Prentice J. Sargeant

HIST 711

Dr. Martin Sherwin

December 9th, 2013

Islands of Sanity: John F. Kennedy & the Alliance for Progress

On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced an economic aid program for

Latin America, unparalleled in size and scope to anything that the United States had attempted in the region. Dubbed the Alliance for Progress, this new program was designed as a "vast cooperative effort…to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health, and schools." In this speech, the president made clear that the “Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free governments-and it must work to eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in which it has no right place.” This, Kennedy said, was the joint mission of all nations in the Western

Hemisphere.1 By promoting a mutual economic aid program to assist in nation-building,

Kennedy sought to accentuate social and economic growth while simultaneously combating communism in Latin America.

By joining these two purposes, the Alliance for Progress combined both soft and hard power. Superficially, the AFP was entirely soft power.2 It espoused ideals, like erasing poverty and improving education, and promised massive economic aid to promote growth, which was greatly needed in Latin America. Nations in Latin America commonly dealt with high inflation,

1 John F. Kennedy: "Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics," March 13, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8531. 2 According to political scientist Joseph Nye, soft power is required to “attract others in world politics and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions.” Rather than using blunt military force, or even extortion or threat of violence, Nye argues that the desirability of a nation’s culture, political values, and foreign policies can instill a “power of seduction” that induces allegiance with certain values. Joseph S. Nye, Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (: Public Affairs, 2004), 5-9. high infant death rates, and a lack of public education for the masses. Economic aid, to promote progressive economic and social change, was necessary to end the crises gripping the region.

But the AFP was not just an example of soft power; as time wore on Kennedy also applied hard-line policies to achieve the changes he desired in the Western Hemisphere.3 To the

Kennedy administration, Latin America was not just the impoverished neighbor that needed an economic jumpstart; it was a feeding ground for communist ideas, gripping entire regions in the

Cuban mindset. In order to stop communism from spreading, Kennedy resorted to policies used by his predecessors.

President Kennedy’s policies in Latin America were conceptually flawed, from start to finish. As senator, Kennedy heavily criticized the Eisenhower administration for ignoring the

“economic gap, the gap…between the developed and undeveloped worlds.” Kennedy claimed that by ignoring the needs of the Third World, Eisenhower permanently damaged the American reputation as the leader of the free world.4 During his presidential run, Kennedy pledged to break from the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policies; covert operations were to be replaced with foreign aid programs to bring the Latin America into the First World. The Alliance for

Progress was Kennedy’s vision for progressive change. But reality trumped Kennedy’s vision and that he resorted to the same tactics that Eisenhower had practiced.

Kennedy adopted both hard and soft policies in Latin America. In nations like Venezuela and Columbia, his policies were welcomed by anticommunist leaders. But in others, particularly

Brazil and Argentina, Kennedy was greeted with disinterest: Brazilian and Argentinean leaders did not share Kennedy’s fear of Cuban communism. In Kennedy’s mind, anticommunism was

3 Nye describes hard power as “military and economic might” that “rest[s] on inducements or threats,” which includes military action and extortion. Nye, 5-9. 4 “Economics: The Economic Gap,” Speeches and the Press, February 19, 1959, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 1-7. key to the progressive change that he wanted in Latin America: if a nation fell to communism or promoted communism, it could never improve living standards, educational values, and economic development.5 The AFP, then, was an aid program designed to help developing nations that supported anticommunist policies; and a weapon to weaken left-leaning governments.

Despite some of the actions that his administration would take in and Argentina,

Kennedy was dedicated to his vision of progressive change, for both the United States and Latin

America. Desperate to differentiate himself from the previous administration of covert military operations, Kennedy first exhibited his dedication to change by his refusal to send reinforcements to Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion.6 But his dedication to the AFP waned when Kennedy realized that economic aid did not beget anticommunism. The Bay of Pigs represented one of the few examples in which the Kennedy administration sacrificed anticommunism for the benefit of the AFP.

In arguing that Kennedy doomed the Alliance for Progress, I am reversing a few trends that have existed in the Kennedy mythology since the 1960’s. One of Kennedy’s biographers,

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., blamed President Johnson’s administration for giving up on the AFP.

Schlesinger claimed that, had Kennedy lived to fulfill his first and possibly win a second term, the AFP may have succeeded in creating the progressive change Kennedy envisioned. Because

Kennedy’s time in office only “lasted about a thousand days,” Schlesinger argued that “the

Alliance was never really tried.”7 To prove his point, Schlesinger recalled a brief conversation

5 Kimber Charles Pearce, Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), 88-89. 6 “Memorandum from the Attorney General to President Kennedy, April 19, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics, (Washington GPO, 1996), 302-305. 7 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective,” in Latin America: The Search for a New International Role, ed. Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), 83. between Robert F. Kennedy and a State Department official in 1965, shortly before the attorney general left for a tour of Latin America:

“After listening to the usual cant, Kennedy finally said, ‘What the Alliance for

Progress has come down to then is that you can close down newspapers, abolish

congress, jail religious opposition, and deport your political enemies, and you’ll

get lots if help, but if you fool around with a U.S. oil company, we’ll cut you off

without a penny. Is that right?’ The official replied, ‘That’s about the size of it.”8

Ted Sorensen believed that “reality did not match the rhetoric which flowed about the Alliance.”

