between the adviser and the president is worth considering as a reason for why some advisers are more powerful than others.
There are many scholars who place a great importance on this personal connection, especially after the relationship of President Barack Obama and General Jim Jones. The lack of their personal relationship prior to the appointment of Jones had a negative impact on his influence as an adviser.141 Destler argues that “to be effective, an NSA must be personally close to the president and in sync with his operating style”.142 Kevin Marsh builds off these scholars to say:
Jones's stint as NSA confirms the findings of prior scholars who argue that the power and influence of an NSA depends upon the personal relationship with the president. Repeatedly, Jones found himself at a distinct political disadvantage within the administration's foreign policy making process due to his lack of a close personal advisery relationship with President Obama…What this episode suggests is that the NSA is only as influential and powerful as the strength and depth of the personal relationship with the president.143
Richard Best points to a successful national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, to show the importance of this personal relationship: “[Scowcroft’s] tenure was marked by the absence of public confrontations with Cabinet officers and a close working relationship with the
President.”144
David Rothkopf highlights Ronald Reagan’s second national security adviser, Judge
William Clark, to show the importance of the personal relationship. Whereas Richard Allen was
141 Marsh, Kevin. “The Contemporary Presidency the Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 15(4) December (2012): 827-842. 142 Destler, I.M. "Donilon to the Rescue?" Foreign Affairs. 13 October 2010. Web.
Clark was more powerful than Allen, and Rothkopf uses this to argue “that the adviser’s relationship with the president is by far the most important tool he has and his most important qualification. As a presidential staffer, his credibility and thus his power rises and falls with that relationship.”145
There is a scholarly consensus surrounding the presidential relationship framework.
However, this framework does have holes, given that strong personal relationships did not always lead to more influential advisers, such as Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush.
Similarly, poor relationships between the adviser and the president in the case of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not prohibit the adviser from becoming extremely powerful.
C. The president’s management style
Because the growth of presidential power model and the personal relationship model both have limitations, it is important to explore the academic literature on a third framework: the managerial style of the president.
Scholars have argued from a best practices perspective that presidents should create an advisory system that fits with their decision-making and managerial style.146 Fred Kaplan
145 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Print. Pg. 227. 146 Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Pg. 218-21; Haney, Patrick J. Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisors, and the Management of Decision Making. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997. Pg. 113-114; Hermann, Margaret, and Preston, Thomas. “Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign Policy: The 26 supports this framework, claiming that the role of the national security adviser is “as powerful as the president wants it to be”.147 Thomas Franck agrees that it is the president who shapes the role of the national security adviser as he notes that the position is not established by law.148 Michael
Nelson also believes that “The influence of the national security adviser within the administration depends entirely on the president”.149 Because the national security adviser and most NSC staffers owe their position and status entirely to the president, they have few competing loyalties. Former national security advisers also support this perspective. For example, Colin Powell, who served as Reagan’s last national security adviser, said, “At the end of the day, the duty of the National Security Council staff and the assistant is to mold themselves to the personality of the president”.150
Lyndon Johnson's second national security adviser, Walt Rostow, explained how he changed his behavior based on the managerial style of Johnson: “I started off sending the memoranda to Johnson without any recommendations by myself. After three weeks he said, ‘I don’t want you ever to send me a piece of paper without your own view. I’ll expect you to represent the departments fairly when they have differences of opinion’”.151
Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, supports the managerial framework as well: “[It is the] NSC’s relationship to the president and its dependence on his
Effects of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements.” Political Psychology 15 (1) (1994): 75-96; Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors? Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002. Pg. 154. 147 Kaplan, Fred. "Why No One Will Miss Jim Jones, the Departing National Security Advisor." Slate Magazine. 08 Oct. 2010. Web. 06 Dec. 2014.
Security Council and the influence she will have on the president, rather than her personal relationship with the president or the institutional growth of the presidency.
The Tower Commission Report, convened in response to the Iran-Contra Affair, also supports this managerial framework: “Because the system is the vehicle through which the president formulates and implements his national security policy, it must adapt to each individual president's style and management philosophy”.153
Destler describes how presidents’ managerial styles have had a major influence of the power of the national security adviser. Destler believes that Kennedy transformed the role of the national security adviser when he:
centered its responsibilities on management of the president’s personal, day-to- day foreign and defense business….With the new job now tied to the daily activities of an activist president, it now had enormous potential for engagement and influence.154
Joseph Bock supports Destler’s claim as he explains how Kennedy “required Bundy to present unrepresented options during policy deliberations and requested that he be a public spokesman for U.S. foreign policy, a role traditionally reserved for the secretary of state”.155
Following Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson retained many of Kennedy’s staff in order to maintain continuity. This being said, “after Bundy left the administration, Johnson decided to downgrade the role of the national security assistant and shift toward a more State Department-
152 Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. “The NSC's Midlife Crisis.” Pg. 81. 153 Tower, John, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board. New York: Random House, 1987. Pg. 88. 154 Destler, I. M. “National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought.” Political Science Quarterly 95 Winter (1980): 578. 155 Bock, Joseph G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Pg. 52. 28 centered foreign policy process”.156 Destler also discusses Johnson’s choice to decrease the power of the role because he wanted an adviser who would better mesh with his managerial style: “Thus, Rostow was designated simply ‘special assistant to the president,’ with ‘national security affairs’ deleted”.157 It was incongruent with Johnson’s management style to have another adviser like Bundy.
With regard to Nixon, Destler says that the president decided early on that he wanted to run foreign policy from the White House and he chose Kissinger as his agent to do so.158 Richard
Best’s explanation of Kissinger’s power supports the managerial style model. He notes how
Nixon reduced the influence of the State Department and created four new bodies: the
Washington Special Action Group, the NSC Intelligence Committee, the Defense Program
Review Committee, and the Senior Policy Review Group.159 Kissinger headed all of these bodies. Nixon’s managerial style was to have power concentrated in the White House and away from the State Department. Thus, Best argues that it was not the personal relationship or an increase in presidential power, which accounts for Kissinger’s enormous degree of power.
Instead it was a product of Nixon’s choice and managerial style.
Best continues to support the management style framework as he describes how Reagan’s preferences decreased the power of the national security adviser and increased that of the State
Department.160 Reagan had NSC subcommittees chaired by State, Defense, and the CIA instead
156 Ibid., Pg. 71. 157 Destler, I. M. “National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought.” Political Science Quarterly 95 Winter (1980): Pg. 580. 158 Ibid., 573-588. 159 Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001. 160 Ibid. 29 of by NSC staff members.161 Nelson claims that choice and presidential preference affected the power of Bush’s national security adviser: “President George H.W. Bush made the position of national security adviser stronger than it had been in the Reagan administration.”162
Terry Moe and Scott Wilson agree with Destler that the organization of the president’s adversarial system is a product of the president’s interests and managerial style. They argue that because the president does not suffer from the collective action problems that plague Congress, he can make his own decisions and determine his own preferences when it comes to his internal organization. This would include the amount of power that the national security adviser holds.163
Daalder and Destler acknowledge that some national security advisers are more influential than others. Although they mention the relationship with the president as being important, they point to the president’s managerial style to explain the role the adviser has had in the administration. They conclude that “[t]he job exists because presidents want it to exist. And the person occupying it has power and influence over policy because the president wants him or her to have that power and influence”.164 They acknowledge there are different formulas for how to be an effective adviser but reiterate their support for the managerial framework when they say that the role’s influence “depends very much on what the president wants and needs.”165
Kennedy created the position; and they argue that, ever since, the president has determined its degree of influence.
161 Ibid., Pg. 17. 162 Nelson, Michael. The Powers of the Presidency. Washington, DC: CQ, 239. 2008. 163 Moe, Terry M., and Scott A. Wilson. "Presidents and the Politics of Structure." Law and Contemporary Problems, 1994. Pg. 16. 164 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 10. 165 Ibid., 301. 30
The president’s managerial style will influence in part how the president and the national security adviser will relate to each other: the degree to which they communicate, how much they confide in one another, and who they involve in the decision making. However, the president’s managerial style may or may not match his desire to have close personal relationships with the staff. For example, his managerial preference may be to delegate power to his cabinet; this may result in a weaker national security adviser despite his strong personal relationship with her
(Bush and Rice). Alternately, the president may prefer to concentrate power in the White House, but decide to have an adviser with whom he has a weak personal relationship with (Obama and
Jones). The managerial and the personal relationship frameworks, therefore, would represent different explanations for the degree of power national security advisers can attain.
While each of these three frameworks can help explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others, they rarely are the sole focus of scholarly study. Most of the arguments and observations noted in this review of the literature are part of larger studies examining the common characteristics of national security advisers or different models for their roles. Also, none of the studies has compared the three models to each other.
Given the integral role that national security advisers can play in shaping United States foreign policy and the dearth of existing literature, there is a need for a study solely addressing the question as to why some advisers are more powerful than others. This will be the goal of my thesis.
31
-Chapter 3-
INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH
We had staffs roughly in terms of 40, 50 – take a few as senior officers who were responsible for different issues in parts of the world. Today, the NSC staff writ large is well over 300 people – that creates a bureaucracy.166 -Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2014
No government ever voluntarily reduces itself in size. Government programs, once launched, never disappear. Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll ever see on this earth.167 -Ronald Reagan, 1964
Description of explanatory model
The United States and the presidency have changed dramatically since the days of
Washington and Jefferson. The U.S. now operates in a globalized world, serves as the world’s superpower, and spends billions of dollars annually on defense. Over the years, the nation’s policymaking process has become centralized within the White House, and the presidency has increased its grip over the policy bureaucracy.168 Given that the national security adviser serves as a member of the White House staff, one would assume that along with the growth of the presidency this position would also experience a commensurate increase in power. This chapter
166 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Quoted in: Ballasy, Nicholas. "Brzezinski, Scrowcroft: Obama Should Shrink 300-Plus National Security Staff." PJ Media, 9 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 May 2015.
Overview of the growth of presidential power: from TR to Obama
Theodore Roosevelt oversaw the expansion of the Bureau of Budget in 1921, and the creation of the Executive Office of the President: both transformed the presidency.169 This expansion was recommended in 1937 by the President’s Committee on Administrative
Management (also known as the Brownlow Committee),170 which believed that “the president needs help”171 given that the responsibilities of the office had begun to outweigh the capacity of the president. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “New Deal” and decision to fight in World War II further spurred the institutionalization and growth of the presidency. Beginning in 1933 during
FDR’s first term in office, there were eight cabinet departments, which operated with a total
169 Greenstein, Fred I. “Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency.” The New American Political System. Ed. Anthony King. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978. 45-86; Koenig, Louis W. “The Invisible Presidency: Growth of the White House Staff.” Power and the Presidency. Eds. Philip Dalce and George Skau. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1960; Moe, Terry. “Presidents, Institutions and Theory.” Researching the Presidency. Eds. George Edwards III, John H. Hessel, and Bert Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. 170 A committee comprised of Louis Brownlow, Charles Merriam and Luther Gulick. 171 President’s Committee on Administrative Management, 1937, 5. 33 federal budget of $4 billion. Today, the cabinet has doubled in size, and the total federal budget has ballooned to over $3 trillion.172
In addition to a rise in the federal budget, presidents have benefited from the ambiguities in the U.S. Constitution and have increasingly taken more unilateral actions.173 The War Powers
Act of 1973, although intended to curb unilateral military engagements ordered by the president, has ironically resulted in the institutionalization and legalization of unilateral action by the president. In the foreign policy realm, the president has accumulated more authority, which has made the institution of the presidency more powerful.
Growth of the National Security Council
The general increase in power of the presidency has paralleled a growth of the national security council staff (See Appendix A).174 In 1947, after the passage of the National Security
Act, the secretary of state chaired the National Security Council (NSC) meetings, and President
Harry S. Truman chose not to regularly attend the meetings after convening the first session.175 It was not until the Korean War in 1950, when Truman consistently presided over meetings, that the NSC increased in influence. Eisenhower subsequently institutionalized and expanded the
172 Freie, John F. The Making of the Postmodern Presidency: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama. Boulder CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2011. Pg. 14. 173 Moe, Terry M., and William G. Howell. "Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory." Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.4 (1999). Web. Pg. 851-852. 174 Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1999. Print. Pg. 85. 175 Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001. Pg. 7. 34
NSC and created the administrative position of the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, now known as the national security adviser.176
Under President John F. Kennedy, the role of the national security adviser became more important as the White House began to deal with more national security crises, such as the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis. Even before these international events, Kennedy said Bundy would assist in "helping [him] strengthen and to simplify the operations of the National Security
Council."177 Thus, Kennedy’s adviser, McGeorge Bundy, played an influential role in the policy making process: he was no longer the “neutral keeper of the machinery”.178 He was also given an office that provided him greater access to the president, institutionally increasing his power.
Further, Kennedy created a Situation Room after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a “nerve center” that offered him real-time information to make quick foreign policy decisions.179 This room has provided presidents a front row seat to crisis situations as they develop around the world.
Over time, presidents have relied on the national security adviser as the point-person for making foreign policy decisions.180 This, in and of itself, has increased the position’s power. The staff at the adviser’s disposal has also increased since the Kennedy administration. Bundy, the first national security adviser, had fewer than 12 staff members working for him.181 This number
176 Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2001. Pg. 8. 177 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Web.
Kissinger had over 50.182
The rise in staff members under Kissinger was due in part to the reality that Nixon wanted to be his own secretary of state and allowed Kissinger to expand the institutional power and size of the NSC staff.183 Congress also granted the adviser more institutional responsibilities during this time. For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 states that the national security adviser must approve electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence.184
Kissinger and his successor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, oversaw the rise of the power and the size of the NSC staff. Because of this unprecedented growth in size and influence, a feud between Carter’s secretary of state and national security adviser ensued. This dysfunction led
Reagan to reduce the institutional power of and the reliance on the National Security Council, and instead gave more institutional power and committee chairmanships to his cabinet departments.185
The reduction of the institution of the NSC halted after the Tower Commission, and the
NSC was restored during the end of the Reagan administration. The NSC expanded the Clinton
White House. He enlarged the institutional size of the NSC staff in a way that made it look like an agency rather than a supporting staff for the president.186 Part of this growth stemmed from
Presidential Decision Directive 2, which expanded the NSC to include the Secretary of Treasury,
182 Destler, I. M. "National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought." Pg. 576. 183 http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2000/11/governance-daalder. 184 Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 29. 185 Ibid., 17. 186 Destler, I. M., and Ivo H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration." The Brookings Institution. N.p., 15 Nov. 2000. Web. 15 May 2015.
U.S. Representative to the U.N., the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the president’s chief of staff.187
The size grew because the issues that the President faced, since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, had increased and were different.188 Globalization of the economy, the interconnected nature of nations and the birth of the internet led to a new world with new challenges. I.M.
Destler and Ivo H. Daalder write that this led to a new phenomenon:
The long-recognized dividing line between foreign and domestic policy has blurred, if not disappeared altogether. Questions like the global environment, combating infectious diseases, and protection against domestic terrorism do not fit neatly on one side or the other. Similarly, the economics-security divide has lost much of its meaning: in U.S. policy toward Russia and China, questions of trade and investment rank as high as issues like weapons proliferation.189
Although Clinton expanded the NSC to face these new challenges, the next administration felt that the 42nd president had overcompensated and created what Bush’s first national security adviser considered a bloated NSC staff.190 Condoleezza Rice, who would later become the president’s secretary of state, reduced the NSC staff by one third.191 However, after
9/11 and the new threat of transnational terrorists, the staff grew by 50 percent of the amount of people she had started with, along with additional deputies to her own Steven Hadley.192 Rice says that although she tried to thin the NSC staff, the “transnational threats [that] became the dominant factor in American foreign policy, if you think about it, they’re not only transnational, they’re transfunctional, and that means they cross all kinds of jurisdictional boundaries in the
187 Best, Richard A., Jr. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 21. 188 Destler, I. M., and Ivo H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration." 189 Ibid. 190 Richard Hollbroke quoted in: David. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Pg. 405. 191 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Pg. 405. 192 Ibid. 37 government, and it’s therefore not surprising that the integration comes [to the NSC].”193 These threats have not disappeared.
The Obama Administration made a change to the structure of the NSC by combining it with the Homeland Security Council. This created the notorious and now null, National Security
Staff.194 However, the structure has been recently returned to the “NSC” model following Susan
Rice becoming the national security adviser. There are now over three hundred people in the staff, and the NSC functions as a government agency.195 What began as a dozen staff members working with Bundy to support President Kennedy in foreign policy making now has its own press, legislative and speechmaking offices, totaling over three hundred individuals.196 One might expect that the power of the national security adviser would increase with this growth of the NSC staff.
All of the evidence would suggest that the national security adviser’s role has increased in power along with that of the presidency. If this framework holds true, it would propose that this increase in power is linear, as shown in Figure 3-1. That is, this framework predicts that the power (y axis) would rise over time with each national security adviser’s tenure in increasingly larger presidential institutions (x axis). For example, in 1960 the institution of the presidency was limited compared to today, and McGeorge Bundy would similarly have a limited role with little power. As the institution of the presidency has grown over time, we would expect a proportionate increase in the power of the advisers: Kissinger would be more powerful than
193 Rothkopf, David. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Pg. 405. 194 Shear, Michael D. "Security Staff Getting Its Old Name Back." The New York Times, 10 Feb. 2014. Web. 15 May 2015.
Bundy, Lake more than Brzezinski, and modern day advisers such as Jones would have considerable power. One would hypothesize that the first few advisers functioned only slightly more in influencing policy and decision making than their managerial predecessors did in the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations. As the presidency grows, the framework would suggest that the national security adviser begins to have increased access to the president, involved in more significant decisions, able to push their own policy recommendations, control information and involvement of other staff members, and potentially have more influence than cabinet secretaries.
39
Figure 3-1: Expected Relationship between National Security Advisers and
Their Power*
*Chart created by the author: 0=not powerful, 5=most powerful
Case studies
Bundy’s power flux
McGeorge Bundy was the first national security adviser and one of the more powerful ones. Although not as powerful as some of his successors (e.g. Kissinger, Brzezinski), Bundy 40 had an influential role in the Kennedy administration. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy relied even more on Bundy.197 Bundy occupied an office in the West Wing basement and had close proximity with the president, which allowed him to be more powerful than subsequent advisers such as Richard Allen and Jim Jones.198 This reduction in the power of later advisers weakens the institutional growth framework as an explanation for why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. Another weakness in this framework is that Bundy lost much of the power he enjoyed with Kennedy once Johnson became president after Kennedy’s assassination.199 Instead of the collegial academic who would play devil’s advocate with
Kennedy in the president’s trusted inner circle, Bundy, in the Johnson administration, was merely a “messenger boy”.200
Early power
Henry Kissinger was the fourth adviser to the president for national security affairs.
Given that the U.S. has had eighteen advisers total, Kissinger was one of the earliest. The institution of the presidency has increased in resources and power since the Nixon administration, and the institutional growth of the presidency model would predict that Kissinger was a relatively weak national security adviser. Despite this prediction, it is evident that
Kissinger was not one of the weakest; in fact, just the opposite is true.201 The case of Henry
197 Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court. 149. 198 Ibid. 199 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisors and the Presidents They Served—From JFK to George W. Bush. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. Pg. 41-42. 200 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Print. Pg. 289. 201 Dumbrell, John, and David M. Barrett. The Making of US Foreign Policy. Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 1990. Print. Pg. 88; Hastedt, Glenn P. Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Print. Pg. 552. 41
Kissinger challenges the ability of the presidential institutional growth model to explain how he became so powerful. If one would predict the power of the national security adviser to rise linearly as the NSC grew, Kissinger should not rank at the top.
