A MINORITY OF CITIZENS: THE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES ON TRUST IN IMMIGRANTS IN QATAR
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER FOR THE DEGREE OF PHD IN SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
2017
MAJED MOHAMMED H A AL-ANSARI
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCI ENCES - CATHIE MARSH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 11 1.1 The Qatari Context ...... 15 1.2 Key Concepts and Previous Research ...... 27 1.3 Research Hypotheses...... 40 1.4 Proposed Causal Model ...... 42 1.5 Thesis Outline ...... 43 CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODS ...... 46 2.1 Introduction ...... 46 2.2 Survey Methodology ...... 48 2.3 Survey Experiment ...... 67 2.4 Focus Group Methodology ...... 72 CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF CONTACT ON TRUST IN IMMIGRANTS ...... 83 3.1 Introduction ...... 83 3.2 Background and Past Research ...... 84 3.3 Aims and Hypotheses ...... 90 3.4 Explanatory Variables ...... 92 3.5 Analysis and Results ...... 96 3.6 Conclusion...... 105 CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOSITY AND TRUST IN IMMIGRANT ...... 109 4.1 Introduction ...... 109 4.2 Background and Past Research ...... 110 4.3 Explanatory Variables ...... 115 4.4 Analysis and Results ...... 120 4.5 Conclusion...... 136 CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND TRUST IN IMMIGRANTS ...... 139 5.1 Introduction ...... 139 5.2 Background and Past Research ...... 140 5.3 Explanatory variables ...... 143 5.4 Analysis and Results ...... 147 5.5 Conclusion...... 160 CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND TRUST IN IMMIGRANT GROUPS ...... 163 6.1 Introduction ...... 163 6.2 Background and Past Research ...... 165 6.3 Political Attitudes Measures ...... 170
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6.4 Analysis and Results ...... 175 6.5 Conclusion...... 190 CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHETI C A L J O B CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT ...... 193 7.1 Introduction ...... 193 7.2 Background and Past Research ...... 194 7.3 Detailed Hypotheses ...... 197 7.4 Experiment Results ...... 198 7.5 Experiment Results against Contact and Values ...... 201 7.6 Conclusion...... 221 CHAPTER 8: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL COHESION IN QATAR ...... 225 8.1 Introduction ...... 225 8.2 Background and Past Research ...... 226 8.3 Research Questions ...... 230 8.4 Results and Analysis ...... 230 8.5 Conclusion...... 252 CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION ...... 256 9.1 Summary of Results ...... 256 9.2 Implications and Recommendations ...... 266 9.3 Methodological Observations ...... 276 9.4 Limitations and Further Research ...... 279 9.5 Final Words ...... 281 REFERENCES ...... 282 APPENDICES ...... 296 Appendix A: Social Cohesion Questionnaire ...... 296 Appendix B: Hypothetical experiment resumes ...... 319 Appendix C: Focus group guide ...... 323 Appendix D: Proposal of social cohesion survey project (QU) ...... 326 Appendix E: Missing values table ...... 328 Appendix F: AME of effect of values on trust with missing values included ...... 331 Appendix G: Chapter-Based ...... 332 G.C: Full model statistics for Chapter 3 ...... 332 G.R: Full model statistics for Chapter 4 ...... 340 G.S: Full model statistics for Chapter 5 ...... 347
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Word count: 91 652
Table of Figures
Chapter 1 A1: Arabian Peninsula map………………………………………………………………………… 16 Chart 1: Causal schema………………………………………………………………………………43 Chapter 2 M.A: Map of Qatar municipalities ……………………………………………………...…………...50 Table M1: Responses by groups …………………………………………………………………….52 Table M3: Trust in Qataris and foreigner groups ………………………………………...………….60 Table M4: Demographic characteristics of sample…………………………………………………. 62 Table M5: Interactions of demographic characteristics………………………………...…………... 64 Chapter 3 Table C.B: Having and socially meeting non-Qatari friends……………...………………………... 93 Table C.C: Having and meeting with non-Qatari neighbours……………...………………………. .94 Table C.D: Having and meeting with non-Qatari co-workers……………..……….………………..95 Table C.4: Average marginal effects of multiple contact variables on trust…..…..……………….. 98 Table C.5: Predicted probabilities of trust………………………..…………………………………101 Graph C.5.1: Predicted probablities of trust in Arabs across variables…………………………...... 101 Graph C.5.2: Predicted probablities of trust in Westerners across variables……………………….101 Graph C.5.3: Predicted probablities of trust in Indian Sub-Continentals across variables…………101 Graph C.5.4: Predicted probablities of trust in East Asians across variables……………………….101 Chapter 4 Table R.D: Descriptive statistics of religiosity indicators………………………………..……….. 116 Table R.F.1: Eigenvalues of factor analysis………………………………………………………. 121 Graph R.F.1 Scree plot of eigenvalues of EFA………………………………...…. ……………... 122 Table R.F.2: Results of EFA – three-factor solution……………………………………………… 122 Table R.F.3: Results of exploratory factor analysis for religious variables………………………. 124 Table R.R: Average marginal effects of religiosity indicators on trust…………………………... 127 Table R.P: Predicted probabilities of logistic regression results………………………………….. 129 Graph R.P.1: Predicted probabilities of trust in Arabs……………………………………………...130 Graph R.P.2: Predicted probablilities of trust in Westerners……………………………………….130 Graph R.P.3: Predicted probabilities of trust in Indian Sub-Continentals………………………….130 Graph R.P.4: Predicted probabilities of trust in East Asians………………………………………..130 Graph: R.P.G Predicted probabilities of trust in Westerners according to age……………………..133 Chapter 5 Table S.D: Descriptive statistics of social values indicators ……………………………………….142 Table S.F.1: Eigenvalues of factor analysis……………………………………. ………………….146 Graph S.F: Scree plot of eigenvalues of EFA……………………………………. ………………..147 Table S.F.2: Results of EFA……………………………………..……………………………….....148 Table S.F.3: Results of CFA……………………………………. ……………………………….....149 Table S.C: Correlation of social values indicators……………………………………. ………….. 150 Table S.D.1: Correlation of social values with trust in immigrants………………………………...151 Table S.R: Average marginal effects of multiple social values variables on trust ………………...152 Table S.P: Predicted probabilities of logistic regression results…………………………………....154
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Graph S.P.1: Predicted probabilities of trust in Arabs……………………………………………...155 Graph S.P.2: Predicted probablilities of trust in Westerners……………………………………….155 Graph S.P.3: Predicted probabilities of trust in Indian Sub-Continentals………………………….155 Graph S.P.4: Predicted probabilities of trust in East Asians………………………………………..155 Chapter 6 Table P.D: Descriptive statistics of political values indicators……………………………………. 169 Table P.F.1: Eigenvalues of factor analysis ……………………………………. …………………174 Graph P.F.1: Scree plot of factor analysis ……………………………………. …………………...175 Table P.F.2: results of EFA- 3 factor solution ……………………………………. ……………….175 Table P.F.3: Results of factor analysis for high loading factors ……………………………..….....177 Table P.C.: Correlation of religious and Islamist factor scores……………………………………..177 Table P.C.A: Correlation of religious and Islamist indicators……………………………………...178 Table P.D.1: Correlation of religiosity dimensions with trust in immigrants………………………181 Table P.R: Average marginal effects of political values variables on trust……………………… 182 Table P.P: Predicted probabilities of logistic regression results …………………………………...183 Graph P.P.1: Predicted probabilities of trust in Arabs……………………………………………...184 Graph P.P.2: Predicted probablilities of trust in Westerners……………………………………….184 Graph P.P.3: Predicted probabilities of trust in Indian Sub-Continentals………………………….185 Graph P.P.4: Predicted probabilities of trust in East Asians………………………………………..185 Chapter 7 Table A.E: Covariates across experiment sub-samples…………………………………………….197 Table E.D.1: Agreement to hiring hypothetical job applicant ……………………………………. 198 Table E.D.2: Correlation of experiment results with values variables……………………………..201 Table E.R.1: AME of contact and values against decision to hire Arab Muslim………………….202 Table E.P.1: Predicted probabilities for Arab Muslim ……………………………………..………203 Table E.R.2: AME of contact and values against decision to hire Western Muslim ...……………205 Table E.P.2: Predicted probabilities for Western Muslim……………………………………. …... 206 Graph E.P.2: Predicted probabilities for Western Muslim………………………………………….206 Table E.R.3: AME of contact and values against decision to hire Arab non-Muslim……………..209 Table E.P.3: Predicted probabilities for Arab non-Muslim ………………………………………..210 Graph E.P.3: Predicted probabilities for Arab non-Muslim………………………………………..210 Table E.R.4: AME of contact and values against decision to hire Western non-Muslim…………212 Table E.P.4: Predicted probabilities for Western non-Muslim ……...……………………………..213 Graph E.P.4: Predicted probabilities for Western non-Muslim…………………………………….213 Table E.P.G: Probability of hiring Western non-Muslim according to age ………………..………214 Table E.R.5: Average marginal effects of final models for all steps……………………………... 215 Table E.R.C: AME of ethnic and religious treatments……………………………………………..218
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DEDICATION
TO MY WIFE AND FOUR BEAUTIFUL GIRLS…
YOU WERE AND WILL ALWAYS BE MY INSPIRATION, MOTIVATION AND
ASPIRATION
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ABSTRACT
University of Manchester Majed Mohammed H A Al-Ansari PhD Social Change A MINORITY OF CITIZE NS : THE EFFECTS OF RELIG IOUS, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL VALUES ON TRUST IN IMMIGRAN TS IN QATAR
27/ 10 /2016
This study aims to further social cohesion research in the Qatari context through identifying the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants in Qatar. As religion and traditional attitudes play an important role in forming Qatari identity, the focus is on identifying the effects of religious, social, and political attitudes on trust in immigrants. The first part of the thesis uses the results of the Social Cohesion Survey of Qatar (SSCQ) and tests how contact and religious, social, and political attitudes affect trust in the four major immigrant groups in Qatar. The results show that contact with immigrants is beneficial to trust among them as contact with immigrant friends improved trust in all groups as well as contact with neighbours and co-workers in non-Arabs. Personal religiosity was negatively related to trust in the only perceived non-Muslim group, Westerners. Religious inclusion was positively related to the only perceived all Muslim group, Arabs. Conservative views on gender roles were a consistent predictor of low trust in all the groups considered. Support for Islamists was positively linked to trust in Arabs, while liberal political views were positively linked to trust in non-Arab immigrants. Education and employment were found to be positively linked to trust in non-Arabs, while being interviewed by a Qatari was positively linked to trust in Arabs. The results of the hypothetical candidate experiment where respondents were asked about their approval of hiring one of four candidates with different religious and cultural characteristics suggested that Qataris consider religion more important than cultural background in their approval of immigrants and that conservative Qataris are less likely to hire any of the candidates. Finally, the focus groups conducted supported the importance of contact, and religious and cultural similarity in improving trust in immigrants. Also, they provided important insight into how Qataris define immigrants. Those born in Qatar and who share Qatari values were found to be of a different, more integrated calibre, than other immigrants. This study offers a comprehensive view of Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants and paves the way to a better understanding of how the influx of immigrants from diverse backgrounds affects society. It is hoped that this research provides both academics and policy makers with tools to better understand and deal with the effects of large scale changes to the social structure and demographic setup of Qatar.
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DECLARATION
No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning
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COPYRIGHT STATEMENT
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Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/display.aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge, first of all, the efforts of my supervisors Professor Robert Ford and Dr Laurence Lessard-Phillips. They have provided me with exceptional support and guidance throughout the four years of my PhD. Through professional and personal advice and assistance, my supervisors helped me overcome countless obstacles that, if not for their help, would have not allowed me to complete my work. I am indebted to them for all they have offered, above and beyond what is required of them. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Dr Nick Shryane from the Cathie Marsh Institute for Social Research (CMIST) for his help in designing the survey experiment used in this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the support and valuable advice I received from the former and current directors of The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) Dr Darwish Al-Emadi and Dr Hassan Al-Sayed, along with Dr Abdoulaye Diop, Head of research at SESRI. Their support in my fieldwork was essential and allowed me to widen the scope of my work to include a nationally representative survey. Also, Mohammed Al- Subaey, Research Assistant at SESRI, participated in the development and design of the project and was my sounding board throughout the design and fieldwork of the Survey of Social Cohesion in Qatar (SSCQ). Furthermore, Dr Kien Trung Le provided support in the sampling and weighting for the survey. SESRI Policy Analyst, Fatimah Al-Khaldi and former research assistant at SESRI Mashael Al-Qattan provided important assistance, especially on local culture and contextual women issues throughout all phases of the survey. Amina Al-Bloshi, administrative assistant at SESRI, recruited for and ran the woman focus group and here I acknowledge the countless hours she spent on the phone making close to 800 phone calls in the recruitment efforts. She also moderated the focus group professionally and remained persistent even after two failed attempts at holding the group. Yousif Sabri, the intern at SESRI, provided assistance in the transcribing of the focus group results. Survey Operations Manager at SESRI Dr Elmogiera Elawad participated in the recruitment and training of interviewers and the supervision of the data collection. Survey Research Technology Specialist Anis Miladi and Ayman Kahlout wrote the BLAISE programming script for data collection and provided technical assistance throughout the fieldwork period, and more than 70 field supervisors and fieldworkers conducted the interviews for the survey. To all these and countless others, I am grateful and extend my deepest appreciation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The single most important event in the establishment of Islam was the migration of The
Prophet Mohammed from his birthplace Mecca to Yathreb – later known as Medina, the city of The Prophet. This is why the Islamic calendar is called the “Hijri” calendar in reference to the Arabic word “Hijra” meaning migration and the first year on that calendar is the year of the migration. The reason for the emphasis on this event is that it is seen as the founding of the Muslim nation. The prophet and his followers were under religious prosecution in
Makkah by its political and economic elite and the people of Medina sent envoys to The
Prophet telling him that the two main tribes of Medina had agreed to become the hosts of
Islam, this new religion. As soon as the agreement took place between the Prophet
Mohammed and the delegation from Medina Muslims started migrating in great numbers to
Medina. Most of them were stripped of their possessions before leaving Makkah and arrived in Medina as poor refugees. After the majority of Muslims had migrated, The Prophet and his confidant Abu-Baker began their migration (Ibn Hisham, 2002).
When The Prophet Mohammed first entered Medina the population was made up of two main factions. The dominant group consisted of the people of Medina and the second group consisted of the immigrants, the people who had fled Makkah. This second group was, for the most part, economically challenged and had no social status. The Prophet Mohammed, now leader of Medina at the behest of its people, was faced with a grave prospect. The refugees were second-class citizens in Medina while they were also the founding members
11 | P a g e of the Muslim faith. Therefore, The Prophet issued a decree; every Medinan citizen was required to take in a Makkan refugee family as brothers. The decree stated that houses and income should be shared between the new brothers and so families from both groups began living in the same houses and the people of Medina were dubbed “Ansar” the supporters, by
The Prophet. “Sirat Ibn Hisham” (2002) the main text on the period states that the result of this decree, which was known as Al Moakha (‘the brothering’), was generally positive as the people of Medina took honour in supporting the new group and in a relatively short period of time the majority of the refugees became economically active. After the death of The
Prophet the elders of Medina, most of whom were from the original tribes of Medina, elected a former refugee, Abu-Baker, as the first Caliph. Assuming the historical account is accurate, how did that decree succeed in resolving a seemingly unresolvable situation?
According to Allport (1954), prejudice against minority groups can be diminished through meaningful recurrent social contact. However, Allport sets conditions for this meaningful contact: equal status, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. The decree of Moakha satisfied these conditions whilst ensuring optimal contact between members of the two groups by making them live in the same households. The decree named the refugees as brothers to the original citizens thus elevating them to equal status. Both groups belonging to the Islamic faith and political project gave them common goals and the political, social, and religious authority gave its blessing and support to this new social experiment. It can be argued that these shared goals and values made the Makkan refugees more acceptable to the people of Medina. It is not possible to empirically ascertain the effects of common values and enforced contact on prejudice in
Medina in the era of The Prophet; however, in today’s world it is much easier to do so.
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In Qatar, a small state in the Arabian Gulf with one of the largest proportions of immigrants internationally, society is also stratified along citizenship lines. It is similar to the situation that existed in Medina, as the citizens are financially comfortable and socially and politically dominant, while most immigrants receive a lower income and all have considerably less rights and benefits. It is interesting to note that citizens constitute the minority while immigrants total 88% of the population. These non-Qatari citizens, the majority of the population, do not have access to the free healthcare, education, electricity, water, and housing that Qatari citizens enjoy. While some non-Qatari citizens hold high paying positions in both the public and private sectors, the majority of them are labourers who live outside of the capital city in collective worker camps. Furthermore, naturalisation is not probable in Qatar as there is no clear path for gaining citizenship.
As Qatar aspires to become an international hub of commerce, the host of mega events, and a centre for tourism it is slowly developing its legal framework to provide non-citizens with more rights and to insure social justice for all, especially as its growing economic and social prominence has brought increased scrutiny from international human rights organizations.
The legal situation, however, is only part of the problem. Qatari citizens and non-Qatari citizens are strongly divided in many other aspects. Social and religious differences, and large economic inequalities, separate Qataris from many non-Qatari groups and generate tension between them. This environment is likely to produce high prejudice between the dominant group and the newcomers; therefore, it is paramount for policymakers to turn their attention to social cohesion as a means of guaranteeing sustainable social order and continuing prosperity.
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This thesis aims to improve the understanding of the state of social cohesion in Qatar, and to identify its determinants by exploring how Qataris’ attitudes about non-Qatari residents are formed. Using the results of a unique representative social survey – the Social Cohesion
Survey of Qatar (SSCQ) (Al-Ansari et al., 2016) – the thesis undertakes one of the first quantitative analysis of the effects of social contact, religious and social values, and political orientation on trust in immigrant groups conducted in a Gulf state, and assesses how the social and religious characteristics of non-Qataris affect how Qataris view them. Also, a qualitative aspect to the analysis will be introduced through the discussion of the results of two focus groups, which focused on exploring the thinking behind the quantitative results in more depth. As regression analysis, a survey, and focus groups are being utilised, this thesis embodies a mixed method approach in hopes of offering a comprehensive analysis of the attitudes towards immigrants in Qatar.
Being the first of its kind in the Qatari context, this study addresses a major issue in empirically measuring attitudes in the GCC and Muslim contexts in general. Most research on social cohesion and social capital focuses on the Western contexts, this study is an attempt to design contextually related measures of contact, attitudes and social acceptance.
Therefore, we believe that this research will offer significant insight into how different this context is to Western context and how these differences affect our understanding of concepts addressed by the thesis.
The analysis will discuss Qataris’ attitudes towards non-Qatari residents in Qatar; however, in order to simplify the terminology used non-Qatari residents will be referred to throughout the thesis as “immigrants”. This decision is taken for the sake of simplicity and in line with the terminology used in social science literature in the Western context. However, it is not
14 | P a g e fully representative of the population of the non-Qatari residents, who are not legal immigrants (their status is closer to guest workers) and many of them have been born and raised in Qatar, while some of them are third-generation residents. The characteristics of immigrants in Qatar will be examined more closely in the later section.
Each analytical chapter of this thesis will start with a review of literature on the subject matter followed by a discussion of relative results. The chapters have been thematically distributed, with Chapters 2 to 5 discussing how trust in immigrant groups is affected by contact and by religious, social, and political values. This will be followed by a survey experiment in which the interaction of cultural background and religion of immigrants as predictors of acceptance by Qataris will be examined. Finally, a discussion of the focus groups results provides more in-depth analysis on the thought processes underpinning the quantitative findings.
This introduction will continue with an overview of Qatar’s history, its social, religious, and political environment, and immigration patterns. Then the theoretical basis for the study will be set out, introducing the concepts of social cohesion and social trust. Finally, research questions and outline of the thesis will be introduced.
1.1 The Qatari Context
Before discussing the theoretical framework of the study it is necessary to provide the reader with some background on Qatar and Qatari society. In Qatar, most of the inhabitants are non-citizens and there has been a rapid change from a small homogenous society to a cosmopolitan international city with a population from diverse racial backgrounds and religious traditions. As the analysis focuses on religious, social, and political values and
15 | P a g e immigration this contextual background will focus on these specific aspects. We begin with a short historical overview, and then move to religious and social values followed by the political environment of Qatar and end with a discussion of immigration and immigrants in
Qatar.
1.1.1 A Brief History of Qatar
A1: Arabian Peninsula Map
Source: Gulf art guide, (2013)
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As the map shows, Qatar is a small peninsula located on the western shores of the Arabian
Gulf, connected by the land only to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and by the sea to Bahrain,
United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iran. Originally, Qatar was the part of the Ottoman
Empire, but following a dispute with the Ottoman governor of the region who wanted to replace the Al-Thanis as the ruling tribe, the Al-Thanis, aided by loyal Qataris, overthrew the Ottomans in the Al-Wajba battle of 1893 and gained autonomy for the peninsula. After losing the battle, the Ottoman Sultan wrote to Sheikh Jassim and acknowledged the defeat.
The Ottoman Empire was in a weak and fragile state so it decided not to further assert their rule. In 1916, the ruling family of Qatar headed by Sheikh1 Abdullah bin Jassim decided to sign a treaty with the British for protection while in return granting the British special economic rights including dominance over drilling for oil and producing petroleum (Al-
Jaber, 2002). In 1939, during the British overseeing of the country, petroleum was discovered. The first shipment was dispatched ten years later paving the way for prosperity in Qatar. In 1971 Qatar gained its independence2 from the United Kingdom and in a few years the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Qatar became amongst the highest in the world. This rapid economic prosperity brought with it modernity and rapidly transformed a society of nomads and coastal fishing communities into a vibrant metropolitan city-state.
(Fromherz, 2012).
Through the last three decades of the twentieth century, Qatar benefited from the revenues of oil and natural gas using them to enhance the infrastructure, improve the lives of Qatari citizens, and develop modern state institutions. This modernisation of the state expanded
1 Sheikh is the proper designation of any member of the royal tribe and of tribal elders in general. 2 Although Qatar was never occupied by the UK as it was deemed a protectorate, the announcement by the Emir in his 1971 speech to the people declared Qatar as an independent state.
17 | P a g e rapidly after Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa took power in 1995 in a bloodless coup overthrowing his father Sheikh Khalifa. His reign began with an agreement to host a U.S. military base in Qatar thus ushering in a new era of U.S / Qatari relations that went beyond a military and political alliance to also include the introduction of educational and administrational American consultants in various institutions. This relationship continued to be strong until the two countries had a falling out in 2008 due to the Israeli war in Gaza and
Qatar’s pro-Palestinian position. Starting then, the country took a more pan-Arab and pro-
Islamist stance alienating its Western allies to some extent.
Less than twenty years after he took power, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa abdicated his position and his son Sheikh Tameem took office inheriting strained relations with both the west and neighbouring Arab countries caused by the turmoil that followed the Arab Spring.
Using the Al-Jazeera news network as a soft power tool Qatar played a significant role in advancing the revolutionary cause in many Arab countries and still plays a vital role in the region politically.
1.1.2 Religion in Qatar
The dominant religion in Qatar is Sunni Islam. The movement of Mohammed bin Abdul-
Wahab influenced Sheikh Jassim Bin Mohammed, the founder of Qatar, and Salafi Islamic teachings became the state’s religious doctrine (Fromherz, 2012). Abdul-Wahab began his movement through an alliance with Mohammed bin Saud, the founder of the Al-Saud tribe, who, at the time, was the ruler of a small town on the outskirts of Riyadh, which is now the capital of Saudi Arabia. The alliance between the tribal leader and the religious scholar focused on removing idols and graves considered holy by other tribes and spreading a
18 | P a g e traditionalist view of Islam where the teachings of the first three generations of Muslims – known as “Salaf” – would be the basis of religious education and jurisprudence. The movement created the first Saudi state unifying most of the Arab peninsula under Al-Saud
(Al-Nadawi, 1999). Religious scholars were brought from Saudi Arabia to become judges and teachers starting from the late nineteenth century and continuing to the present day.
Formal education was established under the oversight of religious scholars and religious education became mandatory in public schools. Although modernising initiatives gave way to Western education institutions and consultants, religious education remains compulsory in all government sponsored schools and universities. Qataris, generally speaking, are highly religious and socially conservative. Survey results using various religiosity indicators testify to this reality with high conservatism rates on religious questions (Al-Ansari et al., 2016;
Diop et al., 2015). Reported religiosity levels in 2010 through 2015 have remained stable with more than 90% of Qataris stating that they are either highly or somewhat religious.
Even the observation of the Fajr call to prayer, which entails waking up before dawn, yielded above 60% reported rates of observance (Al-Ansari et al., 2016).
The Ministry of Endowments3 and Islamic Affairs oversees most religious issues in Qatar.
Mosques are regulated by the state and the ministry appoints Imams. The ministry also regulates religious activities, for example, requiring prior approval of religious scholars coming from outside Qatar and the arrangement of religious events. Some religious activities are carried out by non-governmental religious organisations; however, they also fall within the ministry’s overview. Although the government bans political parties and highly regulates
3 Endowments refer to “Waqf”, a form of religious financial donation that is given to the state by donors to build Mosques and fund religious activities.
19 | P a g e any political groups, Islamist groups do operate in Qatar mostly through charities and civil society entities.
However, not all Qataris are Sunnis. Religious minorities among Qataris are mostly Muslim sects with Shiite backgrounds. While there is no official estimate of how large these groups are, Shiite Mosques are public and operate officially under the supervision of the Ministry of
Endowments and Islamic Affairs. Some prominent Shias figures have risen to high profile positions in government and in the private sectors. For example, the business partner of the former Prime Minister Hussein Al-Fardan; however, no non-Sunni has ever held a ministerial post in Qatar’s short history (Al-Jaber, 2002).
While there is no official estimate, many immigrants are non-Muslim. The most visible religious groups are the various Christian denominations. Qatar is home to six churches housed within the multi faith complex built on land gifted by the government. According to some estimates, Christians form roughly 10% of the population (Murphy, 2009). These groups are mostly made up of Filipinos and Indians immigrants; however, Western embassies play an integral role in the operation of the churches. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs handles the issues of non-Muslim religious institutions; however, only Christians have been granted official status. This status allows Christians to practice their religion under the protection of the state in designated churches while other non-Muslim religious groups do not enjoy these rights. People of other religions do live in Qatar; however, there is no reliable estimate of their numbers or denominations.
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1.1.3 Social Issues in Qatar
Ethnically most Qataris are Arabs with the exception of some families with Persian backgrounds. Also, most Qataris belong to larger Arab tribes that can be found all over the region. Qataris are mostly Arab speakers and Muslims. Although Westernisation and modernity are quite visible in the country it is far from Western liberal standards in its social mores. Arranged marriages are the norm and in most social gatherings women are separated from men. Most Qataris still wear traditional garments and identify themselves with a tribe.
The current and previous government encouraged tribal activities and instituted the traditional “Ardha4” during the national day for each tribe, through providing financial support for these tribal celebrations (Al-Jaber, 2002).
Qataris belong to many different tribal backgrounds; however, they can be stratified into four main groups. First are “Hadhar5” tribes who are mostly city dwellers who used to work in the pearl industry and form the majority of Qataris. Second are Bedouin tribes that mostly migrated from inland Arabia at different points in history as they are inherently nomadic, and remain in close-knit communities with some of them still going back and forth between
Qatar inland and Saudi Arabia. Third are Yemeni migrants, similar to the first group, but the fact that they are relatively recent migrants – most migrated in the 60’s and 70’s – means they hold lower social status. Finally, immigrant families from the cost of Persia, this group can be broken into two sub-groups: Persian Arabs and Persians. Persian Arabs are Arab migrants that belong to similar tribes as the Hadhar tribes. These tribes migrated back from
4 A traditional celebration which includes patriotic and tribal chants and sword play, it used to be confined to weddings and social events, now it is organised for the national day. 5 Hadhar refers to the tribes that are settled and do not migrate according to seasons.
21 | P a g e their towns on the Persian coast due to religious and ethnic persecution in the early twentieth century and settled all along the Gulf States. The Persians are mostly Sunnis who migrated from Iran at different points in history and adapted rapidly to Qatari customs and the Qatari dialect. These two last groups, although economically significant, are looked upon as lower born in comparison to the original tribes of Qatar. Gradually, most Qataris have adopted the traditions of the dominant Hadhar tribes; however, there remains a social hierarchy that disadvantages non-Hadhar groups (Al-Kathim, 1991).
1.1.4 Politics in Qatar
Qatar is an absolute monarchy where the Emir, the sovereign, enjoys wide ranging powers.
A legislative body called the “Shura” council exists; however, the Emir appoints this body.
The new constitution, ratified in a national referendum in 2003, proclaims that two thirds of the Shura council should be directly elected (Almeezan, 2016), but the government has not, at the time of writing this research, announced any timeline for conducting elections. The
Council of Ministers is tasked with executive powers and headed by the Prime Minister who is directly appointed by the Emir, as are the Ministers (Al-Jaber, 2002; Al-Kathim, 1991).
The only elected body in government is the Municipality Council, an advisory entity, which comes under the Minister for Municipality and Environment. Members of the council offer advice and convey popular concerns to the Minister, but the law does not grant them any power over the ministry (CMC, 2016). Furthermore, the law does not allow for establishing political parties or organizations and political activity is highly restricted.
When it comes to foreign affairs, the state is highly involved in the region. Qatar’s support for the Arab Spring uprisings is highly visible through state and state sponsored media, such
22 | P a g e as the Al-Jazeera News Network. Qatar is also known for supporting Palestinian resistance groups such as Hamas and Syrian militant opposition groups. Furthermore, Qatar has supported Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab Spring and has received many Islamist exiles (Ulrichsen, 2014). This has resulted in heightened tensions with Qatar’s neighbours, especially in 2015 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE threatened sanctions against the Qataris to pressure them into ceasing support for revolutionary and
Islamist movements in the Arab world. Recently, however, relations between Qatar and its neighbours have improved significantly, especially after King Salman of Saudi Arabia took power after the death of his predecessor and exhibited less hostility towards Qatar and its policies. Furthermore, Qatar’s government has reduced its support to proponents of the Arab
Spring and political dissidents in the region in the new Emir’s attempts to stabilised relations with neighbours.
Qatar’s high GDP and low population has enabled the government to provide jobs for all its citizens. They also provide free education, healthcare, electricity, water, land, and building loans are available for most of the citizens. As a result, the government has popular support and there is limited interest in democracy, which have been registered in various studies (Al-
Ansari et al., 2016; Diop, 2011). Trust in government institutions has always been high and the only known political prisoner was Mohammed Al-Ajmi, a Qatari poet who criticised the
Emir and his family, and was released in 2016 after resolving tensions with Gulf
Cooperation Council neighbours. It is notable, however, that political sensitivity of the issues studied in the above mentioned studies in an authoritarian context would make expressions of dissent less likely. Especially as these surveys were conducted through a government entity – Qatar University.
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That said, many commentators outside Qatar point to the contradiction in Qatari policy of supporting democratisation everywhere except for Qatar. Al-Jazeera English even asked the
Foreign Affairs Minister of Qatar at the time, Dr. Khalid Al-Attiya, about the matter and the
Minister’s answer was that the state has provided a prosperous life for Qataris and that this is the “Qatari democracy”6. Officially, the government maintains its commitment to hold elections for the Shura Council without announcing a date for this.
1.1.5 Immigration in Qatar
According to the March 2016 statistics, there are approximately 300,0007 individuals bearing Qatari citizenship while the general population is 2,527,000 (MDPS, 2016).
Therefore, citizens constitute 12% of the population, making them a small minority in their own country. This makes Qatar one of the countries with the highest proportions of immigrant populations (88%); the only other country in the region to surpass Qatar in this regard is the UAE where citizens constitute 88% of the population. Other Gulf Cooperation
Council states also have high proportions of non-citizen populations with the lowest being
Saudi Arabia at 32% (Gulf Labour Market and Migration, 2017). The immigrant population has grown very rapidly – in 1984 citizens, though already a minority, constituted 44% of the population in Qatar (Al-Kathim, 1991; Al-Kurdi, Mujahid & Al-Isa, 1985). In order to maintain a level demographic distribution between citizens and non-citizens the state employs an informal, unpublicised migrant workers quota policy. The policy guarantees that
6 Interview was for “Up front” with Mehdi Hassan on Al-Jazeera English, broadcast on October 29th 2015. 7 As the Qatar Statistics Authority (QSA) – the only body conducting an official census in Qatar – does not publish any numbers regarding the number of Qataris this information was obtained through a former employee at Qatar Statistic Authority with whom the author is in contact with.
24 | P a g e the largest single group in Qatar remains the Qataris and, therefore, puts a cap on expatriates from any one nationality8.
Arab immigrants have been in Qatar since independence, some even arrived before the discovery of oil. During the first three decades of the state’s establishment (1940 to 1970) the Arab immigrants laid the foundation for education, the health service, and the civil service as they were brought in by the government to establish governmental entities. The first directorate for education and the health service, and the first president of Qatar
University were all non-citizen Arab migrants. They also benefited from government policies to prefer Arabs over other immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s. By the end of the
1970s, the Arab immigrant population went from constituting two thirds of all immigrants to only half. The reason for this is non-Arab immigrants are favoured by Western energy firms, which have dominated the petroleum and natural gas sectors since the 1940’s (Al-Jaber,
2002). These firms preferred European and American white-collar employees, who spoke
English and had previously worked in similar Western companies, and Asian blue-collar employees, who were paid significantly less than local recruits. This preference for
Westerners, however, was the case for the semi-private energy sector while the government preferred Arab workers. Therefore, most non-Arab immigrant in the mid-twentieth century worked in these sectors. In the 1970’s, the construction boom led to a dependence on cheap
Asian labour as Arab labour was comparatively expensive. As a result, Asian immigrants from different countries in the Indian subcontinent became the largest group in Qatar (Al-
Ghanim, 1996; Al-Jaber, 2002; Al-Kathim, 1991; Al-Kurdi et al., 1985).
8 This policy is common knowledge in Qatar to citizens and foreigners; however, no record is made of it publically. The author obtained this information form a source at the Ministry of the Interior.
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Arabs share a common language and, in most cases, a common religion with Qataris and have easily adapted to Qatari customs and social norms that are mostly similar to their own.
Legally they are treated no differently than non-Arabs; socially they are more likely to be included in Qatari social events, such as attending marriage ceremonies and tribal celebrations. Western immigrants came into the country in very few numbers in the beginning; however, after the economic growth of the 1990’s the government and the private sector started recruiting highly skilled Western professionals and consultants in order to modernise operations in different sectors. Most of these Western immigrants come from
English speaking countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia; however, other European nationals can also be found but in lower numbers.
Westerners are isolated from Qataris when it comes to living conditions and live mostly in gated communities. The cultural, religious, and linguistic gaps between them and Qataris have often proved difficult to bridge (Al-Jaber, 2002).
As mentioned above, the largest group of immigrants in Qatar are Asians; this group can be divided into two sub-groups: East Asians, mostly form the Philippines and Indonesia, and
Indian sub-continentals, mostly from India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The extreme majority of them live in labour camps in the industrial areas or in on site accommodation, and they have very little contact with other residents outside a service capacity as domestic servants, salesmen, or labourers (Diop et al., 2010). The majority of Asian immigrants are single men, though there are some resident families. The legal framework in Qatar only allows an immigrant to be joined by his family if his monthly income is over 6000 Qatari
Rials, which is equivalent to 1000 Great British Pound (GBP) per month, significantly higher than the typical income of construction and service staff.
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When considering the workplace, Arabs are employed in most professions ranging from construction workers to engineers. Westerners, on the other hand, are mostly professionals and occupy high paying jobs in both the government and the private sector. Asians are mostly labourers and domestic staff and are seldom found in administrational posts or secretarial jobs.
Qatar’s unique demographic situation, with a minority of citizens, makes the issue of social trust in immigrants central to social cohesion and national security. Along with the demographic uniqueness, the high religiosity, and the traditional tendencies in Qatari society increase the need for understanding the effect of religion and tradition on social cohesion.
While most previous research focused mainly on Western settings, Qatar is a Muslim Arab country with a sizable non-Arab, non-Muslim, immigrant population. This context is extremely beneficial for the study of social cohesion as the divide between the minority of citizens and the majority of immigrant non-citizens is clearly defined by the state and society. Also, the presence of various groups that belong to different religious and social backgrounds within the immigrant population provides a useful tool in assessing how these differences effect intergroup relations differently. The following section explores the concepts of social cohesion, capital, and trust and how they are linked to this study.
1.2 Key Concepts and Previous Research
This section will discuss the key concepts addressed by this thesis, findings of previous studies regarding these concepts, and how they relate to one another. These concepts are as follows: social cohesion, social capital, and social trust.
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1.2.1 Social Cohesion
With increasing diversity and immigration studies on social cohesion have gained prominence in social science research. This growing body of research makes use of various conceptualisations of the term. Lockwood (1999) suggests that social cohesion is a state in which there are strong primary networks between members of different groups in society.
While this definition captures the main outcome of social cohesion, it does not address how social cohesion comes to be. Chan et al. (2006) provide a more comprehensive definition as they suggest that social cohesion is:
…a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations. (p. 290) This definition provides a more comprehensive view of how social cohesion operates. Chan et al. (2006) acknowledge the importance of trust and social participation in forming social cohesion. Trust between members of society is a sign of strong ties and positive relationships between members of society. This trust transforms into a strong sense of belonging to cohesive groups. Societies with a high level of diversity face a growing challenge to social cohesion as waves of immigrants from various different backgrounds, cultures, religious traditions, and group identities become part of society. In Qatar, the high segregation of Qataris from other groups in society decreases the likelihood of intergroup cooperation and interaction. Although the sources of this segregation are many, one is the residential pattern. Qataris usually live in large villas in residential neighbourhoods where even some Arab families reside, whereas Westerners and other expatriates prefer to live in gated compounds or flats. Another source of segregation is language and cultural practices
28 | P a g e as Qataris and Arab immigrants speak the same language and share many cultural and religious attributes and, therefore, attend similar activities from religious gatherings to theatre. Non-Arab immigrants would not attend such activities as they are usually conducted in Arabic.
However, one main issue with the concept of social cohesion concerns the discussion of individual vs. group level cohesion and how they interact (Friedkin, 2004). Individual social cohesion refers to one’s willingness to remain within a social group and strengthen ties with the group. Group level cohesion refers to the intensity of mutual ties within the group.
Individual social cohesion is, arguably, the basis on which group cohesion is built; the stronger an individual’s feeling of belonging is the more likely positive relationships will be formed. More positive relationships result in stronger ties across the community. Almost all
Qataris belong to the same group racially and religiously: Arab Muslim. The traditional and conservative nature of Qatari society and the increase in immigration from non-Arab, non-
Muslim backgrounds may increase the likelihood of a "hunkering down" effect (Putnam,
2007) where individuals become more attached to the in-group and more distanced and prejudiced against the out-groups.
1.2.2 Social Capital
Social capital is a complex and highly controversial term in its own right; nonetheless, it is widely used by scholars in various disciplines as a measure of connectedness between individuals in society. In literature on in-group out-group relationships there is another dimension of social cohesion, which is captured within the social capital literature. Social capital theorists came to differentiate between two types of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital reflects connections and networks within a homogenous
29 | P a g e group, while bridging social capital is concerned with social ties across ethnic, religious, and social groups (Beaudoin, 2011). In the context of this research, bonding social capital can be seen to reflect interaction between Qataris themselves or interaction amongst the larger Arab group. Bridging social capital is strongly related to the concept of social cohesion (Cheong et al., 2007), as conflict between groups is more frequently the driving force behind less social integration. One definition of bridging social capital offered by Putnam (2000) indicates that bridging social capital concerns horizontal ties based on shared interests that go beyond differences of race, religion, and socio-economic characteristics. In a way, social cohesion can be reached through realising the benefit of cross-community relations
(Granovetter, 1973); the more groups in society that work together the more likely it is that all groups will benefit. In Qatar, the realisation of a national level social cohesion is in need of more bridging connections across groups, and mainly between Qataris and immigrants who are different culturally.
Bridging social capital guarantees that the benefits of bonding social capital are society wide rather than group specific. As Pieterse (2003) asserts, for bonding social capital to result in a general positive outcome bridging social ties need to be strong and positive. Some authors even argue that strong bonding social capital has a negative effect on social cohesion at the societal level (Leonard, 2004; Rajulton, 2007). The same authors argue that strong ties within the group increase the likelihood of prejudice towards members of different groups.
In Qatari society, the commonalities between Qataris and Arabs are relatively high as almost all are Muslim and speak the same language. Immigrants, and especially non-Arabs, in Qatar are often socially segregated from Qataris due to economic status, living conditions, and cultural boundaries. This social setting encourages each group to stick to their own.
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Nonetheless, Qataris and most Arab immigrants often work together, and sometimes share neighbourhoods and even schools and universities. There is much that connects Qataris and
Arabs, almost as much as there is segregating the two groups from non-Arabs. Therefore, it is extremely relevant to this research to understand how these strong intragroup ties affect bridging between Qataris, Arabs, and the rest of the immigrant groups.
When it comes to measurement, individual and group level social cohesion or bonding social capital is measured through assessing the existence and intensity of ties within the group
(Friedkin, 2004). On the other hand, when assessing social cohesion across groups or bridging social capital, attitudes towards members of other groups and ties with them form the basis for measurement. One of the most frequently used measures of intergroup and intragroup social cohesion is social trust in both generalised and particular trust formats. The following section will discuss social trust as a concept, its relevance to this research, and how it is utilised in the study of social cohesion.
1.2.3 Trust in Social Science Research
The main focus of this thesis is to explore the determinants of trust in immigrants in Qatar.
Chapters 2 through 5 will use particular social trust as a dependent variable to explore what affects trust in immigrant groups. Trust is a complicated construct, many definitions and operationalisations have been used in various social science areas to portray and measure it.
In the following section a definition of trust that is relevant to this research will be provided along with an exploration of its different uses in social science research.
1.2.3.1 Defining Social Trust Defining trust is not an easy task, as the Arabic proverb says “….the most complicated of tasks is explaining that which is in no need of explanation”. Trust is a word used daily in
31 | P a g e various settings to describe a state of mind or a predisposition towards others. Trust is a state defined by expectations about how other people will behave. As Deutsch (1958) explains:
An individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behaviour, which he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed. (p. 266) Deutsch (1958) suggests that due to the expectation of a positive outcome the trusting party would be more affected by betrayal of trust than affirmation of it. If you trust someone you have decided beforehand that the outcome of interacting with him or her will be positive. If you are in doubt about the positive outcome you do not have trust. Trust is, therefore, a relationship between two actors: the first extends trust and the second receives it (Baier,
1986; Hardin, 1993, p. 507; Luhman 1980). This relationship revolves around an expectation of reciprocity where the trusting person expects the positive view he or she exhibits towards the trusted will result in a positive outcome.
Trust, as a concept, explains why people take risks in dealing with others, participate in solving collective problems, or act in ways that seem conflicting with the definition of self- interest (Levi & Stoke, 2000). However, it is argued that it is in one’s self interest to be trusting, as this trust enables access to benefits in dealing with others, lowers cost in everyday business, and is a reason for reciprocation by others (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002).
Trust is mutually beneficial when it is reciprocal, when the trusting and trusted act according to expectations.
Therefore, it is plausible to suggest that trust is a rational choice as both parties gain from the relationship and it is in the interest of the trusted to maintain their trustworthy status by delivering to expectation (Guth et al., 2008). Whenever that reciprocal trust cycle is broken,
32 | P a g e all parties lose. This is why some researchers view social trust as a sociological rather than psychological issue (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). It is a result of the combination of social interaction and individual needs; in order to function as a group, trust is needed between individuals, it is the lubricant of social systems (Arrow, 1972).
Inter-group trust is the focus of this study; trust that encourages cooperation between members of society regardless of race, religion, or nationality. Understanding what trust exists between Qataris and immigrants and what factors effect it is the first step in advancing social cohesion. The necessity of good trust stems from the benefits of a cooperative society and the dangers of non-cooperation.
1.2.3.2 Operationalisation of Trust Using trust as a measure in survey research has taken many forms. In regards to whom we trust, researchers identify three domains: trust in those we know, trust in institutional entities, and trust in undefined others or generalised trust. Regarded at times as familial
(Levi & Stoker, 2000), particular, or thick trust (Delhey et al., 2011) this first type of trust is direct, as the trusted is known and the relationship is easily explained. Repeated co-operation within the inner circle provides the necessary data to decide whether or not to trust someone
(Stolle, 2002). The second domain of trust unveils the perception of the people about the performance of the institutions (Miller, 1974; Hetherington, 1998). This type of trust is not stable and undergoes changes during the individual’s life span e.g. policy outcomes and political updates affect the views of people. This establishes the partial management of the people on power in the institutional trust building (Halapuu et al., 2014).
The last domain of trust, generalised trust, refers to the trust in others in society without specification of a certain group or individual. This concept is widely discussed in social
33 | P a g e science literature and is usually measured by the survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” or a variation of this question (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Delhey et al., 2011;
Levi & Stoker, 2000; Robinson & Jackson, 2001). Stolle (2002) defines generalised trust as
“The potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and to abstract preparedness to engage in civic endeavours with each other” (p.4). Therefore, many view this type of trust as inherently good.
However, generalised trust is not without its critics. Arneil (2006), for example, argues that while generalised trust might function well in homogenous society it is not as useful when considering ethnically diverse contexts. This is especially relevant in Qatar where the population is clearly divided into Qataris, white-collar immigrants, and blue-collar immigrants, while cultural and religious divides intersect with these stratifications.
Furthermore, as Wilson (forthcoming) suggests, a respondent may often be thinking of his own group when prompted to assess trust in “others” and, therefore, the answer will not reflect an all-encompassing view of society. This is especially true in societies with a clear ethnically or religiously dominant group where the perception of a social identity of the majority dominates the social environment. Again, this was affirmed in the Qatari context by viewing the trust levels of Qataris. The levels of generalised trust and Qataris trust in other
Qataris, as a group, was similar while trust in other ethnic groups was much lower (Diop et al., 2011).
These criticisms and others revolve around the radius of trust while the level of trust assesses the intensity of civic cooperation in society the radius determines the width of that cooperation (Delhey et al., 2011). Radius of trust refers to how trust expands to encompass
34 | P a g e wider circles in one’s social realm. Qataris, for example, might restrict this radius to their own families or tribes, or expand it to include certain groups while excluding others. The radius of trust is also related to the type of social networks apparent in society and how they function as more fragmented societies react differently than more cohesive ones. Through using indicators measuring in-group and out-group trust Delhey et al. (2011) conclude that it is possible to test for radius of trust. Their results suggest that societies with more familial and tribal ties tend to have a narrow radius of trust while more advanced individualistic societies exhibit a wider radius. These results suggest that the stronger sub-groups in society are less likely to have a wider, all-encompassing radius of trust exist as the groups become more inward oriented.
Particular trust has been used in many studies to measure the level of trust individuals place in identified groups. The World Value Survey (WVS) in its fifth wave introduced several variables to gauge particular trust in family, neighbours, acquaintances, people met for the first time, and people of different religions and nationalities (Crepaz et al., 2014). The introduction of these variables to one of the largest international social and political surveys allowed researchers to compare and contrast, on a wider scale, the two forms of social trust.
Many studies found a positive relationship between generalised and particular trust (Crepaz et al., 2014; Putnam et al., 1993; Traunmuller, 2010); however, the dynamics of trust are seen to be different. Crepaz and colleagues (2014) found that generalised trust relates to positive attitudes towards out-groups while particular trust is indicative of negative attitudes towards other groups. Uslaner and Conley (2003) found that generalised trust was positively related to civic participation while particular trust was negatively related to it, except for participation in in-group organisations. Particular trust, or in-group trust, has been proven to
35 | P a g e function differently from generalised trust and is, as explained above, more suited to studies where the radius of trust is an issue as in this study.
As Qatari society is highly familial and tribal it is expected that the strong social divide between Qataris and immigrants will yield a narrow radius of generalised trust that focuses on Qataris as a community rather than extending trust to the overall diverse society. Qataris are likely to view themselves as “the” group in society as they are the citizens while all others are “temporary”. Qataris also live in proximity to their own, and their perception of the general public is hampered by the way society is structured. For Qataris, it is easier to view society in a segmented way. These segments appear as follows: those who live within
Qatari society including Qataris and highly integrated Arabs, white-collar non-Arabs who mostly interact with Qataris in the workplace and in educational institutions, and manual workers who have very rare personal contact with Qataris. However, this apparent economic divide may not be sufficient to explain attitudes. Qataris may also view immigrants according to their backgrounds – with more culturally proximate Arabs viewed differently than Westerners or Asians when other economic and social conditions are the same.
Therefore, using particular trust through asking Qataris about their trust in certain groups according to their background is better suited to the context at hand.
Trust has been used in social science research as a gauge for prejudice, social capital, and social cohesion among other uses. This research aims to use particular trust in immigrant groups as an indicator of acceptance of these groups by Qataris. As suggested above, the decision to use particular trust is a result of the high level of diversity and social distance between groups in Qatar. Also, as the main emphasis is on exploring determinants of social trust in immigrants, particular trust offers a more suitable tool.
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1.2.3.3 Previous Explanations of Social Trust Many explanations of intergroup social trust have been offered by previous studies. Various explanations will be discussed in detail in corresponding chapters of this thesis; here relevant explanations are introduced in summary. One main explanation supported by various studies in different contexts is contact. Contact theorists suggest that social trust across groups is improved by increased out-group contact between members of these groups (Forbes, 1997;
Putnam, 2007; Schmid et al., 2014; Sigelman & Welch, 1993; Stein et al., 2000). In Qatar contact is of prime importance as social and religious differences are strongly apparent, many migrant social groups are relatively new to Qatari society and different groups have different contact dynamics with Qataris. Arabs are generally more integrated as they speak the same language as Qataris and share many social and cultural attributes. Asians are more likely to be domestic staff and, therefore, they are more likely to live in Qatari households though not on an equal social status that is necessary for contact to be beneficial (Allport,
1954). Westerners, on the other hand, have very little in common with Qataris as most of them do not speak Arabic, they do not live in Qatari neighbourhoods, and their children do not attend public schools. This social setting, which will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 2, requires a measurement of contact that acknowledges these different dynamics. This study will focus on three types of contact that correspond with how contact is facilitated in Qatari society.
Another explanation for trust between groups is based on religious attitudes and practices.
Some authors, such as Schoenfeld (1978), have found a positive link between attending religious services and generalised trust. Other researchers have found that belonging to the dominant religious group in society has a negative effect on trust in members of other
37 | P a g e religious groups (Brenneman, 2008; Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Traunmuller, 2010; Welch et al., 2007; Welch et al., 2004), and while most of these studies took place in Western and
Protestant settings some evidence is found to support this finding in non-Western Muslim settings (Gaduh, 2012; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009;). These studies suggest that a stronger affiliation to the dominant religious group yields less trust and more prejudice towards minority religious groups. While these issues will be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3, it is important to emphasise that religiosity, in the many forms it has been operationalised by the previously mentioned and many other studies, has been proven to be an important indicator of social trust, especially when it comes to other social groups. The religious conservative nature of Qatari society encourages exploring the relationship between religion and trust as immigrant groups include both Muslims and non-Muslims.
However, religion is not the only aspect of Qataris’ conservatism, social norms are also highly important to Qataris.
Social conservatism and social attitudes in general have also been observed to effect social trust, especially when it comes to immigrants. Strong adherence to group specific social norms has been associated with lower trust in members of other groups (Conover, 1984;
Dawes t al., 1988; Okamoto, 2003; Uslaner & Conley, 2003). Civic values, as in participation in social organisations and activities, have been linked to higher levels of trust
(Ingleheart & Baker, 2000). The strong tribal nature of Qatari society elevates the significance of social norms and social conservatism in understanding trust between Qataris and immigrants.
Political orientation also offers an explanation for social trust (Mughan & Paxton, 2006;
Pettigrew, 1998; Raijman & Semyonov, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010; Weldon, 2006). With
38 | P a g e immigration growing in prominence in political discourse in the West, the importance of political orientation in explaining trust in immigrants is growing. In the authoritarian Qatari context, political orientation is difficult to gauge as no political parties exist and it is difficult to measure political polarisation. Nonetheless, the Arab Spring and the resulting chaos in the region had an impact on all Arab countries and Qatar was no exception. Arab media’s polarisation around support and opposition of Arab Spring uprisings and Qatar’s involvement in supporting Islamists in the region generated high public interest and polarised Qataris around the issue. This political polarisation makes it possible to test for the effects of Islamism and liberal political attitudes on trust in immigrants.
Moreover, while these explanations have been proven to be effective in understanding social trust, the interaction between them is also important in the Qatari context. Religious, social, and political attitudes are highly intertwined as social norms arise from religious teachings and political polarisation is affected by support for Islamism and religious conservatism.
Understanding how religious, social, and political attitudes interact with each other is necessary to determine how significant these effects are and which of them is more important in predicting social trust.
1.2.4 Connecting Social Cohesion, Capital, and Trust
As explained in the review above, the three main concepts identified are closely intertwined.
Social cohesion is seen as an outcome of social capital and is frequently measured by social trust. In this study we assess bridging social capital in Qatar from the viewpoint of Qataris through mainly identifying determinants of social trust in immigrant groups along with attitudes towards them.
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Observing the interaction between social cohesion, social capital, and social trust provides a comprehensive understanding of the social dynamics across groups in Qatari society.
Understanding these dynamics will fill in a knowledge gap in two subjects. First, the results will provide a benchmark for bridging social capital and social cohesion in Qatar through which future research can assess social change taking place in this rapidly transforming setting. Second, as seen from the review above and as concurrent reviews in following chapters will show, most intergroup relation studies are conducted in Western settings and, even when conducted in non-Western settings, are defined by measures and models developed in Western contexts. The results of this study will advance empirical evidence on existing explanations of social capital, cohesion, and trust in a context where little has been previously done on the subject using measures and models more relevant to the unique characteristics of Qatar and the region detailed in the contextual section above.
1.3 Research Hypotheses
As explained above, the issue of social cohesion between various ethnic groups in Qatar is highly significant due to the unique demographic structure. Few scholarly works can be found that address this issue, even though diversity increases rapidly and its social and economic implications for Qatar are becoming more apparent every day. This thesis aims to advance social cohesion research in Qatar through identifying the main determinants of
Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants. Moreover, as religion and traditional values play an important role in forming Qatari identity this research focuses on comparing the effects of conservative religious and social values on attitudes towards immigrants. Also, this thesis
40 | P a g e aims to evaluate existing measures of social interaction and values and introduce contextually relevant measures to advance research on the subject.
First, the effects of contact on trust in immigrant groups will be measured, as contact is identified to be one of the main determinants of intergroup trust (Gaertner et al., 1996;
Putnam, 2007; Siegleman &Welch, 1993; Stein et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2006). Second, we will move to testing the effects of social and religious attitudes on trust in immigrant groups using a construct of religious and social indicators. As explained above, the high religiosity and traditional tendencies displayed by Qataris makes the exploration of this relationship pivotal to understanding social cohesion in Qatar. Political orientation is also explored as a predictor of trust mainly because in the Qatari context, as with other Arab contexts, the Islamist vs. liberal political polarisation is increasing and is highly connected to religious conservatism. Also, as explained above, political orientation in many Western contexts has been proven to effect social trust, while the political setting in Qatar is different than those in the West. It is still plausible that political orientation will have a significant effect on trust.