His speeches, alongside those of economist Walt Whitman Rostow, embodied Kennedy’s personal beliefs about progressive economic and social change; but the man who wrote many of

Kennedy’s speeches argued that Kennedy embraced the neutralism of Latin America during the

Cold War, refusing to “fix an aid recipient’s domestic policy” or coerce an alliance out of a neutral power.9

Some contemporary historians have agreed with Schlesinger and Sorensen, including presidential biographer Robert Dallek. In his biography of Kennedy, Dallek argued that

“[r]esistance to reform in Latin America itself was a…greater obstacle. Kennedy’s idealistic rhetoric about transforming the region had not persuaded entrenched interests across the hemisphere.”10 Some Latin American critics even went so far as to call the AFP the “Fidel

Castro Plan.” Dallek did argue that Kennedy resorted to the interventionist policies of the

Eisenhower years, but Dallek countered that criticism of the president, arguing that his proposed

“alliance between the United States and Latin America to advance economic development,

8 Schlesinger, “The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective,” 80. 9 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), 537-539. 10 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 2003), 436. democratic institutions, and social justice” trumped Kennedy’s desire to keep Latin America from turning red.11

Contemporary historians have been more willing to blame the failure of Kennedy’s vision on Kennedy’s actions. In his work, Stephen G. Rabe argued that “President John F. Kennedy brought high ideals and noble purposes to his Latin American policy. Ironically, however, his unwavering determination to wage Cold War in ‘the most dangerous area in the world’ led him and his administration ultimately to compromise and even mutilate those grand goals for the

Western Hemisphere.”12 Rabe’s argument is similar to mine, but it differs in a key way. Rabe rested a lot of blame on Johnson’s rejection of democracy in Latin America, choosing to support military dictatorships who were rabidly anticommunist rather than support hemispheric democracy, as had Kennedy.13 But I find that Kennedy’s failures to fully commit himself to his grand vision of progressive change irrevocably damaged the AFP; by the time Johnson inherited the program, it was already dead.

According to Kennedy, progressive change and anticommunism went hand-in-hand. The

AFP was designed to “create a neighborhood of Western hemisphere countries with whom [the

United States] can live on a friendly basis.” Kennedy wanted to count on Latin American

“support in the basic issues of the world power struggle” between the United States and the

Soviet Union.14 Progressive change, therefore, meant that the United States and Latin America would cooperate on hemispheric decisions, but Kennedy envisioned an anticommunist relationship. Leaders like Jânio Quadros of Brazil or Arturo Frondizi of Argentina- who lived easily with communism- forced Kennedy to give up on the progressive change he sought in favor

11 Dallek, 340-342. 12 Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline, 1999), 199. 13 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area, 173. 14 Edwin McCammon Martin, Kennedy and Latin America (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 73-74. of the anticommunist policies that had defined the U.S.-Latin American relationship since World

War II.

The Alliance for Progress was Kennedy’s brainchild, but he drew on the writings, works, and policies of several men to inspire his project. One of the most notable was economist Walt

Whitman Rostow, future economic advisor to President Kennedy. Rostow was a prolific supporter of free enterprise and a staunch anti-communist; his manifesto, The Stages of

Economic Growth, was his crowning achievement. The basis of Rostow's argument was that most economic growth would naturally lead to the development of democracy and capitalism, as seen in Western Europe. Rostow described this rise as a "transition," one from what he called

"the traditional society" to "the take-off," which Rostow argued would lead to "the age of high mass-consumption," which the United States and Western Europe had largely achieved after the

Industrial Revolution.15 Kennedy embraced this ideology and it became a staple in his foreign policy goals for the remainder of his career.16

Another key inspiration for the AFP was former Brazilian President Juscelino

Kubitschek’s Operation Pan America, a challenging idea that promoted economic reform and development throughout the entire hemisphere. Originally designed as a reinterpretation of the

Marshall Plan geared towards Latin America, Operation Pan America never jumpstarted, mostly because Eisenhower refused to dedicate himself to a project based solely on economic aid.17

Kubitschek repeatedly requested economic aid from the United States, citing a figure of about

$40 billion over the following twenty years. When briefed on the subject, Eisenhower brushed