Kissinger is not an exception to this model: the sixth national security adviser, Zbigniew
Brzezinski was also one of the most powerful national security advisers. If the institutional growth of the presidency and NSC staff framework could consistently help explain the adviser’s power, then Brzezinski should not have become one of the most powerful advisers. The fact that
Kissinger and Brzezinski were powerful does not diminish the strength of this model. What does challenge it, however, is that the power of national security adviser peaked with these two advisers.
Weakening of the role and the framework
Reagan, after seeing the substantial power of both Kissinger and Brzezinski, purposefully reduced the role’s power and authority.202 His first national security adviser, Richard Allen, was one of the weakest in the role’s history. Allen’s office was moved back down to the basement of the West Wing. He had three superiors with whom he had to deal with before reaching the president and chaired no interagency committees. Reagan gave the most power to his secretaries of state and the departments they led.203 Allen’s successors in the Reagan administration were also institutionally weak. The fact that McFarlane and Poindexter had power was due to a lack of oversight by the president not the growth of the institution.
202 Best, Richard. "The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment." Pg. 17 203 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 132. 42
The Reagan administration’s weak national security advisers were not the exception. Two national security advisers in the 21st century, at a time when the role was supported by the greatest number of staff members and resources, were weak compared to their predecessors.
Condoleezza Rice was a weak national security adviser compared to other national security advisers because of her limited power within the president’s cabinet (Rumsfeld and Cheney).204
Similarly, Obama’s first national security adviser, General Jim Jones, was just as weak as
Richard Allen under Reagan. Despite having hundreds of staff members working at their disposal, Rice and Jones were weaker than Bundy, the first national security adviser, who had just twelve people working for him. In the personal relationship chapter, the case study of Rice and Bush will be explored to understand how, despite their strong friendship, Rice became a weak national security adviser. This chapter will now explore how Marine Corps General Jones became one of the weakest national security advisers, despite having over 300 staff members and working in a national security apparatus with a budget of billions of dollars.
General(ly) Weak
Barack Obama, a junior senator from Illinois and former community organizer, defeated
John McCain, a Vietnam War hero and a Senate foreign policy titan, and made history as the nation’s first African-American president. While he brought many skills to the White House, one thing that the “amateur”, to borrow the title of Edward Klein’s book205 on the 44th president, lacked was foreign policy experience.
204 Destler, I. M. "The Role of the National Security Advisor FPC Briefing." U.S. Department of State, 16 Mar. 2009. Web. 21 May 2015.
When President Obama faced the decision of who to appoint as national security adviser, he turned to a former two-time national security adviser and revered “honest broker” for guidance: General Brent Scowcroft.206 Scowcroft recommended General James Jones for the post, and Obama agreed. The president told his transition staff and campaign advisers that he wanted General Jones as his national security adviser, because it provided someone outside of the Pentagon but who also brought considerable military credibility.207 According to Ambassador
Michael McFaul, who later worked for Jones in the NSC and was a campaign adviser at the time,
“the chitchat was that it was either going to be Jim Steinberg or Susan Rice, not General Jones.
So that came as a pretty out-of-the-blue decision”.208 He believes Jones was chosen over
Steinberg and Rice, who were both Obama campaign advisers, because the junior senator wanted a military adviser who could him manage his relationship with the Pentagon and the armed forces during the planned drawdown of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.209 Jones was the perfect man: the General, nicknamed “Gentleman Jim”, had served for forty years in the
Marines, became Marine commandant, led NATO for four years, and was the lead U.S. commander in Europe: his national security experience was unparalleled.210
The institutional growth of the presidency model would suggest that “Gentleman Jim” would have been one of the most powerful national security advisers in the role’s history.
However, this was not the case. General James Jones was one of the weakest advisers in the role’s history. He served an administrative role. His lack of power and influence was due to: a
206 Mann, Jim. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, 2012. Print. Pg. 165. 207 Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Print. Pg. 37. 208 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript). 209 Ibid. 210 Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Print. Pg. 36. 44 lack of a personal relationship with the president and the president’s managerial style. Jones had agreed to serve as adviser for only two years. However, he was pushed out of the job before the two-year mark when Bob Woodward’s book exposed him as dissatisfied with his job and outside the inner circle of decision-making.211
Obama surrounded himself with a team of advisers known as the “Chicago boys”, or as his first secretary of defense Robert Gates called them, the “Politburo”.212 They included Dennis
McDonough, Mark Lippert and Ben Rhodes. They were Obama’s closest and most trusted advisers who had known the president since his time on Capitol Hill.213 Secretary Gates noticed that these “Chicago boys” were part of “an inner core that worked closely together during the campaign and formed a special bond with the president”.214 Another official said that these three were the president’s de facto national security advisers.215 McFaul, the president’s special assistant and Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Affairs, notes:
My impression was there were often times meetings on big foreign policy issues that [Jones] was not present at--among an informal group of advisers of the White House… He obviously was in all the formal meetings, he was in every NSC meeting, and most certainly ran the principals committee meeting, but I remember hearing about different sessions happening in the Oval Office, or sometimes down in the situation room…My impression from talking to General Jones from time to 216 time about it, is that sometimes it was frustrating to him.
211 Wilson, Scott. "James Jones to Step down as National Security Adviser." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 08 Oct. 2010. Web. 11 May 2015.
The “informal group of advisers” McFaul refers too, although not stated explicitly by him, is the
“Chicago Boys”.
Obama’s reliance on his trusted aides, who lacked golden resumes and decades of elite foreign policy experience, translated into them having greater influence than the cabinet members, such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.217
The president lacked a personal relationship with both of these secretaries: he had recently run against Clinton in an ugly presidential primary, and Gates was a leftover from the Bush administration. Relationships with his trusted aides trumped his dependence on these cabinet secretaries and his national security adviser.
The president relied on this inner circle in the White House, because he wanted to control power and decision-making: “[T]his was the way Obama wanted it, enabling him to make the ultimate decisions”.218 The concentration of power within this inner circle in the White House took away power from his cabinet secretaries and national security advisers. McFaul mentions how D.C. veterans, who had lived through many presidential administrations, “compared [the
Obama administration] to the Nixon days where everybody knew that that’s where foreign policy
219 was being made and the president himself was a big decision maker.” Usually, as later chapters will show, when a president concentrates power within the White House, the power and influence of the national security adviser increases. This was not the case with President
Obama’s adviser.
217 Mann, Jim. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, 2012. Print. Pg. 82. 218 Ibid. 219 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript).
46
Jones soon discovered that Obama spoke first, not to him, but with his closest and most trusted advisers from his senate and campaign days before meeting with his cabinet secretaries and made his final decisions.220 An individual’s power and influence in the Obama administration has not always correlated with their title; Obama’s de facto advisers were not
“senior”.221
Dennis McDonough, who has recently become the president’s chief of staff, was a close friend with the president throughout the campaign and the two enjoy playing basketball together.222 Often times, it was McDonough telling Jones what the president wanted, not vice versa.223 It became evident in Washington D.C. that McDonough held more influence than Jones.
This phenomenon is explained in The Obamians, “If you get a request from Jim Jones, he might or might not be speaking for the president. If you get a request from Dennis McDonough, he’s asking on behalf of the president himself.”224
This can be explained by the stark contrast in personal relationships and the trust that comes with such a bond. Obama and Jones had only spoken with each other twice before Obama asked him to serve as his adviser.225 Jones grew annoyed that he was outside the “inner circle”.226
As McFaul notes, “it most certainly was the case that he felt like an outsider because he was an
220 Mann, Jim. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, 2012. Print. Pg. 143. 221 Ibid., 82. 222 Luce, Edward, and Daniel Dombey. "US Foreign Policy: Waiting on a Sun King." 223 Ibid. 224 Mann, Jim. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, 2012. Print. Pg. 10. 225 Baker, Peter, and Helene Cooper. "Issues Pressing, Obama Fills Top Posts at a Sprint." The New York Times. The New York Times, 04 Dec. 2008. Web. 11 May 2015.
McDonough or Lippert. Jones, who did not get along well with the president’s inner circle, had numerous unflattering nicknames for this team of trusted advisers: “campaign set,” “the water bugs,” “the Mafia,” and the “Politburo”.228 This being said, as observed by McFaul, “he didn’t develop the rapport with the president… I don’t really know why to be honest, some say it was a generational thing, he was much older than the president and was much older than most of his staff.”229
Jones’ deputy on the other hand, Tom Donilon, had a closer relationship with the president, vice president and other principals, allowing him to become one of the most powerful deputy national security advisers: even more powerful than his boss.230 It was Donilon, not
Jones, who compiled the presidential daily briefing, chaired interagency and deputy committees and acted as the NSC staff COO.231 Obama and his chief of staff would meet with Donilon, who
232 “was a masterful briefer”, bypassing Jones, for foreign policy advice.
227 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript). 228 Mann, Jim. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, 2012. Print. Pg. 225; Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Print. Pg. 138. 229 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript). 230 Marsh, Kevin. "The Contemporary Presidency: The Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor." Presidential Studies Quarterly 42.4 (2012). JSTOR. Web. 11 May 2015. Pg. 836. 231 Marsh, Kevin. "The Contemporary Presidency: The Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor." Pg. 836; Wilson, Scott. "James Jones to Step down as National Security Adviser." 232McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript); Kaplan, Fred. "Good Man, Wrong Job: Why No One Will Miss Jim Jones, the Departing National Security Adviser." Slate, 8 Oct. 2010. Web.
The managerial style of President Obama clashed with General Jones’ regimented military background and contributed to the latter’s lack of power.233 Jones was familiar with hierarchy, rank, and a structure in which information flowed up from subordinates and junior aides reported to the principals; this was not how Obama’s foreign policy making process operated.234 McFaul observed that Donilon who succeeded Jones, had a style “that just meshed better with Obama.”235 He said that Donilon is a “conceptual thinker, analytic, and I think in that respect his style of thinking through problems, he is a lawyer, Obama is a lawyer, maybe it’s from that.”236
Breaking with precedent, Obama usually chaired the weekly National Security Council meetings himself, not General Jones.237 Jones’ role as adviser was reduced to that of an administrator, similar to that Richard Allen under Reagan.238 This was a product of a president whose management style was “to control the details of policy making himself”.239 This was evident during the Afghanistan strategy review, where the president became involved in the details of the policy making process, which subsequently decreased the power of his national security adviser.
233 Marsh, Kevin. "The Contemporary Presidency: The Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor." Pg. 835. 234 Ibid. 235 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript). 236 Ibid. 237 Luce, Edward, and Daniel Dombey. "US Foreign Policy: Waiting on a Sun King." 238 Marsh, Kevin. "The Contemporary Presidency: The Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor." Pg. 829. 239 Pfiffner, James P. "Decision Making in the Obama White House." Presidential Studies Quarterly 41.2 (2011): 244. Web. 49
Despite conventional wisdom regarding Jones and his lack of power and involvement,
McFaul says that the four-star General played an influential role with regards to Russia policy.240
McFaul notes:
with respect to Russia, Jones played a very important role in that policy domain. He established a pretty good working relationship with his counterpart in Moscow, and was ready to get on the plane and fly to Moscow as we did more than once, to engage on, then it was the START Treaty, was central, but other issues. In that domain, I would say that he played a very important role in terms of very concrete foreign policy outcomes that were the president’s agenda…[He also] helped to execute policy in interaction with his counterpart. That’s usually what the secretary of state does. That’s what the secretary of defense does, treasury, commerce. That’s what they do. It’s not typically what the national security adviser does.241
Nowhere in the literature is it noted that Jones was this powerful. It is unclear why he played such a prominent role in Russia policy and not others. McFaul, although he admits he was not in the meetings with regard to other policy meetings such as the drawdown in Iraq242 or the Surge in Afghanistan, he said: “I don't think that's the case across a lot of other policy domains.”243
Someone who might have more insight with regards to Jones’ role in Afghanistan policy is the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (2009-2011), Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry.
When asked whether or not Jones was a “powerful” and influential player in the formation of
U.S. policy towards Afghanistan, he responded:
the short answer is "yes" he did play an important role. He visited Afghanistan in the fall of 2009 as review of our strategy was taking place in order to get a better understanding of the situation firsthand. As well, he chaired the many PC meetings that occurred during the strategy review and was, of course, present when the President chaired many of the National Security Council.244
240 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript). 241 Ibid. 242 General Jim Mattis declined to comment on the role General Jim Jones played in the formation of U.S.-Iraq policy. Mattis oversaw the war in Iraq during his time as the head of U.S. Central Command. (See Appendix L for for email) 243 McFaul, Michael. Personal interview. 20 May 2015. (See Appendix G for full interview transcript). 244 Eikenberry, Karl. Email interview. 21 May 2015. (See Appendix K for full email). 50
The two responses from Ambassadors McFaul and Eikenberry run counter to conventional wisdom that Jones was a very “weak” national security adviser. However, the existing literature and McFaul’s impression that Jones was often left outside the inner circle of presidential decision-making, suggest that overall he was weak because he did not consistently have the opportunity to influence policy. More memoirs from the Obama administration will be written, and more administration officials will eventually go on the record regarding Jones. In time, his role will become clearer. Until it is revealed that Jones was in the private and intimate meetings between the president and his most trusted advisers, it still seems that he was a relatively weak national security adviser compared to others.
Thus, the Jim Jones case study shows that the institutional growth of the presidency and
NSC staff cannot explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others.
The model would predict Jones to be one of the most powerful advisers in the role’s history, but this is not the case. This case study shows the strength of the other two models: personal relationship and managerial style. Jones’ lack of personal relationship with the president made it difficult for the president to trust and feel comfortable with his adviser. Instead of Jones, it was
Donilon, McDonough, Lippert and Rhodes who became the de facto national security “advisers”, because the president had known them from his senate and campaign days. Similarly, the president’s managerial style was not well suited for a powerful national security adviser like
Jones. The president was active in foreign policy, despite lacking experience, and would chair
NSC principal meetings. Obama’s style of concentrating power himself and his lack of personal
51 friendship with Jones better explain why Jones lacked power than the institutional growth framework.
Powerful data
The power of the national security adviser has not consistently risen along with the growth of the institution of the presidency and the NSC. In this thesis, power of the national security advisor is defined as the ability to affect policy outcomes that are preferred by the president and national security advisor and to prevent the implementation of ones that are not.
However, operationalizing this definition is challenging, and no consensus exists on how best to estimate it. Assessments from non-fiction literature and anecdotes from memoirs can contribute to determining how much impact the adviser had with regards to policy. A review of the literature, suggests a variety of factors can contribute to the degree of power that a national security adviser such as ability to have close contact with the president, involvement in policy decision making, and inclusion in the president’s inner circle. Clearly not all factors have the same weight. For example, the number of years served can indicate an adviser’s success. An adviser who served for one year like Allen or Jones probably was not as powerful as an adviser who served for six years as did Kissinger. However, chairing an interagency committee meeting or daily briefing the president will give more power to an adviser with a short tenure compared to an adviser who does neither but serves for multiple years. If an adviser is able to brief the president every morning, this will increase her power because she is able to deliver information to the president in a way that can serve her interests, and voice her opinion on matters in such a private setting. If she chairs interagency meetings, she can manage the policy making process. If
52 the president is not in attendance, she can convey to him, unbiased or not, what transpired like in the case of Brzezinski. If she is taking covert actions or going on diplomatic missions, this means that she has influence similar to that of the secretary of state. If she is visible in the media, she will be seen as the spokeswoman for the administration and can use that platform to push her agenda. Lastly, impact on important policies, while difficult to measure, can reflect how much influence an advisor has with the president in the policymaking process. In addition, an office down the hall from the Oval Office compared to one in the West Wing basement, while very telling with regards to how the president sees the role of his adviser, is not as important as controlling the policy making process by chairing interagency meetings, seeing the president every day, or having a consistent impact on policies.
Given that any one factor probably does not determine one’s power, looking at them together may provide an approximation. For this thesis, these following seven factors will be combined to provide an estimate: 1) number of years in office, 2) briefing the president daily, 3) chairing important committees, 3) taking covert actions, 4) involvement in diplomatic missions,
5) location of one’s office, 6) visibility in the media, and 7) influence on presidential decisions regarding policy. Clearly there are other factors that affect power and should be considered.
However, a complete analysis of other factors is beyond the scope of this research.
The seven variables have been used to determine a power score for each national security adviser (See Appendix B). These numerical ratings are meant to give a general estimate of their power, and thus, the intervals between numbers are not equivalent. It is assumed that over the last two administrations, all covert missions, if any, are still classified, and this will affect their overall power rating.
53
Power scores for each adviser are estimated and shown in Figure 3-2. Instead of the incremental growth that the institutional growth of the presidency model predicts, the power of the national security adviser appears sporadic.
Figure 3-2: Estimated Power of the National Security Adviser
*Chart created by the author: 0=not powerful, 5=most powerful
54
Conclusion: Explanatory strengths and limits of this model
The institutional growth of the presidency framework fails to adequately explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. Although the institution of the presidency and the size of the NSC staff have increased over time, the power of the national security adviser has not always followed. Other models might better explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. The next two chapters will explore these models.
55
-Chapter 4-
THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
I believed for various reasons that I could not do my job as well if I succumbed to being [President Clinton’s] friend. Also it was hard to draw the line between being a friend and being a courtier and I detest courtiers….And since I left, we became sort of friends. But I didn’t want it at the time.245 -Anthony Lake, 2002 .
The "power" in the position really comes from proximity to the President and the nature of the person's relationship with him.246 -Condoleezza Rice, 2015
Description of explanatory model
The personal relationship model views the power of the national security adviser in the context of her personal relationship with the president (See Appendix C). This model proposes a positive correlation between the two variables: the stronger the personal relationship, the more powerful the national security adviser; and the weaker the relationship, the weaker the adviser.
Given how important trust is in the decision-making process, this model argues that the president will give more authority and autonomy if he trusts his adviser. A good personal relationship increases the amount of trust. Whether it is faith in the adviser’s ability to make good decisions,
245 "Interview with Anthony Lake (2002)." The Miller Center. University of Virginia, Web.
56 or simply that she will not leak information, trust is an important determinant of power. From this perspective: the stronger the trust, the more powerful the adviser. This model predicts that advisers with already strong relationships will have the most power. This chapter will highlight several personal relationships between the presidents and their national security advisers to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of this model.
Case studies
The Boston boys
One of the strongest cases in favor of the personal relationship model is the difference in power that McGeorge Bundy had in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Bundy’s power provides a unique opportunity to consider this model because he is the only national security adviser to serve in two sequential administrations. Although such variables as international crises do affect an adviser’s power, he is the only example where the variable of the national security adviser is held constant.
On a cold January day in 1961, President Kennedy stood on the steps of the United States
Capitol and told the nation, “Ask not what your country can do for you--ask what you can do for your country.” McGeorge Bundy, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard, answered
Kennedy’s call not only to serve his country, but to do so in the White House as the president’s national security adviser. The two “liked each other immensely”.247 Kennedy and Bundy had known each other longer than any other president and national security adviser; in fact, they
247 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Print. Pg. 289. 57 knew each other as children growing up in Boston.248 Both were educated together in Brookline,
Massachusetts at the private Dexter Lower School and shared a similar character and style that complemented the other well.249 Bundy and Kennedy were so close that Kennedy was willing to share his sexual infidelities with his national security adviser.250 This compatibility led to a good working relationship and a powerful national security adviser.251
Bundy also played an integral role in the foreign policy decision-making process, often being assigned the role of devil’s advocate by the president when certain arguments were not argued and sides not taken. According to Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler: “[Bundy] became an influential and oft-prominent player in decisions on current issues, on a par in importance (if not yet in rank) with the secretaries of state and defense.”252 After the Bay of Pigs debacle, Kennedy entrusted more power to Bundy, moved his office closer, and relied increasingly more on Bundy over time, thus bolstering the position.253 Before Bundy, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was merely an assistant with little responsibility.