Additionally, the thesis explores the interaction between religion and cultural background through an experimental design. The aim of the experiment is to compare the relative effects of religion and cultural background of immigrants on Qataris’ prejudice towards them by experimentally isolating each factor. Finally, the attitudes identified in the quantitative analysis are assessed using focus groups to determine how Qataris identify immigrants and how their attitudes towards them are shaped allowing for a contextual explanation for the results.
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Further, this thesis aims to provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of how
Qataris view and compare immigrant groups. Theoretically, a negative relationship between conservative values and trust in non-Arab immigrants is expected as these groups are more likely to be socially and religiously different to Qataris. The interaction between religious and cultural background will most likely prove religion is more important to Qataris than a shared background as religious commonalities are strong while social traditions are diverse in the Arab world. It is also expected that the definition of the immigrant will be found to be more complex than the legal one. The strict Qatari legal framework for immigration makes it important to understand how society defines an outsider and when immigrants are absorbed and accepted by Qataris.
1.4 Proposed Causal Model
As this study is focused on the effects of religious, social, and political attitudes on trust in immigrants in Qatar, we propose that the effects of conservative attitudes on the attitudes towards immigrants will be mitigated by two factors. First is the characteristics of the group in question and how close they are to Qataris in religion, language, and shared cultural background. Second is the existence and intensity of contact with members of the group in question.
We propose, as the flowchart 1 implies, that conservative religious, social, and political attitudes will have a negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants. These effects will be amplified by dissimilarities with the various groups and reduced by more contact with members of the groups. These connections will be further explained and explored in following chapters.
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Chart 1: causal schema of the research
Contact
Religious, social Attitudes towards and political immigrants attitudes
Similarity of group to Qataris
1.5 Thesis Outline The thesis is comprised of 7 chapters along with an introduction, conclusion, and appendices. Chapter 1 discusses the methodologies used throughout the thesis. The chapter includes information on the survey used for the quantitative part of this thesis, analysis methods, and experimental design parameters along with the focus group methodology.
Chapter 2 explores the effects of three types of contact on trust in immigrant groups in
Qatar. Having and meeting friends, neighbours, and co-workers from immigrant group is tested along with controls. The findings of this chapter portray a different pattern of effect according to the type of contact and interaction dynamic of the group.
Chapter 3 discusses the effects of religiosity and religious attitudes on trust in immigrants.
The chapter identifies three dimensions of religiosity and tests them against trust in the four groups. The results suggest that personal religiosity is the strongest predictor of distrust
43 | P a g e among the three and that trust in Arabs, who are mostly Muslim, is not affected by religiosity.
Chapter 4 moves to social attitudes and identifies four types of attitudes. The results suggest that conservative gender roles attitudes are negatively related to trust in non-Arab groups and that civic participation is positively linked to trust in all groups through raising the likelihood of contact.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the effects of political orientation on trust in immigrants. The effects of political conservatism, support for Islamism, and liberal values are tested in this chapter. The results suggest a positive effect for liberal values on trust in non-Arab groups and a positive effect of support for Islamism on trust in Arabs.
Chapter 6 is dedicated to the experimental design where respondents are asked about their approval in hiring a hypothetical candidate with four subsamples receiving four different candidates. This chapter compares religious and social attitudes and their interaction with each other. The results suggest that religion is a better predictor of acceptability than cultural background.
The final analytical chapter discusses the results of two focus groups on attitudes towards immigrants. The results of this chapter provide a deeper insight into the immigrant as a concept in Qataris’ minds and how attitudes are formed. Finally, in the conclusion we bring the results together and discuss their implications for Qatari society and social cohesion research.
Each analytical chapter is comprised of a review of past research on the issues relevant to the chapter’s emphasis, a summary of methods, an analysis, and a discussion of results. This
44 | P a g e is mainly because of the decision to discuss the results thematically. Also, the mixed method format means that introducing each method will need a different narrative in discussion of both literature and results.
The results of this study will offer researchers and decision makers a comprehensive view of how Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants are formed and affected by social settings and social, religious, and political attitudes. The growing immigrant population in Qatar and the strong religious and social identity of its people makes understanding the dynamic between citizens and immigrants of prime importance for the future of Qatari society. The study aspires to be a catalyst to an academic, social, and political discourse on the issue.
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODS
2.1 Introduction As discussed earlier, this study aims to examine and explain trust in immigrants in the Qatari context. Being the first study of its kind in Qatar on the determinants of intergroup social trust there was a broad gap to fill. In order to provide a comprehensive view of the determinants of trust in immigrants a mixed method approach was utilised, which included survey results analysis, survey experiment, and focus groups. It is difficult to find previous results on the subject due to the scarcity of social trust research in Qatar in general; therefore, first there was a need to identify patterns of social trust, contact, and values and assess how they relate to one another. This was done using quantitative analysis. The quantitative and qualitative section of this study tests four concepts: social contact with
Qataris and non-Qataris; religiosity; social conservatism; and political conservatism, as an explanation of social trust in immigrants. Several variables were used from the SSCQ to operationalise and test these concepts. Measures of having and socially interacting with friends, neighbours, and co-workers from immigrant groups were utilised and these measures were then used to stratify respondents according to level and type of contact with immigrants. Second variables on religious values were used including classic measures and context-based ones. These variables aimed to assess religious conservatism. Third variables on social conservatism that aimed to gauge the importance of social traditions and norms for the respondent were used in order to stratify respondents on a spectrum between liberal and
46 | P a g e conservative social attitudes. Finally, political variables on support of Islamists and Islamist policies in the Arab world were employed as a gauge for political conservatism. These variables will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
The study also includes an experiment to assess the relative impact of cultural and religious affinity on trust in immigrants – this is discussed thoroughly in the corresponding chapter.
Wanting to gain a deeper understanding of what the quantitative results meant in the complex Qatari context, focus groups, a widely used qualitative method, were conducted to provide a contextual understanding of how the values relate to each other and how the impact of cultural and religious diversity operate on intergroup relations. This format classifies this study as using a mixed method approach.
The use of mixed methods in social research has significantly increased over the years
(Creswell, 2005). Like this one, many mixed method studies begin with a quantitative analysis that results in robust aggregate findings on the subject matter. This is followed by a detailed qualitative examination collecting more comprehensive views from respondents, in order to understand the thought processes driving the quantitative results. Other designs use qualitative methods in the exploration phase and use results to guide in the design of the quantitative step (Creswell, 2003). A mixed method approach is commonly used for corroboration and expansion on results; however, the assumption that it adds validation to the study is dependent on clarity and implementation rather than simply using more than one method (Bazeley, 2004).
This chapter will provide a discussion of the research methods utilised in this mixed method research. Initially there is a discussion of the survey methodology including information
47 | P a g e regarding sampling, data collection, questionnaire development, variables used, missing data, and analysis methods. Then a discussion about the focus group methodology starting with participant recruitment and moving to running the groups and analysing results is explained
2.2 Survey Methodology 2.2.1 Data Source
Chapters 2 through 6 of this study utilise the SSCQ results conducted by the Social and
Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) of Qatar University in December 2013 in the state of Qatar. The survey asked respondents about religious values and practices, social conservatism, and political orientation. Also, respondents were asked about their attitudes towards, and relations to, immigrants. The purpose of the questionnaire design was to measure the effect of personal beliefs and values on tolerance and social trust of others (Al-
Ansari et al., 2016).
2.2.2 Sample The following section discusses the sampling design used in the SSCQ survey. As detailed below, SESRI provided the sample frame and undertook the sample selection process. In this section sample frame, sample design, and weighting of data is discussed. Information on sampling, weighting, and fielding detailed below are gathered from two main sources. The first source is the SSCQ report published by SESRI (Al-Ansari et al., 2016). The second source is the notes taken from debriefing meetings with interviewers during the fielding of the survey.
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2.2.2.1 Sampling Frame
In the SSCQ the target population included Qatari nationals who lived in residential housing units in Qatar during the time the survey was fielded in December 2013. The target population excluded those who lived in institutions such as army barracks, hospitals, dormitories, and prisons. The sampling frame was developed by SESRI in March-April
2011. In this frame, all housing units in Qatar are listed with their housing address and information to identify whether residents in the housing units are Qataris, white-collar migrant workers, or blue-collar migrant workers. In this survey, the sampling frame was limited to Qataris only as the aim of the study was assessing the determinants of Qataris’ trust in immigrant groups.
2.2.2.2 Sampling Design M.A: Map of Qatar Municipalities
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Source: D-Maps, (2016), Qatar Municipalities [ONLINE]. Available at: http://www.d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=56306&lang=en [Accessed 21 August 2016].
Qatar is divided into seven administrative units called municipalities. Each municipality contains a number of zones and each zone is divided into several blocks. In the frame used for the survey, there are 72 zones and 320 blocks. In this survey, housing units in each municipality were ordered by geographic location from north to south in order to permit a well-distributed sampling of housing units in different areas and then a systematic sample
50 | P a g e was constructed. The method of systematic sampling for this frame was to select housing units by using the ratio between the frame size and the sample size as an interval for choosing the sample unit. The systematic sampling assures proportionate representation as a block containing a certain percentage of Qatari households in the frame would be represented by the same percentage of the total number of sampled units.
2.2.2.3 Within Household Sampling The second step of sampling was at the household level, only one person 18 years or older was selected for the survey per household. As ethical considerations required an adult’s consent the sample was limited to those over 18 to avoid having the parent or guardian present during the interview of minors. SESRI developed its own within household sampling method to fit the Islamic culture in Qatar. The method can be summarized as follows. First, the interviewer asks the first adult contacted by interviewers (the informant) for the number of adults 18 years or older in the household. Based on the number of adults within the household the computer automatically and instantly chooses the respondent. For example, if the number of adults is one, the first person asked is de facto selected to complete the interview. If there are two adults in the house, the computer randomly selects between the first person asked and the other adult. If there are three adults in the house, the computer randomly selects the first person asked 33% of the time. If the first person asked is not selected, the computer randomly selects between the younger and the older of the other two adults. And as the number increases the likelihood of selecting the first contact household member from his family members decreases appropriately. If the respondent chosen is not present at the time of this initial contact then a second visit is arranged at a time that works best for that respondent.
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2.2.2.4 Sample Size, Non-Response, and Sampling Error Overall, 4,158 Qatari households were initially sampled for this survey. Table M1 prepared by SESRI’s fieldwork team indicates sample size and the type of responses received for the sampled households (See table M1).
Table M1: Responses by groups Responses Number
Complete 1,732
Incomplete: 2,426
Eligible 567
Ineligible 943
Unknown eligibility 916
Response Rate (RR1) 54%
*Source: SSCQ *Eligible refers to interviews with respondents who fit the sample description (i.e: Qatari) but did not complete the interview, ineligible refers to interviews that were not completed because the respondent did not fit the criteria of the sample (i.e: immigrant living in a Qatari household) and unknown eligibility refers to houses where after three visits no one answered.
As seen in table M1, the response rate, which is the ratio between the numbers of completed interviews (1,732) and the total sample size after excluding ineligible interviews (3,215), was 54%. With the numbers of completed interviews presented in table M1, the maximum sampling errors for a percentage are +/- 2.6 percentage points. The calculation of the sampling error takes into account the design effects resulting from weighting and stratification as explained below.
2.2.2.5 Weighting As described by the sampling report issued by SESRI (Al-Ansari et al., 2016) the final weights in the data are constructed from three components: the base weights, which address
52 | P a g e the selection probability both of the household and the individual within the household; adjustments for non-response; and the post-stratification adjustments in line with the 2010
Census of Qatar (QSA, 2010). In addition, weight trimming was also used to reduce variance, especially for large households where selection probability is reduced and, therefore, high weights are given to respondents.
Base Weights
These weights are basically the inverse of the selection probabilities of the persons in the sample. Because of proportionate stratified sampling used by SESRI, each household in the sample frame has the same chance of being selected and the weights are given according to this formula:
housing unit housing unit Wbase = 1⁄p and p = n⁄N where Wbase
p is the probability of selection.
n is the sample size.
N is the number of housing units in the frame.
It is worth mentioning that for this study that the frame included only Qatari households.
The weight for the within household selection probability is the above weight multiplied by the number of eligible persons in the household:
person housing unit Wbase = Wbase ∗ h
h is the number of persons in the household who fit the criteria of the sample.
In layman’s terms, the less probability the respondent has to be chosen the more weight he or she is given, this is before trimming is applied. With a large household the probability is
53 | P a g e highly decreased. For example, if there are 10 members of the household that fit the criteria of the sample then the probability is one tenth that of a respondent who is the only member of his household. Correspondingly the weight will be significantly increased for the prior mentioned case.
Adjustment for Non-Response
Again weights are applied to give more weight to those who are less likely to be represented due to non-response. For example, response in the capital city of Doha is considerably lower than response in a rural area like Al Shamal. This is mainly due to the metropolitan nature of
Doha, where inhabitants live in various types of households while in rural areas most households are Qatari and most housing units are large villas making it easier for fieldworkers to produce a response. The weighting process here corrects for that through calculating the weights according to the non-response levels within each municipality.
Simply put, the inverse of the response rate for each municipality was used as a weighting variable.
Post-Stratification Weights
The weights were also adjusted to align the results with the population estimates based on the latest census of Qatar, which was conducted in 2010 (QSA, 2010). This adjustment can help reduce the effect from non-response and under-coverage of the sampling frame. The adjustments considered gender, marital status, municipality, age group, education, and homeownership.
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2.2.3 Questionnaire Development The questionnaire was designed to gauge religious, social, and political attitudes towards the four main immigrant groups (Arabs, Westerners, Indian sub-continentals, and East-Asians).
The survey also included an experiment on the threshold of acceptance for Qataris through asking respondents about their approval of hiring a hypothetical candidate for a government position. Four sub-samples received four different candidates each with a different ethnicity and religious affiliation. Details on the experiment will be provided in Chapter 6. The survey was programmed into the Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) system using the software BLAISE. After debugging the program, a face-to-face pre-test on a small number of randomly selected Qatari households was conducted. The face-to-face pre-test consisted of 50 respondents, from a selection of municipalities, who were interviewed by 15 interviewers over a time span of 5 days. This pre-test gave valuable information, which was used to refine question wording, response categories, introductions, transitions, interviewer instructions, and interview length. Based on this information, the final version of the questionnaire was created and then programmed into CAPI for the fieldwork. An English version of the SSCQ questionnaire, as opposed to the Arabic version, is provided in the appendix.
2.2.4 Interviewer Recruitment Interviewers in SESRI are recruited from a pool of fieldworkers acquired by the field operations department accumulated over time. As it stands the SESRI’s pool of interviewers is made up totally of non-Qatari Arabs who are mostly Sudanese, Egyptians, and
Palestinians. Qataris rarely do part-time jobs due to their high income. Also, the social implications, of going door to door and interviewing their fellow Qataris in a small and
55 | P a g e conservative society, make it difficult especially for a Qatari woman to function as an interviewer. However, as the Social Cohesion Survey needed to measure attitudes towards non-Qataris it was worthwhile to make an effort to recruit Qatari interviewers. As the available interviewers were all non-Qatari Arabs it would be difficult for Qatari respondents to sound any negative views towards Arab immigrants.
The first attempt to recruit Qatari interviewers was through approaching a volunteer recruitment organization. While they initially agreed to the concept they were not able to deliver the required number of interviewers. In a letter explaining why they opted out of the contract they said that two main reasons hampered their efforts. First, they stated that it was very difficult to convince Qataris to commit to a daily four-hour shift. The second reason related to female recruits as they reported that those they approached considered it inappropriate for women to go to a stranger’s house without a male escort from the family.
The second attempt at recruiting Qataris was through lowering the bar to search for non-
Qatari interviewers who were convincing enough to pass as Qataris. These interviewers should speak the local dialect fluently and wear Qatari attire. This proved easier and 15 of the 68 interviewers recruited fit the description. After the survey was fielded, random callbacks for 20% of the sample were conducted and a question was asked about the nationality of the interviewers whom the respondent had met. More than 80% were convinced that the “Qatari-look-alike” they met was a Qatari proving that these interviewers could help in diminishing the interviewer nationality effect in future surveys. The “Qatari- look-alike” interviewers conducted 37% of interviews with the rest conducted by regular non-Qatari interviewers. All through the analysis a control for type of interviewer was kept to observe the effects. In all models attempted in the analysis being interviewed by a Qatari
56 | P a g e interviewer was negatively linked to trust in Arabs while no significant effect was found for non-Arab groups. The presence of the effect provides evidence to support the importance of the interviewer’s nationality – or at least the perception of nationality – when asking sensitive questions about specific social groups.
Each interviewer received an orientation to the CAPI system, participated in a short training program covering the fundamentals of CAPI interviewing and standards protocols for administrating survey instruments, and had practice time on the computers (laptops). Also, the questionnaire was discussed with interviewers to ensure they had a full comprehension of the questions and what they were gauging.
2.2.5 Variables Used 2.2.5.1 Missing Cases Before discussing the variables used in the analysis a short description of missing values is needed. This is mainly because all further discussion of the data will be after removing missing cases as discussed below.
As is apparent in table M2 in Appendix D some of the variables examined throughout the analysis yielded a high number of missing cases. The trust in immigrants and political orientation variables yielded the highest “don't know” and refusal responses. Trust in Arabs generated 1% in missing cases (n=11), and trust in Westerners was the highest with 3%
(n=58). The remaining two variables were trust in Indian sub-continentals where missing cases were 2% (n=32) and trust in East Asians was 3% (n=45).
For the political orientation questions fieldwork reports suggested that some respondents found the context of the questions out of their grasp as most of the questions required a general following of regional political events. Two questions resulted in the highest missing
57 | P a g e values: the first on Islamic parties being democratic (n=271, 15%) and the second on the
Muslim Brotherhood being responsible for the turmoil in Egypt (n=316, 18%). It should be mentioned that there are no political parties or an elected legislature in Qatar to allow for a vibrant political discourse among citizens. The questions were potentially very politically sensitive, especially as they were asked during a very turbulent time in the Arab world. This offers another explanation of the high non-response rate to the questions.
In order to maintain the largest possible number of cases in the analysis we have opted to recode the “don’t know” responses for the trust questions as a middle answer adding a fifth response to the original four point scale. Later, as the analysis needed to reduce the trust scale to a dummy variable that middle response was classified as 0 indicating no trust. The main argument for doing this was that those opting for the “don’t know” option do not give a positive indication they are expressing trust. Those stating refusal to answer were dropped from the analysis for the trust and all other variables, as it is difficult to assert assumptions based on that answer. As we acknowledged the probability of different means when applying these changes, we tested the final model of the determinants of trust in immigrants using the original sample with missing values included. As table A.R.M in Appendix F suggests, minimal differences were observed between the results with and without our treatment of the missing values. The table uses the same parameters as the final model used in the analysis in Chapter 5, which includes political and significant attitudinal indicators along with contact, demographics, and other controls. The only significant observation was that meeting Western neighbours became non-significant when including missing cases.
For religious, social, and political attitudes variables the results of the factor analysis of every set of attitudes were used in the corresponding chapter to replace both “don’t know”
58 | P a g e and “refuse to answer” values with the results of variables loading highly together. In other words, the answer given to other variables that prove to be statistically related in a factor analysis to the variable in question was used to replace the missing value. For the remaining categorical variables utilised in the analysis the “don’t know” response was recoded as a middle value indicating neither support nor opposition. Implementing these changes to the data resulted in increasing the analytical sample size from 1202 to 1485 out of the 1732 completed cases.
2.2.5.2 Dependent Variable
As the study aims to measure the effect of contact, religiosity, social values, and political attitudes on trust in immigrants, the analysis utilised a battery of variables on particularised social trust in different immigrant groups to construct the dependent variable. The survey asked respondents “How much do you personally trust each of the following groups of people: Qataris, Arabs, Westerners, EastAsians, and Indian sub-continentals”. The variables utilised a simple four-point Likert scale (highly trust, somewhat trust, somewhat distrust, and highly distrust). For this analysis, the answer groups were recoded to give the higher trust groups a higher score. Also, the variables were dichotomised, highly and somewhat trust becoming trust and the remaining two answers ‘no trust’, in order to reach a satisfactory n size as some answer groups resulted in low n as described in the previous section.
Table M3: Trust in Qataris and foreigner groups
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Indian sub- Qataris % Arabs % Westerners % continentals East-Asians % %
Highly trust 27 7 2 2 1
Somewhat trust 66 74 44 45 43
Somewhat distrust 5 12 24 26 26
Highly distrust 2 6 27 25 28
Do not Know 0 0 3 2 2
Source: SSCQ, n=1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H
As is apparent from table M3, when asked about their trust in other Qataris, respondents exhibited high levels of trust. The results show that 93% expressed trust in other Qataris,
27% said they highly trusted Qataris and 66% said they somewhat trusted them.
Respondents also exhibited high levels of trust in Arab immigrants as 74% said they somewhat trusted them, and 7% exhibited high trust. While Qataris exhibit high trust in
Arabs it is clear that there is still a negative effect for being foreign as there is a notable difference in Qataris’ trust between non-Qatari Arabs and their fellow countrymen.
Trust in non-Arab groups was considerably lower. As seen in table M3 Westerners, East
Asians, and Indian sub-continental immigrants were considered trustworthy by less than
50% of respondents. Around 47% of respondents said they trusted immigrants from the
Indian sub-continent with 2% saying they highly trusted those, 46% said they trusted
Westerners, and as with the previous group only 2% prompted for the highest trust option.
The lowest trust levels were observed with East Asians as 44% of respondents said they trusted them with only 1% stating high trust.
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Levels of distrust were extremely close between the non-Arab groups with 51% of both
Westerners and Indian sub-continentals displaying distrust and a slightly higher 54% displayed distrust in East Asians. From these results we can see that Qataris exhibit high and consistent levels of distrust in all non-Arab foreign groups. Given the very different economic and social status of the three groups asked about here it is interesting to find such similar patterns of trust between them. These results confirm the importance of the questions asked by this study, trust in the group closest to Qatari religious and social values received the highest level of trust while non-Arab and mostly non-Muslim groups received similar trust levels.
2.2.5.3 Control Variables
Along with the dependent and independent variables, which will be discussed in
following chapters, the analysis took into account a number of control variables. These
variables included general demographics such as gender, age, educational attainment
level, employment, and marital status. Higher education attainment and employment
status have been found to positively affect social trust in various studies (Alesina & La
Ferrara, 2002; Daniels & Ruhr, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2006; Leigh, 2006; Stein et al.,
2000). When it comes to gender, some research suggests that women are less trustful of
immigrants (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002) while others suggest the opposite (Hooghe et
al., 2006). Additionally, age is often significantly linked to social trust as older cohorts
are frequently found to be less trusting (Daniels & Ruhr, 2010; Stolle et al., 2008). Being
married was also found to negatively affect trust (Daniels & Ruhr, 2010; Sturgis et al.,
2010). Also, the model included a variable on studying abroad, to control for living in a
61 | P a g e different social setting than Qatar for prolonged period of time as previous research found that studying abroad improved attitudes towards out-groups (Anderson et al., 2006).Table
M4: Demographic characteristics of sample
Recoded Label Original Label % Gender of respondents 0 Female 51 1 Male 49 Highest level of education attained Least educated Never attended school 3 Primary school 9 Preparatory school 11 Vocational 0 Middle education Secondary school 36 Post-secondary diploma 9 Higher education University degree 31 Master’s degree 2 Doctoral degree 1 Studied abroad 1 Yes 20 0 No 80 Employment In active employment Full time employment 53 Part time employment 1 Not in active employment Central article 2 Unemployed and seeking employment 2 Unemployed and not seeking employment 2 Student 11 Housewife 18 Retired 11 Marital status Currently married Married 69 Currently not married Separated 1 Divorced 2 Widowed 3 Never married 25 Age Mean 40 Std. Dev. 13.29 Source: SSCQ, n=1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H
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When it comes to gender, before weighting, respondents interviewed were 48% male and
52% female; however, as seen in table M4, weighting slightly adjusted the ratio in accordance with the Qatar Statistics Authority numbers to make it 49 to 51. The mean age of respondents was 40. The sample included a majority of married respondents in line with the population estimates. There were 69% of respondents who were married at the time of the survey and 25% that had never been married, and only 6% reported being divorced, separated, or widowed (See table M4).
Respondents were asked about their highest level of education. As seen in table M4, 34% of respondents reported completing a university degree or higher attainment while the remaining respondents ranged between never attending school and post-secondary diploma,
36% had only completed their secondary school degree and 3% had never attended school. It is important to note that levels of higher education attainment are generally high among citizens in Qatar as university education is free and guaranteed to all Qataris meeting the minimum requirements of secondary school achievement. Of those reporting at least some educational attainment, 20% said they did study abroad for a period of six months or more.
As this group is more likely to have had interaction with cultures other than Qatari culture it was proposed that they might be more likely to be trusting of foreigners from non-Arab countries. Finally, when it comes to employment, 54% of respondents were employed at the time of the survey; however, only 2% reported being unemployed and seeking employment as the remainder of the unemployed respondents stated being students, housewives, or retired.
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Table M5: Interactions of demographic characteristics % Educational attainment distributed by age group 18-30 31-45 46+ Below secondary 8 16 41 Secondary and diploma 69 43 25 University and higher 23 41 34 Educational attainment distributed by gender
Female Male Below secondary 23 22 Secondary and diploma 41 48 University and higher 36 30 Employment distributed by gender Female Male Unemployed 40 5 Employed 60 95 n=1485, source: SSCQ
It is important to point out some interactions between demographic variables to better understand how some demographic characteristics effect each other. For instance, in the
Qatari context it is more likely for men to be employed than women while women are more likely to be highly educated. Understanding the effects of these demographics will largely depend on understanding how they relate to one another. For example, as seen in table M5, when looking at employment by gender 40% of women reported being unemployed as compared to only 5% of men. As Qatar is still a traditional conservative society the likelihood of women joining the workforce is still considerably lower than men.
However, when considering education, women were as likely as men to be highly educated.
In fact, 36% of female respondents were highly educated as compared to 30% of men. When considering education and age the older cohorts were most likely to belong to the group with below secondary education; 41% of respondents aged 46 and above reported an educational
64 | P a g e level below secondary education. However, when the highest educational attainment group is examined the gap is smaller. The results show 34% of respondents from the oldest group reported higher education attainment compared to 41% of the middle group. The younger respondents were the least likely to be highly educated; however, this is understandable as the youngest group includes those aged 18 to 21 who are more likely to be in higher education at the time of interview (See table M5). Education in Qatar has developed rapidly in the past 20 years, from having only one university and mostly public schools to three universities, two community colleges, five local campuses of international universities, and a number of international schools along with various scholarship programs sending thousands of Qataris to study abroad. This leap forward in education has favoured quantity over quality since the 1980’s public education has been free up to the university level for all Qataris.
However, now more choices and higher calibre educational institutions offer a variety of options for students to pursue.
2.2.6 Analysis Methods As the dependent variable is not linear, a binary logistic regression was used rather than linear regression, where the model attempted violated no assumptions. Logistic regression calculates the probability of occurrence for a certain event (dependent variable) when other factors change in value (independent variables). Logistic regression is the most suitable method to use when the dependent variable is dichotomous and the independent variables are continuous or interval (Mood, 2010). Ordinal logistic regression was attempted first; however, the models violated assumptions of this type of regression when running the Brant test. This meant that there was a need to dichotomise the dependent variable; the two higher
65 | P a g e trust categories were assigned a value of 1, and the two lower categories were assigned the value of 0. The command “logit” in STATA was used for the first step of analysis.
As coefficients across models are being compared average marginal effects (AME) were utilised. As suggested by Mood (2010), AME’s are more suitable when comparing the effects in a logistic regression across models, sample groups, or time intervals as unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. The resulting AMEs reflect the probabilities averaged throughout the model to provide comparable values of the effect on the dependent variables.
As the effects of various attitudes on trust in four different groups are being compared this tool is extremely beneficial for the analysis. Throughout the analysis the command
“margins” in STATA was used following “logit” to produce AMEs.
The models used in Chapters 2 through 5 use similar parameters. For every chapter the analysis includes four models, one for trust in each of the four immigrant groups. Along with the specific attitudinal measures used in the chapter, the model includes demographic controls and other control variables. Attitudinal measures that denote significance are retained for the analysis of the following chapter. In Chapter 5, the models attempted include all measures denoting significance throughout the analysis along with political measures, the focus of that chapter.
In the first analytical chapter contact variables are tested against trust in immigrant groups.
In the following chapters religious, social, and political values indicators are introduced. In each chapter the analysis model introduced the new set of variables while maintaining only explanatory variables that denoted some significance in earlier chapters. In the experiment chapter the same structure is used where contact was introduced, followed by each set of
66 | P a g e variables and the final model includes variables that denoted significance in previous models. Demographic and control variables remain the same across models.
Finally, to further examine the size of effects observed, predicted probabilities were calculated. This method offers another tool with which to compare the size effects of the variable when the remaining variables are held at controlled values (Long, 2009). The
“prvalue” command in STATA was utilised. This provides predicted probabilities for specified values of variables included in regression models while holding the remainder of the variables at a pre-specified value.
2.3 Survey Experiment
Our study also utilised a survey experiment embedded in the SSCQ. This section will discuss the use of survey experiments in previous research and its application in the thesis.
Starting with medical sciences, controlled laboratory experiments have long been utilised as a research method (Deutsch, 1958). They first gained prominence in social psychology and then were gradually introduced to economics, sociology, and political science (Fehr et al.,
2003). These experiments were first confined to the laboratory experiment model. However, since the 1980’s the trend has shifted to combining experimental approaches with surveys to eliminate order effects, as in the first or last choice of answer being favoured by respondents
(Patton, 1980). Experiments were later developed for quantitative methods in the form of survey experiments where they were embedded in the survey interview.
Survey experiments were developed as a means of determining casual relationships through manipulating questions to test how priming for certain issues and attitudes and changing the order of responses affect answers. Another use of experiments was to limit the effect of
67 | P a g e social desirability in certain socially and politically sensitive contexts and issues. This was done through randomising the order of answers in a survey question, or by using split sample designs where different subsamples received different questions or different forms of the same question. As suggested by Gaines and Kuklinski (2006), survey experiments are a methodological breakthrough for public opinion research. This method has gained importance and is proving a strong tool in advancing our understanding of public attitudes.
There are many forms of substantive survey experiments. Some include the use of vignettes describing different scenarios, comprising the use of visual aids such as cards that include information on a proposed scenario. Others involve priming for certain attitudes through adding questions for various subsamples or changing the wording of questions about the experiment topics. For example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) used two forms of an immigration question, which they randomly assigned to respondents of a survey to test how opposition to immigration was affected when asking about approval for low and highly skilled immigrants. Their findings suggested that both low skilled and highly skilled natives were more supportive of highly skilled immigrants.
Vignettes are a useful technique as they assist in enabling sophisticated, experimental manipulations to be presented in a plausible and easy to understand format. Schwartz et al.
(1991) used vignettes to test prejudice in Israel, presenting six different descriptions of an
Israeli family to respondents to test how prejudice is affected by ethnic background. The vignettes used two names for the head of the household, one North African and the other
European. The results of this study suggested that Israelis of European decent desired more social distance from North Africans as compared to Europeans. In this study, names were also used to signify racial background and religious affiliation. In the middle-eastern setting
68 | P a g e names offer, in many cases, a lot of information on social and religious background making it extremely useful for experiments on attitudes towards immigrant and minority groups.
Using a similar model, Thomsen et al. (2008) used vignettes of two hypothetical individuals to test prejudice against Muslims and Latinos in the United States. Here the names of the two individuals, Mohammed and Carlos, signified racial background. Each of the names was associated with two different scenarios: one where the person wants to assimilate into
American culture and another where the person wishes to segregate himself from the dominant culture. The authors found no difference in prejudice between the Muslim and
Latino names; however, they established that willingness to assimilate yielded less prejudice. In the experiment detailed below a similar manipulation is used. Arabic and
Western names were used along with Muslim and Christian names and religious affiliation to test for the threshold of prejudice in Qatari society. Using such triggers proved useful in the two studies mentioned in conveying the characteristics desired by researchers.
Finally, some survey experiments use ‘priming’, where material is used to push respondents to think about a particular issue before asking them the main experiment question. One example of this is in the study performed by Kuo and Margalit (2012) to identify the determinants of individual identity. In this study, respondents were divided into four groups.
The first group was the control group; the remaining three groups were asked additional sets of questions that focused on nationality, race, ethnicity, and occupation. Respondents were then asked a self-identification question focusing on the same labels for which they had been primed. The authors found a significant effect for using these primes on self-identification suggesting a correlation between the prime and the choice of identification. The use of priming is significant in understanding how individuals react to different triggers. However,
69 | P a g e using such priming techniques was not suitable for this experiment as the small n value for the sub-groups did not allow for further segmentation within each subgroup to introduce a prime.
While the examples presented above testify to the value of survey experiments, some possible weaknesses might result from design errors. Returning to the work of Gaines et al.
(2006), they suggest that survey experiments face many threats in the design phase. For example, when experiments are not positioned accurately within the survey interview it could have a spill-over effect on to the remainder of the instrument. Moreover, using multiple experiments in one survey could contaminate the results of the experiments, especially if they are around the same issues. For these reasons, amongst others, it was decided to use only one experiment in the design and to place that experiment towards the end of the interview to limit its effect on the remainder of the questionnaire. This meant that the previous questions that were on attitudes towards immigrants could have an effect on the experiment. The section immediately before the experiment asked respondents about their trust in immigrant groups. Nonetheless, this effect can be seen as beneficial to the experiment as it pushes respondents to form a view on immigrant groups before introducing the resume of a person that falls into one of these groups.
Experimental design has been proven to be extremely beneficial to the study of public opinion in general and social prejudice specifically. The hypothetical scenario, either in the form of a game or survey experiment provides a useful tool for our analysis of trust in immigrant groups as it allows a better understanding of the causal relationship between cultural and religious backgrounds and prejudice towards immigrants to be formed. As seen above, the use of vignettes allows for a more subtle approach at gauging a sensitive issue
70 | P a g e like social prejudice, which is hampered by social desirability to appear open and tolerant.
As the respondents are not asked directly to admit their prejudice towards different groups, it is more likely to capture attitudes that reflect existing prejudice and allows for avoiding social desirability bias.
Using a similar model to that used by Thomsen et al. (2008) a hypothetical candidate experiment was embedded in the SSCQ survey. The experiment used four separate resumes, each including the exact same high calibre credentials. All candidates were endowed with an
MBA from a prestigious Western university, more than 20 years of work experience, with half in the United States and the other half in Qatar, all were married, and all were male to eliminate any gender or family-based bias. However, each resume used a different name and religion: a Muslim with an Arab-sounding name, Christian with an Arab-sounding name,
Muslim with a Western-sounding name, and Christian with a Western-sounding name. Each resume was randomly assigned to a subsample including a quarter of respondents9 and the respondent was not aware of their being three other resumes.
After reading the resume, respondents were asked the following question: “Let us assume that you are the manager of recruitment in a governmental department. This person applied for a major job in your department. In front of you is the resume of that person. To what extent do you agree to hire this person?” The rationale behind this setup for the experiment was to measure the effect of religion and cultural background, and their interaction on acceptance, at least within the parameters of the workplace and as an indication of overall social acceptance.
9 Resumes can be found in the Appendices
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2.4 Focus Group Methodology
Following the results of the survey, the study utilised qualitative focus groups to provide deeper insight into how religious, social, and political attitudes effect trust in foreigners.
Focus groups are used frequently in social science research and this section will start by discussing the development and use of focus groups in social sciences and how this thesis utilised the method.
The use of focus groups as a method of acquiring qualitative data dates back to the 1920s
(Basch, 1987; Bogardus, 1926; Morgan, 1998). Focus groups are generally defined as group interviews that aim to collect data through observing the interaction and collective thinking of participants recruited using parameters which satisfy the needs of the research and they are guided by an objective facilitator (Khan et al., 1991; Kitzinger, 1994; Morgan &
Spanish, 1984; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009; Smithson, 2000; Webb & Kevern, 2001).
Originally, focus groups were a preferred method for market researchers in assessing reactions to commercial brands and products and studying consumer behaviour (Folch-Lyon
& Trost, 1981; Morgan & Spanish, 1984; Peña & Frehill, 1998). They have also been instrumental to scholars of public health, who use them to measure how social groups, and society in general, are affected by illness and health problems (Bertrand, Brown, & Ward,
1992; Kitzinger, 1994). More recently, focus groups have migrated to other social sciences areas, particularly the political field, where voting behaviour research uses the method in a similar way to that used in marketing research.
Focus groups are considered most appropriate for an exploratory investigation where little is known about the context (Bratton & Liatto-Katundu, 1994; Smithson, 2000; Solorzano et al.,
2000). They provide insight into a social phenomena in a way that quantitative data cannot.
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The interaction between participants encourages individuals to discuss controversial and personal issues in detail allowing for deeper, more contextual information to be gathered.
Many researchers use focus groups as a means of assessing and validating survey instruments. Groups with participants, who usually represent those targeted by the prospective survey, are used to identify themes and evaluate the validity of questions to be included in the survey (Berry et al., 2011; Bratton & Liatto-Katundu, 1994; Krause et al.,
2000; McLafferty, 2004).
However, focus groups also benefit from survey techniques. Questionnaires are used before or after conducting focus groups in order to collect demographic information about the participants or measure the effects of participating in the focus group on attitudes (Morgan
& Spanish, 1984; Khan et al., 1991; Peña & Frehill, 1998). In addition, many researchers combine focus groups with one-to-one, qualitative interviews in order to strengthen the findings. Utilising the two methods of data collection can make it easier to investigate issues that are of a personal nature and would be difficult to discuss in a collective setting as some sensitive issues are better discussed in a one to one interview (Altschuler et al., 2004;
Mayoux, 2001; Poston & Turnbull, 2004; Randhawa, 1998; Valentine, 1993). Moreover, some studies go further, using focus groups in a model with both interviews and surveys
(Berry et al., 2011) or ethnographic methods such as observation (Kilpatrick et al., 1999;
Verkuyten, 2003). Focus groups are useful within these formats as they can be used in further developing other methods or in adding a different angle to the analysis where information is generated from the discussion rather than directly reported by interviewees. In this study, focus groups were conducted after analysing the survey data in order to provide context for the findings and answer underlying questions that arose from the results.
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One major advantage of focus groups is that researchers can observe and record the words and phrases that participants use in discussing the subject matter. Hearing the language that respondents use is especially useful for developing survey items because it insures that the questions asked are formulated in a way that participants understand and can relate to
(Morgan, 1988; Krause et al., 2000; Kitzinger, 1994). This is especially important when working with diverse contexts where different languages and cultures require different wording for questions so that they are context specific.
Substantively, observing the discussion allows the researcher to monitor agreement, disagreement, and idea formulation giving the analysis a broader view of the issues studied.
The focus groups help to answer the “why” question behind attitudes and positions by revealing the thought processes of respondents in more detail (Bertrand et al., 1992; Bratton
& Liatto-Katundu, 1994; Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981).
When it comes to researching Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants, focus groups were found to be extremely beneficial. The collective format made participants more comfortable in sharing their views about different immigrant groups. Participants were more forthcoming in their views when everyone in the room was Qatari, and as the discussion developed, participants offered more candid views and identified with one another’s experiences. As the groups were conducted after analysing the survey data the results could be perceived through the eyes of participants.
While these advantages testify to the efficacy of focus groups as a research method, one main disadvantage makes it less suitable to large sample-frame research. Focus groups, as with other qualitative methods, are not fully representative of the target population (Khan et al., 1991; Peña & Frehill, 1998). For small sample-frames, such as members of a social club
74 | P a g e or support group, the issue of representation is not so important. Larger sample-frames, and especially national frames, require complex sampling techniques, which are not practical for focus groups. Therefore, in the case where representation is an issue, mixed method studies, such as this one, provides a compromise where previously determined general findings from nationally representative surveys are discussed in the group form in order to gain a deeper insight.
However, the fact that focus group analysis is based on researcher chosen selections from the transcribed dialogues means that the chance for researcher bias and human error is higher than in other forms where directly reported results are used (Khan et al., 1991). This is especially true when focus groups are conducted in a different language than that of the analysis. Translating exchanges between participants could provide a distorted version of reactions to ideas and emotional formulation. In Arabic, for example, there is more frequent use of stronger language in discussions, when translated they appear hostile when they are not so in the original context. Unless the researchers record their impressions of the participant’s emotions and context around what was said at the time it would be very difficult to infer that from the raw text.
2.4.1 Participant Recruitment As specified above, one of the main limitations of focus groups is that their results cannot be generalised. However, sampling for focus groups is not completely without form. While most focus group research relies on convenience sampling methods such as snowballing
(Altschuler et al., 2004; Peña & Frehill, 1998), in many cases, participants are recruited using parameters that satisfy the needs of the research at hand (Krause et al., 2000; Poston &
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Turnbull, 2004; Solorzano et al., 2000). These parameters are usually demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and ethnicity.
Some studies utilise existing survey samples as a pool from which participants are recruited
(Krause et al., 2000; Randhawa, 1998). While this method provides a broader sample representation, it was found that high non-response rates make it much more costly and less effective. As detailed below, this method was attempted for this study using the survey sample to recruit participants. However, the low response, particularly among women, forced the decision to resort to convenience sampling relying on university students attending a single course.
Mostly, recruitment for focus groups is done through telephone screening, emailing or by post (Harper & Hurtado, 2007; Morgan & Spanish, 1984; Randhawa, 1998). Some rural and less developed contexts require home visits (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981). Screening the participants beforehand allows researchers to drop recruits who do not fit the parameters of the study. Also, many researchers support that it is beneficial for the group to be homogenous (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981; Harper & Hurtado, 2007; Kitzinger, 1994;
McLafferty, 2004). In our study, researchers screened for nationality to ensure that all those who were invited to participate were Qatari. It was also decided that there should be one group for each gender. Having same-sex groups arguably makes participants more comfortable in the discussion and in the conservative Qatari context it is expected that a focus group with both male and female participants would deter female participants from attending or actively engaging in the discussion. (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981; Smithson,
2000).
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2.4.2 Group Setup The same criteria for screening participants can be used when considering the facilitator and other parties attending on behalf of the research team (Altschuler et al., 2004; Folch-Lyon &
Trost, 1981; Hopkins, 2007; Krause et al., 2000; Randhawa, 1998; Smithson, 2000;
Valentine, 1993). For this study, it was decided that both the facilitator and note taker should be Qatari and of the same sex as the participants. It was felt that a non-Qatari could have made participants uncomfortable about conveying their opinions about immigrants. When it comes to the number of participants many sources agree that there should be between 6 and
12 participants in each group (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981; Hopkins, 2007; Poston &
Turnbull, 2004). With fewer than six participants, difficult or uninteresting topics may not generate active dialogue, and the interactions between participants will be limited. With more than 12 participants, not all will be able to share their point of view, and the discussion becomes difficult to control. In this study, each of the two groups was comprised of 6 participants. As suggested by Folch-Lyon and Trost (1981), only the general subject of the groups was explained while recruiting participants, no specific discussion items were explained to avoid preparation and tuning by participants. While many researchers provide monetary incentives (Altschuler, 2004; Krause et al., 2000; Morgan & Spanish, 1984), it was decided not to offer any as the high income of Qataris makes it difficult to offer an amount that would constitute an incentive to recruits.
2.4.3 Analysis Method In studies like this one, where the emphasis is on attitudes towards a certain issue, the most suitable method of analysis is thematic analysis (Altschuler, 2004; Kitzinger, 1994; Poston
& Turnbull, 2004; Solorzano et al., 2000). Thematic analysis is a technique where
77 | P a g e researchers read through the transcripts of the focus groups and identify recurring themes; these themes are then used to categorize quotes. After transcribing, the results are carefully read and scanned for themes within the discussion. In this case, as there were only two focus groups, we opted for reading the transcripts carefully and qualitatively identified recurring themes using the themes in the group structure used in the discussion guide as a basis. This method was the most appropriate in this context as there was insufficient primary material due to the small number of groups conducted.
Two focus groups were conducted for the second part of this study. These focus groups were divided by gender. The men’s group was held on Saturday the 19th of May and the women’s on Tuesday the 18th of November 2014 at Qatar University. The groups lasted for between 70 minutes and 90 minutes, and each included 6 participants in line with the numbers suggested by most literature (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981). The aims of the focus groups will be detailed in Chapter 7; however, the main objective was to understand the context of the survey results. In other words, better understanding was wanted of how
Qataris define immigrants and perceived their interactions with them. The groups were also used to validate the results of the survey part of this study. The effects of social and religious values on tolerance and trust in foreigners were examined. Political values, while used in the survey, were not used as an item of discussion in the focus groups. It was believed that the sensitivity of discussing political values in the non-democratic context of Qatar could cause unnecessary anxiety for the participants, especially as the groups were recorded.
As explained in the Chapter 7, two main themes were identified from the discussion guide, the experiment, and social interaction, while one theme, the definition of the immigrant, was identified through reading the transcripts and grouping related quotes. Although these
78 | P a g e themes were developed through reading the transcripts, the results of the survey analysis of previous chapters guided the process. As survey results showed the importance of social interaction and religion in the context of this study it was fitting to focus on these as themes in this chapter. Also, using the experiment design in this format compliments the results of the survey experiment.
2.4.4 Sampling and Recruitment All respondents were Qataris in accordance with the aim of the study. Participants were screened beforehand for nationality. Participants in the male group were recruited from the dataset of respondents who were interviewed for the SSCQ of 2013. The participants were contacted using the telephone numbers they provided at the time of the survey and asked to participate in a discussion on social cohesion in Qatar as a continuation of their participation in the survey. No financial incentive was offered. In order to secure the participation of the 6 men that attended the group more than 800 telephone calls were made to survey participants.
The same was attempted for the female group; however, after three failed attempts at holding the focus group, none of the respondents attended although many confirmed attendance, convenience sampling was adopted as a last resort. The research team acquired the assistance of a female faculty member at Qatar University who allowed the team to conduct the focus group as part of a class she taught. The participants were five female students of that class with one university employee.
Sampling for a focus group in Qatar is not easy for many reasons. First, the practice is relatively new in the country making it is not easy to explain during recruitment. Second, most Qataris enjoy high incomes making financial incentives ineffective as a recruitment tool. Third, the conservative nature of Qatari society makes inviting women to attend a
79 | P a g e group with strangers difficult. While only two groups were conducted the results of these groups offered great insight into the results reached in the survey section.
The male group was highly diverse as the participants ranged widely in age and employment status. Two participants were below 30 years of age, two were over 40, and the other two participants were in their 30s. When it came to employment there was even more variance as one participant was in the military, another was a government employee, a third worked in the semi-private sector, another was a university student, and the final participant was a secondary school student. Even with ethnicity variance was high as the group included a member of a nomadic tribe, a Qatari tribe member, a member of the royal tribe, a person of
African descent, and a person of Yemeni origin. This information was gathered without asking respondents, but rather by identifying ethnically specific names and dialect. Asking directly would be deemed socially inappropriate in the Qatari context. It is notable that this variance was not planned and came about solely as the result of random selection from the dataset of survey respondents.
Less variance was found in the female group as all participants were below 30 and five of them were university enrolled in the same module. It is more difficult to establish ethnic backgrounds for women, as the names were not recorded for social sensitivity reasons, as it is considered impolite to ask for personal information from unfamiliar women. The convenience sampling of this group resulted in this low diversity, which did not allow for the same broad array of opinions and attitudes visible with the male group.
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2.4.5 Conducting the Focus Groups The decision to hold separate groups for men and women was taken for a number of reasons.
First, the social context of Qatar deems it undesirable to gather men and women in such an intimate setting as the focus group and this would have made it difficult for the women to attend. Second, the presence of men would have meant that female participants would be less inclined to actively join the discussion out of social propriety and this would have limited their input. Third, it was perceived that female participants would react better with a female moderator and men would be more forthcoming with a male moderator. The moderator for the male group was the researcher while an administrative assistant at Qatar
University handled the female group; both were trained in focus group moderation.
A moderator and note-taker facilitated the group for the men while only the moderator facilitated the female group. Before the focus group commenced participants were given a short questionnaire to provide some demographic information including age, employment, and marital status. The participants were instructed not to write their names on the form to ensure anonymity. The moderator began by welcoming and thanking participants for attending, and then informing them of the presence of two voice recorders before asking them to review the consent forms provided and sign it if they agreed.
The two focus group discussed four main themes: the effect of ethnicity and religion on hiring a hypothetical job applicant, the social implications of having ethnically and religiously diverse foreigners, the effect of foreigners on society’s religious values, and the participants’ evaluation of the values indicators utilized in the SSCQ. The moderator of the group was provided with a discussion guide in the instructions for use only when needed and
81 | P a g e not to force issues onto the participants. The method of analysis used was thematic analysis and the themes identified are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
This chapter detailed the methods used in this mixed method study. While more chapter- specific discussions of methods will be provided in coming chapters, the discussion here provides a general view of how the use of methods is structured throughout the thesis. The study of the determinants of social trust in immigrants in Qatar is complex and the various methods used allow for a wide-angle view of the issues. Beginning with the survey analysis, then using a survey experiment, and then discussing the results and their context in focus groups provided a strong methodological tool to analyse the issues at hand. The next chapter will discuss the effect of contact on trust in immigrant groups and will be followed with chapters discussing the effects of religious, social, and political values on trust. The experiment and focus groups will be the focus of the last two analytical chapters. Each chapter will include a short description of methods relevant to that chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF CONTACT ON TRUST IN IMMIGRANTS
“I will side with my brother against my cousin and with my cousin against a stranger”
- Arab proverb - 3.1 Introduction
Many explanations have been put forward for what affects trust in those from other social groups. One main theory, which is commonly referred to and utilised in the literature, is the contact hypothesis, which was developed by Allport (1954). The contact hypothesis has been defined and redefined by various scholars; however, the main idea remains the same: more contact leads to higher trust and more positive intergroup relations. In Qatar, different immigrant groups interact with Qataris differently. Arabs, who share language and cultural background with Qataris, are expected to have more frequent contact with them compared to non-Arabs. Non-Arabs are either white-collar employees who usually live in gated communities or labourers, and both groups have considerably less venues and chances of contact with Qataris.
This chapter seeks to study the effect of Qataris’ contact with immigrants on their trust in them. As explained below, the analysis identifies four distinct foreigner groups (Arab,
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Western, East Asian, and Indian sub-continental10 immigrants) and three main contact variables (friendship, living in proximity, and co-working with foreigners). Using logistic regression, an attempt will be made to identify whether having casual and meaningful contact (Allport, 1954) with foreigners will result in more trust in them. A strong point of the analysis is that we test three types or domains of contact (friendship, neighbourhood, and workplace) to understand how different types of contact with immigrants affect trust towards them. The main findings suggest that meaningful contact was indeed positively related to trust in all immigrant groups. The pattern of the effect suggested that non-Arab groups benefited more from the workplace and the neighbourhood as venues of contact to improve trust. Trust in Arabs was only elevated through friendship. The first section of this chapter identifies previous literature on the issue, the second section defines the methods used in the analysis, and the final section will review the results of the analysis
3.2 Background and Past Research Allport’s work in the 1950s, mainly his book titled The Nature of Prejudice (1954), has been described as most influential piece of literature when it comes to early work on the relationship between contact and attitudes towards a certain group. Allport’s suggestion was that generalisations that produce negative perceptions could be addressed by advocating contact between members within these groups. Allport’s main contribution was suggesting four conditions that are needed for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice.
10 While the term “Indian sub-continentals” is not the most appropriate term in the English context, the term was used for the Arabic questionnaire and we are using it here for consistency, as other terms, such as south central Asians, could be misleading.
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The first condition Allport suggested for contact to reduce prejudice was equal status, both parties involved had to perceive their relationship with one another as equally positioned and not as “superior” or “inferior”. The second condition was the existence of a common goal.
Allport suggested that in order for contact to be meaningful and positive it had to take place in the context of a shared objective. Pettigrew (1998) suggests that team sports present a good example of this where players that often belong to different social groups work together towards a common goal. The third condition noted by Allport was cooperation between the groups rather than competition. If groups are working towards a common goal while competing against each other than contact is not going to produce a positive outcome.
The fourth condition was support for intergroup contact by both the state and society through institutions and social norms.
Following the work of Allport, analysis by various authors has been published supporting the contact hypothesis. Sigelman and Welch (1993), for example, in their study of African and White Americans, found that the effects of contact are significant in reducing hostility towards other groups at the neighbourhood level, as respondents perceived less hostility when considering their neighbours, as opposed to general hostility towards members of other groups. In this study, the authors were dependent on diversity in the neighbourhood as a proxy indicator of contact, using the demographic distribution of residents in the neighbourhood and their ethnic backgrounds to assess the level of diversity that later is used to predict contact in their analysis.
Stein et al. (2000) and Schmid et al. (2014), on the other hand, highlight the negative short- term effects of increased diversity in increasing prejudice. Stein et al. (2000), when studying prejudice towards Hispanic immigrants in the US, asserted that the long-term effects of
85 | P a g e diversity have proven to be positive, but their results showed that living in a highly diverse area does produce higher tension between groups in the early stages. However, as the increased number of residents belonging to other groups facilitates more contact, residents generally become more tolerant and show less prejudice towards one another. Schmid et al.
(2014) suggest that the same is true in England as they also found that increased neighbourhood diversity initially elevates intergroup tensions as the new group starts making its mark on the neighbourhood, culturally and economically. However, increased contact mitigates the effect of diversity as those who reported increased contact in the form of social mixing and daily contact with ethnic minority members were less likely to exhibit negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities.
Nevertheless, while many scholars still depend on diversity in the neighbourhood as a measure of contact with other groups, some studies suggest that increased diversity on the neighbourhood level is not indicative of increased contact (Goemans, 2011; Matijskova &
Leitner, 2011; McLaren et al., 2011). In their ethnographic study, conducted in East Berlin,
Matijskova and Leitner (2011) found no correlation between increased diversity in a neighbourhood and establishing meaningful contact. Their study also found that cultural diversity does not bring positivity in the attitudes of the anti-immigrants, while the meaningful contact, through working together on social projects, could significantly contribute to reduce their prejudices. These results support Allport’s (1954) common goal and group cooperation conditions. When people from other groups are working together to achieve a societal goal their prejudice towards each other diminished. Furthermore,
Goemans (2011), in a study of prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands, found that
86 | P a g e living and studying with Muslims did not result in having more Muslim friends or less prejudice towards them.
Also, the social context around contact is important in understanding the effects of contact on attitudes towards other groups. One way of incorporating social context in the analysis of social contact is through differentiating between positive and negative contact. Barlow et al.
(2012) found, in their study of Australian and American prejudice towards Blacks, Muslims, and asylum seekers, that negative contact is stronger in predicting higher prejudice than positive contact is in predicting lower prejudice. Using indices of quantity and perception of contact the authors found that reported negative contact with the groups mentioned above resulted in higher prejudice towards them. The authors found that increased positive contact was a weak predictor of less prejudice towards only one of the three groups in the Australian case and towards Blacks in the American case. Perceived negative contact was a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards all groups in both contexts. The causal relationship, however, could work in the reverse. More prejudiced individuals are more likely to perceive their contact with members of the groups they are prejudiced towards as negative, and the opposite is true of less prejudiced individuals.