15 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 8-9. 16 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 588-592. 17 “Memorandum from Thomas C. Mann to C. Douglas Dillon, January 26, 1959,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1991), 709. aside the plan and commented that “he approved of Latin American leaders who ‘battled’ their people.” Eisenhower was never interested in promoting a the close relationship for which

Kubitschek advocated.18 But Kennedy loved the idea; in its initial conception the AFP was what historian Edwin M. Martin described as a “fulfillment of Kubitschek’s ‘Operation Pan

America.’”19 The similarities between the AFP and Operation Pan America, which had been extremely popular amongst Latin American leaders, helped Kennedy garner hemispheric support for the Alliance for Progress.20

Perhaps the most important inspiration for the AFP came from President Dwight D.

Eisenhower. While in the Senate, Kennedy maintained a constant criticism of the Eisenhower administration’s handling of foreign policy, especially his policies towards Latin America. In

1959, Kennedy attacked Eisenhower over his lack of economic aid to Latin America; he claimed that the only reason Eisenhower expressed any interest in the region was because his vice president had been attacked by angry mobs in Uruguay, Venezuela, and Columbia.21 In

Congress, Kennedy quipped that only “[w]hen the Latin Americans throw rocks at the Vice

President, there is finally talk of a Latin American load fund.”22 Furthermore, he pledged to support new programs that broke away from Eisenhower’s inept policies. Kennedy blamed the

Eisenhower administration for the state of affairs in the Western Hemisphere, declaring that an

“announced policy of non-intervention becomes a sham when it is turned off and on to suit our own purposes.” Calling for unity, Kennedy believed that a cooperative relationship was the only

18 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1988), 110-114. 19 Martin, 88. 20 Lincoln Gordon., interview by John E. Rielly, May 30, 1964, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, transcript, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Oral History Collection, Boston, MA, available online at http:www.jfklibrary.org, 6-7. 21 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 366th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 22, 1958” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1991), 239-240. 22 “Economics: The Economic Gap,” 1-7. way forward because it would foster educational reform, judicial reform, and economic reform all of which would help end the stigma of underdevelopment in Latin America.23

After winning the election of 1960, Kennedy created a Task Force for Latin America to determine why Latin America was stuck in a constant battle against poverty, malnutrition, and disease.24 Members, including Lincoln Gordon, Teodoro Moscoso, Robert Alexander, and Adolf

Berle were tasked with “latch[ing] onto the Good Neighbor policy of Roosevelt” because it “had been successful.”25 In their report, the Task Force found that Latin America was a “major and active Cold War theatre” and concluded that “continued inaction may entail grave risk” to the hemisphere.26 Gordon, the economic member of the Task Force, argued that “private enterprise and a good climate for it and for American investment would accomplish all necessary social and economic development.”27 Unlike previous stimulatory expeditions into Latin America, the task force recommended a new program that would lead a “sustained effort for economic development and social progress, combining rigorous measures of self-help with the provision of complimentary outside resources” from the United States and agencies that it funded.28 Task

Force members recommended that the Kennedy administration should “emphasize its vivid interest in Latin America,” while ensuring that President Kennedy continue to support Latin

American republics by preventing “its capture by overseas Communist Power

23 “Foreign affairs: A New Attitude on Latin America,” Speeches and the Press, December 15, 1958, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 4-9. 24 Lincoln Gordon Interview, 4-6. 25 Adolf A. Berle Jr., interview by Joseph E. O’Connor, July 6, 1967, in , New York, transcript, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Oral History Collection, Boston, MA, available online at http:www.jfklibrary.org, 7-8. 26 Adolf A. Berle Jr. Interview, 10-11. 27 Task Force Report, January 4, 1961, Moscoso Papers, box 9, “Report of the Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems, Winter, 1960,” John K. Kennedy Presidential Library, 2-4. 28 “Drafts Memorandum from the Lincoln Gordon to Richard N. Goodwin, March 6, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 6-8. politics.”29Anticommunism was the report’s central theme. The Task Force believed that

“American governments shall not become either prisoners or tools of extra-American Power politics.” Task Force members went even so far as to argue that the “present Communist challenge in Latin America resembles, but is more dangerous than, the Nazi-Fascist threat” of the

1930s.

After initial planning, Kennedy chose Teodoro Moscoso as the Coordinator of the

Alliance for Progress.30 Kennedy had high hopes for Moscoso, but his hopes were misplaced. As

Arthur Schlesinger remembered, Moscoso’s failings more apparent than his successes; “Moscoso was unexcelled in communicating the political and social idealism of the Alliance,” to “Latin

Americans, who had great faith in him, to Congress, where he was well-respected, and to his own staff.”31 He was ill-prepared to handle the bureaucratic nightmare that was aid distribution and he lacked sufficient political weight to garner inter-departmental support for the AFP which contributed to its failure.32

On August 17th, 1961, the AFP was officially created. Drafted by the OAS, the Charter of

Punta del Este was a treaty between the United States and Latin America, promising to affirm positive change in the latter, particularly in regards to economic reform and social development.