Bundy was given close access to the president and was quite involved in making foreign policy.254 In previous administrations, the secretary of state was the spokesman of the administration. Under Kennedy, Bundy was a public spokesman for the administration’s foreign
248 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 13. 249 Kifner, John. "McGeorge Bundy Dies at 77; Top Adviser in Vietnam Era." The New York Times. N.p., 16 Sept. 1996. Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
Was it the strong personal relationship that led Kennedy to give Bundy power? Or, was
Bundy’s power due to institutional forces and changes? It could be argued that it was Kennedy’s realization that he needed a national security adviser that gave Bundy more power and not his good relationship. Regardless of why Bundy possessed significant power under Kennedy, he had a poor relationship with his next boss, and his power declined.
Clash of cultures
On November 22 1963, the assassination of John F. Kennedy abruptly put Lyndon B.
Johnson in the presidency. Returning to the White House from Dallas that evening, Johnson told
Kennedy’s national security adviser and secretary of defense that Kennedy, “gathered around him the ablest people I’ve seen…I want you to stay. I need you.”258
Although Johnson told Bundy he “needed” him, in practice this is not what happened.
Johnson tasked Bundy with less substantial issues than Kennedy had and relied more on his cabinet secretaries, such as Dean Rusk.259 Bundy himself admitted that the president “[didn’t]
255 Bock, Joseph G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Pg. 52. 256 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. Pg. 223. 257 Ibid., 223. 258 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 41. 259 Ibid., 41-42. 59 pay attention to what I [was] telling him”.260 Bundy said he felt he was being treated not as an adviser in the White House, but like an adviser in the Kremlin: constantly ignored and abused by
Joseph Stalin.261This was, in part, due to the fact that Johnson was simply less interested in foreign policy than Kennedy was; his vision for America was not focused on a red scare, but a great society.262 Although this was the case, it is hard to ignore the poor personal relationship between Johnson and Bundy.
This example fits nicely in the personal relationship model. Bundy was powerful under
Kennedy, but weak under Johnson. The personal relationships appear to be the major difference.
Whereas Kennedy and Bundy got along well, the opposite was the case with Johnson. Bundy and
Kennedy were both Bostonian elites who attended the same private elementary school in
Brookline and Ivy League College in Cambridge. Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler write that there was “a deep cultural gap—a chasm, really—between the new president and the ‘Harvards’ who had held sway under the old….Its aura evoked a mix of discomfort, envy, resentment, and contempt in LBJ, the graduate of Southeast Texas State Teachers’ College”.263
The loss of Bundy’s influence is most evident during the lead up to the Vietnam War.
Whereas Bundy played an integral role in the Executive Committee (ExCom) meetings during the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Kennedy Administration, Johnson downgraded Bundy to merely a “messenger boy” during the policy making process for the Vietnam War.264 Two days after
260 Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House. 2013. Print. Pg. 428. 261 Ibid. 262 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 41-42. 263 Ibid., Pg. 42. 264 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. Pg. 289. 60
North Vietnamese PT boats attacked the USS Maddox destroyer, Johnson was ready to retaliate immediately after receiving questionable reports that a second attack had taken place.265
It is unclear why Johnson was so eager to strike back; in fact the military questioned its own reports. Regardless, this incident demonstrates the limited influence Bundy had in the
Johnson administration.266 When Johnson heard the reports of the second attack, which now appear to have been bad weather, he stormed over to his national security adviser’s office in the basement of the White House and told Bundy that the U.S. would retaliate.267 Bundy recalls that he interrupted the president “‘and said [he] thought [they] ought to think it over.’ Johnson snapped back [at Bundy], ‘I didn‘t ask you that. I told you to help me get organized’”.268 This was the beginning of serious tension between the president and Bundy surrounding the escalation of the Vietnam War.269
Despite this disagreement, Bundy continued to write memos to the president encouraging him to explore alternative policy options before making a decision. In a memo about the U.S.
Foreign Aid Program, Bundy wrote to Johnson, “It would be my objective…to make sure that every alternative is fully explored and that you have an absolutely clear shot at all the choices and possibilities”.270 In addition to expressing his recommendations for the president regarding the program, at the bottom of the memo, Bundy checked a box that said “Speak to me”.271
Johnson gave Bundy the option to check either “Go ahead,” or “Speak to me” at the bottom of
265 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 43-44. 266 Ibid., Pg. 44. 267 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. Pg. 289. 268 Ibid. 269 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 48. 270 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson. “Review of the Foreign Aid Program”. 18 September 1965, 4:30PM. 271 Ibid. 61 his memos to the president (See appendix I for full memo).272 This shows that although Johnson did not rely as much on Bundy as Kennedy did, he did allow the Harvard Dean to speak with him personally about issues. This undoubtedly gave Bundy some power, even if Johnson was unwavering in his beliefs.
A major disagreement between Bundy and Johnson came during administration’s public relations campaign with regards to the Vietnam War.273 As Robert Dallek writes, they disagreed
“over building a consensus for the war effort. Bundy was critical of Johnson’s decision to announce the first troop escalation in Vietnam in July 1965 at a noon press conference, ‘when no one was watching TV’”.274
After Bundy debated Hans Morgenthau on CBS against the president’s will, tension between the two rose to an all-time high.275 After the televised debate, an unhappy Johnson began to purposefully forget or mispronounce Bundy’s name.276 The tensions between the two ended in February 1966 when Bundy resigned and accepted a position as president of the Ford
Foundation.277 The personal relationship model is strengthened again when examining the lack of influence that Bundy had during the Johnson Administration. As Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler write, “personality mattered. The same Bundy who meshed so well with one president was clearly out of sync with his successor…With Johnson the culture clash was acute”.278
272 Ibid. 273 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 48. 274 Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House. 2013. Print. Pg. 428. 275 Bundy, McGeorge. "McGeorge Bundy Oral History, Special Interview 1." Interview by Robert Dallek. LBJ Library, 30 Mar. 1993. Web. Pg. 20.
Walt Rostow, Bundy’s deputy, replaced him as Johnson’s national security adviser.
Johnson realized that Rostow was not the same caliber as Bundy, but Rostow unwaveringly supported Johnson’s policies; something Bundy, the intellect who liked to play devil’s advocate, could never do.279 This worked out well for Rostow and Johnson’s working relationship, and the two got along well.280 Walt Rostow began his stint as adviser by sending Johnson memos without including personal recommendations. Johnson, however, wanted Rostow’s input and
281 told him to include his own view on the issue.
Although Johnson had a poor relationship with Bundy, he had a good one with Rostow.
Under the personal relationship model, one might think that Rostow would have had substantial power, given that he and Johnson enjoyed a better relationship. However, this does not appear to be the case. Other officials in the administration did not trust Rostow, and Johnson did not put him in charge of the policymaking process.282
One person that Johnson did trust and rely on, however, was his secretary of state.
According to Bundy, Johnson felt, “This is my kind of man, and I can get along with him, and I understand him and he understands me, and we are both aware that the country is full of
Yankees”.283 Given that Johnson did not get along well with Bundy, who was “Yankee”, but did
279 Ibid. 280 Ibid., Pg. 301. 281 Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler. 1999. Introduction. The role of the national security adviser, oral history roundtable, the NSC project. Brookings Institution, October 25. Pg. 4. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/nsc/19991025.PDF?la=en. 282 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 301. 283 Bundy, McGeorge. "McGeorge Bundy Oral History, Special Interview 1." Interview by Robert Dallek. LBJ Library, 30 Mar. 1993. Web. Pg. 6.
The personal relationships of Kennedy and Johnson with their national security advisers and others in their cabinet support this model. However, the following case study of the relationship between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger weakens its explanatory strength.
An odd couple
Henry Kissinger is considered to be the most powerful national security adviser in the history of the position.285 If this is the case, according to the personal relationship model, then the personal relationship between Nixon and Kissinger should have been be excellent; the opposite was true. First of all, like Bundy and Johnson, they came from different backgrounds.
Nixon was a Quaker and politician originally from a small town in California.286 Kissinger, on the other hand, was a German-Jewish émigré and a Harvard professor.287 Before making him his national security adviser, Richard Nixon had met Kissinger only once.288 It was at a Christmas
Party in 1967 at Clare Luce’s apartment. 289 Kissinger wrote in his memoir that the interaction was awkward: “We exchanged a few strained pleasantries and went our separate ways”.290
Kissinger was thus surprised when Nixon named him national security adviser, partly because he
284 Pace, Eric. "Dean Rusk, Secretary of State In Vietnam War, Is Dead at 85." The New York Times. The New York Times, 21 Dec. 1994. Web. 16 May 2015.
Given his desire for attention and power, Nixon also had doubts about Kissinger’s loyalty.295 In response, Nixon often called Kissinger “Jew boy”.296 Nixon staff member, John
Ehrlichman, remembers that:
There were days when Nixon would directly castigate liberal Jews in front of Kissinger. ‘Nixon would talk about Jewish traitors, and the Eastern Jewish Establishment-Jews at Harvard,’ John Ehrlichman recalls. ‘And he’d play off Kissinger. ‘Isn’t that right, Henry? Don’t you agree?’297
“Kissinger’s celebrity enraged Nixon”.298 Although Nixon believed that Kissinger was an important asset, he constantly felt threatened by Kissinger’s success and saw him as “a competitor for public prominence”.299
Kissinger did not hold Nixon in high regard either: Kissinger said Nixon was “a very odd man, an unpleasant man. He didn’t enjoy people”.300 Kissinger had plenty of nicknames for
Nixon: “madman”, “our drunken friend”, “meatball mind”, and “maniac”.301 He was also jealous about Nixon’s personal relationship with Secretary of State William Rogers. Although Nixon
291 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. Pg. 78. 292 Ibid., 93. 293 Ibid. 294 Ibid., 540. 295 Ibid., 93. 296 Ibid. 297 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Pg. 84. 298 Ibid., 456. 299 Ibid., 474. 300 Ibid., Pg. 91. 301 Ibid., Pg. 93. 65 and Rogers had grown apart during the 60s, the two had known each other from when they served in the Eisenhower Administration as Vice President and Attorney General respectively, and they were close friends.302 Rogers and his wife, who had grown close to the Nixons, were invited over for dinner in the first family’s private quarters of the White House; this angered
Kissinger who wasn’t once invited.303 It is reported that Kissinger would send memos to Nixon highlighting the sins of the secretary of state.304
Kissinger’s obsession with taking charge of the policymaking process led Nixon to want to fire him. Nixon continuously fought this urge, as he was aware of the integral role Kissinger was playing in what he believed to be a successful foreign policy.305 Nixon relied on the skillful
émigré from Germany to execute many of his foreign policy objectives despite their strained personal relationship.306 This reliance peaked during the Watergate scandal, when “Nixon’s need to use Henry [Kissinger] and foreign policy to counter threats of impeachment made Kissinger an indispensable figure in a collapsing administration”.307
Although Nixon and Kissinger had a weak personal relationship, Kissinger was a strong national security adviser. Whereas Johnson was disinterested in foreign policy, Nixon was a foreign policy junkie. It was his hobby and primary interest. This, by nature, gave Kissinger more power and influence.308 But, Kissinger was given an unprecedented amount of power and autonomy. As Seymour Hersh notes in his book, The Price of Power, “The power grab was so complete that some decisions normally made by presidents after careful consideration were
302 Kissinger, Henry, and Luce, Clare Boothe. White House Years. Pg. 26. 303 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Pg. 113. 304 Ibid. 305 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. Pg. 615. 306 Ibid. 307 Ibid. 308 Ibid., Pg. 99. 66 delegated—almost casually—to Kissinger”.309 While important, Nixon’s greater interest in foreign affairs cannot alone account for the exorbitant amount of power that Kissinger yielded.
Kissinger was one of the few officials who saw the president every day.310 Whereas Kissinger had 198 meetings with Nixon, Rogers and Laird attended only thirty total.311
Access to the president was not the only extent of his influence. For example, Nixon entrusted Kissinger and a group of NSC aides to conduct the covert Paris peace talks with the
North Vietnamese.312 Kissinger, with another group of aides, held private SALT negotiation talks with the Soviets.313 He also circumvented the Defense Department when he ordered bombing operations in North Vietnam.314 It was Kissinger, not Nixon, who approved the replacement for Thomas Moorer as the Chief of Naval Operations.315 Also, during the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, Nixon delegated decision-making to Kissinger.316 By the beginning of the 1970s,
Kissinger had a stranglehold over the CIA. Instead of analyzing raw intelligence data, the
Agency sent the data directly to Kissinger and his NSC staff to analyze and draw their own conclusions.317 During the Watergate scandal, Kissinger, more than ever, was entrusted to manage the foreign policy of the U.S.318
Kissinger had a knack for secrecy. Not only would he plan trips with the president without telling the State Department, but he at times kept even his NSC staff specialists in the
309 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Pg. 205. 310 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. Pg. 101. 311 Ibid. 312 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Pg. 205. 313 Ibid. 314 Ibid. 315 Ibid. 316 Ibid., 531. 317 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Pg. 207. 318 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. Pg. 540. 67 dark.319 It is clear that “The Kissinger operation right from the beginning was a one-man operation”.320 He understood that he could maximize his power and control the policymaking process if he could “stifle the flow of information”.321
The personal relationship model does not explain how powerful and influential Henry
Kissinger was despite having such a weak personal relationship with the president. The case of
Kissinger and Nixon shows that although the personal relationship is important and can improve one’s power and standing in the administration, it is definitely not an essential requirement.
Kissinger was the United States’ most powerful assistant to the president for national security affairs, but had one of the weakest relationships with the president.
The honest brokers
President George H. W. Bush said in 1990, “I would hate to be President without friendships”.322 His friendship with his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, supports the personal relationship model. The relationship between Bush and his national security adviser was excellent. In Scowcroft’s own words, he had “a very close relationship with President Bush.”323
The two had known each other and developed a close personal and working relationship during their time serving in the Ford Administration.324 Scowcroft was Ford’s national security adviser, and Bush was the head of the CIA at the time. They also worked together when Bush was vice
319 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New Pg. 103. 320 Ibid. 321 Ibid., 113. 322 Quoted In: Thomas, Maureen Dowd. "The Fabulous Bush & Baker Boys." The New York Times. N.p., 05 May 1990. Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
Scowcroft too had experience with and a vision for the role. He realized that to be an effective national security adviser, he needed to inspire trust among his colleagues.329 Part of his success was his ability to manage the policy making process properly and earn that trust. He never overstepped his role and gained the trust of the cabinet secretaries that he would be an honest broker. For example, he was careful to “never challenge Baker’s role as the public face of
U.S. diplomacy to the American people and the world”.330 This proved wise, given the president’s personal relationship with his secretary of state.
The interesting thing about the George H.W. Bush case is that despite having a solid personal relationship with his national security adviser, the president had an even stronger one
325 Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Knopf, 1998. Print. Pg. 19. 326 Schmitz, David F. Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Print. Pg. 92. 327 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 192. 328 Ibid. 329 Ibid., 181 . 330 Newmann, William W. Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process. Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh, 2003. Print. Pg. 66. 69 with his secretary of state, James Baker.331 Their relationship dates to their time as partners on the Houston double’s tennis circuit where they won two championships together.332 Baker, the man who Bush called his younger brother, ran all of Bush’s political campaigns and played an integral role in Bush’s successful political career.333 Bush was even Baker’s daughter’s godfather.334 Although Bush and Scowcroft were close friends, the president’s relationship with
Baker was stronger.
In various administrations (Carter, Nixon, W. Bush), cabinet secretaries have found themselves jockeying for power and the ear of the president. One might think that George H.W.
Bush’s strong personal relationship with Baker might cause the secretary of state to clash with
Scowcroft who yielded a great amount of power. However, “Scowcroft’s growing influence did not so much diminish as augment that of Baker, and he was able to avoid the usual conflicts over policy and power that had beset relations between secretaries of state and national security advisers in other administrations”.335 Bush was aware of the tensions between cabinet level officials of the previous two decades, so he chose friends who he knew would work well together and that he had known for quite some time.336 Because they knew each other, the group of friends was comfortable with and loyal to each other.337As Baker writes in his memoir,
331 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 175. 332 Baker, James Addison, and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989- 1992. New York: Putnam, 1995. Print. Pg. 18; Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 176; 333 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg.168, 175. 334 Baker, James Addison, and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989- 1992. New York: Putnam, 1995. Print. Pg. 18. 335 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 169-70. 336 Ibid., Pg. 175. 337 Ibid. 70
“Friendships mean a lot to George Bush. Indeed, his loyalty to his friends is one of his defining personal strengths…he likes to say, ‘Where would we be without friends’”?338
Even though Bush might have had a closer friendship with Baker, Scowcroft was extremely close to the president: even closer than Bush’s long-time friend heading the State
Department.339 The honest broker “was constantly at Bush’s side—in the Oval Office, at Camp
David, sailing on the waters…That’s how Bush wanted it”.340 Bush said that Scowcroft became
“the closest friend in all things” and as close to family as you could be without being related by blood.341 It was clear that Scowcroft became Bush’s closest adviser on foreign policy, and the two of them who became so intimate drove the policy agenda in the White House.342
Because of their strong personal relationship, Scowcroft felt he could disagree with the president. Scowcroft has said that it is “important that the national security adviser tell the president what you think he or she needs to know, not what he wants to hear”.343 When Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, Scowcroft told the president not what he wanted to hear but what he thought the president needed to hear: an argument in favor of intervention.
The extent of Scowcroft’s influence in the Bush administration is exemplified in his role in the Gulf War. As soon as the crisis arose, it was, “Brent Scowcroft [who] took charge of the effort to fashion an American response. He literally took control of the process overnight, chairing a series of deputies meetings…drafting presidential orders freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti
338 Baker, James Addison, and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989- 1992. New York: Putnam, 1995. Print. Pg. 21. 339 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 190. 340 Ibid., 190-191. 341 Alfonsi, Christian. Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq. New York: Doubleday, 2006. Print. pg. 88; Gates, Robert Michael. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Print. Pg. 458. 342 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. 169-170. 343 Schmitz, David F. Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Print. Pg. 92. 71 assets”.344 Scowcroft was outraged by the invasion and felt that the first principals meeting to discuss the crisis lacked enthusiasm he felt such an action warranted.345 Thus, Scowcroft told the
President that at the next meeting he wanted to make a strong opening statement to show the significance of the issue.346 Bush disagreed, wanting to make the statement himself. However,
Scowcroft argued that he should make the case,347 and the president agreed.348 Bush had trusted
Scowcroft with managing the policymaking process because he had shown to be an honest broker.
Not only did Scowcroft manage the process, he drove it towards his desired outcome: intervention. When Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait, President Bush said “we’re not discussing intervention”.349 Despite this initial stance, Scowcroft wrote a memo to Bush saying that military intervention might be necessary, warning him that they might not be able to accept the status quo, setting a bad precedent for the post-Cold War era.350After listening to Scowcroft’s warning, three days later he told reporters “This will not stand.” As observed in the New Yorker,
“Scowcroft argued unyieldingly for intervention, and his view prevailed”.351 The retired air force general had single handedly changed the president’s policy preference in this case, a sign of how powerful he had become as assistant to the president for national security affairs. 352
344 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. 196. 345 "Oral History Interview: Brent Scowcroft." PBS: Frontline, n.d. Web. 17 May 2015.