Another way of incorporating social context surrounding contact is through social status of the groups in question. Henry and Hardin (2006), in their study of Muslims and Christians in
Lebanon and Whites and Blacks in the US, found that perceived social status was significant in explaining the effect of contact on prejudice. In both contexts implicit prejudice towards
Whites and Muslims was reduced as a result of contact, while prejudice against these groups was not. The authors suggest that minority, or perceived lower status groups, are especially mindful in dealing with higher status groups, while the latter groups are stereotypical in
87 | P a g e interacting with lower status groups. As mentioned in the section on Qatar in the introduction of the thesis, there is a perception that immigrants have a lower status in Qatar due to social and economic settings.
Another contextual aspect surrounding contact is the venue where it is facilitated; different venues are expected to result in different contact patterns and effects. Savelkoul et al. (2010) found that while contact via friendship did not have an effect on attitudes towards Muslims in the Netherlands, workplace contact positively affected these attitudes. According to the authors, having a Muslim work colleague diminished anti-Muslim attitudes significantly.
This is especially useful in this study, as the workplace in Qatar provides a good venue for contact between Qataris and immigrants – especially for Arabs and Westerners – in government and semi-government entities.
Contact can also be affected by the intensity and strength of the relationship (Granovetter,
1973; Pettigrew et al., 2007). Granovetter suggests that the presence of weak ties, which refers to indirect relationships that result from strong relationships to others, have a strong role in explaining overall social cohesion in society. In fact, the author suggests that as the strongest ties are between those of similar backgrounds they assist in fragmentation of society while weaker ties allow for access to benefits and relationships otherwise difficult to acquire. Following the same logic, Pettigrew et al. (2007), in their study of anti-Muslim attitudes in Germany, tested the effects of having a Muslim friend and having a friend who had a Muslim friend. Their findings initially suggested that direct and indirect contact had a significant effect in lowering prejudice against Muslims. The authors conclude, however, that while both types of contact can explain attitudes towards immigrants that effect has to be placed in the right social context. Young, well-educated Germans who live in a major city
88 | P a g e are more likely to be in positive contact with immigrants. This network of immigrant- accepting Germans is likely to be predisposed to accepting immigrant friends and, therefore, to befriend likeminded individuals who share their position towards immigrants.
Furthermore, the relationship between context and contact could work both ways. Christ et al. (2014) found, in their analysis of seven different surveys conducted in various European settings, that increased intergroup contact had a macro effect on society as a whole. The effect, as the authors suggest, is more tolerant social attitudes in general. In all the surveys explored in their research, the authors found a positive relationship between increased contact and general tolerant tendencies even when controlling for various individual and societal factors. The findings were also validated in two longitudinal surveys where increased contact and more society wide tolerant attitudes went hand-in-hand. On a similar note, Dixon et al. (2015) found that positive contact between Indian and black South
Africans in an unofficial settlement resulted in Indian settlers becoming more open to social cooperation and for supporting policies that benefit the settlement as a whole. The authors suggests that contact resulted in a feeling of solidarity as both groups perceived prejudice against them.
Hindriks et al. (2014) found similar to Dixon et al. (2015) that intergroup contact was beneficial for attitudes between minority groups. In their study of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, Hindriks et al. (2014) found that while intergroup contact did not affect attitudes towards the majority group, it resulted in more positive attitudes towards other minority groups, especially Muslim groups as the majority of the two groups studied were
Muslim. Their results hint to the importance of similarities and differences between groups; this will be addressed by this thesis in the following chapters.
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Social contact is not a simple linear phenomenon; many other aspects play a role in understanding its effects on prejudice and intergroup trust. Evidence is strong supporting the contact hypothesis; however, these effects need to be understood in the social context in which they operate. Different types and venues for contact yield different results for different groups. As the aim is to assess the effect of contact on trust in immigrants various venues of trust that allow for measuring meaningful contact between Qataris and immigrants need to be identified. Depending on diversity alone is not viable in Qatar as Qataris make up only 12% of the population and casual contact with immigrants is inevitable. As the SSCQ included variables on contact with friends, neighbours, and colleagues it is possible to test different types of contact and how they relate to attitudes towards immigrants. In Qatar, the workplace is the main venue for contact between Qataris and non-Arabs on a somewhat equal level. Therefore, it is expected to be a good predictor of trust in these groups.
3.3 Aims and Hypotheses In this chapter the aim is to assess the effect of contact on Qataris’ trust of immigrants. The analysis addresses three types of contact: friendship with immigrants, contact with immigrant neighbours, and contact with immigrant co-workers. These types of contact are tested against trust in four immigrant groups: Arabs, Westerners, East Asians, and Indian sub-continentals. As discussed above, much of the previous research on contact effects has found intergroup contact to be beneficial to intergroup relations. However, these effects depend on the social context surrounding contact. The perceptions of the group and venue of contact play a strong role in explaining how contact affects prejudice (Henry & Hardin,
2006; Savelkoul et al., 2010). Therefore, three hypotheses have been put forth:
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H2.1 First, the effect of contact, regardless of type and intensity, on Arabs will be minimal as Arabs are strongly integrated into Qatari society. Perceptions of
Arabs are not expected to significantly change through specific types of contact, as casual contact with Arabs is extremely high as a majority of immigrants are Arabs and live and work with Qataris. Also, as suggested by Hindriks et al. (2014), contact’s positive effect is limited when considering the majority group, which Arabs in this case constitute as they are greater in numbers than the Qataris themselves.
H2.2 Second, as Savelkoul et al. (2010) suggests, the venue of contact will mitigate its effects, and, as different groups will have different venues of contact with Qataris, we expect that different forms of contact will have different effects according to venue and the access of the group to that venue. Westerners, for example, do not reside in Qatari neighbourhoods; however, they are likely to work with Qataris. East
Asians and Indian sub-continentals, on the other hand, do reside in Qatari neighbourhoods, but are not usually found in equal status roles to Qataris in the workplace. Therefore, it is assumed that contact with Western co-workers will be a better predictor of trust in them while for the other two non-Arab groups contact with neighbours will be more effective.
H2.3. Finally, while Henry and Hardin (2006) and Hindriks et al. (2014) suggest that cultural similarity can advance the effect of contact in improving intergroup relations, we argue for the opposite. We make the presumption that the positive effect of contact will be greater for the most culturally distant groups, as Arabs enjoy high trust initially and share many characteristics with Qataris, contact will have little effect because they are not distant enough culturally for this contact to be
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helpful in changing perception towards them. In other words, Qataris are all too
familiar with Arabs and their cultural characteristics for Arab friends, neighbours or
co-workers to change the way they think about them. As a result of this presumption
three patterns of trust are expected to emerge from the analysis. The first for Arabs,
the closest group to Qataris who we do not expect to benefit from contact greatly,
followed by Indian sub-continentals and East Asians as, who while not sharing social
values with Qataris, are likely to be Muslims, and finally Westerners who generally
speaking are the most distant group from Qataris socially and are both culturally and
religiously distinct and therefore we expect them to benefit most from contact in all
its forms.
3.4 Explanatory Variables As explained in Chapter 1, the dependent variable used in the survey analysis is trust in immigrant groups. The dichotomised variables measured trust in Arabs, Westerners, Indian sub-continentals, and East Asians.
Three variables from the SSCQ are used for portraying contact with immigrants in this analysis. The first set of variables asked respondents if they have friends from the four groups in question and then asked them how often they meet friends from each groups. The answers provided were as follows: I never meet them socially, less than once a month, one to two times a month, 3 to 5 times a month, and more than 5 times a month. The second and third sets of variables follow the same pattern with different types of contact, the second asked about neighbours, and the third asked about co-workers.
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For analysis, the variables were recoded into three variables each for a type of contact. Each of the variables contained three values: 0 for not having non-Qatari friends, neighbours, or co-workers; 1 for having non-Qatari friends, neighbours, or co-workers without meeting them socially; and 2 for having and meeting non-Qatari friends, neighbours, or co-workers.
As discussed above, Allport (1954) indicates contact must be “meaningful and equal” and
Granovetter’s (1973) method of identifying strong ties is to measure the frequency of meeting. Utilising these ideas it was conceptualised that having contact with foreigners without meeting with them socially constitutes a weak and less meaningful relationship while meeting them regularly constitutes meaningful contact and strong ties. The descriptions below offer insight into the preliminary results.
Table C.B: Having and socially meeting non-Qatari friends Indian sub- Westerners East Asians Arabs % continentals % % % No friends from that group 13 74 78 75
Have friends but never meet 12 8 5 6
Have friends and meet them 75 18 17 19
Source: SSCQ, n= 1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H
As seen in table C.B, 75% of respondents have Arab friends and meet with them, making
Arabs the group most socialised with Qataris. The results suggest that 12% of respondents said they have Arab friends whom they never meet socially, and the remaining 13% testified to not having Arab friends. Contact with non-Arab groups, seemed similar as low levels of contact were observed with all three groups: 74-78% of respondents reported not having friends of the three non-Arab groups. 17-19% of respondents report having and meeting friends of the non-Arab groups mentioned. And 5-8% said they have non-Arab friends but
93 | P a g e do not meet them socially. From this table we can see how most Qataris (87%) reported having Arab friends while almost the same percentage of Qataris reported not having friends from the other groups. This affirms the claim made earlier that Arabs are highly integrated into Qatari society with a large gap between them and other non-Arab groups.
Table C.C: Having and meeting with non-Qatari neighbours
Arabs Westerners East Asians Indian sub-
% % % continentals % No neighbours from that 34 88 80 75 group Have neighbours but never 27 10 15 19 meet Have neighbours and meet 39 2 5 6 them Source: SSCQ, n= 1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H
Qataris report even fewer interactions with their immigrant neighbours. As shown in table
C.C, 34% of Qataris did not have Arab neighbours, 27% said they do but never meet with them, and 39% have Arab neighbours and meet with them. For the non-Arab groups,
Westerners were the least likely to be living in proximity to Qataris as 88% of Qataris surveyed reported not having Western neighbours, 80% said they did not have East Asian neighbours, and 75% said they had no Indian sub-continental neighbours. When it comes to those who have non-Qatari neighbours, the most likely group to live near Qataris were
Indian sub-continentals with 19% reporting having neighbours from that group while not meeting with them socially and only 6% said they meet with them. Respectively, 10% and
15% said they have Westerner and East Asian neighbours, and those who said they meet with neighbours from these two groups were 2% (Westerners) and 5% (East Asian).
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It is common to find Arabs residing in Qatari neighbourhoods due to the shared language and customs. For Westerners, the main reason behind the small percentage (12%) of Qataris reporting having neighbours from that group is the fact that Westerners mostly live in gated complexes and residential towers which isolate them from Qataris. For the other two non-
Arab groups, the results show that there is an increased likelihood to find them in Qatari neighbourhoods. This is mainly related to them sharing some social and religious attributes with the Qataris and this makes the Qatari neighbourhoods – with ample Mosques and more family oriented settings – suitable for the minority of Indian sub-continentals and East
Asians who have come along with their families. Also, live-in domestic staff in Qatari households are predominantly from these two groups, thus increasing the likelihood that
Qataris would report them as neighbours.
Table C.D: Having and meeting with non-Qatari Co-workers
Indian sub- Westerners East Asians Arabs % continentals % % % Not working 23 23 23 23 No co-workers from that 30 59 55 50 group Have co-workers but never 21 12 15 18 meet Have co-workers and meet 26 6 7 9 them Source: SSCQ, n= 1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H
As seen in tables C.D and C.C, fewer Qataris work with Arabs than have Arab neighbours, as 30% of those surveyed reported not having an Arab Co-worker, 21% said they had Arab co-workers without meeting them socially, and 26% of respondents said they have Arab co- workers and they do meet with them socially. The Indian sub-continentals were the most
95 | P a g e likely non-Arabs to work with Qataris (27%) as opposed to East Asians (22%) and for
Westerners (18%). Moreover, 9% said they meet their Indian sub-continentals colleagues outside of work, 7% said the same about their East Asian colleagues, and 6% about their
Westerners colleagues. The small differences between non-Arab groups still suggest that they share a pattern of contact different than observed with that of Arabs.
3.5 Analysis and Results As discussed earlier, the analysis aims to assess the effect contact has on trust in immigrants in the Qatari context. The analysis below will measure the effects of having and socially meeting immigrant friends, co-workers, and neighbours on trust in the four immigrant groups. To assess the effects of contact variables discussed above on trust in immigrant groups the average marginal effects were calculated for a logistic regression model as explained in Chapter 1. The three types of contact are tested against trust in the four groups.
All contact variables are on three-point scale: 0 meaning no contact; 1 having friends, neighbours, or co-workers; and 2 meaning socially meeting that friend, neighbour, or co- worker. First, a bivariate analysis of contact and trust was run followed by the multivariate model.
Table C.D.1: Trust in immigrant groups by contact with them Do not Trust Type of contact Intensity of contact trust % % Arabs No Arab friends 30 70 Contact with Arab friends Having Arab friends 17 83 Meeting Arab friends 17 83 No Arab neighbours 19 81 Contact with Arab neighbours Having Arab neighbours 25 75 Meeting Arab neighbours 15 85 Contact with Arab co-workers No Arab co-workers 19 81
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Having Arab co-workers 22 78 Meeting Arab co-workers 16 84 Westerners No Western friends 63 37 Contact with Western friends Having Western friends 37 63 Meeting Western friends 29 71 No Western neighbours 55 45 Contact with Western neighbours Having Western neighbours 52 48 Meeting Western neighbours 23 77 No Western co-workers 59 41 Contact with Western co-workers Having Western co-workers 36 64 Meeting Western co-workers 28 72 Indian sub-continentals No Indian sub-continentals friends 60 40 Contact with Indian sub-continental Having Indian sub-continentals friends friends 47 53 Meeting Indian sub-continentals friends 29 71 No Indian sub-continentals neighbours 55 45 Contact with Indian sub-continental Having Indian sub-continentals neighbours neighbours 52 48 Meeting Indian sub-continentals neighbours 32 68 No Indian sub-continentals co- workers 60 40 Contact with Indian sub-continental co- Having Indian sub-continentals co- workers workers 40 60 Meeting Indian sub-continentals co- workers 24 76 East Asians No East Asians friends 62 38 Contact with East Asians friends Having East Asians friends 58 42 Meeting East Asians friends 32 68 No East Asians neighbours 59 41 Contact with East Asians neighbours Having East Asians neighbours 52 48 Meeting East Asians neighbours 28 72 No East Asians co-workers 63 37 Contact with East Asians co-workers Having East Asians co-workers 40 60 Meeting East Asians co-workers 26 74 Source: SSCQ, n=1732, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H As seen in table C.D.1, there is a consistent pattern where more contact leads to better trust.
Those reporting not having friends, neighbours, or co-workers from immigrant groups were
97 | P a g e less likely to trust immigrants. The only exception was with trust in Arabs where reporting having Arab neighbours or co-workers resulted in the decline of the likelihood of trust when compared to having no contact with Arabs. Reporting socially meeting Arab neighbours and co-workers resulted in increased trust as with other groups. As the baseline of trust was high with Arabs trust did not greatly improve as a result of contact. Non-Arabs, however, benefited highly from social contact. Trust in non-Arabs was raised from 37-45% with no contact to 68-76% by social contact for all groups.
Table C.4: Average marginal effects of multiple contact variables on trust
Arabs Westerner Indians East-Asians
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.11 0.21 0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Meeting 0.11 0.27 0.20 0.18
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.04
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.23
(0.03) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06)
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.14
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.06 0.21 0.19
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) Education (ref: Below Secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) University and higher 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.17 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Gender (ref: female) -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.02 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.07 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
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Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%. Age, marital status and studying abroad were tested for and omitted from table as they denoted no significance. n=1485. Source SSCQ
As can be observed in table C.4, after introducing the three different contact variables into the model along with control variables the pattern of effect for contact is different from one group to the other. When it comes to contact through friendship the effect of having and meeting friends is shown to be consistently beneficial to trust in immigrants in Qatar. The effect is strongest and largest with Westerners as trust increased by 21% for having friends and 27% for socially meeting them. The effect was weakest with Arabs increasing trust by
11% for both having friends and meeting them socially. The effect for the two remaining groups is only significant for meeting friends socially. For the Indian sub-continentals there was a 20% higher chance of trusting them and 18% for East Asians.
When it comes to having and socially meeting neighbours the effect was non-significant for
Westerners. For Arabs, the effect of having neighbours was significant and negative, decreasing probability of trust in them by 0.7%. For Indian sub-continentals, the effect was a
13% higher chance of trust for meeting neighbours socially, and for East Asians the effect was strongest raising the likelihood of trust by 23% for socially meeting neighbours. For the third type of contact, having immigrant co-workers, the effect was strongly significant and positively related to trust in the three non-Arab groups. As seen in table C.4, the effect of having co-workers raised the likelihood of trust 9-14% for the three groups. The effect of meeting with expatriate co-workers socially increased the likelihood of trust by 21% for
Indian-sub-continentals and 19% for East Asians. The effect with Westerners was non- significant as the positive effect was only observed for having Western co-workers not for
99 | P a g e meeting with them socially. It is notable that, even with reference to trust in Qataris, having co-workers was a predictor of higher trust as seen in table A.Q in appendix J11.
When it comes to control variables, three variables exhibited a significant effect on trust: education, employment, and interviewer nationality. When it comes to education, the results from table C.4 show that highly educated respondents were more trusting of the three non-
Arab immigrant groups. The effect was an increase in the likelihood of trust by 11% for
Westerners, 14% for Indian sub-continentals, and 17% for East Asians. Being employed raised the likelihood of trust in Westerners only by 10%. Being interviewed by a Qatari interviewer was negatively related to trust in Arabs only reducing the likelihood of trust by
0.6%, and this is not surprising as the remainder of interviewers were Arab immigrants.
11 Table A.Q was prepared to provide a benchmark of trust through measuring the predictors used in the analysis against trust in Qataris to show how the effects of these predictors are different when considering trust in other groups.
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Table C.5: Predicted probabilities of trust in immigrants across variables denoted significance in logistic regression Arabs Westerners Indians East-Asians Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Friends 0.70 0.81 0.11 0.30 0.58 0.28 0.27 0.47 0.19 0.21 0.37 0.17 Neighbours 0.70 0.75 0.05 0.21 0.36 0.15 Co-workers 0.30 0.40 0.10 0.27 0.47 0.20 0.21 0.37 0.17 Education 0.30 0.44 0.14 0.27 0.42 0.14 0.21 0.35 0.15
Gender
Employment 0.30 0.41 0.11 Interviewer nationality 0.70 0.63 -0.08 Values shown are for variables denoting significance in logistic regression model, Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%.
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When looking at the predicted probabilities of trust in table C.5 a validation of the regression results can be seen. Contact with friends improved the likelihood of trust in Arabs by 11%, in Westerners by 28%, Indian sub-continentals by 19%, and East Asians by 17%. The results here are consistent with the fact that Arabs are more integrated into Qatari society and, therefore, a ceiling effect can be observed where trust is high to start with, leaving less room for improvement. Westerners, on the other hand, are the most isolated group socially and meaningful contact is seen to be most effective for them.
When it comes to neighbourhood contact, the predicted probabilities of trust in table C.5 indicates that trust in Arabs increased by 5%, although the effect was small and negative in the logistic regression. Trust in Indian sub-continentals increased by 8% moving it from 27 to 36%. The increase was significantly larger for East Asians as probability of trust increased from 21 to 36%. As discussed earlier, Qataris and Arabs predominantly occupy
Qatari neighbourhoods. Westerners, on the other hand, mostly live in residential towers or gated compounds. Indian sub-continentals and East Asians are likely to live in Qatari households as the majority of domestic staff come from these two groups. While not common, it is also possible to find families from these two groups living in Qatari neighbourhoods.
Furthermore, as seen in table C.5, the effects of workplace contact on the predicted probability of trust was highest for trust in Indian sub-continentals and the lowest for
Westerners. The increase of trust in Westerners was at 10%, for Indian sub-continentals it was 20%, and for East Asians it was 17%.
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Belonging to the higher education group increased the probability of trust by 14% for both
Westerners and Indian sub-continentals and by 15% for East Asians. Therefore, it can be concluded that Qataris who possess a university or higher level of education are more likely to be trusting of non-Arab groups. Employment raised the probability of trust in Westerners by 11%. This fits with the context of the workplace being the prime venue of contact for
Westerners and Qataris. Finally, being interviewed by a Qatari interviewer reduced the probability of trust in Arabs by 8%.
As is apparent from the results that contact through friendship is a strong facilitator of trust in all groups studied. Friendship is the strongest of the three types of contact as it assures the existence of meaningful contact. Nonetheless, it is the only type of contact observed that is not dictated by context as one usually does not actively choose all neighbours and co- workers while friends are of personal preference. Having friends in a particular group signals a positive predisposition to the group. As long as one is open to having friends from the group it is more likely that a person would be trusting of that group.
The results also suggest that while simply having neighbours from the two mixed groups has little or no effect on trust; however, meeting them socially does. As explained above, families from these two groups do reside in Qatari neighbourhoods, and, like the Arabs, they live within the Qatari community rather than in isolated settings like most Westerners. This allows for the development of friendly neighbourly relations with the Qataris that, according to the results, can improve trust in them. Furthermore, as a good proportion of the members of these two groups are Muslim, it is more likely that Qataris would interact with them in the mosque and other religious activities. Shared faith and cultural attributes has been proven to advance the positive effect of contact (Hidriks et al., 2014). Also, some Indian sub-
103 | P a g e continentals have been living in Qatar for generations making them better acquainted with
Qatari customs. However, economically speaking, members of these two groups do not have equal status with Qataris and the significance of the results here suggest that status might not be as influential as suggested by Allport (1954) and others, at least when considering neighbourly contact in the Qatari context. The effect of status in this context seems to be offset by religious and cultural similarities. The conservative and highly religious nature of
Qatari society meant that the social acceptance within the neighbourhood of those who are more likely to share religious beliefs and social customs is higher regardless of economic status.
As with previous contact variables, the high integration of Arabs in the Qatari community meant that trust in them was not affected by having or meeting with Arab co-workers. As the workplace is the most likely venue of contact between Qataris and non-Arabs, having non-
Arab co-workers proved beneficial to trust in non-Arabs. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain the lack of a significant effect for socially meeting Western co-workers while for the other two non-Arab groups it was highly significant and with a relatively large effect. One explanation is that meeting co-workers socially might be a result of work related social events and, as the cultural divide between Qataris and Westerners is the widest amongst the four groups, the likelihood of positive effects from casual social interaction is small.
The results above show that the effect of contact, when analysed, reveals that different types of contact affect trust differently. The most consistent effect was observed for having friends and meeting them socially. Participants who had friends from any of the groups examined were more likely to be trusting of that group. Interaction in the neighbourhood seems to not affect trust in Arabs, the most integrated, or Westerners, the least integrated groups of
104 | P a g e immigrants. Indian sub-continentals and East-Asians, who have less contact with Qataris while sharing some cultural attributes, did benefit greatly from having meaningful interaction in the neighbourhood and the workplace. The variations according to venue of contact are in line with the findings by Savelkoul et al. (2010) regarding the importance of capturing the context around contact and where it takes place.
The dynamic described above suggests that there might be an unaddressed effect of social and religious values. While Arabs were the most trusted amongst the groups they are also the closest to Qataris in social and religious values. Amongst the non-Arabs groups, the groups that benefited from social contact more were the groups that are more likely to be
Muslim. The pattern of effect relating to the religious affiliation of the groups merits testing how religious beliefs and attitudes affect Qataris’ views towards immigrants. This issue will be extensively addressed in the next chapter.
3.6 Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to identify the effects of various types of contact on trust in immigrant groups. The analysis in this chapter presented average marginal effects and predicted probabilities from a series of logistic regressions to test the effect on trust of having and meeting immigrant friends, neighbours, and co-workers among Arab, Western,
Indian sub-continental, and East Asian immigrants.
Specifically, this chapter aimed to test three hypotheses. First, we expected contact to have a weaker effect on trust in Arabs than other groups due to the high integration of Arabs in
Qatari society and the cultural proximity to Qataris. Along with considerably high levels of trust, the results of both average marginal effects and the predicted probability analysis
105 | P a g e partially support this claim as both neighbourhood and workplace contact did not have a significant effect on trust in Arabs. As explained earlier, however, the initially high trust in
Arabs means that there is less scope for positive contact to improve already positive attitudes.
The second hypothesis was that having a western co-worker would have a stronger positive effect than with other groups, while trust in the other two non-Arab groups would be more affected by contact with neighbours. As discussed earlier, the workplace is the main venue for contact between Qataris and Westerners while the remaining groups work and live alongside Qataris, which opens the door for contact at the neighbourhood level. The results offer evidence that partially supports this assumption as having and meeting neighbours was significantly related to trust in Indian sub-continentals and East Asians, but not in
Westerners. Having and meeting co-workers on the other hand, was significant for
Westerners as hypothesized. However, the effect was stronger in predicting trust in the other two non-Arab groups contrary to what was assumed. This is supportive of the findings by
Savelkoul et al. (2010) in relevance to the importance of the venue of contact in assessing its effects on intergroup relations.
Finally, the third hypothesis was that the results would yield three patterns of trust: the first for Arabs, the second for Westerners, and a final pattern for Indian sub-continentals and East
Asians. As seen this was the case as the effect of contact for Arabs was considerably weaker than non-Arab groups. While the pattern of effects was similar among the non-Arab groups, trust in Westerners was more strongly linked to friendship with this group (which is rather rare) than the other two types of contact, suggesting that trust in Westerners mostly benefits from strong meaningful contact when compared to casual neighbourhood and workplace
106 | P a g e contact. As Henry and Hardin (2006) and Hindriks et al. (2014) suggest, the groups’ similarity to Qataris played an important role in explaining contact with and trust in them.
From the control variables introduced, only education proved a strong predictor of trust. This effect was limited to non-Arab groups. From this it can be concluded that higher education in Qataris removes some of the prejudice against dissimilar groups that might be associated with religious and social similarities. Other variables such as gender, employment, and interviewer nationality exhibited a smaller effect. Men were more trusting of East Asians, the employed of Westerners, and those interviewed by Arabs rather than Qataris were more trusting of Arabs and, remarkably, East Asians.
Some limitations did affect the ability to further examine the relationship between trust and contact in the Qatari context. First, social desirability is an issue in this analysis, as the
SSCQ does not offer validation to the existence of contact beyond that reported by the respondent. Second, the survey did not include the demographic distribution of nationalities in order to test for the effects of neighbourhood diversity on trust.
These findings suggest that the effect of contact can be understood by social and religious differences and similarities between the groups in question. When the groups are similar in religion and social background contact is not useful in predicting trust as high integration dilutes the effect of contact as was seen with Arabs, and when strong dissimilarities are the case only strong meaningful contact can produce higher trust. Further work is needed to establish how religious and social attitudes affect trust in expatriate groups. There is also a need to understand if certain conservative attitudes affect trust differently. In the conservative Qatari society the line between social and religious life is blurred and,
107 | P a g e therefore, further analysis is needed to assess how religious and social attitudes affect trust.
The analysis in Chapter 3 will deal with this issue; more precisely, the effect of religious indicators from the SSCQ against trust in foreigner groups will be tested. The three variables used here will be included in that analysis to compare the effects of contact to those of religiosity as they proved to be meaningful variables in this analysis.
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CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOSITY AND TRUST IN IMMIGRANT
“...Religion still makes for prejudice and still unmakes prejudice....”
(Allport, 1958, p. 413)
4.1 Introduction
Many scholars have identified a connection between religious attitudes and measures of social cohesion, primarily social trust (Berggren & Bjornskov, 2011; Brañas-Garza et al.,
2009; Brenneman, 2008; Hinze et al., 2011; Kupper & Zick, 2010; Scheepers et al., 2002;
Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Schoenfeld, 1978; Tan & Vogel, 2008; Traunmuller, 2011). This relationship is especially relevant when considering religiously diverse societies and religiously conservative communities where religious conflict and strong religious group identification segments society. The Qatari case is a unique one when considering religion and trust. The Qatari population is made up of a majority of non-Qatari immigrants and a minority of Qatari citizens. The citizens are almost entirely Arab and Muslim, while immigrants come from an array of different ethnicities and faiths. Adding to the uniqueness of Qatari society is a rapid process of liberalisation and modernisation taking place within
Qatar, while society is still highly conservative and religion remains central to defining
Qatari identity.
Drawing from that, the aim of this chapter is to test the effect of religiosity on trust in immigrants. The chapter starts with an overview of past research, followed by a description
109 | P a g e of data, and measurement. Then the same data utilised in the previous chapter is used to measure the effect of religiosity on trust in immigrant groups. The analysis begins with a factor analysis to determine how the indicators of religiosity used relate to one another. That is followed by testing religiosity dimensions against trust in each of the four groups of immigrants. Finally, the predicted probability of trust for each variable in our model is calculated
4.2 Background and Past Research The discussion on religiosity and its effects on social trust must begin with considering the empirical definition of religiosity. Many authors suggest that simple reported religiosity is not efficient in capturing religious attitudes and behaviour. Cygnar (1977), for example, suggests that the effect of religiosity on prejudice differs when considering different dimensions of religiosity. Many dimensions are suggested in the literature; however, three aspects of religiosity come up in the discussion most frequently: practice, affiliation, and beliefs. Practice is usually defined by attendance and frequency of prayer, affiliation refers to belonging to certain religious denominations, and beliefs are interpretations of dogma and views on the nature of God and the afterlife. Using these three aspects, the existing evidence on the connection between religiosity and trust will be discussed
When it comes to practice, authors disagree on the effect of attendance on trust in and tolerance of others. Some authors point to a negative effect of religious practice on trust
(Hinze et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2002), while others affirm it has a positive effect. One of the earliest and more extensive studies supporting a positive effect of practice on trust is provided by Schoenfeld (1978), who found in his study using the results of the General
Social Survey (GSS) in the Unites States, a direct link between church attendance and
110 | P a g e generalised trust. He observed that respondents who said they attended church more often also exhibited higher levels of trust in others in general. The explanation offered by
Schoenfeld is that this effect of attendance shows that human interaction is more important than doctrine and the theological stance. This claim is strongly supported when considering that in some cases, even when religiosity’s other dimensions proved insignificant or unclear, attendance was still positively correlated with trust or tolerance (Brañas-Garza et al., 2009;
Brenneman, 2008; Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Schoenfeld, 1978). However, this relationship could be explained the other way around; the more social and trusting you are, the more likely you would be to attend social activities.
For religious affiliation, existing evidence suggests that there is a dominant group affected when studying the relationship between affiliation, trust, and tolerance. This makes it quite difficult to assume a clear-cut theological effect of being affiliated to a certain religious group without considering the position of that group in the social hierarchy. This dominant group effect can be observed when considering Protestants in the United States (Brenneman,
2008; Welch et al., 2004; Welch et al., 2007) and Europe (Schmeets & Riele, 2013;
Traunmuller, 2010), Catholics in Latin America (Brañas-Garza et al., 2009), and even
Muslims in Indonesia (Gaduh, 2012). When considering generalised trust, the members of the dominant religious group tend to be more trusting than the members of minority religious groups (Brañas-Garza et al., 2009; Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Traunmuller, 2010;).
On the other hand, when asked about trust in, or tolerance of, those belonging to other religious or ethnic groups or immigrants, members of dominant religious groups exhibit less trust and more prejudice than their non-dominant group member counterparts (Brenneman,
2008; Gaduh, 2012; Scheepers et al., 2002). Dominant groups members tend to feel
111 | P a g e threatened by new identities in society, and, therefore, are more prejudiced towards these identities and the people who hold them. These new identities might be seen as a threat to the main religious or social identity of society, especially in social settings where the dominant religion is apparent and strongly visible in public life such as Muslim identity in
Qatari society. Using the result of the GSS of the United States, Alesina and La Ferrara
(2002) offer more insight into how belonging to a minority group affects trust. They suggest that while affiliation to a certain religious group does not affect social trust, belonging to a group that has been historically discriminated against does diminish social trust. This, along with the evidence shown above, confirms that the social status of the religious group to which one is affiliated is more important than the beliefs held by that group. When a religious group is socially dominant its members feel more secure and when asked about trust in “others” they tend to assume it refers to their group. Minority religious groups, on the other hand, feel less secure and are more likely to face prejudice from the dominant group. They are also more likely to assume that “others” refers to other groups rather than their own.
Following the same line of thought, Kunovich and Hodson (1999), in their paper studying a sample of Croatian nationals, address the issue in light of resurgence and salience theories.
Resurgence theory suggests that the return of religiosity into the social sphere is at least partially to blame for growing intolerance and prejudice. Salience theory suggests that the connection between religiosity and intolerance is because they both stem from a growing competition over resources and conflict in society. The results of Kunovich and Hodson’s
(1999) study are in favour of salience theory, as they found that church attendance and intensity of religious beliefs are not a direct cause of intolerance in the Croatian context.
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Rather, they suggest that the effects are spurious and are a result of strong polarisation in society between ethnic groups that also happen to be associated with different religions. This provides another dimension to the dominant group effect, as political instability and conflict between different enclaves in society will often overlap with religious affiliation. The growing tension in the Arab world between various religious groups is not far from the
Qatari context and, therefore, it is important to determine if personal or group religious identity affects trust in immigrants and how that effect will function.
While most research on the issue has focused on Judeo-Christian settings, some studies have been conducted in Muslim contexts. One study in Indonesia by Gaduh (2012) finds that while religiosity — reported religiosity and practice — in the Muslim context leads to more trust in neighbours and members of the same community, it proves a negatively correlation with trust in members of other groups. This result is affirmed by the negative effect of religious diversity in trust, which the author reports in the same study. Those individuals with a stronger connection to their faith are also more likely to feel threatened, as explained earlier, by members of different religious groups. Another study by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2009), on a sample of Muslims and Hindus in Bangladesh, found that Muslims were more trusting of Bangladeshis of a similar faith than Hindu Bangladeshis, who are the minority. While Hindus were also more likely to trust Hindus, it was more likely that they would trust Muslims than Muslims trusting them. One reason for this is that in the tense religious climate of Bangladesh, where Hindus are the minority, they are less likely to admit their prejudice towards the dominant group, while Muslims are more likely to voice their prejudice against the minority.
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Finally, the effects of the set of beliefs held personally or portrayed in religious doctrine are also discussed with varied results. Some researchers find a positive effect of personal religious experience and personal religious conviction (Brambilla et al., 2013; Scheepers et al., 2002) as trust and tolerance levels were elevated by the presence of both factors. Other research is concerned with the doctrinal beliefs, such as a belief in a merciful or vengeful
God and the belief that one’s religion is the only true one (Hinze et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2002); these two factors were found to be associated with lower social trust. However, as
Scheepers et al. (2002) suggest, this can be attributed to strong identification with the religious groups, as this sense of belonging strengthens in-group solidarity and elevates prejudice towards other groups. Supporting this is the fact that personal, as opposed to institutional, religiosity and a merciful view of the divine are, according to the authors, beneficial for trust and tolerance.
Along with the scarcity of research on non-Judeo-Christian societies, other limitations to the research on the effect of religiosity on trust and tolerance arise. First, while there is a lot of discussion on the effect of practice, most of the research conducted uses attendance of religious services and activities as the only measure of religiosity using such measures as, the frequency of reading core religious texts and performing individual religious rituals.
Second, more work is needed to disambiguate religious values and beliefs from social values and convictions and political views, as in many societies the three are intertwined. This was clearly demonstrated in the Croatian context discussed earlier (Kunovich & Hodson, 1999) and in Alesina and La Farrera’s paper (2002), where the authors found that those groups who suffered from discrimination historically displayed less trust in others. Finally, the dominant group effect needs to be considered whenever discussing religious affiliation, as in
114 | P a g e different contexts discussed above, a pattern of highly generalised trust and low trust in out- groups is almost always linked to the dominant religious group in society.
In this chapter, the main aim is to test the effect of religiosity on trust in immigrant groups.
As seen above, religiosity cannot be treated as a uni-dimensional phenomenon, different aspects of religiosity lead to different effects. The main hypothesis of this chapter is that religiosity will have a significant effect on trust in immigrants; however, the effect will not be consistent through different dimensions. Trust in Muslims will generally benefit from stronger religious attitudes and will decrease for non-Muslims. The analysis here will first identify different dimensions of religiosity in the Qatari context and then move to measuring how they affect trust in immigrants.
4.3 Explanatory Variables The analysis here utilises the same parameters employed in the previous chapter. The dependent variable is the same as previously: trust in immigrant groups. First, a description of the explanatory variables will be provided, then the factor analysis, and then the regression results.
The SSCQ provides many variables on religiosity and religious attitudes. These variables can be classified into three distinct groups according to the type of religious attitudes they measure. The first group of variables are centred on personal religiosity. The first variable asked respondents about how religious they considered themselves to be. The second asked respondents about the frequency of saying the dawn prayers on time. As these prayers usually take place between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m., dependent on the time of year, it is expected to be the least attended among the day’s five prayers. Therefore, asking about praying at dawn
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provides a more intense indication of religious devotion. The third variable was on attending
religious activities regularly. Considering that attending prayer in the mosque is mainly for
men, asking about attendance of religious activities such as Quranic circles and spiritual
lectures is a more consistent indicator, as these activities are attended by both genders.
Table R.D: Descriptive statistics of religiosity indicators Answer % Would you describe yourself to be…? Not religious at all 0 Somewhat not religious 1 Somewhat religious 82 Very religious 16 How frequently do you observe (Dawn prayer) on time? Less than once a month 4 Once a week/ More than once a month 9 More than once a week 33 Daily 53 Do you attend any religious activities such as Quranic circles and lectures? No 73 Yes 27 To what extent to you agree that a smoker can be considered religious? Strongly agree 5 Somewhat agree 53 Somewhat disagree 26 Strongly disagree 16 To what extent to you agree that a woman not wearing Hijab can be considered religious? Strongly agree 3 Somewhat agree 19 Somewhat disagree 18 Strongly disagree 60 To what extent to you agree that a person who does not pray can be considered religious? Strongly agree 1 Somewhat agree 19 Somewhat disagree 28 Strongly disagree 51 To what extent to you agree that a person who deals with a non-Shari’a compliant bank can be considered religious? Strongly agree 3
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Somewhat agree 35 Don’t know/missing 1 Somewhat disagree 26 Strongly disagree 35 Would you agree to marrying your daughter to someone who does not pray? Strongly agree 1 Somewhat agree 5 Somewhat disagree 7 Strongly disagree 86 Table R.D: Descriptive statistics of religiosity indicators (continued) How important is it for you that the maid or the driver be Muslim?
Not important at all 9 Somewhat not important 18 Somewhat important 30 Very important 43 How important is it for you that the recipient of your donation be Muslim? Not important at all 14 Somewhat not important 16 Somewhat important 24 Very important 45 How important should belonging to Islam be as requirements for somebody seeking citizenship? Not important at all 2 Somewhat not important 3 Somewhat important 8
Very important 87 Source: SSCQ, n=1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H
As seen in table R.D, the majority of Qataris interviewed considered themselves to be
religious. However, more opted for the somewhat religious answer group, as only 18% said
that they were highly religious compared to 81% stating that they are somewhat religious,
and only 1% in the somewhat not religious answer group. When it comes to the second
variable, the results show that 53% of respondents observed dawn prayers daily, while 42%
said that they did so once or more than once a week, and 4% said that they seldom or never
performed the prayer on time. Concerning the third variable, 27% said that they attended
other religious activities, while 73% said that they do not attend such activities.
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The second group of variables measured how respondents perceived the religiosity of others
(i.e. it is a gauge of tolerance of behaviour that contradicts popular Islamic teachings in the
Qatari context). The main variables included in this group were from a battery of questions on evaluating the religiosity of others. The survey asked respondents if they believed that someone could be considered religious if they did certain things that were considered prohibited in Islamic doctrine. The prohibited actions included: smoking, not wearing a headscarf or Hijab (for women), neglecting prayer, and dealing with a non-Shari’a- compliant bank. Smoking and non-Shari’a-compliant banking, while prohibited in the
Islamic tradition in Qatar, are less frowned upon in society than more religiously linked behaviours such as praying and wearing a Hijab. Also, a closer-to-home relationship question was used, asking the respondent about agreeing to marry their daughter to someone who does not pray. The significance of prayer comes from the fact that it is customary for the father of the bride to inquire about adherence to prayer through the Imam of the mosque the prospective husband frequents (See table R.D).
The results of these questions on perceived religiosity offered the widest variance yet. As visible in table R.D, if the person smoked 58% agreed that they can be considered religious,
38% said the same about dealing with a non-Shari’a-compliant bank, and 22% of respondents said that a woman not wearing Hijab and 20% of respondents said that a person who does not pray regularly can be considered religious. On marrying their daughters, there was less variance: 93% said that they would refuse to marry their daughters to those who do not pray, with 86% saying that they would strongly refuse.
The final group of variables considers the attitudes of respondents towards others’ belonging to Islam. The three variables in this dimension asked respondents how important belonging
118 | P a g e to Islam was for someone to be given the citizenship of the Qatar, to benefit from a donation given by the respondent, or to work as live-in domestic staff in the respondent’s home. The results suggest that 87% consider being a Muslim to be a very important requirement for gaining Qatari citizenship, 8% view it as somewhat important, while 5% view it as unimportant. 69% said that a Muslim receiving their donation was important to them, with
45% saying that it was highly important. 27% of those asked said that religion was not important in their choice of maids, while the remaining 73% considered it to be important.
Using the factor scores from the analysis below, these dimensions will form the three religiosity variables included in the analysis.
Along with the dependent and independent variables, the analysis took into account a number of control variables. These variables are the same as those used in Chapter 2. The three variables on contact used in the previous chapter were utilised here as control variables to compare their effect to that of religiosity.
The analysis that follows starts with a factor analysis to assess the connection between the religiosity variables and to determine how they fit with each other. Second, the religiosity variable (or variables) resulting from the factor analysis is examined against trust in immigrant groups. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, a set of logistic regressions was conducted for that purpose: first, using religiosity against trust with basic controls, and second, introducing education and employment, which were strong predictors of trust in the
Chapter 2 analysis. Finally, contact was introduced. Then, the average marginal effects
(AME) for the logistic regression results were calculated to allow for comparing effects across models, as odd ratios reflect the degree of heterogeneity in the model (Mood, 2010).
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Finally, the predicted probability of trust was calculated for all variables that denote significance in the regression to measure and compare the size of the effect.
4.4 Analysis and Results 4.4.1 Factor Analysis As discussed earlier, the study aims to establish if the variables on religiosity fit together or provide a more complex setup mirroring the discussion on dimensions of religiosity outlined above. Examining how the religiosity indicators outlined above relate to each other does this. For this purpose, exploratory factor analysis was utilised to examine the extent of variance shared between the indicators in question and to calculate the factor scores of correlated variables to be used in the next section of the analysis.
To start, the fit of the proposed factor analysis model was examined. All variables correlated at .3 or above, with at least one other item confirming the existence of a relationship meriting study between the variables were examined. Second, Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which is used to test for homogeneity in the sample (Bartlett, 1937), produced a significant p-value testifying to the appropriateness of using factor analysis. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .71, which is above the recommended value to consider the sample suitable for factor analysis (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). With this confirmation of the suitability of running a factor analysis, an exploratory factor analysis was run in the first instance.
The analysis was conducted using STATA’s “factormat” command. As the variables in question are not continuous, a polychoric matrix was developed for the analysis. When dealing with ordinal variables, many scholars suggest the use of a polychoric matrix rather
120 | P a g e than a Pearson correlation (Baglin, 2014; Flora and Curran, 2004; Holgado–Tello et al.,
2010). The extraction method used in the factor analysis was iterated component factors. For the rotation an oblique rotation solution, promax was used for the reason suggested by
Matsunaga (2010), which is that the orthogonally rotated solution artificially removes a correlation between variables and this is likely to distort the results.
Following the initial factor analysis, the eigenvalues suggested a three-factor solution when using the Kaiser criterion of considering factors with eigenvalues more than 1.0 (See table
R.F.1). Furthermore, when viewing the scree plot of the results, in accordance with Cattell’s scree test, the levelling-out begins after the fourth factor, suggesting a four-factor solution
(See graph F1). After running the analysis with three and four factors it was decided to retain three factors. The main reason behind this choice, along with the eigenvalues, was the theoretical strength of the three-factor solution, as it provided a more robust, logical structure than the other solutions.
Table R.F.1: Eigenvalues of factor analysis
Factor 1 1.49 Factor 2 1.38 Factor 3 1.04 Factor 4 0.92 Factor 5 0.90 Factor 6 0.88 Factor 7 0.82 Factor 8 0.76 Factor 9 0.49 Factor 10 0.33 Source: SSCQ, n=1485
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Graph R.F.1. Scree plot of eigenvalues of EFA
2
1.5
1
Eigenvalues
.5
0
0 5 10 Number
Table R.F.2: Results of EFA – three-factor solution
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Smoking* 0.485 0.047 -0.028 Not wearing head scarf* 0.583 -0.082 0.076 Not praying regularly* 0.677 -0.047 -0.123 Dealing with non-Islamic bank* 0.511 0.122 -0.010 Marrying your daughter to someone who does not pray 0.439 0.066 0.286 Reported religiosity -0.036 0.567 0.121 Performing dawn prayers on time 0.051 0.729 -0.105 Attending religious activities 0.032 0.395 0.013 Having a Muslim maid -0.087 0.230 0.324 Donating to Muslims -0.047 -0.009 0.514 Citizenship applicant being a Muslim 0.081 -0.038 0.437 Source: SSCQ, n=1485. Bold indicates loading of 0.3 and higher, n=1485, *Question was: Would you consider someone who does this to be religious?
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Variable loadings for the factor analysis can be found in Table R.F.2. As Hair (1998) suggests, any variable loading at .3 and above was considered to be significant, due to the relatively large n size. Hair (1998) suggests that for any model with a sample size larger than
350 it is acceptable to lower the factor loadings threshold to .3. The n size in this case was
1485.
For the first factor it was found that indicators of perceived religiosity (i.e. perception of others’ religiosity) loaded highly onto one factor. Along with the four variables on considering someone religious if smoking, not wearing Hijab, not praying, and dealing with a non-Shari’a-compliant bank. The variable on agreeing to marry one’s daughter to someone who does not pray also loaded highly. All of the variables loading on this factor concern the respondents’ evaluation of the religiosity of others, rather than their own religious convictions and practices. Three variables load highly on the second factor: reported religiosity, frequency of observing the dawn prayers on time, and attending religious activities. The three variables loading on this factor concern personal religious convictions and practices. The variables loading highly on the final factor have a different type of commonality; they are asking about the importance of being Muslim as a criterion for various social decisions. The final factor seems to measure inclusion of out-groups (See table R.F.2).
To validate the results above, three additional factor models were used in an exploratory factor analysis. Each model would test the association between variables loading highly on each of the three factors retained in the previous analysis. For this step the principal component factor (PCF) extraction method was used, which assumes the presence of a single factor in order to confirm the findings above.
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Table R.F.3: Results of exploratory factor analysis for religious variables
FA1 FA2 FA3 Smoking* 0.624 Not wearing head scarf* 0.693 Not praying regularly* 0.706 Dealing with non-Islamic bank* 0.674 Marrying your daughter to someone who does not pray 0.649 Reported religiosity 0.756 Performing dawn prayers on time 0.817 Attending religious activities 0.629 Having a Muslim maid 0.643 Donating to Muslims 0.730 Citizenship applicant being a Muslim 0.652 Source: SSCQ, n=1485 *Question was: Would you consider someone who does this to be religious?
From the results in table R.F.3, it can be confirmed that when taking the variables that load highly in the individual factors they measure one latent concept each. The results of the
KMO test produced values above .5 for the three models. However, for both the personal religiosity and the religious inclusion models the KMO values were bordering on the minimum accepted (.56, .57), whereas the sampling adequacy of the perceived religiosity model was much stronger at .77.
From the results of the factor analysis, it was concluded that there are three dimensions of religiosity captured by the 11 indicators used in the SSCQ. The first dimension is personal religiosity, the second is perceived religiosity, and the third is religious inclusion. These dimensions were utilised as independent variables to test the effects of these dimensions on trust in immigrants in the Qatari context. For this purpose, a regression factor score was generated for each of the three dimensions identified in the analysis using STATA’s
“predict” command. Regression factor scores predict the location of each respondent on the
125 | P a g e factor and, therefore, produce an aggregated score for the individual while taking into account all variables loading on the factor (Di Stefano et al., 2009).
4.4.2 Detailed Hypothesis This chapter attempts to test three hypotheses:
H3.1. First, as previous studies found that a dominant group effect raised the
likelihood of prejudice towards out-groups (Brañas-Garza et al., 2009; Brenneman,
2008; Gaduh, 2012; Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Traunmuller, 2010; Welch et al., 2004;
Welch et al., 2007) it is expected that, at least for the Westerners, which is mostly
made up of non-Muslims, the dimensions of religious inclusion and perceived
religiosity, which are concerned with acceptance of others, will be negatively
related to trust.
H3.2. Second, as Muslims are the main group and stronger group identity leads to
stronger intragroup relations (Gaduh, 2012), the effect of religiosity, at least in its
personal form, on groups more likely to be Muslim, such as Arabs, is expected
to be positive.
H3.3. Third, it is posited that for the Qataris, contextually linked measures of
religiosity utilised in this study including observing dawn prayers and the
battery of questions on the perception of religiosity of people who do not pray
regularly, use Islamic banking, and wear Hijab will be better predictors of
social trust in the Qatari context than conventional measures of religiosity
widely used in previous research such as reported religiosity, importance of
religion in major decisions. This is especially important as this study puts forth
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measures developed for Muslim societies in general and with special relevance to the
Qatari case. The argument is that these measures will offer better tools of
understanding and measuring religiosity in Qatar.
4.4.3 Results As explained in Chapter 2, logistic regression is used to produce average marginal effects.
The analysis was conducted using a “three by four” format. The three identified dimensions of religiosity were tested against trust in each of the four immigrant groups. The analysis begins by reviewing the correlations between factor scores of religiosity dimensions and trust in immigrant groups. The final model presented controls for various demographics, interviewer nationality, studying abroad, and contact. Only variables denoting significance in relation to trust for at least one of the groups in question were retained in the model below.
Table R.D.1: Correlations of religiosity dimensions with trust in immigrants Indian sub- Arabs Westerners East Asians continentals Personal religiosity 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 Perceived religiosity 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 Religious inclusion 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 Source: SSCQ, n=1485, Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%,
As observed in Table R.D.1, the three dimensions of religiosity correlated positively with trust in Arabs; however, the correlation was weak and only the correlation with religious inclusion was significant. For the three non-Arab groups, the correlations were negative with the exception of religious inclusion on trust in East Asians where no correlation was observed. However, religious inclusion was not significantly correlated to trust in any of the three groups. While the patterns of correlation were relatively similar between all three non-
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Arab groups trust in Westerners exhibited a slightly higher correlation with religious dimensions than the other two groups. The highest correlations were observed between perceived religiosity and trust in non-Arabs ranging between 0.11 and 0.13.
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Table R.R: AME of religiosity indicators on trust Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 Personal religiosity -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 (0.02) (-0.02) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03) Perceived religiosity 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) Religious inclusion 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) Age 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gender (ref: Male) -0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.01 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Interviewer nationality (ref: non- -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 Qatari) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 (0.03) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) University and higher 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.17 (0.03) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.06 (0.03) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.12 0.21 0.06 -0.03 (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.06) Meeting 0.12 0.27 0.21 0.18 (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04)
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Table R.R: AME of religiosity indicators on trust (continued)
Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.04 (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.23 (-0.03) (-0.13) (-0.07) (-0.06) Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.14 (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.05 0.21 0.18 (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.07)
Source: SSCQ, n size in all models = 1485; Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%, age2 is multiplied by 1000. M1 includes main explanatory variables and controls, M2 introduces previously significant effects
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Table R.P: Predicted probabilities of logistic regression results Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif.
Personal religiosity 0.39 0.24 -0.14
Religious inclusion 0.57 0.75 0.18 Age (18 vs. 60) 0.17 0.21 0.04 Age (18 vs. 28) 0.17 0.25 0.08 Age (28 vs. 38) 0.25 0.28 0.03 Age (38 vs. 48) 0.28 0.27 -0.01
Interviewer nationality 0.72 0.63 -0.09 Education 0.28 0.40 0.12 0.27 0.42 0.14 0.26 0.40 0.14 Employment 0.28 0.39 0.10 Contact (Friends) 0.68 0.81 0.13 0.28 0.57 0.29 0.26 0.47 0.20 0.25 0.44 0.19 Contact (Neighbours) 0.68 0.73 0.04 0.26 0.36 0.09 0.25 0.40 0.15
Contact (Co-workers) 0.28 0.37 0.09 0.26 0.48 0.21 0.25 0.38 0.13 Dif. is the difference between A and B. Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%. Significance refers to the AME results reported above. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean. Source: SSCQ, n=1485
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Graph R.P.1: Predicted probabilities of trust Graph R.P.2: Predicted probabilities of trust in Arabs in westerners 0.85 0.6 0.55 0.8 0.5 0.75 0.45 0.4 0.7 0.35 0.3 0.65 0.25 0.6 0.2 0.15 0.55 Min. Max.
0.5 Personal religiosity Age (18 vs. 60) Age (18 vs. 28) Min. Max. Age (28 vs. 38) Age (38 vs. 48) Education Religious inclusion Interviewer nationality Employment Contact (Friends) Contact (Co-workers) Contact (Friends) Contact (Neighbours)
Graph R.P.3: Predicted probabilities of trust Graph R.P.4: Predicted probabilities of trust in Indian Sub-continentals in East-Asians 0.5 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.4 0.38 0.4 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.3 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 Min. Max. Min. Max.
Education Contact (Friends) Education Contact (Friends) Contact (Neighbours) Contact (Co-workers) Contact (Neighbours) Contact (Co-workers)
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As seen in table R.R, religiosity indicators only exhibited significance for Arabs and
Westerners, the most similar and most dissimilar groups to Qataris respectively. When it comes to Arabs, the only religiosity indicator that exhibited significance was that of religious inclusion. The effect was strongly significant (p<0.05) and positively related to trust suggesting that respondents who placed greater emphasis on religion in social decisions were more likely to trust Arabs. Perceived religiosity was marginally significant and positively related to trust in non-Arab groups in the first step of the analysis; however, after introducing contact the effect became non-significant. The predicted probability of expressing trust in Arabs increased from 57-75% between the lowest and highest religious inclusion scores as can be seen in table R.P. This effect is likely due to the fact that the majority of Arabs are Muslims and they represent the in- group for Qataris, sharing, along with religious affiliation, many social attributes such as language and traditions. Those who emphasise the importance of a common religion follow through on their beliefs as they show greater trust in Arabs, who meet this criterion, but not others who do not. This is compared to the remaining groups, as the majority of Westerners are non-Muslims, and the remaining two groups are mixed, including Muslims and non-Muslims who speak different languages. This result testifies to the importance of belonging to the dominant group religiously on how religiosity affects trust in others (Brañas-Garza et al., 2009; Brenneman, 2008; Gaduh, 2012;
Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Traunmuller, 2010; Welch et al., 2004; Welch et al., 2007).
For Westerners, personal religiosity proved a negative predictor of trust (AME=-0.05).