The U.S. Delegation spearheaded the creation of the Charter, advocating the Alliance as a

“cooperative effort to accelerate the economic and social development of the participating

29 “Report From the Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems to President-Elect Kennedy, January 4, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics, (Washington GPO, 1996), 3. Emphasis in original document. 30 Martin, 69. 31 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 790. 32 Schlesinger argued that Moscoso was unable to argue his way to other top level government agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moscoso’s weakness forced him to “seek short-term political results at the expense of long- term development policies,” which in turn weakened the AFP. Schlesinger, “The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective,” 73-74. countries of Latin America.”33 But the United States circumvented the “cooperative” aspect of the Charter. In the final draft, the American delegation promised American financial assistance, over $20 billion over the course of the decade, but maintained that “a substantial portion…should be extended on flexible conditions with respect to periods and terms of repayment and forms of utilization, in order to supplement domestic capital formation and reinforce their import capacity.”34 Therefore, the United States had the right to reject financial aid, if the nation receiving it was deemed unreliable by the Kennedy administration. Cooperation was supplanted by American domination; with this compromise, Kennedy and his advisors were the dominant voice in the AFP and its aid distribution policies.

When the Alliance for Progress was created, Kennedy had two goals: to promote progressive change in Latin America, through economic and social development, and to stem the rising tide of communism. Hoping to combine the two, Kennedy attempted to foster progressive change through anticommunist aid policy. But reality trumped Kennedy’s vision. Few Latin

American leaders had faith in Kennedy’s AFP. Venezuela’s Betancourt and Columbia’s Lleras

Camargo recognized the need for the “Alliance for Progress and the need for the United States to wage Cold War against the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally.”35 Both had been supporters of

Kubitschek’s “Operation Pan America,” so the AFP was the type of program they believed could succeed.36

But national leaders in Brazil and Argentina were more indifferent to Kennedy’s anticommunist policies. None of the leaders viewed Cuba or the Cuban ideological prose as a

33 “The Charter of Punta del Este,” August 17th, 1961, “The Avalon Project,” Yale University, accessed on http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/. 34 “The Charter of Punta del Este,” August 17th, 1961, “The Avalon Project,” Yale University, accessed on http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/. Emphasis added by author. 35 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 123. 36 Martin, Kennedy and Latin America, 87-88. threat to national security, but many were still in favor of American economic assistance.

Kennedy’s rhetoric did not pierce their shroud of security and none of them supported the United

States’ dominance of the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, Kennedy had to alter his policies in

Latin America. With those who supported American anticommunism, Kennedy was gracious with funds from the AFP. For those who rejected his policies against Cuba, Kennedy was far more hesitant to promote the progressive change his vision entailed, fearing his aid would fall into the hands of an unreliable regime.

Open support for the AFP was hard to come by. In Venezuela, Rómulo Betancourt welcomed Kennedy’s policies with open arms for two reasons. The first was Venezuela’s deteriorating economic situation. Coming into power as one of the first democratic Venezuelan presidents, Betancourt was determined to enact social reforms, transforming Venezuela into a permanent democracy, without interference from the extreme left or right. But global prices for

Venezuela’s biggest export, oil, were dropping steadily in the early 1960’s; despite the taxes he was issuing on oil exports, Betancourt was not making enough money to pay for the social reforms for which he was pushing. Betancourt knew that American aid, through the AFP and through additional loans from the Agency for International Development (AID), would be able to sponsor the change he and Kennedy wanted for Venezuela.37

The second reason that Betancourt supported Kennedy was his desire to rid Latin

America of communism. In the first years of his presidency, Betancourt pledged to help Kennedy block Cuba from the OAS. Betancourt even tried forming special bonds with more ambivalent

Latin American leaders, such as Presidents Frondizi and López Mateos, in order to align them

37 Martin, 358-359. against Cuba in the OAS.38 Additionally, Betancourt pledged his dedication to hemispheric democracy in his own “Betancourt Doctrine,” which stated that Venezuela “shall solicit cooperation of other democratic governments of American to request jointly that OAS exclude from its midst the dictatorial governments,” such as Cuba.39 Betancourt’s dedication to anticommunism was among the most fervent in Latin America.

For the Kennedy administration, Venezuela was the ideal poster-nation for the AFP. Not only was Betancourt a “rugged fighter for democracy,” but Venezuela was deemed the “greatest point of attack” by communists forces by Kennedy’s Task Force.40 Cuban forces were interested in removing Betancourt from power and they attempted to assassinate him several times.41 If the

AFP could foster growth in Venezuela, while combating the communist threat, Kennedy’s dual- mission in Latin America would be achieved.