Scowcroft’s power definitely was increased by his great personal relationship with the president. But friendship alone cannot account for his power because of Bush’s even stronger friendship with Baker. One of the advantages that the national security adviser has over the cabinet secretaries is her proximity to the president. The adviser’s office is in the West Wing, and she sees him every day. This is a luxury that the secretaries of state and defense do not have.
Scowcroft in particular was not a vocal national security adviser. Instead, he “achieved power through proximity. He built a relationship with the president based on loyalty and trust…That reality gave Scowcroft tremendous power”.353 When personal relationships between the president and his advisers are similarly strong (as in the case with Bush, Scowcroft and Baker), one is still more powerful than the other. Perhaps institutional variables may account for the differential amount of power. It could be that the proximity plays an important role when personal relationships are held constant.
Another factor that should be noted is the president’s interest in foreign policy. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Kennedy had a much greater interest in foreign policy than his successor. The power of the national security adviser correlated with this shift; Bundy was more powerful under Kennedy than Johnson. In the case of George H.W. Bush, the 41st president was extremely interested in foreign affairs. He was the director of the CIA, U.S. ambassador to the
U.N. and chief U.S. Liaison to the People’s Republic of China. It is even believed that he lost his second term election because he did not focus enough on domestic policy.354 Could it be that
Scowcroft’s immense power relative to other national security advisers was due to the fact that
353 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisors and the Presidents They Served—From JFK to George W. Bush. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. Pg. 191. 354 "American President: A Reference Resource." The Miller Center. University of Virginia, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
“activism naturally enhanced the centrality of the White House in America’s foreign relations— and with it the power of the person in charge of managing foreign policy for the president.”355
Scowcroft had a strong personal relationship with his president, and was an influential national security adviser. They grew so close that Bush and Scowcroft co-wrote their memoirs of their time in the White House. At the end of Bush’s presidency, it was clear that Scowcroft was the president’s “most important and trusted foreign policy adviser”.356
A friend of Bill
Bill Clinton defeated President Bush and became America’s 42nd president. Clinton was faced with a difficult decision when selecting his national security adviser, in part because of a personal relationship. Clinton was good friends with Samuel (Sandy) Berger ever since the two had met working for George McGovern’s 1972 presidential campaign.357 Berger was considered a “long-standing Friend of Bill (FoB)”.358 On the other hand, Anthony (Tony) Lake had advised
Clinton during his campaign for the presidency and had tremendous experience as a Foreign
Service officer and Kissinger adviser in the Nixon administration. Thus, “Clinton had to choose between Berger’s friendship and Lake’s experience.”359 As good friends do, Berger made the
355 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 191. 356 Ibid., 170. 357 Ibid., 208. 358 Dumbrell, John. Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2009. Print. Pg. 17. 359 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office Pg. 208. 74 decision easy for Clinton. He told the president that Lake should be his assistant for national security affairs.360 Berger later became Clinton’s second-term national security adviser.
Lake purposefully did not seek power and prestige as national security adviser. It is unclear if his time under Nixon influenced his perception, but he believed that the adviser should be “strictly an inside operator. [He] should not speak publicly, engage in diplomacy, nor undermine the Secretary with Congress or the news media”.361 Lake had a self-described
‘passion for anonymity’, rarely spoke out publicly and did not push his own policy preferences.362 Now this could be by choice, but one could point to his limited personal relationship with Clinton as a reason for his lack of influence.
In addition to not having a previous relationship with Clinton prior to becoming his national security adviser, Lake made no effort to befriend Clinton once in office.363 This might have been problematic for his influence given how much Clinton valued close and friendly personal relationships.364 This was a conscious choice on Lake’s part, however, because he did not feel as if he could be a good adviser if he was the president’s friend:
I believed for various reasons that I could not do my job as well if I succumbed to being [President Clinton’s] friend. Also it was hard to draw the line between being a friend and being a courtier and I detest courtiers…And since I left, we became sort of friends. But I didn’t want it at the time.365
This appears to be the only case where a weak personal relationship between the president and his national security adviser was by choice. It is odd that Lake decided against a personal
360 Ibid. 361 Ibid., 214. 362 Ibid., Pg. 215. 363 "Interview with Anthony Lake (2002)." The Miller Center. University of Virginia. Web.
Sandy Berger’s closeness to the president in the first year or so”.366
Lake’s hesitance to be a strong national security adviser hit a turning point after the
Somalia crisis. After what is considered as Clinton’s “Bay of Pigs”, Lake offered his resignation.
Clinton rejected it. This served as a wake-up call for Lake who realized that he needed to be a stronger policy advocate and that his dream of being an adviser in the shadows, similar to Andy
Goodpaster in the 1950s or Brent Scowcroft under Ford, was not possible. Lake realized the policymaking process, which he managed, was not being pushed towards taking action.367
Following the Somalia crisis, Lake began to voice his opinions more often but continued to retrain himself as to not run into the same problems that the powerful Kissinger and
Brzezinski made.368 Even after his re-calibration, Lake and Clinton did not mesh well. Lake liked to divide politics and policy, whereas Clinton was more concerned with the politics surrounding policy.369 Lake was by no means a failed national security adviser. However, he was not as influential as Berger.
Sandy, as his friends called him, was unlike many of the national security advisers who had preceded him; instead of being a professor or military service member, he was a political operative in his president’s party.370 This started a trend. After Clinton easily won his second term in 1996, he needed to replace the outgoing Lake, who was being nominated to become
366 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 217. 367 Ibid., 228. 368 Ibid., 229. 369 Ibid., 235. 370 Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993. Pg. 322. 76
Director of Central Intelligence.371 Clinton wanted Berger, his longtime friend and deputy national security adviser, to be his national security adviser.372
Berger’s appointment was an easy choice for Clinton who had known him for twenty years.373 In Clinton’s own words,
[Berger] felt comfortable bringing me bad news and disagreeing with me at meetings, and he had done a superb job on a whole range of issues in the first term…He understood my strengths and weaknesses and how to make the most of the former and minimize the latter. He also never allowed his ego to get in the way of good decision making.374
Unlike Lake, Berger was a natural fit with Clinton.375 Clinton also liked Berger’s approach to the role; Berger worked well with the other cabinet members and was not interested in power or glory for himself.376
Although Berger might not have been interested in power, by the end of Clinton’s second term, he had become, “the President's closest foreign-policy aide, perhaps the most influential national security adviser since Henry A. Kissinger” according to the New York Times.377 Like
Scowcroft and unlike Kissinger, Berger was a likable man who was able to manage the policymaking process without stepping on the toes of the president’s cabinet secretaries. For
371 Myers, Steven Lee. "Experienced Player Who Shuns Spotlight: Anthony Lake." The New York Times, 05 Dec. 1996. Web. 16 May 2015.
Albright”.378 These shrewd decisions account for his effectiveness.379
In addition to Berger’s strong personal relationship with the president, other hypotheses could also account for why he was so powerful. The first is an institutional element which was also evident in the cases of Bundy, Kissinger and Scowcroft; Clinton less more interested in foreign policy than other presidents have been. Clinton focused more on domestic policies his first term, probably because he had little experience in the field as governor of the small state of
Arkansas. He also ran against a foreign policy-focused president who was out of touch with domestic policies and a recession at home. The priorities were different for Clinton during his second term, and this could account in part why Berger was more powerful than Lake.380
Another reason could simply be that Berger saw the role differently from Lake. Whereas
Lake believed the adviser “should not speak publicly”, Berger said, “Part of my job…is to explain to the American people what our objectives are”.381 Berger went on fifty Sunday news talk shows compared to Lake’s five and was constantly on Capitol Hill explaining the administration’s position on various issues.382 Part of Berger’s shift in the role was due to the 24 hour news cycle, and the politicization of foreign policy.383 Because of this shift, he increased the communications staff from the two part-time directors that worked under Lake to eleven officials.384
378 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 241. 379 Ibid., 238. 380 Ibid., 240. 381 Ibid., 241. 382 Ibid., 241, 242. 383 Ibid., 242. 384 Ibid. 78
In line with the hypothesis of the personal relationship model, Berger had a stronger personal relationship with the president than did Lake. He was also a more powerful adviser. It appears that the personal relationship played a role. Surely, Clinton gave Berger more autonomy and responsibility because he trusted him. They had been friends for a quarter of a century and had worked well together. This being said, there are other factors that account for Berger’s power: how he saw the role, Clinton’s new focus on foreign policy, the 24-hour news cycle and the politicization of foreign policy.
In light of these examples, the personal relationship model seems to have limitations. At best, the two variables (power and personal relationship) appear to be related. The case of Nixon and Kissinger presents a major issue for the personal relationship model. Similarly, the George
W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice example shows the limits of the model.
The professor
George W. Bush first met Condoleezza Rice on a trip to Maine in 1998. His father introduced him to Rice, who served as the Soviet specialist in his administration.385 The following year, during a hike on his Texas ranch, Dr. Rice told the future first lady and her former boss’ son about the history of the Balkans. Impressed, he decided that he would make her his national security adviser if he was ever president.386 Bush and Rice grew so close that the 43rd
385 Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York: Crown, 2010. Print. Pg. 82. 386 Ibid., 83.
79 president even said, “Miss Rice is like my sister”.387 Rice herself has not been one to hide her
“close personal relationship with the president”.388
Their personal relationship was very strong: “Kissinger called it the closest such relationship of any in modern times”.389 During his time in the White House, Rice continued to be Bush’s most liked and trusted adviser.390 Her special relationship gave her the same proximity that Scowcroft enjoyed under the first President Bush.391 The former Stanford Provost “spent an extraordinary amount of time with Bush---sometimes six or seven hours a day.”392 This gave her potential for power that others in the administration could not enjoy. She believes, “The fact that you have been friends before he was president just gives you a level of trust and a level of comfort that I think is very helpful. I could be very direct with him”.393
Despite her proximity to the president, however, Rice was not as powerful relative to other national security advisers and especially her cohorts in the cabinet.394 Although she aligned her views with that of the president, Bush’s cabinet members often circumvented Rice to implement their desired policies, sometimes leaving the former Stanford provost outside the inner circle.395 This reality casts doubt on the personal relationship model.
387 "Transformed By Her Bond With Bush." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 03 Sept. 2007. Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
Rice was not as powerful as one might think given her personal relationship with the president for a variety of reasons. The first is that she chose not to be as powerful. For example, she thought the NSC staff under the previous administration had become bloated and thus “cut the staff by nearly a third, mainly by consolidating and eliminating some of the policy and supporting directorates”.396
The second was that her counterparts were well experienced in bureaucratic politics.
Cheney, who had been a White House chief of staff for Ford and the secretary of defense for
Bush’s father, came with considerable government experience. Cheney was able to dominate the policy process and circumvent Rice, thus decreasing her power. Joel Goldstein, author of The
Modern American Vice Presidency, has said that “"Vice President Cheney has been the most powerful vice president that we've ever had”.397 For example, early in 2001, Cheney convinced
Bush to support restrictions that would limit greenhouse gas levels without telling his secretary of state, national security adviser, or even the EPA administrator.398 Another example of this pattern occurred when Rice learned on television that the president had signed an executive order allowing the U.S. military to detain people who he believed “engaged in, aided or abetted, or considered to commit” terrorist acts.399 During his time as second in line to the presidency,
Cheney “expanded the prerogatives of the executive branch and orchestrated secret, warrantless domestic surveillance, circumventing a court set up by Congress specifically to oversee such surveillance…[and] played a major role in persuading President Bush to go to war against
396 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 260. 397 Totenberg, Nina. "Cheney: A VP With Unprecedented Power." NPR, 15 Jan. 2009. Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
Iraq”.400 Cheney took advantage of a president who was less concerned with details and acted as his chief operating officer.401
Similarly, Donald Rumsfeld was able to dominate and keep Rice out of the policymaking process. It is believed that he became the most powerful secretary of defense since Robert
McNamara.402 Like Cheney, he had significant experience in government. Rumsfeld started out his successful career in politics as a congressman from Illinois, and then, like Cheney, had also been chief of staff for President Ford. He was also serving in his second stint as secretary of defense, so he knew how to maneuver the bureaucratic policymaking process. This put him at an advantage over the relatively younger and less experienced university professor. Rumsfeld did not hold Rice in very high esteem: he read while she spoke during meetings, missed meetings that she called, and made dismissive comments when she spoke.403 He would sometimes attend a meeting and demand decisions on issues that his colleagues were not prepared to make. Also, he would not attend meetings called by Rice in order prevent her from implementing policies with which he disagreed.404 These tactics allowed Rumsfeld, “to control the process and gain power, it worked and he was able to eliminate the military as an independent voice during policy deliberations”.405 Rumsfeld told Rice, “You’re not in the chain of command,” and prevented her from playing a role in military planning or decision making.406 He made it clear to her, saying, “I
400 Totenberg, Nina. "Cheney: A VP With Unprecedented Power." NPR, 15 Jan. 2009. Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
Whereas Rice was a weak national security adviser, her successor, Stephen Hadley, was more effective. Although Hadley did not have the strong personal relationship with the president that Rice had, “he accomplished something on Iraq policy that Condoleezza Rice was never able to bring about: a reality-driven review of policy choices, culminating in a serious and consequential presidential decision.”408 This could be due to the fact the Rumsfeld was no longer in office, but it is difficult to determine how much of an effect this had, since Cheney remained as vice president.
Conclusion: Explanatory strengths and limits of this model
The personal relationship model has serious limitations. The strong personal relationship of Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush did not yield a powerful national security adviser. The poor personal relationship of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not prevent Kissinger from becoming the most powerful national security adviser in the country’s history. The case studies in this chapter begin to unveil other factors that might be more important. For example, the degree of power that the national security adviser wants: Lake wanted to be less powerful than
Berger. Outside factors such as the 24-hour news cycle benefited Berger. Also, how interested a president is in foreign policy matters: Johnson and Clinton, during their first terms, were not as interested in foreign policy as were Kennedy, Nixon and Clinton, during his second term. Other powerful and experienced cabinet members such as Cheney and Rumsfeld can diminish the
407 Draper, Robert. Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush. New York: Free, 2007. Pg. 284. 408 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 297. 83 power of the national security adviser. The geographical proximity of the national security adviser to the president, which often is near the Oval Office, can in part account for why advisers might be more powerful than cabinet members: Scowcroft might have been more powerful than
Baker because of this, despite Baker’s stronger relationship with the president. Finally, the third framework of this thesis, how the president decides to allocate power and his managerial style, matters. Bundy and Kissinger benefited from Kennedy and Nixon concentrating power in the
White House, whereas Rice fell victim to the cabinet style government under Bush.
In this chapter, a number of these factors have been shown to impact the power of the national security adviser when the personal relationship model fails. Whether or not the personal relationship model can be completely discarded is unclear, given that some evidence suggests it can help explain the degree of power that a national security adviser will have. There is no denying that strong personal relationships will instill trust in the president to give more authority to his adviser. Also, no clear evidence exists to suggest that a strong personal relationship will decrease an adviser’s power. Rather, the decline in power seems related to a number of other factors. The next chapter will explore a third explanatory model: the managerial style of the president and its effect on the power of the national security adviser.
84
-Chapter 5-
THE MANAGERIAL STYLE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Finally, the national security adviser is an amorphous position. It's as powerful as the president wants it to be, and if the adviser wants his role to be larger, he has to carve out his own path to influence and power.409 -Fred Kaplan, 2010
410 I'm the decider and I decide what is best... -George W. Bush, 2006
Description of explanatory model
The managerial style of the president model views the power of the national security adviser in the context of how the president constructs his foreign policy apparatus (See Appendix
D). The position is not in the Constitution, nor is it required by law.411 As Ivo Daalder and I.M.
Destler write, “The job exists because presidents want it to exist. And the person occupying it has power and influence over policy because the president wants him or her to have that power and influence.”412 This desire is usually expressed through a structural decision and happens when the president assembles his cabinet and White House staff. Each president brings a
409Kaplan, Fred. "Why No One Will Miss Jim Jones, the Departing National Security Adviser." Good Man, Wrong Job. Slate, 8 Oct. 2010. Web. 10 May 2015.
This chapter will highlight two common management styles that generally have fallen along party lines: power concentration in the White House (Democrats) and cabinet-style government (Republican). It will focus on two presidents that differed greatly in management style and have not yet been discussed: Carter and Reagan. Then, it will use the managerial style model to explain why Kissinger was the most powerful national security adviser, filling in the gaps of the first two models that failed to explain why one of the first national security advisers, who had a poor relationship with his boss, was so powerful.
Case studies
Decision-making donkeys
Since the birth of the national security adviser, Democratic presidents have usually concentrated power in the White House. Kennedy created a central nervous system after the Bay of Pigs incident and increased his reliance on his advisers, especially his adviser for National
Security Affairs. By concentrating power in the White House, Kennedy removed the military and
CIA from decision making and depended on an inner circle of trusted advisers.413 This was clearly evidenced in his Executive Committee, which included only his closest and most trusted advisers. Bundy, Kennedy’s national security adviser, was one of the more influential national
413 Destler, I. M. "National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought." Political Science Quarterly 95.4 (1980). Pg. 578.
After the Kennedy assassination, Johnson continued to centralize power in the White
House. Most point to his selection of specific targets to bomb in Vietnam as an example of how obsessed he was with exercising power.414 His managerial style differed from Kennedy’s approach, however, which altered the power of Bundy who Johnson had asked to continue as national security adviser. Johnson’s style avoided the collegial debate and encouragement of differing opinions on which Kennedy thrived. The best example to highlight this was Johnson’s response to Bundy’s call for caution after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.415 Not only did Johnson avoid debate over national security issues, he did not trust the Kennedy team despite keeping them on board after the assassination.416
The most recent Democratic president, Barak Obama, has also concentrated power in the
White House rather than delegating it to his cabinet secretaries. Although President Obama has had powerful secretaries of state, he has made the White House the hub of decision-making and relies on his inner circle of “Chicago Boys”. His managerial style is one that depends on his most trusted advisers, regardless of their title, age or experience. This meant that even though Jim
Jones was the de jure national security adviser, other senior staffers, with whom the president had greater trust and better working relationships, served as the de facto adviser(s). Despite
Ashton Carter appearing to be a strong secretary of defense, Obama historically has not had
414 Brands, H. W. The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Google Books. Pg. 15. 415 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. Pg. 289. 416 Galvin, Daniel. Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Print. 191. 87 powerful secretaries heading the Pentagon.417 Although Hillary Clinton and John Kerry have been visible and active, the president has managed to concentrate power in the White House and has not delegated a great deal of authority to his cabinet secretaries.418 McFaul notes that
President Obama, “himself was a big decision maker…and was also often times pretty operational on stuff, he negotiated the new START Treaty, when I was there, we had our advisers and we had our official negotiators, but all the big heavy lifts, he did.”419 Like Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon and Carter, President Obama has concentrated power in the White House.
A Zbig role
One-term president Jimmy Carter is the epitome of a Democratic president who concentrated power in the White House. Carter has not been bashful in explaining that this was his strategy and his preferred managerial style: “[T]he final decisions on basic foreign policy would be made by me in the Oval Office, and not in the State Department.”420 The Carter White
House set the pace and direction of both the State and Defense departments instead of the other way around.421 Carter followed Nixon’s lead by allowing his national security adviser to become as powerful, if not more powerful, than the secretary of state or any other cabinet official.
Carter’s managerial style points to why his national security adviser was so powerful. Carter concentrated power in the White House and operated as a micromanager who was over-involved
417 Duff-Brown, Beth. "At Stanford, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter Unveils Cyber Strategy, Calls for Renewed Partnership with Silicon Valley." Stanford University, 24 Apr. 2015. Web. 16 May 2015.