Thought the effect here was marginally significant at 10% it suggests a decreased likelihood of trust in Westerners for respondents who reported higher personal religiosity. When looking at the predicted probabilities, it was found that the probability of trust decreased from 39-24% between the lowest and highest scores on personal
133 | P a g e religiosity. While the results do offer support relating to the effect of practice on trust
(Brañas-Garza et al., 2009; Brenneman, 2008; Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Schoenfeld,
1978) the weak significance does cast doubt on the effect of practice in the Qataris setting. For the remaining two groups none of the religiosity indicators showed a significant relationship to trust; however, the direction of the relationship was negative for almost all indicators except for religious inclusion with East Asians. This lack of effect can be attributed to the fact that, while not predominantly Muslim, these two groups have a large proportion of Muslims among them, which may make it difficult for
Qataris to judge these groups based on religious criteria.
For the remaining variables in the analysis, the effects are similar to those observed in the previous chapter. The effect of contact remained strong throughout, suggesting that contact has a bigger impact on trust than religiosity. Higher levels of education resulted in more trust in non-Arab immigrants as in the previous chapter. Also, being employed heightened the likelihood of trust in Westerners, while contact in the workplace did not benefit trust in the same group. The interviewer effect was significant for trust in Arabs
(AME = -0.06), suggesting that those interviewed by Qataris were more likely to express distrust in Arabs than those interviewed by Arabs. Age was positively related to trust in
Westerners suggesting that older cohorts were more trusting of Westerners.
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Graph: R.P.G Predicted probabilities of trust in Westerners according to age
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% 18 28 38 48 60
Trust in westerners
As the results suggested that older participants are less trusting of non-Arab groups, we ran extra-predicted probabilities to compare the probability of trust by age group in 10- year intervals. As seen in table R.P and graph R.P.G, the probability of trust being expressed by 18-year-olds was the lowest at 17%, the probability of trust then increased with age to a peak at age 38 then decreased again among those older than 38. The likelihood of trust in Westerners peaked between the ages of 28 and 38 with a slight decrease when comparing 38 to 48. A larger decrease in probability (6%) was observed when comparing 48 to 60. The results indicate that the youngest and oldest respondents portray the least trust in Westerners. One possible explanation is that middle aged Qataris have the most prolonged exposure to Westerners in the Qatari workforce, through jobs in the newly prosperous Qatari economy. The older Qataris will have worked for many years prior to Westerners being heavily recruited for public and semi-public sector jobs, while the youngest have not worked with them for long or are still in University.
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Three patterns emerge from the results. The first is concerning trust in Arabs, a second with trust in Westerners, and a third for the remaining non-Arab groups. Only religious inclusion was a predictor of trust in Arabs, as other religiosity variables were non- significant. A possible explanation for this is that strong religious inclusion attitudes relate to strong group identity and, therefore, more positive attitudes towards members of the same religious group. For Westerners, the most distant group from Qataris, the effect of personal religiosity was significant and negative. For the remaining two groups the religiosity indicators seemed to have no effect on trust. As explained earlier, this may be due to the fact that these two groups are made up of both Muslims and non-Muslims, making it difficult for Qatari respondents to identify them as one or the other.
4.5 Conclusion The main objective here was to assess the effect of religiosity and religious attitudes on trust in immigrants in Qatar. To achieve this, the study produced a comprehensive index of measures using both classic and contextual measures of religious attitudes and developing from them three dimensions of religiosity that relate closely to the Muslim and Qatari contexts. While classic measures provided low or no variance, context specific measures included in comprehensive indices offered better variance and a clear understanding of how Qataris segment religious attitudes. The research found personal, perceived, and inclusive dimensions of religiosity. First, a factor analysis was conducted that resulted in three factors, each representing a dimension of religiosity. Calculating average marginal effects, testing for the effects of the three dimensions on trust, followed this. Finally, producing the predicted probability of trust for each of the variables and, therefore, denoting significance concluded the analysis.
As discussed earlier, the chapter tested three hypotheses. First, dimensions of religiosity relevant to evaluating other people religiously were expected to be negatively related to
136 | P a g e trust in non-Muslim immigrants. From the results detailed above, it can be observed that personal religiosity was a predictor of low trust in Westerners, contrary to our hypothesis. Nonetheless, it is in line with an observed trend by some authors linking practice and attendance with lower trust (Hinze et al., 2011; Scheepers et al., 2002). The importance of this finding lies in the fact that the Westerners are the only group examined that are perceived to be generally non-Muslim, the other two non-Arab groups are mixed, as many of them are Muslim. Therefore, it was found that strong personal religiosity leads to less trust in a group when the perception of that group is that they are non-Muslim, while mixed and Muslim groups are not affected by this dimension of religiosity. However, the results were weakly significant.
Second, it was suggested that high religiosity would improve the likelihood of trust in groups similar to Qataris. As shown above, Arabs, the group most similar to Qataris and the only examined group with a majority of Muslims, benefited from one of the three dimensions of religiosity examined. Religious inclusion, which measures attitudes on religious affiliation of others, was positively linked to trust in Arabs, affirming that, at least in relation to that dimension, the hypothesis stands. This affirms results of previous research in Muslim contexts (Gaduh, 2012). The effect also points towards an in-group out-group mechanism, as Arabs have more than religion to share with Qataris. This will be tested in detail when considering social values in the following chapter.
Third, it was proposed that measures derived from the Qatari context would function better and provide more variance than measures widely used in previous research. As was seen in the explanatory variables discussion above, variables commonly used in the literature, such as reported religiosity, provided little variance, while the most variance was found with variables relating to the context. As the majority of Qataris can be viewed as highly religious, the variance found in variables on reported religiosity is very
137 | P a g e small. Variables on religious attitudes towards the behaviour of other Muslims or views on non-Muslims developed for the sake of Qatari society provided better variance and, therefore, were more useful in the analysis of religiosity in Qatar.
The results also show that contact and education remain strong predictors of trust in immigrants in general. The effect of religiosity for Indian sub-continentals and East
Asians became non-significant after the introduction of these two variables to the model, and the effect was reduced in relation to Westerners. The effects of the remaining variables also remained as they were in the Chapter 2 analysis. These results, however, do suggest that looking at only religious values does not provide a clear understanding of how values in Qatar affect trust. The effects shown towards Arabs suggest the presence of social values. The similarity of Arabs to Qataris is not only religious – they share many social traditions and values as well. This leads us to the need for a more detailed examination testing for both religious and social values to determine, whether the effect of religiosity observed here was genuinely religious or a factor of social distance.
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND TRUST IN IMMIGRANTS
“A dress only remains beautiful if it is patched from the same cloth it was made from”
- Arab proverb - 5.1 Introduction As seen in the previous chapter, Qatari society is highly conservative religiously. This conservativeness is not limited to only religious values. Socially, Qatar is a tribal and traditional society that was catapulted into modernity through increasing immigration and prosperity. However, even though Qatar, in many aspects, is modernising quickly, with the introduction of Western educational institutions, the growing international scholarship program, and legislation supporting women rights and tolerance, social traditions remain an integral part of everyday life. The tribe and tribal pride, for example, remain strong in society, as social status is still dependent, to some extent, on one's tribal affiliation. While some features of social conservatism can be linked to religious doctrine, there is still a separate realm of social conservatism that is, at times, contradictory to Islamic teachings and religious tradition. Conservative views on women can be linked to Salafi religious teachings common in Qatar. The tribal and ethnic discrimination, however, is a result of social norms and customs and, arguably, contradictory to mainstream religious interpretation (Al-Jaber, 2002; Al-Kathim, 1991).
Therefore, it is important to test the impact such social attitudes have on trust, especially in immigrants who mostly exist outside of traditional social hierarchies, to develop a comprehensive view of conservatism in the Qatari context.
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This chapter mainly aims to test the effect of social conservatism on trust in foreigners through identifying dimensions of social conservatism and testing them against trust in immigrants. Also, as civic participation has been proven to be a predictor of higher trust in out-groups, it was considered here as it is socially driven and indicates predisposition to working together with others for the common good which is relevant to tolerance of others (Putnam, 1995; Putnam et al., 1993; Uslaner, 1998; Veenstra, 2002; Verba et al.,
1995; Welch et al., 2007). The chapter starts with an overview of past research. This is followed by the analysis, which begins with a factor analysis to determine how the indicators of social attitudes and civic participation used relate to one another. This is followed by testing dimensions of social attitudes against trust in each of the four groups of immigrants. Then, the predicted probability of trust for each variable in the model was calculated. Concluding remarks follows this.
5.2 Background and Past Research The aim of this chapter is to study how social conservatism and civic participation affect trust in immigrants in Qatar. While social conservatism is a broad ranging term, three main themes have been identified that are relevant to the context and research aims: traditionalism, as Qatar is a highly tribal society with customs and traditions playing an important role in everyday life; attitudes towards immigration, as the study is on determinants of trust in immigrants; and civic participation, as many scholars linked volunteering and participation in civic organizations to attitudes towards out-groups.
Some scholars describe traditional values in the Western context as the form of intolerance towards abortion, divorce, and homosexuality, and the favouring of a patriarchal view on society, respect for parental authority, and family life (Everett, 2013;
Ingleheart & Baker, 2000). Another view of traditional values relates to group identity and collectivism. Group identity is defined as both a self-awareness of an objective
140 | P a g e membership in the group in question and a mental sense of attachment to that group
(Conover, 1984). Some authors link a strong sense of group identity to diminished generalised trust in society and an increased particularised in-group trust (Conover, 1984;
Dawes et al., 1988; Uslaner & Conley, 2003). Those confirming the presence of this link assert that strong attachment to one’s group, while encouraging trust within the group, increases an individual’s prejudice against those who belong to different groups
(Conover, 1984; Dawes et al., 1988; Uslaner & Conley, 2003). In the context of this study, tribal attachment and high regard for traditions and customs are clearly observed in Qatar. These measures can be linked to group attachment along with other measures of social conservatism.
Furthermore, Janoff-Bulman (2009) presents a general view of what is socially important to both conservatives and liberals. First, he suggests that conservatives are concerned mainly with protecting society while liberals are more interested in providing for society.
Also, he considers that conservatives focus more on social identity and intergroup boundaries while liberals are more focused on intragroup interdependence and capitalising on diversity. Furthermore, the author asserts that conservatives rely on inhibition and restraint as means for social regulation stemming from being attuned to negative outcomes, while liberals, who are more focused on positive outcomes, prefer activation as a means for social regulation. Therefore, conservatives are, as the author suggests, more attuned to protecting the social identity of the dominant group and are more likely to view those who differ from them culturally as a threat to that identity.
Janoff-Bulman (2009), along with other authors, agrees in relating conservatism to Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Jost et al., 2007; Pratto et al., 1997). In short, SDO is a measure used in social psychological research to gauge support for a hierarchical, as opposed to an egalitarian, society. Those scoring high on the SDO measure tend to be
141 | P a g e less inclined to support equal rights for all groups in society and show more support for maintaining and increasing gaps between the dominant and subordinate groups in society. Evidence has been presented by some authors for a correlation between SDO and other conservative attitudinal measures, (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost et al., 2007), while others reported no significant connection between the two (Pratto et al., 1997). While it is not used as a stand-alone measure of conservative attitudes, SDO measures are used commonly as items in indices of conservatism (Jost et al., 2007).
This connection between conservatism and SDO is especially useful in this study as it indicates that conservative values are related to how members of the dominant group in society view other groups. Qataris, though a minority, enjoy a considerably higher economic and social status than immigrant groups. The issue of more rights for non- citizens has been raised in connection to the World Cup 2022 and the international media discussion of workers’ rights in Qatar.
While group identification demonstrates how collectivism in this form affects trust, reference can be found to a more modern and institutional form of collectiveness: volunteering and civic participation. This form of collectiveness is distinct and, in most cases, differently related to trust than group identification (Realo et al., 2008). While volunteering and participation in civil society organisations can be limited to the social group, in most instances this type of collective action takes place in diverse settings and is encouraging of a more outward outlook on society. More specifically, in Qatar, the focus of volunteer groups and organisations is charity work, which is mostly directed towards immigrants as most Qataris enjoy high income and government support. Uslaner and Conley (2003), in their study of ethnic Chinese in southern California, suggest that strong group identification is negatively related to civic participation, and even when the relationship is positive it concerns engagement in group specific organisations. The
142 | P a g e positive relationship between volunteering and civic participation and trust is confirmed by many authors (Eliasoph et al., 1996; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Uslaner, 1998;
Veenstra, 2002; Welch et al., 2007). The main argument offered explaining this positive effect suggests that participation provides more contact with members of other groups and encourages a more cooperative view of society (Welch et al., 2007).
The causality in this relationship is difficult to determine, as it is likely that those who are originally more trusting will be more likely to volunteer and participate in organisational activities. As Uslaner and Conley (2003) mention, the main question could be about what attitudes people bring into civic groups rather than what attitudes develop within them.
According to this view, Qataris, who are more trusting of immigrants, would be more likely to volunteer in organisations where the main beneficiaries would be immigrants.
This review of existing research on social attitudes and trust identifies three main themes: traditionalism, group identity, and civic participation. These themes, while not all linked to one another, constitute important measures of social attitudes for the Qatari context.
Both the traditional and conservative nature of Qatari society, and the presence of a large number of charities and volunteer groups, makes these measures contextually important and highly relevant to understanding attitudes towards immigrants. This chapter will use measures on social conservatism and civic participation to understand how these measures of social attitudes and behaviour affect Qataris attitudes towards immigrant groups.
5.3 Explanatory variables The SSCQ included a section relating to the subject matter of this chapter, which included four variables on attitudes towards gender issues, three variables on traditionalism, and two variables on volunteering and participation in organisational
143 | P a g e activities. These variables were used to gauge attitudes on various social issues in the context of Qatari society. The first variable was on agreement to Qatari youth wearing
Western clothes in public. This is connected to various social media and public discussions between younger, more liberal, Qataris who consider it their right and a sign of the times to wear Western clothes in public, and older, or more conservative, Qataris who consider local attire consisting of a traditional head dress and garment to be a defining sign of masculinity. As is apparent in table S.D, 33% of respondents were opposed to Qatari youth wearing Western clothes in public.
Table S.D: Descriptive statistics of social values indicators
%
To what extent do you agree with Qatari youth wearing trousers in public in Qatar? Strongly disagree 4 Somewhat disagree 29 Somewhat agree 20 Strongly agree 48 To what extent do you agree with Qatari women working in mixed environments? Strongly disagree 16 Somewhat disagree 41 Somewhat agree 16 Strongly agree 28 To what extent do you agree with Qatari women appearing on television? Strongly disagree 20 Somewhat disagree 49 Somewhat agree 14 Strongly agree 16 To what extent would you agree to sending your daughter to a co-ed-university? Strongly disagree 13 Somewhat disagree 28 Somewhat agree 13 Strongly agree 45 When it comes to traditions and social norms do you consider yourself to be: Highly not-conservative 0 Somewhat not-conservative 0 Somewhat conservative 49 Highly conservative 51 How important is the tribe in your everyday life? Not important at all 3 Not too important 5 Somewhat important 21
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Very important 71 To what extent do you think that it is important to children to learn about Qatari tribes history? Not important at all 2 Not too important 6 Somewhat important 25 Very important 67 In your opinion, how important should Adhering to Qatari traditions be as a requirement for somebody seeking citizenship of Qatar? Not important at all 3 Not too important 8 Somewhat important 24 Very important 65 During the past 12 months have you volunteered in any non-governmental activity? No 83 Yes 17 Do you participate in the activities of a charity, sports club, youth centre or any other similar organization? No 79 Yes 21 Source: SSCQ, n=1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H Along with the variables on youth’s clothing, the data includes three variables on women’s issues. It is visible how divisive these issues are in Qatari society. When asked about their approval of Qatari women appearing in television, working with men, and studying in co-ed universities 69% of respondents were opposed to Qatari women appearing on television, 57% were opposed to Qatari women working with men, and considerably less (41%) were opposed to Qatari women studying in co-ed universities.
These measures provide a theoretically grounded indicator of the divide between social conservatives and modernists, as social conservatives tend to oppose women's involvement in society, whereas those exposed to the values and workings of more modern societies tend to have a more liberal stance.
The following three variables offer more evidence to the highly conservative nature of
Qatari society. First, when asked to assess how socially conservative they were, almost all respondents opted for the somewhat conservative (49%) and highly conservative
(51%) options. Second, when asked about the importance of the tribe in their day-to-day
145 | P a g e a life a surprisingly high 92% of respondents considered it to be important. Also, when asked how important it was for children to be taught about the history of Qatari tribes
92% of respondents considered it to be important. This is especially surprising as not all
Qataris belong to tribes. While there is no available data on the issue, as it is considered highly sensitive, it is known that most Qataris originating from Iran and some non-GCC
Arab countries are not tribally affiliated. The result can be understood when it is considered that for years the state has encouraged tribal life through tribal celebrations on
Qatari National Day. Governmental officials have suggested that non-tribal families reinstate their tribe of origin in their formal documents and there has been a heightened state media emphasis on tribal traditions and histories. These policies, along with a higher social position for tribally affiliated families, are reasonable causes of this support for the tribal way of life.
One of the questions on prerequisites to gaining Qatari citizenship offers a slightly different perspective. Here it seems that a greater percentage of Qataris did not opt for the conservative options when it came to tribal affiliation as a prerequisite. As seen in table S.D, 57% of respondents considered belonging to a Qatari tribe important for someone applying for Qatari citizenship. However, when asked about adhering to Qatari traditions, 89% of respondents considered it to be important. This is understandable as
Qatari traditions are not specific to a certain group, and the loose term allows every
Qatari to consider their own traditions while asking about tribal affiliation excludes the groups with no tribal affiliation
Finally, the remaining two variables asked about volunteering and participation in activities held by civil society organisations. While these two variables do not gauge attitudes towards social issues, as explained earlier, they are considered measures of civic participation, which are a form of collectiveness that is attributed to higher social trust
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(Putnam, 1995; Putnam et al., 1993; Uslaner, 1998; Veenstra, 2002; Verba et al., 1995;
Welch et al., 2007). As is apparent in table S.D, 17% of respondents reported volunteering during the 12 months prior to the survey and 21% said they participated in activities. While the two variables seem to be similar, the Arabic wording used for participation in the SSCQ was “Mosharaka”, which is indicative of passive participation or, to be specific, attending activities of organisations while volunteering is an active form of participation. Moreover, we tested the two variables to make sure that they are not highly correlated. They are correlated at 33% and, therefore, using both variables in the analysis below was deemed suitable.
These variables will, in the remainder of the analysis, be used as explanatory variables.
Along with the control variables used earlier, the contact variables, and religiosity indicators that denoted significance in the previous chapter. The analysis will test the effects of social attitudes on trust in immigrant groups.
5.4 Analysis and Results This chapter aims to assess the effect of social conservatism and civic participation on trust in immigrant groups in Qatar. In this chapter, first, there is a factor analysis of the social value indicators described above to determine their correlations to each other and then develop factor scores of those variables correlating highly to use in the remainder of the analysis. After that the resulting factor scores will be tested against trust producing
AMEs and predicted probabilities.
5.4.1 Factor Analysis As discussed above, the first step of the analysis aims to establish how the variables on social attitudes and civic participation from the SSCQ survey relate to one another. This is done, as in the previous chapter, through exploratory factor analysis to examine the
147 | P a g e extent of variance shared between the indicators in question and to calculate the factor scores of correlated variables to be used in the next section of the analysis.
Table S.F.1: Eigenvalues of factor analysis Factor1 2.60 Factor2 1.33 Factor3 1.15 Factor4 0.48 Factor5 0.23 Factor6 0.13 Factor7 0.12 Factor8 0.07 Factor9 0.02 Factor10 0.00 Factor11 0.00
Source: SSCQ, n=1485
Graph S. F: Scree plot of eigenvalues of EFA
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Eigenvalues
3
2
1
0 0 5 10 15 Number
The analysis was conducted using the same parameters and methods used in the previous chapter. Following the initial factor analysis, the eigenvalues suggested a three-factor solution when using the Kaiser criterion of considering factors with eigenvalues more than 1.0 (see table S.F.1). Furthermore, when viewing the scree plot of the results, in accordance with Cattell’s scree test, two, three, or four possible factors can be found (See graph S.F). After running the analysis with two, three, and four factor solutions it was decided to retain three factors. The reasons behind this choice was the low eigenvalues for the fourth factor and that all variables loaded highly on one of the first three factors.
Also, the two-factor solution was not theoretically sound as variables that did not appear to be related that loaded highly together. The three-factor solution brought together variables with a logical relationship to each other and, therefore, it was used for the analysis.
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Table S.F.2: results of EFA FA1 FA2 FA3
Youth wearing Western apparel 0.399 0.268 -0.006 Women working with men 0.838 -0.050 -0.021 Women appearing in the media 0.667 -0.018 0.040 Daughter attending co-ed university 0.798 -0.023 -0.030 Level of social conservatism 0.262 0.372 -0.072 Importance of the tribe 0.116 0.576 0.067 Teaching children about tribes -0.114 0.693 -0.040 Applicants for citizenship tribally affiliated to Qatari tribes -0.005 0.408 -0.014 Applicants for citizenship adhering to Qatari traditions -0.002 0.376 0.045 Volunteering -0.080 -0.005 0.653 Participation in organisations 0.052 0.016 0.991
Source: SSCQ, n=1485
Variable loadings for the factor analysis can be found in Table S.F.2. Four variables loaded highly on the first factor, three of them concerned attitudes towards women, and the fourth was the item asking about Qatari youth wearing Western clothes. The connection between the four variables seems to be attitudes towards gender issues as wearing traditional Qatari attire is considered proper masculine behaviour as opposed to wearing Western clothes. The remaining three variables measure attitudes towards women’s rights to work, study, and appear in the media alongside men. The second factor gathered measures of traditional values with two variables on tribal affiliation and a third on perceived social conservatism. Also, two variables on the importance of traditions and tribal affiliation as a prerequisite for Qatari citizenship loaded highly on this factor. The third factor included the variables on volunteering and participation in non-governmental organisations. These two variables can be considered measures of civicness. (See table S.F.2).
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Table S.F.3: results of CFA
FA1 FA2 (1&2) FA3
Youth wearing Western apparel 0.610
Women working with men 0.851
Women appearing in the media 0.780
Daughter attending co-ed university 0.846
Level of social conservatism 0.771
Importance of the tribe 0.823
Teaching children about tribes 0.581
Applicants for citizenship tribally affiliated to Qatari tribes 0.746
Applicants for citizenship adhering to Qatari traditions 0.834
Volunteering 0.907
Participation in organisations 0.907
Source: SSCQ, n=1485
To validate the results above, three additional factor models were used. Each model would test the association between variables loading highly on each of the factors retained in the previous analysis. For this step, the principal component factor (PCF) extraction method was used, as with the analysis in the previous chapter. As can be seen in table S.F.3, after running the confirmatory step of this analysis the results of the first and third factors validate the findings of the first step while the variables loading highly on the second factor loaded on two factors. The first factor included variables on conservative attitudes while the second factor included the two variables of prerequisites to citizenship. These will be used separately further in the analysis as suggested by the results to see how they function alongside each other.
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Table S.C: correlation of social values indicators
Traditional Civic Social inclusion Gender roles views participation Traditional views 1.00
Social inclusion 0.24 1.00
Civic participation -0.04 -0.02 1.00
Gender roles 0.22 0.12 -0.09 1.00
Source: SSCQ, n=1485
From the results of the factor analysis, four measures of social values are found: attitudes towards traditional values, social inclusion, civic participation, and gender roles. The factor scores of the confirmatory factor analysis reported above will be used as indicators of social values in the remainder of this analysis. Finally, to make sure that the association between the factor scores of dimension does not exceed expected values a correlation was run which found, as suggested by table S.C, that the correlation between the four measures is not high. The highest association found was between traditional views and social inclusion (0.24), which is still within acceptable limits.
5.4.2 Detailed Hypotheses Using the results of the factor analysis above, more detailed hypotheses were produced.
An attempt is made to test two hypotheses:
H4.1. First, we expect that those with more conservative social views will be
less trusting of immigrants as social conservatism has been linked to less out-
group trust in previous research (Conover, 1984; Dawes et al., 1988; Uslaner and
Conley, 2003). Also, unlike the case with religious values, social
conservativeness is expected to negatively affect trust in all immigrant groups, as
social values are more concerned with specific Qatari traditions and issues rather
than general Arab or Muslim issues.
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H4.2. Second, it is proposed that increased civic participation, defined here
as volunteering and participation in social activities, will have a positive
effect on trust, as those who tend to participate in such activities have a higher
likelihood of social contact with immigrants and possess a more open attitude in
general (Putnam, 1995; Putnam et al., 1993; Uslaner, 1998; Veenstra, 2002;
Verba et al., 1995; Welch et al., 2007).
5.4.3 Results Following the same logic of analysis used in the previous chapter, the factor scores developed above were tested against trust in the four expatriate groups. First, the correlation between social values indicators and trust are provided and discussed.
Second, the factor scores calculated for the measures of social values explored earlier were tested against trust in each of the groups mentioned, along with controls, which included contact and religiosity indicators. Finally, variables that denoted significance were used to produce predicted probabilities comparing between minimum and maximum values as done in the previous two chapters.
Table S.D.1: Correlations of social values with trust in immigrants Indian sub- Arabs Westerners East Asians continentals Traditional views 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 Social inclusion -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 Civic participation 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 Gender roles -0.03 -0.18 -0.10 -0.12 Source: SSCQ, n=1485 As seen in table S.D.1, traditional views were negatively and significantly correlated with trust in all non-Arab groups while it was not significantly correlated with trust in
Arabs. Social inclusion was not significantly correlated with trust in any group, and gender roles were significantly and negatively correlated to trust in all non-Arab groups.
Civic participation on the other hand was significantly and positively correlated to trust
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in all groups. It seems that conservative views on social inclusion and gender roles result
in a very narrow trust radius excluding even highly integrated Arabs.
Table S.R: AME of multiple social values variables on trust with and without controls
Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Gender roles 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01)
Traditional views 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.02) (0.02) (-0.02)
Social inclusion 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01)
Civic participation 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.05
(0.03) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04)
Age 0.00 0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.01)
Age squared 0.00 0.00 -0.30 -0.27 -0.20 0.00 -0.22 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
(-0.02) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03) (0.03) (-0.03)
Education (ref: below secondary)
Secondary and diploma -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04)
University and higher 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.15
(0.03) (-0.03) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04)
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Table S.R: AME of multiple social values variables on trust with and without controls (continued) Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 0.00 -0.02 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.07 Employed (ref: unemployed) (0.03) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) (0.04) (-0.04) Friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.11 0.2 0.05 -0.04 (-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.06) Meeting 0.1 0.24 0.2 0.17
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04) Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.03 (-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.23
(-0.03) (-0.12) (-0.07) (-0.06) Co-workers (ref: no co- workers) Having 0 0.09 0.12 0.15 (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.04) Meeting 0.01 0.04 0.2 0.19
(-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.06) (-0.07) Personal religiosity -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02
(-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03) Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 0 0.03 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) Source: SSCQ, n size in all models = 1485; Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%, age2 is multiplied by 1000. M1 includes main explanatory variables and controls, M2 introduces previously significant effects
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Table S.P: Predicted probabilities of logistic regression results
Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians
Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif.
Gender roles 0.78 0.67 -0.10 0.42 0.25 -0.18 0.38 0.25 -0.12 0.30 0.18 -0.11
Interviewer 0.72 0.64 -0.08 nationality
Education 0.72 0.76 0.04 0.32 0.43 0.11 0.30 0.43 0.13 0.23 0.37 0.14
Age (18 vs. 60) 0.16 0.23 0.07 Age (18 vs. 28) 0.16 0.27 0.11
Age (28 vs. 38) 0.27 0.32 0.05
Age (38 vs. 48) 0.32 0.31 -0.01
Employment 0.32 0.42 0.10 0.23 0.28 0.05 Contact (Friends) 0.69 0.81 0.12 0.32 0.59 0.27 0.29 0.49 0.19 0.22 0.35 0.13
Contact 0.69 0.73 0.04 0.29 0.38 0.09 0.22 0.38 0.16 (Neighbours)
Contact (Co- 0.32 0.40 0.08 0.29 0.51 0.21 0.22 0.41 0.19 workers)
Personal 0.41 0.29 -0.12 religiosity
Religious 0.60 0.78 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.11 inclusion
Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%. Significance refers to the AME results reported above. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean. Source: SSCQ, n=1485.
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Table S.P.1: Predicted Table S.P.2: Predicted probabilities of trust in Arabs probabilities of trust in westerners 0.83 0.65 0.6 0.78 0.55 0.73 0.5 0.45 0.68 0.4 0.35 0.63 0.3 0.25 0.58 0.2 Min. Max. 0.15 Gender roles Min. Max. Interviewer nationality Gender roles Education Education Age (18 vs. 60) Age (18 vs. 28) Contact (Friends) Age (28 vs. 38) Age (38 vs. 48) Contact (Neighbours) Employment Contact (Friends) Religious inclusion Contact (Co-workers) Personal religiosity
Graph S.P.3: Predicted probabilities of Graph S.P.4: Predicted probabilities of trust in Indian sub-continentals trust in East-Asians 0.54 0.45
0.4 0.49 0.35 0.44 0.3
0.39 0.25
0.34 0.2
0.15 0.29 0.1 Min. Max. 0.24 Min. Max. Gender roles Education Gender roles Education Employment Contact (Friends) Contact (Friends) Contact (Neighbours) Contact (Neighbours) Contact (Co-workers) Contact (Co-workers) Religious inclusion
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As seen in table S.R, the first model in the analysis showed that conservative attitudes towards gender roles were a negative predictor of trust in all immigrant groups as with the correlations above. The effect was similar for the four groups at a decrease in trust of
2% for Arabs, 4% for Westerners, and 3% for the remaining two groups. It is notable, however, that the effect was marginally significant for trust in Arabs and was not significant in the first model, while it was strongly significant for the remaining three groups. Traditional views originally exhibited a positive, marginally significant relationship to trust in Arabs; however, introducing contact to the model rendered that effect non-significant. Nonetheless, even trust in Qataris was reduced as a result of more traditional values as reported in table A.Q, in appendix J. Also, while social inclusion did not denote significance in reference to trust in non-Qataris, it was positively related to trust in Qataris. This suggests that those who are more protectionist of society are more trusting of the in-group while it does not affect their trust if others. The same was true for civic participation as it initially showed a positive effect on trust in all groups, which became non-significant when introducing contact. As suggested by the hypothesis earlier, it seems that the positive effect of being a volunteer and participating in social activities simply raises the likelihood of contact and, therefore, when introducing contact to the model it diminishes the effect to non-significance. However, the result supports the importance of civic participation as a catalyst for contact. Therefore, civic participation is substantial for attitudes towards immigrants as a facilitator for contact. Therefore, more trust in immigrants as the results suggest. Social inclusion did not denote significance all through the analysis.
When looking at predicted probabilities, however, it was found that while trust in all groups decreased with more conservative attitudes towards gender roles, the highest drop is for trust in Westerners. The decrease in probability of trust in Westerners was 18%,
158 | P a g e while the decreases were 10% for Arabs, 11% for East Asians, and 12% for Indian sub- continentals. As is apparent in table S.P, the starting level of trust for Arabs is considerably high (78%) when compared to Westerners, Indian sub-continentals, and
East Asians (42%, 38%, and 30% respectively).
Social values, as the results suggest, have a stronger negative effect on trust in non-Arabs than Arabs. This affirms that Arabs are highly integrated as they are very minimally affected by a strong traditional view. The results affirm the notion that bonding social capital embodied here by support for traditions and tribal affiliation has a negative impact on bridging social capital (Leonard, 2004; Rajulton, 2007) as the effects of social values grew with the perceived cultural distance between Qataris and the groups in question. This is also a sign of how strong group affiliation can negatively affect trust in other groups (Conover, 1984; Dawes et al., 1988; Uslaner & Conley, 2003).
It is notable, however, that the only social indicator to retain significance in the final model is gender roles. One explanation for the strong effect of gender roles is that the measures used concern the most visible differences between Qataris and immigrants.
Therefore, they are, along with being measures of conservative gender views, measures of general social conservatism. The significance of gender roles can also be explained using Janoff-Bulman’s (2009) idea of conservatives tending to be more protectionist of social norms and customs. Gender roles in the Qatari context have rapidly moved from a traditional society where men and women are segregated in education and the workplace to a more liberal setting where co-ed education is available widely. All this would prompt Qataris who believe in protecting social norms to be less trusting of immigrants coming from more liberal societies.
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Contact, especially with friends, remained the strongest indicator of trust. Education and employment also remained positively and significantly related to trust in non-Arabs.
Employment did not retain significance in the second model for trust in Indian sub- continentals.
The results suggest that, while contact with expatriate friends is still the strongest predictor of trust in expatriate groups in Qatar, gender roles presents itself as a strong indicator of low trust in non-Arab groups. The difference in gender norms between
Qataris and non-Arab expatriates, especially Westerners and Westernised expatriates, is probably the cause behind the significant effect of the gender roles indicator on trust in these groups. The difference in attitudes is most visibly observed when it comes to modesty, choice of attire, and women-related issues, and, as explained above, the measure for gender roles includes items on both. Studying the focus group results in
Chapter 6 will provide better insight on what issues determine Qataris’ view of non-
Qataris.
As the results portray, civic participation only retained significance before introducing contact affirming the relationship between contact and civic participation proposed earlier. However, as discussed above, this affirms the benefit of civic participation in facilitating positive and meaningful contact with immigrants (Allport, 1954). The results, therefore, offer support to previous research affirming the positive effect of civic participation on trust in out-groups (Eliasoph et al., 1996; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2007;
Uslaner, 1998; Veenstra, 2002; Welch et al., 2007).
5.5 Conclusion The chapter’s main emphasis was on assessing the effect of social conservatism and civic participation on trust in immigrant groups. The analysis identified, through factor
160 | P a g e analysis, three dimensions of social values and an additional dimension was included measuring civic engagement. Gender roles, traditional values, social inclusion, and civic participation were tested against trust while controlling for religiosity, contact, and other demographic variables. After producing the AMEs, the analysis concluded with measuring predicted probabilities of trust.
The chapter tested two hypotheses. It was expected that those with more conservative social views would be less trusting of immigrants in general. While three of the four dimensions of social values tested did not exhibit significance in the final model, gender roles proved negatively and significantly related to trust. However, while trust in all groups declined as a result of increased conservative gender role views, a higher decrease in predicted probabilities was observed for Westerners. The smallest effect was on trust in Arabs. The findings suggest that differences in views towards women and general appearance play a strong role in Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants. As suggested by some authors (Everett, 2013; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), supporting a patriarchal society and a traditional view towards women is a sign of social conservatism, and these measures are indicative of such views. Also, these differences represent a more visible form of difference between conservative Qataris and the generally, more liberal, immigrants, especially non-Arabs. Also, the results give an indication of the varying social distance between the groups and Qataris. Trust in Arabs was the least negatively affected among the four groups and Westerners were the most negatively affected in accordance with how similar or dissimilar these groups are to Qataris culturally and religiously. Finally, the results support that protectionist social attitudes are negatively related to attitudes towards out groups (Janoff-Bulman, 2009).
Second, it was proposed that increased civic participation would have a positive effect on trust due to the increased likelihood of contact. The findings initially suggested the
161 | P a g e presence of an effect for civic value and that the effect is positive, the effect, however, was rendered non-significant by introducing contact suggesting that the effect of civic participation is encompassed in contact with immigrants. These findings supports the work by Welch et al. (2007) as the benefit of participation and volunteering on trust is seen to be an increased level of contact with out-group individuals. As the models include contact in three forms, the effects of volunteering and participation were diminished in the second step. And while the effect of civic participation was dependent on contact, the results still support that civic participation is beneficial to intergroup relations as a catalyst for meaningful contact leading to more positive attitudes across groups (Eliasoph et al., 1996; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Uslaner, 1998; Veenstra,
2002; Welch et al., 2007).
The effects of the remaining variables in the model were very similar to those observed in previous chapters. Education and employment remained significantly and positively related to trust in non-Arabs while being interviewed by a Qatari remained negatively related to trust in Arabs. This and the previous chapter provide evidence of the effect of conservative attitudes on trust in immigrants. The next chapter will consider a different dimension of conservatism. Political attitudes will provide the last of the three types of attitudes studied in this thesis and will allow understanding of how social, religious, and political conservative attitudes fare alongside each other as predictors of prejudice against immigrants.
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CHAPTER 6: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND TRUST IN IMMIGRANT GROUPS
“I seek refuge in god, from the devil…and politics”
- Saeed Al-Norasi - 6.1 Introduction As has been established in previous chapters, religious and social conservatism is significantly related to trust in immigrants. This effect is largely negative, especially concerning trust in non-Arabs. What remains for this analysis of the determinants of trust in immigrants in Qatar is to measure the effect of political attitudes. Qatar is an absolute monarchy and, although the constitution of the state describes an elected legislative body, the government has yet to hold general elections or even set a date for one. The Shura
Council – the Qatari legislative body – is still fully appointed by the Emir. Also, the law still prohibits the formation of political parties (Fromherz, 2012). In this environment, it is very difficult to gauge political attitudes using classic political attitudes measures such as left-right orientation. Nonetheless, the developments in the region following the Arab
Spring uprisings resulted in a high level of political polarisation between those who support and those who oppose Islamists, who came out as the most visible regional alternative to the old regimes following the uprisings (Ozekin & Akkas, 2014). This polarisation of the Arab masses led to more interest in political issues and can provide scholars with a political attitudes spectrum for the Arab world that is applicable in Qatar.
This spectrum, developed in this chapter, uses support for Islamists and Islamist policies to differentiate between conservative and liberal political attitudes, along with liberal
163 | P a g e attitudes measures. Also, support for Islamist political attitudes and religiosity are closely linked. We examine if attitudes towards general, religiously-oriented policies and support for Islamists are the same for Qataris.
Political discourse in the region has been focused on the events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
Syria, and Yemen. In these countries, the old regimes were viewed as secular or anti-
Islamist while the main political force behind the uprisings against these regimes was the
Islamist opposition groups (Ozekin & Akkas, 2014). As stated earlier, the SSCQ was held around the end of 2013 where the events of the time were favouring the secular powers that have governed the region for decades. In Egypt, a military coup d’état overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood’s president Mursi. Civil war hardened between the regime and mostly Islamist rebels in Syria, and the Islamist revolutionaries and their partners failed to establish stable governments in Libya and Yemen.
The Qatari government has been viewed as a supporter of the uprisings, with the state sponsored Al-Jazeera news network playing a vital role in the Arab Spring through positively covering its events and engaging actively in its developments. The government offered military support to the rebels in Libya and Syria, and they offered financial support to the ousted Egyptian president Mursi who represented the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian coalition government, which included the Al-Nahda Islamist party.
Many Islamist political dissidents from Arab countries reside in Qatar (Ulrichsen, 2014).
On the other hand, Qatar is far from acting as an Islamist state, no religious scholars are members of the Shura Council. Islamist political groups are legally banned, as are secular ones. The sale of alcohol, although controlled, is allowed in Qatar. Qatar’s constitution states that Islam is the official religion and Mosques and religious activities are sponsored by the state. This conflicting position surely affects Qataris’ political attitudes
164 | P a g e in a country where support for the government is consistently high according to various surveys (Al-Ansari et al., 2016; Diop et al., 2011).
While most were conducted in Western settings, many studies confirm that conservative political attitudes resulted in less trust in out-groups (Mughan & Paxton, 2006; Pettigrew,
1998; Raijman & Semyonov, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010; Weldon, 2006). In the Qatari context, as stated earlier, it does not contextually fit to use classic measures of political conservatism. Nonetheless, it is believed that support for religiously oriented policies and opposition to liberal political views constitutes a good measure of political conservatism.
In an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of the determinants of trust in immigrants in Qatar, measures of support for Islamists, religious political conservatism, and liberal values were used to study the connection between political attitudes and trust in immigrants.
As with previous chapters, the results of the SSCQ (Al-Ansari et al., 2016) will be used for this purpose. The chapter begins with an overview of previous research on political attitudes and their effect on intragroup relations. Then, following the same methods used in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, a factor analysis of the political values measures was run and the resulting factor scores tested against trust in Immigrant groups using AMEs and predicted probability techniques. Finally, we offer concluding remarks on the results of this chapter and of the effects of religious, social, and political attitudes on trust in immigrant groups when analysed altogether.
6.2 Background and Past Research Most of the literature on political conservatism is centred on Western, secular, and democratic contexts. Nonetheless, some research was produced within Muslim contexts, in both democratic and non-democratic settings. In these settings, where religion plays a
165 | P a g e significant role in public life and political discourse, it is extremely important to consider the effect Islam and political Islamism has on political attitudes. Some scholars affirm that religion is not as central in forming political attitudes in Muslim countries as widely believed (Tessler, 2003), even when considering support for Islamist political agenda.
Therefore, Islamism need not, necessarily, be considered as a by-product of religiosity. It needs a more contextually linked understanding of how political positions formed in the recent history of the Arab and Muslim world. Research on the effect of Islam on political values has been gaining momentum since the Iranian Islamic revolution presented the first modern Islamist state (Humphreys, 1979). Since then, Islamism, as a term, has been used to describe a political position supporting an active role for Islamic religious teachings in the state. However, this use of the word has been overshadowed by the rise of Jihadist elements and by 9/11. The term was widely used to describe militant Jihadist groups and supporters (Mozaffari, 2007). As explained by Wittes (2008), the term
“Islamist” has been used to describe all forms of social movement, political parties, and even radical military groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Therefore, a clear distinction between political Islamists, militants, and social religious groups is required before analysing Islamist attitudes. Attempting to study Islamism without making this distinction would be similar to studying political conservatism in a Western context and considering the US Republican Party and the Ku Klux Klan under the same classification.
In recognition of the importance of distinguishing between political and other forms of
Islamism throughout this research the definition of Islamism offered by Guilain (2002) is adopted, which states that Islamism is:
“A form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which
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rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition” (p.61) As the definition suggests, the term is used here in reference to Islamist political parties and groups. These groups played a significant role in the Arab Spring. Our measures focus first on direct support for political Islamists and support for Islamic, religious, political causes, as explained in the following section.
It is important to note that recently the Arab Spring and the rise of Islamists to power in countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia has divided the Muslim world deeply between those who support and those who oppose Islamists (Ozekin & Akkas, 2014).
Many surveys in the Arab world have confirmed this high polarisation between supporters and opponents of Islamists in various Arab countries (ACRPP, 2015). This fragmentation, however, is not only a result of religious conservatism; it is also related to the role Islamists have played in opposing existing regimes.
Most measures used for gauging support for political Islamism have focused on the role of religion in politics using measures like agreement to religious scholars’ interference in political decisions and the appointment of non-believers in public office (Ciftci, 2010;
Tessler, 2002; Yuchtman-Ya’ar & Alkalay, 2010). However, while these measures capture attitudes towards the role of religion in public life, they fall short of measuring attitudes towards Islamist political parties, groups, and agenda. Modern Islamist political parties have often presented progressive positions acknowledging a form of separation between religion and the state while maintaining a general position that Islam should be a point of reference for lawmakers.
One important study on Islamism that presents a more contextually relevant index of
Islamist tendencies is the work done by Mujani and Liddle (2004). Their analysis of
Islamist attitudes in Indonesia utilised an index of 14 variables that measured support for
167 | P a g e various Islamist policies. Their measures were derived from the agenda and rhetoric of
Indonesian Islamist parties and issues of polarisation within the political sphere. The index asked respondents to state their agreement or disagreement on statements like
“Government based on the Quran and Sunnah under the leadership of Islamic authorities is best for a country like ours” and “The government must make obligatory the implementation of Shari‘a”. Other variables gauged electoral preference such as “In elections we must choose the candidate who fights for the implementation of Shari‘a” and “In elections there should only be Islamic parties”. Also, four variables were devoted to women’s issues that are controversial in Islamic settings such as the agreement to women holding the post of president or a judge and that priority of education should be for boys. Finally, a group of variables were around the support for government enforcement of religious edicts such as fasting in Ramadhan, women wearing headscarves, and cutting off the hands of thieves.
Using their index, Mujani and Liddle (2004) found that the proportion of respondents that showed Islamist tendencies was identical to the proportion of Indonesians who voted for Islamist parties in the previous Indonesian general elections. While their measure is extensive and strongly linked to the context, some items are more linked to religiosity than political attitudes. For example, one item asks respondents for their attitude towards polygamy and another on women leaving their houses without a male chaperone. Both are social issues that relate to Islamic teachings and have almost no connection to political matters. A distinction needs to be drawn, as it should not be assumed that religious attitudes would be equal to support for Islamists.
While no literature was found measuring the effects of Islamism on social trust, many studies affirm that conservative political attitudes reduce trust in out-groups (Mughan &
Paxton, 2006; Pettigrew, 1998; Raijman & Semyonov, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010; Weldon,
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2006). Two main explanations are offered for this. Frist, political conservatives, similar to highly religious individuals, tend to feel more threatened by competing identities in society. Second, political conservatives are more likely to view out-groups as economic competitors and, therefore, tend to have less tolerant views towards them (Raijman &
Semyonov, 2004).
Regarding measurement, some authors criticise widely used measures of political orientation as assuming a certain level of general political sophistication, which is not necessarily evident, particularly in more rural settings and authoritarian societies with no democratic traditions (Evans et al., 1996). When fielding the SSCQ survey, for example, the highest rate of “do not know” answers was observed in the political values section of the survey (Al-Ansari et al., 2016). Also, field reports suggested that many respondents found it difficult to answer political questions due to lack of knowledge about the issues.
For this reason, and the fact that Qatar is not a democracy and the law does not allow for the formation of political parties, the survey did not ask respondents to position themselves on a political spectrum of any kind.
This chapter, as discussed earlier, will test the effect of support for Islamists, religious conservative political attitudes, and liberal political attitudes on trust of immigrant groups. The distinction made between religious political attitudes and support for
Islamism in the analysis provides an important tool in developing how political orientation in the Muslim world is understood. The analysis will include measures on contextually specific items similar to the attempts by Mujani and Liddle (2004). Also, some variables will focus on specific support for Islamist parties and figures relevant to the events of the Arab Spring, as the SSCQ was conducted in 2013 in the midst of the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings (Al-Ansari, et al., 2016). Finally, variables that measure support for liberal political attitudes are also used to gauge their effect.
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6.3 Political Attitudes Measures The SSCQ included a section on political attitudes covering various issues relating to political Islamism and the role of religion in political institutions. The section included three variables on the importance of traditions i.e. Shari’a (Islamic law), Islamic principles to development on the Arab world, and one variable on whether modern constitutions should mention Islam as a point of reference for legislation. These variables were designed to be measures of general religious conservative tendencies without specifically gauging support for specific Islamist political groups.
Another set of variables asked about Islamist parties being democratic, religious scholars being consulted in political matters, and the Muslim Brotherhood being mainly to blame for turmoil in Egypt. These variables were focused on support for political Islamism. The first question asked if the respondent believes Islamist political parties are democratic.
This issue was the topic of discussions in the Arab media during the Arab Spring, as regime linked media outlets and commentators accused the pro-Arab Spring Islamist parties of using democracy as a means for establishing autocratic religious regimes similar to Iran’s Islamic republic (Nafea, 2016). Islamists, for their part, defended their parties through affirming their democratic nature. The second question, regarding scholars being consulted in political matters, has been used by various studies to measure
Islamist tendencies, as mentioned above (Ciftci, 2010; Mujani & Liddle, 2004;
Yuchtman-Ya’ar & Alkalay, 2010; Tessler, 2002).
The final two variables were about freedom of religion for followers of all religions and approval of secular parties participating in Arab elections; two issues that are indicative of liberal tendencies as opposed to conservative Islamic values. The SSCQ also asked about the importance of democracy to the development of the Arab world; however, a decision was made not to use that variable in this analysis as the political transformation
170 | P a g e taking place at the time gave Islamists the best chance of taking power as a result of democratic elections almost all over the Arab world. This reality meant that Islamists had a lot to gain from democracy. Therefore, they would have been highly supportive of democratic transformation while secular powers were alarmed by the populist Islamist push for power and, therefore, were expected to be less supportive of democratisation.
Therefore, the variables on democracy would have not provided a good gauge of conservative vs. liberal attitudes or Islamist vs. secular tendencies. Also, previous research maintains that Islamism or Islamic values does not affect support for democracy thus supporting the argument above (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Jamal, 2006; Tessler,
2002; Yuchtman-Ya’ar & Alkalay, 2010).
able P.D: Descriptive statistics of political values indicators %
Importance to development in the Arab world: Adhering to Islamic principles Very important 93 Somewhat important 7
Importance to development in the Arab world: Implementing Shari’a Very important 89 Somewhat important 10 Somewhat not important 1 Important to development in the Arab world: Maintaining traditions and customs Very important 76 Somewhat important 20 Somewhat not important 3 Not important at all 1
Modern Arab constitutions should use Islam as a reference
Strongly agree 75 Somewhat agree 19 Neither agree nor disagree 2 Somewhat disagree 3
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Strongly disagree 1
Islamist political parties are mainly democratic Strongly agree 14 Somewhat agree 42 Neither agree nor disagree 11 Somewhat disagree 21 12 Strongly disagree
Religious scholars should be consulted in matters of politics Strongly agree 41 Somewhat agree 39 Neither agree nor disagree 3 Somewhat disagree 10 Strongly disagree 7 Muslim Brotherhood mainly to blame for turmoil in Egypt Strongly agree 10 Somewhat agree 19 Neither agree nor disagree 11 Somewhat disagree 27 33 Strongly disagree
Important to development in the Arab world: Religious freedom for followers of all religions Strongly agree 43 Somewhat agree 35 Neither agree nor disagree 1 Somewhat disagree 13 Strongly disagree 9 Agreement to secular political parties participating in elections in the Arab world Strongly agree 16 Somewhat agree 31 Neither agree nor disagree 6 Somewhat disagree 16 Strongly disagree 31
Source SSCQ, n=1485, Standard errors and confidence intervals can be found in appendix H.
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When viewing the results of the four variables on conservative tendencies, it was found that the majority of Qataris surveyed exhibit conservative political views. Almost all respondents reported that adhering to Islamic principles and implementing Shari’a were important to development in the Arab world with 89-93% opting for very important. The majority of respondents also found maintaining traditions and customs important to development in the Arab world with 76% considering it very important and 20% stating somewhat important, only 4% said it was not important. While they are still important for Qataris, traditions and social norms seem to be less important than Islamic law and principles. The final variable on Islam as a reference for modern constitutions also returned a high level of agreement as 75% said they highly agreed, and 19% somewhat agreed. Only 4% disagreed with the remainder opting for the do not know answer – seen in the table as the middle category (See table P.D).
Political Islamism is apparently a divisive, issue according to the results. While 56% supported the notion that Islamist parties are mainly democratic, 33% of Qataris stated their belief that these parties are not democratic. It is notable that 11% did not provide an answer in either direction for this question (See table P.D). As mentioned earlier, it can be argued that these measures require a certain level of political sophistication and a certain familiarity with political affairs that the high proportion of “Do not know” raises questions about. Also, in the non-democratic context, Qatari respondents might prefer not to voice their opinions on political issues altogether.
A higher proportion of respondents agreed to the idea that religious scholars should be consulted on political issues. The results show that 80% of respondents agreed (41% highly agree) and 17% disagreed. Unlike its neighbours in Iran and Saudi Arabia, Qatar does not have a tradition of involving religious scholars in political decisions. While the state sponsors and governs mosques and religious institutions, religious scholars are not
173 | P a g e given seats on the Shura Council, the consultative legislative body. Nor are religious scholars allowed to control the religious police, as in Saudi Arabia, or are they given political supremacy, as in the Iranian regime. This shows that the majority of Qataris support a change in the government’s relationship with religious scholars.
The final variable on Islamism was on the situation in Egypt. Here only 10% strongly agreed that the blame should be placed on the Muslim Brotherhood, 19% somewhat agreed, 11% opted for the do not know answer, 27% somewhat disagreed, and 33% strongly disagreed. It should be remembered that the Qatari government actively supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and strongly opposed the military coup against their rule. Still, the results show a split in opinion in Qatari society.
Although the results above suggest that a majority of Qataris are politically conservative, the proportion exhibiting liberal tendencies is not small. As seen in table P.D, 78% of respondents said they considered freedom of religion for Muslims and non-Muslims important for development in the Arab world. This is surprising, especially when considering how simply hanging Christmas decorations in shopping malls resulted in public uproar some years back forcing the removal of the decorations (Al-Raheem,
2011). Also, Qataris were vocal on social media in their opposition against establishing the Christian complex in Doha, which houses various churches servicing immigrants
(Khatri, 2008).
The final variable asked respondents for their agreement or disagreement with secular political parties taking part in elections in the Arab world. Qataris were split evenly when it comes to this issue, as 6% stated no opinion and the remaining respondents were equally distributed between agreement and disagreement (See table P.D). As mentioned earlier, Qatar’s law prohibits the formation of political parties and elections for public
174 | P a g e office are only held for a Municipal Consultative Council, which operates under the
Minister of Municipalities and Urban Development.
The results also point to an overlap between those who support political Islamism and those portraying liberal tendencies. This is to be expected as political Islamist movements in the Arab world generally support some liberal reforms such as democratisation, freedom of association, and political freedom of speech. Furthermore, when observing the correlation between the construct measures used in the analysis on
Islamism and liberalism, we find that there is no significant negative correlation between the two sets of attitudes (Correlation = -0.001). Therefore, we are using both measures in the analysis and analysing them as separate sets of political attitudes.
6.4 Analysis and Results The variables discussed above will be used as explanatory variables on political values along with the control variables used in earlier chapters. The analysis will test the effects of political attitudes on trust in immigrant groups. In the factor analysis used here, along with identifying dimensions of political attitudes, an attempt is made to prove that support for political Islamism is not the same as conservative political attitudes.
6.4.1 Factor Analysis First, as in the other chapters, a factor analysis was done to establish how the variables on political attitudes from the SSCQ survey relate to one another. As before, an exploratory factor analysis was done to examine the extent of variance shared between the measures in question and to calculate the factor scores of correlated variables to be used in the remainder of the analysis.
Table P.F.1: Eigenvalues of factor analysis
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Factor1 2.3
Factor2 1.1
Factor3 1.1
Factor4 0.9
Factor5 0.9
Factor6 0.7
Factor7 0.6
Factor8 0.4
Source: SSCQ, n=1485
The analysis was conducted using the same parameters and methods used in the previous chapters. Following the initial factor analysis, the eigenvalues suggested a three-factor solution when using the Kaiser criterion of considering factors with eigenvalues more than 1.0 (See table P.F.1). Furthermore, when viewing the scree plot of the results, in accordance with Cattell’s scree test, the levelling-out began after the second factor and is again observed after the fourth factor, suggesting the possibility of two, three, or four factors (See graph P.F.1). After running the analysis with two, three, and four factor solutions it was decided to retain three factors. The main reasons behind this choice were that the two factor solution had many overlapping variables across the two factors and was not theoretically logical, and that the eigenvalues for factors after the third are lower than 1. Also, the variables’ distribution on the factors is theoretically sound for the three- factor analysis, as explained below.