But only half of the battle was actually won. By the time Betancourt peacefully transferred power in 1964, the communist threat had been thwarted. With American support,

Betancourt had managed to establish a new democratic tradition in Venezuela. Robert Kennedy asserted that, had it not been for American assistance, “Venezuela would have been taken over by the Communists.”42 But when it came to economic and social growth, Venezuela was regarded as a failure for the AFP. Under the AFP, educational reforms had failed to succeed, while the annual growth rate never hit the 2.5% that the Charter of Punta del Este called for.43

38 “Memorandum of Conversation, December 16, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 272. 39 “The Betancourt Doctrine,” quoted in Robert J. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982, 525. 40 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 766 and “Report From the Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems to President-Elect Kennedy, January 4, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics, (Washington GPO, 1996), 3. 41 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 36. 42 Ed. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, Robert Kennedy In His Own Words: The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), 256. 43 Ronald L. Scheman, The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective (New York: Praeger, 1988), 26-28. The Kennedy administration’s resolve to promote progressive change and anticommunism was not strong enough to see gains in both goals. In Venezuela, progressive social and economic development failed to take hold, but the democratic traditions Kennedy wished to impart in the region did succeed, for a time.

In Columbia, President Guillermo Leon Valencia was extremely dedicated to U.S. policies, calling Kennedy’s AFP speech the “most important document in all Panamerican history.”44 Winning the election of 1962, Valencia became the leader of one of the most dysfunctional nations in Latin America. Columbia had a history of unstable democratic rule, stemming from violent conflicts between local liberals and conservatives. Valencia’s predecessor, Alberto Lleras Camargo, had worked closely with Betancourt to exclude Cuba from the OAS, recommending that the hemisphere “break off relations with [Cuba]” because Cuba had “reneged on its inter-American commitments.”45 Additionally, before the AFP was created,

Lleras had already begun issuing new tax and agrarian reforms, supported by American aid from

AID.46 Schlesinger recalled that Lleras’s Columbia was one of only a few governments that were

“fully responsive to the aims of Alliance,” both in terms of progressive reform and anticommunism.47

But Valencia only claimed dedication to the AFP: because of the deadlock in congress created by an equal split between liberal and conservative members, Valencia could not secure the proper legislation to support a reform plan as the AFP required. Valencia remained committed to anticommunism, as Lleras had before him. His anticommunism and the political instability gripping Bogotá caused Kennedy pledge AFP aid to support the Valencia government,

44 Valencia quoted in Martin, Kennedy and Latin America, 325. 45 “Memorandum of Conversation, December 17, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 275-276. 46 Martin, 323. 47 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 790. despite its failure to promote any type of economic or social development. Choosing to support a short-term stability rather than promote progressive change, Kennedy abandoned his grand vision in Columbia, but continued to support Valencia because of his dedication to Lleras’s anti-

Cuba policies in the OAS.48 Because Valencia could not issue any sort of economic or social reform, the AFP in Columbia is remembered as “a notable failure.”49 Columbia was proof that

Kennedy’s vision was easily overcome by anticommunist stability: progressive change was not so important for a nation dedicated to preventing the spread of communism.

But what happens when a nation takes an ambivalent stance on American anticommunism? How would President Kennedy react to a nation that rejected the threat of communism in Latin America? The answer is simple: aid would be withheld or diverted to other local leaders that were more willing to support an American agenda. Unwilling to promote military action against neutral states since he did not want to appear to be a bully in what was drafted as a cooperative relationship, Kennedy was forced to use the AFP, his vision for progressive change, as an instrument of economic blackmail. Kennedy wielded this weapon in several ways, but the most obvious of those were in Brazil and Argentina, In these two nations, the Kennedy administration, through the AFP and the CIA, destabilized regimes that disagreed with American policymakers, reversing the Kennedy’s vision of a cooperative relationship between the United States and Latin America.

In Brazil, President Jânio Quadros fostered an independent foreign policy that promoted openness with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. Claiming to be “systematically neutral,”

Quadros drew on a wide popular base that supported this independent policy.50 In nationwide

48 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 160. 49 Martin, 328. 50 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 64. Quadros also hosted Josip Tito and Ché Guevara, awarding the latter with the Order of the Southern Cross, one of Brazil’s most prestigious national honors. polls, over 70% of Brazilian voters supported open relations with the Soviet Union and China, while only 22% believed in a close relationship with the United States, such as the one created in the Charter of Punta del Este. Still, 40% more Brazilian politicians preferred a policy emanating the American policies, rather than their Soviet equivalents. But nonalignment was the preferred foreign policy.51

Despite his admiration for President Kennedy, Quadros had no interest in following a

U.S.-directed anticommunist policy. Kennedy recognized the importance of Brazil in Latin

American affairs: Brazil possessed huge economic potential and the largest market in Latin

America. Communism was still a small national movement, but the Northeastern region of Brazil was one of the most impoverished regions in South America and the Kennedy administration feared that communism could find support in the poor farmers failing to make a decent living.52

Kennedy feared that, with an independent leader like Quadros, Brazil would be more susceptible to communist intervention. In order to prevent this, he needed to bring Quadros to an American mindset. Economic aid became his bargaining chip.