Brzezinski, like Henry Kissinger, was a European émigré and an academic product of
Harvard. Both were extremely ambitious, hard-working and took advantage of their presidents’ managerial style to become the two most powerful national security advisers in U.S. history.
President Carter was even warned about Brzezinski being too ambitious.423 Carter was comfortable with this possibility, given that Brzezinski served as his chief foreign policy adviser during his presidential campaign. Carter considered himself as “an eager student” of the
Columbia professor.424 Although Carter was aware of the characterizations of Brzezinski as being aggressive, he welcomed them: “they were in accord with what I wanted.”425 This shows the importance of presidential preference. The managerial style matters in determining the power of the national security adviser.
During Carter’s single term as commander in chief, Brzezinski became “the president’s primary foreign policy adviser”, whom he met with first thing every morning in the Oval
Office.426 Brzezinski himself understood that the managerial style of the president was key to acquiring his own power. As an academic, he had studied the role and believed the “NSC’s relationship to the president and its dependence on his personal working style [that have] determined its evolution”.427 He took advantage of the president’s desire to run foreign policy out of the White House rather than the State Department.
422 Ibid., 211. 423 Carter, Jimmy. Pg. 55. 424 Ibid., 54. 425 Ibid., 55. 426 Ibid., Pg. 53; Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 95. 427 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1987. “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis.” Foreign Policy 69 (Winter): 81. 89
He had an aggressive and ambitious personality that drove his desire to control the policy making process and push his policy preferences. Brzezinski himself believes that the power of the national security adviser “varies so much depending on personalities, self confidence, knowledge (See Appendix F for full email).”428 He definitely had the ambitious personality, the self-confidence, and deep understanding as a scholar of international relations to become powerful. This being said, his power “could not have evolved without the support or direction of the president—who in fact embraced and largely shaped it.”429 The structure of Carter’s administration and his managerial style allowed Brzezinski to become so powerful.
Carter structured his foreign policy apparatus in such a way that allowed Brzezinski to become more powerful. Although they had a good relationship, Carter’s managerial style appears to be the most salient explanation for why Brzezinski became one of the most powerful advisers in the history of the role. One of the structural changes that Carter made was to form the Special
Coordinating Committee which was chaired by the national security adviser.430 Brzezinski wrote committee meeting summaries and draft directives, which he forwarded directly to Carter before meeting attendees had a chance to seen them.431 Never before had the national security adviser chaired a cabinet level committee meeting on a regular basis.432 This structural change was a managerial decision by Carter that gave Brzezinski unprecedented institutional power.
428 Brzezinski, Zbiginiew. Personal email to Walter Pincus on behalf of the author. 19 May 2015. 429 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 169. 430 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 101-102. 431 Ibid., 102. 432 Ibid., 101-102. 90
A Zbiger feud
Unlike Nixon’s first Secretary of State William Rogers who did not mind a powerful national security adviser, President Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, was displeased with Brzezinski’s expansive role. Given their infamous feuding throughout their time in office, it is ironic that Vance and Brzezinski had recommended each other for their posts.433 Soviet
Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin explained it best, “under Carter there was probably more controversy and heated debate among top officials than under any modern American president”.434 Vance and Brzezinski clashed for personal, ideological and bureaucratic reasons.435 One bureaucratic feud stemmed from Vance’s sentiment that the State Department was ignored during the Nixon Administration.436 He felt that Nixon’s concentration of power and attention in the White House rather than at State weakened the morale of Foreign Service officers and made policy continuity from administration to administration difficult.437
Other clashes occurred when Brzezinski made public statements. Carter authorized
Brzezinski to help articulate the administration’s foreign policy on occasion.438 This was a product of Carter’s managerial style; he believed his national security adviser could help the secretary of state communicate the administration’s foreign policy goals. Vance disapproved of
Brzezinski’s speaking on behalf of the president, regardless of whether or not he had Carter’s approval.439
433 Carter, Jimmy. Pg. 55. 434 Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995). Pg. 386 435 Brauer, Carl. "Lost In Transition." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 01 Nov. 1988. Web. 10 May 2015.
Although some might find this feud dysfunctional, Carter saw it as just the opposite. He allowed the two to butt heads, and wrote in his memoirs:
The different strengths of Brzezinski and Cy matched the roles they played, and also permitted the natural competition between the two organizations to stay alive. I appreciated those differences. In making the final decisions on foreign policy, I needed to weigh as many points of view as possible.440
Vance, from day one, objected to the arrangement. He told the president his concerns, arguing that the national security adviser should only have “the power to interpret the thrust of discussion or frame the policy recommendations of departmental participants.”441 Part of these concerns might have stemmed from Vance’s claim that there were “discrepancies, occasionally serious ones” between what he said in meetings and what was summarized by Brzezinski and his staff.442
Vance also disliked the Presidential Directive that Carter signed at the beginning of his administration. This directive allowed Brzezinski to spearhead the most important issues because the document failed to define what constituted a “crisis.”443 This gave Brzezinski and the White
House the ability to take the lead on issues they found most important; the state department did not have this same luxury.444 The system that the directive established was another structural change by Carter that gave his national security adviser more power.
The Carter administration’s policy towards China highlights Brzezinski’s influence and the growing the dispute between him and the secretary of state. After the first month of Carter’s term, the Washington Post wrote about a secret deal between the Nixon administration and the
Chinese government that had agreed to complete the normalization of relations by the end of
440 Ibid., 57. 441 Vance, Cyrus R. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Print. Pg. 37. 442 Vance, Cyrus R. Pg. 37. 443 Rothkopf, David J. Pg. 168. 444 Ibid. 92
Nixon’s second term in office.445 This was news to the Carter administration, which discovered only “empty safes” and no records from the Nixon administration following the inauguration.
Michel Oksenberg was the NSC’s director for China policy and tasked to work Richard
Holbrooke, assistant Secretary of State for Asia, to piece together the agreement.446 After working together, Oksenberg recommended that the U.S. should reaffirm this agreement with
China and complete normalization.447 They sent this recommendation to Brzezinski who then wrote a memo to the president supporting the recommendation.448 Vance was livid and told
Brzezinski that the national security adviser should not be making policy recommendations without notifying the secretary of state.449 Vance also did not support the policy of reaffirming the Nixon agreement and demanded that the memo be shredded.450 Despite the objection, the president followed his national security adviser’s advice and chose normalization.451
Not only did Brzezinski send memos without consulting Vance, he continued to aggravate the secretary of state by visiting China. He had asked Oksenberg to arrange a trip to
China on his behalf; a few days later, to Vance’s and Holbrooke’s surprise and disapproval, a
Chinese diplomat publically accepted the trip request and invited the national security adviser.452
This trip went counter to Vance’s belief that the national security adviser should not act as the president’s diplomat.453 The memory of Kissinger’s activism was still fresh in Vance’s mind.
However, Carter again sided with his national security adviser, who took advantage of every
445 Tyler, Patrick. "The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations." Foreign Affairs. 01 Sept. 1999. Web. 10 May 2015.
China.454
Brzezinski’s power and autonomy expanded during the China trip, as he limited the number of officials that could plan the itinerary and decided who could accompany him during it.455 For example, Richard Holbrooke was barred from attending Brzezinski’s meeting with
Deng in Beijing and from reading the national security adviser’s talking points for the meeting.456 It was Carter’s managerial style that allowed Brzezinski to wield so much power over his colleagues. This managerial approach can also be seen when Carter held a meeting to discuss “sore subjects”, such as the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Brzezinski was able to exclude
Vance from the meeting, which concluded with Carter deciding that the U.S. would try to finalize normalization, the policy that Brzezinski had supported, but Vance had not.457
Zbigniew Brzezinski became so visible and powerful that it led Carter’s successor,
Reagan, to fundamentally alter the role. While Brzezinski’s power resulted in part from his good personal relationship with the president, it related most to Carter’s managerial style. Carter concentrated power within the White House, allowed Brzezinski to exercise power as he felt necessary, sided often with Brzezinski over Vance, met with his adviser first thing every morning, and appointed him as chair of a cabinet level committee. Carter’s managerial style was the epitome of a Democratic administration concentrating power in the White House that produced a powerful national security adviser.
454 Prados, John. Keepers of the Key: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush. New York: William Morrow, 1991. Print. Pg. 422. Tyler, Patrick. "The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations." 455 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 190. 456 Ibid. 457 Carter, Jimmy. Pg. 775-76; Tyler, Patrick. "The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations." 94
Grand ole executives: cabinet-style government
Republicans, on the other hand, have generally managed their administrations like CEOs in a phenomenon known as cabinet-style government. While Nixon is an outlier, Reagan and both of the Bush presidents have structured their administrations along this model. For example,
George H.W. Bush, although he had a powerful national security adviser, entrusted substantial power to his best friend and secretary of state, James Baker and a future power-broker in his son’s administration, Dick Cheney. The second President Bush also empowered his cabinet, allowing bureaucratic veterans such as Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney to accumulate power at the expense of the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice.
Reducing the role
Ronald Reagan, a former union leader, Democratic Party member and beneficiary of
FDR’s social programs, has become an icon of the Republican Party. He could not have differed more from his predecessor; they were exact opposites:
Carter was hands on. Reagan was hands off. Carter was a micromanager. Reagan didn’t want to be bothered with details. Carter was interested in too many issues, drawn into too many directions. Reagan was focused on a few core concerns…Carter was an engineer. Reagan was an actor. Carter saw the world in shades of gray. Reagan saw the world in black and white—or red, white, and blue.458
458 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 211. 95
Reagan intentionally acted more as a distant CEO, overseeing the entire operation in the form of a cabinet-style government.459 His managerial style had significant implications for the amount of power his national security advisers had.
The former California governor structured his administration to delegate more power to his cabinet secretaries and departments at the expense of the national security adviser. Reagan signed presidential directive, NSDD-2, which formally gave more authority to the State
Department and reduced the role of the national security adviser.460 Reagan wanted Alexander
Haig, his secretary of state, rather than his national security adviser to take charge of foreign policy making.461 He explicitly told Haig, “I won’t have a repeat of the Nixon-Rogers situation.
I’ll look to you, Al”.462
Haig agreed, telling the president that he would act as the “single manager who can integrate the views of all [the] Cabinet officers and prepare…range of policy choices.’”463 Haig added that Reagan should “establish a number of interdepartmental groups,” chaired by the State
Department in an effort to prevent “friction between the National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.”464 Haig also demanded that “contacts with foreign officials must be conducted at the
State Department” and that “there must be no independent press contact with the office of your
National Security Adviser. I must be your only spokesman on foreign affairs”.465 President
459 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office .Pg. 131. 460 Best, Richard. "The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment." Pg. 17; Reprinted in Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1982. Vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1983). Pg. 18-22. 461 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 131 462 Haig, Alexander. Caveat. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), Pg. 12. 463 “The Document That Sowed the Seed of Haig’s Demise,” Washington Post, July 11, 1982, p. C1. Cited in Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg 132. 464 Ibid. 465 “The Document That Sowed the Seed of Haig’s Demise,” Washington Post, July 11, 1982, p. C1. Cited in Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg 132. 96
Reagan and his secretary of state were in agreement on every point.466 As noted by Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler, “Secretarial dominance of foreign policy suited Reagan’s priorities and perspective”.467
Even Reagan’s national security adviser believed that the role’s power should be reduced.
Dick Allen, Reagan’s first of six national security advisers, agreed with his boss and the secretary of state. He believed, “The policy formation function of the national security adviser should be offloaded to the Secretary of State”.468 Allen saw as his model--Gordon Gray,
President Eisenhower’s national security planning director before the role of national security adviser even existed.469
Given the president’s desire to limit the power of the national security adviser, the role was weakened. Allen’s rank was reduced to a deputy secretary level, and he chaired no interagency committees as his predecessor had.470 His desk was moved from the West Wing corner office, which had been occupied by Kissinger and Brzezinski, to the White House basement.471 To accomplish anything, Allen had to get his work approved by three superiors.472
His morning briefings with the president in the Oval Office were even replaced by written daily memos.473
Reagan and his entire team agreed on this issue and purposefully reduced the power of the national security adviser after witnessing how powerful the role had become under Nixon and
466 Haig, Alexander. 58. 467 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 133. 468 Ibid., 132. 469 Richard Burt, “Reagan Aides Tell of Plans to Strengthen Secretary of State and Curb National Security Adviser,’ New York Times, November 19, 1980, p. A28. 470Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 133. 471 Ibid. 472 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 217. 473 Ibid., 222. 97
Carter.474 They also had seen the infighting within the Carter administration between a powerful national security adviser and a secretary of state who felt the role was getting out of hand.
Reagan made structural changes to remove power from the White House NSC staff and give it to the cabinet. For example, NSC subcommittees were chaired by CIA, State and Defense
Department officials rather than NSC staff members.475 Reagan’s managerial style greatly affected the power of his first national security adviser.
The role rises in power
One of the effects of a weak NSC staff and NSC adviser is the lack of a strong person managing the policy making process. Haig notes in his memoir that Allen had become
“irrelevant”.476 This void was felt throughout the Reagan Administration, and thus the second national security adviser, Judge William Clark played a bigger role.477 After being caught in a gift-receiving scandal, Allen was forced out of the White House and was replaced by Clark.478
Although Clark was Haig’s deputy at State, he lacked foreign policy experience.479 “Judge Clark was a former California Supreme Court Justice and Governor Reagan’s chief of staff; he had the personal trust and friendship of the president and was considered a “Reaganite.”480 As Haig’s deputy and Reagan’s former chief of staff, he had a good personal relationship with both.481
Given his close previous relationship with Reagan, Clark could brief the president face to face,
474 Best, Richard. "The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment." 475 Best, Richard. "The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment."; Rothkopf, David J. Pg. 218. 476 Haig, Alexander. Pg. 85. 477 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 225. 478 Ibid., 224-225. 479 Ibid., 225. 480 Poindexter: Quoted in Rothkopf, David J. Pg. 225. 481 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 225, 227. 98 take items to him directly and drive the policy making process, all of which Allen was barred from doing in part because he lacked a personal bond with Reagan.482 The personal relationship framework can, to some degree, explain Clark’s increased power over his predecessor.
Because he was in Reagan’s inner circle, Clark’s role was expanded such that he could make decisions and changes without the approval or knowledge of the State and Defense departments.483 For example, he appointed his deputy and eventual successor, Robert McFarlane as a Middle East envoy in order to communicate and coordinate with him covertly.484 In addition, he helped launch Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative program. Reagan’s secretaries of state and defense, Shultz and Weinberger respectively, were unaware of the program until a few days before the president’s speech announcing it.485 Clark also made policy decisions regarding CIA mining off the coast of Nicaragua without the knowledge or approval of the State
Department. Contrary to the Reagan administration’s initial plans, this national security adviser was arguably more powerful than the secretary of state.486 This offers support for the personal relationship framework, because Reagan’s managerial style did not change between his first and second national security advisers. What changed was his personal relationship with the two and the amount of power they had.
A dysfunctional supporting cast
Despite increasing the significance of the role, Judge Clark was uncomfortable as the assistant to the president for national security affairs. Thus, when secretary of the Interior, James
482 Poindexter Quoted Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 225-226; Rothkopf, David J. Pg. 226. 483 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 226. 484 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 155. 485 Ibid 486 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World Pg. 227. 99
Watt, resigned, Clark convinced the president to assign him to what would be his third post in the administration in three years.487 Robert McFarlane, Clark’s original deputy and special envoy to the Middle East, became Reagan’s third national security adviser. This was the beginning of a dysfunctional, criminal and disastrous chapter in Reagan’s presidency.
During the tenure of Clark and his successors, Reagan was unable to avoid the cabinet infighting that plagued the Carter Administration. This deadlock led Reagan to frequently say just “work things out” and to give his subordinates responsibility for the policymaking process.488 This ushered in a period during the Reagan Administration where his national security advisers wielded “insufficient influence and excessive power.”489 Their influence on broad policy decisions was limited because of Reagan’s deference to his cabinet and his concept of cabinet government. At the same time, their authority on day-to-day operational decisions was often enormous and unchecked because Reagan provided them with minimal guidance and even less supervision.490
This lack of supervision kept his national security advisers guessing as to Reagan’s policy preferences which had serious consequences for the Administration. The president did not give his advisers clear instructions or guidance.491 In an effort to avoid the troubles of the Carter
Administration, Reagan reduced the role of the national security adviser: “The result was an unsupervised, underproductive, ingrown system that collapsed on itself and almost brought the
487 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 231. 488 Cannon, Lou. President Reagan, p. 295 found in Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office.Pg. 155.; Smith, Hedrick. The Power Game: How Washington Works. New York: Random House, 1988. Print. Pg. 599. 489 Ibid., 295. 490 Ibid. 491 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World Pg. 232. 100 administration down with it”.492 This dysfunctional system gave rise to a major blemish of
Reagan Administration, the Iran-Contra Affair.493
When McFarlane took over from Clark, he lacked any clear supervisor and took the opportunity to increase the power of the adviser, turning the NSC staff into an operational body that executed policy.494 He used this power and proposed a plan that would sell weapons to moderate factions in the Iranian government in order to gain influence in the country and ultimately win the release of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon.495 His plan was immediately rejected by secretary of state George Shultz and secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger.496
Knowing that Reagan would be touched by the human element of the operation, the freeing of hostages, McFarlane lobbied and convinced him to support the plan.497 McFarlane delegated the operational task to NSC staff member, Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, and instructed him to execute it in secrecy.498 Around 1985, once the arms sales failed to obtain the release of the
American hostages, McFarlane claimed after the fact that he recommended stopping the program to the president.499 This is where the lack of influence but extensive power becomes a problem.
McFarlane had trouble influencing Reagan, and notes that, ''The President didn't always listen to
492 Ibid., 210. 493 Best, Richard. "The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment." 494 Walsh, Lawrence E. "Chapter 1: United States v. Robert C. McFarlane." Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1993. Web.
I could have relied upon others who did have influence with him. I could have insured that George Shultz took much firmer positions on it. The President had a high regard for him. I could have gotten him into the Oval Office more often and nailed it down about stopping the program. We could have made pests of ourselves.501
McFarlane, who would later attempt suicide because of his involvement in the program, did not make himself a pest, and the program continued.502 Instead of cancelling the plan once it failed to achieve the hostages’ release, the program was accelerated when the U.S. began to profit from the sales.503 President Reagan gave simple instructions to his national security adviser: to keep the Nicaraguan contras alive.504 This vague instruction was typical of Reagan who spoke in generalities and avoided the details of policies.
McFarlane resigned his post as national security adviser at the end of 1985 to spend more time with his family.505 His deputy, Navy Vice Admiral John Poindexter, replaced him and continued the illegal program for another year. At this point, Oliver North proposed a new plan: the profit from the sales to Iran could fund weapons for the Nicaraguan Contras who were fighting the communist Sandinista government, despite a Congressional ban on such sales.506
500 Dowd, Maureen. "McFarlane Suicide Attempt: 'What Drove Me To Despair'" The New York Times. The New York Times, 01 Mar. 1987. Web.
The program was exposed by Reagan’s Attorney General, Ed Meese. Poindexter, along with others involved in the program such as McFarlane and North, was convicted of multiple felonies for his involvement.507 The scandal almost destroyed the Reagan administration and made it clear that the National Security Council Staff needed serious reform. Reagan’s inattentive managerial style led to the Iran-Contra affair.508 According to a Special Review Board Report,
“The NSC process did not fail, it simply was largely ignored”.509
Reagan did not supervise the national security adviser and his subordinates which enabled them to wield considerable power. The Contra diversion was a policy inspired by
Reagan’s vague instruction to keep the Contras “alive” and executed by poorly supervised NSC staff members.