Graph P.F.1: Scree plot of factor analysis
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2.5
2
1.5
1
.5
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 Number
Table P.F.2: Results of EFA- 3 factor solution FA1 FA2 FA3
Importance of adherence to Islam to development 0.931 Importance of implementing Shari’a to development 0.801 Importance of traditions to development 0.576 Islam as reference of constitution 0.355 0.338 Islamic parties are democratic 0.423 Scholars should be consulted in politics 0.599 Muslim Brotherhood not to be blamed for Egypt Freedom of religion 0.653 Secular parties in development 0.428 Source: SSCQ, n=1485
As seen in in table P.F.2, three variables load highly on the first factor. These variables were the importance of adherence to Islam, implementing Shari’a, and the importance of social traditions to development in the Arab world. The three variables seem to measure the political conservatism of respondents. As observed in the table, the loadings were
177 | P a g e extremely high for this factor testifying to its importance and strength as an indicator.
The second factor included two variables on supporting Islamists and Islamist political ideology, the first on Islamist parties being democratic and the second on the role of religious Scholars in political matters. The final factor included two variables, the first on freedom of religion in the Arab world and the second on secular political parties participating in elections in the Arab world. These two variables measure support for liberal or secular inclinations and, therefore, we consider this factor a measure of liberal values (See table S.F.2).
Two variables were problematic in the factor analysis. The variable on Islam as a reference for constitutions in the Arab world loaded on the first and second factors. As the indicator/variable had little variance as reported earlier, it was decided to remove it for the remainder of the analysis. The second variable, regarding the turmoil in Egypt, did not load highly on any of the factors as all loadings were below .3, and a decision was taken to also remove it from the analysis below.
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Table P.F.3: Results of factor analysis for high loading factors
Importance of adherence to Islam to development 0.906
Importance of implementing Shari’a to development 0.887
Importance of traditions to development 0.727
Islamic parties are democratic 0.795
Scholars should be consulted in politics 0.795
Freedom of religion 0.794
Secular parties in development 0.794
Source: SSCQ, n=1485
To validate the results above, three additional factor models were used. Each model tested the association between variables loading highly on each of the three factors retained in the previous analysis. For this step, the principal component factor (PCF) extraction method was used, as with the analysis in previous chapters. As seen in table
P.F.3, after running the confirmatory step of this analysis the results validate the findings of the first step. The first factor included three variables on conservative political attitudes, the second factor included two variables on support for Islamism, and the third factor included two variables on liberal political values.
Table P.C: correlation of religious and Islamist factor scores Religious Perceived Personal Islamism inclusion religiosity religiosity Islamism 1 Religious inclusion 0.14 1 Perceived religiosity 0.10 0.09 1 Personal religiosity 0.09 0.15 0.18 1 Source: SSCQ, n=1485.
Table P.C.A: correlation of religious and Islamist indicators
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Scholars should be consulted Islamic parties are in politics democratic Scholars should be consulted in politics 1.00 Islamic parties are democratic 0.22 1.00 Reported religiosity 0.05 0.09 Having a Muslim maid 0.08 0.13 Donating to Muslims 0.04 0.06 Citizenship applicant being a Muslim 0.09 0.06 Smoking* 0.06 0.03 Not wearing head scarf* 0.10 0.00 Not praying regularly* 0.07 -0.02 Dealing with non-Islamic bank* 0.09 0.01 Marrying your daughter to someone who does not pray 0.13 0.07 Performing dawn prayers on time 0.07 0.02 Attending religious activities 0.07 0.03 Source: SSCQ, n=1485, *Question was: Would you consider someone who does this to be religious?
As Islamist political values can be linked to religious attitudes, it was important to assess how religious indicators and indicators of Islamism related to one another. As seen in table P.C above, the correlation coefficients observed between the factor scores of
Islamism and dimensions of religiosity, although highly significant and mostly positive, were relevantly small with the highest coefficient observed being 0.14 for religious inclusion, indicating that while there is observed correlation it is generally small. Also, as seen in table P.C.A, when observing correlations between the original variables that make up the factor scores, we do not observe any high correlation coefficients with both the variable on scholars being consulted in political matters or Islamist parties being democratic. It is notable that significant correlations were observed between all religious indicators and the variables on religious scholars being consulted in political matters, except for reported religiosity and donating to Muslims. On the other hand, when it comes to the variables on Islamist parties being democratic, only variables on religious inclusion and two variables on personal religiosity exhibited significance. All significant correlation coefficients observed, however, were lower than 0.14.
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As a final step in assessing the correlation between Islamism and religiosity, we ran models of trust against religious and Islamism. We attempted various models introducing
Islamism and religiosity separately and with combination of religious dimensions, and found that no significant change took place in reference to patterns or significance of effects across models. This, along with the results of the correlation analysis above, leads us to assume that there is some correlation between political Islamism and religious dimensions in the Qatari context. Islamism is not a function of religiosity, at least in the form of the dimensions identified in our analysis.
Political Islamist groups, while being of a religious background in the Arab world, have gained popular support through opposing oppressive regimes in the region and in many instances being the only vocal opponents of these regimes. Their push for more democracy, rule of law, and freedom of expression has made them more than religious political parties and extended their reach beyond traditional religious bases. As the results show here, more religiously conservative individuals are not necessarily more supportive of Islamists and vice versa.
The factor scores generated from the analysis above will be used in the remaining analysis to represent the different dimension of political attitudes. The analysis will measure the effects of these dimensions on trust in immigrant groups along with variables that denoted significance in analysis of previous chapters.
6.4.2 Detailed Hypotheses Using the results of the factor analysis above, a more detailed hypothesis was produced.
As stated earlier, this chapter had two aims. First, to establish if support for political
Islamism is different to conservative religious attitudes. The results of the factor analysis above concur with findings by Tessler (2003) that support for political Islamism is not a
181 | P a g e result of high religiosity. The second aim was to measure the effect of political attitudes on trust in immigrants in Qatar. The analysis identified three dimensions of political attitudes: conservative, Islamist, and liberal.
The analysis below tests three hypotheses:
H5.1. First, it is expected that those with more conservative political views
will be less trusting of immigrant groups. As discussed earlier, previous studies
have confirmed the negative effect of conservative political attitudes on views
towards out-groups (Mughan & Paxton, 2006; Pettigrew, 1998; Raijman &
Semyonov, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010; Weldon, 2006), the hypothesis is that this
will be true in Qatar, as different aspects of conservatism proved negatively
related to trust in immigrants in previous chapters.
H5.2. Second, it is assumed that respondents who support political Islamism
will be less trusting of non-Arab groups and especially of Westerners.
Islamist political ideology has been mostly critical of Western influence on the
Muslim world. This position concerns Western military and political influence as
well as cultural influence (Guilain, 2002). Islamist sympathisers, therefore, are
expected to be less trusting of Westerners.
H5.3. Third, as liberal political attitudes were attributed with a more inclusive
view of out-groups in previous research (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Raijman &
Semyonov, 2004; Weldon, 2006), it is proposed that liberal political values
will positively affect trust in non-Arab groups. Qataris who hold liberal
political views are expected to be more tolerant of immigrants and immigrant
culture.
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6.4.3 Results Following the same parameters used previously, the factor scores developed above were tested against trust in the four immigrant groups using both AMEs and predicted probabilities. First, however, we begin with looking at the bivariate correlation between the political attitudes measures and trust in immigrants.
Table P.D.1: Correlations of religiosity dimensions with trust in immigrants Indian sub- Arabs Westerners East Asians continentals Conservatism 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 Islamism 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 Liberalism 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.10 Source: SSCQ, n=1485
The results shown in table P.D.1 suggest that political Islamism is positively and significantly related to trust in Arabs. Conservatism was not significantly correlated to trust in any group. Liberalism on the other hand averaged a 0.10 significant and positive correlation with trust in non-Arabs, suggesting that people with more liberal tendencies are more trusting of non-Arabs.
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Table P.R: AME of political values variables on trust with and without controls Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 Conservatism 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) Islamism 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Liberalism 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.18 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Interviewer nationality -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 (ref: non-Qatari) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) University and higher 0.04 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.16 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Employed (ref: 0.00 -0.02 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.07 unemployed) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.12 0.20 0.05 -0.04 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Meeting 0.10 0.25 0.20 0.18 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.03 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.24 (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) Co-workers (ref: no co- workers) Having 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.15 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Meeting 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.19 (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) Personal religiosity -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Gender roles -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Source: SSCQ, n size in all models = 1485; Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%, age2 is multiplied by 1000. M1 includes main explanatory variables and controls, M2 introduces previously significant effects
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Table P.P: Predicted probabilities of trust Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians
Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Min. Max. Dif. Conservativism 0.08 0.33 0.25 Islamism 0.64 0.74 0.10 Liberalism 0.25 0.36 0.10 0.24 0.33 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.06 Age (18 vs. 60) 0.16 0.22 0.06 Age (18 vs. 28) 0.16 0.26 0.10 Age (28 vs. 38) 0.26 0.31 0.05 Age (38 vs. 48) 0.31 0.30 -0.01 Interviewer nationality 0.71 0.62 -0.09 Education 0.31 0.43 0.11 0.29 0.43 0.14 0.22 0.37 0.15 Employment 0.31 0.41 0.10 0.22 0.27 0.05 Contact (Friends) 0.68 0.80 0.12 0.31 0.59 0.27 0.48 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.35 0.14 Contact (Neighbours) 0.68 0.72 0.05 0.31 0.37 0.05 0.21 0.37 0.16 Contact (Co-workers) 0.31 0.40 0.09 0.28 0.50 0.22 0.21 0.40 0.19 Personal religiosity 0.36 0.22 -0.14 Religious inclusion 0.59 0.77 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.11 Gender roles 0.75 0.68 -0.07 0.41 0.24 -0.17 0.36 0.24 -0.12 0.29 0.17 -0.11 Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1percent, Bold and italicised = 5percent, Bold = 10percent. Significance refers to the AME results reported above. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean. Source: SSCQ, n=1485.
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Graph P.P.1: Predicted probabilities of Graph P.P.2: Predicted probabilities of trust in Arabs trust in westerners 0.85
0.56 0.8 0.46
0.75 0.36
0.7 0.26
0.16 0.65 0.06 Min. Max. 0.6 Personal religiosity Age (18 vs. 60) Age (18 vs. 28) Age (28 vs. 38)
0.55 Age (38 vs. 48) Education Min. Max. Employment Contact (Friends) Religious inclusion Interviewer nationality Contact (Co-workers) Contact (Friends) Contact (Neighbours)
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Graph P.P.2: Predicted probabilities of Graph P.P.4: Predicted probabilities of trust in Indian sub-continentals trust in Indian East-Asians 0.5 0.5
0.45 0.45 0.4
0.4 0.35
0.3 0.35
0.25
0.3 0.2
0.25 0.15
0.1 Min. Max. 0.2 Min. Max. Education Contact (Friends) Education Contact (Friends) Contact (Neighbours) Contact (Co-workers) Contact (Neighbours) Contact (Co-workers)
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As seen in table P.R, conservative political attitudes proved significantly and positively related to trust in Westerners. In fact, the positive effect was observed towards all groups, although non-significant. The predicted probability of trust in Westerners increased from 8 to
33% between the minimum and the maximum scores on conservatism. As the result is not in line with theoretical expectation, as more conservative respondents were expected to be less trusting of Westerners, the results were explored further. Running the AME model with various combinations of variables, it was found that the positive significant relationship only occurs when including both demographic and contact variables in the model. Also, for the correlation between conservatism and trust in Westerners, the result was -0.03 suggesting a negative relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, to test for the possibility of multicollinearity, we investigated the correlation between conservatism and contact in its three forms and none of the correlations went past -0.07. Therefore, this relationship is inconclusive and does not warrant further examination.
Islamism was marginally significant and positively related to trust in Arabs only. Although the effect was relatively small, advancing the likelihood of trust in Arabs by 2%, the predicted probabilities show an 11% increase in probability of trust in Arabs from 64 to 74%. Although the relationship is weakly significant at the ten percentile level, it fits the theory that those with higher Islamist tendencies would be more trusting of Arabs, who are more likely to be
Muslim. Furthermore, the results suggest that the effect of Islamism, while non-significant for the remaining non-Arab groups, was negatively associated with trust in them. As Janoff and
Bulman (2009) suggested, conservatives are more likely to be interested in protecting social norms and Arabs, who generally embody similar norms, are the answer as Qataris understand
188 | P a g e the need for immigrants to keep their small country operational. More trust in Arabs, therefore, is a reflection of that need to protect social norms and values.
A consistent effect was observed with liberal attitudes, as it proved positively and significantly related to trust in all three non-Arab groups. The effect, however, was small, increasing the likelihood of trust by 2% for all groups and marginally significant for trust in
East Asians. The size of the effect was similar to that of Islamism on trust in Arabs.
Probability of trust increased the most for Westerners from 25 to 36 %, for Indian sub- continentals it was from 24 to 33%, and for East Asians from 18 to 25%. As expected, the results suggest that a rise in liberal attitudes lead to more trust in non-Arabs. This is consistent with earlier research suggesting that liberal values lead to more tolerance of out-groups
(Raijman & Semyonov, 2004; Weldon, 2006).
For the remaining variables used in previous chapters some changes were observed when introducing political values variables. Education lost significance in relation to trust in Arabs, however it remained one of the strongest predictors of trust in non-Arabs in the model.
Contact with Western neighbours became significant for trust in Westerners and became non- significant for Indian sub-continentals. The effects of other variables are similar to those observed in the analysis of previous chapters.
The findings above suggest that, unlike religious and social conservatism, conservative political attitudes and support for Islamism do not explain trust in non-Arab immigrants in
Qatar. While, conservative political attitudes were first seen as positively related to trust in
Westerners, the result were inconclusive when running various models and generating a correlation. Islamism had a marginally significant positive effect on trust in Arabs while no significant effect was observed for non-Arabs. Liberalism on the other hand, was proved to be
189 | P a g e a predictor of high trust in all non-Arab groups. Remembering that the two variables that make up this measure are support for freedom of religion and secular political parties, the results supports the notion that modern values and liberal attitudes increase tolerance of out- groups in the very religious and conservative Qatari context in a similar way to in more secular and liberal Western contexts.
6.5 Conclusion This chapter had two main objectives; the first was to prove Islamism and religiosity need to be measured separately as they are not necessarily intertwined. To address this objective, we looked at the correlation between the Islamism measure developed for this chapter and the religiosity measures used in Chapter 3. Furthermore, we looked at correlations between the original variables on Islamism in the SSCQ and those on religiosity. As seen above, the results presented showed that Islamism and religiosity are weakly correlated at best and, therefore, we determined that Islamism is not a function of religiosity in the context of this study. Adding to previous literature suggesting the same (Tessler, 2003), this finding has a significant implication on the understanding of Islamist political attitudes. While a link between being devout or highly religious and supporting Islamism can be easily theorised, the findings suggest that those having extreme attitudes towards religion are not necessarily the same as those supporting Islamists and their agendas.
The second, and main, objective of this chapter was to test the effect of political values on trust in immigrants in the Qatari context. Specifically, it was intended to test three hypotheses.
First, it was expected that more politically conservative views would lead to less trust of immigrants in general. Second, it was assumed that support for political Islamism will be
190 | P a g e negatively related to trust in non-Arab groups and especially Westerners. Finally, it was proposed that liberal political values would positively affect trust in non-Arab groups.
The first hypothesis was not confirmed by the results, as having conservative political views did not reduce trust in any of the immigrant groups examined. Unlike some aspects of social and religious values, political conservatism did not lead to less tolerance of out-groups. The results show that previous findings linking conservative political views to less trust in out- groups were not confirmed in the context of this study (Conover, 1984; Dawes et al., 1988;
Uslaner & Conley, 2003).
When it comes to the second hypothesis, it only received weak confirmation in the case of trust in Arabs as a marginally significant, positive relationship was observed. Islamists and their supporters in Qatar seem to be no more or less trusting of non-Muslim immigrants than the general population, though they are somewhat more trusting of fellow Muslim Arabs. The finding of the study suggests that conservative and religious, political attitudes in the Qatari context are not linked to less trust in out-groups. These results are contrary to many studies confirming the negative effect of conservatism on out-group attitudes (Mughan & Paxton,
2006; Pettigrew, 1998; Raijman & Semyonov, 2004; Rustenbach, 2010; Weldon, 2006).
Unlike religious and social conservatism, political conservatism and Islamism in Qatar does not have a negative effect on social cohesion, in fact the effect when observed to be significant is positive.
The only consistent effect for political values observed was that of liberal political attitudes.
The effect, although relatively small advancing the likelihood of trust by 2% only, was consistently positive for trust in non-Arabs. Liberal political attitudes and conservative perceptions of gender roles are the only value-based measures tested to prove consistent in
191 | P a g e their effect on trust in out-groups. However, it is worth mentioning that the two liberal values measured are both relevant to openness and test inclusive tendencies. It could be argued that these measures gauge acceptance of others and inclusiveness, specifically rather than being measures of politically liberal tendencies.
More research is needed to validate the use of political value measures used here. One main aspect that needs further study is developing measures more suited to those less politically sophisticated in order to reduce “Do not know” responses focusing on simpler more direct measures in accordance with what Evans et al. (1996) suggested. Also, more work is needed to confirm the effect of liberal, political attitudes through testing various liberalism measures that represent different aspects of liberal attitudes.
Through the past three chapters various values measures against trust in immigrant groups have been measured. The only two measures to show significant and consistent effect were perception of gender roles, which had a negative effect on trust in non-Arabs and Liberal attitudes, positively affecting trust in non-Arabs. One interpretation for these results is that
Islam has a minimal effect on trust in immigrants even when they are non-Muslim. All measures directly related to Islamic issues had either no effect or a weak non-consistent effect on trust. The only two-attitudinal variables in this analysis that retained a consistent relationship were of a non-religious nature. The first is around social conservatism and the other is on liberal attitudes. Contact and education also proved consistent predictors of trust in immigrants. However, a more direct examination is needed to affirm this lack of religious effect on Qataris’ views of immigrants. To establish this, a survey experiment will be used that will determine if the threshold of acceptance for Qataris is religious or social. The next
192 | P a g e chapter will discuss the parameters and results of this experiment and how they interact with the results from this and the previous chapters.
CHAPTER 7: HYPOTHETICAL JOB CANDIDATE EXPERIMENT
“There is no difference between an Arab and a non-Arab”
- Mohammed (PBUH) -
7.1 Introduction Following the analysis of the effect of contact and values on trust in immigrants, it was found that contact is the strongest predictor of trust in all groups. In this chapter, a different method was used to understand the context behind Qataris views of immigrants. As explained in earlier chapters, the workplace is the most likely venue for contact between Qataris and immigrants. With this in mind, an experiment was designed around a hypothetical workplace scenario. The scenario assumes the respondent is a manager in a hiring position and he/she was presented with the resume of a prospective job candidate. The resume randomly varies the religion and ethnicity of the candidates while maintaining the same qualifications.
The main aim of this chapter is to explore the determinants of acceptance for Qataris in the job market, and, in particular, the relative importance of ethnic and religious difference.
Through a randomised experimental design, the aim is to understand how religion and cultural backgrounds of immigrant workmates affect Qataris' approval of them. The chapter begins with a discussion of past research on using experiments in social science research. Then the setup of the experiment is explained. Following that, the descriptive results are discussed.
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Afterwards, the results of the AME and predicated probability analysis of the effects of contact and values on the hiring decision are presented. Finally, there is a general discussion of the results.
7.2 Background and Past Research Audit experiments, or fictitious candidate field experiments, are widely used in measuring prejudice against minorities and immigrants in the job market. Various studies use fake resumes to understand how personal prejudice affects the hiring process. Mostly, the experimental research using this model focuses on running field experiments through sending resumes with various racial treatments to employers and observing the call-backs and hiring of the candidates. This study concerns a hypothetical candidate and the participant is not actually an employer. The result field experiments are important in understanding the results of this study because of the similarity in both approaches.
Banerjee (2009), for example, randomly allocated caste-linked last names in resumes to reflect caste in India in order to gauge the effect of belonging to a non-upper-caste caste on the likelihood of hiring. He found no evidence of discrimination against non-upper-caste as a whole; however, he did find large and significant differences between call-backs for upper- castes and other castes. Also, he found no evidence of discrimination against Muslim Indians.
On the other hand, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), in their study of prejudice against
Blacks in the US, found that white names received 50% more call-backs for interviews than black sounding names. They also found that response to qualifications in the white resumes was higher than observed for black resumes. Pager et al. (2009) went further in the examination of prejudice against minorities in the US and found that Latino and Black resumes fared no better than white applicants who reported coming out of prison. Employers
194 | P a g e were also found to direct minority applicants to jobs with less customer interaction and more menial labour. Prejudice in the hiring process is clearly based on stereotypical notions about groups.
While the above-mentioned studies focused on minority groups other studies gauged prejudice against immigrants. Booth et al. (2012) studied the effect of using immigrant- sounding names in Australia, as compared to Anglo-Saxon names. Their main finding was that immigrant candidates would need to apply to double the job postings in order to receive the same number of interviews as Anglo-Saxons. These differences vary systematically across ethnic groups. Similarly, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) found that Swedish employers called back candidate with Swedish sounding names 50% more than candidates with Middle-Eastern names. They also found that male recruiters and those representing smaller companies were less likely to call-back Middle-Eastern applicants.
Kaas and Manger (2012) implemented a similar experiment in Germany with Turkish sounding names and found that German names resulted in 14% more call-backs than Turkish names. However, they added another treatment including in section of resumes reference letters from German employers speaking favourably of the candidates. This introduces another layer of understanding prejudice against immigrants, the validation of other members of the dominant group. Oreopoulos and Dechief (2011) reached similar results in their study of the Canadian employers. While they initially found that Canadian-born individuals with
English-sounding names were significantly more likely to receive call-backs, having experience in Canada and extracurricular activities in the Canadian context increased the likelihood of the immigrant candidate receiving a call-back. Also, the authors found that proficiency in English was cited as a justification of prejudice against immigrant applicants.
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Cultural distance manifests itself as an important scale for prejudice. The more cultural differences with the group, the more likely members of the group will be penalised in the hiring process.
One study, conducted by Dietz et al. (2009) in Canada,is more similar to the setting of the hypothetical candidate experiment utilised in this chapter. In the first part of the study, the authors assessed participants’ subtle prejudices through various questions. In the second part of the study, participants were provided with profiles of three male applicants and asked to evaluate them for a sales executive position in a Canadian firm. The first two resumes were for white candidates, one qualified and the other not. The third candidate was a South-African immigrant who was a citizen or a non-citizen, black or white, and with accredited or non- accredited credentials by Canadian authorities. The results suggested that the accreditation of credentials mitigated the effects of immigration status and racial background. Their results point to an important fact in prejudice against immigrants. Race should not be considered as a unilateral attribute during research, it should to be linked to the context as other attributes that lessen the effect of “foreignness”. Their study, however, was limited to racial attributes and did not use religious or cultural treatments. In the Qatari setting sharing other attributes with
Qataris, such as religion, can have such an effect on prejudice towards immigrants. In this study, participants were provided with the three candidates together and only one candidate was found an immigrant. This fact signifies the issue of social desirability and hinders observing the actual prejudice.
Assessing prejudice through audit experiments and laboratory experiments is useful and beneficial to subtly measure attitudes towards minorities and immigrants. Our experiment offers added value as it was situated within a survey rather than in a laboratory experiment or
196 | P a g e through actual job postings. As the reminder of the paper will discuss, offering only one candidate to respondents provided a subtler gauge of prejudice controlling for social desirability.
7.3 Detailed Hypotheses In this chapter, the results of a hypothetical candidate survey experiment are discussed. The aim is to understand the effect of religion and race of immigrants, and the interaction between them, on prejudice towards them. Specifically, there is an expectation of finding evidence supporting three hypotheses:
H6.1. First, it is expected that the Arab Muslim candidate will receive the highest
approval ratings while the Western non-Muslim candidate will receive the lowest
approval. Also, as suggested by Booth et al. (2012), acceptance is higher when using
names that correspond to the dominant social group. As levels of trust in previous
chapters showed a preference for Arabs, the same pattern is expected here. The Arab
Muslim sharing most characteristics with Qataris is expected to be the most likely hire
in the experiment. The Western non-Muslim, having the least similarity to Qataris in the
design, is likely to face the most opposition to being hired.
H6.2. Second, it is proposed that more conservative respondents will be less likely
to hire all candidates except for the Arab Muslim. As seen in previous studies,
cultural distance mitigates acceptance of applicants (Oreopoulos & Dechief, 2011). The
Arab Muslim candidate is the only candidate that is similar to Qataris in both cultural
background and religion; therefore, conservative values are expected to predict a
prejudice against the remaining candidates. Using the same values measures, it is
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suggested that respondents scoring higher on conservatism will be more opposed to
hiring candidates that are dissimilar to Qataris.
H6.3. Third, as the results of the chapter on contact showed that contact with members
of the group was positively related to trust in that group, it is expected that contact
here will also have a positive effect on approval of hiring the candidates.
7.4 Experiment Results Table: A.E: Covariates across experiment sub-samples AM (%) WC (%) AC (%) WM (%) Total Some people have problems waking up for prayers because of different reasons. How frequently do you pray Fajr on time? A few times a year 4 5 3 5 4 More than once a month 9 8 11 9 9 More than once a week 33 33 33 35 33 Daily 54 54 52 52 53 Do you attend any Majlis, excluding Family Majlises regularly? No 46 40 44 48 45 yes 54 60 56 52 55 In your opinion, to what extent do you think freedom of religion is important to development in the Arab world? Very important 41 44 44 43 43 Somewhat important 36 35 34 34 35 Do not Know 1 0 2 0 1 Somewhat not important 13 13 13 13 13 Not important at all 9 9 7 9 9 Contact with Arab friends No Friends 10 13 14 12 12 Friends without meeting 13 12 10 13 12 Friends with meeting 77 75 75 76 76 Gender Female 50 55 51 49 51 Male 50 45 49 51 49 Age 18-30 33 27 32 29 30 31-45 30 36 31 35 33 46 and above 37 37 38 36 37 Employment Unemployed 22 23 25 21 23
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Employed 78 77 75 79 77 Nationality of Interviewer Immigrant 61 69 58 56 61 Qatari 39 31 42 45 39 Education attainment Below Secondary 26 22 24 20 23 Secondary 41 45 42 49 44 University and Higher 33 33 34 31 33 Source: SSCQ, n=1485 Before reviewing the results of the experiment, it is important to validate balance across sub- samples. As seen in table E.A, proportions across covariates are similar for all four sub- samples and within the margin of error. The highest disparity observed is in regards to Majlis attendance where 40% of respondents in the Western non-Muslim resume sub-sample said they did not attend any Majlis while 48% testified to the same in the Western, Muslim group.
The results show that there is sufficient balance across treatment groups.
Table E.D.1: Agreement to hiring hypothetical job applicant Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
% % % % Arab Muslim 40 47 7 6 Western Muslim 40 45 8 7 Arab Christian 20 46 17 17 Western Christian 22 44 12 22 Total Average 31 46 11 13 Source: SSCQ, n=1485
After validating randomisation, we move to the result of the experiment. As is apparent in table E.D.1, the results indicate a clear preference for Muslim applicants, as both the Western and Arab Muslim candidates scored higher than both otherwise identical non-Muslim candidates. 87% of respondents said they would agree to hiring the Arab Muslim candidate,
40% said that they strongly agreed to hiring him and 47% said they somewhat agreed. These ratings were similar to those for the Western Muslim (85%) with 40% saying they would
199 | P a g e strongly agree to hiring the candidate and 45% saying they would somewhat agree. Both
Muslim resumes scored between 13 and 15% in the disagreement answer categories.
Respondents were less enthusiastic about the non-Muslim candidates: only one in five respondents (20% and 22%) receiving the two non-Muslim candidates said they would strongly agree to hire them. The highest level of rejection was from the group receiving the
Western non-Muslim resume as 34% of respondents said they would not agree to hire the candidate with 22% saying they would strongly disagree. Of the respondents who received the
Arab non-Muslim resume, 34% said they would not agree to hire the candidate. However, only 17% said they would strongly disagree, suggesting that opposition is slightly higher for the Western non-Muslim candidate.
The results in this descriptive format show that religion has a strong effect on acceptance while cultural background has a limited impact, at least in the scenario utilised here. This suggests that the preference shown towards Arabs in previous chapters was partly a result of religious similarities rather than due to cultural differences. It could also be theorised that this preference is a result of the fact that the majority of Arab expatriates are Muslim, while the remaining groups are, at best, mixed. However, deeper analysis is needed to determine what lies behind the decision to hire or not hire the hypothetical candidates. The following analysis will test the results here against different types of values and other demographic variables. In order to accomplish this, and as there is a relatively small sample size, the experiment variable was recoded into a dummy variable with 0 for disapprove and 1 for approve of hiring the candidate.
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7.5 Experiment Results against Contact and Values
Using contact and values indicators developed in earlier chapters, further analysis was performed on what influenced the respondents’ decision on whether or not to hire the hypothetical candidate. The analysis followed the same setup used in earlier chapters with the same values and demographic variables. The dependent variable in this analysis was the likelihood to hire and each subsample was analysed separately. As with previous chapters correlation, AME’s and predicted probabilities of the logistic regression results were used.
For contact, however, only the “contact with friends” variables were used and for two groups only, Arabs and Westerners, as they were the only groups addressed by the experiment.
Moreover, as there were significantly smaller samples for each experimental condition, the other forms of contact were dropped from the analysis to maintain statistical strength. Also, contact with friends was the only type of contact to show a consistent effect across immigrant groups in previous chapters.
The analysis goes through seven steps. First, we start with a correlation of the dependent variable and explanatory values variables. Second, the effect of contact on the decision to hire the candidates for each of the four resumes was measured while controlling for age, gender, education, employment, and interviewer nationality. The third through fifth steps measure the effect of religious, social, and political values factor scores against the decision to hire with the same controls. The sixth step includes variables denoting significance in previous steps.
The final step produced predicted probabilities of variables that denote significance in the
AME final model.
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7.5.1 Descriptive Results of Predictors of Willingness to Hire Table E.D.2: Correlation of experiment results with values variables AM% WC% AC% WM% Contact -2 -4 0 9 Personal Religiosity -4 -2 -4 -3 Perceived religiosity -3 -11 1 -8 Religious inclusion -4 -9 -6 -4 Gender roles -15 -14 -18 -19 Civic participation -3 -1 -2 4 Traditional values 4 -11 -1 -1 Social inclusion -4 -2 -3 7 Conservatism -5 2 -10 1 Islamism -1 8 5 0 Liberalism 9 5 3 8 Source: SSCQ, AM is Arab Muslim, WC is Western Christian, AC is Arab Christian and WM is Western Muslim As seen in table E.D.2, correlations are relatively small and inconsistent. The only exception is the correlation between gender roles and the likelihood to hire all candidates. As the results suggest, those displaying conservative gender attitudes are less likely to hire all the candidates. The decrease in the likelihood to hire for this variable was similar across all candidates ranging between 0.14 and 0.19. Contact was weakly correlated to likelihood of hiring three of the four candidates and slightly improved the likelihood of hiring the Western
Muslim candidate by 0.9. Perceived religiosity was negatively linked to the likelihood of hiring the Western non-Muslim by 0.11, the same was true for religious inclusion by 0.9, and traditional values by 0.11. Conservative political values were negatively correlated with the likelihood of hiring the Arab non-Muslim candidate by 0.10, and Liberalism was positively related to the likelihood of hiring the Arab Muslim by 0.9.
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7.5.2 Arab Muslim Resume Table E.R.1: Average marginal effects of contact and values against decision to hire Arab Muslim Religious Social Political Contact Final model values values values Arab friends (ref: no friends)
Having -0.14
(0.10)
Meeting 0.01
(0.07)
Personal religiosity 0.01
(0.04)
Perceived religiosity -0.01
(0.02)
Religious inclusion -0.01
(0.02) Gender roles -0.04 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01)
Traditional views -0.05
(0.05)
Social inclusion 0.03
(0.03)
Civic participation -0.01
(0.02)
Conservatism -0.05
(0.05)
Islamism -0.01
(0.02)
Liberalism 0.01
(0.01) Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.02 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) Gender (ref: female) -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) University and higher 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) Employment 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Interviewer nationality 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Source: SSCQ. Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%. n=366. Age squared shown is divided by 1000.
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Table E.P.1: Predicted probabilities for Arab Muslim
Min. Max. Dif. Gender roles 0.95 0.82 -0.12 Significance refers to the AME results reported above. Minimum and maximum refer to factor scores. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean.
Table E.P.1: Predicted probabilities for Arab Muslim by gender roles 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.9 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.8 Min. Max.
In the first step of this part of the analysis contact denoted no significance. However, even while not denoting significance, having Arab friends shows a relatively large effect on the decision to hire. Socially meeting their friends shows a positive sign; however, the effect is small improving willingness to hire by 1% only. This suggests that those who have Arab friends are less likely to hire Arab Muslims; however, the effect is non-significant. The second step tested religious variables against approval of hiring the Arab Muslim candidate.
Here none of the variables exhibited significance. The third step with the social values variables yielded significance only with gender roles (AME= -0.04), proving highly significant at the 1 percentile level. The results suggested that those with more conservative views toward gender roles were less likely to hire the Arab Muslim candidate. One explanation for this is that the resume suggested a Western education and work experience,
204 | P a g e and this might have negatively affected the position of the more conservative respondents on gender issues. None of the political values variables was significant in the third step.
Nonetheless, reviewing the AMEs, it was found that 7 out of the 10 values variables are negatively related to the decision to hire. As the n size is considerably small, it is expected that few significant relationships would be found; however, the negative effects are suggestive of a pattern where more conservatism leads to less likelihood of hiring (See table E.R.1).
In the final step, the only values variable to exhibit a significant effect, gender roles, was tested. The effect of gender roles became less significant at the 5-percentile level. To test the size of the effects observed predicted probabilities were used. The results suggest, as seen in table E.P.1, that conservative gender roles attitudes decrease the approval of hiring the candidates by 12%.
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Western Muslim resume
Table E.R.2: Average marginal effects of contact and values against decision to hire Western Muslim Religious Social Political Final Contact values values values model Western friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.10 (0.06) Meeting 0.05 (0.06)
Personal religiosity 0.05
(0.04)
Perceived religiosity -0.05 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Religious inclusion -0.01
(0.02)
Gender roles -0.04 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Traditional views -0.01
(0.06)
Social inclusion 0.05
(0.03)
Civic participation 0.02
(0.02)
Conservatism 0.03
(0.03)
Islamism 0.00
(0.02)
Liberalism 0.00
(0.01) Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.10
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) Gender (ref: female) -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) University and higher -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) Employment 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Interviewer nationality 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) Source: SCSQ. Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%. Employment, marital status, interviewer nationality, studying abroad were tested for and omitted from table as they denoted no significance. n=355. Age squared divided by 1000.
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Table E.P.2: Predicted probabilities for Western Muslim Min. Max. Dif. Perceived religiosity 0.97 0.85 -0.13 Gender 0.91 0.76 -0.14 Source: SSCQ, Significance refers to the AME results reported above. For gender minimum is female and maximum is male and refers to factor scores for perceived religiosity. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean.
Graph E.P.2: Predicted probabilities for western Muslim 1
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7 Min. Max.
Perceived religiosity Gender
The second candidate was the Western Muslim. As seen in table E.P.2, the first step of the analysis showed that contact was not significantly related to the decision to hire; however, the effect is positive for both having Western friends and socially meeting Westerners. Gender exhibited significance (AME=-0.12) suggesting that men were less likely to hire this candidate than women. One explanation for this is that men are more likely to compete for managerial positions than women in Qatar’s traditional setting. Westerners are more likely than other immigrants to compete for the same positions.
The second step, seen in table E.R.2, yielded one significant variable. Perceived religiosity was significant and negatively related to approval of hiring the candidate. The effect of gender
207 | P a g e remained the same. The third step suggested that gender roles were significantly and negatively related to the hiring decision. None of the political variables denoted significance in the fourth step. The direction of the relationship was split in the values variables here as four variables were negatively related to the hiring decision. Notably, civic participation and liberalism were positively related to hiring the candidate confirming results reached previously in the study regarding the effect of these two measures on trust in non-Arab groups. Respondents who participated in civic activities and hold more liberal views were more likely to hire the Western candidate. The direction of the political orientation variables was positive. In the final step, the effect of perceived religiosity remained marginally significant, decreasing willingness to hire by 3%. Gender roles became non-significant and gender remained negatively related to the decision to hire decreasing likelihood by 12%.
The marginal effect of gender roles did not withstand in the final model; however, both perceived religiosity and gender remained significant. Predicted probability can shed light on the size of the effect. When looking at the results in table E.P.2, it can be seen that both perceived religiosity and gender had a similar effect on likelihood of approval. The probability of approval decreased from 97% to 85% when comparing minimum to maximum scores of perceived religiosity. The decrease was from 91% to 76% between female and male respondents. The mixed nature of this candidate, although Muslim he is still Western and, therefore, likely to be unfamiliar with Arab culture, may play a role in explaining the effect of perceived religiosity and gender roles. These two variables are related in that both are about perception of others rather than personal values.
The results suggest that those who have a stricter view of measuring other people’s values were less likely to hire a candidate with a Western cultural background, even if they are
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Muslims. Therefore, the more conservative respondents, in relation to evaluating other people’s behaviour, were also stricter in the hiring decision. It could be concluded that these respondents are strict in their evaluation of others in general, which would also explain why the same direction of effect was found towards the Arab Muslim candidate above. Men who are more likely to compete with Westerners for managerial positions were also less likely to hire this candidate.
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7.5.3 Arab Non-Muslim Resume Table E.R.3: Average marginal effects of contact and values against decision to hire Arab non-Muslim Religious Social Political Final Contact values values values model Arab friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.03 (0.11) Meeting -0.03 (0.07)
Personal religiosity 0.02
(0.07)
Perceived religiosity 0.04
(0.03)
Religious inclusion -0.01
(0.02)
Gender roles -0.06 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02)
Civic participation -0.13 -0.12
(0.08) (0.08)
Traditional views 0.04
(0.04)
Social inclusion 0.00
(0.02)
Conservatism -0.19 -0.15
(0.08) (0.07)
Islamism 0.02
(0.02)
Liberalism 0.00
(0.02) Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) Gender (ref: female) -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) University and higher 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.04 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Employment 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Interviewer nationality 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Source: SSCQ. Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%. n=372.
Table E.P.3: Predicted probabilities for Arab non-Muslim
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Min. Max. Dif. Gender roles 0.80 0.53 -0.27 Conservativism 0.94 0.64 -0.30 Significance refers to the AME results reported above. Minimum and maximum refer to factor scores of both variables. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean.
Graph E.P.3: Predicted probabilities for Arab non- Muslim 1 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 Min. Max.
Gender roles Conservativism
For the Arab non-Muslim candidate, the results in table E.R.3 show that contact was not significantly related to the hiring decision. The effect was small and having and socially meeting Arab friends yielded opposite effects as having Arab friends was positively related to hiring and meeting them socially was negatively related to hiring. Second, none of the religious variables had a significant effect on hiring the candidate. In the third step, gender roles proved negatively and significantly related to approval of hiring the candidate decreasing the likelihood of hiring by 6%. Civic participation was negatively related to the likelihood of hiring the candidate; however, the effect was marginally significant and became non-significant in the final step. The fourth step, with political indicators, suggests that having conservative political values is negatively and significantly related to approval of hiring the candidate. The effect was highly significant and relatively large, decreasing the willingness to
211 | P a g e hire by 19%. Both gender roles and conservatism remained strongly significant in the final step. While the effect of gender roles remained the same, the effect of conservatism decreased to a reduction 15% in willingness to hire.
As seen in table E.P.3, the predicted probabilities suggest a large effect for gender roles and conservatism. Having conservative views on gender roles decreased the probability of approval for hiring from 80% to 53%. Having conservative political values decreased approval from 94% to 64% when comparing minimum to maximum values. Again, the direction of the effect for value variables is mixed; however, gender roles remains consistently a predictor of refusal to hire. The strong negative effect of political conservatism here could be linked to the political position of most Arab Christian political and social figures in the Arab world who, during the Arab Spring, opposed Islamists and Islamist political policies. As a result, more politically conservative respondents, which in our case are pro-Islamist, are expected to be more prejudiced towards this group.
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7.5.4 Western Non-Muslim Resume
Table E.R.4: Average marginal effects of contact and values against decision to hire Western non-Muslim Religious Social Political Final Contact values values values model Western friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.18 0.17 (0.08) (0.08) Meeting 0.07 0.04 (0.07) (0.08)
Personal religiosity -0.04
(0.05)
Perceived religiosity -0.06 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
Religious inclusion 0.00
(0.03)
Gender roles -0.04 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Traditional views -0.04
(0.07)
Social inclusion -0.04
(0.04)
Civic participation 0.01
(0.03)
Conservatism 0.04
(0.06)
Islamism 0.02
(0.02)
Liberalism 0.01
(0.02) Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Age squared 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.52 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) Gender (ref: female) -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.03 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) University and higher 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Employment 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Interviewer nationality -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Source: SSCQ. Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%, n=355
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Table E.P.4: Predicted probabilities for Western non-Muslim Min. Max. Dif. Contact 0.57 0.63 0.06 Age 18*60 0.83 0.73 -0.10 Age 28*60 0.68 0.73 0.05 Age 38*60 0.58 0.73 0.15 Age 48*60 0.59 0.73 0.14 Source: SSCQ. Significance refers to the AME results reported above. For contact minimum is no friends and maximum is having friends. For age 18 and 60. Dummy variables are held at the lowest value and continuous variables are held at the mean. Graph E.P.4: Predicted probabilities for western non-Muslim 0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55 Min. Max.
Contact Age 18*60 Age 28*60 Age 38*60 Age 48*60
The final candidate examined was the Western non-Muslim. Having Western friends proved significantly and positively related to the hiring decision. The effect was relatively large as willingness to hire was increased by 18%. As with previous chapters, the most distant group from Qataris benefits the most from contact while similar groups do not. Age was also significant and negative, suggesting that older respondents were less likely to hire the candidate. One variable proved significant in the second step. Perceived religiosity yielded a negative result suggesting that conservative views on religiosity of others result in lower willingness to hire the candidate. The effect however was marginally significant. The effect of age remained significant in this step (See table E.R.4). Gender roles was the only variable to exhibit significance from the social values measures. The effect was marginally significant
214 | P a g e and negative decreasing likelihood of hiring by 4%. None of the political values proved significant in the fourth step while age also remained significant in these two steps. In the final step, the four variables that denoted significance in previous steps were tested along with the controls. Perceived religiosity and gender roles became non-significant. Having Western friends had the largest effect observed in this step improving willingness to hire by 17%. The effect was positive and significant at the 5-percentile level. Age was also significant and negatively related to likelihood of hiring.
E.P.G: Probability of hiring Western non-Muslim according to age 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 18 28 38 48 60
Probability of hiring Western non-Muslim
The predicted probability of variables exhibiting significance in the previous analysis suggests that having Western friends increased the probability of hiring by 5%, raising it from 57% to
63%. When it comes to age, the probability of hiring between an 18-year-old respondent and a
60-year-old respondent, as seen in graph E.P.G, reveals that there is a 10% decrease in the probability of hiring from 83% to 73%. However, when comparing other age groups against the older group, an interesting pattern is found. For ages 28, 38, and 48, it is found that
215 | P a g e approval for hiring the candidate is actually lower than that observed with the eldest group.
The difference in approval to hire was least between the 28 year olds and the 60 year olds
(68% and 73%). For the 38 and 48 year olds approval to hire was considerably lower than the older group and similar at 58% and 59% (See table E.P.4).
The effect of age suggests that the youngest group of Qataris who are most exposed to
Western culture and values and to an economy where Westerners have an established role, are most willing to accept the non-Muslim Western candidate. Additionally, these younger
Qataris may not have experienced any tensions in the workplace as most of them are in university. Whereas those in their twenties and thirties may feel resentment towards
Westerners competing with them for higher positions. The age of retirement in Qatar is 60, and the earliest age to be out of school and in the job market is around 18, although most
Qataris attend at least some higher education. Therefore, respondents more likely to be students or retired are also more likely to approve of hiring the candidate. Supporting this claim is the considerable drop in probability of hiring between the 18 and 28 year olds (83% to 68%), which is the largest drop observed.
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7.5.5 Results Discussion
Table E.R.5: Average marginal effects of final models for all steps Arab Western Arab non- Western non-
Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim
Contact with friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.17
(0.08)
Meeting 0.04
(0.08) Personal religiosity Perceived religiosity -0.03 -0.05
(0.02) (0.03) Religious inclusion Gender roles -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Traditional views -0.12
(0.08) Social inclusion
Civic participation Conservatism -0.15
(0.07) Islamism Liberalism Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gender (ref: female) -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.03 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) University and higher -0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) Employment 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.01 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) Interviewer nationality 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) Source: SSCQ, Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined= 1%, Bold and Italicised=5%, Bold=10%, n=366 From the results above, it can be concluded that contact, as defined here, was only significantly related to the decision to hire the Western non-Muslim candidate. Having a
Western friend positively affected the likelihood of hiring the most distant candidate to
Qataris. When it comes to religious values only perceived religiosity exhibited significance
217 | P a g e and only with reference to Western resumes. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim candidates were negatively affected by perceived religiosity. The effect, however, was marginally significant for the Western Muslim candidate and became non-significant for the Western non-Muslim in the final model. Nonetheless, it is notable that the effect of perceived religiosity was negative regardless of the religion of the candidate, suggesting that those with more conservative religious views are more likely to discriminate against Westerners. One explanation for this is that conservative Qataris view Westerners as the most visible threat to religious identity as the majority of them are non-Muslim. Also, Western values are perceived as contradicting with Muslim values especially in issues like gender equality, personal freedoms, and the political role of religion (See table E.R.5).
With regards to social values, only gender roles exhibited significance. Conservative views on gender roles diminished the likelihood of hiring all candidates. The effect was strong for both
Arab candidates while losing significance in the final model for both Western candidates. The results here suggest that Westerners are mildly affected by religious and social values. The effect does not seem to be a function of religion of the candidate, as both Western resumes exhibited similar patterns. However, looking at the general pattern of values effects, it can be found that variables around social and religious behaviour of others negatively affected the decision to hire all candidates. This pattern suggests that individuals who are more conservative in their views of other people’s behaviour are also stricter in their hiring decision. Therefore, it can be assumed that these variables are indicators of an overall “too careful” approach that is not restricted to religious or social values. Although it can also be assumed that giving the candidates a Western education and past experience in a Western country played a role in this negative attitude among conservatives.
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Finally, being conservative politically proved negatively related to the probability of hiring the Arab non-Muslim candidate only. It is possible that the polarization in the Arab world made the scenario of Arab non-Muslims more politically relevant. Therefore, as the results suggest, those who convey conservative political attitudes were less likely to hire an Arab of a different religion. The effect of gender roles suggests that social conservatism affects all groups in a same way regardless of the religious or racial background.
Table E.R.C: AME of ethnic and religious treatments M1 M2 M3 Non-Muslim CVs -0.2 -0.2 -0.41 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 Non-Arab CVs -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.11
Arab friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 Meeting -0.01 -0.01
-0.04 0.04 Western friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.05 Meeting -0.02 -0.02
-0.04 0.04 Gender roles -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 Civic participation -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 Age squared 0.14 0.14 0.15 0 0 0.00 Gender (ref: female) -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 Education (ref: below secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.03 0.01 0.01
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-0.04 -0.03 0.03 University and higher 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03
Age*non-Muslim CVs 0.00
0.00 Age*non-Arab CVs 0.00
0.00 Gender roles*non-Muslim CVs 0.01
0.02 Gender roles*non-Arab CVs 0.01 0.02 Source: SSCQ, n=1466, Age2 is multiplied by 1000
One final step remains in the analysis, determining if religious or cultural background was the main threshold of acceptance. While the experiment did not include a direct control group, such as a Qatari candidate, the Arab Muslim candidate can function as a control as Qataris are both Muslim and Arab. As seen in table E.R.C, when using treatments of non-Muslim and non-Arab resumes against the Arab Muslim we find that non-Muslim candidates were 20% less likely to be hired than the control, while the likelihood of hiring non-Arab candidates was not significantly different than the control. Introducing interactions of age and gender roles – the factor scores of conservative attitudes towards women rights and gender specific clothing
– with the treatments resulted in the non-Muslim candidates being 41% less likely to be hired, while the effect of gender roles was slightly increased and the effect of age became more significant at the 1 percentile level. While previous studies suggested that cultural background or race were the main obstacles to acceptance (Booth et al., 2012; Carlsson & Rooth, 2007,
Kaas & Manger, 2012; Oreopoulos & Dechief, 2011), we found that using treatments for religion alongside cultural background revealed that Qataris discriminate between candidates based on religion more than race or cultural backgrounds.
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Although the results are not conclusive, there seems to be a negative effect of particular forms of conservatism on the probability of hiring candidates regardless of their cultural origins and religious affiliation. The effect of age in reference to the Western non-Muslim candidate does suggest a generational shift towards openness. However, it is also potentially indicative of conflict in the workplace as the predicted probabilities of hiring suggest. The probability of hiring the Western non-Muslim decreases with age; however, it increases again for the oldest group, the most likely to be in retirement.
7.6 Conclusion This chapter aimed to measure the effect of religion and cultural background and the interaction between them on Qataris prejudice towards immigrants. Looking at the descriptive results of the experiment it was found that when it comes to acceptance of immigrants, religion is more important than ethnicity to Qataris, at least in the workplace. After discussing the results of the experiment the results of AMEs and predicted probabilities of contact and values against the decision to hire the candidate were examined.
The first hypothesis suggested that the Arab Muslim candidate would be the most hireable candidate of the four. While the Arab Muslim was the most likely to be hired, the Western
Muslim candidate came a close second with a difference within the margin of error. The non-
Muslim candidates registered significantly lower likelihoods of being hired; suggesting that cultural background did not benefit the candidate while being Muslim was clearly beneficial for the hiring decision. Moreover, towards the end of the analysis, running a model with non-
Muslim and non-Arab treatments revealed the validity of our initial findings as the non-
Muslim treatment exhibited a highly significant negative relationship with the control. While similar experiments focused on race only (Booth et al., 2012; Carlsson & Rooth, 2007, Kaas
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& Manger, 2012; Oreopoulos & Dechief, 2011) or lumped religion and race in one treatment
(Thomsen et al., 2008), these results testify to the importance of using various treatments for immigrant attributes and testing them against each other.
The second hypothesis assumed that more conservative respondents across religious, social, and political values would be less likely to hire all candidates except for the Arab Muslim.
The results show that individually none of the values variables provided a consistent effect with the exception of gender roles. Perceived religiosity exhibited a negative effect in relation to the Arab Muslim candidate. Gender roles initially were significant and negatively related to all candidates; however, final models show that the effect only retained significance with
Arab candidates. The pattern of the results beyond statistical significance suggests that there is a negative effect of conservative views of other people’s values on the decision to hire.
Politically, only conservatism exhibited significance for the Arab non-Muslim candidate.
The second hypothesis was not strongly supported by the results. Notably, the direction of the relationships is consistently negative for the significant effects, suggesting that more conservative respondents were less likely to approve of hiring any of the candidates, including the Arab Muslim. This is contrary to the hypothesis. This can be explained through the nature of the values that showed a notable effect. Variables on evaluating other people’s behaviour yielded the most visible negative effect on hiring all the candidates. It seems these variables are indicative of a more conservative nature in evaluating others in general or that the Western education and work experience given to the candidate negatively affected how the conservative respondents views the candidates.
The third hypothesis expected that contact would improve the likelihood of hiring the candidate. Contact proved highly significant and positively related to social trust in previous
222 | P a g e chapters; however, only denoted significance in this analysis in relation to hiring the Western non-Muslim candidate. Interestingly, the effects were consistently positive for hiring both
Western candidates and negative for both Arab candidates especially in the “having friends” category. As was seen in earlier chapters, non-Arab groups were more likely to benefit from contact; therefore, the results for Western candidates are in line with the findings thus far. The negative effect for the Arab non-Muslim is small and, along with being non-significant, leads towards dismissing the effect.
Another significant finding was the effect of age on the decision to hire the Western non-
Muslim candidate. According to the results, those aged 18 and 60 were more likely to hire the candidate than those in the other age groups. The largest shift can be seen between 18 and 28, suggesting that reaching working age results in increased opposition to hiring the Western non-Muslim candidate. While opposition does increase with older age groups it decreases again for 60-year-olds. Those outside the economic activity age are less likely to be provoked by the discourse on Westerners taking Qataris’ jobs and influencing decision making in government. Therefore, they are less likely to be prejudice against the candidate in question.
As research on social prejudice and intergroup relations in the Qatari context is in its infancy an experimental design like the one attempted here is very important. The task of differentiating religious from social and cultural attitudes is not easy due to the entangled nature of these values in Qatari society. However, as was seen in this chapter, the experiment successfully tested for prejudice in the cultural and religious aspects and their interaction. The experiment’s design allowed for a subtle and socially acceptable approach where respondents were not required to openly voice their prejudice towards other groups.
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However, the experiment design is not without its limitations. One main limitation is the absence of a control group. In an optimal scenario there should have been a group with a
Qatari Muslim candidate to use as a control option. The small n size that adding an additional subsample would produce resulted in the decision not to use a control group scenario. Another limitation was not obtaining information on the occupation of the respondents. Those who were in a position of hiring in their institutions may have behaved differently from those who have never been through the experience of hiring employees. Nonetheless, the results offer important insight into the main threshold of social acceptance for Qataris. The findings of the experiment need to be validated through replication in other surveys and through the introduction of different treatments and scenarios where other variables, such as likelihood of hiring Qataris, are controlled.
New patterns emerged in this chapter suggesting that shared beliefs are more important than shared heritage to Qataris. Also, the effect of age indicates that prejudice is intensified in middle aged, or, in other words, within the economic activity age, offering an additional job market explanation to that offered in previous chapters. While having Western co-workers was beneficial to hiring the Western non-Muslim, being within the economic activity age reduces the probability of hiring members of that group. However, this is not to say that there is an age group effect as there was a considerable difference between 28 year olds and 48 year olds. Deeper analysis is needed to understand how the workplace dynamic operates and how age factors into this dynamic. In the next chapter, the results of two focus groups, which were designed after reviewing the results of the survey, are utilised and used to probe deeper into how Qataris define, interact with, and view immigrants.
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CHAPTER 8: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL COHESION IN QATAR
8.1 Introduction In previous chapters different determinants of trust in immigrants in the Qatari context were explored. Analysing the survey data affirmed the importance of social contact and conservative views on gender roles in explaining trust in immigrants. The survey experiment suggested that shared religious beliefs are a better predictor of acceptance by Qataris than a shared cultural background. These results, while opening new doors in the understanding of social trust in Qatar, fall short of answering the deeper questions on what forms these attitudes and why they are formed. While it is apparent that religious, social, and political values can affect attitudes towards immigrants, this needs to be contextualised in Qataris’ understanding of who the immigrant is, what classifications they have for immigrants, and how different economic and social settings yield different personal experiences in dealing with immigrants.
In order to address the issues surrounding the main research question, ‘What determines
Qataris trust of immigrants?’ in greater depth a qualitative research method was utilised, namely, focus groups. There were two focus groups – one for men and one for women. The main objective was to explore how Qataris define and perceive their interactions with immigrants. More specifically, the aims of the focus groups were to explore how Qataris define immigrants, understand how cultural dissimilarities affect attitudes towards immigrants, and explore the mechanisms explaining the findings from the experiment utilised
225 | P a g e in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we start with an overview of past research using focus groups to study intergroup relations, we then move to an overview of the participants, and then a discussion of the results.
