The Impact of Conservative Discourses in Family Policies, Population Politics, and Gender Rights in Poland and Turkey

Social Politics 2011 Volume 18 Number 3

UMUT KORKUT AND HANDE ESLEN-ZIYA

TheImpactofConservative Downloaded from Discourses in Family Policies,

Population Politics, and Gender http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ Rights in Poland and Turkey at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012

Abstract This article uses childcare as a case study to test the impact of ideas that embody a traditional understanding of gender relations in relation to childcare. Conservative ideas regard increasing female labor market participation as a cause of decreasing fertility on the functioning of a set of general policies to increase fertility rates. It looks into the Polish and Turkish contexts for empirical evidence. The Polish context shows a highly institutionalized system of family policies in contrast to almost unessential institutions in Turkey. Formally, the labor market participation of women is much lower in Turkey than in Poland. Yet, given the size of the informal market in Turkey, women’s labor participation is obviously higher than what appears in the statistics. Bearing in mind this divergence, the article suggests Poland and Turkey as two typologies for studying population politics in contexts where socially conservative ideas regarding gender remain paramount. We qualify ideas as conservative if they enforce a traditional understanding of gender relations in care-giving and underline

Fall 2011 Pages 387–418 doi:10.1093/sp/jxr014 # The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] Advance Access publication August 8, 2011 388 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya

women’s role in the labor market as an element of declining fertility. In order to delineate ideational impact, this article looks into how ideas (a) supplant and (b) substitute formal institutions. Therefore, we argue that there are two mechanisms pertaining to the dominance of conservative conventions: conservative ideas may either supplant the institutional impact on family policies, or

substitute them thanks to a superior reasoning which societies Downloaded from assign to them. Furthermore, conservative conventions prevail alongside women’s customary unpaid work as care-givers regardless of the level of their formal workforce participation. We propose as our major ﬁndings for the literature of population politics that ideas, as ubiquitous belief systems, are more powerful than institutions since they provide what is perceived as legitimate, http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ acceptable, and good for the societies under study. In the end, irrespective of the presence of institutions, socially conservative ideas prevail.

Introduction

Population politics concern ideas regarding gender relations, at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 families, and women’s employment more than formal institutions that regulate family policies. Parental leave and childcare institutions as well as family allowance are at the core of family policies. Family policies attest to the importance, which institutional practices occupy, in respect of the functioning of population politics. Whilst we recognize the importance of formal institutions in guaranteeing gender equality and work/family reconciliation practices in the regulation of family policies, we argue that at the expense of institutions, socially conservative ideas prevail in the functioning of population politics. Following Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) work, we define ideas as beliefs held by people. These beliefs may reside in the background as well as in the foreground of policy debates as normative concepts, but they give substance to frames of thinking (Campbell 2004, 98). In this effort, we are especially concerned with ideas about care-giving and, hence, women’s unpaid labor is required for population growth. We define population politics as a set of general policies to facilitate fertility increase and, hence, to ascertain population growth. Thus, we do not consider coercive efforts to reduce population growth within this realm. So, why do we specify care-giving? Despite the developments in gender equality, women are still the primary care-givers irrespective of the pervasiveness of family policies and their formal workforce participation. How do socially conservative ideas come to the fore? There are two mechanisms pertaining to the dominance of conservative conventions: conservative ideas may either supplant the Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 389 institutional impact on family policies, or substitute them due to a superior reasoning that societies assign to them. Furthermore, conservative conventions prevail alongside women’s customary unpaid work as care-givers regardless of the level of their formal workforce participation. We follow Gal and Kligman’s (2000) earlier work showing the importance of ideas about gender roles with regard to interaction with central cultural constructions such as the nation, the Downloaded from family, or the public good. We further show that these ideas outweigh the institutions, which population politics establish, to bolster population growth. While we qualify such institutions as formal institutions, we also believe that pervasive ideas in the background forge an institutional impact on population politics. But whose dis- http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ course become authoritative, and why? In this effort, we maintain that the effects—rather than the sources—of ideas are crucial (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 7). Particular common beliefs related to gender issues, nationalism, social policy, and employment are taken for granted by social actors. These beliefs are ubiquitous and they have a significant

impact on the operation of population policies. Both policy makers at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 and the public use these beliefs as normative yardsticks of value- judgment or tools in order to merge ideas and cultural or discursive frames. In this instance, as Campbell (2004, 93) states, ideas can represent underlying assumptions residing in the background of decision-making debates. As such, they are pervasive, largely accepted, and unquestioned. Following Schmidt and Radaelli’s (2004) methodology, we do not assess beliefs as objects by dissecting texts and deconstructing speeches, but we look for expressions of ideas through various means, such as media sources, political discourse, and ubiquitous beliefs, in our attempt to demonstrate how they trump institutions. Throughout the article, gender is deﬁned as the socially and culturally produced ideas about male–female difference, power, and inequality that structure the reproduction of these differences in the institutionalized practices of society (Gal and Kligman 2000, 4). In this article, we follow Be´land’s (2009) research attempting to establish a constructive dialog between researchers of gender, on the one hand, and the growing number of policy scholars who explore the role of ideational processes, on the other, and contribute to the literature with a case study wherein we can conjoin gender and policy research. The article uses care-giving as a case study to test the impact of socially conservative ideas on the functioning of formal institutions regulating family policies. We look into the Polish and Turkish contexts for empirical evidence. This is an important case selection given the divergence between Poland and Turkey with respect to the 390 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya levels of institutionalization of family policies and formal participation of women in the labor market. Hence, our article suggests Poland and Turkey as two typologies for studying population politics in contexts where socially conservative ideas regarding gender reign supreme. As Haas (2005, 502) maintains, typologies make it possible to draw abstract pictures of reality that may in turn be compared, analyzed, and further developed on a theoretical level. We Downloaded from will show that in the face of the impact of the ideational factors on family policies—the conservative conventions regarding gender roles generally, and women’s breadwinning and care-giving roles speciﬁcally—the existence of institutions matters little. The nature of women’s work—unpaid in the domestic sphere http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ and, at times, informal in the public sphere—is the primary reason why family policies supporting work/family reconciliation are non- operational. Dominant social conventions related to women’s private duties promote care-giving as women’s public responsibility. While this expectancy is evident in the cases of unemployed or infor- mally employed women, even in the cases of formal employment