The Power of Tower
One positive consequence of the Iran-Contra affair was the Tower Commission, which recommended a restructuring of the National Security Council staff and operations.510 The
Tower Commission realized that the problem that led to Iran-Contra was the president’s management style and his inability to drive the policy making processes.511 The report also recognized the importance of a flexible national security system that fits the president’s management style: “Because the system is the vehicle through which the president formulates
507 "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - The Legal Aftermath." Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - The Legal Aftermath. Web. 10 May 2015.
Balance of power
Frank Carlucci, Weinberger’s deputy, was tasked with restoring the role and dignity of the National Security Council staff and adviser. He reorganized the NSC staff by putting himself at the top of a pyramid-style organization and giving the national security adviser, himself, more institutional power.513 Knowing that Secretary of State Shultz was displeased with the Tower
Commission’s conclusion to increase the national security adviser’s power to manage the policy making process, Carlucci told him that he would not circumvent him.514 Part of this institutional change was that the NSC adviser would chair senior-level interagency meetings.515
Carlucci observed that Reagan preferred a hands-off management style often gave vague instructions: “I mean you were never quite certain where he was except on key issues. But if you went to him with a problem, you weren’t always certain where he was coming out.”516 Seeing how his predecessors dealt with this management style, Carlucci was determined to learn from their mistakes. Soon after becoming the adviser, he remembers when,
Colin and I went back to my office and we sat down and said, Look, we’re going to have to figure out how we make decisions in this kind of process, because we have to be faithful to what we think the president would want without getting
512 Ibid., 88. 513 Daalder, Ivo and I.M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office. Pg. 164. 514 Ibid. 515 Ibid., 165. 516 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 253. 104
explicit guidance from him. It’s clear that some of the people who were working for him prior to us didn’t go through that kind of process. They took the lack of crisp decision making to be license to go do their own thing. And that’s what led to the abuse. In essence, he trusted his people too much.517
A telling aspect of Reagan’s schedule highlights his management style and how he relied on his staff members to execute policy guided by his generalities. For example, Reagan left for
Camp David by 3:30PM on Fridays and returned Sunday nights without contacting anyone at the
White House. Powell remembers, “We didn’t call him. We didn’t bother him. It was Reagan’s style, and the world was a little different. You can’t do that anymore.”518 Carlucci and his successor Colin Powell re-balanced the power of the national security adviser in which they were not as powerful as Brzezinski or Kissinger, but not as weak as Allen.
It is evident that the president’s management style affects the power of his national security advisers. Although the institutional power and influence of Reagan’s advisers was diminished, his hands-off management style allowed for McFarlane and Poindexter to be as powerful as Kissinger and frequently operate in the shadows.
The Madman-ager
Nixon restructured his administration away from the collegial system that worked for
FDR and JFK.519 Kissinger believed that Nixon relied so much on him, in part, because the
Harvard professor was less well known; his anonymity could allow Nixon to take credit for his
517 Quoted in Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 253. 518 Powell quoted in Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 256. 519 Burke, John P. “The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 2 (2005a). 105 accomplishments in the White House.520 This obviously did not turn out to be the case; Kissinger landed on the cover of Time magazine and quickly became a celebrity.
Nixon’s managerial style can account for why Kissinger was the most powerful national security adviser in the history of the position. When Nixon planned the organization of his administration, he made a conscious effort to concentrate power in the White House like many
Democratic presidents.521 He purposefully downgraded the influence of the State Department, by choosing someone who had little foreign policy experience, so that he and Kissinger could be the primary foreign policy makers in his administration. 522 Part of the reason Nixon did this was that he felt mistreated by the State department during his time as Eisenhower’s Vice President.523
Nixon wanted to be his own secretary of state and in charge of important negotiations; he excluded secretary of state Rogers from meetings with diplomats.524 When a state dignitary met with the president in the Oval Office, it was Kissinger next to Nixon, not the secretary of state.525
As Seymour Hersh writes, Kissinger was more powerful than Rogers, “not because Rogers did not try, but because Nixon wanted it that way”.526 Rogers himself understood the nature of the position he was in: “I was prepared to play a subordinate role,” Rogers said. “I recognized that
[Nixon] wanted to be his own foreign policy leader and did not want others to share that role.”527
520 Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Print. Pg. 25-26. 521 Ibid., 11. 522 Ibid., 28. 523 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2007. Print. Pg. 79-80. 524 Kissinger, Henry. Pg. 28. 525 Ibid. 526 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit, 1983. Print. Pg. 32. 527 Quoted in: Hersh, Seymour M. Pg. 32. 106
Not only did Nixon reduce the power of the State Department, but also he pushed the
CIA out of the policy making process to harness his grip over power.528 Kissinger benefited greatly from this management style, because he was Nixon’s right-hand man in the White House where Nixon had concentrated power.
In addition to benefiting tangentially from Nixon’s power grab, Kissinger’s power increased because the president institutionalized it. He formed four new bodies that Kissinger chaired: the Washington Special Action Group (WASAG), the NSC Intelligence Committee, the
Defense Program Review Committee, and the Senior Policy Review Group.529 These chairmanships and managerial preferences of the president allowed Kissinger to control the foreign policy making process in the Nixon White House, giving him great power.
Kissinger himself admits that the most important thing was proximity to the president.530
An institutional benefit that Kissinger had was that his office was a large corner office in the
West Wing, close to the Oval Office.531 Other than Reagan’s advisers, this is the office that national security advisers have worked in ever since.
Even when Kissinger became Nixon’s secretary of state in September of 1973, in the wake of Watergate, he retained his power and gained more because he remained his role as national security adviser and kept the corner West Wing office.532 This allowed him to have both the state department and NSC staff resources at his disposal and coordinate processes between
528 Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Pg. 11. 529 Best, Richard. "The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment." Pg. 13. 530 Rothkopf, David J. Running the World. Pg. 91. 531 Ibid. 532 Ibid. 107
the two.533 This was a managerial decision by Nixon, partly due to the Watergate scandal, that
increased Kissinger’s power.
These institutional positions trumped the poor personal relationship between Nixon and
Kissinger. It also negated the notion that the growth of the presidency accounted for Kissinger’s
power, as he was one of the first to occupy this position and yet was more powerful than his
successors who came decades later with more resources and institutional capacity.
Conclusion: Explanatory strengths and limits of this model
The managerial style of the president is the strongest of the three frameworks in its ability
to explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. Presidents are
given a tremendous amount of autonomy when structuring their administration at the outset of
their first term in office. They decide whether or not to concentrate power in the White House or
create a cabinet-style government. Presidents can choose to have powerful national security
advisers or can place responsibility for foreign policy making on their secretary of state. Such
decisions are more important in determining the degree of power that the president’s adviser for
national security affairs will have than either the personal relationship he has with her or the
institutional growth of the presidency and NSC staff.
533 Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. Print. Pg. 37. 108
-Chapter 6-
CONCLUSION
Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac.534 -Henry Kissinger
The job exists because presidents want it to exist. And the person occupying it has power and influence over policy because the president wants him or her to have that power and influence.535 -Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler, 2009
The national security adviser is a recent invention in our nation’s history. Since the early
1960’s, the role of the adviser has evolved from a mid-level managerial position to becoming one of the more prominent and prestigious members of the president’s administration Given that it escapes Congressional approval and oversight but yields tremendous influence, it is important to understand why some advisers are more powerful than others. This thesis has sought to understand this variation in power from the perspective of three different explanatory models found in the literature: institutional growth, personal relationship and managerial style.
534 Nelson, Bryce. "How Does Power Affect The Powerful?" The New York Times. The New York Times, 08 Nov. 1982. Web. 11 May 2015.
The three models: strengths and weaknesses
Scholars such as Dr. Amy Zegart have noted that the institutional role of the national security adviser has increased over time.536 Destler and Daadler highlight fluctuations in power from administration to administration. Looking in depth at each adviser’s power, it is apparent that not all national security advisers since Bundy have had the same power. This thesis has shown that the empirical findings are not as clear-cut as either Zegart or Destler and Daadler suggest. It has used three models from the literature that could explain the power of the national security adviser, applied them to specific cases of advisers, and determined how well they explain the differences in power.
Institutional growth model
The institutional growth model is the weakest of the three explanatory frameworks in shedding light on why some national security advisers have more power than others. It might help explain why some of the later advisers had more power than earlier ones, given that both the presidency and national security apparatus grown over time. Overall, the role of the national security adviser has enjoyed greater prestige and prominence, which is related somewhat to the institutional growth of the presidency and the heightened emphasis on national security in the
U.S. since the end of World War II. However, it does not account for those instances when the national security adviser becomes more powerful than others (cabinet secretaries) in the presidential administration. Conversely, it fails to adequately explain how the power of the national security adviser has not continued to keep pace with the increased power of the
536 Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design. Pg. 85. 110 presidency. Rather, the role has returned at times to a much weaker one, resembling to how it functioned in the Eisenhower White House. For example, General Jim Jones might have had hundreds of staff working underneath him and been given more resources at his disposal than
McGeorge Bundy or Henry Kissinger, but he was much less powerful than both. This model predicts an incremental growth of power for both the presidency and NSC. However, in reality, the power of the national security advisor has varied from administration to administration.
Therefore, this model fails to adequately explain why some national security advisers are more powerful than others.
Personal relationship model
The personal relationship between the president and his national security adviser is important, but not predictive nor necessary to produce a powerful national security adviser. Trust is important in politics and can be solidified by personal relationships. As in the cases of a)
Bundy with Kennedy and then with Johnson, b) Clark with Reagan, c) Scowcroft with Bush, and d) Susan Rice with Obama, a previous personal relationship instilled trust and led to an increase in the presidents’ reliance on their advisers. The personal relationship in all of these cases appears to be the most salient variable that led to a more powerful national security adviser, thus showing the strength of the model. However, cases such as Nixon with Kissinger or Condoleezza
Rice with Bush demonstrate that a personal relationship is not predictive of a powerful national security adviser. Other variables play an arguably more important role in determining how powerful a national security adviser will be.
111
Managerial style of the president model
The most important factor in determining the power of the national security adviser is the managerial style of the president. The president has the privilege of deciding how to structure his administration and in so doing will determine the role of the national security adviser. Presidents have decided to increase (Nixon with Kissinger) or decrease (Reagan with Allen) the power of the national security adviser based on how they have wanted to run their administration. In both the extreme cases of Nixon (Kissinger as the most powerful adviser) and Reagan (Allen as weakest adviser), it was the decision of the president and his managerial style that accounted for the drastic change; personal relationships did not play a role. Presidents can include or exclude a national security adviser by constructing who is included and excluded from their inner circle of decision making. In addition, the president has the ability to make the adviser more powerful by appointing her chair of interagency meetings and by sending her on covert or diplomatic missions. These factors can increase an adviser’s power, and they depend on the managerial style of the president.
Interestingly, two models of presidential management have emerged in the last fifty years: concentrating power in the White House and cabinet-style government. Both of these models have a significant effect in determining how much power an adviser can have. For example, advisers can benefit from a president who both trusts them and concentrates power in the White House. Arguably each of the three most powerful advisers, Bundy (under Kennedy),
Kissinger, and Brzezinski, all enjoyed his president’s trust and benefitted from the centralization of power in the Oval Office. Their power was further enhanced with the geographic proximity of their offices and direct access to their presidents. Alternately, the cabinet-style government can
112 deemphasize the value of personal relationship between president and national security adviser.
If the president delegates power to his cabinet secretaries, as in the case of George W. Bush, a good personal relationship might not result in a powerful national security adviser (Rice).
Comparing the frameworks
The managerial style framework best explains why some national security advisers are more powerful than others. The president has great autonomy in setting up the powers structure of his administration. Thus, he can decide how much power the national security adviser has and how much he relies on and trusts her.
The institutional growth model has merit, but there are too many examples of weak national security advisers in powerful and large NSC’s (Jones) that suggest the linear growth of the presidency and the NSC cannot be the most salient determinant for the power of the national security adviser.
While the personal relationship between the president and the national security adviser are extremely important in the amount of power the adviser has, it has significant limitations in its ability to explain some key partnerships. There have been examples of poor relationships and strong advisers (Nixon and Kissinger) as well as good relationships and weak advisers (Bush and
Rice).
The managerial style model can explain the cases that the other two frameworks cannot.
For example, Nixon’s managerial style led to concentrating power and foreign policy making in the White House and to making Kissinger the point person. This provided Kissinger with considerable power and influence. Similarly, Obama’s decision to rely on the “Chicago Boys” to
113 serve as his de facto national security advisers instead of General Jones represented a preference in managerial style. W. Bush’s managerial decision to appoint powerful Cabinet members such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld accounts for Condoleezza Rice’s less influential role in the making of foreign policy compared to some of her predecessors. At this point, the managerial style, rather than the growth of the presidency or the personal relationship between president and adviser, appears as the more helpful framework in understanding why some national security advisers are more powerful than others.
Limitations
One major limitation of this study is the small sample size of national security advisers.
The position is relatively new, and there simply are not many national security advisers to study.
Also, this thesis could not consider all eighteen advisers given the level of detailed qualitative nature of the analysis. The thesis was limited to a few case studies and omitted many others.
This study could not rely on a pre-existing, research-based rating of the power of each national security adviser. An agreed-upon rating method does not exist in the literature. While this thesis identified seven factors and attempted to combine them to estimate an adviser’s power, there are clear limitations to this method: there are many additional factors to consider, not all evidence is declassified or available, and evaluation and combination of the factors may vary based on what one finds salient. However, the purpose of the thesis was not to determine the degree of power of individual advisers. Rather it was to determine why some are more powerful than others.
114
Recommendation for future research
Future research should take up this last point of determining the degree of power. It would be a contribution to the literature to devise a metric for defining the amount of power a national security adviser possesses, identifying each of the key factors and weighting variables according to their influence on power. For example, the opportunity for a national security adviser to daily brief the president seems like a key factor in how powerful they are. However, at this point in time given the rapid changes in global events, daily briefings have become necessary for most advisers and presidents. Thus it may no longer account for the degree of power one holds compared to other variables (consistent impact on decisions throughout one’s tenure, authorizing covert actions). Conducting such a rigorous study would indeed be resource- intensive and require a variety of analytic methods such as cataloging every diplomatic or covert mission made by an adviser, dissecting each policy decision, and asking advisers, other principals, and scholars to rank the power of each adviser. However, the study is doable and would be a meaningful contribution to the literature.
Implications
The managerial style of the president matters. It will determine how much power the national security adviser will have in the policy and decision making process. When structuring their administration, presidents should consciously reflect on and articulate their preferred managerial style. This will help them decide how they want to concentrate power in the White
House or develop a cabinet-style government. It will also guide them to decide the role of the national security adviser and the NSC. This overt process will then help cabinet secretaries, staff
115 and those people tapped for the national security adviser position the opportunity to gauge how much power that role will have. While personal relationships are important for trust and a healthy policy making processes, it is recommended that the president choose a national security adviser who she knows and can work well with in the managerial style he prefers. The American people elect the president and have no input into the selection, role or power of the national security adviser. Their Congressional delegates do not approve the adviser, have no oversight of their activities, and cannot force them to testify. History has shown that when a president’s managerial style is “hand-off”, disastrous consequences can result from national security advisers who have considerable power and little oversight (Reagan and Iran-Contra).
Conversely, a managerial style that yields too powerful a national security adviser might cause tension within an administration and create gridlock (Brzezinski and Vance). Also, concentration of power by Nixon and Kissinger, even when there is no feud, could be problematic. Americans may not be aware of how much power Kissinger wielded, particularly in the days following
Watergate. Awareness of the president’s managerial style and its effect on the national security adviser’s power can perhaps help prevent undesired consequences and promote a more balanced and effective policy decision making process.
116
Appendix A: Institutional Growth of the NSC Staff in Relation to Power
Adviser President Years Served NSC STAFF Bundy Kennedy 1961-1963 121 Bundy Johnson 1963-1966 15-202 Rostow Johnson 1966-1969 35-403 Kissinger Nixon/Ford 1969-1975 554 Scowcroft Ford 1975-1977 405 Brzezinski Carter 1977-1980 40-516 Allen Reagan 1981-1982 407 Clark Reagan 1982-1983 508 McFarlane Reagan 1983-1985 609 Poindexter Reagan 1985-1986 5010 Carlucci Reagan 1986-1987 6011 Powell Reagan 1987-1989 5012 Scowcroft Bush 41 1989-1993 5013 Lake Clinton 1993-1997 50-6014 Berger Clinton 1997-2001 22515 C. Rice Bush 43 2001-2005 155`16 Hadley Bush 43 2005-2009 20017 Jones Obama 2009-2010 37018 Donilon Obama 2010-2013 37019 S. Rice Obama 2013-Present 37020
1Destler, I. M., and Ivo H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration." The Brookings Institution. N.p., 15 Nov. 2000. Web. 15 May 2015.
7 Destler, I. M., and Ivo H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration." 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Patterson, Bradley H. The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and beyond. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000. Print. Pg. 72. 17 Hart, Michael. From Pride to Influence: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy. Vancouver: UBC, 2008. Print. Pg. 243. 18 Rothfopf, David. "National Insecurity." Foreign Policy. N.p., 9 Sept. 2014. Web. 15 May 2015.
118
Appendix B: Power Rating of the National Security Adviser
Adviser President Tenure Years Daily Covert Diplomatic Committee Site of Influence Sum Power Served Briefing Actions Missions Chair Office on Rating Policies i ii iii iv v Bundy Kennedy 1961- 1 3 3 0 4 2* 3 16 4 63 vi vii viii ix Bundy Johnson 1963- 1 3 3 2 0 1 1 12 3 66 x xi xii Rostow Johnson 1966- 1 3 0 0 3 1 1 9 2 69 Kissinger Nixon/ 1969- 3 3xiii 4xiv 2xv 4xvi 2 3xvii 21 5 Ford 75 xviii xix xx Scowcroft Ford 1975- 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 7 2 77 Brzezinski Carter 1977- 1 3xxi 3xxii 2xxiii 4xxiv 2 3xxv 18 4 80 Allen Reagan 1981- 0 0xxvi 0 0 0xxvii 0**xxviii 0xxix 0 1 82 Clark Reagan 1982- 0 3xxx 0 0 0xxxi 1 0xxxii 4 1 83 xxxiii xxxiv xxxv xxxvi McFarlane Reagan 1983- 1 3 3 0 0 1 3 11 3 85 xxxvii xxxviii xxxix xl Poindexter Reagan 1985- 0 3 3 0 0 1 3 10 3 86 xli xlii xliii xliv Carlucci Reagan 1986- 0 3 0 0 3 2 1 9 2 87 xlv xlvi xlvii Powell Reagan 1987- 1 3 0 0 3 2 1 10 3 89 xlviii xlix l li Scowcroft Bush 41 1989- 2 3 0 2 4 2 3 16 4 93 lii liii liv lv Lake Clinton 1993- 2 3 0 0 3 2 1 11 3 97 lvi lvii lviii lix Berger Clinton 1997- 2 3 0 2 3 2 3 15 4 01 lx lxi lxii lxiii C. Rice Bush 43 2001- 2 3 N/A 2 3 2 0 10 3 05 Hadley Bush 43 2005- 2 3lxiv N/A 0 3lxv 2 3lxvi 13 3 09 Jones Obama 2009- 0 3lxvii N/A 2lxviii 2lxix 2 0lxx 9 2 10 Donilon Obama 2010- 1 3lxxi N/A N/A 3lxxii 2 3lxxiii 12 3 13 S. Rice Obama 2013- 1 3lxxiv N/A N/A 3lxxv 2lxxvi 3lxxvii 12 3 15
1 Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Web.