8.2 Background and Past Research When it comes to intergroup relations, focus groups have also been widely used to explore the issue. While the results of focus groups cannot be generalised, the method allows for a deeper and more complex exploration of social phenomena. The interaction and exchange of ideas between participants offers researchers a wealth of knowledge on the issue that is not the result of individual attitudes but rather that of a “collective voice” composed by a group
(Smithson, 2000). Qualitative research on attitudes towards immigrants offers deeper insight into the drivers and mechanisms of anti-immigrant attitudes. In previous chapters, we identified key attitudes that affect how Qataris trust immigrants. Reviewing research of a qualitative nature offers validation to assumptions about the strong effect of cultural differences discussed earlier.
A main issue that drives negative attitudes towards immigrants seems to be cultural differences. In the West, the discussion of prejudice against immigrants and “others” in general shifted from biological theories of inferiority to cultural differences and adapting to the norms and customs of the dominant group (Verkuyten, 2001). Verkuyten’s (2003) assessment of anti-immigrant sentiment in the Netherlands showed that prejudice was based on a perception of cultural differences, a “new racist” discourse, which sees the coexistence of different cultures as a negative development. The perception is that “they” must adapt to
“our” lifestyle and customs.
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In his study of inhabitants of an inner-city neighbourhood in the Netherlands, Verkuyten
(1997) found that the participants created an image of the community based on set of social and cultural values, which they used to evaluate immigrant groups as foreign and a threat to social cohesion.
A main conclusion drawn by Verkuyten is that cultural differences dominate the discussion and these differences are used to affirm the incompatibility of incoming cultures with the local dominant culture. Also, according to the author, the term culture is rhetorically very powerful in establishing prejudice.
Furthermore, Paxton and Mughan (2006), in their study of anti-immigrant sentiment in the
United States, suggest that “cultural threat” should be understood in the American context as
“assimilation threat”, which, as the authors suggest, is a perception that immigrants fail to embody the customs and lifestyle of the dominant group in society. The authors argue that
Americans feel familiar with the concept of assimilation and that they feel it justifies their concern about immigrant from other cultures. Also, they believe that assimilation is measured by commitment, and they suggest that commitment is defined through striving to learn the
English language, productivity in society, and gaining US citizenship.
When it comes to how immigrants are viewed and the mechanisms of negative attitudes against them, findings vary and offer a wide array of views. North et al. (2014) found that fear, especially after dramatic events linked to immigrants, may allow for a relaxation of social norms that normally suppress the expression of prejudice against immigrants.
Furthermore, while such events will not necessarily make everyone comfortable about attacking immigrants, it might encourage passive prejudice such as wanting to leave an airplane when Arabs boarded or wishing that Muslims could be barred from air travel.
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Another means of justifying prejudice against immigrants is through presenting them as backward and anti-modern (Verkuyten, 1997). Also, immigrants are, at times, held responsible for the difficulties and prejudices they face, making reference to their negative attributes in order to transfer the problem of prejudice and racial hatred to the victims
(Verkuyten, 1997).
Discrimination and prejudice, however, is not always constraint to dominant vs. minority groups. Córdova and Cervantes (2010), for example, find that within immigrant groups discrimination is apparent and is dependent on nativity status and the region of the United
States. As suggested by these authors, US-born immigrants indicated that they were stereotyped as gang members, while foreign-born participants linked discrimination against them to perceptions of low cultural assimilation in such matters as maintaining traditional ways of dress, the use of native language, and English proficiency.
On the same note, Solorzano and colleagues (2000) conducted focus groups with African
American university students to measure the presence of “microaggressions” in US university campuses. The results of their study shed light on how African American students suffer from this subtle type of racism from their own community and members of other groups. Statham
(2003), on the other hand, stated that focus groups conducted in the UK revealed that participants defined the limits for acceptable anti-immigrant stances from expression by the political elites. They were willing to go as far as the elite would go and would then consider that socially acceptable. This seems to show that the bar for what is acceptable can be set by political discourse. Therefore, in the Qatari context, where the government clearly distinguishes between Qataris and immigrant and enacts laws that extend preferential
228 | P a g e treatment to “original” Qataris, it is expected that citizens would feel more comfortable in voicing their anti-immigrant views.
Another aspect of attitudes towards immigrants is concerned with how members of the dominant group define what and who is foreign. Verkuyten (1997), for example, found in his study of the Netherlands that the discussions were mainly about Turk and Moroccan immigrants, who are predominantly Muslim, and much less about Surinamese and Antilleans, who are black. Dutch participants in the study identified with the latter two groups as they were mostly from former Dutch colonies and were seen to embody social and cultural characteristics similar to them while Muslim immigrants were seen to be foreign culturally.
The author also found that Turks and Moroccans were systematically seen as the least attractive social partners when compared to other groups. Nonetheless, Verkuyten makes clear that his results should not lead to a glossing over of actual cultural differences. Cultural differences according to Verkuyten, in the Dutch context, exist strongly and visibly and have actual meaning and profound results in the daily life of ordinary people. These differences are clearer in relation to Turks and Moroccans.
The discussion above reveals the importance of cultural differences in defining views towards immigrants and minorities in general. It is also apparent that these cultural differences play an important role in the perception of assimilation. In our study, as previous chapters revealed cultural differences strongly affected trust in non-Arab groups, the analysis below will shed light on how cultural differences shape Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants.
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8.3 Research Questions This chapter’s main objective is to explore how Qataris define and view immigrants. As explained in the introduction of this chapter and the previous chapters, survey results have proven that Qataris have more favourable views of Arabs and Muslims than other immigrants.
They also yielded negative effects for some religious and social conservatism variables. In this chapter, further exploration is made into how Qataris define immigrants according to their distance from Qatari community. An effort is made to understand the dynamics behind the results of the experiment detailed in the previous chapter. The survey experiment showed that religion was a better indicator of acceptance than shared cultural background; through focus groups, we aim to understand how this position is formulated and how it relates to different immigrant groups.
Also, there is an aim to gather further information on the social interaction between Qataris and immigrants. Mainly, there is a desire to see how Qataris evaluate their interaction with immigrants and how this interaction is perceived by Qatari society.
8.4 Results and Analysis As explained in the methods chapter, the focus groups conducted were recorded and transcribed in Arabic. After the groups were concluded the recordings were transcribed into an Excel file, to be used for the analysis, using numbers in the place of participant names. The numbers were attributed according to the order the participants introduced themselves in at the beginning of the recording.
In accordance with the research questions and group discussion guide design, two themes were predefined: the hypothetical candidate experiment discussion and the social interaction
230 | P a g e with immigrants. A third theme was added during the analysis, the definition of the immigrant. As the survey part of this study was conducted prior to the focus groups, the latter utilised the results in its design. The design of the focus groups focused on the experiment and social interaction themes. The definition of immigrant was developed through the discussion and analysis of the transcripts, which revealed it as a separate theme. Following this thematic analysis, grouped quotes that related to the themes were manually identified. Relevant quotes were translated into English and discussed below. First, there is a short overview of participants and then the results are discussed.
8.4.1 Overview of Participants The recruitment procedure was explained in detail in the methods chapter. In this section, some demographic information about the participants is identified. The first group included 6 men. The first participant [M1] was a retired military officer, educated, and in his late fifties.
The second participant [M2] was a professional in the energy sector, with a Western education, and in his twenties. The third participant [M3] was a secondary school student in his late teens. The fourth participant [M4] was a junior employee in the energy sector, holding a postgraduate diploma, and in his twenties. The fifth participant [M5] was a Qatar university student in his twenties. The sixth participant [M6] was a government employee who also had his own business, with a university degree, and was in his forties.
The participants in the women’s group were all Qatar University students taking a course on qualitative research methods. As explained in the methods chapter, the same recruitment techniques were attempted that resulted in the diversity of the male group; however, they failed. With the aid of a female research assistant trained in conducting focus groups hundreds of female survey respondents were approached in order to recruit them for groups, but only 20
231 | P a g e women confirmed attendance. Even with confirmed attendance we had 3 failed attempts at holding the focus group – none of the respondents attended although all had confirmed attendance. So the decision was taken to resort to convenience sampling. In the end, only university students were used, as it was the only viable alternative when considering time and resource restraints. Female participants were taking a course on research methodology, which included focus groups; however, the timing of the focus groups was at the beginning of the course and the syllabus suggested that focus groups had not yet been discussed at the time.
8.4.2 Discussion Through thematic analysis the following themes were identified from the discussion. The experiment discussion was identified as a separate theme partly because it was predefined in the discussion guide as a separate discussion point. Also, the discussion around the experiment, after distributing the resumes, focused on the immigrant in the workplace and the religious and social attributes of the immigrant in line with the objective of the experiment.
The second theme identified was social interaction with immigrants. The discussion in both groups included a focus on how participants evaluated their interaction with immigrants and perceived effect of immigrants in society. The final theme was defining the foreigner. The discussion included clear discussion of who is to be considered a foreigner and clear definitions and exclusions were presented.
Each theme is discussed below in two parts, one for each of the two focus groups. The reasons for this setup were twofold. First, it is believed that the differences in the discussion between the two groups are significant and need to be highlighted through separating the analysis.
Second, the fact of having only two groups to analyse allows the development of the discussion in each group to be followed.
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8.4.2.1 Experiment In the first part of the focus groups the participants were handed resumes from the experiment detailed in the previous chapter. The four versions of the resumes were handed out which included the two Muslim candidates and the two non-Muslims candidates. Similarly to the survey experiment, the participants were asked to assess their approval of hiring the candidates. They were then asked to discuss what had influenced their decision.
The Men’s Group Discussion When it came to the men’s group, participants briefly discussed the religion of the candidate before moving beyond the experiment parameters. The older, retired military participant [M1] stated his preference for the Arab Muslim candidate in the case where all other qualifications are identical:
“Without a doubt if there is a test or a qualification or so and so or if the prospective employee needed to speak Arabic or English. I mean perfect if he satisfied all things, without a doubt the Arab Muslim will have priority.” Participant [M6] of the same age group as [M1] agreed stating:
“Let us do a case study, but the heart leans towards the Arab.”
The only other participant to share his views on this point was [M2] the younger professional with a Western education. His view was contradictory, rejecting the idea that the religion of the candidate had played a part in his decision:
“About my answer his religion did not affect me to be honest, only his nationality, as long as the other candidates do not include Qataris.” These two quotes are in line with the findings concerning the effect of age on trust in
Westerners, as the young professional was more open to Westerners than the retired older gentleman. It is notable that Qataris are inherently Muslim; however, the
233 | P a g e participant’s Western education background might have played a vital role in his more liberal view towards non-Muslims. At the moment there is no government policy favouring Muslim or Arab immigrants; however, it can be seen in the quotes above there is a polarisation around the preference for Muslims. The discussion quickly moved to immigrants in the job market. Almost all participants criticized the increase of non-
Qataris in positions similar to those of Qataris in the job market. Commenting on the hypothetical scenario of the experiment, [M1] stressed that non-Qataris should acknowledge that they are guest workers and their main objective should be training
Qataris to take over their positions:
“Primarily I would not hire the candidate on a Qatari job number, he has to feel that his presence is temporary, we should always have Qataris working close with him, not one maybe two or three to gain from his experience and … even his feeling should be that he is providing services for us and that he is essential so much so that we cannot let him go.” On the same note, [M2] voiced his frustration with the job market’s preference for non-
Qataris. According to him, there is an apparent “racism” towards Qataris. A surprising notion when considering that Qataris enjoy many benefits, which non-Qataris do not. The participant stated:
“I mean in the job market today non-Qataris get paid many folds more than Qataris. And there are people with the same experience, the Qataris might even be more qualified, but the non-Qatari… just because he is non-Qatar, we are speaking on a racial basis our allegiance lies with the Qatari but the job market we see as racially for the non-Qatari, giving the non-Qatari a high positions and the Qataris is more qualified than him.” In agreement with participant [M2], participant [M4] suggests that the benefits offered to
Qataris in some workplaces are less than those offered to non-Qataris, which resulted in these workplaces being deterrent to Qataris:
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“There are qualified Qataris, but the problem is some workplaces are off-putting [to Qataris], you find that if a Qatari fills a position they do not give him the same benefits they give the non-Qatari. Yes because some managers and officials say we will pay school tuition, health care and airplane tickets” The university student [M5] affirmed that he would hire the candidate based on his experience even if there was a Qatari candidate, echoing the suggestion by [M1] to have Qataris shadowing him:
“When it comes to me I will hire him, the reason is he has experience. I would make use of his experience, not only experience he has a degree…I will benefit from him why should not I, and I make his subordinates Qataris so that they can learn from him.” The same participant even said he would refuse a less qualified Qatari candidate stating the high cost of training and development while a non-Qatari candidate could be found with all the necessary experience:
“Why should I train the Qatari, spend money on him, send him abroad [for training] when I have a person who came to Doha ready with minimal cost…as long as he is in your country [Qatar] I should make use of him.” The discussion of the job market had two sides: national and cultural divides. Most participants agreed that Qataris should continue to be preferred and given special rights in the job market as they are now and that this preferential treatment should be further developed.
When it comes to immigrants, more traditional participants favoured immigrants that share beliefs and cultural background with the Qataris. These results echo those found by
Verkuyten (1997) regarding older and more traditional participants in his study who lived in proximity to immigrants Younger, highly educated participants exhibited more liberal views towards immigrants in the job market. The discussion here explains the finding of the experiment in the previous chapter. There is a separate level of resistance to immigrants in general regardless of cultural or religious background in the job market, especially amongst
235 | P a g e more traditional and conservative Qataris. As seen here, older more traditional participants were keen on voicing their preference for Qataris regardless of the attributes of the immigrant.
Another issue that was raised in response to the experiment was the nationality and religion of domestic staff. The discussion naturally occurred as a result of discussing immigrants in the job market. Participants were split when it came to hiring non-Muslims as domestic staff.
Some participants considered it a priority to hire Muslim maids and family drivers, while others extended their tolerance of non-Muslim workers to the home. The intimacy of having someone residing in the home diminished tolerance of non-Muslims for one older respondent who previously had shown agreement to having non-Muslim workers in the country:
“We in [residential area] prefer Muslims…for me the maid has to be Muslim, even from another point of view to benefit a Muslim family [the maid’s family] and such.” [M1] Conversely, two respondents believed that hiring for the home should depend on competency rather than religion. Participant [M5], who was very vocal in criticizing non-Muslim behaviours earlier in the discussion, suggested that Qataris prefer non-Muslim domestic staff:
“I mean, I mentioned earlier that people used to want Muslim maids but after we opened up [to the world] we found Christians who were better than Muslims.” Attitudes towards immigrants in the job market in this group point to a cohort effect.
Older more traditional participants were less open to non-Qataris in general and to non-
Arabs and non-Muslims. Younger participants exhibited more open and inclusive views towards immigrants. The discussion here offers validation and context to the findings in previous chapters on the role age and conservative attitudes play in prejudice towards immigrants.
The Women’s Group Discussion
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In the women’s group, the experiment generated a different discussion. Here there was less emphasis on immigrants vs. Qataris in the job market and more on the religious aspect of hiring an immigrant. Two respondent [W5] and [W3] exhibited a liberal view on the religion of the candidate. In the beginning, [W5] clearly indicated that religion should not be a factor in the hiring decision:
“I believe that if I was going to hire someone I will not look at religion, and that is because he is coming for the work, I feel his qualifications are ok.” Participant [W3] agreed, stating that both Muslims and non-Muslims would be held accountable for their actions regardless of their religious background:
“I do not think that religion affects, at the end both will be appraised according to the same performance indicators and in both cases I will hold them accountable if there was a shortcoming in work, whether they be Muslim or non-Muslim.” A strong and passionate rebuttal was offered by [W2]. Her position was that Muslims have more integrity, and, as the religion stated for the non-Muslim candidate was Christian, she went on to criticize the Christian moral stance:
“Sorry, but I object to [R5’s opinion]. If I, for example, get the resumes of two people with almost the same credentials and educational attainment I will hire the Muslim because in the end he has integrity, I will be trustful of his work. I am not saying that he will be honest and will not commit mistakes, or that he might not cheat, but when I hold a Muslim accountable for cheating it is not like when I hold a Christian for cheating in his work. Because the Muslim will have integrity…but the Christian I cannot hold him accountable because his religion does not encourage him to be honest” This strongly prejudicial statement points to vary narrow radius of trust. Christians, speaking of Christians in general, to the participant are not to be trusted and have no integrity. It is notable that Qataris use “Christian” as a classification for all Westerners. Europe and the US are referred to by Qataris as Christian countries. Therefore, perceptions and attitudes about
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Westerners and Christians are somewhat intertwined. Also, this view highlights the primacy of religion in framing and defining social groups for this individual at least.
Participants [W2] and [W4] agreed that Muslims should be preferred; however, their justification suggests that they were envisioning Westerners rather that Christians. Both suggested that it would be more expensive to hire Christians who are likely to be Westerners in the Qatari context:
“I think that we will spend more on the Christian, double the salary, and I will give him insurance and other things [W4]…They always get more benefits, I mean different than citizens, they get other benefits [W2].” After this exchange, the moderator stepped in to push the discussion forward by asking the participants if they considered the growing presence of immigrants in Qatar positive or negative. Here, participant [W2], after her strong negative stance earlier, attempted to present a more positive viewpoint discussing the benefits of having non-Qataris in Qatar:
“For example, we can have them give courses to university graduates and in general benefit from their experience, this way their presence will be positive.” Three other participants – [W1], [W3] and [W6] – agreed that the growing presence of immigrants in the workplace was positive. However, these participants explained that the main reason behind their stance was that non-Qataris could fill jobs that Qataris will not do.
The high income of Qataris and guaranteed employment by government resulted in non-
Qataris holding all menial and service professions. The participants specifically mentioned sales staff in the retail sector, street cleaning, construction, and restaurant staff, suggesting a more pragmatic stance by the younger, more highly educated participants in this focus group.
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Similar to the men, the women participants were split on the importance of religion in hiring domestic staff. Some participants argued that they do not feel comfortable leaving their children in the care of non-Muslim maids while others testified to the superiority of non-
Muslim maids over their Muslim counterparts. Two participants supporting hiring Muslim maids said:
“I cannot approve of a Christian, for example, praying in front of my children, at least [a Muslim] knows some Quran.” [R4] Another participant [W1], who showed a preference for hiring non-Muslim maids, explained how her experience led her to that position:
“[The participant’s non-Muslim maid] has integrity, what comforts me is that she deals with my daughter like her own,… high morals that’s why I hire non-Muslims.” In Qatari society, the women of the house are responsible for most decisions regarding maids and nannies and are more likely to deal with them than the men. As a result, most participants displayed a more practical attitude than the men towards hiring maids. The main motivation behind prejudice against non-Muslim domestic staff for the participants was with regard to children. Some participants feared the cultural effects of interaction between their children and non-Muslims. For non-Muslim staff, some participants pointed to non-Muslim religious practices taking place in front of their children, which they feared might affect their children’s religious upbringing. Many Qatari families consider the Hijab a mandatory part of a maids’ uniform, stating that they do not want their children to grow up in a home environment where not wearing Hijab is acceptable. When discussing competency, the prejudice was actually against the Muslims, as participants almost unanimously agreed that non-Muslim maids had a better work ethic. One explanation of this is that most non-Muslim maids are from big cities in the Philippines, while Muslim maids are mostly from rural areas in both the Philippines and
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Indonesia. Therefore, non-Muslim maids are usually more educated, familiar with city life and technology, and speak better English.
The discussion using the experiment revealed that in both groups there was no consensus on the effect of religion in the decision to hire an immigrant. While some participants exhibited strong preference for Muslims, others publically refused to use religion as a defining characteristic in the recruitment process. This proves that younger, more educated Qataris are at least conscious of political correctness and consider openly voicing prejudice against other groups as taboo. On another note, cultural origin was not discussed in the context of the experiment. While the four resumes presented included a mix of race and religion, the discussion focused on the religious aspect as participants ignored the cultural background of the candidates. These results testify to the validity of the results from the previous chapter, which suggested that religion and not race was the main threshold for acceptance by Qataris.
Moreover, in both groups participants voiced their frustration with highly paid immigrants, considering them to be better off than their Qatari counterparts.
8.4.2.2 Social Interaction with Immigrants Following the discussion of the workplace, the participants moved to social interaction with immigrants. The discussion was prompted by the moderator asking respondents about the social effects of having immigrants in Qatar. In both groups, the moderators waited until the discussion on the experiment died down and then asked, “Outside the workplace, do you think immigrants have as a positive or negative effect on our society?” In both groups, this question resulted in a detailed discussion of how immigrants impact Qatari society and how Qataris interact with immigrants.
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The Men’s Group Discussion The first part of this discussion focused on how immigrants affected the way Qatari youth dressed. Older participants were clearly annoyed by Qatari youth and immigrants wearing
Western clothes. Younger participants disagreed, questioning the assumption that this was a negative impact of immigrants or a problematic behaviour. The youngest participant in this group [M3], while not objecting to the matter, considered that the appearance of foreigners encouraged Qatari youth to follow suit. He said:
Since I started understanding [An Arabic phrase meaning since he was really young] I was wearing shirts and trousers, but I think there is a difference and people have been influenced by foreigners. Another young participant [M2], made a clear distinction saying that modest clothes that fit the social, moral code are acceptable, regardless of whether they are traditional clothes or not.
For this participant, Western clothes are accepted as long as they are not revealing:
“When it comes to clothes, modest clothes personally I see no harm in them. I mean if a Qatari is wearing a shirt or sporting clothes it is up to him, but revealing clothes I am against, and we have seen it widely, and this is regrettably the effect of interacting with immigrants, they even do not see it as a problem to walk around in shorts!” Older participants were more critical of straying from social norms. Participant [M1], when comparing the behaviour of youth today to that he witnessed when he was growing up had this to say:
“Youth and children, of course [immigrants] affected them, if they see someone wearing a shirt and trousers…I mean some things were impossible, when we were young we did not even go to the local shop unless we were properly dressed, now you see even GCC citizens who speak in GCC dialect wearing shirts and trousers and walk about in malls.”
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One of the older participants [M6], suggested that the local police should deal with those appearing in public without proper attire and another older participant went as far as to support the establishment of a religious police similar to the one in Saudi Arabia:
“We have to have an Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vices [proper name of Saudi religious police] like Saudi Arabia…. I mean morals are receding here, and the presence of an authority … should be guiding and with wisdom.” The younger participant [M2] disagreed, stating that the presence of such a body would not solve the problem and suggested that a solution should start with education rather than penalization. He suggested that the moral code should be taught even to foreign children in schools:
“There are people who take [the Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vices] as violent and so on, it is better to start at the foundation, where is the foundation? Schools, here I focus on students, what is done is done and I focus on new generations even of foreigners.” When it comes to the subject of appearance, younger participants showed more tolerance than older participants; however, all participants agreed that immigrants should not be allowed to go out in public while wearing revealing outfits.
Finally, participant [M5], the university student, shared his experience about interacting with immigrants. He presented a positive view about the effects of increased interaction with immigrants:
“In my opinion, interacting with [immigrants] provides you with more information and culture, provides you with a lot things, especially for me as a university student. I mean you know university students every course are from three or four countries, you get more knowledge, you see the whole world while you are in your country.”
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Again, younger, highly educated Qataris are advocates of a more open approach towards immigrants and diverse social culture. Those younger participants have only lived in post-prosperity Qatar where the norm is a majority of immigrants and a cosmopolitan society. They do not remember the cohesive nature of pre-prosperity Qatar where cultural norms and social traditions were shared amongst the majority of residents as the older participants can. However, it is notable that the discussion focused on the appearance rather than the actions of immigrants. As was seen with the survey results analysis, the issue of how immigrants dress and appear in public is important in forming
Qataris’ views about immigrants. Qatar’s traditional and patriarchal nature means that women hold the main responsibility in raising children and, therefore, in preserving family values. This can explain the heightened interest in appearance of immigrants in public.
The Women’s Group Discussion The issue of appearance was also a subject of discussion for the female group as participants’ criticised foreigners for their immodest clothing choices. However, the participants here provided more positive evidence for non-Muslim foreigners’ respect of the Muslim dress code, suggesting a solution for the problem through dialogue with the foreigners:
“I saw a Christian English person and his wife wearing Qatari outfits… I was happy that they were open to other cultures.” [W6] Notice here, how Qataris automatically define Westerners as Christians. The context suggests that the participant does not have prior knowledge of the couple; however, she designated them as Christians. This validates the use here of the “Christian” attribute in the experiment as it is a preconceived notion about Westerners in Qatari society. It also confirms the claim that
Westerners are viewed as generally non-Muslims. The quote also highlights the fact that
243 | P a g e adherence to local customs in appearance has a positive effect on views towards immigrants just as the opposite elevates prejudice. The same participant also testified to the positive effects of interaction. According to this example, when immigrants are introduced to local culture properly it eases their inclusion culturally.
“[A faculty member] asked me why you say when I am dressed like this that it is disgraceful. So, we said to her that this in your country is normal, here it’s a different situation, respect the culture….now in this course she is wearing proper and long clothing.” [W6] However, participants put more emphasis on the effect behaviour of non-Muslims was having on society. Most participants spoke very passionately about how foreigners were affecting values in society. Participants were alarmed by the prospect of cultural effects being uncontrollable:
“It will affect, because we will be affected by their customs and their clothes and many other things that can affect us.” [W4] “There are new cultures that will come into [our society] and [they will be] different, in fact we can hardly control them about their clothes, everything will be different.” [W5] “We will not influence them, they will influence us, because we always create the suitable atmosphere for them and help them and do for them so they can come and reside with us.” [W2] This fear of the other cultures remains centred on appearance and clothing, as with the men’s group. These are the most visible aspects of difference felt by Qataris. Participants did not suggest any countermeasures against this cultural effect, perhaps reflecting an acceptance of the inevitability of influence in a society where 88% of the population are immigrants. Also, the government, in its preparation to host the World Cup 2022, announced many measures relaxing laws against public shows of affection, drinking, and religious symbols. These included promising the establishment of special courts for dealing with these types of crimes
244 | P a g e during the tournament. These, among other measures, have increased the anxiety felt among
Qataris about other cultures coming in overshadowing their culture.
The discussion then moved to the neighbourhood context. Participants were split on views towards immigrants residing in Qatari neighbourhoods. It is good to remember here that
Qataris reside in suburban neighbourhoods in houses with two to three metre high house walls. White-collar immigrants usually reside in residential towers or gated communities.
However, some of them, especially Arabs, reside in Qatari neighbourhoods. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the issue of companies housing their blue-collar workers in Qatari neighbourhoods caused an uproar that led to a government decision to ban labour housing in residential neighbourhoods.
Three participants spoke positively about having immigrant neighbours. Participants [W1] and [W4] stated that they found no difference between Muslim and non-Muslim neighbours:
“I will trust them both. I mean if my treatment of them is kind they will reciprocate with the same kindness and trust.” [W1] “From my point of view the most important thing is morals, if [immigrants] were my neighbours and they did not harm me than it is ok, even if they were Muslim or non-Muslim it does not matter.” [W4] Participant [W5] presented an anecdote to support her view that immigrants in the neighbourhood have a positive influence:
“My brother was coming home late, he called and called and no one answered, he parked his car and attempted to jump over the wall of the house, an Indian who was living around us passed by, and he started to struggle with my brother, my brother asked him don’t you see me enter this house daily? This is our house, the Indian was determined and said by god you will never enter this house…I do not know if it was yours.” The purpose of this anecdote was to defend immigrants as moral and socially responsible. As evident from the remarks below, many Qataris view immigrant
245 | P a g e neighbours as distant and culturally insensitive. Other participants disagreed with the above positive stances. Participant [W3] affirmed her preference for Qatari neighbours:
“Of course I will prefer the Qatari, I mean Arab from the same culture as me and Muslim, better than a foreigner with a different religion. I mean I will be more comfortable, psychologically, the same environment we were raised in.” She continued to describe the differences between the traditional, homogenous Qatari neighbourhood and the more diverse neighbourhoods of today, mimicking similar traditionalist nostalgia in other contexts:
“I mean before, the door was always open, but now never, everyone shuts their doors, that is what I am talking about, cultures are different between us. I mean it is difficult for them to adapt to each other and visit with each other.” Participant [W2] agreed with the previous statement, adding that neighbours were family before and now they feel like strangers. Participant [W4] also agreed, stating experiences with immigrant neighbours from a Western background and Asian blue-collar workers:
“I mean when I was living in father’s house our neighbours were English, so there was absolutely no relationship with them, and they had a disco! And one of my friends she was living with her mother in a rental house…and next to them was a collective blue-collar workers house, they were spying on them and peeping into their rooms and the house, they only stayed there a couple of months then moved.” The discussion summarised in this section shows that the concerns participants hold towards immigrants revolve around values, mainly the visible aspects of these values. Participants who spoke negatively about social interaction with immigrants in both groups often mentioned examples of clothing styles. This validates the use of the variable on Qatari youth wearing Western outfits as a measure of social conservatism in Chapter 4. Furthermore, clothing in the Qatari context is closely linked to religious attitudes, especially when it comes to women. While some participants pointed clearly to appearance as a social practice, most of
246 | P a g e them discussed appearance as a reflection of modesty, which is strongly embedded in Islamic teachings in the Qatari context. As discussed in the review in the beginning of this chapter, style of clothing was found in previous research to be a measure of assimilation (Córdova &
Cervantes, 2010) and our results support these findings. Clothing, being one of the most visible cultural differences, appears to be strongly relevant to the discussion of assimilation.
A second issue that was discussed in the women’s group was immigrants in the neighbourhood context. The discussion shows that the main concern with immigrants living in
Qatari neighbourhood was cultural differences. Even those defending immigrants living in
Qatari neighbourhoods used cultural similarities as justification. However, looking at the examples used by participants, it was found that security played an important role in their assessment. Just as reported by North et al. (2014), fear helps in elevating prejudice and allows for that prejudice to be voiced in ways that normal settings would prohibit. Some participants talked about increasing crime, others spoke of immigrant labourers “peeking” into their homes. The low level of trust in immigrants and especially single labourers had a profound impact on participants’ sense of neighbourhood security. These results link to
Verkuyten’s (1997) findings, where inhabitants of an inner city blamed immigrants for various negative changes including increased crime in the neighbourhood.
8.4.2.3 Defining the Foreigner After discussing social interaction with immigrants, participants went on to identify who they were speaking of when using the term “immigrant” or “foreigner".
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The Men’s Group Discussion Participants began the discussion by stratifying immigrants by cultural background similar to the classification used in earlier analysis. Participant [M3] confined the definition of the foreigner to Asians and Westerners:
“I mean when you say foreigner my mind immediately goes to the Asian and the Westerner, it will never be the Arab.” Participant [M1] widened the scope of the definition to include all non-Arab immigrants. On the other hand, participant [M6] used religion as an identifier, suggesting that foreigners referred to non-Muslims. However, other participants did not agree to this wide spanning inclusion. Participant [M2] offered a more complex explanation:
“Foreigners, it depends on the context, I mean it could mean non-Arab or it could mean non-Qatari. I mean now if someone comes in we would say let us change the subject because a foreigner walked in, so it depends on the time and situation.” This distinction is important as different levels of social distance operate in different ways.
Muslim immigrants are not necessarily Arab and not all Arabs are Muslims. In previous chapters a positive effect was found for having an Arab interviewer on trust in Arabs. Arab interviewers did not have the same effect towards trust in other groups. This suggests that when Qataris are with Arabs they feel comfortable in voicing their prejudice against the
“others”. Therefore, when they are with Arabs they speak of the non-Arabs as foreigners, thus including Arabs in the “in” group. However, when the discussion takes a more nationalistic view then non-Qatari Arabs are likely to be excluded.
There was consensus amongst participants that, when talking about the negative effects of foreigners, they were not speaking of Muslim Arab immigrants. All participants agreed that
Muslim Arabs are highly integrated and are not considered foreign by Qataris. Moreover,
248 | P a g e those foreigners received praise and favourable attitudes from participants. Along with being
Arab and Muslim, participants pointed to a growing population of immigrants born and raised in Qatar. These immigrants have not been naturalised due to the strict nationality laws; however, they have lived in Qatar all their lives, attending Qatari schools and living in Qatari neighbourhoods. Both young and old participants agreed that this group is integrated and accepted by Qataris. The following quotes from two participants, one from an older and the other from a younger participant, testify to this:
“There is a special section of them, foreigners, that have been with us since we were young, frankly, virtuous teachers and colleagues, they were like us and better, traditions they adopted from us, and they object to what we object to and discard what we discard. But, we talk about the foreigners as in the foreigner who comes from a different environment and a different religion and certain behaviours.” [M1] “One [Arab foreigner] studied with me from first grade primary to third grade secondary here and [he was] better than the Qataris and memorized the whole Quran MASHALLAH [a prayer said as praise].”[M5] Also, these immigrants, who are born and raised in Qatar, share more with Qataris than other immigrants. Many of them speak the Qatari dialect, wear Qatari clothes, and adhere to Qatari tradition making them undistinguishable from Qataris:
“One of my best friends is an immigrant born in Doha. I mean if he enters here you will think he is Qatari, he speaks Qatari dialect better than us. I have dealt with many Arabs who were born in Doha. I noticed that they have adapted to many of our customs.”[M2] However, participant [M6] asserted an exception to the “born in Doha” criteria. According to this participant for an immigrant to be identified within that favoured group they have to be assimilated into Qatari society:
“Born in Qatar means those who were born in Qatar and studied in Qatari schools and not those who were born in Qatar, but do not speak Arabic, born in Qatar and studied in international schools.”
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For the male participants of this group, the definition of the foreigner is not straightforward.
Participants offer a pyramid of social distance to assess how “foreign” foreigners are. At the top of that pyramid are Arab Muslims born in Qatar and integrated into Qatari culture. They are followed by Arab Muslims in general and at the bottom of that pyramid are non-Arabs.
These findings support those by Verkuyten (1997), where participants felt Muslim immigrants were more foreign to them because of the strength of cultural differences when compared to other immigrants coming from former Dutch colonies. In the Qatari context, Arab Muslims born in Qatar resemble the situation of the immigrants from former colonies in the Dutch context.
The Women’s Group Discussion The discussion on this subject yielded less detail in the women’s group. Three participants affirmed that they were more comfortable with Arabs than other immigrants. Participant [W2] even differentiated between Arabs and others, reserving the “foreigner” label for non-Arabs:
“Arabs will be more connected than foreigners, foreigners have different cultures, Arabs very rarely have differences, true their culture is a little bit different but there is a connection between us.” Participant [M5] added that Asians could reach a high level of integration like Arabs when they adopt Qatari customs and speak Arabic:
“We have Pakistani neighbours and their children god bless them they come visit us, every day they come…they speak Arabic fluently. I mean anything they need they ask for it.” The results of this section of the discussion suggest that there is a distinction when using the “foreigner” label. Most participants refused to consider Muslims and, in particular,
Arabs as foreigners. In the men’s group, a further distinction was present for those who were born and raised in Qatar supporting previous evidence on nativity as a measure of
250 | P a g e assimilation (Córdova & Cervantes, 2010). For Qataris, it seems, the legal aspect of citizenship is not the only gauge of foreignness. As Qatar is very strict in naturalisation of immigrants, participants showed that society has its own methods of accepting long staying and culturally assimilated immigrants as members of the local community, even if they are not equal in the eyes of the laws regarding citizenship.
The analysis included three main themes: the discussion of the experiment, which focused on immigrants in the workplace; the discussion of social interaction, which focused on cultural differences; and defining the immigrant, which revolved around who
Qataris considered to be immigrants or to be foreigners.
When it comes to immigrants in the workplace, while most participants agreed that priority and benefits should go first to Qataris, older and younger participants disagreed on how to evaluate immigrants. Older participants showed clear preference for Muslim and Arab immigrants while younger highly educated participants showed more liberal views towards non-Muslim and non-Arab immigrants in the job market. When it comes to social interaction with immigrants, the impact of visible cultural differences was strong. Modesty and what Qataris consider a “moral” dress code point to the underlying effect of religion in defining social identity and group membership. When it comes to defining the foreigner, participants clearly differentiated between Arab Muslim immigrants and others. They also gave special status to those immigrants born and raised in Qatar as the most integrated and least foreign. The results provided validation for some of the results reached in previous chapters and shed light on the context of other findings. Mainly, support was found for the claim about the perception of the
251 | P a g e religious identity of Westerners and the importance of visible aspects of values, among other issues, as the conclusion of this chapter will detail.
8.5 Conclusion This chapter utilised the results of two focus groups on immigrants to explore how
Qataris define and view immigrant groups. Although the logistical and social difficulties detailed here and in the methods chapter resulted in only two groups, the discussion of these two groups provided a wealth of knowledge. Mainly this chapter operates as a qualitative conclusion to the discussion in previous chapters. In this chapter, the focus was on how implementing the experiment utilised in the previous chapter in the focus group setting would affect the discussion of shared beliefs and shared culture as gauges of acceptance. Also, there was further exploration into how Qataris view their interaction with immigrants and how they perceived the impact of immigrant cultures.
Finally, how Qataris define foreigners was explored.
The hypothetical candidate experiment used in the previous chapter was implemented in the focus groups. The results supported the results of the survey experiment as participants in both groups focused on religion rather than on cultural background when discussing the candidates. While participants were divided on the issue, the fact remained that cultural background was not discussed and did not form a defining feature for the candidate. It seems that when thinking of defining differences, Muslims are generally considered to represent values similar to those of Qataris regardless of cultural background. Cultural differences, identified in previous research as a main definer of attitudes towards immigrants, seem to be more related to religious identity than social identity (Verkuyten, 2001; Verkuyten, 2003). However, it is worth noting that
252 | P a g e participants did not approve of any type of immigrant receiving higher pay or benefits than Qataris.
The chapter also aimed to explore how Qataris view interaction with immigrants. In the two groups, and regardless of the context, the discussion revolved around cultural dissimilarities proving that they are the main drive behind negative attitudes. The opposite was true when participants wanted to speak positively of immigrants. They used examples of cultural similarities and of immigrants behaving in a “Qatari” like manner socially. This leads to reaffirming previous results; the problem is not who the immigrants are, but rather how they behave in public and how culturally and religiously different they are from Qataris. The results here also support the importance of cultural differences in assessing assimilation (Córdova & Cervantes, 2010; Verkuyten, 1997).
The more Qataris shared cultural norms with immigrants the more likely they were to support them and defend them in the discussion.
Finally, this chapter focused on the definition of the foreigner. Cultural dissimilarities seem to have a great effect on social distance. The results suggest that, while religion and ethnicity do play an important part in forming Qataris attitudes towards immigrants, adherence to cultural and social norms improved views towards immigrants and were even sufficient to elevate some foreigners to the in-group for Qataris. Also, participants agreed that immigrants who were born and raised in Qatar could not be considered foreigners. This is consistent with previous findings on nativity as a measure of assimilation (Córdova & Cervantes, 2010). Although most of them do not qualify for citizenship under the country’s stringent naturalisation laws, it seems Qataris, at least in
253 | P a g e the context of our focus group, viewed them differently and accepted them as they would Qataris.
While the results of these two groups provide a wealth of knowledge on Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants, they also shed light on significant methodological considerations. First, it was found that recruiting participants through the phone yielded a low level of attendance. This was especially true when recruiting for the women’s group. It was found that more convenient methods of sampling, such as using undergraduate students and snowballing, while less desirable, were more likely to succeed and save valuable time and effort. We also suggest utilising existing Majlises, recurrent social gatherings, as basis for focus groups as they are reasonably diverse and
Qatari social norms make it difficult for Majlis organisers to refuse participation.
A second methodological issue is the use of Qataris or immigrants who dress and speak like Qataris as moderators and note takers is very useful in groups concerned about local
Qatari issues. Qataris moderated the two groups and participants did not shy away from their prejudices as a result. Although the study did not include a control group to test for this effect, the presence of a negative effect for the Arab interviewer in the survey as detailed in previous chapters served as evidence for the benefit of using Qataris in such settings.
Further research using focus groups is needed to explore who “the foreigner” is for
Qataris. The results here suggest that simply not being a citizen is not enough for Qataris as a definition. The importance of research discussing different attributes and utilising that in a discussion of social cohesion is advised. Also, the experiment utilised here proved instrumental in launching the discussion of immigrants in the workplace and
254 | P a g e similar experiments can be used as a catalyst for such sensitive subject matters. This chapter concludes the analytical part of this thesis and in the final chapter the results will be comprehensively discussed and conclusions drawn.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
This thesis aimed to further social cohesion research in the Qatari context through identifying the main determinants of Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants. Understanding that religion and traditional values play an important role in forming Qatari identity, the focus was on comparing the effects of religious, social, and political values on attitudes towards immigrants. In this final part of the thesis, the results of this mixed method study, and how they complement each other and come together to paint a picture of social cohesion in Qatar’s diverse society, are discussed. The first section will summarise the results of the various analytical chapters and seek to explain how they relate to each other. The second section will discuss the implications for this research academically and socially and offer recommendations for policy makers and civil society. This will be followed by some methodological observations and suggestions drawing on the experience of collecting data for this thesis. The final section will discuss the limitations of this study and what further research is facilitated by its findings.
9.1 Summary of Results Being a mixed method study, this thesis is made up of three main elements: survey results, survey experiment, and focus groups. First a summary of each analytical chapter is given before showing the connections between them.
9.1.1 Chapter 2: Contact and Trust in Immigrants The first analytical chapter of the thesis discussed the effect of contact on trust in immigrant groups. Contact has been widely proven to benefit trust in out-groups (Pettigrew et al., 2007;
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Sigelman & Welch, 1993; Stein et al., 2000). The analysis included three types of contact: with friends, neighbours, and co-workers. The results of the analysis suggest that these three types of contact operate differently according to the groups in question and the social distance between the group and the dominant groups. The chapter outlined three hypotheses. First, it was expected that contact would have minimal or no effect on Arabs. Second, that workplace contact would be more beneficial to trust in Westerners than other non-Arab groups while neighbourhood contact will have a more beneficial effect for the other two non-Arab groups.
Third, it was expected to find three patterns of effect for contact on trust: the first for Arabs, the second for Westerners, and the third for Indian sub-continentals and East Asians according to the cultural distance of the groups to Qataris.
The first hypothesis was partially supported by the results, as friendship was beneficial to trust in all groups. This is in line with Allport’s (1954) hypothesis about the positive effect of meaningful equal status contact. However, the least variance was observed in relation to trust in Arabs. Also, other types of contact did not affect trust in Arabs. When it came to the second hypothesis, the results were contradictory as workplace contact was strongly and positively related to trust in Indian sub-continentals and East Asians. In fact, the effect was weaker on trust in Westerners than the other two non-Arab groups. Finally, the third hypothesis was supported as three distinct patterns of the effect of contact were observed: trust in Arabs benefited from friendship only, trust in Westerners from both friendship, and the workplace and for the remaining two groups the three types of contact proved beneficial to trust in them.
It is important to note that the effect of contact with friends and co-workers remained strong throughout the analysis, even after introducing various value variables. While the effect of neighbourhood contact became non-significant in relation to trust in Indian sub-continentals
257 | P a g e in the final model. Along with adding to the literature supporting the positive effect of contact on trust, this chapter offers support to the importance of considering different types and levels of contact rather than using social diversity as a measure of contact (Goemans, 2011;
Matijskova & Leitner, 2011; McLaren et al., 2011). Results in previous studies on the importance of the venue for contact (Savelkoul et al., 2010) and intensity of contact
(Granovetter, 1973; Pettigrew et al., 2007) are complemented by the findings, as different venues and different levels of contact yielded different results.
9.1.2 Chapter 3: Religious Values and Trust in Immigrants The second analytical chapter was on the effect of religiosity and religious attitudes on trust in immigrants. First, the chapter analysed the measures on religious attitudes in the SSCQ and developed through factor analysis three dimensions of religiosity. Personal religiosity included a measure on reported religiosity, a variable on frequency of prayer, and frequency of attending religious activities. Perceived religiosity included four variables on approval of considering someone religious if they did not pray, did not wear hijab, smoked or dealt with a non-Shari’a-compliant bank, and a variable on approval of marrying one’s daughter to someone who did not pray. Finally, religious inclusion included measures on the importance of having a Muslim maid, the receiver of a donation being Muslim, and Islam as a prerequisite of gaining Qatari citizenship.
The chapter tested three hypotheses. First, that dimensions of religiosity would be negatively related to trust in non-Muslim immigrants. Second, it was suggested that high religiosity would improve the likelihood of trust in groups culturally and religiously similar to Qataris.
Third, it was proposed that measures derived from the Qatari context would function better and provide more variance than classical measures widely used in previous research.
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The first hypothesis was supported by the results as personal religiosity, indicated the consistent negative relationship across groups, only had a significant effect in relation to
Westerners – the group least likely to include Muslims. This, or any other dimension of religiosity, did not affect the remaining groups that are mixed between Muslims and non-
Muslims. The second hypothesis was supported by the effect of religious inclusion, which had a positive effect on trust in Arabs, the most likely Muslim group.
A significant finding of this chapter was affirming the importance of context-based measures of religiosity in Qatar and the Muslim world in general, the third hypothesis. Muslim countries remain highly conservative when compared to Western countries, and classic measures of religiosity, such as self-reported religiosity, did not yield good variance as almost all respondents (98%) reported being religious. Measures developed for this study that related to the Muslim context fared much better and provided good variance. These included the measures on perceived religiosity and personal religiosity, which offered significantly more variance than reported religiosity.
The results of this chapter testify to the importance of considering dimensions of religiosity
(Cygnar, 1977). Furthermore, the results contradict a significant body of literature testifying to the positive effect of religious attendance on social trust and tolerance of out-groups
(Brañas-Garza et al., 2009; Brenneman, 2008; Schmeets & Riele, 2013; Schoenfeld, 1978) as the measures on attendance, two of the three items of personal religiosity, proved negatively related to trust in out-groups. Finally, the results also support the findings of many scholars
(Brenneman, 2008; Gaduh, 2012; Scheepers et al., 2002) on the highly religious members of dominant groups having more prejudices towards members of religious out-groups.
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9.1.3 Chapter 4: Social Values and Trust in Immigrants The fourth analytical chapter of the thesis measured the effects of social conservative attitudes and civic participation on trust in immigrants. Following the same analytical steps utilised in
Chapter 3, the analysis began by identifying the dimensions of social attitudes. The analysis suggested three dimensions of social conservatism. The first dimension was based on gender roles, including a variable on Qatari youth wearing Western clothes in public and three variables on women working with men, appearing in the media, and attending co-ed universities. The second dimension included variables on traditional social views. The first was reported social conservatism and the remaining two variables were on the importance of tribes and teaching children about them. The third dimension was social inclusion, which included two variables on the importance of belonging to Qatari tribes and adhering to local traditions and customs for citizenship applicants. The measures developed through these dimensions were used along with a measure of civic participation, volunteering, and organizational participation in the analysis against trust in immigrants.
The chapter examined two hypotheses. First, those with more conservative social views would be less trusting of immigrants in general. While three of the four dimensions of social values tested did not exhibit significance in the final model, gender roles proved negatively and significantly related to trust in all immigrant groups. The variables used in constructing that measure, while focusing on gender issues, do reflect a general socially conservative view, as suggested by previous studies (Everett, 2013; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), affirming the hypothesis, at least partially.
Second, it was expected that increased civic participation would have a positive effect on trust due to the increased likelihood of contact. The results showed a positive effect for civic
260 | P a g e participation initially. The effect became non-significant by introducing contact suggesting that the effect of civic participation is increased contact with immigrants. These findings are in line with previous studies linking civic participation to increased contact with out-groups
(Welch et al., 2007).
The results also proved that it is possible and useful to separate religious from social attitudes, as it was seen that religious values functioned according to the group’s distance from Islam, while conservative social values affected all immigrant groups in the same way. Socially conservative Qataris are less trustful of immigrants in general, while highly religious Qataris are less trustful of non-Muslim groups.
9.1.4 Chapter 5: Political Attitudes and Trust in Immigrants This chapter measured the effect of political attitudes on trust in immigrants. The analysis identified three dimensions of political attitudes. The first dimension was conservative political attitudes, including three variables on the importance of Islam, implementing Shari’a, and customs and traditions to development in the Arab world. The second was Islamism, with a variable on Islamist political parties being democratic and another on religious scholars being consulted in political matters. The final dimension was liberal political attitudes including a variable on freedom of religion and another on secular political parties.
The chapter had two main objectives. The first was to establish if Islamist political attitudes were a function of religiosity. After running a factor analysis with both variables on Islamism and religiosity the findings suggest that Islamism and religiosity are not measures of the same phenomena. These results present an important view of Islamism in Qatar, and the Muslim world, as they support the claim that Islamism is not necessarily a product of religious attitudes (Tessler, 2003).
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Second, the chapter aimed to measure the effect of conservative, Islamist, and liberal political attitudes on trust in immigrants. Three hypotheses were tested, the first of which assumed that conservative political attitudes would result in less trust in immigrants. The findings suggest that, unlike religious and social conservatism, political conservatism is not a predictor of lower trust in immigrants. Previous results by various studies showing that conservative political views decrease trust in out-groups were not confirmed in the context of this study
(Conover, 1984; Dawes et al., 1988; Uslaner & Conley, 2003).
Second, Islamism was expected to have a negative effect on trust in non-Muslims, namely
Westerners. The results showed that, in the Qatari context, this was not true. However, respondents who scored highly on the Islamism measure were more likely to trust Arabs, the group most likely to be Muslim. Finally, it was expected that having liberal political views would increase the probability of trust in non-Arab immigrants. The effect of liberalism was positive and consistent for trust in all three non-Arab groups, supporting previous studies that reached similar results in Western contexts (Raijman & Semyonov, 2004; Weldon, 2006). The findings of this chapter provide political scientists with important information on measuring
Islamism and political attitudes in Muslim contexts. Islamism was not found to be a product of religiosity, and conservative political attitudes were found to be distinguishable from
Islamism.
9.1.5 Chapter 6: Hypothetical Candidate Experiment This chapter focused on exploring the relative importance of ethnic and religious difference in explaining prejudice towards immigrant groups. Our experiment involved four sub-samples receiving four different resumes. All resumes were identical except for name and religion: a
Muslim Arab, a non-Muslim Arab, a Muslim Westerner, and a non-Muslim Westerner.
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Respondents were asked about their approval of hiring the candidate. The chapter presented three hypotheses. The first hypothesis suggested that the Arab Muslim candidate would be the most hireable candidate amongst the four, being the most similar to Qataris culturally and religiously. The second hypothesis assumed that more conservative respondents across religious, social, and political values would be less likely to hire all candidates except for the
Arab Muslim. The third hypothesis expected that contact would improve the likelihood of hiring the candidate.
When it comes to the first hypothesis, the results prove that both Muslim candidates received similar high approval ratings, while both non-Muslim candidates received significantly lower approval. The results suggest that the relative importance of religion as an identifier is considerably stronger than cultural background for Qataris. Shared beliefs are more important to Qataris than a shared background.
When it comes to the second hypothesis, the results suggest that variables on attitudes towards other people’s behaviour were negatively related to the decision to hire all candidates. The results prove that conservative gender roles and perceived religiosity negatively affect the likelihood of hiring all candidates, irrespective of religion and cultural background.
Respondents with more conservative views on these variables seem to have an extremely narrow radius of trust. Finally, contact in this experiment was only significant when considering the Western non-Muslim candidate, partially supporting the third hypothesis.
9.1.6 Chapter 7: Focus Group Discussion of Social Cohesion in Qatar Finally, the focus group results provided a wealth of information and added context to the results on the quantitative part of this study. The focus groups aimed to answer a number of research questions that resulted from the survey-based analysis. First, the aim was to explore
263 | P a g e how Qataris define immigrants according to their distance from the Qatari community.
Second, a better understanding was wanted of the dynamics behind the results of the experiment that showed how religion was a stronger identifier to Qataris than cultural background. Finally, there was an attempt to explore how Qataris evaluate their interaction with immigrants and how they define immigrants and classify them.
Conducting the experiment in the group setting resulted in a similar outcome as the discussion revolved around religion in both groups and cultural background did not prompt a similar discussion. Participants were strongly polarised around views on Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants, while being Arab or non-Arab was not an item of contention.
The discussion on social interaction with immigrants revealed a high sensitivity towards behaviour and appearance that does not adhere to Qatari social norms. In this discussion it was difficult to disassociate religious from social conservatism, as both became entangled throughout the discussion. The discussion also hinted to the fact that adhering to Qatari social norms elevated the status of the immigrant in the eyes of the Qataris and integrated them into
Qatari society.
One important revelation in the groups was the way in which Qataris define the foreigner.
Participants refused to identify immigrants who were born in Qatar and adhere to social norms as foreigners. To them, this group are more Qatari than foreigner. This definition is important when studying social cohesion, as legal definitions can be misleading in a society where naturalisation is not a viable prospect for all immigrants.
The results of this mixed method study point to the significance of contact in increasing trust in immigrants in Qatar; however, religious and social considerations are also important in
264 | P a g e understanding anti-immigrant tendencies. Furthermore, observing the relationship between various forms of contact and religious, social, and political attitudes reveals that they are strongly linked12. Perceived religiosity and gender roles are negatively related to friendship with immigrants with perceived religiosity effecting contact with co-workers as well. It is not easy to determine causality. However, as theorised in the introduction of this thesis, contact and attitudes are intertwined. The more conservative the individual is, the less likely they will be open to befriending and socially interacting with immigrants. On the other hand, the more contact individuals have with immigrants, the more likely they would be introduced to different cultures and ideas and views that relate to other cultures (i.e. gender roles and perceived religiosity) are expected to improve. However, the focus group discussion found that cultural differences played a significant role in forming attitudes towards immigrants.
While in many instances participants pointed to positive contact as a precursor for defending immigrants, various forms of cultural differences appeared to guide the discussion in explaining prejudice.
In short, the findings suggest that Qatari prejudice against, and lack of trust in, immigrants is primarily driven by perceptions of cultural dissimilarity and considerably lessened through contact. Qataris, who are more conservative in their appraisal of other people’s religious and social behaviour, and, therefore, more anxious about cultural differences, are less likely to trust in non-Arab and non-Muslim immigrants. The results of the focus groups suggest that
Qataris are alarmed by visible displays of values that are different to their own. Also, liberal attitudes encourage a wider radius of trust (Delhey et al., 2011), along with an age effect where younger participants were more tolerant. These liberal tendencies seem to signify a
12 Table H.R on the effects of attitudes on contact can be found in appendix H.
265 | P a g e generational shift towards a more accepting culture, as we saw in the focus groups. Younger and more highly educated young Qataris were considerably more tolerant of immigrants and behaviour not compatible with social norms.
Qataris’ classification of immigrants is highly affected by the group’s perceived social and religious distance. Immigrants born in Qatar and who adhere to social and religious norms are highly accepted by Qataris. Westerners, who have less in common with Qataris, are the group most negatively affected by conservative attitudes, despite their relatively high socio- economic status. However, as seen in the experiment results in both survey and group formats, shared beliefs are more important to Qataris than a shared background. Even social attitudes that proved significant in explaining trust in immigrants had a religious aspect.