women find themselves under the dual obligation of family work at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 and extra-family employment. This issue of double-presence is particularly important as it is directly linked to social norms about motherhood and women’s roles as mothers (Guerrina 2005, 125). From this angle, we argue that Turkey, on the one hand, is a context whereby family policies do exist but are unessential or even irrelevant given the size of unregistered (i.e., informal) employment of women. Poland, on the other hand, has better-defined family policies. Yet, despite the difference between the two countries on the level of institutionalization of family policies, women are the primary unpaid care-givers in both societies. Moreover, this role is expected of them in order to bolster population growth. The ideational similarities in our two contexts are puzzling despite their differences in the institutionalization of family policies and formal participation of women in the labor market. These countries are at the semi-periphery of the “core Western Europe” with specific imposed secular traditions, Poland during communism and Turkey under Kemalist republicanism. The last two decades of the twentieth century marked important turning points in the politics of both countries: while formerly authoritarian Poland consolidated its democracy, Turkey began the liberalization of its political system. In both countries, the end of 1980s resulted in the proliferation of women’s organizations and the amplification of feminist demands (Walsh 2010). These organizations drew attention to women’s exclu- sion from politics and labor markets. Gender equality and violence against women received particular attention which were accentuated Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 391 by increased international attention to women’s human rights. Moreover, Poland as a recent European Union (EU) member and Turkey as an accession state have gone through respective processes of “normalizing” their legal framework, aligning it with the EU’s body of law, the acquis communautaire. Both Polish and Turkish women’s groups have utilized these processes in order to advance gender equality and women’s rights. Therefore, in both countries the Downloaded from EU accession process cultivated legal changes in the field of gender equality. Conservative tradition, significant in both contexts, is also noteworthy. In Poland, the Catholic Church and in Republican Turkey the Kemalist ideology defined women as the vanguards of tradition http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ and custom while emphasizing motherhood as a noble social role. In Poland, family was the “symbol of Polish resistance to foreign occu- pation coupled with the powerful symbol of the ‘Polish Mother’ (‘Matka Polka’)” (Heinen and Portet 2009; Walsh 2010). The Catholic Church has been influential in this construction. John Paul II’s homily to the workers of a textile factory in 1987 in Łodz is a

case in point: at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 The social doctrine of the Church fully values as work what women are doing at home, all the activity of mother and edu- cator. It is a highly valuable work. And that great work must not be socially undervalued; it must be continuously enhanced if society does not want to contribute to its own ruin. (John Paul II 1994) Similarly, the Republican elite in Turkey promoted the idea of women as mothers predisposed to care-giving and educating future generations (Eslen-Ziya and Korkut 2010). In line with the construction of the Polish and Turkish mother, the “ideals of child well-being” and the “ideals of care” have been very similar in both countries as two surveys carried out, respectively, in Turkey (1995) and in Poland (1998) demonstrate (Heinen and Wator 2006; Turkish State Institute of Statistics 1995). In Poland, the reluctance of Polish mothers to use public childcare centers is reinforced by speciﬁc repre- sentations of child well-being, and the very ideal of taking care of children—merging femininity with maternity (Heinen and Wator 2006, 206). Yet, there is an acute difference between Turkey and Poland regarding women’s registered workforce participation. In Poland, 52.4 percent of women were registered to work in 2008, whereas in Turkey the level was a comparatively meager 24.3 percent.1 However, this does not mean that women are not employed in Turkey; on the contrary it indicates that women’s employment is 392 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya largely informal. The continued predominance of unpaid agricultural work for women accounts for some of the substantially high share of the informal sector in total employment. As far as women’s non- agricultural employment is concerned, the share of the informal sector has risen from 40 to 51 percent in the span of two decades (Aydin, Hisarciklilar, and Ilkkaracan 2010). Widespread informal employment contributes to low female labor force participation and Downloaded from women’s unlikely move to the formal sector (World Bank 2009). Women’s employment is also higher than what the statistics show in Poland. Research on post-transition poverty in Poland indicates women’s increasing unemployment, and hence women’s return to informal agricultural work, in rural Poland (Pine 1998), as well as http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ the lasting discrimination, both on national and household levels, that women are exposed to due to the feminization of poverty (Tarkowska 2001). As in Turkey, women are part of the unregistered workforce in Poland, where the size of undeclared work, demarcated by the phenomenon of “envelope wages,” is broader (at 11 percent) than the 5 percent EU average in Poland (Undeclared Work in the

