ISSN 0919-9748

Spring 2020 No.88

Opinion From Geo- to Helio-Centrism -- Int’l Cooperation Is the Prescription for Global Warming --

Focus INF and ’s National Security

Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Contents

Spring 2020 No.88 1 • Opinion From Geo- to Helio-Centrism Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle -- Int’l Cooperation Is the Prescription for Global Warming-- Miya Bldg. 8th Fl. 4-3-4, Kojimachi, Chiyoda-ku, 4 • Focus 102-0083, Japan INF and Japan’s National Security TEL : 81-3-3239-2091 FAX : 81-3-3239-2097 E-Mail [email protected] • Info-Clip Web Site http://www.cnfc.or.jp/ 3 Plutonium Management in Japan 11 Onagawa-2 Passed Safety Review 12 Restart Situation of Nuclear Power Stations Publisher Yuji Tsushima

Editorial Offi ce Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle

CNFC Members of the Board Acting Chairman TSUSHIMA, Yuji Former Member of the House of Representatives Directors ETO, Akinori Member of the House of Representatives KIMURA, Jiro Member of the House of Representatives MORIMOTO, Satoshi Chancellor, Takushoku University TORII, Hiroyuki Former Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology TSUSHIMA, Jun Member of the House of Representatives WATANABE, Shu Member of the House of Representatives YAMAMOTO, Yuji Member of the House of Representatives Auditors ASANO, Shuichi Certifi ed Public Accountant SHIMOYAMA, Shunji Former President, Japan Chapter Institute of Nuclear Material Management

Akamon Gate at the -a graduate and family taking pictures to commemorate - The university’s Hongo campus is the former Tokyo residence of the (present-day ). The gate was constructed by the Kaga feudal lord (Maeda Nariyasu, the 13th lord of the Kaga Domain) in 1827 to receive Princess Yasu (Yasuhime), a daughter of the dictator of Japan in those days (Tokugawa Ienari, the 11th shogun of the ), as his offi cial wife. The gate is called Aka- mon, literally red gate in Japanese (aka means red), because it is painted in so-called Chinese red, or vermillion. It was designated as the important cultural property of Ja- pan in 1931. Today, people sometimes say “Akamon” to mean the University of Tokyo. Akamon gate is very graceful, compared with other gates built by other feudal lords in the period (1603–1868). It has old Chinese-style curved tile-roofed gatekeeper’s boxes on both sides. This rare and gorgeous feature of the roof matches the prestige of the Kaga Domain, which was the largest (1 million koku: koku is a measure of produc- tivity of land; the larger, the more powerful) of the feudal domains under the Tokugawa shogunate. The gate was originally at about 15 meters to the east from the current location. It was moved to the current site when the university expanded the campus area in 1903. Date of Issue : May 15, 2020 In 1970, there were large-scale public protests involving students against the United States-Japan Security Treaty. The gate was once covered with scratches made by the Designed by QB System Co., Ltd. student activists armed with wooden sticks, but restored afterwards. From Geo- to Helio-Centrism -- Int’l Cooperation Is the Prescription for Global Warming --

We human beings used to have the geo- The underlying notion of these kinds of without taking any measures against it until centric view of the universe, in which the views is that the volume of carbon dioxide the next glacier period? Obviously No! sun moves around the earth. This view (CO2) produced by human activities is The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) was egocentric but intuitive. We actually too little to warm this huge Earth, which published by the United Nations Inter- live on the spherical earth, which rotates will cool in any case when the next gla- governmental Panel on Climate Change around its axis and orbits the sun. We cial period comes. Notice, however, that (IPCC) in 2007 stated, “It is very unlikely converted from the geocentric view to the the CO2 concentration on Earth was 280 that the Earth would naturally enter anoth- heliocentric one thanks to the scientific ppmv before the Industrial Revolution in er ice age for at least 30,000 years.” Some verifi cation of the heliocentric model and 1750, but increased by 40% to 400 ppmv consider it not necessary to do anything the discovery of the infinite vastness of by 2013 and counting. Some studies say against the global warming because it will the universe, which helped us realize that that, if this CO2 concentration of 400 be solved by nature in 10,000 or longer we are not in the center of the universe. ppmv continues, the area of surface ice years, whereas others such as the IPCC Earth rotates around its axis at about 1,670 and snow will not increase even if the so- consider it essential to take immediate km per hour at the equator. It orbits the lar irradiance on the Earth’s surface of the measures against the global warming. In Sun at 108,000 km per hour, and our Solar Northern Hemisphere due to, for instance, interpreting the same interglacial period, System moves around the center of the a change in the angle between the Earth’s there in a huge gap between the two. Milky Way galaxy at an inconceivably fast rotational axis and its orbital one; conse- Some scientists recommend more velocity of 864,000 km per hour. Today, quently, the transition from the interglacial strict and immediate measures against the a lot of information is shared across the to glacial period will be hampered. global warming. They are afraid that, if globe; so, few believe that we are at the The world population was about 800 Earth gets further warmer and the sea wa- center of the universe, I believe. million in 1750, and about 7.3 billion in ter temperature rises by more than three Prevention of global warming requires 2015. It is expected to grow to about 9.2 degrees Celsius, methane hydrate reserves international efforts. How are we address- billion by 2050. The rate of increase of under the ocean floor accumulated dur- ing this issue globally? Aren’t we still ob- the volume of CO2 is, however, not com- ing the glacial periods will be released as sessed by a notion similar to the obsolete parable to the rate of population increase, methane gas into the atmosphere, thereby geocentric view? Aren’t we denying the which is attributable to CO2 absorption raising the temperature further. This vi- global warming for political or personal by plants and the oceans, but it is thought cious circle will continue and accelerate. reasons? Actually, one country announced that recently the CO2 emission by human If CO2 and methane gases increase further, withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, activities surpassed the volume absorbable human beings will suffer from the diffi cul- an international framework to prevent by plants and the oceans, thereby showing ty in breathing. And, if the situation today the global warming. Some scientists an increasing trend. The population will continues, human beings will be extinct in even deny the threat of the global warm- increase further. Earth’s glacial periods 200 years—or 80 years in the worst-case ing. They argue that presently we live in repeated at intervals of 100,000 years in the scenario. This is an extravagant warning. an interglacial period and this temperate modern age since 780,000 years ago. So, to According to the AR5 (2014) of the climate will last more than 10,000 years suppress the temperature rise, what should IPCC, during the period from 1880 to no matter what we do to fi ght against the we do? Can we just wait for the next gla- 2012, the averaged temperature on the global warming. cial period? Can we just emit CO2 freely globe increased by 0.85℃, and by the

Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 1 Opinion

year 2100, it is predicted to increase fur- rate will be 1.7% and 0.5% by 2030 and tricity generation will be 84%, which is ther by 2.6 to 4.8℃ in the worst-case sce- 2050, respectively, and its annual energy Japan’s rate of electricity self-suffi ciency. nario. This prediction makes the above- saving rate will be 2.3% and 2.7% by 2030 In summary, according to the CRIEPI mentioned warning more realistic. What and 2050, respectively. It then estimates quantitative analysis, to accomplish the can we do to stop this temperature rise? Japan’s electricity demand in 2050 will strategic goal set by the government,

Let us examine the measures taken by the be 1,100 TWh, and the electrifi cation rate which is 80% reduction of CO2 emissions Japanese Government. will be 28% and 50% in 2030 and 2050, by the year 2050, implement electrifica-

respectively. Consequently, the CO2 emis- tion at all sectors as much as possible and In FY 2015, the business and public sion from the non-electric utility sector drastically increase the percentage of zero- service accounted for 78% of Japan’s such as industries and private households emission electricity such as renewable

CO2 emission and the private households will decline to 182 million tons by 2050. energy, hydropower, and nuclear.

22%. The latter includes the CO2 emis- So, if the CO2 emission from the electric To realize the analysis result, or more sion from household cars --6%. The CO2 utility sector can be reduced to 65 million specifically, to introduce solar and wind emission by sector is as follows: industry tons, Japan will be able to accomplish powers on a large scale, storage battery

34%, commerce and service 22%, private 80% reduction of CO2 emission in 2050. facilities will also have to be installed on a households 22%, transportation (vessels * https://criepi.denken.or.jp/jp/serc/ large scale as their backups. Realistically and cargo) 11%, energy conversion sector source/pdf/Y19501.pdf (available only in speaking, if we have to take into account (power stations, gasworks, oil refineries) Japanese) the frequency of battery replacement due

6%, industrial processes (cement plants, To accomplish the CO2 reduction in the to battery deterioration, the installation of etc.) 4%, and industrial waste 2%. electric utility sector, Japan surely should the storage facilities such as battery stor- The Japanese Government authorized fi rst increase renewable energy as much as age power stations will involve a tremen- the “Plan for Global Warming Counter- possible. The Japanese Government as- dous amount of capital investment and measures” and “Japan’s Long-term Strat- sumes that the capacity of solar and wind running cost. A great challenge for Japan’s egy under the Paris Agreement” by the powers will be 356 GW and 75 GW, re- electric utility industry in the future is how cabinet meeting on May 13, 2016, and Jun spectively by 2050. These targets for the to absorb the above-mentioned capital in- 11, 2019, respectively. In these, the gov- year 2050 seemingly consist of a number vestment and running cost --which will be ernment pledged itself to succeed in both of targets set by various organizations in- refl ected in your electricity bills--. the prevention of the global warming and cluding the Ministry of the Environment. The capacity of hydropower today is the growth of economy. The long-term To exploit the vast resources of solar and 33.7 GW even if we include its stations goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions wind power facilities and provide a reli- currently under construction and planned. by 80% by 2050. Japan’s CO2 emission able supply of electricity of these renew- We can add contributions from the biomass was 1.24 billion tons in 2013. The strat- able sources, the report estimates that and geothermal power to this target of 59 egy is to reduce the emission to 250 mil- Japan will need as much as 216 GW of GW in this segment, but still sounds way lion tons by 2050, which amounts to 20% battery storage. Additionally, the report too much. The government assumes that of the emission in 2013. estimates that Japan will need to have the the capacity of pumped-storage hydropow- How can we accomplish this substantial following capacity: 59 GW for hydro, bio- er stations will be more than twice as large reduction of greenhouse gases? The So- mass, and geothermal power combined; as today, including those planned. Japan cio-Economic Research Center in the Cen- 26 GW for pumped-storage hydropower, already has too many hydropower stations tral Research Institute of Electric Power and 29 GW for nuclear power. For fossil in this small country. Can we still develop Industry (CRIEPI) published in April 2019 fuel power, the report estimates that Japan hydropower resources large enough to fi ll the analysis report titled “Quantitative will need 67 GW LNG-fi red power facili- the gap of this magnitude? In contrast, the Analysis of Economy as well as Supply ties. This is probably to complement fl uc- government assumes that nuclear power and Demand of Energy and Electricity to tuations in electricity supply and demand. capacity will be 29 GW by the year 2050,

Enable Substantial CO2 Reduction in the Of course, the report assumes zero oil- which will be 22% less than that of to- Year 2050*.” Only a brief outline of the and coal-fi red power. With this electricity day. The total capacity today is 37.2 GW report is given here. First, the report as- portfolio, the percentage of zero-emission with 36 reactors, which is the sum of the sumes Japan’s annual economic growth electricity that does not emit CO2 in elec- nuclear power stations that applied for as-