119
11 Miller, James Edward. The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2009. Print. Pg. 128. 12 "A Forum on The Role of The National Security Advisor." (n.d.): n. pag. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the James A. Baker III Institute For Public Policy of Rice University, 12 Apr. 2001. Web.
120
38 Best, Richard. National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 19 39 John, Anthony Wanis-St. "The National Security Council: Tool of Presidential Crisis Management." 40 Best, Richard. National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 19 41 Brown, Warren, and Lehr, Heather. Wagner. Colin Powell: Soldier and Statesman. Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2005. Pg. 62. 42 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 19. 43 Ryan, April, and Cummings, Elijah. The Presidency in Black and White: My Up-close View of Three Presidents and Race in America. 2015. Pg. 33. 44 Mitchell, David. Making Foreign Policy. Pg. 106. 45 Brown, Warren, and Heather Lehr. Wagner. Colin Powell: Soldier and Statesman. Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2005. Pg. 62. 46 Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Pg. 19. 47 Kessler, Glenn. "Colin Powell versus Dick Cheney." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 03 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 May 2015.
121
72 “Thomas Donilon on National Security Issues.” C-SPAN.org. 16 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 May 2015.
The power rating for national security advisors was determined by assigning each factor a numeric value, as follows:
1) Number of years of service as national security advisor in a given administration 0-1 years=0 2-3 years=1 4-5 years=2 6-7 years =3
2) Daily briefing by national security adviser directly to the president
No=0 Yes=3
3) Served as the chair of committee(s) No=0 Inter-agency committee(s) =3 Inter-agency and created or chaired new committee (s) =4
4) Site of national security adviser’s office
West Wing White House Basement=1 West Wing White House=2 • *If an adviser’s office was moved to a more geographically proximate location to the president than their predecessor’s office, then 1 extra point was added. (This occurred once: Bundy’s tenure as JFK’s adviser) • **If an adviser’s office was moved to a less geographically proximate location to the president than their predecessor’s office, then 1 point was deducted. (This occurred once: in Allen’s tenure as Reagan’s adviser) 5) Involved in covert actions N/A=not available due to classification 122
No=0 Yes=3
6) Involved in diplomatic missions N/A=information not yet disclosed No=0 Yes=2
7) Influence on policies Minimal=1 Moderate=3 Substantial=5
The numeric values for each factor were then summed to provide an overall score. The total scores were then converted into the following power ratings:
Sum of Factors Power Rating 0-4 1 5-9 2 10-14 3 15-20 4 21-24 5
123
Appendix C: Personal Relations Between POTUS and His Adviser in Relation to Power
Adviser President Years Served Personal Power Relationship Rating
Bundy Kennedy 1961-1963 Strong 4 Bundy Johnson 1963-1966 Weak 3
2 Rostow Johnson 1966-1969 Neutral Kissinger Nixon/Ford 1969-1975 Weak 5 Scowcroft Ford 1975-1977 Neutral 2 Brzezinski Carter 1977-1980 Good 4 Allen Reagan 1981-1982 Neutral 1 Clark Reagan 1982-1983 Strong 1
McFarlane Reagan 1983-1985 Neutral 3 Poindexter Reagan 1985-1986 Neutral 3 Carlucci Reagan 1986-1987 Neutral 2 Powell Reagan 1987-1989 Neutral 3 Scowcroft Bush 41 1989-1993 Strong 4 Lake Clinton 1993-1997 Weak 3 Berger Clinton 1997-2001 Strong 4 C. Rice Bush 43 2001-2005 Strong 3 Hadley Bush 43 2005-2009 Neutral 3 Jones Obama 2009-2010 Weak 2 Donilon Obama 2010-2013 Good 3 S. Rice Obama 2013-Present Good 3
124
Appendix D: Managerial Style of President in Relation to Power
Adviser President Years Served Managerial Style Power Rating Bundy Kennedy 1961-1963 WH 4 Bundy Johnson 1963-1966 WH 3 2 Rostow Johnson 1966-1969 WH Kissinger Nixon/Ford 1969-1975 WH 5 Scowcroft Ford 1975-1977 Cabinet 2 Brzezinski Carter 1977-1980 WH 4 Allen Reagan 1981-1982 Cabinet 1 Clark Reagan 1982-1983 Cabinet 1 McFarlane Reagan 1983-1985 Cabinet 3 Poindexter Reagan 1985-1986 Cabinet 3 Carlucci Reagan 1986-1987 Cabinet 2 Powell Reagan 1987-1989 Cabinet 3 Scowcroft Bush 41 1989-1993 Cabinet 4 Lake Clinton 1993-1997 WH 3 Berger Clinton 1997-2001 WH 4 C. Rice Bush 43 2001-2005 Cabinet 3 Hadley Bush 43 2005-2009 Cabinet 3 Jones Obama 2009-2010 WH 2 Donilon Obama 2010-2013 WH 3 S. Rice Obama 2013-Present WH 3
125
Appendix E: Email Exchange: Former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice with the author, May 15, 2013
In response to the following two questions: 1. "Why do you think some NSAs are more powerful than others." 2. "How did your personal relationship/friendship with President Bush affect how much power you had as NSA?"
------
Happy to help:
The NSA is the President's most senior staff person on matters of foreign affairs. The "power" in the position really comes from proximity to the President and the nature of the person's relationship with him. NSA's can affect policy outcomes in a number of ways -- but most effectively by representing the President's views to the national security principals (SEC STATE, SEC DEFENSE, etc.) and fairly representing their views to the President. The NSA is usually not representing his or her own views but should try to as you put it, make sure that the President's preferences are carried out. Also, the NSA must make sure that the President hears all views and has good options.
Brent Scowcroft was a very low-key NSA but is universally regarded as the most successful because he did not interject himself, allowed the Secretaries to do their work and fairly represented the President.
That is how I would think about this. It also helps if the NSA has good relations with the Secretaries -- particularly State and Defense. The National Security Council is a team.
Hope this helps.
126
Appendix F: Email to Author Regarding Exchange Between Former United States National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Washington Post Journalist, Walter Pincus, May 19, 2015
Redactions have been made to this email to protect personal information that was disclosed and irrelevant to this thesis. Dr. Brzezinksi’s quote is responding to the question, “Why do you think some national security advisers are more powerful than others?" He was unable to answer the other questions sent to him.
George,
I am sorry to report that Dr. Brzezinski kjs sdsd sdskj sd jk will not be able to give you the information you would like. I assume you have looked at his more recent book and latest writings.
One great source should be the various appearances he has made with Brent Scowcroft, the latest was before the Senate Armed Services Committee early this year.
Here is part of his response to my forwarding your questions to him:
“Walter dfhgfdgfhdhgfdhgfdhgfdhgfdhgfdhgfdhgfdhgfdhgfdhfdhgfhdhdf
Your student should really ask Condi — it varies so much depending on personalities, self confidence, knowledge, etc.”
Not much, but that's it.
Good luck on the thesis and stay in touch.
127
Appendix G: Interview Transcript: United States Ambassador to the Russian Federation Michael McFaul with the author, May 20, 2015
Saba (S): If you feel like you say something that you didn’t want on the record…
McFaul (M): No we are on the record. I am very cognizant about that.
S: Thanks. My first question would be, given that you worked on the Obama Campaign, what were the arguments for why Jones was selected as national security adviser?
McFaul (M): My impression was that he was selected to help the president manage his relationship with the pentagon, with the armed forces at a time when we were fighting two wars and that the president-elect had very firm views about especially one of them, the Iraq war, about where he wanted to go with that war and therefore the idea of having a 4-star general percolated as a way to help him with that very specific set of foreign policy challenges. It’s important to realize that Jones was not part of the campaign, he was not part of the foreign policy team during the campaign, to the best of my knowledge I should add, because maybe he was an informal adviser? But he most certainly wasn’t in the chain of command that I saw. And therefore, the way I was interpreted to me was that he was hired for that very specific purpose.
S: I think that’s right. I even heard that he advised the McCain Campaign
M: That’s what people say. I don’t know that for a fact, but it wouldn’t surprise me.
S: So do you think that the fact he wasn't on the Obama team or wasn’t one of Obama's guys, or didn’t even have the same world view as the president, that contributed to him not being as successful of a national security adviser? If you could you also maybe say whether or not you thought he was powerful or successful.
M: Well, with respect to success, that's a harder question, right? Depends on what you are trying to measure. What's the evidence that would support success or not? For instance, now that I think about it, for the set of policies I was involved in, with respect to Russia, Jones played a very important role in that policy domain. He established a pretty good working relationship with his counterpart in Moscow, and was ready to get on the plane and fly to Moscow as we did more than once, to engage on, then it was the START Treaty, was central, but other issues. In that domain, I would say that he played a very important role in terms of very concrete foreign policy outcomes that were the president’s agenda, that's key. It wasn't his personal agenda. I don't know actually what he had said about the START treaty before he joined the government But he early on, figured out that the president wanted this to get done and more generally that the idea the reset he embraced because he knew that his boss embraced it. And I found him to be really useful in terms of getting that done. For me, you know, working on that set of issues. I don't think that's the case across a lot of other policy domains. I've read other accounts already. To explain that, I don't want to pretend I know, like was he useful in terms of what the president wanted to do on the Iraq War? I'm not an expert on that, I wasn't in those meetings. Same with 128 the surge, I mean I’ve heard people talk about it, but I don’t have any first-hand knowledge, I’m sure you know more than I do by now on that stuff. I would say on your other variables the things you’re trying to get at, it most certainly was the case that he felt like an outsider because he was an outsider, you know? It wasn’t like any set of…there’s a reason why he had that perception because it was true. He was staffed by people that came from the Obama campaign, or from the president, but I’d have to go through the list, but they weren’t his people, they weren’t his, especially at the deputy national security level, that’s the crucial place, if you think about Donilon, McDonough, [Ben] Rhodes, and John Brennan, none of those people were Jones’ people, right? General Jones interviewed me and hired me, but I was recommended to him by the campaign and I think that was in terms of running the NSC, that proved to be, just created problems for him. And then the other thing I would say is that he didn’t develop the rapport with the president. I think those accounts that have been written in the same way that historically other national security advisers have, I don’t really know why to be honest, some say it was a generational thing, he was much older than the president and was much older than most of his staff. A second theory that I occasionally witnessed is that he was a General, a four-star General. He’s used to being the principal, not the staffer. You are not a staffer when you’ve been a general. And other people around the president of course thought of themselves as staffing the president, and I’m exaggerating a bit, obviously, General Jones knew who the boss was, and there was never any question about that. He would never do anything out of the chain of command but just his style of work he reminded me of another principal as opposed to the staffer to the president. On Russia issues, he helped to execute policy in interaction with his counterpart. That’s usually what the secretary of state does. That’s what the secretary of defense does, treasury, commerce. That’s what they do. It’s not typically what the national security adviser does. There are variations, you know the variation better than anybody by now, but if I think about afterwards, the two other national security advisers of the president has I don’t see them trying to play that role because they think of their job in a different way.
S: So you said he played a more influential role in Russia, or at least…[pause in interview] Do you think he was involved in Obama’s “inner circle”? At least from your experience in Russia policy? When the final discussion was made, when Obama is with his most trusted guys, was Jones part of that?
M: My impression was there were often times meetings on big foreign policy issues that he was not present at. Among an informal group of advisers of the White House. That doesn’t mean that he wasn’t…he obviously was in all the formal meetings, he was in every NSC meeting, and most certainly ran the principals committee meeting, but I remember hearing about different sessions happening in the Oval Office, or sometimes down in the situation room, a couple of times I was even pissed off I wasn’t there and so that I think was true. My impression from talking to General Jones from time to time about it, is that sometimes it was frustrating to him.
S: A lot of people on the campaign thought it would be Jim Steinberg who would be chosen, who was on the campaign. Why do you think they went with Jones, was there any other reason beyond the fact that he had this military experience?
129
M: Steinberg joined the campaign rather late too, empirically, just so you know, he was not in the beginning. I think as I remember the transition and I was here, I was not in Washington, but that the chitchat was that it was either going to be Jim Steinberg or Susan Rice, not General Jones. So that came as a pretty out-of-the-blue decision. And I think there was a sense, this is all second hand, the only person who really knows is the president of the United States, and I’ve never had this conversation with him, so I don’t actually know the answer, and that’s really important qualification. My sense in terms of the chitchat, again second hand, was that he wanted a military person in that job and Steinberg and Susan Rice at the time I believe were both working at the Brookings institution and that’s not the personality and the resume that he, allegedly, I want to really emphasize that because this is all second hand, that he allegedly wanted for that job given the challenges of those two words. I personally think both Steinberg and Rice would have done the those jobs confidently, there was no doubt, both very talented people, they are not people with military backgrounds and so my sense is that it was just that simple.
S: Were you in the NSC during Donilon at all?
M: Yes
S: How would you say he was different as a national security adviser compared to Jones and what was his relationship like? Was he in the inner circle and in these private meetings?
M: With Obama?
S: With Obama
M: Tom had had the deputy job for a long time, for the entire time, before he was promoted. He was a masterful briefer, I’ve seen many briefings by Tom and he was really good at it with the president in a way that I think he was better at it than General Jones. I think he understood what the president needed in those briefings better than General Jones did. Maybe because he observed for a while and then when he took the job he was better prepared? That could be a simple explanation. Not that Jones failed at it because he didn’t, he just had less experience. He also ran, as deputy, and then again as the national security adviser, he ran a very plodding, methodical, but I think therefore comprehensive DC and PCs. He was very good at it in his lawyerly way, drilling down on different arguments, so I think that made him effective that way. I know it drove some people nuts, and he was a very demanding boss, in terms of the paper that he needed to be prepared for these meetings, he put in extraordinary time, preparing for meetings, way more time than General Hones did, demanding way more prep time with the staff including me, for those meetings but therefore was very prepared and knew his brief on everything, not just Russia I would say in general. So I would say he was a more effective adviser to the president, and that’s another thing, Tom always knew that his job, he was a staffer. Its an important word. He was staff. He never thought of himself as a principle. And he thought that his most important job was to staff the president of the United States on national security matters. Tom didn’t like to travel, because of that. He didn’t want to be out of the building
130 because he knew that his job was to staff the principal, not be a shadow secretary of state. And third, he is just a smart guy. He is an incredibly smart guy. Conceptual thinker, analytic, and I think in that respect his style of thinking through problems, he is a lawyer, Obama is a lawyer, maybe its from that, I don’t know. I think his style was one that just meshed better with Obama in that just stylistically.
S: In terms of a friendship or a past relationship?
M: No, that part I don’t now, but I don’t think it was about friendship I think it was really about being analytic and that has to do with who the principal is. I can think of other presidents I’ve met, privately, not working for, but as a private citizen who General Jones’ style probably would have meshed better with, just for instance. I don’t see it as good or bad. It appeared to me that in terms over the whole broad basket of issues that then national security adviser has to deal with, I think Tom was a better fit with what the president wanted. But I do think this is a point that I don’t think is well understood that most certainly things I’ve read that on certain issues, Jones had value. And for me, on the Russia account, tremendous value. That particular that willingness to play the role of interlocutor with the Russians, he was good a that. The Russians liked him. They liked the General. They liked the four star. They like the guy that can come and say ‘you were the enemy for forty years but now I want to work with you.’ That whole six-foot-four, broad shoulders, that worked well in dealing with the Russians.
S: I haven’t read that anywhere. This is great and I’ll probably emphasize this, just because in the literature it’s been overlooked and he hasn’t been given fair credit it seems like.
M: Well for that piece he deserves credit. I don’t want to speak about others. You’ll do that yourself.
S: One last question.
M: Ok
S: Do you think president Obama tried to concentrate power in the White House? Instead of letting his secretaries of state, defense take on more issues?
M: Yes. I think whether it was good or bad, I’ll leave to others, the statement that the NSC in the Obama Administration, especially in the beginning, I’ve been out of it now so I don’t know how it looks today, I think especially on keeping tight the reins of decision making, and then also getting involved in execution of policy, not in a direct way, but managing that, yea, I know people would talk about it in Washington, old hands that have been though many administrations and compare it to the Nixon days where everybody knew that that’s where foreign policy was being made and the president himself was a big decision maker in the Obama administration and was also often times pretty operational on stuff, he negotiated the new START Treaty, when I was there, we had our advisers and we had our official negotiators, but all the big heavy lifts, he did. That was something unique I think.
131
S: Do you think he was good at it?
M: Yea he was good at it and liked it. He was interested. He’s had an interest in arms control from his college days actually.
S: He wrote a paper on it his senior year.
M: His senior thesis, just like you are doing right now. I’ve never read it, I don’t know if it’s a public document.
S: I haven’t read it either.
M: I think they put it under lock.
S: Just like all of his other college records.
M: Is that right?
S: Yea, I don’t think he will release his grades.
M: I didn’t know that. That’s curious to me. That’s interesting.
S: Yes. Well I appreciate you taking the time, I know you are busy.
M: Ok, alright, send me a copy when you get one.
S: I will. Thank you so much.
132
Appendix H: McGeorge Bundy’s Archives at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas
133
Appendix I: Bundy Memo to LBJ, “Review of Foreign Aid Program” Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 18 September 1965, 4:30PM. Found in Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, 12C
134
Appendix J: “Agenda for Luncheon” One of Johnson’s “Tuesday lunch” meeting agendas, covered with what appear to be Bundy’s doodles. Primary topic is Vietnam. 30 March 1965. Found in Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, 47.
135
Appendix K: Email Exchange: Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, May 21, 2015
In response to the following email question sent by the author:
I conducted an interview for my thesis on the national security adviser with Ambassador McFaul yesterday and contrary to the literature, he thought General Jim Jones played a very influential role in forming US-Russia policy, noting that the General went on diplomatic missions and met with his counterpart in Moscow often.
Ambassador McFaul admits that this was maybe not the case across all policy issues. Would I be able to ask you, for my thesis, what role General Jones played with regards to US-Afghanistan policy? Was he a "powerful" and influential national security adviser in this policy domain?”
------
Hi Geo - the short answer is "yes" he did play an important role. He visited Afghanistan in the fall of 2009 as review of our strategy was taking place in order to get a better understanding of the situation firsthand. As well, he chaired the many PC meetings that occurred during the strategy review and was, of course, present when the President chaired many of the National Security Council.
Best,
Karl
136
Appendix L: Email Exchange: General Jim Jones, Former Commander of United States Central Command with the author, May 21, 2015
In response to an email asking him what role he saw General Jones play in US foreign policy and whether or not he saw Jones as influential and powerful?
Geo—Thanks for getting in touch. This is the sort of research that digs into the reality of policy formulation and the efficiency of our gov’t in executing policy.
While I admire your initiative, your choice of topic and approaching me, I’m unable to be a good source on your study. I maintain confidentiality on the discussions with my seniors and I would not be able to stay true to my decision to keep silent on the individuals who are still responsible for running our country, so I could not be candid.
Notwithstanding my reluctance to be open on this issue, I wish you every success. Best, Jim
137
Bibliography
Unpublished Primary Sources
Archived Collections and Material
Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.
Bundy, McGeorge. Agenda for Luncheon. Found in Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library,
National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, 47. 30 March 1965.
Bundy, McGeorge. Memorandum to Lyndon B. Johnson. “Review of the Foreign Aid
Program”. 18 September 1965, 4:30PM.