European Union Eurobarometer October 2007 Report). at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 Despite the institutional and employment-related divergences between Turkey and Poland, we argue that we should look into the ideational rather than the formal institutional forces in examining the functioning of population politics. Our case study focuses on care-giving. In line with the short introduction above, table 1 sum- marizes the research design of this article. In this attempt, we realize that institutions are hardly gender- neutral (Orloff 1993a; 1993b) and they may be in a position to represent as well as impose a conservative interpretation of gender relations. Our paper certainly relates to the literature studying induc- tively the role of actors, their interests, and their ideas in the determi- nation of institutional forms. However, our central question is not whether the nature of institutions matters or not, but whether the existence of formal institutions is relevant to population politics or not—given the nature of work that women engage in. And with regard to the lack of gender neutrality in institutions, we do not

Table 1. Most-Different-Context Research Design

Set of Family Forms of Women as primary ideas institutions employment care-givers

Poland and Resemble Differ Differ Resemble Turkey Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 393 follow the conventional line of studying how conservative ideas infil- trate the existing formal institutions and, hence, compromise their gender neutrality in care-giving. Rather, we choose to explore how the prevalent nature of care-giving follows the traditional pattern, irrespective of the existence or absence of work/family reconciliation- related institutions. There is a discussion in the institutionalism literature as to Downloaded from whether ideas should be treated endogenously or exogenously when exploring their impact. In this context, for historical institutionalists, institutions structure individuals’ preferences, whereas for rational- ists, the preferences of individuals structure institutions (Blyth 2002). In response to this debate, we argue that the ideational http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ impact is not endogenous or exogenous but constant as long as there is a confluence between the prevalent ideas and the roles that actors subscribe to (either voluntarily or reluctantly). Our article shows that ideas, as belief systems, reflect families’, employers’, employees’, and social actors’ preferences. These belief systems are powerful to the extent that they constrain the perceptions of legitimate roles by

the actors, prescribing what is “acceptable” and even what is at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 “good” in societies. Thereby, we do not look into how ideas infil- trate institutions of work/family reconciliation, but we deal with the impact of ideas, concerning the nature of care-giving, on actors’ roles at the expense of existing institutions in this area. As long as care-giving is seen mainly as women’s work, the equality aspects of childcare regimes and parental leave procedures—even if they seek to promote work/family reconciliation—will be irrelevant. We realize that the nature of “women’s work” is not particular to our two contexts, but given the variation between Poland and Turkey regarding the presence of formal institutions, we argue that they offer interesting typologies for our case study. We compare a country that hosts well-defined institutions of family policies with another where the institutions are unessential. In order to depict our theoretical assumption better, we suggest the figure below. Interdependence of family responsibilities of women, market opportunities, and state policies (Meyers, Gornick and Ross 1999) may explain figure 1. In this attempt, we also recognize that there are differences in the pace of population increase in Poland and Turkey. In fact, as Perelli-Harris (2006) shows, the availability of informal work is positively related to wanting and having children. Along with other factors, this may explain the pace of population growth in Turkey. However, increasing fertility levels—hence the success of population politics—is not under the scope of our research. Despite the fact of Turkey’s growing population, as we will demonstrate, the fear of population stagnation remains an 394 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya Downloaded from http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/

Figure 1. Prevalence of Socially Conservative Ideas Regarding Care-giving. issue for politicians there. Brieﬂy, in Turkey, this is due to the gov-

ernment’s conscious efforts to provide cheap labor to investors and at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 maintain a young, dynamic, consumption-oriented market economy. In Poland, however, population stagnation and decline threaten the future of the pension system significantly, along with impacting on health care policy. Similar to most other EU states, population stagnation will impact upon future economic efficiency and competitiveness. There are continuous policy efforts which are determinedly geared toward reversing this trend in Poland inspired and mobilized by the e´tatist legacy of Polish welfare state (Inglot 2008). As stated above, we use these two contexts to illustrate the importance of social conventions to the functioning of population politics. In order to develop our argument and present why we believe that ideational factors outweigh the power of formal institutions, we have the following plan. First, we will discuss what makes ideas conservative and why their impact is significant. Second, we will look at how ideational impact subordinates institutional impact. We suggest that there are two routes of subordination: as ideas either supplant or substitute formal institutions. This section also clarifies our defini- tion as well as our understanding of the relationship between ideas and formal institutions. Third, we will examine the validity of our theoretical assumptions looking into work/family reconciliation policies, care-giving, and the nature of women’s work in our two contexts. Finally, in conclusion, we will state the relevance of our case study and research to the study of the role of ideas and institutions in the field of population politics. Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 395

What Is the Ideational Impact of Social Conservatism and Why Does It Matter? The ideational impact of conservative convictions on population politics is fundamental to our research. How do we delineate ideas as conservative? In this article, we argue that ideas are conservative if

they enforce a traditional understanding of gender relations in care- Downloaded from giving, undermine women’s role in the labor market, and apportion blame to women who decide to enter the labor market for decreasing population. In order to delineate ideational impact, our article looks into how ideas (a) supplant and (b) substitute formal institutions.