Before the AFP had been chartered, Kennedy sent Ambassador Adolf Berle to meet with

Quadros in order to convince the Brazilian president to support American sanctions, both military and economic, in Cuba. When Berle and current ambassador met with Quadros, he offered $100 million to the Brazilian president to help import necessary capital goods for emergency relief in the Northeast.53 Berle recalled that, after Quadros politely declined to accept the money, the ambassador attempted to persuade Quadros to support American action

51 TNA: PRO: "Attitudes of the Brazilian Congress, Lloyd A. Free," in 1961, RG 59: General Records of the State Department: Bureau of Inter-American Affairs: Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Box 1. 52 Martin, 291. 53 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 65. in Cuba, which Quadros also declined. Berle was upset at the results, but he did not think that

Quadros took the meeting negatively.54

But Cabot remembered Berle’s meeting with Quadros differently. In his official memorandum to the State Department, Cabot wrote that Quadros did “seem to be in complete agreement with Berle’s analysis of [the] Cuba situation.”55 But, when recalling the meeting between Berle and Quadros a few years later, Cabot remembered Berle saying, “‘now, we’re going to let you have a hundred million dollars, no strings attached, and we can consider more if you need it.’” After an initial refusal, Berle then mentioned the Cuban question, asking for public support should the United States take some action against Cuba. Before hearing an answer, Berle again mentioned the $100 million dollars to in an attempt to sway Quadros over to his side.

Cabot recalled that Berle’s ploy was obviously “just a bribe.” Quadros, “with increasing irritation,” again refused and then promptly ended their meeting.56 Berle’s attempt at extortion was the first example of the Kennedy administration using economic aid as a weapon.

But Quadros’s presidency turned out to be short lived. On August 25th, only eight months into his presidency, Quadros resigned, thinking that the Brazilian military and congress would demand him back. But that never happened: instead, João Goulart, a socialist sympathizer, became president, albeit with limited executive power.57 Ambassador Lincoln Gordon warned

54 Adolf A. Berle Jr. Interview, 30-32. This took place a little more than a month before the Bay of Pigs Invasion, which ended disastrously for Kennedy. Brazilian support, while unlikely, may have convinced the president to push harder after the initial invasion failed. 55 “Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, March 3, 1961,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 427-428. 56 John Moors Cabot, interview by William W. Moss, January 27, 1971, in Washington, D.C., transcript, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Oral History Collection, Boston, MA, available online at http:www.jfklibrary.org, 3-5. In the same trip to Latin America, Berle made a similar offer to Betancourt in Venezuela, who graciously supported any action the U.S. would take against Cuba Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, 21. 57Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990), 35-36. Brazilian power brokers, both in the military and government, feared Goulart’s allegiances, so the office of prime minister was created to check executive power, which had been the dominant force in politics since World War II. Kennedy and his advisors to “be prepared to give [Goulart] reasonable benefit of doubt."58

Kennedy did give Goulart some initial support, arranging a transfer of $84 million as “stopgap assistance” in 1962, with $314.5 million more to follow by 1964. 59

But Goulart proved to be too leftwing for the Kennedy administration. To gauge

Goulart’s dedication to American policy, Kennedy sent two emissaries to observe Goulart. The first, General William Draper, wrote that additional funding would be required to fix the economic situation, especially since Goulart’s government was lagging on curbing inflation.

Draper recommended that the president “keep in touch with the civil and military alternatives to

Goulart…if Goulart were replaced.”60 The second emissary, Attorney General Robert F.

Kennedy, “didn’t like Goulart, nor did I trust him.”61 Kennedy’s men persuaded him to cut back on aid to Brazil, resulting in a breakdown of relations between the two nations. Shortly after these missions, Kennedy began to rethink his Brazilian aid program and he decided to cut and divert the aid, keeping it away from Goulart.