2 Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 Opinion

sessment of the compliance with Japan’s Japan’s primary energy before the 2011 we must share information with young new regulatory requirements for nuclear Tohoku earthquake--based on the data in generation and raise their awareness. We power stations imposed after the 2011 To- 2010--. If Japan reduce this segment to also must make efforts for a global com- hoku earthquake and those that have not the above-mentioned capacity by the year munity and the entire human race. All yet applied. If we take into consideration 2050, can we still have a reliable supply countries on Earth must cooperate with the number of nuclear power stations to be of electricity? We are a little concerned each other, and press on toward the goal shut down in 30 years and necessary new about the prospect. of each country systematically. We should nuclear stations, it may safely be said that In any case, the result of this this analy- not stop the history of human beings. this analysis is providing us with more sis clearly indicates that Japan has set a re- Earth will survive, but will we? realistic targets. Recall that nuclear power ally bold target in the strategy against the (Editorial Offi ce) emits no CO2 and accounted for 11.2% of global warming. To accomplish the target,

Plutonium Management in Japan

Japanese inventories of plutonium • Reactors and Other Facilities • Plutonium in Fuel Fabrication are made public once a year. Plutonium 134 Processes Joyo (experimental fast reactor) inventories existing at the end of (134) 0 Monju, Joyo, etc. December 2018 are as follows: Monju 282 (0) (prototype fast breeder reactor) (282) [The tables in parenthesis are previous year values.] 776 Commercial Reactors • Plutonium Loaded in Reactors (Unit: kgPu) (2,300) 1,524 113 Reactors R&D (critical facilities, etc.) (0) 1. Separated Plutonium (113) 1,305 • Reprocessing Plants Subtotal [Reference Data] (2,829) JAEA*1 JNFL*2 Each state’s national holdings of civil un-irradiated 9,022 plutonium and of plutonium contained in spent civil Total Plutonium nitrate, etc. (10,546) reactor fuel published by IAEA under “Guidelines (plutonium at all stages for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549 from the time it is separated 28 274 of March 16, 1998)” as of December 2017 are as after dissolution until it (26) (275) 2. Separated Plutonium at Overseas follows: (Unit: ton Pu; Civil plutonium and plutonium declared excess to defense needs is contained.) goesthrough blending and (Foreign services are commissioned conversion) to fabricate most of them into MOX Non-used Plutonium in Plutonium oxide 167 3,329 fuel for use in Japan’s light water Plutonium Spent Fuel (plutonium oxide laid up in (233) (3,329) U.S.A. ------storing containers) reactors.) (Unit: kgPuf) Russia 59 159 195 3,603 Subtotal (259) (3,604) U.K. 14,199 (14,226) U.K. ------France 10,013 (10,039) France 80.9 295 • JAEA Facility for Plutonium Fuel Total 24,212 (24,265) China ------Fabrication Japan 10.5 164 Plutonium oxide 3. Separated Plutonium in Use (2018) Germany --- 121 2,559 (plutonium oxide laid up in storing (Unit: kgPu) Belgium (<50kg) 42 (2,479) containers) • Plutonium Oxide Recovered Switzerland (<2kg) 20 Plutonium in stages of experiment 913 0 JAEA reprocessing plant *1: JAEA: Japan Atomic Energy Agency and fabrication (928) (0) *2: JNFL: Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited New fuel products 446 0 JNFL Reprocessing plant (in fabricated fuel assemblies) (446) (1) 3,919 0 Subtotal Total (3,854) (1)

Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 3 Focus

INF and Japan’s National Security

Satoshi Morimoto Chancellor, Takushoku University

What Expiration of INF Treaty Implies The treaty banned building the tion, which was unprecedented. The launch pads as well as fl ight tests. INF Treaty, founded on the strategic The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Although the treaty stipulated a stability and nuclear deterrence be- Forces Treaty, or the INF Treaty in complete ban on the intermediate- tween the U.S. and Russia based on short, is not a nuclear disarmament range missiles as a carrier of nu- the New START Treaty (Strategic treaty. Because of the name, people clear warhead, it did not obligate Arms Reduction Treaty), had played tend to regard it as a treaty that the parties to eliminate the nuclear an important role in establishing re- bans intermediate-range nuclear warheads mounted on the mis- gional stability especially in Europe missiles, but it’s wrong in some re- siles. The treaty applied only to the and East Asia. However, the U.S. spects. ground-launched missiles, which in- found that changes in the situation The INF Treaty was a treaty be- cluded ballistic and cruise missiles. in the post-Cold War era made the tween the U.S. and the Soviet Union It did not apply to the sea and air- INF Treaty no longer beneficial to (then), in which the two countries launched intermediate missiles. the nation, and decided to withdraw agreed to eliminate ground-launched The INF Treaty expired on August from the treaty. This is the back- ballistic missiles with a range of 2, 2019. From the late 1970s to the ground leading to the expiration of 500 to 5,500 kilometers within three middle of the 1980s, the treaty was the INF Treaty. years of the treaty’s effective date. a fundamental driving force, affect- Now that there is no longer the The treaty applied to the interme- ing the Cold War regime and the INF Treaty, what should we do diate-range missiles and their as- deterrence strategy of the Western about the INF-range missiles? I sociated entire system, including world. It was the most effective would like to state several points missiles (both deployed and to-be- arms control treaty among treaties that must be addressed in the com- deployed missiles), launch pads, as- executed since the Cold War, and ing days. sociated facilities, and missile bases. had a means to verify implementa- First, how and how far will many

Mr. Satoshi Morimoto is a specialist on national security and defense policy, Chancellor of Takushoku University, former Minister of Defense, and Director of Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle.