Gender roles included variables on wearing modest clothing, approval of women appearing in the media or working, and women studying with men. These issues are connected to religious attitudes, as modesty and segregation between men and women are based on religious convictions in the Salafi Islamic School most prominent in Qatar.
These results have many implications for Qatar’s diverse society and for social cohesion in
Qatar. Government policies of immigration and naturalisation and the work of Qatar’s civil society entities stands to benefit greatly from this comprehensive view of attitudes towards immigrants in Qatar. The following section will discuss these implications in detail.
9.2 Implications and Recommendations The implications of this study are diverse and many. However, they can be classified into three categories: research, social, and political implications. In this section, these implications will be addressed and recommendations proffered based on the results.
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9.2.1 Theoretical Implications The outcome of this study has profound contributions to the fields of social cohesion, social capital, and social contact. While we utilised the definition offered by Chan et al. (2006) for social cohesion that focused on trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to cooperate as characteristics of social cohesion, we propose that cultural understanding is as important if not more so than the characteristics mentioned in identifying and achieving social cohesion. As the results reveal, the cultural disparity between Qataris and non-Arab immigrants play a significant role in defining how Qataris view and perceive immigrants. The survey, experiment, and focus group results all point to various highly visible forms of cultural differences hindering positive attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, assessing the nature of cultural differences and their importance to social groups is important in understanding social cohesion.
Another definition that can be improved through observations revealed through this study is that of bridging social capital. Granovetter (1973) affirms that positive intergroup relations are a result of realising the benefit of cross-community relations and Putnam’s (2000) conceptualisation of bonding social capital focuses on shared interests. This research adds to that the importance of a sense of shared values. By values we refer to beliefs and practices relating to religious, social, and political aspects. This sense of shared values is more important than political and even social group formation. As the results showed Arabs received better trust, Muslims received better acceptance, and those born and raised in Qatar were viewed as of the “in” group. Muslim Westerners were highly favoured in the experiment while Arab non-Muslims were not, and attitudes towards groups including but not mainly
Muslims were viewed more favourably than Westerners, who were less likely to share
267 | P a g e religious and social values with Qataris. The focus group discussion revealed that sharing values with Qataris, especially religious, brought them much closer in the eyes of Qataris.
When it comes to social trust, the results clearly emphasize the importance of considering the radius of trust (Delhey et al., 2011). The radius identified in the Qatari context was not clear- cut; Qataris do not only consider nationality or even social group as identifiers of circles where they extend trust. Trust is extended according to a form of assimilation; however, assimilation in this case is into the wider Muslim context rather than the local Qatari context.
Therefore, when considering the radius of trust research should acknowledge the complex form of this radius that transcends preconceived notions of “in” and “out” and applies measures of accepted ideas and behaviour. A Westerner is highly prejudiced against unless he or she is Muslim then they receive high acceptance. On the flip side, Arabs are highly accepted unless their religion is revealed to be non-Muslim as seen in the experiment or they behave in a way contradicting Qatari religious and social norms as discussed in the focus groups.
The results also affirm the importance of Allport’s (1954) conditions for meaningful contact.
Contact with immigrant friends and co-workers were very significant in improving attitudes towards immigrants, while contact with neighbours was less effective. Therefore, as identified by previous research, we find that diversity in the neighbourhood is not a good predictor of attitudes towards immigrants (Goemans, 2011; Matijskova & Leitner, 2011; McLaren et al.,
2011). However, it is importance to give more consideration to the context of contact. In our study, we found that contact with friends functions differently than contact with neighbours or co-workers, and the characteristics of the group in question affects which context of contact has more of an effect on attitudes towards them. Furthermore, we believe that while shared
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“interests” would make contact more meaningful and, therefore, more effective in improving intergroup relations, being culturally similar hinders the positive effect of contact. As we saw with Arabs, contact did not have a strong effect on trust in them, and while we acknowledge the initial high trust in Arab and how it leaves little room for improvement, we propose that in order for contact to improve attitudes it needs to provide insight into the out-group’s values and norms alleviating prejudice. When the two groups are culturally similar there is little to be gained by contact in providing a better understanding of the other group.
The theoretical implications of this research will help in providing a conceptual understanding of social cohesion, capital, trust, and contact that is mindful of the different and unique social setting in the Arabian Gulf and the Muslim world in general. These key concepts are immensely important in today’s Arab region, which is rapidly realising the effects of globalisation and immigration and the various reactions in society. The results also offer some more practical research implications that will be discussed below.
9.2.2 Research Implications This study offers a comprehensive view of the effects of contact, and religious, social, and political attitudes on trust in immigrants in the unique context of Qatar where citizens are the minority while enjoying an array of benefits and high income. This study adds to the growing literature supporting the contact hypothesis, measuring contact through type and intensity rather than diversity of the neighbourhood allowed the identification of how contact affects trust in different groups (Goemans, 2011; Matijskova & Leitner, 2011; McLaren et al., 2011).
This method of measuring contact is recommended especially in highly hierarchal and segregated societies, such as the Arabian Gulf and Singapore, where immigrant populations count for a sizable proportion of the population.
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The study of values in the Arab Muslim conduct is problematic because of the fusion between the social and the religious. In this study, it was observed how different social and religious conservatism indicators interact with each other. Social values are highly affected by religious teachings; traditionalism in the Qataris context is akin to religiosity. However, it is possible to disentangle the two through using more context specific indicators such as tribal affiliation and importance of symbolic social behaviour such as local attire. This is especially important to research in the Arabian Gulf where strong tribal and traditional attitudes prevail in societies with exceptionally large and diverse immigrant populations.
Measuring political values proved more problematic in this non-democratic context where no political parties or elected legislature exist. The right-left measures used in the west would have not been easy to comprehend nor relevant. However, using Islamism as a gauge of political conservatism proved effective as the measures provided good variance and analytical power. The use of Islamism had two main benefits to the research. First, asking about attitudes towards specific government policies would have added to the sensitivity of the political indicators making it difficult for the respondent to openly voice their opinions, while speaking in the abstract or the regional dimensions on Islamism allowed for a more relaxed measure. Second, the extensive media coverage and handling of the Arab Spring conflicts in which Islamist political groups played a very significant role, assured acceptable exposure to the issue among respondents and Qataris in general. Notably, while there was an initial expectation of low variance on some political variables on Islamism due to the Qatari government support for Islamist groups in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Palestine, the well- balanced variance observed in the results prove that these measures were reliable.
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The survey experiment utilised in this study testifies to the efficacy of such tools of data collection in socially sensitive topics (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Schwartz et al., 1991;
Thomsen et al., 2008). The results of the experiment offered a clear predisposition amongst
Qataris for Muslims. The experiment can be replicated in different settings to test prejudice against immigrant groups. Also, it would be beneficial to consider other experimental manipulations along with religion and cultural background. As was apparent from the focus group discussion, being born in Qatar is an important indicator of Qataris acceptance of immigrants and can be used as a condition in the experimental design.
While the task of recruiting for and conducting the focus groups was a formidable challenge, their results reveal the importance of the method in providing a comprehensive view of
Qataris’ attitudes towards immigrants. However, the logistical difficulties point to the importance of developing better suiting recruitment techniques. Majlises, weekly or daily gatherings of friends and family in the reception room of the house, can offer a good setting for focus groups with Qataris as they are easily segmented. Bedouin (Nomadic tribes) and
Hadhar (City-dwellers) and men and women have different Majlises. Local custom makes it difficult for the host to refuse a proposal to conduct the group in the Majlis.
Social cohesion and social trust research is gaining importance in Qatar and the world, especially with the growing refugee crisis and the waves of immigrants moving into Europe and other parts of the world (Chan et al., 2006; Cheong et al., 2007; Friedkin, 2004; Putnam,
2007). This study offers a benchmark for attitudes towards immigrants in a region where little study on the subject has been done. The comprehensive view offered on these attitudes allows for further studies on the subject to test various explanations of attitudes towards immigrants in the Muslim context. Through testing the effects of contact, alongside value-based
271 | P a g e explanations of trust, a picture of intergroup social trust is presented that transcends classical diversity arguments and identifies how beliefs and social identity and traditions interact with contact and increased diversity to influence views on immigrants. The mixed method design employed allowed the capture of patterns of trust and how Qatari nationals explain them.
Finally, it is important to note the significance of this study in understanding social cohesion and intergroup relations in the unique context of Qatar. As stated earlier in the thesis, most research on the subject focused on Western contexts. This study was designed from the Qatari context and with measures specifically developed for that context. Therefore, it offers strong insight into how social cohesion operates in Muslim society where the privileged citizens are a minority and where immigrants hail from all around the world. In many respects, the patterns observed solidified theories of social contact and the perceived effects of conservative values on intergroup relations. However, the dynamics observed pointed to the importance of considering the context in measuring contact and values and linking them to intergroup relations. In Qatar, the scope and intensity of religious affiliation and practice is very different than Western contexts, in the SSCQ all respondents identified themselves as
Muslims and more than 90% reported being somewhat or highly religious. Even with demanding and intense religious practices and attitudes such as praying at dawn and perceiving women who do not wear headscarves as religious, the results showed that a majority of respondents were practicing and conservative in their assessments. These measures that were designed with the context in mind provided better variance than reported religiosity and conservatism and generic religious practice measures.
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9.2.3 Social Implications Qatar’s society is unique in many ways, one of which is the social structure that is layered hierarchically according to tribal and national considerations. The minority of citizens are provided with exceptional benefits and services, while living in a sea of non-citizen immigrants who have more limited resources and rights, and little prospect for naturalisation.
As discussed before, the results suggest that Qataris identify a certain subset of immigrants as being part of Qatari society; these are immigrants who have lived most of their lives in Qatar and have adapted to Qatari customs. Also, as apparent from the experiment results, religious similarities are a predictor of acceptance by Qataris. Furthermore, the results of both survey analysis and focus groups suggest that visible shows of cultural and religious differences, such as immodest attire and non-Muslim religious practices, exacerbate prejudice among more traditional Qataris. Younger and more liberal Qataris tend to show less prejudice and more tolerance for non-Arabs.
These results suggest that Qatari society is alarmed by the perceived dilution of its religious and social identity with the growing immigrant population, especially those who come from non-Arab, non-Muslim backgrounds. While the results suggest that contact is positively related to trust, the importance of considering religious and cultural differences and how they are perceived is stressed. Social policies are needed to encourage contact and, at the same time, raise awareness among recent immigrants from non-Muslim settings about the religious and social traditions in Qatari society, and their importance to Qatari citizens. Some social projects that address this issue do exist, such as the “Reflect your Respect” campaign initiated by a group of female Qatari volunteers to educate immigrants on Qatari customs and the
“Qatar Guests Centre” and “Qatar Cultural Centre” that focus on religious education and
273 | P a g e awareness for non-Muslims. These projects are helpful and additional emphasis on a dialogue between immigrants and Qataris is needed. The Qatari education system, on the other hand, should introduce students to the cultures of other communities that live in Qatar and encourage them to interact and better understand what these cultures bring to the larger Qatari community.
Civil society entities also play a significant role in improving social cohesion, as was seen in
Chapter 4. Volunteering and participation in organisational activities initially exhibited a positive effect on trust and were seen to encourage contact. With a small highly connected society like Qatar’s, the induction of more volunteers to existing charity programs that mainly benefit immigrants in Qatar will increase contact and encourage positive interaction between
Qataris and immigrants.
Political Implications
The government of Qatar has been successful in maintaining political stability and relatively low levels of public dissent by employing the "rentier state" model (Di John, 2002) that was possible due to the high natural resource income. Qataris have enjoyed increasing income and growing benefits that have raised Qatar to the highest personal income levels internationally
(International Monetary Fund, 2016). Nonetheless, the social implications of naturalising immigrants and the high economic cost of naturalisation have deterred the government from reforming immigration laws and instituting a clear path to citizenship. At the same time a large and growing immigrant population is needed to maintain and further develop Qatar’s growing economy (Babar, 2014).
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From the results above, it is clear that Qatari society draws its own distinctions and totally accepts a growing population of immigrants who were born in Qatar and share many characteristics with Qataris. This group of immigrants provides a solution for policy makers who are wary of the social implications for naturalisation. They are highly integrated, many of them are indistinguishable from Qataris, and they are accepted by Qataris themselves. This is illustrated by reactions to the interviewers who worked on this survey, who included many members of this highly integrated group to test for the differences between using Qatari and non-Qatari interviewers.
The results showed a significant negative effect of being interviewed by a Qatari on the levels of trust in Arabs, even though the interviewers were not actually Qatari but they belonged to the “born and raised” in Qatar immigrant group. The results, therefore, suggest that respondents were not able to distinguish between actual Qataris and these immigrants.
Gradually, naturalising individuals from this group as a first step would provide the country with a much-needed, settled, and much less likely to leave the country, workforce that is highly connected culturally and religiously to Qatari native citizens. The high trust levels and positive attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims in the focus groups suggest that a return to the
1960’s policies of preferring Arabs and Muslims in work visa allocation (Al-Jaber, 2002) will be beneficial to Qatari social cohesion. While liberal attitudes are gradually spreading through younger more educated Qataris, the majority remain highly conservative religiously and socially. These policies would be similar to cultural preference policies in East Asia and
Europe. In these countries, the policies favoured immigrants from a similar ethnicity to the dominant social groups considering them to be “returning” to the motherland. The Spanish case is most similar to Qatar’s as the policy favoured immigrants based on a notion of
275 | P a g e common culture and heritage. Immigrants from Latin America and the Philippines were faced with fewer requirements for citizenship and enjoyed social rights and services reserved for
Spanish citizens (Skrentny et al., 2007).
Qatari society is seeing more liberalisation that will surely minimise these levels of prejudice in the future. However, as suggested by previous research, the initial impact of a diverse and large non-Arab and non-Muslim immigrant intake could have a negative effect on social cohesion. The gradual introduction of more similar immigrants to Qataris socially and religiously will ease the transition to a more global and cosmopolitan society.
9.3 Methodological Observations Many methodological issues arose during the fieldwork and analysis that merit the attention of researchers embarking on studies that use such methods either generally or in similar contexts to Qatar. In this section, some methodological observations for each method used will be discussed.
9.3.1 Survey While designing the instrument of SSCQ measures of religious, social, and political attitudes were utilised in both the standard forms frequently used in research and context based indicators specifically developed for this survey. Many scholars have discussed the importance of developing contextually appropriate measures especially in traditional societies
(Ferketich, Phillips, & Verran, 1993; Flaherty et al., 1988; Harzing, 2006). Generally, the context-based indicators provided better variance and quality of data. Standard measures such as reported religiosity and social conservatism yielded more than 90% conservative responses.
On the other hand, when it comes to political indicators it was found that asking about attitudes towards regional issues that are not directly related to Qatar provided a better tool of
276 | P a g e analysis than questions on Qatar. The mean reason for this is that focusing on non-Qatari contexts dilutes the political sensitivity of the questions. As Qatar is an authoritarian state, political dissent is not likely to be voiced.
Initially the aim was to recruit only Qatari interviewers, to minimise the effects of having
Arab immigrant interviewers while asking about trust in Arab immigrants among other groups. The experience suggests that it is very difficult to convince Qataris to participate in such an effort. Qatar is a small and densely networked society, so if Qataris visited homes as interviewers they were likely to meet members of their tribes, families, and friends, and those approached stated that socially this would be unacceptable. Also, it was difficult to incentivise
Qataris through monetary compensation due their high income. An attempt was even made to recruit interviewers through a volunteer organisation with hundreds of Qatari members. The organisation pulled out of the research, after the pilot study, indicating that they objected to the fieldwork nature and social sensitivity of entering unfamiliar Qatari households. The solution found was to hire highly integrated Arab immigrants who speak in the Qatari dialect and wear traditional attire, both men and women. These interviewers were responsive to monetary incentives as the income of this group was significantly lower.
Conducting quality assurance call-backs to respondents suggested that around 80% of the
Qatari “lookalikes” passed convincingly as Qataris. The analysis of the results suggested that there was a positive correlation between being interviewed by an Arab immigrant and trust in
Arabs, as opposed to the Qatari lookalikes. While this group is not as easy to recruit as Arab immigrants, a Qatari can recruit them through rigorous interviewing beforehand to assess their dialect and appearance.
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On a related note, it was found that the male interviewers were only suitable for interviewing male respondents, while both males and females accepted female interviewers. Many female respondents explicitly refused being interviewed by male interviewers, male respondents, however, had no objections about the sex of the interviewer. Fielding female interviewers was also difficult as public transport was not a viable option in Doha and women drivers are not common in Qatar. This resulted in a supervisor being supplied, who also acted as a driver, for every two female interviewers. The male supervisor also participated in the initial contact with the household as female interviewers requested their presence when meeting the first respondent from the household as a safety precaution. The supervisor withdrew before the interview was conducted.
9.3.2 Focus Groups The main issue faced by focus groups was a low response rate from participants. After conducting 800 phone calls to SSCQ survey respondents only six male participants were secured, none of the female participants that confirmed attendance came through on two separate occasions. As a result, participants were recruited from a course at the University of
Qatar. As reported by previous research, participant recruitment in familial and traditional societies is more difficult and requires understanding and utilising existing social networks
(Umaña-Taylor & Bámaca, 2004; Winslow, Honein, & Elzubeir, 2002). These experiences lead to the suggestion that snowballing or purposive convenience sampling is more appropriate in the Qatari context, especially for female participants. Also, it is suggested to use Majlises as a venue for conducting focus groups as they are regular, weekly or daily meetings. The only down side to this is that participants will probably be from the same social
278 | P a g e group; however, this can be screened for beforehand through choosing specific Majlises where attendance is more diverse.
9.4 Limitations and Further Research As with any research on social phenomena, this study has its limitations and produced further questions in addition to those that were answered. In this section, we discuss some of these limitations will be discussed and suggestions for further research offered that arise from the results of this thesis.
First, in the quantitative part of this study, the stratification of immigrants relied on their country of origin. Such groups, however, are not necessarily coherent religiously. The two
Asian groups are mixed between Muslims and non-Muslims and even some Westerners are
Muslim. The survey experiment has revealed that acceptance of the Westerner was as high as the Arab when both were identified as Muslim. Further research will benefit from separating religion and cultural background when measuring attitudes towards immigrant groups. One way to do this is through asking respondents about their trust in Muslim members of the group then following with another question about non-Muslims of the same group. Another is to ask first about trust in Muslims and members of other groups, and then follow with a different battery on cultural background. Also, this research focused solely on the determinants of attitudes of the dominant group members towards immigrants. Further research is encouraged to study the attitudes of immigrants towards Qataris in order to form a more comprehensive view of social cohesion in Qatar.
When it comes to measures of religious, social, and political attitudes, this research provides a wealth of data on the reliability and validity of contextually specific measures that can be used
279 | P a g e in the study of various phenomena in Qatar and the Muslim world. When tested along with classical measures, these measures performed better and provided better variance especially when it comes to religious indicators. It is hoped that future research takes advantage of these measures and develops them further to encompass more dimensions of religiosity, social conservatism, and support for Islamism in the Arab and Muslim world.
Moreover, the focus groups revealed that the definition of the immigrant includes other dimensions: how long they have lived in Qatar and how integrated they are. More research is needed on the radius of trust in the Qatari context to determine how this dimension dilutes prejudice. As proven by Delhey et al. (2011), the radius of trust in familial and tribal societies tends to be narrower than in a modern, individualistic society and the results of the focus groups testify that this is true for Qatar. Perhaps using length of stay in Doha and a vignette of a socially and culturally integrated immigrant in an experiment similar to the hypothetical candidate would provide a much needed view of the radius of inclusion in Qatari society, which can be translated into a radius of trust.
Third, the absence of a control group with a Qatari candidate in our experiment did not allow us to compare our result to Qataris general approval of hiring a Qatari candidate. This is particularly important as the discussion of the focus group showed that the Qatari vs. immigrant in the workplace is a major point of contention for Qataris.
Fourth, the number of focus groups, although providing a wealth of information, is not large enough to provide a broad view of society. More groups are needed with more variance in ages and socio-economic status of participants.
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Finally, due to scope and logistical restraints, the study focused mainly on how the dominant group, Qataris, view other groups. To develop a more comprehensive view of social cohesion in Qatar, more research is needed on how immigrant groups view Qataris and each other.
9.5 Final Words This study was an ambitious undertaking entailing a nationally representative survey, the first ever implementation of the hypothetical candidate survey experiment, and organizing socially sensitive focus groups, all in a socially conservative context with little exposure to such measures. The quantitative part of the study included designing a survey instrument, running a pilot survey, training more than 70 interviewers, overseeing a month long fieldwork operation, cleaning the data, and rigorous analysis of the results from 1732 interviews.
Conducting the focus groups entailed conducting 800 phone calls and various failed attempts at organising logistics for a group where no one showed up.
Nonetheless, the wealth of results gained from this study made all that effort worthwhile. This study will pave the way for further research on a concept that is central for the future of Qatar.
As the country prepares for the 2022 World Cup and various other international events, more immigrants are flocking in to fill the void between Qatar’s ambitions and wealth and its small number of citizens. A socially and religiously conservative society is facing rapid economic and social change with diverse cultures and cultural groups growing in society and challenging the coherent nature of Qatari society. It is hoped that this research provides both academics and policy makers with tools to better understand and deal with the effects of large scale changes to the social structure and demographic setup of Qatar.
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APPENDICES Appendix A: Social Cohesion Questionnaire
The Social Cohesion Project
(LPI: Majed Al-Ansari )
Questionnaire
The Social & Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI)
Qatar University, P.O. 2713 Doha, Qatar Tel: + (974) 403 3020 Fax: + (974) 403 3021 Email: [email protected]
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QUESTIONNAIRES
{Q: INTRO} Read the following to the respondent. Good morning/afternoon/evening, I am ______, an Interviewer from the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute. We are conducting this survey on behalf of Qatar University to identify Qataris’ attitudes towards foreigners living in Qatar and explore their social interaction patterns with them and how that is affected by changes in Qatari culture and social values. the results of this study will further researchers and state institutions understanding of how Qataris view their non-Qatari counterparts and will assist policy makers in comprehending social trends and attitudes.
Your household was selected at random to be part of our sample. The information obtained here will be treated strictly confidentially, and your name will not be printed or used in any documents. The results from the analysis of these data will be presented in an aggregate format.
Participation in this survey is fully voluntary and you may refuse to participate. If we come to a question you do not want to answer, let me know and we can go to the next question. You also can stop the interview at any time.
May I speak to the head of the household OR anybody 18 years or older who is present in the household? 1 IF HE/SHE IS AT HOME (GO TO SELECTION OF RESPONDENT) 2 IF NOT AT HOME (MAKE AN APPOINTMENT)
[IF APPROPRIATE/NECESSARY: When may I find him/her? When is the best time to call? What is the best time to reach him/her?] [Once the head of household or anybody 18 years or older is reached – he will be asked about the number of adults and males/females in the household. Based on this information, a respondent will be randomly selected to complete the rest of the survey – if that person is available, READ: You have been selected and I would like to ask if you would work with us by answering a few questions. If the selected respondent is not available – reschedule]
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Demographics 1
{Q: GENDER } Record gender of respondent 1. MALE 2. FEMALE 8. DON’T KNOW/CAN’T TELL 9. REFUSED
{Q: DOB } What year were you born? INSERT YEAR: ------9998. DON’T KNOW 9999. REFUSED
{Q: MARITAL } What is your current marital status? 1. MARRIED 2. SEPARATED 3. DIVORCED 4. WIDOWED 5. NEVER MARRIED 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: CHILD } IF MARITAL < = 4, ASK Do you have children under 18 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: EDUC}
What is the highest level of education you attained 1. PRIMARY (1-6) 2. PREPARATORY (7-9) 3. VOCATIONAL 4. SECONDARY (10-12) 5. POST SECONDARY 6. UNIVERSITY GRADUATE/BA/BCOM/BSC
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7. MASTERS 8. PH.D. 9. OTHER (SPECIFY)……….. 10. NEVER ATTENDED ANY SCHOOL [SKIP TO EMPLOY] 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: EDUCM} If EDUC =6,7 and 8 , ASK [OPEN-ENDED QUESTION/ TO BE CODED AFTER THE PILOT] What major did you study during university level? ……………………………… 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: ABROAD} Did you study abroad for 6 months or more? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: ABROADW} If ABROAD =1, ASK Can you name the countries you have studied in? 1. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2. UNITED KINGDOM 3. Australia 4. Canada 5. Other (Specify):------8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: ABROADS} If ABROAD =1, ASK What is/are the educational level/levels you have completed abroad? 1. PRIMARY (1-6) 2. PREPARATORY (7-9) 3. VOCATIONAL 4. ALBAND ALMARKAZI 5. SECONDARY (10-12) 6. POST SECONDARY 7. UNIVERSITY GRADUATE/BA/BCOM/BSC 8. MASTERS 9. PH.D. 10. OTHER (SPECIFY)……….. 98. DON’T KNOW
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99. REFUSED
{Q: EMPLOY} What is your current employment status ? 1. Full-Time Employed 2. Part-Time Employed 3. Alband Almarkaze 4. Unemployed, Seeking Work 5. Unemployed, Not Seeking Work 6. Student 7. Homemaker/Housewife 8. Retired 9. Unable To Work 10. Other (Specify) 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: TITLE} IF EMPLOY< =2, ASK What is your job title at the moment? …………………….. 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: SECTOR} IF EMPLOY< =2, ASK Do you work in government, semi- government, private or Other? 1. Government 2. Semi-government 3. Private 4. Other (please specify)……….. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
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Social Values
{Q: CONSERV } When it comes to traditions and social norms do you consider yourself to be :
1. Highly conservative 2. Somewhat conservative 3. Somewhat not-conservative 4. Highly not-conservative 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: FAMILY} How many times do you get together with members of your extended family excluding family members who live with you in the same house per month?
INSERT NUMBER OF TIMES: ……….. 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: MAJLIS}
Do you attend any Majlis, excluding Family Majlises regularly? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: MAJLISF}
IF MAJLIS =1, ASK How many Majlis do you attend weekly?
ENTER NUMBER OF MAJLIS______
98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: GATHERING}
How important is it for you to attend social gatherings like weddings, funerals and dinners?
1. Very important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Not too important, 4. Not important at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
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{Q: IMPOTRIBE } How important is the tribe in your everyday life?
1. Very important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Not too important, 4. Not important at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: QPANTS} To what extent do you agree on Qatari youth wearing pants in public in Qatar? 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: MIXJOB}
To what extent do you agree on Qatari women working in mixed environment?
1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: WOMEDIA} To what extent do you agree on Qatari women appearing on television? 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: COED}
If you assume you had a daughter starting university, to what extent would you agree to sending your daughter to co-ed-university? 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED {Q: MARRYTRIBE} If we assume you had a daughter old enough to be married, to what extent would you agree to marrying your daughter to someone from a different tribal background?
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1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: MARRYPRAY} If we assume you had a daughter old enough to be married, would you agree to marrying your daughter to someone who does not pray? 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: QMIGRANT} Do you agree that migrants who gained citizenship recently are representatives of Qatari society? 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
In your opinion, how important should the following be as requirements for somebody seeking citizenship of Qatar? Would you say it is very important, somewhat important, somewhat not important, not important at all?
(INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) 1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. Somewhat not important 4. Not important at all 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name Being tribally connected to Qatari tribes {Q: CITIZENTRIBE} Adhering to Qatari traditions {Q: CITIZENTRAD} Being a Muslim {Q: CITIZENRELIG} Religious Values {Q: RELIGION } What is your religion?
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1. ISLAM 2. CHRISTIANITY 3. HINDUISM 4. BUDDHISM 5. OTHER (SPECIFY)…………… 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: RELIG} Would you describe yourself to be very religious, somewhat religious, somewhat not religious or not religious at all? 1. Very religious 2. Somewhat religious 3. Somewhat not religious 4. Not religious at all 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: IMPORELIG}: Cancelled
{Q: RELIGDIFF} How important is religion for you in facing difficulties? 1. Very important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Somewhat not important, 4. Not important at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: MUSLIMMADE} How important is it for you that the maid or the driver be Muslim? 1. Very important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Somewhat not important, 4. Not important at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
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To what extent to you agree that a person can be consider religious if (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name He / She smoke {Q: RELIGSMOKE} She don't wear Hijab {Q: RELIGHIJAB} He / She Don't pray regularly {Q: RELIGPRAY} He / She deal with a commercial bank (TO CLARIFY: NOT ISLAMIC / {Q: RELIGBANK} INTERESTS)
{Q: FAJR} Some people have problems waking up for prayers because of different reasons. How frequently do you pray Fajr on time? 1. Daily 2. More than once a week 3. Once a week 4. More than once a month 5. Once month 6. A few times a year 7. Seldom 8. Never 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: ATTENDRELIG1} Do you attend any religious activities such as Quranic circles and lectures? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
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{Q: ATTENDRELIG2} IF ATTENDRELIG1 =1, ASK Do you attend these activities: 1. Daily 2. More than once a week 3. Once a week 4. More than once a month 5. Once month 6. A few times a year 7. Seldom 8. Never 98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: DONATE } During the past 12 months have you donated money for charity? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: DONATMUSLIM} IF DONATE =1, ASK If you were to donate, how important is it for you that the recipient of your donation be Muslim? 1. Highly important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Somewhat unimportant, 4. Highly unimportant 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
Let us assume that you have children at the age of going to school. To what extent do you think that it is important to your them to learn about the following : (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE)
1. Very important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Somewhat not important, 4. Not important at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name Prophets and companions {Q: TEACHPROPH} Matters of worship {Q: TEACHWORSHIP}
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Qatari tribes history {Q: TEACHTRIBE} The Majlis tradition {Q: TEACHTRAD}
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Political Values
{Q: ROLEMODEL} Select from the following list of leaders the best suitable role model for Arab youth those days in your opinion? 1. Jamal Abdulnasser (Former president of Egypt) 2. King Faisal Bin Abdulaziz AL Saud (Former King of KSA) 3. Rejb Taib Erdogan (Current PM of Turkey) 4. John F. Kennedy (Former president of USA) 7. NON OF THE ABOVE 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
In your opinion, to what extent do you think the following is important to development in the Arab world? (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE)
1. Very important, 2. Somewhat important, 3. Not too important, 4. Not important at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name Adhering to Islamic principles {Q: DEVISLAM} Religious freedom for followers of all religions {Q: DEVFREEREL} Implementing Shari’a {Q: DEVSHARIA} Democracy {Q: DEVDEMO}
Maintaining traditions and customs {Q: DEVTRAD}
I will read to you a list of phrases could you please tell me for each one if you: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree with each of them : (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name The military should intervene in political life to protect democracy {Q: MILITARY} Islamist political parties are mainly democratic {Q: ISLAMIST}
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Secularist and liberal political parties should be allowed to play a vital role in the {Q: SECULAR} development of Arab democracy Modern constitutions in the Arab world should reference to Islam {Q: CONST} Pan-Arabism and western political ideas are to blame for the lack of democracy {Q: DEMOLACK} in the Arab world Religious scholars should be consulted in matters of politics {Q: SCHOLAR} The Muslim Brotherhood was to blame for the current situation in Egypt {Q: EGYPT} Naturalization laws in Qatar should be relaxed {Q: IMMIG }
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Contact
{Q: CHAT1 } Do you use chat services like Whatsapp or Black Berry daily? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: CHAT2} Deleted
{Q: SOCNET 1} Do you use social networks like Twitter or Facebook daily? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: SOCNET 2} Deleted
{Q: FRIENDS } Deleted
Do you have (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) friends? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name
Qataris {Q: FRQATARI_H} Arab {Q: FRARAB_H}
Westerns {Q: FRWEST_H} East Asians {Q: FRASIAN_H}
From Indian subcontinent {Q: FRIND_H} Regularly, how often do you meet with your (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) friends? 1. More than 5 times a month 2. 3 to five times a month 3. One to two times a month 4. Less than once a month 5. I never meet with them socially 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
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ITEM Variable Name [IF FRQATARI_H = 1, ASK] {Q: FRQATARI_M} Qataris Arab [IF FRARAB_H = 1, ASK] {Q: FRARAB_M}
Westerns [IF FRWEST_H = 1, ASK]{Q: FRWEST_M} East Asians [IF FRASIAN_H = 1, ASK]{Q: FRASIAN_M} From Indian subcontinent [IF FRIND_H = 1, ASK]{Q: FRIND_M} IF EMPLOY< =2, ASK Do you have (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) co-workers? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name Qataris {Q: COQATARI_H} Arab {Q: COARAB_H} Western {Q: COWEST_H} East Asian {Q: COASIAN_H} Indian subcontinent {Q: COIND_H} IF EMPLOY< =2, ASK Regularly, how often do you meet with your (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) co-workers outside work? 1. More than 5 times a month 2. 3 to five times a month 3. One to two times a month 4. Less than once a month 5. I never meet with them outside work 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name Qataris [IF COQATARI_H = 1, ASK] {Q: COQATARI_M} Arab [IF COARAB_H = 1, ASK] {Q: COARAB_M} Westerns [IF COWEST_H = 1, ASK]{Q: COWEST_M} East Asians [IF COASIAN_H = 1, ASK]{Q: COASIAN_M}
Indian subcontinent [IF COIND_H = 1, ASK]{Q: COIND_M} Do you have (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) neighbors?
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ITEM Variable Name Qataris {Q: NEQATARIB_H} Arab {Q: NEARAB_H} Westerns {Q: NEWEST_H} {Q: NEASIAN_H} East Asians Regularly, From Indian subcontinent {Q: NEIND_H} how often do you meet with your (INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE) neighbors?
1. More than 5 times a month 2. 3 to five times a month 3. One to two times a month 4. Less than once a month 5. I never meet with them socially 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name Qataris [IF NEQATARI_H = 1, ASK]{Q: NEQATARI_M} Arab [IF NEARAB_H = 1, ASK]{Q: NEARAB_M}
Westerns [IF NEWEST_H = 1, ASK]{Q: NEWEST_M}
East Asians [IF NEASIAN_H = 1, ASK]{Q: NEASIAN_M}
Indian subcontinent [IF NEIND_H = 1, ASK]{Q: NEIND_M}
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Trust And Tolerance
{Q: GTRUST} Generally speaking do you think "most people can be trusted or that "you cannot be too careful"? 1. You cannot be too careful when dealing with people 2. Most people can be trusted 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
How much do you personally trust each of the following groups of people:
(INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE)
1. Highly trust 2. Somewhat trust 3. Somewhat distrust 4. Distrust at all. 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
ITEM Variable Name
Qatari {Q: TQATARI} Arab {Q: TARAB} Westerns {Q: TWEST} East Asians {Q: TASIAN } Indian subcontinent {Q: TIND}
ITEM Variable Name
Cancelled {Q: TPOLICE} Cancelled {Q: THEALTH} Cancelled {Q: TEDUC}
To what extent would you approve if your [INSERT FROM THIS TABLE: (INSERT ITEM 1, RANDOMIZE) (INSERT ITEM 2, RANDOMIZE)
1. Strongly approve
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2. Somewhat approve 3. Somewhat not approve 4. Not approve at all 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
IIEM 1 ITEM 2 Group Neighbor Boss
was a Qatari {Q: NEQATARI_A } {Q: BOSSQATARI}
was an Arab {Q: NEARAB_A } {Q: BOSSARAB}
was a Westerner {Q: NEWEST_A } {Q: BOSSWEST}
was an East Asian {Q: NEASIAN_A } {Q: BOSSASIAN} was from the Indian {Q: NEIND_A } {Q: BOSSIND} subcontinent
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Assumption Case
FOR THE PROGRAMMER: ROTATE RANDOMLY BETWEEN A, B, C, AND D let us assume that you are a manager of the recruitment department in a governmental sector. this person applied for a major job in your department.
In front of you is the CV of that person. To what extent do agree to hiring this person ?
1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Somewhat disagree 4. Strongly disagree 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
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Demographics 2
{Q: VOLUNTEER } During the past 12 months have you volunteered in any non-governmental activity? 1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
Table questions were cancelled {Q: MEMBERORG1} Do you participate in the activities of a charity, sports club, youth center or any other similar organization?
1. YES 2. NO 8. DON’T KNOW 9. REFUSED
{Q: MEMBERORG2} If MEMBERORG 1= 1, ASK Please list the names of the organizations that you participate with: ………………………………………………………………
98. DON’T KNOW 99. REFUSED
{Q: ETHNICITY } Cancelled
{Q: OUTRO}
I have just a couple of final questions. As I mentioned, all of your answers are strictly confidential, and you can skip any question you don’t wish to answer.
{Q: PINCOME1} If (EMPLOY<2 OR EMPLOY=Other), ASK
Is your monthly income from work less than or greater than QR20,000? 1 Less than QR20,000 2 QR20,000 or more 8 DON’T KNOW 9 REFUSED {Q: PINCOME2} If PINCOME1=1 ASK
You said your monthly income is less than QR20,000. Is it…
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1 Less than QR5,000 2 QR5,000 to less than QR10,000 3 QR10,000 to less than QR15,000 4 QR15,000 to less than QR20,000 8 DON’T KNOW 9 REFUSED {Q: PINCOME3} If PINCOME1= 2ASK
You said your monthly income is QR20,000 or more. Is it… 1 Less than QR25,000 2 QR25,000 to less than QR30,000 3 QR30,000 to less than QR35,000 4 QR35,000 to less than QR45,000 5 QR45,000 or more 8 DON’T KNOW 9 REFUSED
Household income questions were deleted
{Q: TWITTER} IF SOCNET1=1, ASK The institute is currently studying the relationship between the person’s opinions and his/her activities on social networking sites. Can you provide us with your twitter username provided that it will only be used to view your public tweets.
INSERT TWITTER USERNAME: ………………
8 DON’T KNOW 9 REFUSED
{Q: THANKYOU} Are there any other comments you would like to make? [OPEN-END]
Thank you very much for participating. We appreciate the time you have taken to complete this interview.
[If you have any questions, you may call 44033031 or email at [email protected] or visit the website at http://www.qu.edu.qa/sesri. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you can also contact the Qatar University Institutional Review Board through the Office of the Academic Research at 44856356 or [email protected]
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Just mention the Social Cohesion Study in Qatar
Again, thank you and goodbye.
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Appendix B: Hypothetical experiment resumes13
Resume 1: Arab Muslim Mohammed Ahmed Hassan
Personal Information:
Birth date: 25/4/1978 Nationality: US
Marital status: Married Sex: Male
Email: [email protected] Religion: Muslim
Education:
BA Management- North Carolina University- USA
MBA- North Carolina University- USA
Work Experience:
1990-2003 Department of Administrational Affairs-USA 1990-1995 Administrative employee 1995-1997 Head of review section 1997-2003 Director of Research and Development
2003-2013 General Secretariat for Development Planning 2003-2009 Director of systems development 2009-2013 Director of Research and Strategy
13 Translated from Arabic
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Resume 2: Western non-Muslim Robert Philips
Personal information:
Birth date: 25/4/1978 Nationality: US
Marital status: Married Sex: Male
Email: [email protected] Religion: Christian
Education:
BA Management- North Carolina University- USA
MBA- North Carolina University- USA
Work Experience:
1990-2003 Department of Administrational Affairs-USA 1990-1995 Administrative employee 1995-1997 Head of review section 1997-2003 Director of Research and Development
2003-2013 General Secretariat for Development Planning 2003-2009 Director of systems development 2009-2013 Director of Research and Strategy
Resume 3: Arab non-Muslim
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George Ibrahim Al-Rayhani
Personal information:
Birth date: 25/4/1978 Nationality: US
Marital status: Married Sex: Male
Email: [email protected] Religion: Muslim
Education:
BA Management- North Carolina University- USA
MBA- North Carolina University- USA
Work Experience:
1990-2003 Department of Administrational Affairs-USA 1990-1995 Administrative employee 1995-1997 Head of review section 1997-2003 Director of Research and Development
2003-2013 General Secretariat for Development Planning 2003-2009 Director of systems development 2009-2013 Director of Research and Strategy
Resume 4: Western Muslim
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Abdul-Hakeem white Johnson
Personal Information:
Birth date: 25/4/1978 Nationality: US
Marital status: Married Sex: Male
Email: [email protected] Religion: Muslim
Education:
BA Management- North Carolina University- USA
MBA- North Carolina University- USA
Work Experience:
1990-2003 Department of Administrational Affairs-USA 1990-1995 Administrative employee 1995-1997 Head of review section 1997-2003 Director of Research and Development
2003-2013 General Secretariat for Development Planning 2003-2009 Director of systems development 2009-2013 Director of Research and Strategy
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Appendix C: Focus group guide
The focus groups we are conducting are a part of the Social Cohesion project that concluded the survey phase in December 2013; these focus groups have the following aims:
1- Understanding why Qataris put religion before culture in prejudice against foreigners. 2- Understanding how Qataris feel about living with non-Arab and non-Muslim foreigners. 3- Validating the measures used in the survey to gauge values. 4- Validating the resume experiment results. Introduction
Welcome Introduce yourself and the notetaker, and send the Sign-In Sheet with a few quick demographic questions (age, gender, employment, education) around to the group while you are introducing the focus group.
Review the following:
Who we are and what we’re trying to do What will be done with this information Why we asked you to participate Why were you specifically chosen to participate
Explanation of the process Ask the group if anyone has participated in a focus group before. Explain that focus groups are used in research to provide valuable insight into attitudes and social patterns.
About focus groups We learn from you (positive and negative) Not trying to achieve consensus, we’re gathering information The focus groups is a dialogue and not a questionnare In this project, we are doing both questionnaires and focus group discussions. The reason for using both of these tools is that we can get more in-depth information from a smaller group of people in focus groups. This allows us to understand the context behind the answers given in the written survey and helps us explore topics in more detail than we can do in a written survey.
Logistics Focus group will last about one hour and a half Feel free to move around Where is the bathroom? Exit?
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Help yourself to refreshments
Ground Rules Everyone should participate. Information provided in the focus group must be kept confidential Stay with the group and please don’t have side conversations Turn off cell phones if possible Be respectful to other opinions but do not be afraid to say what you think
Turn on Tape Recorder
Ask the group if there are any questions before we get started, and address those questions.
Introductions
Go around table: introduce yourself, name, where you work or study, do you have daily contact with non-Qataris? and who?
Discussion begins, make sure to give people time to think before answering the questions and don’t move too quickly. Use the probes to make sure that all issues are addressed, but move on when you feel you are starting to hear repetitive information.
Distribute the resumes after the introductions.
Questions
1. Let’s start the discussion by looking at the resume in front of you, take 2 minutes to read through it, now let us imagine you were responsible for hiring in your organization, would you hire this person [go around the room] ? 2. Ask both who answered yes and no, why? 3. What do you think about having more Westerners in Qatar, is it a good or bad thing? Why? 4. Do you think other groups like Arabs are better or worse than foreigners? 5. Which would you prefer as your neighbors Arabs or Westerners? How about Asians? 6. Let us move the discussion onto a different subject, I want you to read the questions in front of you, what do you think they are supposed to be measuring? [explain that there are three different versions] 7. Back to the issue of foreigners in Qatar, do you think the religion of a person should be a factor in determining if they should be allowed to live in Qatar?
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8. Now with the world cup coming shoudn’t Qatar be more open and allow for different religions and cultures to cohabitate? 9. Do you think religion or culture of the foreigner is the problem?
Probes for Discussion: Number of Qataris against needs of job market The killing of the English teacher incident International schools Competition with Westerners on high level jobs Higher education in the west
That concludes our focus group. Thank you so much for coming and sharing your thoughts and opinions with us. We have a short evaluation form that we would like you to fill out if you time. If you have additional information that you did not get to say in the focus group, please feel free to write it on this evaluation form.
Materials and supplies for focus groups Sign-in sheet Consent forms (one copy for participants, one copy for the team) Evaluation sheets, one for each participant 15 Copies of resumes for hypothetical job applicant 15 copies of survey questions on values Name tags Pads & Pencils for each participant Focus Group Discussion Guide for Facilitator 1 recording device Batteries for recording device Permanent marker for marking tapes with FGD name, facility, and date Notebook for note-taking Refreshments
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Appendix D: Proposal of social cohesion survey project (QU)14
Research proposal:
A Survey of Social Cohesion in Qatar
Introduction:
The study of diversity and its effects on society as a whole dates back to the end of the Second World War (Pettigrew, 1998) when influxes of immigrants arrived at the shores of wealthy Western countries from both former colonies and impoverished regions. Many theories were tested in relation to the effects of diversity on social cohesion and the main question to be answered was whether increased diversity was a means to a more prosperous and vibrant society or a hazardous shift towards a segmented insecure social environment.
Arguments have developed and transformed significantly through the years, form the positivists like Allport (1954) who believed that increased meaningful contact between different social groups will resolve differences and remove prejudice, to the increasingly pessimistic like Robert Putnam (2007) who believe that we are crawling back into our shells as diversity grows and we become less social altogether,. As it stands today most of the existing literature is set in the context of the United States, United Kingdom and other developed, as a result current theories are more suitable to that context and are less applicable in other parts of the world.
The Arabian Gulf area has been widely overlooked in research on diversity even though it is rapidly becoming a sought after destination for immigration from both developing and developed nations. Qatar, an Arabian Gulf country, with a population of less than two million is a seemingly unique case as the majority of the population – more than 80%- is made out of expatriates from various nationalities. With most expatriates coming from Arab countries and Southeast Asia, Western expatriates are seen to be of a distinctive nature as their high income is similar to their Qatari counterparts while their social and linguistic credentials differ greatly. Arab expats on the other hand are in-sync with the Qatari population as they share religion, language and many social traditions, however when it comes to income the majority of them are less significantly lower than Qataris on the economic ladder.
14 Research proposal presented to SESRI at Qatar University for funding and approval to conduct survey.
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This research is an addition to the effort of understanding diversity and its impacts on society through testing the validity of the three main theories explaining the effects of diversity on social cohesion; contact, conflict and Value based theories. Set in the context of Qatari society the research will focus on attitudes of Qataris towards diversity.
Aims and objectives
This survey aims to assess Qatari attitudes towards expatriates and evaluate the effects of contact, social and religious values and political orientation on these attitudes. The results of the survey will serve as benchmark indicators of prejudice and intergroup relations and will provide necessary data to conduct further analysis on religiosity, social values and conservatism in Qatar. Also, the results can be used to aid in setting and reforming social policy locally.
Sample size
The survey will measure only Qataris’ attitudes towards members of other groups. the sample will understandably be constrained to Qataris. However as the survey will include an experiment where the sample will be split into four groups, the sample size is proposed to be 1700 allowing for 425 respondents in each controlled group.