The Kennedy administration diverted Brazilian aid in several ways. Originally, Kennedy supported Lincoln Gordon’s destabilization plan, which entitled AFP aid to conservative opponents of Goulart in congress, state governorships, and the military. Considered “islands of sanity,” Gordon thought that these conservative allies of the United States would “[perform] according to Alliance for Progress standards,” as opposed to Goulart and his leftwing allies.62

Some of the money that was supposed to be sent to Goulart to support his Five Year Plan for the economy was funneled to men like Governor Carlos Lacerda, who opposed Goulart in any way

58 Lincoln Gordon to Sec. of State Dean Rusk, 6 Sept. 1961, NSF Co-K. 59 Phyllis R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Revolution, 1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 38-39. 60 William Draper summarized in Martin, Kennedy and Latin America, 311. 61 Guthman and Shulman, 366. 62 Lincoln Gordon quoted in Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964, 47 and TNA: PRO: "H. Wellman to State Department," 30 Nov. 1962, RG 59: General Records of the State Department: Central Decimal File, 1960- 1963, Box 1579. he could. The rest of the money never made it to Brazil; it stayed safely in the AFP. The CIA supported Gordon’s plan as well: operatives spent an additional $5 million on grassroots organizing and campaigning for various state legislators, governors, and even a few national senators.63

Kennedy even diverted funds from the extremely impoverished Northeast, which was making improvements with aid from the AFP. Instead, funds the Kennedy administration allocated those funds for the American Institute of Free Labor Development. The AIFLD was dedicated to promoting anticommunist labor unions; 89% of their budget, nearly $15.4 million, was supplied by Kennedy through the AFP. These funds went to funding protest movements against Goulart and the labor unions that supported him, rather than assisting poor Northeastern

Brazilian families.64

With AFP aid making its way into conservative hands, Kennedy actually assisted in funding the coup that ended Goulart’s regime in 1964. Carried out by the Brazilian military, with tacit military support from the Johnson administration, the coup removed Goulart from power and installed General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco as Brazil’s first military president.

Ambassador Gordon described the coup as the "single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-20th century."65 For the next two decades, a military junta governed Brazil; these leaders believed that civilian politicians were unqualified to govern Brazil, so they retained dictatorial power until 1985. Despite the harsh military rule under Castello Branco and his successors, the

Johnson administration sent between $600 and $700 million to the junta every year of his

63 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 69. 64 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 69. 65 Lincoln Gordon quoted in Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, 197. presidency from the AFP.66 It is unknown how Kennedy would have handled the coup against

Goulart, but many of Kennedy’s former advisors, including members of the Task Force for Latin

America, supported the coup and the resulting military regime. Edwin M. Martin recalled that

“Washington and the Embassy encouraged [the coup],” while Robert Kennedy thought that

“Brazil would have gone communist” had Goulart’s regime continued.67

The Brazilian situation was unique because it collapsed within a matter of three years. In

Argentina, it took even less time for the situation to deteriorate. In 1958, Arturo Frondizi was elected president after thirty years of unstable pseudo-military rule. For three decades preceding his victory, Argentina had been under the control of Juan Perón, a dictatorial-populist leader that dominated politics by appealing to the poorest of Argentineans. To cement his popularity, Perón had spent millions of dollars, virtually bankrupting the Argentinean government while creating a skyrocketing inflation. In the first three years of his presidency, Frondizi had made strong gains in curbing the runaway inflation and cementing democratic institutions through free elections, but he had not succeeded in achieving that positive growth.68

Unlike Quadros or Goulart, Frondizi strongly supported the AFP, seeing it as the best solution to his economic woes. Frondizi was desperate for American aid. He requested that

Kennedy use Argentina as an “example” for the AFP, proving that economic change and social development could indeed succeed with American assistance.69 Kennedy agreed: Argentina’s prior economic strength, its special relationship with Western Europe, and its sizeable market made it an ideal ally for the United States.

66 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007), 117. 67 Martin, 311 and Guthman and Shulman, 366. 68 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 56-58. 69 Martin, 268-269. Frondizi had already endangered himself by refusing to alienate Cuba from the OAS.

Like Quadros and Goulart in Brazil, Frondizi did not view Castro and his allies as much of a threat. The United States strongly disagreed with Frondizi’s stance on Cuba: Kennedy and his men took efforts to change his policies towards communism. The United States promised copious economic aid, if Frondizi would support excluding Cuba from the OAS.70 Similar to

Berle’s bribing of Quadros in 1961, Kennedy used economic aid as a coercive tool to effect foreign policy change in Argentina.