Care-giving and family as realms of women’s responsibility may be http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ socially constructed ideas, and social and biological functions of reproduction may have been assimilated in the concept of motherhood—nevertheless, they are effective in the composition of gender regimes. Krasner (1983) argues that a regime can be defined as a complex of rules and norms that create established expectations. Thus, gender regime consists of the rules and norms about gender relations, allocating tasks and rights to the two sexes (Sainsbury 1999). In addition, we argue that, in gender regimes, at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 social conventions, through fostering an ideational impact, also matter at the expense of the formal rules and even subordinate them. Therefore, as Guerrina (2001) also argues, there is virtue in inves- tigating how values and beliefs about motherhood can define the scope of population politics. Maternity occurs within a social framework that enshrines specific assumptions about “woman,” “motherhood,” and their relationship. A dominant factor in respect of social conventions is the religious affiliation of the majority. Along with its staunchly secular legal system, the majority religion in Turkey is Islam. In the case of Poland, not only is Catholicism the religion of the majority, the tenets of this religion also impact upon the legal system, especially with respect to abortion. McQuillan’s (1999) research on political contexts where religion affects identity of the population, such as Ireland and Quebec, shows that values are a necessary, though insufficient, basis for religion to serve as a determinant of fertility. Still, the religious affiliation of the population enhances the appeal of conservatism for the majority. Other factors include a highly male-dominated decision-making arena (low per- centages of women elected to parliaments) and a gender-blind culture, which is little inclined (and indeed unwilling) to promote women’s rights (Guadagnini and Dona` 2007, 165). In respect of gender roles, social conservatism primarily targets women to an extent that decreasing fertility rates become a national issue instigated by “unpatriotic” and economically independent 396 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya women. Continuous discussions in media outlets regarding the population problem, marriage at a later age, decrease in new-borns, as well as the determined efforts of politicians searching how to amelio- rate child support evaluate women’s rights under the frame of family issues. Hence, feminism and reproductive rights become a cause of decreasing fertility, to the conservative mind. As Michelle Goldberg (2010) writes in her fascinating study “The Means of Reproduction,” Downloaded from there is one thing that unites cultural conservatives throughout the world: all view women’s equality and self-possession as unnatural, a violation of the established order (Goldberg 2010, 223). The idea of a woman as responsible for the family rather than occupied in a professional career is a legacy from a past that is still present in numer- http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ ous political cultures (Guadagnini and Dona` 2007, 165). A close examination of this discourse illustrates how the female ideal becomes the good “wife-mother-caregiver,” whose most important characteristic is her willingness to sacrifice herself for her family (Ferge 1983 in Goven 2000, 287). As such, emancipated women deviate from “what is normal.” This discourse constructs

families as safe havens and sees problems occurring within families at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 as linked to the changes in the structure of families or to women’s participation in the labor market (Verloo 2010, 60). A conservative tone of pro-natalism vies for the protection of a religious-cultural way of life against outside influences and conspiracies seeking to destroy traditional values. In the United States, for example, neocon- servative discussions have for several decades emphasized the crisis in family life. They have labeled the family “sick” and have called for churches, local and state governments, and individuals to “re-create” it. In Eastern Europe, in the face of massive change, the family is popularly considered the one institution that provides continuity with the past (Gal and Kligman 2000, 68). As Kincade Oppenheimer (1994, 295) shows, the one-sided emphasis on the role of women’s changing economic behavior and status as the most important determinant of recent demographic shifts is theoretically and empirically unwarranted. Finally, we agree with Krause (2001, 586) that treating fertility decline like an epidemic, in which women are portrayed as the major carriers, is to deny the importance of other economic and social factors. Ironically, as Gusfield (1989) states, groups can also become locked into a “social problems” frame once something is called a social problem. This is what we deduce above as the confluence between the prevalent ideas and the roles of actors. Hence, the problem of reproductive choice may encourage women to personal- ize their dilemma of preferences rather than seeing how preferences were shaped by factors beyond their control. In this respect, while Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 397 ideational institutions are without exception constituted by language, the functioning of the language is especially hard to see (Searle 2011, 90). In effect, ideas can take the form of cultural and discursive frames that actors use to challenge or justify existing arrangements (Be´land 2009) regarding, for instance, work and family reconciliation policies. At the normative level, ideas consist of values, attitudes, and identities, but they do not specify Downloaded from cause-and-effect relationships (Campbell 2004, 93). They are taken for granted and effective. In summary, we consider ideas as conservative if they demote the economic rights and status of women and impose a traditional interpretation of gender relations. And we believe in their ubiquity. http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ In order to substantiate our theoretical assumptions and enlarge the empirical scope of the paper, we also look closely into research on family policies in Italy. Italy has commonalities with the two countries under our focus: it shares with Poland a Catholic heritage, and like Turkey it features an extensive informal economy (Guerrina 2005, 119). Despite making significant changes in the public sphere

by the late 1970s, Italy still experiences continuity in social practices, at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 especially in the domestic division of labor. Saraceno (1978 in Guerrina 2005, 116) claimed that, in Italy, women’s roles were still primarily deﬁned in terms of their position as wives and mothers. Since then, several studies on household work patterns have sought to describe the permanence of gender divisions of labor in the private sphere, and its detrimental impact on women’s employment in the ofﬁcial labor market. The conclusions of these studies point to the fact that legislation alone may not substantially change the socio- economic opportunities of women if there are structural barriers inhibiting their realization. Thus, in brief, while we can recognize how conservative conventions come into existence, we should also investigate how these conventions subordinate formal institutions.

How Do Conservative Conventions Supplant or Substitute Formal Institutions? As stated above, we suggest that socially conservative discourses operate in ways to allocate care-giving roles to women. This is the case regardless of the existence of family policies or the formal labor participation of women. In order to demonstrate the validity of this argument, first we will probe various expressions of ideational influence. We also delineate our understanding of “ideas” and “formal institutions,” which are two politically and socially loaded terms inducing the assertion of social conventions and maintenance of social policies. Then, we will shift our focus to discuss how the lack 398 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya of formal institutions and formal employment relations foster, or even strengthen, the ideational impact of conservative conventions. This section will outline the theoretical mechanisms which this article will then employ when examining convergence in childcare in two divergent countries. Institutions hardly ever persist by themselves, as Szelewa (2009, 257) states. Specifically, family policy arrangements are either a his- Downloaded from torical construction, as O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver (1999, 157) demonstrate, or are struggles “of persons, personalities, teams, groups, units, departments and researchers from holding particular sets of ideas as to how to respond to social needs, shifts in political and/or economic spheres or demographic ups and downs,” as http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ Szelewa (2009, 257) writes. Hence, there is an inevitable interaction between context and institutions. Institutions consist of rules, moni- toring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which individuals and organizations operate and interact with each other (Campbell 2004). Formal institutions are important to the extent that their procedures may eventu-