4 Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 Focus

regional great powers, including the INF-range missiles? As the INF- sion between the Western and the the U.S. and Russia, advance their range missiles are being developed Eastern Bloc escalated during the development and deployment of the and deployed, the necessity of the Cold War era, the Soviet Union INF-range missiles in the post-INF corresponding missile defense sys- deployed short- and intermediate- Treaty world? A serious challenge tem will increase. Then, how should range missiles in the Warsaw Pact for the future is that a more intense the deterrence by denial as well as countries. NATO needed to act arms race is predicted not only be- deterrence by punishment be coordi- against this threat independently. tween the U.S. and Russia but also nated with the defense system? It adopted the so-called Flexible Re- among many countries. Moreover, Fourth, how can we construct sponse strategy in 1967 to maintain in this new arms race, one must con- a framework of arms control that the stability in Europe. The Flexible sider not only ground-launched mis- oversees a new INF-range missile Response strategy was to strengthen siles (both ballistic and cruise mis- system, and what will be the target conventional weapons while main- siles), which were the target of the of the new framework? Other ques- taining nuclear weapons for a pre- INF Treaty, but also air- and sea- tions that must be addressed include emptive strike. launched missiles and hypersonic the following: Can this kind of arms Russia, meanwhile, had started glide vehicles, which were beyond control framework really achieve to modernize its intermediate-range the framework of the INF Treaty. regional stability as well as the missiles since around 1977 by de- Second, how will this kind of situ- strategic stability between the U.S. ploying the SS-20 missiles, which ation change alter the function of and Russia? Can the arms control were to modernize the SS-4 and deterrence and stability? The New agreement really deter the develop- SS-5 missiles. The SS-20 missile START Treaty (Strategic Arms ment and deployment of the INF- was a mobile system with a longer Reduction Treaty) maintains a bal- range missiles? What does it mean range and better precision than SS-4 ance in the strategic nuclear forces to the stability of international so- and SS-5 missiles. It had survivabil- between the U.S. and Russia. There ciety? Can we involve China in the ity as well as striking capability that are also tactical and theater nuclear new framework of arms control? would allow strike against major missiles, including the new INF Last, but not least, if the U.S. military bases in Western Europe. missiles. How can we establish an plans to deploy the INF-range mis- Since the SS-20 deployment, doubts overall balance among these mis- siles with conventional warheads in over the U.S. commitment to Europe siles and ensure the deterrence and Europe and Asia, how should U.S. al- had surfaced in Europe: If the U.S. stability? Some in the U.S. consider lies respond? Especially the deploy- should face the risk of a counter- it important to establish a frame- ment of the conventional INF-range attack to its homeland, would it dare work of arms control involving the missile will clearly indicate the U.S. to use its nuclear forces to defend U.S, Russia, and China for the fu- stance on China. How should Ja- Europe? This doubt gave rise to a ture deterrence and stability, and pan respond to this U.S. deployment debate for “the decoupling” of Euro- for that, the U.S. and Russia must in the context of Japan-China-U.S. pean security. fi rst reconsider the extension of the relations? This is an issue of the na- The U.S. was determined to take New START Treaty. Furthermore, tional security of Japan. initiative to start a negotiation of there is a movement of making a arms control to demand the demise INF Treaty Negotiations and Lessons new framework of arms control for of the INF Treaty. It was also deter- the INF-range missiles involving The U.S. has promoted the theory mined to deploy the INF in Europe China. One must consider overall of extended deterrence to reassure if the negotiation failed. With this arms control including both strate- U.S. allies since the Cold War era, mindset, the U.S. proposed the So- gic weapons and intermediate-range whereas NATO has not wanted to viet Union to start the INF negotia- missiles. rely solely on this; instead, it has tion. Third, how do we develop and de- wanted to promote its own nuclear The Soviet Union initially rejected ploy missile defense systems against strategy. Especially when the ten- the negotiation, but it began in 1981.

Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 5 Focus

The Soviet Union suspended the ne- gan especially since 1983. Europe the Soviet Union during the Cold gotiation in 1983 in response to the united under a common goal of plac- War era but also a balance among Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, ing Western Europe in a strategical- the Western and the Eastern Blocs or Star Wars) concept proposed by ly important position in the frame- in Europe and Asia, thereby con- President Reagan. The negotiation work of international security, which tributing to global stability to a cer- resumed in 1985. The U.S, mean- also greatly contributed to the suc- tain extent. while, threatened the Soviet Union, cess. Two other factors also greatly In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. declaring that if it did not agree to contributed to the INF agreement: planned to deploy the ballistic mis- negotiate, the U. S. would deploy First, Chancellor Schmidt of West sile defense (BMD) system in Poland intermediate-range missiles (Persh- Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher and Romania in 2007. It seems that ing II) and ground-launched cruise of the U.K, and President Mitterrand Russia regarded the deployment missiles in Europe. of France cooperated with President of this BMD system as a violation The Soviet Union deployed more Reagan to unify NATO members. of the INF Treaty and had started than 360 SS-20 missiles, of which Second, Prime Minister Nakasone considering the withdrawal from more than two-thirds were deployed of Japan cooperated with President the treaty as well as the deployment in Eastern Europe (the Warsaw Pact Reagan to eliminate the SS-20 mis- of new missile systems that would members in Eastern Europe) and siles in the Far East. When the Per- have a suffi cient range to attack this about one-third (more than 120 SS- shing II was about to be deployed in BMD system. Russia began point- 20 missiles) were deployed in the Europe in 1983, antinuclear move- ing out that especially the deploy- Far East. Even if the Soviet Union ment occurred mainly in Europe, ment of the launchers in the BMD and the U.S. agreed to eliminate but the governments of European system that would enable to launch the SS-20 missiles deployed on countries managed to ease tension Tomahawk cruise missiles was in the frontline in Europe, and if the in each country amid a rather tough violation of the INF treaty. Soviet Union transferred the SS- political environment. The U.S. responded, “The Aegis 20 deployed in the Far East to Eu- In summary, the achievement and Ashore Missile Defense System rope, then the agreement would be lessons learned from the INF Treaty does not have an offensive ground- meaningless to European security. were as follows: First, the treaty ad- launched ballistic or cruise missile Japan argued that the security in dressed the reduction and elimina- capabilities. Specifi cally, the system the Western world was inseparable, tion of nuclear-weapons transport lacks the software, fi re control hard- and, without complete elimination of systems for the fi rst time in the his- ware, support equipment, and other the SS-20 deployed in the Far East, tory of arms control agreements. Sec- infrastructure needed to launch of- the threat to the West could not be ond, it agreed to eliminate an entire fensive ballistic or cruise missiles eliminated. President Reagan, who system of one category of weapons such as the Tomahawk. Although it had insisted on the zero option since globally with no exception. Third, utilizes some of the same structural 1981, accepted this logic and the it adopted a realistic and practical components as the sea-based Mk- negotiation started. The goal was inspection system for verification at 41 Vertical Launch System installed set to eliminate the entire INF, that each local site. And last, solidarity on ships, the Aegis Ashore vertical is, global zero option. The relation- and cooperation among the Western launching system is not the same ship between President Reagan and countries greatly contributed to the launcher as the sea-based MK-41 Prime Minister Nakasone greatly successful closing of the treaty. Vertical Launch System. As a re- contributed to this decision. The sult, the system is not a prohibited U.S. and Russia’s Violation of INF Treaty INF negotiation took six years in launcher.” However, the installa- and China’s Stance total from 1981 to 1987. Factors tion of launchers itself is restricted contributed to the success in the end The INF Treaty served to main- under the INF Treaty. So, I would was the presence of General Secre- tain not only a balance in the mili- say that the U.S. explanation lacked tary Gorbachev and President Rea- tary strength between the U.S. and consistency in some respects.

6 Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 Focus

Next, Russia began criticizing on October 20, 2018. I think that and JL-2A carried by the type 094A the U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle the reasons for the withdrawal nuclear submarines; and nuclear (UAV) designed for air-to-surface were as follows: (1) President Putin bomber such as H-6. Furthermore, attack was in violation of the INF announced in 2008 that the INF China unveiled a hypersonic glide Treaty. The U.S. denied this allega- Treaty was not beneficial for Rus- vehicle DF-ZF (WU-14) mounted tion. However, the conditions added sia’s national interest, resumed the on the ballistic missile DF-17 at a by the U.S. Senate when the INF development of intermediate-range military parade in October 2019. Treaty was ratified in the country nuclear forces around 2011, conduct- Chinese advancement in the space clearly stipulated that the UAVs ed missile tests and deployed them and cyber technologies are promi- also be regulated by the treaty. So, I in 2014, but the Obama administra- nent these days. These kinds of would say that the U.S. rebuttal also tion did not withdraw from the INF increasing Chinese overall military lacked consistency. Treaty. President Trump considered strength along with the moderniza- The U.S. first realized Russia’s it against the national interest of tion of its conventional forces is be- violation of the INF Treaty on July the U.S. (2) China’s advancement coming a great threat to the U. S. 28, 2014, when Russia conducted a of the ballistic and cruise missiles China also has a number of short-, ground-launched INF cruise missile (especially, DF-21 and DF-26). Since medium-, and intermediate-range test. The 2014 Compliance Report China did not sign the INF Treaty, ballistic missiles (SRBM, MRBM, published by the U.S. Ministry of it can develop and deploy intermedi- and IRBM respectively) and more State on July 29, 2014 alleged that ate-range missiles. President Trump than 2,000 cruise missiles such as Russia manufactured and owned thought an imbalance between Chi- CJ-10. It is said that more than 90% ground-launched cruise missiles, nese and the U.S. military strength of these Chinese missiles are ca- which were in violation of the INF would develop in time. And, (3) The pable of carrying nuclear warheads. treaty. Russia refuted this allegation. Trump administration wanted to The INF Treaty restricted the num- The U.S. wrote in the U.S. 2017 clear the suspicion of the links with ber of intermediate-range missiles Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Russia in the U.S. presidential elec- in the U.S. and Russia. As far as report that a Russian ship-to- tion and take initiative in the nego- the intermediate-range missiles are surface cruise missile 3M-14 Kalibr tiation with Russia. concerned, China has built up asym- (SS-N-30A) had a ground-launched China has made an effort to catch metric missile strength. Chinese type that may be capable of carrying up with the powerful nuclear-weap- intermediate-range missiles have a a nuclear warhead. Others pointed on states such as the U.S. and Rus- maximum range of about 4,000 km. out that the Kalibr system was sia by developing its nuclear forces. Although Chinese missile bases are able to be launched from ships and China has an arsenal of about 280 scattered across China, these inter- submarines and both types were ca- strategic nuclear warheads, which mediate-range missiles are deployed pable of carrying nuclear warheads. include intercontinental ballistic in central China (mostly in inland or Note that submarine- and ship- missiles (ICBM)—especially, DF- northwestern China) to avoid attack launched missiles were not prohibit- 4, DF-5, DF-5A, DF-5B, DF-31G, from enemy’s naval vessels. The ed by the INF Treaty. However, the DF-31A, DF-31B, DF-31, and DF- strategic goals of these intermedi- U.S. pointed out that the range of a 41 and DF-51; the last two being ate-range are not only to prepare Russian 3M-14 (SS-N-30A, or SSC- still in development are multiple for military operations in Taiwan 8 in the NATO code), which was a independently targetable reentry but also to possess counter-attack ground-launched type equivalent vehicles (MIRV) and can reach the capability to maintain China’s anti- of the Kalibr submarine-launched U.S.; submarine-launched ballistic access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy cruise missile, was in violation of the missile (SLBM) such as JL-3 (in de- in a vast sea area from the first INF Treaty. velopment) carried by the type 096 island chain to the second island President Trump declared the U.S. nuclear submarines, JL-2 carried by chain. This is why the DF-21D and withdrawal from the INF Treaty the type 094 nuclear submarines, DF-26 are called an aircraft carrier

Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 7 Focus

killer and Guam Killer respectively. missile at the country’s west coast hicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise China constructed inland (around on August 19, 2019, 17 days after missiles (HCM)? How should it be the Gobi Desert) huge military facili- the expiration of INF Treaty. The integrated to the missile defense ties that resemble Yokota, Yokosuka, test was successful. The U.S. fur- system? (4) Should the arms control Misawa, and Kadena Bases of the ther tested an intermediate-range agreement impose a limit on the U.S. Forces Japan. The photographs ground-launched ballistic missile on missile system that each country is taken by satellite showed China’s December 12, 2019. allowed to possess? Should the mis- launch tests of ballistic missiles These tests were both conducted sile system be reduced by a certain from the east, suggesting that the for a range of more than 500 km. percentage? Alternatively, rather targets of the intermediate-range The U.S. allegedly collected neces- than reducing the system, should missiles deployed inland China were sary data for development. It was it be like a code of conduct? If so, the U.S. Forces operating in Japan said that it would take at least 18 what kind of function of deterrence and the surrounding waters and air months to deploy a cruise missile and response can we expect? (5) space. and more than fi ve years to deploy a How exactly can we differentiate the ballistic missile. It is diffi cult to pre- function of conventional weapons Agenda to Be Addressed after Expiration dict what will happen in the future. from nuclear weapons? (6) When of INF Treaty This kind of new INF-range missile we consider participating countries Since the INF Treaty’s demise on development is necessary to secure in the negotiation and the target, August 2, 2019, situation around the power of deterrence against goal, coverage, extent, contents, etc. the INF-range missiles has rapidly asymmetric missile threats, but si- of the framework, how can we make evolved. multaneously it induces a missile sure the negotiation refl ects regional Especially, both the U.S. and Rus- arms race. Therefore, we hope that characteristics and strategic stabil- sia have been developing entire non- it will contribute in a positive way ity? (7) How can we make sure to strategic nuclear weapons systems to establishing a new framework of involve China in the negotiation? including the INF-range missiles. intermediate-range missile arms And, (8) How can we effectively veri- For the U.S, the ground-launched control. fy the implementation? There are a missiles have the following advan- I think that no one has any idea number of factors that we must take tages and disadvantages as well: of what a new framework of new into consideration. (1) The ground-launched missiles INF-range missile arms control If there is a new arms control ne- are cost-effective, which motivate should be like. So, I would like to gotiation, the U.S. certainly will fi rst developers. (2) They are very stable point out important factors that want to defi ne the arms control sys- as a system, which facilitates tar- must be taken into account to build tem and exact targets to be regulat- geting a number of objects. (3) To this framework. (1) How will a new ed and then try to pursue a frame- enable a direct attack on enemy’s arms control negotiation be related work that will enable to enhance the mobile missile vehicles, they need to to the strategic stability goal aimed function of deterrence and response have extremely high-precision tar- by the New START Treaty? (2) of the U.S. as well as its allies. Un- get detection and tracking capabil- Should it be a framework involv- less the framework of arms control ity. (4) Also, the U.S. has few army ing many countries, or only a lim- involves the U.S. and Russia as well bases within the range of Chinese ited number of countries such as as China, the U. S. is probably not intermediate-range missiles, which the U.S, Russia, and China? Will willing to participate in the nego- is a great obstacle to deploying the the latter be more effective to ac- tiation. Some in the U.S. insist on ground-launched missiles in specifi c complish the goal? (3) What will be involving China in any new nuclear areas in Asia. The deployed missiles regulated? Should it apply to all of arms control negotiation. Secretary can be the target of attack. the missile systems belong to the of State Pompeo said in May 2019, The U.S. tested an intermediate- army, navy, and air force? Should “President Trump instructed the U.S. range ground-launched cruise it also apply to hypersonic glide ve- National Security Council officials