During a summit at Punta del Este in 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk worked to convince all Latin American nations that Cuba’s role in the OAS was contradictory to the inter-

American democratic system. But Argentina (and five other delegations) did not support the exclusion clause Rusk attached to the discussion. Rusk cited Argentina as the most significant disappointment, because the Argentinean delegation was the only detractor that did not cite

“internal problems” as the leading reason for their choice.71 Rostow, a member of Rusk’s delegation, agreed that the Argentinean delegation had worsened matters by proposing a “mealy- mouthed anti-Communist compromise resolution,” which would have weakened the proposal

Rusk had initiated first.72

Not only was the Kennedy administration wary of Frondizi’s policies towards Cuba, but the Argentinean military reflected similar feelings. The Cuban-Communists and the Peronists were closely connected because of their close relationship with the lower classes of workers; the military feared that, with a Peronist victory in Argentina, communism would become a more

70 “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina, January 11, 1962,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 288-290. 71 “Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, January 31, 1962,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 307-308. 72 “Memorandum for the Record, February 6, 1962,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 308-309. viable threat.73 In February, 1962, Frondizi relented and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in an attempt to appease pressure from the military. The United States applauded this move and awarded Frondizi with $150 million in economic aid.74

But the military did not support Frondizi or his mission to democratize Argentina through free and fair elections. In the election of 1962, the Peronists won 35% of the popular vote and claimed a strong majority of the state governorships throughout Argentina. The military, fearful of a new rise in Peronism, blamed Frondizi for allowing the elections results to stand.75 When

U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock cabled the State Department to warn them of an impending coup, Edwin Martin remarked that “we had to let events take their course and that [McClintock] should not intervene unless new instructions were sent.” On March 28, the military announced the Frondizi had been placed under house arrest and that José María Guido, the President of the

Senate, had been placed in presidency. The military had found its puppet: one his first days in office, Guido politically outlawed parties that claimed allegiance to Perón, Castro, or Frondizi.76

Despite possessing the power to act, the Kennedy administration did not come to the aid of Frondizi, which allowed the Argentinean military to dismantle the democratic processes that

Frondizi had worked to establish and the same that Kennedy had hoped to install throughout

Latin America. On March 30, Schlesinger recommended that Kennedy delay “formal relations with the new government” since it was unclear how the Argentinean public was going to react to a military coup. Schlesinger made this recommendation despite pointing out that “great concern

73 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 60-61. 74 “Memorandum From the Director of the Agency for International Development to President Kennedy, April 6, 1962,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 373. 75 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 61. 76 Martin, 273. [was] reported throughout Latin America from the particular friends of the Alliance for

Progress,” including Betancourt.77

The Kennedy administration alienated the democratic process in favor of promoting a stable, anticommunist regime in Argentina, even though that regime eventually because anti-

American. In 1963, Arturo Illia came to power in a controlled election; shortly after his victory, he nationalized all foreign oil companies in Argentina. McClintock described the new regime’s political orientation as “anti-U.S.” and “anti-Alliance for Progress.”78 The Kennedy administration, by failing to aid Frondizi during the coup, alienated an ally of the AFP and effectively crippled democracy in Argentina. And by failing to approve of the Guido regime immediately, Kennedy failed to make a friend out of the new regime, effectively destroying the chances of a close relationship between the United States and Argentina.

President Kennedy’s actions in Latin America represent a period of little change in U.S.-

Latin American relations. Like his predecessor, Kennedy used interventionist policies to assert his anticommunist policies into the region. In Brazil and Argentina, Kennedy’s policies disrupted democratic practices and furthered instability that eventually led to violent military regimes in both nations. But in nations like Venezuela and Columbia, Kennedy was more supportive.

Fearing that instability in those nations would lead to communist control, Kennedy supported anticommunist governments, even if they lacked initiative to support the AFP. Instability, therefore, was the big fear, for it would leave to a communist intervention. In Brazil and

Argentina, the military stepped up to provide a strong anticommunist government; in Venezuela and Columbia, the United States supplanted the military as the safeguard of stability.

77 “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant to President Kennedy, March 20, 1962,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996), 368-269. 78 Robert M. McClintock quoted in Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 63. When the Kennedy administration was drafting the AFP, Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarked that the AFP should “couple [American] expressions of helpfulness with allusions to cooperative actions” in order to spread the idea of an American brotherhood in the western hemisphere. Rusk’s use of the word “allusion” perfectly demonstrated what the AFP became. It was an economic aid program, publicly designed to foster hemispheric cooperation; but in reality, it was a bribery system set up to support anticommunist governments. The balance that

Kennedy tried to embody, fostering progressive change through economic growth and social development while promoting anticommunism, proved too difficult. By 1966, both Brazil and

Argentina were under the control of military juntas. The policies Kennedy adopted in Brazil and

Argentina, while not directly associated with either military takeover, did cause instability that allowed for the demise of democracy in both nations. As Kennedy remarked to former presidents

Juscelino Kubitschek and Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1962, “the general situation in Latin

America had become worse over the last two years.”79 His policies certainly did not help to make things better.

79 “Memorandum of Conversation, December 13, 1962,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: American Republics (Washington GPO, 1996). Works Cited Page

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