ally impart an effect on individuals’ behaviors and attitudes. The at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 institutionalist literature notes that they are affected by the mode of interaction of the actors within and with the institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1991, 47). Institutional effect can permeate into people’s behavior as long as institutions are legitimate (Scott 1991, 169) and results of the eventual compatibility of personality with structure (Pateman 1977, 45–64). However, we explore the impact of ideas on institutions in situa- tions where ideas operate as effective systems of meaning and normative yardsticks that ascertain the disposition of actors. Does this mean that ideas may evolve into “informal” institutions with deontic powers and with collective acceptance across the society bol- stered by speech acts (Searle 2011)? The problem of ideas requires that we consider carefully how we should define ideas, identify the actors who use them, specify the causal mechanisms that involve them, and develop the appropriate methodologies for studying their impact (Campbell 2004, ix). Be´land (2010, 148), referring to Parsons (2002, 48), states that ideas are claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actors. To these, he also adds cultural assumptions and cate- gories (Orloff 1999 in Be´land 2010, 561) and frames (Be´land 2005). Therefore, the importance of ideas, let us say as informal ideational institutions, or discursive frames manifest in the construction of the world through which actors make sense of their material, social, and political environment (Be´land 2009, 561). In the construction of policy problems, at the gender–social policy nexus, Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 399 deeply embedded cultural assumptions influence the construction of welfare regimes (Be´land 2009, 568). In the context of social policy research, Padamsee (2009) argues that the study of ideas is about filling gaps in our understanding of policy making by comprehend- ing the interdependence of discursive and other types of processes. We demonstrate such interdependence through reference to the functioning of family policies. Downloaded from Goldstein and Keohane (1993) point at three causal mechanisms for ideas influencing policy. First, ideas can be road maps, that is, expected effects of action influencing how individuals act. Second, ideas operate as focal points if they offer acceptable solutions to policy dilemmas by analyzing the interests and strategic interactions http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ of the players. Finally, they will have a lasting influence over time if they become institutionalized. Yet, they do not discuss how ideas acquire an institutional quality. We state that this is due to their ubiquity and their effectiveness measured by how the public takes them for granted as public sentiments. Sometimes, this process is direct and obvious; sometimes, it is indirect and subtle (Campbell 2004).

In this construction, we argue that prevalent conventions shared at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 by societal actors matter either to supplant the existing institutions or substitute for them. Traditionally, in conservative societies, women’s issues are interpreted as “family issues” and women’s rights are often seen as coming at the expense of family life (Brunell 2002). As we showed above, family frames the future of the nation, while women inculcate the characteristics of their nation into their children. The cult of motherhood becomes the glorification of the traditional female role of wife, mother, and proud homemaker. This cult also promotes a vision that women must have babies “for the nation” to teach them the national language and to inculcate them with a love of their ethnic or national heritage (Einhorn 1993, 39–40). The religious actors impart a certain effect on the functioning of population politics. The church has often shown signs of concern about the demographic decline and the need for pro-family policy. In the Catholic literature in Poland, the roots of a demographic decline are usually presented in the light of a breakdown of traditional family and the spread of materialist attitudes. Notwithstanding the Catholic concerns, an overwhelming proportion of women cannot afford to be a stay-at-home mother due to the economic necessity. Pro-family policies and longer maternity leave in particular would, thus, be one remedy for such dilemmas (Szelewa 2009, 61). Goldberg (2010, 200) discusses the frames of thought which the conservative civil actors representing various religions sought to promote at the World Congress of Families, which met in Warsaw in 2007. The maxim of the meeting being, “Demography is the most 400 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya obvious symptom of civilizational exhaustion and as fertility dries up, so do the societies.” Despite the incompatibility of the faiths of the participants, they had agreed mostly to put aside their theologi- cal disputes and to unite before a greater evil: low birth rates, augur- ing shrinking societies in the developed world. Hence, familialism became the message which these actors have spread. As Szelewa (2009, 35) argues, “Familialism as a concept is not only about poli- Downloaded from cies but also about shaping public discourse about the ‘ideal family.’” Since the most often referred to element of family policies in institutionalized contexts is the duration of parental leave and form of childcare, how do such conservative ideas supplant the institutions in this policy arena? http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ Religious actors are influential, but the process through which religious values become likely to play a critical role in shaping demographic behavior depends on the religious authorities’ aptitude in building a network of religious institutions (McQuillan 2004). Reinecke (1994 in Guerrina 2005, 124) discusses the power of the Catholic Church and its great influence on the consciousness of