Interviews
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. United States National Security Adviser (1977-1981). Email interview with Walter Pincus on behalf of author. 20 May 2015
Eikenberry, Karl. United States Ambassador to Afghanistan (2009-2011). Commander of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan (2005-2007). Email interview with author. 21 May 2015
Mattis, Jim. Commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) (2010-2013). Email interview with author. 21 May 2015
McFaul, Michael. United States Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014), Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Russia and Eurasia Affairs (2009-2012). Personal interview with author. 20 May 2015
Rice, Condoleezza. United States Secretary of State (2005-2009), United States National Security Adviser (2001-2005), and Senior Director for Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council (1990-1991). Email Interview with author. 15 May 2015.
Published Sources
Alfonsi, Christian. Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq. New York: Doubleday, 2006.
"American President: A Reference Resource." The Miller Center. University of Virginia, n.d. 138
Web. 20 Mar. 2015.
Anderson, Patrick. The President’s Men: White House Assistants of Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson.
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968.
Benze, James G. Presidential Power and Management Techniques. New York: Greenwood
Press, 1987.
Best, Richard A. The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment. Huntington,
NY: Diane, 2010. Web.
+Council:+An+Organizational+Assessment&hl=en&sa=X&ei=se3HVMfEI4nZoATv8I GoDw&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=National%20Security%20Council%3A% 20An%20Organizational%20Assessment&f=false>. Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Print. Bock, Joseph G. The White House Staff and the National Security Assistant: Friendship and Friction at the Water's Edge. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Brands, H. W. The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. Google Books. Brown, Warren, and Lehr, Heather. Wagner. Colin Powell: Soldier and Statesman. Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 2005. Pg. 62. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “The NSC’s Midlife Crisis.” Foreign Policy No. 69. 1987. JSTOR. Web. 139 Bumiller, Elisabeth. Condoleezza Rice: An American Life: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2007. Bundy, McGeorge. "McGeorge Bundy Oral History, Special Interview 1." Interview by Robert Dallek. LBJ Library, 30 Mar. 1993. Web. %20Dallek%201%20web.pdf>. Burke, John P. The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House from FDR to Clinton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Burke, John P. “The Neutral/Honest Broker Role in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Reassessment.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 2 (2005a). Burke, John P. “The Contemporary Presidency: Condoleezza Rice as NSC Advisor: A Case Study of the Honest Broker Role.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 3 (2005b). Burke, John P. Honest Broker? The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2009a. Burke, John P. The Obama National Security System and Process: At the Sixth Month Mark. White House Transition Project Reports. August, 2009b. Online edition. 01 Dec. 2014. http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/resources/briefing/SixMonth/Burke-6months- review=aug.pdf. Bush, H.W. George, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,” Washington, D.C., August 2, 1990, available at bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2123&year=1990&month=8. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Knopf, 1998. Print. 140 Bush, George W. Decision Points. New York: Crown, 2010. Print. Butler, Shannon Rae. Into the Storm: American Covert Involvement in the Angolan Civil War, 1974-1975. N. 2008. Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Print. Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. Toronto: Bantam, 1982. Print. Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. Print. Connor, Robert E. and Sam Charles Sarkesian. The US Military Profession Into the Twenty-first Century: War Peace and Politics. London: Routledge, 1991. Crabb, Cecil V. and Kevin V. Mulcahy. American National Security: A Presidential Perspective. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1991. Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler. Introduction. The Role of the National Security Advisor, Oral History Roundtable, the NSC Project. Brookings Institution. Web. 25 Oct. 1999. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/nsc/19991025.PDF?la=en. Daalder, Ivo and I. M. Destler. In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisors and the Presidents They Served—From JFK to George W. Bush. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. Print. Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2007. Print. Dallek, Robert. Camelot's Court: Inside the Kennedy White House. New York: HarperCollins, 2013. Print. Destler, I. M. “National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty 141 Years.” World Politics 29 2 (1977). Destler, I. M. “National Security Management: What Presidents Have Wrought.” Political Science Quarterly 95 Winter (1980). Destler, I.M. "Donilon to the Rescue?" Foreign Affairs. 13 October 2010. Web. Destler, I.M. "How National Security Advisers See Their Role." The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. Ed. James M. McCormick. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Destler, I. M. "The Role of the National Security Advisor FPC Briefing." U.S. Department of State, 16 Mar. 2009. Web. 21 May 2015. Destler, I. M., and Ivo H. Daalder. "A New NSC for a New Administration." The Brookings Institution. N.p., 15 Nov. 2000. Web. 15 May 2015. Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents. New York: Times Books, 1995. Dowd, Maureen. "McFarlane Suicide Attempt: 'What Drove Me To Despair'" The New York Times. The New York Times, 01 Mar. 1987. Web. attempt-what-drove-me-to-despair.html>. Draper, Robert. Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush. New York: Free, 2007. Duff-Brown, Beth. "At Stanford, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter Unveils Cyber Strategy, Calls for Renewed Partnership with Silicon Valley." Stanford University, 24 Apr. 2015. 142 Web. 16 May 2015. 042415.html>. Dumbrell, John. Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2009. Print. Dumbrell, John, and David M. Barrett. The Making of US Foreign Policy. Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 1990. Dunn. Charles W., “The Presidency in the Twenty-first Century: Continuity and Change.” The Presidency in the Twenty-first Century. Ed. Charles W. Dunn. Lexington KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2011. Fausold, Martin L., and Alan Shank. The Constitution and the American Presidency. Albany: State U of New York, 1991. Franck, Thomas M. "The Constitutional and Legal Position of the National Security Advisor and Deputy Advisor." The American Journal of International Law 74.3 (1980): 635. JSTOR. Web. 06 Dec. 2014. Freie, John F. The Making of the Postmodern Presidency: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama. Boulder CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2011. Galvin, Daniel. Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Garthoff, Garthoff. Détente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan. Gates, Robert Michael. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 143 George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980. Print. George, Roger Z., and Harvey Rishikof. The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth. Washington, DC: Georgetown UP, 2011. Goduti, Philip A. Kennedy's Kitchen Cabinet and the Pursuit of Peace: The Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009. Greenberg, Gerald S. Historical Encyclopedia of U.S. Independent Counsel Investigations. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000. Greenstein, Fred I. “Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency.” The New American Political System. Ed. Anthony King. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978. Haig, Alexander. Caveat. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984. Print. Haney, Patrick J. Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisors, and the Management of Decision Making. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997. Hastedt, Glenn P. Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: An Encyclopedia of American Espionage. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011. "Henry A. (Heinz Alfred) Kissinger." Department History - Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. 17 May 2015. Hermann, Margaret, and Thomas Preston. “Presidents, Advisors, and Foreign Policy: The Effects of Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements.” Political Psychology 15 (1) (1994). Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: 144 Summit, 1983. Print. “History of the National Security Council 1947-1997.” Federation of American Scientists. Office of the Historian: Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. 1997. Web. 28 Jan. 2015. Hyland, William G. Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999. Pg. 20. Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson. Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. "Interview with Anthony Lake (2002)." The Miller Center. University of Virginia, Web. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Print. John, Anthony Wanis-St. "The National Security Council: Tool of Presidential Crisis Management." JPIA 98-6 1998. American University. Web. Johnson, Loch K., and Karl F. Inderfurth. "The Evolving Role of the National Security Adviser: From Executive Secretary to Activist Counselor. "White House Studies Compendium. Ed. Robert W. Watson. New York: Nova Science, 2008. \ Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997. Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Print. Klein, Edward. The Amateur: Barack Obama in the White House. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2012. Print. 145 Klobuchar, Lisa. The Iran-Contra Affair: Political Scandal Uncovered. Minneapolis: Compass Point, 2008. Web. Koenig, Louis W. “The Invisible Presidency: Growth of the White House Staff.” Power and the Presidency. Eds. Philip Dalce and George Skau. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1960. Komine, Yukinori. Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Pub., 2008. Print. Pg. 3. Kowert, Paul A. Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors? Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002. Print. Lake, Anthony. 6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000. Lowi, Theodore. The Personal President. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985. Print. Mann, Jim. The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power. New York: Viking, 2012. Marsh, Kevin. “The Contemporary Presidency the Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 15(4) December (2012). Menges, Constantine Christopher. Inside the National Security Council: The True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. 146 Miller Center. “Interview with Anthony Lake (2004).” University of Virginia. November 6, 2004. 16 May. 2015 Miller, James Edward. The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2009. Mitchell, David. Making Foreign Policy: Presidential Management of the Decision-making Process. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005. Moe, Terry. “The Politicized Presidency.” The New Direction in American Politics. Eds. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. Moe, Terry. “Presidents, Institutions and Theory.” Researching the Presidency. Eds. George Edwards III, John H. Hessel, and Bert Rockman. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. Moe, Terry, and William G. Howell. “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory. ”Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.4 (1999). Moe, Terry M., and Scott A. Wilson. "Presidents and the Politics of Structure." Law and Contemporary Problems, 1994. Mulcahy, Kevin V. “The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 16 Spring (1986). Mulcahy, Kevin V. “Walt Rostow as National Security Advisor, 1966-69.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25 2 (1995). Nathan, Richard. The Administrative Presidency. New York: John Wiley, 1983. Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political 147 System. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 363, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 2. Confidential. A January 13 memorandum from Pedersen to Rogers proposing revisions in NSDMs 2 and 3, together with typed drafts of the NSDMs with handwritten revisions, are ibid., RG 59, Pedersen Files: Lot 75 D 229, NSC. "National Security Council." The White House. The White House, n.d. Web. Nelson, Michael. Guide to the Presidency and the Executive Branch. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ, 2013. Print. Pg. 1184 Nelson, Michael. The Powers of the Presidency. Washington, DC: CQ, 2008. Print. Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press, 1960. Print. Obama, Barack H. "Remarks by the President in Personnel Announcement." White House Rose Garden. 5 June 2013. Speech. Olszowka, Adam. “Strengthening Multiple Advocacy in the National Security Council.” Thesis. Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1-50. 15 April 2011. Web. m.pdf?sequence=1>. 01 Dec. 2014. Osborne, John. White House Watch: The Ford Years. Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1977. Patterson, Bradley H. The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and beyond. Washington, 148 DC: Brookings Institution, 2000. Patterson, Bradley H. To Serve the President: Continuity and Innovation in the White House Staff. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008. Pfeffer, James. Power in Organizations. New York: Harper Collins, 1981. Pfiffner, James P. "Decision Making in the Obama White House." Presidential Studies Quarterly 41.2 (2011). Web. Pipes, Richard. Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-belonger. New Haven: Yale UP, 2003. Powell, Colin L., with Joseph E. Persico. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995. Prados, John. Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush. New York: Morrow, 1991. Preston, Andrew. The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006. "Provenance of The Ford National Security Adviser Files." The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Feb. 2002. Web. 22 May 2015. Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993. Raymond, Walter John. Dictionary of Politics: Selected American and Foreign Political and Legal Terms. Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Pub., 1992. Reagan, Ronald. "A Time For Choosing." Los Angeles. 27 Oct. 1964. Speech. Reagan, Ronald. An American Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. Print. 149 Rice, Condoleezza. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. New York: Crown, 2011. Print. Rice, Condoleezza. Personal email interview. 15 May 2015. Rodman, Peter. Presidential Command: Power, Leadership and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush. New York: Knopf, 2009. Rosati, Jerel A., and James M. Scott. The Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Andover: Cengage Learning, 2011. Rothkopf, David. J. Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Print. Ryan, April, and Elijah Cummings. The Presidency in Black and White: My Up-close View of Three Presidents and Race in America. 2015. Schmitz, David F. Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Shoemaker, Christopher. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Smith, Hedrick. The Power Game: How Washington Works. New York: Random House, 1988. Sparrow, Bartholomew H. The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security. 2015. Thayer, Frederick C. "Presidential Policy Processes and "New Administration": A Search for Revised Paradigms." Public Administration Review 31.5 (1971). Web. 3 Dec. 2014. Tower, John; Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. The Tower Commission Report: The Full 150 Text of the President's Special Review Board. New York: Random House, 1987. Print. Tyler, Patrick. "The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-Chinese Relations." Foreign Affairs. 01 Sept. 1999. Web. 10 May 2015. 01/abnormalization-us-chinese-relations>. "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - The Legal Aftermath." Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs - The Legal Aftermath. Web. 10 May 2015. poindexter.php>. U.S. President’s Committee on Administrative Management. Report of the President’s Committee. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1937. U.S. President’s Special Review Board, Report of the President’s Special Review Board (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987). Vance, Cyrus R. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. Print. Walsh, Lawrence E. "Chapter 1: United States v. Robert C. McFarlane." Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1993. Web. The Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C., and The Baker Institute at Rice University, A forum on the Role of the National Security Council (April 2, 2001), Washington, D.C. Woodward, Bob. Obama's Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Print. 151 Zegart, Amy B. Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. News and Media Sources "A Forum on The Role of The National Security Advisor." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the James A. Baker III Institute For Public Policy of Rice University, 12 Apr. 2001. Web. Apple, R. W. "A Domestic Sort With Global Worries." The New York Times. The New York Times, 24 Aug. 1999. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. Baker, Peter, and Helene Cooper. "Issues Pressing, Obama Fills Top Posts at a Sprint." The New York Times. The New York Times, 04 Dec. 2008. Web. 11 May 2015. Baker, Peter. "The Security Adviser Who Wants the Role, Not the Stage." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 29 Jan. 2006. Web. 22 May 2015. Ballasy, Nicholas. "Brzezinski, Scrowcroft: Obama Should Shrink 300-Plus National Security Staff." PJ Media, 9 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 May 2015. security-staff/>. "Benghazi Mission Attack Fast Facts - CNN.com." CNN Library. Cable News Network, 2 Dec. 2014. Web. 26 Jan. 2015. attack-fast-facts/>. 152 Brauer, Carl. "Lost In Transition." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, 01 Nov. 1988. Web. 10 May 2015. transition/307120/>. Burt, Richard. “Reagan Aides Tell of Plans to Strengthen Secretary of State and Curb National Security Adviser,’ New York Times, November 19, 1980, p. A28. Bush, George W. "Press Conference." White House Rose Garden, Washington, D.C. 18 Apr. 2006. "CIA Activities in Chile." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, 18 Sept. 2000. Web. 22 May 2015. 1/chile/#4>. De Young, Karen, and Anne Gearan. "Susan Rice Withdraws as Candidate for Secretary of State." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 13 Dec. 2012. Web. 27 Jan. 2015. candidate-for-secretary-of-state/2012/12/13/17ad344e-4567-11e2-8e70- e1993528222d_story.html>. Gerstenzang, James. "White House Reveals Secret Mission to Beijing in July." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 19 Dec. 1989. Web. 22 May 2015. Goldberg, Jeffrey. "Breaking Ranks." The New Yorker. N.p., 31 Oct. 2005. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. Goldman, Andrew. "Nobody Puts Condoleezza Rice in a Corner." The New York Times. N.p., 153 30 Apr. 2011. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. 01talk-t.html?_r=0>. Gwertzman, Bernard. "Presidents and the National Security Council." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 12 Nov. 2008. Web. 22 May 2015. Halper, Daniel. "Working on Vacation: WH Releases Photo of Obama Getting the 'Presidential Daily Briefing'". 12 Aug. 2013. Web. 22 May 2015. getting-presidential-daily-briefing_745950.html>. Ignatius, David. "David Ignatius - On Defense, a Team, Not Rivals." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 07 June 2009. Web. 11 May 2015. dyn/content/article/2009/06/05/AR2009060502832.html>. Isaacson, Walter. "The Best and The Brightest: McGeorge Bundy, 1919-1996." Time 30 Nov. 1996: 34. Web. Kaplan, Fred. "Why No One Will Miss Jim Jones, the Departing National Security Advisor." Slate Magazine. 08 Oct. 2010. Web. 06 Dec. 2014. g_job.html>. Kessler, Glenn. "Colin Powell versus Dick Cheney." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 03 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 May 2015. checker/post/colin-powell-versus-dick-cheney/2011/08/30/gIQAwYydqJ_blog.html>. 154 Kessler, Glenn. "Transformed By Her Bond With Bush." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 03 Sept. 2007. Web. 16 May 2015. \dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090201297.html>. Kifner, John. "McGeorge Bundy Dies at 77; Top Adviser in Vietnam Era." The New York Times. N.p., 16 Sept. 1996. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. vietnam-era.html>. Luce, Edward, and Daniel Dombey. "US Foreign Policy: Waiting on a Sun King." Financial Times. 30 Mar. 2010. Web. 11 May 2015. 11df-b40c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3HDXMLpsO>. Myers, Steven Lee. "Experienced Player Who Shuns Spotlight: Anthony Lake." The New York Times, 05 Dec. 1996. Web. 16 May 2015. anthony-lake.html>. Nelson, Bryce. "How Does Power Affect The Powerful?" The New York Times. The New York Times, 08 Nov. 1982. Web. 11 May 2015. powerful.html>. "Oral History Interview: Brent Scowcroft." PBS: Frontline, n.d. Web. 17 May 2015. Ostrow, Ronald J., and Doyle McManus. "The North Verdict : Next Trial May Target Reagan, 155 Bush : Poindexter Case Could Focus on Their Iran-Contra Involvement." Los Angeles Times, 05 May 1989. Web. 16 May 2015. 05/news/mn-2268_1_poindexter-s-trial-poindexter-s-congressional-testimony-iran- contra-affair>. Pace, Eric. "Dean Rusk, Secretary of State In Vietnam War, Is Dead at 85." The New York Times. The New York Times, 21 Dec. 1994. Web. 16 May 2015. vietnam-war-is-dead-at-85.html>. "Provenance of the Ford National Security Adviser Files." Fordlibrarymuseum.gov. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Feb. 2002. Web. 16 May 2015. Rothfopf, David. "National Insecurity." Foreign Policy. N.p., 9 Sept. 2014. Web. 15 May 2015. Shear, Michael D. "Security Staff Getting Its Old Name Back." The New York Times, 10 Feb. 2014. Web. 15 May 2015. staff-getting-its-old-name-back.html?_r=0.>. Shenon, Philip. "Ex-Official Says Bush Urged End to Iran Arms Shipments." The New York Times. The New York Times, 22 Jan. 1989. Web. shipments.html>. Stahl, Lesley. "Susan Rice on Contending with Crisis." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 21 Dec. 156 2013. Web. 22 May 2015. susan-rice/>. "Thomas Donilon on National Security Issues." C-SPAN.org. N.p., 16 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 May 2015. issues>. Thomas, Maureen Dowd. "The Fabulous Bush & Baker Boys." The New York Times. N.p., 05 May 1990. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. fabulous-bush-baker-boys.html?pagewanted=2>. Totenberg, Nina. "Cheney: A VP With Unprecedented Power." NPR, 15 Jan. 2009. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. "Transformed By Her Bond With Bush." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 03 Sept. 2007. Web. 20 Mar. 2015. dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090201297_2.html>. "U.S. News & World Report." 1981. Web. "White House Author." The White House. The White House, n.d. Web. 22 May 2015. Wilson, Scott. "James Jones to Step down as National Security Adviser." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 08 Oct. 2010. Web. 11 May 2015. 157 About the Author Exploring McGeorge Bundy’s files at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas. February 14, 2014 (See Appendix H-J) George John Saba is a senior majoring in Political Science with honors in International Security Studies at Stanford University. Saba is a 2015 Gates Cambridge Scholar, a member of Phi Beta Kappa and a former Stanford Varsity Baseball player. He has also served as a research assistant for Dr. Condoleezza Rice, a White House intern in the Obama administration, an intern for San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee, the chair of Stanford’s Constitutional Council (student body judicial branch), a Teaching Assistant for Stockton City Councilman Michael Tubbs, the Vice President of the Stanford Pre-Law Society, and a member of the Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity. He will continue his studies this fall at the University of Cambridge’s Corpus Christi College in the U.K. where he will pursue a Master’s in International Relations and Politics. i Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. Web.