Timeline
Task Start Date End Date
Finalizing of survey instrument June 13, 2013 August 1, 2013
Pre-test of survey October 27, 2013 October 31, 2013
Adjusting questionnaire November 3, 2013 November 13,2013
Training for production November 24,2013 November 27,2013
Adjusting questionnaire November 28, 2013 November 29,2013
Production November 30,2013 December 28,2013
Data cleaning and checking December 29, 2013 January 4, 2014
Preliminary Analysis January 5, 2014 January 11, 2014
Preparing draft of results January 12, 2014 March 1, 2014
Midyear appraisal January 30, 2013 January 30, 2013
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Research team
Majed Al-Ansari (MSc) LPI
Kien Trung Lee (PhD) Co-LPI
Robert Ford (DPhil) PI
Laurence Lessard-Phillips (DPhil) PI
Mohammed Al-Subaey (BA) RA
Appendix E: Missing values table
Table M2: Missing values V a r i Don’t know % Refused % Total % a b l e Trust variables Trust in Arabs 7 0% 4 0% 11 1% Trust in Westerners 50 3% 8 0% 58 3% Trust in Indians 28 2% 4 0% 32 2% Trust in Asians 37 2% 8 0% 45 3% Contact variables Arab friends 1 0% 0% 1 0% Western friends 0 0% Indian friends 0 0% Asians friends 0 0% Arab neighbours 0 0% Western neighbours 1 0% 0% 1 0% Indian neighbours 0 0% Asian neighbours 0 0%
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Arab co-workers 0 0% Western co-workers 1 0% 0% 1 0%
Variable Don’t know % Refused % Total %
Indian co-workers 1 0% 1 0% Asian co-workers 1 0% 1 0% Religiosity Reported religiosity 1 0% 2 0% 3 0% Importance of religion in difficulties 0 0% Importance of religion of domestic staff 0 0% Importance of donation recipient’s religion 0 0% Teaching children (about Prophets) 2 0% 2 0% Teaching children (about tradition) 0 0% religion as a prerequisite for citizenship 7 0% 5 0% 12 1% Are smokers religious 8 0% 4 0% 12 1% Are women who do not wear Hijab religious 9 1% 2 0% 11 1% Are people who do not praying religious 9 1% 9 1% Are people who use bank interest religious 18 1% 9 1% 27 2% Importance of daughter’s suitor praying 1 0% 1 0% 2 0% Frequency of praying Fajr 2 0% 5 0% 7 0% Attending religious activity 2 0% 2 0% Social values Importance of Daughter’s suitor belonging to same 1 2 3 tribe 0% 0% 0% Agreement to Qataris wearing Western clothes 2 0% 1 0% 3 0% Agreement to Co-ed job 2 0% 1 0% 3 0% Agreement to Qatari women in media 11 1% 3 0% 14 1% Variable Don’t know % Refused % Total % Agreement to Co-ed education 2 0% 2 0% 4 0% Reported social conservatism 2 0% 2 0% Importance of tribes 8 0% 0% 8 0% Belonging to Qatari tribes as prerequisite to citizenship 14 1% 7 0% 21 1% Adhering to Qatari traditions as prerequisite to 4 4 8 citizenship 0% 0% 0% Volunteering 5 0% 1 0% 6 0% Participation in organisations 1 0% 2 0% 3 0% Teaching children (about tribes) 1 0% 1 0% 2 0% Political orientation Importance of Islam for development 2 0% 2 0%
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Importance of Shari’a for development 3 0% 4 0% 7 0% Importance of traditions for development 3 0% 0% 3 0% 12 16 Islamist parties being democratic 206 65 271 % 4% % Importance of referencing Islam in Constitutions 45 3% 15 1% 60 3% Religious scholars participating in political decisions 60 3% 31 2% 91 5% Importance of religious freedom for development 24 1% 12 1% 36 2% 10 Secular Parties 111 54 165 6% 3% % 12 18 Islamists to blame for Egypt turmoil 204 112 316 % 6% % Demographics Gender 0 0% Marital status 1 0% 1 0% Studying abroad 0 0% Interviewer nationality 0 0% Variable Don’t know % Refused % Total %
Employment 16 1% 16 1% Education 22 1% 22 1% Age 20 1% 13 1% 33 2%
Source: SSCQ, n=1732
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Appendix F: AME of effect of values on trust with missing values included
Table A.R.M: AME of predictors of trust with original missing numbers Arabs Westerners Indians East Asians Conservatism 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) Islamism 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Liberalism 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.02 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) University and higher 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.15 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Employed (ref: unemployed) -0.03 0.09 0.05 0.06 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.12 0.19 0.05 -0.06 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) Meeting 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.17 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.24 (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.15 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Meeting 0.03 0.05 0.22 0.19 (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) Personal religiosity -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Gender roles -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Source: SSCQ, n size in all models = 1437; Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%, age2 is multiplied by 1000. M1 includes main explanatory variables and controls, M2 introduces previously significant effects
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Appendix G: Chapter based G.C: Full model statistics for Chapter 3 The effect of contact on trust in Arabs: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (15,1466) = 8.46 Probability > F = 0
Table G.C.A.R: The effect of contact on trust in Arabs Linearized Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.68 0.30 2.30 0.02 0.10 1.26 Meeting 0.67 0.22 3.13 0.00 0.25 1.10 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.43 0.20 -2.19 0.03 -0.81 -0.04 Meeting 0.24 0.19 1.26 0.21 -0.13 0.61 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having -0.01 0.25 -0.03 0.98 -0.49 0.48 Meeting 0.19 0.25 0.74 0.46 -0.30 0.68 Age -0.01 0.05 -0.29 0.77 -0.11 0.08 Age2 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.72 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.24 0.21 -1.14 0.25 -0.65 0.17 University and higher 0.18 0.23 0.77 0.44 -0.28 0.64 Gender (ref: female) -0.31 0.21 -1.51 0.13 -0.72 0.09 Marital Status (ref: not married) 0.10 0.20 0.46 0.64 -0.31 0.50 Study abroad (ref: never studied abroad) 0.13 0.20 0.62 0.54 -0.27 0.53 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.03 0.25 0.11 0.92 -0.47 0.52 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.41 0.17 -2.32 0.02 -0.75 -0.06 Constant 1.36 0.98 1.39 0.17 -0.56 3.27
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Table G.C.A.A: The Average marginal effects of contact on trust in Arabs Linearized dy/dx z P>|z| Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.11 0.05 2.37 0.02 0.02 0.21 Meeting 0.11 0.04 2.82 0.01 0.03 0.19 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.07 0.03 -2.14 0.03 -0.13 -0.01 Meeting 0.03 0.03 1.26 0.21 -0.02 0.08 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.98 -0.07 0.07 Meeting 0.03 0.04 0.75 0.45 -0.04 0.10 Age 0.00 0.01 -0.29 0.77 -0.02 0.01 Age2 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.72 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.04 0.03 -1.17 0.24 -0.10 0.02 University and higher 0.02 0.03 0.77 0.44 -0.04 0.09 Gender (ref: female) -0.05 0.03 -1.52 0.13 -0.11 0.01 Marital Status (Ref: Not married) 0.01 0.03 0.46 0.64 -0.04 0.07 Study abroad (Ref: Never studied abroad) 0.02 0.03 0.62 0.54 -0.04 0.08 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.92 -0.07 0.08 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.06 0.03 -2.33 0.02 -0.11 -0.01
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The effect of contact on trust in Westerners: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 15,1466) = 8.99 Prob > F = 0
Table G.C.W.R: The effect of contact on trust in Westerners Linearized Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.89 0.24 3.65 0.00 0.41 1.37 Meeting 1.15 0.19 6.03 0.00 0.78 1.53 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having -0.02 0.22 -0.07 0.94 -0.45 0.42 Meeting 0.54 0.57 0.95 0.34 -0.57 1.65 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers)
Having 0.42 0.21 2.00 0.05 0.01 0.82 Meeting 0.25 0.32 0.78 0.44 -0.38 0.88 Age 0.11 0.03 3.23 0.00 0.04 0.18 Age2 0.00 0.00 -3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.11 0.19 0.59 0.56 -0.25 0.47 University and higher 0.50 0.20 2.54 0.01 0.12 0.89 Gender (ref: female) -0.02 0.17 -0.15 0.88 -0.35 0.30 Marital Status (ref: not married) -0.23 0.16 -1.40 0.16 -0.55 0.09 Study abroad (ref: never studied abroad) 0.09 0.17 0.55 0.58 -0.24 0.43 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.48 0.18 2.64 0.01 0.12 0.84 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) 0.03 0.15 0.21 0.83 -0.26 0.32 Constant -3.04 0.66 -4.57 0.00 -4.34 -1.74
Table G.C.W.A: The Average marginal effects of contact on trust in Westerners Linearized dy/dx z P>|z| Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.21 0.06 3.70 0.00 0.10 0.32 Meeting 0.27 0.04 6.24 0.00 0.18 0.35
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Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.94 -0.10 0.09 Meeting 0.12 0.12 0.96 0.34 -0.12 0.36 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers)
Having 0.09 0.05 1.98 0.05 0.00 0.18 Meeting 0.06 0.07 0.77 0.44 -0.09 0.20 Age 0.02 0.01 3.28 0.00 0.01 0.04 Age2 0.00 0.00 -3.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.02 0.04 0.59 0.56 -0.06 0.10 University and higher 0.11 0.04 2.52 0.01 0.02 0.20 Gender (ref: female) -0.01 0.04 -0.15 0.88 -0.08 0.07 Marital Status (Ref: Not married) -0.05 0.04 -1.41 0.16 -0.12 0.02 Study abroad (Ref: Never studied abroad) 0.02 0.04 0.55 0.58 -0.05 0.09 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.10 0.04 2.67 0.01 0.03 0.18 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.83 -0.06 0.07
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The effect of contact on trust in South-West Asians: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 15,1466) = 7.36 Prob > F = 0
Table G.C.I.R: The effect of contact on trust in South-West Asians Linearized Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.28 0.26 1.05 0.30 -0.24 0.79 Meeting 0.88 0.19 4.76 0.00 0.52 1.25 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having 0.10 0.16 0.60 0.55 -0.22 0.42 Meeting 0.56 0.29 1.91 0.06 -0.01 1.14 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers)
Having 0.51 0.17 2.96 0.00 0.17 0.85 Meeting 0.91 0.29 3.19 0.00 0.35 1.47 Age 0.05 0.04 1.35 0.18 -0.02 0.12 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.34 0.18 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.20 0.18 1.13 0.26 -0.15 0.56 University and higher 0.64 0.19 3.30 0.00 0.26 1.02 Gender (ref: female) 0.05 0.16 0.28 0.78 -0.28 0.37 Marital Status (ref: not married) -0.16 0.17 -0.95 0.34 -0.49 0.17 Study abroad (ref: never studied abroad) 0.04 0.17 0.24 0.81 -0.29 0.37 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.24 0.18 1.36 0.17 -0.11 0.60 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.12 0.15 -0.85 0.40 -0.41 0.16 Constant -1.82 0.67 -2.71 0.01 -3.14 -0.50
Table G.C.I.A: The Average marginal effects of contact on trust in South-West Asians Linearized dy/dx z P>|z| Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends)
Having 0.06 0.06 1.04 0.30 -0.06 0.18 Meeting 0.20 0.04 4.85 0.00 0.12 0.29
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Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having 0.02 0.04 0.60 0.55 -0.05 0.09 Meeting 0.13 0.06 1.93 0.05 0.00 0.25 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers)
Having 0.12 0.04 2.93 0.00 0.04 0.20 Meeting 0.21 0.06 3.29 0.00 0.08 0.33 Age 0.01 0.01 1.36 0.18 0.00 0.03 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.35 0.18 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.05 0.04 1.13 0.26 -0.03 0.12 University and higher 0.14 0.04 3.32 0.00 0.06 0.23 Gender (ref: female) 0.01 0.04 0.28 0.78 -0.06 0.08 Marital Status (Ref: Not married) -0.04 0.04 -0.95 0.34 -0.11 0.04 Study abroad (Ref: Never studied abroad) 0.01 0.04 0.24 0.81 -0.06 0.08 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.05 0.04 1.36 0.17 -0.02 0.13 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.03 0.03 -0.85 0.40 -0.09 0.04
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The effect of contact on trust in East Asians: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 15,1466) = 8.46 Prob > F = 0
Table G.C.E.R: The effect of contact on trust in East Asians Linearized Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends)
Having -0.22 0.29 -0.76 0.45 -0.78 0.34 Meeting 0.78 0.19 4.22 0.00 0.42 1.15 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having 0.18 0.18 1.00 0.32 -0.17 0.54 Meeting 1.03 0.30 3.42 0.00 0.44 1.61 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers)
Having 0.63 0.18 3.44 0.00 0.27 0.98 Meeting 0.82 0.30 2.72 0.01 0.23 1.42 Age 0.03 0.04 0.83 0.41 -0.04 0.10 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.83 0.41 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.21 0.19 1.15 0.25 -0.15 0.58 University and higher 0.76 0.20 3.82 0.00 0.37 1.16 Gender (ref: female) 0.11 0.16 0.69 0.49 -0.21 0.43 Marital Status (ref: not married) 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.90 -0.31 0.35 Study abroad (ref: never studied abroad) 0.17 0.17 1.01 0.31 -0.16 0.50 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.33 0.19 1.74 0.08 -0.04 0.70 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.12 0.14 -0.81 0.42 -0.40 0.17 Constant -1.85 0.68 -2.73 0.01 -3.19 -0.52
Table G.C.E.A: The Average marginal effects of contact on trust in East Asians Linearized dy/dx z P>|z| Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] Friends (ref: no friends)
Having -0.05 0.06 -0.78 0.43 -0.17 0.07 Meeting 0.18 0.04 4.19 0.00 0.09 0.26
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Neighbours (ref: no neighbours)
Having 0.04 0.04 1.00 0.32 -0.04 0.12 Meeting 0.23 0.06 3.58 0.00 0.10 0.35 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers)
Having 0.14 0.04 3.39 0.00 0.06 0.22 Meeting 0.19 0.07 2.72 0.01 0.05 0.32 Age 0.01 0.01 0.83 0.41 -0.01 0.02 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.83 0.41 0.00 0.00 Education (ref: Below Secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.05 0.04 1.15 0.25 -0.03 0.12 University and higher 0.17 0.04 3.87 0.00 0.08 0.26 Gender (ref: female) 0.02 0.04 0.68 0.49 -0.05 0.09 Marital Status (ref: not married) 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.90 -0.07 0.08 Study abroad (ref: never studied abroad) 0.04 0.04 1.02 0.31 -0.03 0.11 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.07 0.04 1.75 0.08 -0.01 0.15 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.03 0.03 -0.81 0.42 -0.09 0.04
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G.R: Full model statistics for Chapter 4 The effect of religious attitudes on trust in Arabs Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (16,1465) = 3.24 Probability > F = 0
Table G.R.A.R: The effect of religious attitudes on trust in Arabs Linearized [95% Conf. Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Interval] Personal religiosity -0.15 0.15 -1.02 0.31 -0.44 0.14 Perceived religiosity 0.06 0.08 0.78 0.44 -0.09 0.21 Religious inclusion 0.13 0.06 2.14 0.03 0.01 0.24 Age -0.01 0.05 -0.12 0.91 -0.10 0.09 Age2 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.79 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) -0.33 0.21 -1.57 0.12 -0.75 0.08 Interviewer nationality (ref: - non-Qatari) -0.41 0.17 -2.36 0.02 -0.75 0.07 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.23 0.21 -1.08 0.28 -0.65 0.19 University and higher 0.21 0.23 0.94 0.35 -0.23 0.66 Employed (ref: unemployed) -0.01 0.25 -0.03 0.98 -0.50 0.48 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.72 0.30 2.42 0.02 0.14 1.30 Meeting 0.71 0.22 3.28 0.00 0.28 1.13 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) - Having -0.42 0.20 -2.15 0.03 -0.81 0.04 Meeting 0.23 0.19 1.20 0.23 -0.15 0.61 Co-workers (ref: no co- workers) Having 0.01 0.25 0.06 0.95 -0.47 0.50 Meeting 0.21 0.25 0.82 0.41 -0.29 0.70 Constant 0.63 1.17 0.54 0.59 -1.66 2.91
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Table G.R.A.A: The Average marginal effects of religious attitudes on trust in Westerners Linearized dy/dx Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Personal religiosity -0.02 0.02 -1.02 0.31 -0.06 0.02 Perceived religiosity 0.01 0.01 0.78 0.44 -0.01 0.03 Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 2.14 0.03 0.00 0.04 Age 0.00 0.01 -0.12 0.91 -0.01 0.01 Age2 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.79 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) -0.05 0.03 -1.57 0.12 -0.11 0.01 Interviewer nationality (ref: non-Qatari) -0.06 0.03 -2.36 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.03 0.03 -1.10 0.27 -0.10 0.03 University and higher 0.03 0.03 0.92 0.36 -0.03 0.09 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.98 -0.07 0.07 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.12 0.05 2.48 0.01 0.03 0.22 Meeting 0.12 0.04 2.94 0.00 0.04 0.20 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.07 0.03 -2.10 0.04 -0.13 0.00 Meeting 0.03 0.03 1.20 0.23 -0.02 0.08 Co-workers (ref: no co- workers) Having 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.95 -0.07 0.07 Meeting 0.03 0.04 0.83 0.41 -0.04 0.10
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The effect of religious attitudes on trust in Westerners: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (16,1465) = 8.59 Probability > F = 0
Table G.R.W.A: The effect of religious attitudes on trust in Westerners Linearized [95% Conf. Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Interval] Personal religiosity -0.23 0.12 -1.85 0.06 -0.46 0.01 Perceived religiosity -0.09 0.06 -1.44 0.15 -0.21 0.03 Religious inclusion 0.02 0.05 0.38 0.70 -0.08 0.12 Age 0.09 0.03 2.77 0.01 0.03 0.15 Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.84 0.01 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) -0.13 0.17 -0.80 0.43 -0.46 0.19 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.05 0.15 0.34 0.74 -0.24 0.33 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.05 0.19 0.26 0.79 -0.32 0.42 University and higher 0.46 0.19 2.35 0.02 0.08 0.84 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.45 0.18 2.52 0.01 0.10 0.80 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.92 0.24 3.80 0.00 0.45 1.40 Meeting 1.18 0.19 6.14 0.00 0.80 1.55 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.02 0.22 0.08 0.93 -0.42 0.46 Meeting 0.57 0.59 0.96 0.34 -0.59 1.72 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.43 0.21 2.08 0.04 0.02 0.84 Meeting 0.23 0.32 0.71 0.48 -0.40 0.85 Constant -1.38 0.88 -1.56 0.12 -3.11 0.36
Table G.R.W.A: The Average marginal effects of religious attitudes on trust in Westerners Linearized [95% Conf. dy/dx Std. Err. t P>|t| Interval]
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Personal religiosity -0.05 0.03 -1.86 0.06 -0.10 0.00 Perceived religiosity -0.02 0.01 -1.45 0.15 -0.05 0.01 Religious inclusion 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.70 -0.02 0.03 Age 0.02 0.01 2.81 0.01 0.01 0.03 Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) -0.03 0.04 -0.80 0.42 -0.10 0.04 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.01 0.03 0.34 0.74 -0.05 0.07 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.01 0.04 0.26 0.79 -0.07 0.09 University and higher 0.10 0.04 2.33 0.02 0.02 0.19 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.10 0.04 2.54 0.01 0.02 0.17 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.21 0.06 3.87 0.00 0.11 0.32 Meeting 0.27 0.04 6.38 0.00 0.19 0.35 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.93 -0.09 0.10 Meeting 0.12 0.13 0.97 0.33 -0.12 0.37 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.10 0.05 2.05 0.04 0.00 0.19 Meeting 0.05 0.07 0.70 0.48 -0.09 0.19
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The effect of religious attitudes on trust in South-West Asians: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (16,1465) = 6.81 Probability > F = 0
Table G.R.I.R: The effect of religious attitudes on trust in South-West Asians Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Personal religiosity -0.08 0.13 -0.64 0.52 -0.33 0.17 Perceived religiosity -0.07 0.06 -1.20 0.23 -0.19 0.05 Religious inclusion -0.02 0.05 -0.43 0.67 -0.13 0.08 Age 0.03 0.03 0.99 0.32 -0.03 0.09 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) -0.01 0.17 -0.08 0.93 -0.34 0.31 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.11 0.15 -0.74 0.46 -0.39 0.18 Education (ref: below secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.17 0.18 0.93 0.35 -0.19 0.53 University and higher 0.62 0.19 3.24 0.00 0.24 0.99 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.23 0.18 1.30 0.19 -0.12 0.58 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.26 0.26 0.99 0.32 -0.25 0.77 Meeting 0.91 0.19 4.87 0.00 0.54 1.27 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.10 0.16 0.63 0.53 -0.22 0.43 Meeting 0.57 0.30 1.91 0.06 -0.01 1.16 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.51 0.17 2.92 0.00 0.17 0.85 Meeting 0.90 0.29 3.14 0.00 0.34 1.46 Constant -0.66 0.89 -0.75 0.46 -2.40 1.08
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Table G.R.I.A: The Average marginal effects of religious attitudes on trust in South-West Asians dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Personal religiosity -0.02 0.03 -0.64 0.52 -0.07 0.04 Perceived religiosity -0.02 0.01 -1.20 0.23 -0.04 0.01 Religious inclusion -0.01 0.01 -0.43 0.67 -0.03 0.02 Age 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.32 -0.01 0.02 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) 0.00 0.04 -0.08 0.93 -0.08 0.07 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.02 0.03 -0.74 0.46 -0.09 0.04 Education (ref: below secondary)
Secondary and diploma 0.04 0.04 0.93 0.35 -0.04 0.12 University and higher 0.14 0.04 3.25 0.00 0.06 0.22 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.05 0.04 1.30 0.19 -0.03 0.13 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.06 0.06 0.98 0.33 -0.06 0.18 Meeting 0.21 0.04 4.98 0.00 0.13 0.29 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.02 0.04 0.63 0.53 -0.05 0.10 Meeting 0.13 0.07 1.94 0.05 0.00 0.26 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.12 0.04 2.89 0.00 0.04 0.20 Meeting 0.21 0.06 3.23 0.00 0.08 0.33
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The effect of religious attitudes on trust in East Asians: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (16,1465) = 8.08 Probability > F = 0
Table G.R.E.R: The effect of religious attitudes on trust in Westerners Linearized Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Personal religiosity -0.12 0.12 -0.98 0.33 -0.36 0.12 Perceived religiosity -0.09 0.06 -1.38 0.17 -0.21 0.04 Religious inclusion 0.09 0.05 1.62 0.11 -0.02 0.19 Age 0.03 0.03 0.92 0.36 -0.03 0.09 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.85 0.39 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.75 -0.27 0.37 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.10 0.14 -0.71 0.48 -0.38 0.18 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.19 0.19 1.02 0.31 -0.18 0.56 University and higher 0.77 0.20 3.94 0.00 0.39 1.16 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.28 0.18 1.49 0.14 -0.09 0.64 Friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.16 0.28 -0.57 0.57 -0.72 0.39 Meeting 0.82 0.18 4.44 0.00 0.46 1.18 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.19 0.18 1.03 0.30 -0.17 0.55 Meeting 1.06 0.30 3.47 0.00 0.46 1.65 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.64 0.18 3.50 0.00 0.28 0.99 Meeting 0.79 0.30 2.63 0.01 0.20 1.37 Constant -1.33 0.88 -1.51 0.13 -3.07 0.40
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Table G.R.E.A: The Average marginal effects of religious attitudes on trust in Westerners Linearized dy/dx Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Personal religiosity -0.03 0.03 -0.99 0.33 -0.08 0.03 Perceived religiosity -0.02 0.01 -1.38 0.17 -0.05 0.01 Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 1.63 0.10 0.00 0.04 Age 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.36 -0.01 0.02 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.85 0.39 0.00 0.00 Gender (ref: Male) 0.01 0.04 0.32 0.75 -0.06 0.08 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.02 0.03 -0.71 0.48 -0.08 0.04 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.04 0.04 1.02 0.31 -0.04 0.12 University and higher 0.17 0.04 4.00 0.00 0.09 0.25 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.06 0.04 1.49 0.14 -0.02 0.14 Friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.03 0.06 -0.58 0.57 -0.15 0.08 Meeting 0.18 0.04 4.42 0.00 0.10 0.27 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.04 0.04 1.02 0.31 -0.04 0.12 Meeting 0.23 0.06 3.65 0.00 0.11 0.36 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.14 0.04 3.46 0.00 0.06 0.23 Meeting 0.18 0.07 2.62 0.01 0.05 0.31
G.S: Full model statistics for Chapter 5 The effect of social attitudes on trust in Arabs: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (18, 1463) = 3.13 Probability > F = 0
Table G.S.A.R: The effect of social attitudes on trust in Arabs Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.12 0.06 -1.97 0.05 -0.24 0.00 Traditional views 0.14 0.11 1.26 0.21 -0.08 0.35
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Social inclusion -0.03 0.06 -0.48 0.63 -0.15 0.09 Civic participation 0.34 0.24 1.41 0.16 -0.13 0.81 Age 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.86 -0.08 0.10 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.96 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.49 0.16 -3.02 0.00 -0.81 -0.17 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.28 0.22 -1.30 0.19 -0.71 0.14 University and higher 0.19 0.23 0.82 0.41 -0.27 0.65 Employed (ref: unemployed) -0.16 0.24 -0.64 0.52 -0.63 0.32 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.65 0.30 2.16 0.03 0.06 1.24 Meeting 0.60 0.21 2.81 0.01 0.18 1.02 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.40 0.19 -2.05 0.04 -0.78 -0.02 Meeting 0.21 0.19 1.08 0.28 -0.17 0.58 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.98 -0.47 0.48 Meeting 0.10 0.25 0.42 0.68 -0.38 0.59 Personal religiosity -0.09 0.14 -0.66 0.51 -0.38 0.19 Religious inclusion 0.14 0.06 2.20 0.03 0.02 0.27 Constant 0.35 1.19 0.30 0.77 -1.98 2.69
Table G.S.A.A: The Average marginal effects of social attitudes on trust in Westerners dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.02 0.01 -1.98 0.05 -0.03 0.00 Traditional views 0.02 0.02 1.26 0.21 -0.01 0.05 Social inclusion 0.00 0.01 -0.48 0.63 -0.02 0.01 Civic participation 0.05 0.03 1.41 0.16 -0.02 0.12 Age 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.86 -0.01 0.01 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.96 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.07 0.02 -3.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.03 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.04 0.03 -1.34 0.18 -0.11 0.02 University and higher 0.03 0.03 0.81 0.42 -0.04 0.09 Employed (ref: unemployed) -0.02 0.04 -0.64 0.52 -0.09 0.05 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.11 0.05 2.22 0.03 0.01 0.20 Meeting 0.10 0.04 2.55 0.01 0.02 0.18 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.06 0.03 -2.01 0.05 -0.13 0.00 Meeting 0.03 0.03 1.08 0.28 -0.02 0.08 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.98 -0.07 0.07 Meeting 0.01 0.04 0.42 0.67 -0.05 0.08
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Personal religiosity -0.01 0.02 -0.66 0.51 -0.06 0.03 Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 2.20 0.03 0.00 0.04
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The effect of social attitudes on trust in Westerners: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (18, 1463) = 8.04 Probability > F = 0
Table G.S.W.R: The effect of social attitudes on trust in Westerners Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.16 0.05 -3.29 0.00 -0.26 -0.07 Traditional views 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.86 -0.16 0.19 Social inclusion 0.05 0.05 0.85 0.39 -0.06 0.15 Civic participation 0.27 0.19 1.42 0.16 -0.10 0.65 Age 0.10 0.03 3.28 0.00 0.04 0.16 Age2 0.00 0.00 -3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.06 0.14 0.41 0.68 -0.21 0.32 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.02 0.19 0.08 0.93 -0.35 0.38 University and higher 0.41 0.19 2.16 0.03 0.04 0.79 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.43 0.17 2.58 0.01 0.10 0.76 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.88 0.25 3.55 0.00 0.39 1.36 Meeting 1.08 0.19 5.56 0.00 0.70 1.46 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.03 0.22 -0.13 0.90 -0.47 0.41 Meeting 0.53 0.56 0.94 0.35 -0.58 1.63 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.39 0.21 1.88 0.06 -0.02 0.80 Meeting 0.18 0.32 0.54 0.59 -0.46 0.81 Personal religiosity -0.20 0.12 -1.66 0.10 -0.44 0.04 Religious inclusion 0.04 0.06 0.69 0.49 -0.07 0.15 Constant -2.11 0.91 -2.31 0.02 -3.91 -0.32
Table G.S.W.A: The Average marginal effects of social attitudes on trust in Westerners dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.04 0.01 -3.34 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 Traditional views 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.86 -0.03 0.04 Social inclusion 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.39 -0.01 0.03 Civic participation 0.06 0.04 1.43 0.15 -0.02 0.14 Age 0.02 0.01 3.33 0.00 0.01 0.03
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Age2 0.00 0.00 -3.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.68 -0.04 0.07 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.93 -0.08 0.08 University and higher 0.09 0.04 2.14 0.03 0.01 0.17 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.09 0.04 2.60 0.01 0.02 0.16 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.20 0.06 3.61 0.00 0.09 0.31 Meeting 0.24 0.04 5.68 0.00 0.16 0.33 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.01 0.05 -0.13 0.90 -0.10 0.09 Meeting 0.11 0.12 0.94 0.35 -0.12 0.35 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.09 0.05 1.86 0.06 0.00 0.18 Meeting 0.04 0.07 0.54 0.59 -0.10 0.18 Personal religiosity -0.04 0.03 -1.67 0.10 -0.09 0.01 Religious inclusion 0.01 0.01 0.69 0.49 -0.01 0.03
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The effect of social attitudes on trust in South-West Asians: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (18,1463) = 6.45 Probability > F = 0
Table G.S.I.R: The effect of social attitudes on trust in South-West Asians Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.12 0.05 -2.50 0.01 -0.21 -0.03 Traditional views -0.05 0.09 -0.52 0.61 -0.22 0.13 Social inclusion -0.01 0.05 -0.22 0.82 -0.11 0.09 Civic participation 0.16 0.18 0.85 0.40 -0.20 0.51 Age 0.04 0.03 1.27 0.21 -0.02 0.10 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.24 0.22 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.08 0.13 -0.62 0.54 -0.34 0.18 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.12 0.18 0.69 0.49 -0.23 0.48 University and higher 0.52 0.19 2.72 0.01 0.15 0.90 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.25 0.17 1.47 0.14 -0.08 0.58 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.23 0.26 0.88 0.38 -0.28 0.74 Meeting 0.88 0.19 4.72 0.00 0.51 1.24 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.06 0.16 0.39 0.70 -0.26 0.39 Meeting 0.60 0.30 1.98 0.05 0.01 1.19 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.51 0.17 2.97 0.00 0.17 0.85 Meeting 0.90 0.28 3.19 0.00 0.35 1.45 Personal religiosity -0.06 0.12 -0.47 0.64 -0.30 0.19 Religious inclusion 0.01 0.06 0.21 0.84 -0.10 0.12 Constant -0.76 0.92 -0.82 0.41 -2.57 1.05
Table G.S.I.A: The Average marginal effects of social attitudes on trust in South-West Asians dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.03 0.01 -2.52 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 Traditional views -0.01 0.02 -0.52 0.61 -0.05 0.03 Social inclusion 0.00 0.01 -0.22 0.82 -0.02 0.02 Civic participation 0.03 0.04 0.85 0.40 -0.04 0.11
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Age 0.01 0.01 1.27 0.21 0.00 0.02 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.24 0.21 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.02 0.03 -0.62 0.54 -0.08 0.04 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.03 0.04 0.69 0.49 -0.05 0.11 University and higher 0.12 0.04 2.72 0.01 0.03 0.20 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.05 0.04 1.47 0.14 -0.02 0.13 Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.05 0.06 0.87 0.38 -0.07 0.17 Meeting 0.20 0.04 4.81 0.00 0.12 0.28 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.01 0.04 0.39 0.70 -0.06 0.09 Meeting 0.13 0.07 2.01 0.05 0.00 0.26 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.12 0.04 2.94 0.00 0.04 0.20 Meeting 0.20 0.06 3.28 0.00 0.08 0.33 Personal religiosity -0.01 0.03 -0.47 0.64 -0.07 0.04 Religious inclusion 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.84 -0.02 0.03
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The effect of social attitudes on trust in Westerners: Model fit Statistics Number of strata = 5 Number of observations = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design difference = 1480 F (18, 1463) = 7.51 Probability > F = 0
Table G.S.E.R: The effect of social attitudes on trust in Westerners Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.13 0.05 -2.72 0.01 -0.23 -0.04 Traditional views -0.05 0.09 -0.52 0.60 -0.22 0.13 Social inclusion 0.02 0.05 0.43 0.67 -0.08 0.12 Civic participation 0.24 0.19 1.29 0.20 -0.13 0.61 Age 0.04 0.03 1.24 0.21 -0.02 0.10 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.11 0.27 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.04 0.13 -0.33 0.74 -0.31 0.22 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.14 0.19 0.74 0.46 -0.23 0.50 University and higher 0.67 0.19 3.45 0.00 0.29 1.05 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.31 0.17 1.84 0.07 -0.02 0.65 Friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.18 0.29 -0.63 0.53 -0.75 0.38 Meeting 0.76 0.18 4.12 0.00 0.40 1.12 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.13 0.18 0.72 0.47 -0.23 0.49 Meeting 1.05 0.31 3.42 0.00 0.45 1.65 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.65 0.18 3.59 0.00 0.29 1.00 Meeting 0.84 0.30 2.81 0.01 0.25 1.42 Personal religiosity -0.12 0.12 -0.95 0.34 -0.36 0.12 Religious inclusion 0.12 0.06 2.17 0.03 0.01 0.23 Constant -1.61 0.93 -1.74 0.08 -3.43 0.20
Table G.S.E.A: The Average marginal effects of social attitudes on trust in Westerners dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Gender roles -0.03 0.01 -2.75 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 Traditional views -0.01 0.02 -0.52 0.60 -0.05 0.03 Social inclusion 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.67 -0.02 0.03 Civic participation 0.05 0.04 1.29 0.20 -0.03 0.13 Age 0.01 0.01 1.25 0.21 0.00 0.02
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Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.12 0.26 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.01 0.03 -0.33 0.74 -0.07 0.05 Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.03 0.04 0.74 0.46 -0.05 0.11 University and higher 0.15 0.04 3.47 0.00 0.06 0.23 Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.07 0.04 1.85 0.06 0.00 0.14 Friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.04 0.06 -0.64 0.52 -0.16 0.08 Meeting 0.17 0.04 4.08 0.00 0.09 0.25 Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.03 0.04 0.71 0.48 -0.05 0.11 Meeting 0.23 0.06 3.60 0.00 0.10 0.35 Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.15 0.04 3.55 0.00 0.07 0.23 Meeting 0.19 0.07 2.81 0.01 0.06 0.32 Personal religiosity -0.02 0.03 -0.95 0.34 -0.08 0.03 Religious inclusion 0.03 0.01 2.19 0.03 0.00 0.05
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G.P: CHAPTER 5
The effect of political attitudes on trust in Arabs:
Model fit Statistics: Number of strata = 5 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 21, 1460) = 3.29 Prob > F = 0
Table G.P.A.R: The effect of political attitudes on trust in Arabs Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Conservatism 0.15 0.17 0.90 0.37 -0.18 0.48 Islamism 0.11 0.06 1.74 0.08 -0.01 0.23 Liberalism 0.07 0.06 1.31 0.19 -0.04 0.19 Age 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.94 -0.09 0.10 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female -0.23 0.21 -1.10 0.27 -0.65 0.18 Marital status (ref: not-married) 0.08 0.20 0.39 0.69 -0.32 0.47 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.10 0.21 0.49 0.62 -0.30 0.51 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.39 0.17 -2.27 0.02 -0.74 -0.05
Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma -0.30 0.22 -1.40 0.16 -0.72 0.12 University and higher 0.15 0.23 0.64 0.52 -0.31 0.61
Employed (ref: unemployed) -0.84 0.32 -2.58 0.01 -1.48 -0.20
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.70 0.30 2.35 0.02 0.11 1.28
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Meeting 0.62 0.21 2.97 0.00 0.21 1.03
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having -0.43 0.20 -2.16 0.03 -0.83 -0.04 Meeting 0.21 0.19 1.07 0.29 -0.17 0.58
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.72 0.33 2.20 0.03 0.08 1.36 Meeting 0.88 0.34 2.63 0.01 0.22 1.54
Personal religiosity -0.13 0.15 -0.82 0.41 -0.43 0.18 Religious inclusion 0.14 0.06 2.26 0.02 0.02 0.26 Gender roles -0.08 0.06 -1.36 0.18 -0.21 0.04 Constant -0.48 1.38 -0.35 0.73 -3.20 2.24
Table G.P.A.A: The Average marginal effects of social attitudes on trust in Westerners dy/d Linearized Std. P>|t [95% Conf. t x Err. | Interval] Conservatism 0.02 0.02 0.90 0.37 -0.03 0.07 Islamism 0.02 0.01 1.74 0.08 0.00 0.03 Liberalism 0.01 0.01 1.31 0.19 -0.01 0.03 Age 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.94 -0.01 0.01 - Age2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female - -0.03 0.03 1.10 0.27 -0.09 0.03 Marital status (ref: not-married) 0.01 0.03 0.39 0.69 -0.05 0.07 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.01 0.03 0.49 0.62 -0.04 0.07 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- - Qatari) -0.06 0.02 2.28 0.02 -0.11 -0.01
Education (ref: below secondary) - Secondary and diploma -0.04 0.03 1.44 0.15 -0.11 0.02 University and higher 0.02 0.03 0.63 0.53 -0.04 0.08
- Employed (ref: unemployed) -0.12 0.05 2.61 0.01 -0.21 -0.03
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.11 0.05 2.42 0.02 0.02 0.20
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Meeting 0.10 0.04 2.70 0.01 0.03 0.18
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) - Having -0.07 0.03 2.11 0.03 -0.13 -0.01 Meeting 0.03 0.03 1.07 0.29 -0.02 0.08
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.11 0.05 2.25 0.02 0.01 0.20 Meeting 0.13 0.05 2.69 0.01 0.03 0.22
- Personal religiosity -0.02 0.02 0.82 0.41 -0.06 0.03 Religious inclusion 0.02 0.01 2.26 0.02 0.00 0.04 - Gender roles -0.01 0.01 1.36 0.17 -0.03 0.01
The effect of political attitudes on trust in Westerners: Model fit Statistics: Number of strata = 5 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 21, 1460) = 7.3 Prob > F = 0
Table G.P.W.R: The effect of political attitudes on trust in Westerners Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Conservatism 0.39 0.16 2.50 0.01 0.08 0.70 Islamism -0.03 0.05 -0.49 0.63 -0.13 0.08 Liberalism 0.11 0.05 2.28 0.02 0.02 0.20 Age 0.09 0.04 2.33 0.02 0.01 0.16 Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.35 0.02 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female 0.09 0.17 0.53 0.60 -0.25 0.43 Marital status (ref: not-married) -0.22 0.16 -1.35 0.18 -0.54 0.10 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.07 0.17 0.41 0.69 -0.26 0.40 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.05 0.15 0.31 0.76 -0.25 0.34
Education (ref: below secondary)
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Secondary and diploma 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.80 -0.32 0.41 University and higher 0.50 0.19 2.68 0.01 0.14 0.87
Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.33 0.17 1.99 0.05 0.01 0.65
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.88 0.25 3.48 0.00 0.38 1.38 Meeting 1.10 0.20 5.55 0.00 0.71 1.49
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 -0.45 0.45 Meeting 0.67 0.58 1.17 0.24 -0.46 1.80
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.35 0.22 1.58 0.12 -0.09 0.79 Meeting 0.10 0.33 0.30 0.76 -0.55 0.75
Personal religiosity -0.20 0.12 -1.63 0.10 -0.45 0.04 Religious inclusion 0.05 0.06 0.92 0.36 -0.06 0.16 Gender roles -0.16 0.05 -3.06 0.00 -0.26 -0.06 Constant -3.89 1.20 -3.24 0.00 -6.25 -1.54
Table G.P.W.A: The Average marginal effects of political attitudes on trust in Westerners [95% Conf. dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| Interval] Conservatism 0.08 0.03 2.51 0.01 0.02 0.15 Islamism -0.01 0.01 -0.49 0.63 -0.03 0.02 Liberalism 0.02 0.01 2.30 0.02 0.00 0.04 Age 0.02 0.01 2.35 0.02 0.00 0.03 Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.37 0.02 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female 0.02 0.04 0.53 0.60 -0.05 0.09 Marital status (ref: not-married) -0.05 0.03 -1.36 0.18 -0.11 0.02 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.01 0.04 0.41 0.69 -0.06 0.08 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.76 -0.05 0.07
Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.01 0.04 0.25 0.80 -0.07 0.09 University and higher 0.11 0.04 2.66 0.01 0.03 0.19
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Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.07 0.03 2.00 0.05 0.00 0.14
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.20 0.06 3.52 0.00 0.09 0.31 Meeting 0.25 0.04 5.65 0.00 0.16 0.33
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.10 Meeting 0.14 0.12 1.19 0.24 -0.09 0.38
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.08 0.05 1.55 0.12 -0.02 0.17 Meeting 0.02 0.07 0.30 0.76 -0.12 0.16
Personal religiosity -0.04 0.03 -1.63 0.10 -0.09 0.01 Religious inclusion 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.36 -0.01 0.03 Gender roles -0.03 0.01 -3.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.01
The effect of political attitudes on trust in Indian sub-continentals:
Model fit Statistics: Number of strata = 5.00 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485.00 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 21, 1460) = 5.59
Table G.P.I.R: The effect of political attitudes on trust in Indian sub-continentals Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Conservatism 0.25 0.16 1.51 0.13 -0.07 0.57 Islamism 0.05 0.05 0.86 0.39 -0.06 0.15 Liberalism 0.09 0.05 1.97 0.05 0.00 0.18 Age 0.04 0.04 1.08 0.28 -0.03 0.11 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.06 0.29 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female 0.18 0.17 1.08 0.28 -0.15 0.52 Marital status (ref: not-married) -0.13 0.17 -0.77 0.44 -0.46 0.20 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.01 0.17 0.08 0.93 -0.32 0.35
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Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.11 0.15 -0.77 0.44 -0.40 0.17
Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.16 0.18 0.90 0.37 -0.19 0.51 University and higher 0.63 0.18 3.41 0.00 0.27 0.99
Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.11 0.17 0.66 0.51 -0.22 0.44
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.22 0.26 0.81 0.42 -0.30 0.73 Meeting 0.85 0.19 4.50 0.00 0.48 1.23
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.06 0.16 0.39 0.70 -0.25 0.38 Meeting 0.68 0.31 2.21 0.03 0.08 1.28
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.51 0.19 2.69 0.01 0.14 0.88 Meeting 0.87 0.30 2.90 0.00 0.28 1.45
Personal religiosity -0.06 0.13 -0.48 0.63 -0.31 0.19 Religious inclusion 0.00 0.06 -0.09 0.93 -0.11 0.10 Gender roles -0.13 0.05 -2.54 0.01 -0.23 -0.03 Constant -2.82 1.24 -2.27 0.02 -5.25 -0.39
Table G.P.I.A: The Average marginal effects of political attitudes on trust in Indian sub- continentals [95% Conf. dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| Interval] Conservatism 0.05 0.04 1.52 0.13 -0.02 0.12 Islamism 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.39 -0.01 0.03 Liberalism 0.02 0.01 1.98 0.05 0.00 0.04 Age 0.01 0.01 1.08 0.28 -0.01 0.02 Age2 0.00 0.00 -1.07 0.29 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female 0.04 0.04 1.07 0.28 -0.03 0.11 Marital status (ref: not-married) -0.03 0.04 -0.77 0.44 -0.10 0.04 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.93 -0.07 0.08 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.02 0.03 -0.78 0.44 -0.09 0.04
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Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.03 0.04 0.90 0.37 -0.04 0.11 University and higher 0.14 0.04 3.43 0.00 0.06 0.22
Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.02 0.04 0.66 0.51 -0.05 0.10
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.05 0.06 0.81 0.42 -0.07 0.17 Meeting 0.19 0.04 4.56 0.00 0.11 0.28
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.01 0.04 0.39 0.70 -0.06 0.08 Meeting 0.15 0.07 2.26 0.02 0.02 0.28
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.12 0.04 2.66 0.01 0.03 0.20 Meeting 0.20 0.07 2.96 0.00 0.07 0.33
Personal religiosity -0.01 0.03 -0.48 0.63 -0.07 0.04 Religious inclusion 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.93 -0.02 0.02 Gender roles -0.03 0.01 -2.57 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
The effect of political attitudes on trust in Arabs:
Model fit Statistics: Number of strata = 5 Number of obs = 1485 Number of PSUs = 1485.00 Population size = 1480.448 Design df = 1480 F( 21, 1460) = 6.53 Prob > F = 0
Table G.P.E.R: The effect of political attitudes on trust in East-Asians Coef. Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Conservatism 0.20 0.16 1.27 0.20 -0.11 0.50 Islamism -0.02 0.05 -0.40 0.69 -0.13 0.08 Liberalism 0.08 0.05 1.63 0.10 -0.02 0.17 Age 0.02 0.04 0.51 0.61 -0.06 0.09 Age2 0.00 0.00 -0.50 0.62 0.00 0.00
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Gender (ref: female 0.21 0.16 1.28 0.20 -0.11 0.53 Marital status (ref: not-married) 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.88 -0.31 0.36 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.13 0.17 0.75 0.45 -0.20 0.46 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) -0.10 0.14 -0.72 0.47 -0.39 0.18
Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.17 0.18 0.90 0.37 -0.20 0.53 University and higher 0.75 0.19 3.96 0.00 0.38 1.12
Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.18 0.17 1.11 0.27 -0.14 0.51
Friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.23 0.29 -0.78 0.43 -0.81 0.35 Meeting 0.75 0.19 4.03 0.00 0.39 1.12
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.14 0.19 0.77 0.44 -0.22 0.51 Meeting 1.10 0.31 3.53 0.00 0.49 1.71
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.59 0.19 3.06 0.00 0.21 0.97 Meeting 0.76 0.31 2.44 0.02 0.15 1.36
Personal religiosity -0.08 0.13 -0.63 0.53 -0.32 0.17 Religious inclusion 0.11 0.06 2.03 0.04 0.00 0.22 Gender roles -0.15 0.05 -2.93 0.00 -0.25 -0.05 Constant -2.68 1.23 -2.19 0.03 -5.08 -0.28
Table G.P.E.A: The Average marginal effects of political attitudes on trust in East-Asians [95% Conf. dy/dx Linearized Std. Err. t P>|t| Interval] Conservatism 0.08 0.03 2.51 0.01 0.02 0.15 Islamism -0.01 0.01 -0.49 0.63 -0.03 0.02 Liberalism 0.02 0.01 2.30 0.02 0.00 0.04 Age 0.02 0.01 2.35 0.02 0.00 0.03 Age2 0.00 0.00 -2.37 0.02 0.00 0.00
Gender (ref: female 0.02 0.04 0.53 0.60 -0.05 0.09
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Marital status (ref: not-married) -0.05 0.03 -1.36 0.18 -0.11 0.02 Studied abroad (Ref: never studied abroad) 0.01 0.04 0.41 0.69 -0.06 0.08 Interviewer nationality (ref: non- Qatari) 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.76 -0.05 0.07
Education (ref: below secondary) Secondary and diploma 0.01 0.04 0.25 0.80 -0.07 0.09 University and higher 0.11 0.04 2.66 0.01 0.03 0.19
Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.07 0.03 2.00 0.05 0.00 0.14
Friends (ref: no friends) Having 0.20 0.06 3.52 0.00 0.09 0.31 Meeting 0.25 0.04 5.65 0.00 0.16 0.33
Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.10 Meeting 0.14 0.12 1.19 0.24 -0.09 0.38
Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.08 0.05 1.55 0.12 -0.02 0.17 Meeting 0.02 0.07 0.30 0.76 -0.12 0.16
Personal religiosity -0.04 0.03 -1.63 0.10 -0.09 0.01 Religious inclusion 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.36 -0.01 0.03 Gender roles -0.03 0.01 -3.10 0.00 -0.06 -0.01
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APPENDIX H: STANDARD ERRORS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
Table G.S: Standard errors and confidince intervals of variables used Std. Err. Conf. interval Gender Male 0.01 47% 52% Female 0.01 48% 53% Marital Status Married 0.01 66% 71% Seperated 0.00 0% 2% Divorced 0.00 1% 3% Widowed 0.01 2% 5% Never Marries 0.01 22% 27% Education Primary 0.01 7% 11% Preparatory 0.01 9% 12% Vocational 0.00 0% 0% Secondary 0.01 33% 38% Post secondary 0.01 7% 10% Bachelors 0.01 28% 33% Master's degree 0.00 1% 2% Phd 0.00 0% 1% Never attended school 0.00 2% 4% Studied abroad
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Did not study abroad 0.01 77% 82% Stidied abroad 0.01 18% 23% Employment Full-time employed 0.01 50% 56% Part-time employed 0.00 1% 2% Alband Almarkazee 0.00 1% 2% Unemployed seeking work 0.00 1% 3% Unemployed not seeking work 0.00 1% 3% Student 0.01 9% 13% Housewife 0.01 16% 20% Retired 0.01 9% 13% Unable to work 0.00 0% 1% Contact with Qatari friends No Friends 0.00 1% 2% Having friends without socially meeting them 0.01 4% 6% Having friends and socially meeting them 0.01 93% 95% Contact with Arab friends No Friends 0.01 11% 14% Having friends without socially meeting them 0.01 10% 14% Having friends and socially meeting them 0.01 73% 78% Contact with Western friends No Friends 0.01 70% 75% Having friends without socially meeting them 0.01 6% 9% Having friends and socially meeting them 0.01 17% 22% Contact with Indian sub-continental friends No Friends 0.01 71% 76% Having friends without socially meeting them 0.01 5% 8% Having friends and socially meeting them 0.01 18% 23% Contact with East Asian friends No Friends 0.01 74% 79% Having friends without socially meeting them 0.01 3% 6% Having friends and socially meeting them 0.01 16% 21% Contact with Qatari neighbours No neighbours 0.00 1% 2% Having neighbours without socially meeting them 0.01 17% 21% Having neighbours and socially meeting them 0.01 77% 82% Contact with Arab neighbours No neighbours 0.01 31% 37% Having neighbours without socially meeting them 0.01 23% 28% Having neighbours and socially meeting them 0.01 37% 43% Contact with Western neighbours No neighbours 0.01 87% 91%
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Having neighbours without socially meeting them 0.01 7% 11% Having neighbours and socially meeting them 0.00 1% 3% Contact with Indian sub-continental neighbours No neighbours 0.01 73% 78% Having neighbours without socially meeting them 0.01 16% 21% Having neighbours and socially meeting them 0.01 5% 8% Contact with East Asian neighbours No neighbours 0.01 78% 82% Having neighbours without socially meeting them 0.01 13% 17% Having neighbours and socially meeting them 0.01 4% 7% Contact with Qatari co-workers No co-workers 0.01 44% 50% Having co-workers without socially meeting them 0.01 10% 13% Having co-workers and socially meeting them 0.01 39% 44% Contact with Arab co-workers No co-workers 0.01 47% 53% Having co-workers without socially meeting them 0.01 20% 24% Having co-workers and socially meeting them 0.01 26% 31% Contact with Western co-workers No co-workers 0.01 78% 83% Having co-workers without socially meeting them 0.01 11% 15% Having co-workers and socially meeting them 0.01 5% 8% Contact with Indian sub-continental co-workers No co-workers 0.01 68% 73% Having co-workers without socially meeting them 0.01 18% 22% Having co-workers and socially meeting them 0.01 8% 11% Contact with East Asian co-workers No co-workers 0.01 74% 79% Having co-workers without socially meeting them 0.01 14% 18% Having co-workers and socially meeting them 0.01 6% 10% Would you describe yourself to be… Not religious at all 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat not religious 0.00 1% 2% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat religious 0.01 80% 84% Very religious 0.01 14% 18% How important is it for you that the maid or the driver be Muslim? Not important at all 0.01 7% 11% Somewhat not important 0.01 16% 20% Somewhat important 0.01 28% 33% Very important 0.01 40% 46% How important is it for you that the recipient of your donation be Muslim?
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Not important at all 0.01 12% 16% Somewhat not important 0.01 14% 18% Somewhat important 0.01 22% 27% Very important 0.01 43% 48% How important should belonging to Islam be as requirements for somebody seeking citizenship Not important at all 0.00 1% 2% Somewhat not important 0.01 2% 4% Don't know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat important 0.01 6% 9% Very important 0.01 85% 89% To what extent to you agree that a smoker can be considered religious Strongly agree 0.01 4% 6% Somewhat agree 0.01 50% 56% Don't know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat disagree 0.01 23% 28% Strongly disagree 0.01 14% 18% To what extent to you agree that a woman not wearing Hijab can be considered religious Strongly agree 0.00 2% 3% Somewhat agree 0.01 17% 21% Don't know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat disagree 0.01 16% 20% Strongly disagree 0.01 57% 63% To what extent to you agree that a person who does not pray can be considered religious Strongly agree 0.00 1% 2% Somewhat agree 0.01 17% 21% Don't know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat disagree 0.01 26% 31% Strongly disagree 0.01 48% 54% To what extent to you agree that a person who deals with a non-Shari’a compliant bank can be considered religious Strongly agree 0.01 2% 4% Somewhat agree 0.01 32% 38% Don’t know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat disagree 0.01 23% 28% Strongly disagree 0.01 33% 38% Would you agree to marrying your daughter to someone who does not pray? Strongly agree 0.00 1% 2% Somewhat agree 0.01 4% 6% Somewhat disagree 0.01 6% 9% Strongly disagree 0.01 84% 89% How frequently do you observe (Dawn prayer) on time? Less than once a month 0.01 3% 6% Once a week/ More than once a month 0.01 7% 11%
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More than once a week 0.01 31% 36% Daily 0.01 50% 56% Do you attend any religious activities such as Quranic circles and lectures? No 0.01 71% 76% Yes 0.01 24% 29% When it comes to traditions and social norms do you consider yourself to be : Highly not-conservative 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat not-conservative 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat conservative 0.01 46% 52% Highly conservative 0.01 48% 53% How important is the tribe in your everyday life? Not important at all 0.01 2% 4% Not too important 0.01 4% 7% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat important 0.01 19% 23% Very important 0.01 68% 74% In your opinion, how important should Adhering to Qatari traditions be as a requirement for somebody seeking citizenship of Qatar? Not important at all 0.00 2% 4% Not too important 0.01 7% 10% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat important 0.01 21% 26% Very important 0.01 62% 68% To what extent do you think that it is important to children to learn about Qatari tribes history? Not important at all 0.00 1% 3% Not too important 0.01 5% 8% Somewhat important 0.01 22% 27% Very important 0.01 64% 70% To what extent do you agree with Qatari youth wearing trousers in public in Qatar? Strongly disagree 0.01 3% 5% Somewhat disagree 0.01 26% 31% Somewhat agree 0.01 17% 22% Strongly agree 0.01 45% 51% To what extent do you agree with Qatari women working in mixed environments? Strongly disagree 0.01 14% 18% Somewhat disagree 0.01 38% 43% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat agree 0.01 13% 18% Strongly agree 0.01 25% 30%
To what extent do you agree with Qatari women appearing on television? Strongly disagree 0.01 18% 23% Somewhat disagree 0.01 46% 51%
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Don't know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat agree 0.01 12% 16% Strongly agree 0.01 14% 18% To what extent would you agree to sending your daughter to a co-ed-university? Strongly disagree 0.01 11% 15% Somewhat disagree 0.01 26% 31% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat agree 0.01 11% 15% Strongly agree 0.01 43% 48% During the past 12 months have you volunteered in any non-governmental activity? No 0.01 81% 85% Yes 0.01 15% 19% Do you participate in the activities of a charity, sports club, youth centre or any other similar organization? No 0.01 77% 82% Yes 0.01 18% 23% Importance to development in the Arab world: Adhering to Islamic principles Very important 0.01 92% 94% somewhat important 0.01 5% 8% Importance to development in the Arab world: Implementing Shari’a Not important at all 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat not important 0.00 1% 2% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat important 0.01 8% 11% Very important 0.01 87% 90% Important to development in the Arab world: Maintaining traditions and customs Not important at all 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat not important 0.00 2% 4% Don't know 0.00 0% 0% Somewhat important 0.01 18% 22% Very important 0.01 74% 79% Islamist political parties are mainly democratic Strongly disagree 0.01 10% 14% Somewhat disagree 0.01 19% 23% Don't know 0.01 9% 13% Somewhat agree 0.01 39% 45% Strongly agree 0.01 12% 16% Modern Arab constitutions should use Islam as a reference Strongly disagree 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat disagree 0.00 2% 4% Don't know 0.00 2% 3% Somewhat agree 0.01 16% 21% Strongly agree 0.01 73% 78%
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Religious scholars should be consulted in matters of politics Strongly disagree 0.01 5% 8% Somewhat disagree 0.01 8% 12% Don't know 0.00 2% 4% Somewhat agree 0.01 36% 42% Strongly agree 0.01 38% 44% Important to development in the Arab world: Religious freedom for followers of all religions Strongly disagree 0.01 40% 46% Somewhat disagree 0.01 32% 37% Don't know 0.00 0% 1% Somewhat agree 0.01 11% 15% Strongly agree 0.01 7% 10% Agreement to secular political parties participating in elections in the Arab world Strongly disagree 0.01 14% 18% Somewhat disagree 0.01 28% 33% Don't know 0.01 5% 7% Somewhat agree 0.01 14% 18% Strongly agree 0.01 28% 34% Muslim Brotherhood mainly to blame for turmoil in Egypt Strongly agree 0.01 8% 11% Somewhat agree 0.01 16% 21% Don't know 0.01 9% 13% Somewhat disagree 0.01 25% 30% Strongly disagree 0.01 31% 36% Agreement to hire Arab Muslim Strongly disagree 0.01 4% 9% Somewhat disagree 0.01 4% 9% Somewhat agree 0.03 41% 53% Strongly agree 0.03 34% 45% Agreement to hire Arab Christian Strongly disagree 0.02 12% 21% Somewhat disagree 0.02 12% 21% Somewhat agree 0.03 41% 52% Strongly agree 0.02 16% 24% Agreement to hire Western Muslim Strongly disagree 0.01 4% 10% Somewhat disagree 0.02 4% 11% Somewhat agree 0.03 39% 51%
Strongly agree 0.03 35% 46% Agreement to hire Western Christian Strongly disagree 0.02 17% 26%
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Somewhat disagree 0.02 8% 16% Somewhat agree 0.03 38% 50% Strongly agree 0.03 17% 27% Source: SSCQ 2013, n=1485
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Appendix I: Effect of religious, social and political attitudes on contact
Table I.R: Effects of religious, social and political attitudes on contact with immigrants Contact with friends Contact with neighbours Contact with co-workers East East East Ar Weste Indi Ar Weste Indi Ar Weste Indi Asia Asia Asia abs rners ans abs rners ans abs rners ans ns ns ns - Personal 0.0 0.1 0.2 - religiosity 6 0.03 0.06 0.17 7 0.30 0.32 0.20 5 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.1 0.1 0.1 4 0.15 0.15 0.16 2 0.24 0.14 0.17 2 0.17 0.14 0.15 - - - Perceived 0.1 - 0.0 - 0.3 - religiosity 0 -0.15 0.19 -0.21 3 0.06 0.05 0.03 3 -0.20 0.28 -0.33 0.0 0.0 0.0 7 0.07 0.07 0.07 5 0.12 0.07 0.08 6 0.08 0.07 0.07 Religious 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.1 Inclusion 2 0.04 0.01 -0.05 9 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 0 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 0.06 0.06 0.07 5 0.10 0.06 0.07 6 0.08 0.06 0.07 - - 0.1 - 0.0 - 0.0 - Gender roles 2 -0.22 0.07 -0.16 6 -0.08 0.05 -0.16 6 -0.17 0.03 -0.06 0.0 0.0 0.0 5 0.06 0.05 0.06 4 0.08 0.06 0.06 5 0.07 0.06 0.06 - Traditional 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.1 views 2 0.04 0.02 0.10 2 0.06 0.18 -0.05 5 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.1 0.0 0.0 0 0.10 0.11 0.12 7 0.13 0.10 0.11 9 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 Social inclusion 5 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0 0.00 0.04 -0.07 4 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 0.06 0.06 0.06 4 0.08 0.06 0.06 5 0.06 0.06 0.06 Civic 1.2 0.5 0.7 participation 5 1.18 0.94 1.15 6 0.81 0.27 0.41 9 0.94 0.79 0.62 0.2 0.1 0.2 3 0.20 0.19 0.20 7 0.26 0.19 0.22 1 0.22 0.21 0.21 - - Conservatism 0.1 0.0 - 0.3 - 8 -0.23 0.00 -0.23 9 -0.26 0.05 0.02 0 -0.46 0.33 -0.43 0.1 0.1 0.1 6 0.18 0.16 0.18 1 0.20 0.16 0.17 3 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - Islamism 4 -0.04 0.02 0.00 1 0.15 0.09 -0.03 0 0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 0.06 0.06 0.07 5 0.10 0.06 0.07 5 0.07 0.06 0.07
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- Liberalism 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 3 0.09 0.03 0.10 1 0.00 0.04 -0.03 1 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.0 0.0 0.0 5 0.06 0.05 0.06 4 0.08 0.05 0.06 4 0.06 0.05 0.05 - - Age 0.0 0.0 - 0.4 3 0.00 0.02 0.05 6 0.00 0.01 0.11 0 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 0.04 0.04 0.04 3 0.06 0.03 0.04 4 0.05 0.04 0.05 - Age squared 0.2 - 0.6 5.0 - 2 -0.26 0.29 -0.75 5 0.20 0.04 -1.30 7 -3.04 3.72 -3.78 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 Interviewer nationality (ref: 0.5 0.0 0.8 non-Qatari) 3 0.66 0.53 0.54 0 0.27 0.26 0.23 3 0.56 0.94 0.75 0.1 0.1 0.1 5 0.15 0.15 0.16 2 0.21 0.14 0.15 2 0.17 0.14 0.15 Education (ref: below secondary) - Secondary and 0.1 0.1 0.5 diploma 8 0.70 0.29 0.31 9 0.80 0.21 -0.09 8 1.31 0.72 0.88 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0.26 0.22 0.25 7 0.34 0.22 0.24 9 0.32 0.22 0.24 - - University and 0.0 0.2 1.0 higher 1 1.16 0.22 0.33 5 1.21 0.11 -0.10 0 1.61 0.78 0.84 0.2 0.1 0.1 1 0.26 0.24 0.26 8 0.34 0.22 0.25 8 0.31 0.21 0.23 Employed (ref: 0.3 0.0 unemployed) 5 0.34 0.60 0.41 8 -0.17 0.32 0.16 0.1 0.1 7 0.21 0.22 0.23 4 0.27 0.18 0.22 Source: SSCQ, n size in all models = 1485; Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%, age2 is multiplied by 1000.
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Appendix J: Determinants of trust in Qataris
Table A.Q: AME of predictors of trust in Qataris Religious Social Political Final Contact attitudes attitudes attitudes model Friends (ref: no friends) Having -0.04 (0.06) Meeting -0.04
(0.06) Neighbours (ref: no neighbours) Having 0.00 (0.02) Meeting -0.01
(0.01) Co-workers (ref: no co-workers) Having 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) Meeting 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) Personal religiosity 0.00
(0.00) Perceived religiosity 0.00 (0.00) Religious inclusion 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) Gender roles 0.00 (0.00) Traditional views -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) Social inclusion 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) Civic participation 0.00 (0.00) Conservatism -0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) Islamism 0.00
(0.00) Liberalism 0.00 (0.00) Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Gender (ref: female) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Interviewer (ref: non-Qatari) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Education Secondary and diploma 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) University and higher 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Employed (ref: unemployed) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) Source: SSCQ, n size in all models = 1485; Significance: Bold, italicised and underlined = 1%, Bold and italicised = 5%, Bold = 10%.
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