Italian women, imprisoned within a specific role exclusively at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 maternity- and family-centered. In the end, there has been only a limited amount of progress in developing the necessary infrastructure to allow women to reconcile work and family life (Guerrina 2005, 125). Essentially, such conservative conventions regarding childcare operate against women’s workforce participation. Szelewa (2009, 33) argues that placing childcare as a burden onto women through “extensive periods of leave can contribute to the economic deactiva- tion of women and therefore lower their economic autonomy.” Employment means more than a material sense of economic inde- pendence; it represents a route for involvement in public life, a means to establish greater confidence, economic and political inde- pendence, and liberation. This is especially the case for women (Einhorn 1993, 24). The more affordable and available childcare arrangements are, the more the responsibility of care moves away from the family. Yet, in the industrialized West, married women and mothers are impelled to engage in care-giving and domestic labor. Hence, childcare demonstrates that the core aspects of the sexual division of labor remain (Orloff 1993a, 313; 1993b). In Italy, even the welfare structures have an overwhelming dependence on women’s care work in the private sphere (Guerrina 2005). Such dependence also directly affects women’s access to and employment in the official labor market. In order to promote work/family reconciliation, the EU issued directives and regulations starting in the early and mid-1990s. It made explicit reference to the desirability of men and women Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 401

“sharing employment and family responsibilities.” These regulations and directives affect both of our contexts, as one is an EU member state whilst the other is an accession country. Already in 1992, the EU Council issued a recommendation on childcare in order for member states to develop and/or encourage initiatives to enable women and men to reconcile their occupational, family, and upbringing responsibilities arising from the care of children. The rec- Downloaded from ommendation deﬁned childcare broadly and proposed that measures were needed in four areas: childcare services; leave for employed parents; family-friendly policies at the workplace; and measures to promote the increased participation by men in the care and upbringing of children (van der Vleuten 2007, 156). http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ The EU considers the participation of women into the labor market crucial. In effect, it simultaneously recognizes the salience of equality measures to protect pregnant workers and requires its member states to guarantee working environments to facilitate child- rearing and participation by women in the labor force. Therefore, the EU signals that pro-natalism should not place gender rights and

work participation of women in peril. In effect, the member states at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 become the purveyors of such formal institutional arrangements and mediate between families and markets in order to guarantee due welfare and childcare provisions (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999, 10). Hence, the institutions which the EU established associate family policies with workforce participation of women and seek to alleviate the dual burden of women as workers and care-takers. Nonetheless, as Guerrina (2005, 122) notes, it is interesting to note that European equality policies had their greatest impact in the context of equal treatment and pay rather than maternity rights and parental leave. The main problem with the implementation of maternity rights results from the separation of production and reproduction. It is the division between public roles and private duties that ultimately undermines the principles enshrined within the policy and maintains gender power hierarchies (Guerrina 2005, 127). This brief discussion shows that even in cases where there are well-deﬁned institutions, socially conservative actors may push their agendas to demote the equality principle in family policies. They cause the equality dimension within institutions—guaranteed by the EU in cases such as Italy and Poland—to trip up and stumble; hence, ideas supplant work/family reconciliation policies embedded in institutions. Still, policy developments toward establishing equality in gender regimes have primarily trusted formal institutional practices. An institutionalist interpretation of population politics focuses on women’s concerns related to job and career with respect to childcare facilities as well as family-friendly working practices 402 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya

(Frey 2003), as the factors affecting women’s decisions to bear children. Equal pay legislation, paid parental leave with one’s job held for the duration, high-quality public childcare, and an environment which does not threaten fertility are further institutional factors affecting the reproductive choice of women (Einhorn 1993, 75–76). But, what happens in the absence of formal employment participation of women? How do socially conservative conventions substitute Downloaded from institutions in those contexts? There is a signiﬁcant relationship between birthrate and women’s employment decisions. Economic theory suggests two approaches to understanding the effects of childcare on women’s employment. The ﬁrst depicts childcare arrangements as affecting the value that a http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ woman places on her time at home, with better childcare alterna- tives reducing the attractiveness of full-time care-giving work in the home. In the second approach, the cost of childcare is viewed as a tax on mothers’ wages. An increase in the cost of childcare would have the same effect as lowering wages—decreasing both the likeli- hood of employment and hours of paid work (Meyers, Gornick, and

Ross 1999, 121). at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 Even in the new EU member states, the number of children is one of the main factors of poverty and interferes with women’s job market participation. As an example, survey results from Hungary show that even if women wish to return to their previous jobs after their maternity leave, they face problems. The more children they give birth to, the less likely it becomes for women to get back to their previous jobs. It is also a general complaint that women do not have anyone with whom to leave their children while at work. Frey (2003) interviewed a sample of working mothers for a survey which showed that flexible working hours, leave of absence, and part-time working opportunities would increase women’s willingness to assume their jobs after the end of their maternity leave. In the absence of these options, many women respond to the competing demands of employment and child-rearing by engaging in intermittent employment or reduced-hour and contingent work (Meyers, Gornick, and Ross 1999, 199). These intermittent forms of employment as well as informal employment may also enhance social conservatism. Women’s primary involvement in domestic and childcare responsibilities continues to be a source of vulnerability for them, not only because it represents unpaid work but also because it diminishes women’s mobility and autonomy to design their labor market strategies. In Italy, the lack of alternative forms of employment forces women seeking flexible hours into the underground economy (Guerrina 2005). The feminization of the labor force during the past decades Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 403 has intensified the reliance of many women on informal employment (Benerıá 2001), making their jobs extremely volatile. Thereby, informalization—and ensuing labor market volatilities—imparts an effect on the prevalence of socially conservative ideas in respect of population politics. There are certain ways in which informalization subordinates women to a role of natural care-giver. The lack of access to eco- Downloaded from nomic opportunities outside the family increases the dependence of women on male relatives, particularly their partners, and places a premium on conformity to the ideal of woman as mother. There is a link between inequality outside the household and inequality in decision-making within the household (Lister 2009, 451). Given the http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ importance of family and the value attached to large families, women face strong pressure from relatives and the larger community to bear children. These strong values and conventions substitute potential institutions of care-giving. In this section, we proposed our answers to the question of how ideas subordinate institutions through either supplanting or substi-