8 Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 Focus

to investigate the possibility of a deployment of conventional-warhead factors—besides the political and broader framework of arms control ground-launched INF-range missiles operational factors of candidate site: involving more countries than the outside the U.S. are as follows: fi rst, (1) versatility of the location—ca- traditional U.S.-Russia framework. recognition of the threat, then the ef- pability to respond to missiles from The new framework should include fi ciency of the function of deterrence China, Russia, and North Korea; (2) weapons systems.” and response, followed by various is- effectiveness of missile defense mea- However, it is not easy to involve sues associated with the deployment sures; (3) coupling with sea- and air- China in the negotiation. Chinese --including political and security launched missile systems; (4) coor- Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, factors of the missile deployment dination of operation with the space “China has repeatedly reiterated site as well as operational conditions and cyber system; (5) collaborative that it has no intention to join the including navy and air force mis- operability with U.S. allies; and (6) so-called China-U.S.-Russia trilat- siles--, and arms control negotiation. early-warning radar deployed in eral arms control negotiations, and These issues must all be taken into Asia and military chain of command its position on this issue is very account. and communication function. clear. China fi rmly opposes the U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper con- Since the ground-launched inter- using China as an excuse to evade firmed the U.S. intention to deploy mediate-range missile can easily be and shift its nuclear disarmament the conventional-warhead ground- the target of attack, the U.S. must responsibilities.” Under the pres- launched intermediate-range mis- take into account the missile de- ent circumstances, it seems unlikely siles in the Indo-Pacifi c region. fense system to protect the ground- that China will participate in the However, it is not clear what pro- launched missile. Hence, even if negotiation of arms control (not gram the U.S. has for the deploy- the cost of the ground-launched limited to the INF but including the ment of the INF-range missiles at missile is cheaper than the sea- or strategic and non-strategic weapons military bases. To ensure that the air-launched missiles, total cost of systems). deployment of the INF-range mis- deployment of the ground-launched During the Cold War, the Soviet siles will be an effective means of missile is not necessarily cheaper Union agreed to negotiate the INF deterrence and response of the U.S. than the others. If the U.S. con- Treaty to eliminate SS-20 having against Chinese, Russian, and North sider the deployment of the ground- NATO’s Double-Track Decision and Korean missile capability, the U.S. launched missiles in countries in the Soviet Union’s financial bur- must assess the security environ- the Indo-Pacifi c region, there are not den in the back ground. So, unless ment in the region and examine many U.S. army bases suitable for countries surrounding China deploy various issues associated with the the missile deployment (except for various types of missiles around deployment comprehensively. the U.S. Forces Korea); hence, the China and those missiles apparently Question is where and how the U.S. might want to choose rotational become pressure and burden to missiles should be deployed in the deployment at more than one site China, it may not participate in the Indo-Pacific region. If the U.S. within the region in terms of the arms control negotiation. In other prioritizes potential threat to the survivability of deployed missiles words, to create a situation that will country, some countries among can- and the political diffi culty associated prompt China to agree to take part didate sites of land-based missiles with the deployment. in multilateral negotiation will be deployment should be excluded al- Other candidate regions where the a condition for initiating the INF- ready: Taiwan cannot be a candidate U.S. can deploy its newly-developed range missile negotiation. For the because of the relationship with INF-range missiles beyond the Indo- time being, we must try to establish China. Australia also cannot be a Pacifi c region are Europe --including the system of deterrence and re- candidate because of the distance Eastern Europe-- and the Middle sponse against China’s asymmetric and operational diffi culty. When we East-Gulf countries. NATO member missile threat. consider this kind of deployment states have already deployed the The U.S. decision criteria for the plan, we need consider the following European ballistic missile system

Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 9 Focus

as measures taken against the INF- Treaty evolved in the Cold War era. among the U.S, Russia, and China range missiles of Iran and Russia. The history suggests that Japan will inevitably heighten over the If the latter introduces a new INF discuss closely with NATO member ballistic and cruise missile issues or hypersonic system in Eastern Eu- states, Australia, India, and several in view of the INF-range missiles. rope, or if Iran advances its nuclear other ASEAN member states. It is Japan will have to respond to such development, missile threats at the necessary for Japan to urge the U.S. situation with the mindset to en- European front will grow, thereby to consider the following: (1) Have a hance the function of deterrence of provoking a debate about whether frank talk with Russia about their the U.S.-Japan alliance. the current missile defense system policy toward China, and persuade Taking the above into consider- alone can handle the emerging China to participate in the global ation, I think that Japan should threats. In any case, NATO member arms control negotiation of the INF- adopt the following principles in states thus far agreed to decide its range missiles among the U.S, Rus- policy-making: (1) Act decisively response as a collective defense or- sia, and China. (2) Even if China against current and future threats ganization and act collectively. Un- does not agree to participate in the of the intermediate-range missiles der this policy, each of NATO mem- new arms control negotiation, dis- of China, North Korea, and Russia. ber states is not ready to make any cuss the INF-range missiles in detail (2) Prioritize the Japan-U.S. alli- independent response on its own. with Russia. (3) If the U.S. consider ance and take measures within the In the Indo-Pacific region, apart an option of deploying the ground- framework of the Treaty of Mutual from various types of INF-range launched missiles within the Indo- Cooperation and Security between missiles deployed by China and Pacifi c region, have a close dialogue the U.S. and Japan. (3) Bolster Ja- North Korea, Russia has been con- with Japan as a U.S. ally. pan’s power of deterrence--one by sidering the deployment of its mis- Also, I think that it is important denial as well as punishment--, but siles. Russia announced to have for Japan to request the U.S. to do not pursue offensive capability to conducted site surveys in Matua choose an option to enhance the strike enemy’s military bases as the and Paramushir Islands in 2016 and function of extended deterrence, deterrence by punishment. And, (4) 2017 for the deployment of Bastion, while respecting Japan’s three non- Simultaneously pursue measures for Bal, and Iskander missiles. We need nuclear principles. Even if the U.S. arms control or disarmament that to carefully figure out whether the presents a plan of the INF-range involve China and Russia. Far East will be a strategic environ- missile deployment in Japan, it is If the U.S. requests Japan to de- ment similar to Europe. crucial for Japan to make sure the ploy the INF-range missiles in the missiles are only armed with con- future, Japan should respond in Japan’s Response to Deployment of ventional warheads in view of the the following manner based on the INF-Range Missiles afore-mentioned three non-nuclear above-mentioned principles: (1) Ac- How should Japan respond to principles of Japan. Japan needs cept the deployment of only either those? It is important to strengthen to convince the U.S. that there is no cruise missiles armed with conven- the Japan-U.S. alliance through a room in its territory for the deploy- tional warheads or missiles that are close dialogue with the U.S. about ment of the missiles armed with designed to be equipped with hy- the extended deterrence and re- nuclear warheads. personic glide vehicles. The missile sponses for the national security- Also, Japan has to be able to ex- system should be unmanned and related issues including the INF- plain to the nation why the U.S. include mobile vehicles. To improve range missiles. Simultaneously, it will have to deploy the INF-range the survivability, more than one is also important to express Japan’s missiles armed with conventional unit of them should be deployed on own idea about the deployment of warheads on land within the Indo- remote islands. (2) Deploy several the INF-range missiles to maintain Pacific region. If the U.S. deploys units each not only in Japan but also its national security. the conventional missiles within in several other countries within Recall how things around the INF the Indo-Pacific region, the tension the Indo-Pacifi c region (Guam, other