tuting them. We suggest that in studying gender regimes, along with at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 rules and norms, there is space to consider the ideational impact. As Orloff’s (1993a, 1993b) framework illustrates, population politics is an area where market and state as well as family relations interact. Women’s unpaid work as care-givers also contributes to the survival of such conventions. A myriad of factors play a role in this interaction and we note as signiﬁcant the social construction of motherhood and the role of various actors endorsing conservative conventions. Indeed, at the ontological level, social constructivists argue that beliefs and preferences of individuals are constructed in a social environment where the beliefs and preferences held by the other members of the community constitute the basis of what is deemed to be socially valued or preferred (Cox 2001, 473). In this section, therefore, we showed how conservative ideas develop irrespective of the formal institutional framework in existence. We will discuss this theoretical inference in the next section with empirical evidence gathered from the Polish and Turkish contexts.

Institutions and Ideational Factors in Poland and Turkey As we stated in the introduction of our article, we present Poland and Turkey as two typologies for studying population politics in contexts where socially conservative ideas regarding gender reign supreme. The Polish context shows a highly institutionalized system of family policies in contrast to unessential institutions in Turkey. Formally, as we showed above, the labor market participation of 404 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya women is much lower in Turkey than in Poland. Yet, given the size of the informal market in Turkey, women’s labor participation is obviously higher than what appears in the statistics. We have also demonstrated above our conceptualization of what qualiﬁes as conservative ideas and also presented two mechanisms regarding the ideational impact on institutions of population politics. Using this theoretical approach, we will demonstrate the convergence between Downloaded from our two contexts, despite their differences in terms of institutions of gender politics, in respect of care-giving.

Poland Poland faces an acute population problem. The Polish population http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ has fallen by half a million in the last decade, and, according to the UN Population Program predictions, by 2100 Poland will see a 33 percent decrease of its population in comparison to its 2000 level. In order to reverse this trend, population policies have had political priority in Poland, with successive governments attempting to institutionalize child support and maternity leave programs and policies. In

this respect, concentrating on care-giving, we will look into how at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 socially conservative ideas trump current institutions. As a main pillar of the population program, maternity leave is fully institutionalized in Poland and aligned with workforce participation of women. Maternity benefit is paid on the condition of previous employment of at least six months immediately prior to birth leave. The female employee in the case of childbirth, adoption, and the provision of foster care can receive maternity leave with a fully compensated wage loss. The leave’s duration is eighteen weeks in the case of the first child, twenty in the case of the next, and twenty-eight if there are multiple births. This benefit amounts to 100 percent of the previous wage. Of the leave, fourteen weeks are reserved for women, and obligatory. The father can use the rest of this maternity leave (but only 1 percent decides to use this option). This can be followed by what Szelewa (2009, 36) refers to as “extended leave,” which is twenty-four months in length. Allowance attached to the extended leave is income-tested. There are guarantees on the stability of employment relations, on the return to work to an equivalent position, and on the inclusion of the leave period as part of the total work record (Kotowska et al. 2008, 834). The previous conservative coalition government of Poland led by PiS (Law and Justice Party) sought to extend the financial benefits of child support. In 2006, the Polish parliament passed legislation to universally pay for each new child in an effort to boost the country’s falling population. Under this scheme, every woman would receive a one-off payment for each child she has. Women Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 405 from poorer families would receive double that amount (BBC News, 1 April 2006). In such a manner, Poland has staunchly institutionalized its family policies along the European work/family reconciliation model. However, research shows that only women who are employed in the public sector take advantage of the maternity-related rights (Fuszara 2007 in Fuszara 2008, 106–7). Generally, women aim to Downloaded from return to work as soon as possible after childbirth for fear of losing their jobs, despite legal guarantees. The employers use a range of “tricks” (including a general unwillingness to employ women, or making the post redundant as soon as women return to work) to remove from their companies the employees who take advantage of http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ their rights. As a consequence, women often feel pressure from many sides not to take full advantage of their rights. Fuszara’s research also shows that the majority of women do not welcome the introduction of longer maternity leave and other similar solutions, fearing that this may result in a worse situation of women in general in the labor market. Hence, longer maternity leave and the legal

right to return to work are considered in different ways. On the one at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 hand, they may constitute an instrument for combining professional work life with family life. On the other, they may be perceived as a means of excluding women from the labor market (Fuszara 2008, 106–7). As a result, as a similar study on Italy pointed out, the over- protection offered by the legislation makes the working mothers less employable, because of the costs involved to employers. These attitudes toward women result in two trends: first, the common use of “blank resignations”; and second, the high percentage of working women without children (Guerrina 2005, 126). Care-giving is mainly women’s duty in Poland in the absence of childcare facilities such as cre`ches and kindergartens, and due to the general popular consensus that care-giving is women’s responsibility. Though dated, 2001 figures show that almost only 2 percent of children attend cre`ches in Poland. This percentage increases to 33 percent when we look at children enrolled in all kinds of centers as the share of all children aged three to five (Szelewa 2009, 187). Childcare is expensive: according to Szelewa’s (2009, 38) calcula- tions, payments for cre`ches usually reach about 20 percent of a net average wage. Despite the efforts of the state to institutionalize family policies and the recent increase in maternal leave, why is there a lack of childcare facilities? The institutional response is that the state completely cut their financing and delegated responsibility to municipalities. As the central state gave up their financing, municipalities in Poland rarely run cre`ches and afternoon services. This situation and a lack of financial support for parents after the expiry of 406 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya maternity leave (only 35 percent are eligible for extended leave) suggest that, implicitly, the state locates responsibility for care within the family (Szelewa 2009, 188). As municipalities are also responsible for maintaining kindergartens and cre`ches (Szelewa 2009, 199), the social conventions which local actors aspire to might be an important obstacle to the development of such forms of care. Hence, beyond the institutions, there is Downloaded from room for ideational impact in respect of care-giving. A 2002 survey presenting attitudes toward family and professional roles of women in Poland showed that 45.7 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.” Among other statements, “A pre-school http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” and “A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children” also received 56.8 and 51.0 percent approval rates, respectively (Szelewa 2009, 59). As we stated above, the mode of family policies and population politics set out by the EU requires its member states to guarantee