10 Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 Focus

U.S. allies within the Indo-Pacific from its local municipalities to the Japan must think of its future region, or other friendly countries) missile deployment. seriously. China has more than to confuse enemy’s choice of tar- There are political obstacles to 2,000 intermediate-range missiles gets. Coordinate with air- and sea- Japan’s acquisition and deployment as of now--a nuclear warhead can be launched missiles to enhance the of long-range cruise or ballistic mis- mounted on 90% of these--. Is Japan power of deterrence. (3) Subordinate siles in Japan. However, the deploy- willing to live under the threat of the deployment system to the U.S. ment of a conventional-warhead China today and well into the future? Integrated Air-and-Missile Defense cruise missile or a system for hyper- If the threat becomes a reality, is system (IAMD), and integrate it into sonic glide vehicles by the U.S. to the the U.S. nuclear umbrella enough to the network of the enhanced mis- U.S. Forces Japan is not a problem safeguard Japan’s national security? sile defense system, space and cyber unless it is regarded as a change in We need to think of this seriously. security, C3I (command, control, the equipment subject to the prior Suppose that the U.S. requests the communications, and intelligence) consultation under the U.S.-Japan missile deployment in Japan. What systems. (4) Implement these while Security Treaty. The greatest chal- should we do? If Japan cannot act concurrently promote arms control lenge is to obtain consent from local decisively and end up delaying its and disarmament with China and municipalities to the missile deploy- answer or being indecisive for long, Russia. Use the deployment pro- ment, and also to implement this then that will be the gravest security gram as a means of negotiation as while facing strong opposition from threat to Japan. needed. And, (5) Obtain consent China.

Onagawa-2 Passed Safety Review

Nuclear Regulation Authority tries across Japan. It has been nine years since the formally approved restart of unit 2 At the time of the earthquake, unit 2011 Tohoku earthquake. The evacu- reactor of the Tohoku Electric Power 1 (524 MW) and unit 3 (825 MW) ation orders were issued for a total Company’s Onagawa nuclear power were in regular operation, whereas 1,150 km2 area consisting of the plant on February 26, 2020, complet- unit 2 (825 MW ) just restarted af- whole or part of the area of 11 mu- ing safety examinations under new ter completing periodic inspections. nicipalities around the Fukushima safety standards. The Onagawa plant Immediately afterwards all of them Daiichi plant. The government lifted located at 14.8 m above sea level were automatically shut down. the evacuation orders partially first sank about 1 m, along with the Fu- Tohoku Electric fi led for safety re- in October 2014, and gradually ex- kushima Daiichi and Daini plants, on view of unit 2 under the new safety panded the areas. To date, the orders March 11, 2011, when the earthquake standards in December 2013. It took have been lifted for about 70 percent of magnitude 9 hit the region, but the six years and two months to com- (in terms of area) of the evacuation plant survived a 13 m tsunami and plete. The company decided in Octo- zones. If Onagawa-2 is restarted shut down the reactors safely. This ber 2018 to scrap unit 1. It has not following the approval of the NRA, NRA’s approval should be a major yet filed for safety review of unit 3, it will certainly help revitalize local milestone for those who are working but the approval of unit 2 is certainly communities devastated by the East in electric and nuclear power indus- positive news for unit 3. Japan Earthquake.

Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 11 12 Plutonium No.88 Spring 2020 Editor's Postscripts COVID-19 has spread around the safety examination of their eleven nuclear quake, in contrast to renewable sources, world, and shows no sign of dying out. fuel facilities, but it is much harder to get whose electricity generation fl uctuates in The virus has already impacted global the green-light for them than for nuclear the amount. Nuclear power also played economy. The 2020 Tokyo Olympic and power plants. We hope that facilities in a great role as zero-emission electric- Paralympic Games had to be postponed. line with Japan’s energy policy will start ity generating facilities. The regulatory Healthcare workers around the world are operation as soon as possible. authority has introduced the new safety working day and night to fi ght against the Japan has very limited energy re- standards and safety review process since virus. We are so grateful to them, and sources domestically. To increase self- the Fukushima nuclear disaster, to ensure look forward to good news. We extend sufficiency of primary energy, Japan de- nuclear power will be a safer and more re- our sincere condolences to the victims veloped nuclear power as the main pillar liable source of energy in the future. The of coronavirus and those who have lost of its energy policy, which fulfilled its nuclear power industry has never stopped loved ones, and wish those infected a responsibilities. Because nuclear power evolving. The industry is improving its speedy recovery. does not emit carbon dioxide gases, it was production, operation, and regulatory Hopefully the safety review of the considered as one of the measures against compliance, while there is no pause in Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant under the global warming. Nuclear power played global warming. We look forward to new safety standards is in the fi nal stage. an important role as a reliable electricity seeing quick and reliable results of the Six companies filed for the regulator’s source until the 2011 East Japan Earth- nuclear power industry’s efforts.