working environments to facilitate child rearing, labor participation at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 by women, and non-discrimination on the basis of gender. Heinen and Wator (2006, 190) argue that “with the membership in the EU, one might have expected a new approach to family affairs in Poland, but this did not emerge.” In fact, discrimination against women within the work force in specific and society in general remained noteworthy. Although major policy changes have been implemented during the EU accession period and the Polish labor code has been systematically amended (2007) in line with EU directives and an Act on family violence was presented (2009), gender inequality continues to exist. Heinen and Portet (2009, 12–13) consider this situation in line with the renewal of politicized religious discourse focusing on motherhood, the heterosexual family, and morality. What they call the “dark side of the Polish reality” concerns gender and sexual inequalities and the lack of real public discussion on the issue of gender discrimination.2 While the Polish context succinctly institutionalizes birth leave and maternity leave, when it comes to the operation of the ensuing childcare, hence work/family reconciliation, it veers toward patriarchy with male breadwinners and stay-at-home mothers. There is a visible impact of social conventions on this result. Hence, the institutions of family policies and population politics become redundant in promoting gender equalities in access to work, which the feminist literature considers as a main tenet of women’s emancipation (Einhorn 1993). The minimal presence of childcare facilities and Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 407 the conservative convictions construct care-giving as women’s responsibility. We believe that the importance of maternity leave and child payments in family policies is a sign of socially conservative ideas out- doing the equality measures established in the institutions of gender rights regimes. The prevailing nature of care-giving and the common conventions with respect to women’s responsibilities reinforce one Downloaded from other and operate against the institutions. This is an explicit example of how institutions are supplanted. Hence, the presence of institutions does not alleviate women’s double burden in the public and private spheres, but fail when faced with the nature of women’s work. Therefore, the Polish context shows how the dominant http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ socially conservative ideas can supplant institutions in existence. The structuralist approach holds that the amount and availability of childcare facilities can sufficiently inform us about the socio-political significance of childcare outside the family and about the extent of institutional promotion of or obstacles to female employment (Haas 2005). In the equation of childcare and freedom to work, there is an

assumption that women who do not engage in paid labor have full at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 and sole responsibility for child nurture, and that this is appropriate, even natural. Many of the opponents of public provisioning of childcare describe child rearing as a “private” issue and hence an inap- propriate arena for institutionalization in any form, even for working mothers. Thus, there is an intervention/non-intervention dichotomy involved in childcare discussions (Bacchi 1999, 134). Yet, the availability or lack of availability of childcare can affect women’s lives by primarily delegating care-taking to them and, hence, challenging the equality dimension in work/family reconciliation-oriented institutions.

Turkey In the Turkish context, unlike in the EU contexts, there exists no single and consistent population politics and family planning strat- egy. What we can underline is a constant change of policy in family planning rather than particular policy continuity. Family planning became a priority in the First Development Plan, designed in the 1960s. Increasing health care (Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilatı 1962) received the emphasis, without any speciﬁc reference to women or family; family planning thereby became an extension of ordinary health services. Only in the Second Development Plan did the policies start to target families with an aim to increase the population (Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilatı 1967). The concept of providing mother–child health was accepted in the Third and Fourth Development Plans (Devlet Planlama Tes¸kilatı 1972, 1985). 408 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya

Currently, there is a sixteen-week maternity leave in Turkey whereby the mother can claim 66.7 percent of her salary. For public sector workers, a three-day paternity leave is also provided. Afterwards, the mother can take up to six months of unpaid leave from her job. While Article 88 of the Labor Law obliges employers to arrange nursing rooms and childcare centers for businesses employing at least 150 females, this requirement is rarely met by the businesses. Downloaded from Instead they opt to pay an insigniﬁcant ﬁne for not having a childcare center. Even the number of female, rather than total, employees suggested in the Article is a sign of patriarchal mentality that sees childcare not as a social responsibility but as the responsibility of mothers. In the end, women’s lack of capacity to enter formal http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ employment and their volatile labor participation turn them into free care-providers. Women’s work remains largely informal. And since participation in informal work occurs irregularly, individuals do not consider these activities to be primary or secondary employment. They cannot gain necessary credentials to break out from their dependency on formally employed male breadwinners. The

main obstacle for women’s employment is the lack of legal mecha- at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 nisms and structures to alleviate women’s burden as care-givers. The research shows that in Turkey one in every two women joins the workforce, but do not retain their jobs after their subsequent engagement, marriage, pregnancy, and child birth.3 This shows the impact of women’s nature of work on their employment decisions. Hence, a strong tradition of honor, shame, and the nature of control of female sexuality in Turkey substitute family policies and population politics, which should ideally seek gender equality. Despite the legislative changes during the EU accession process, the “gender roles are constructed around male breadwinner-female homemaker” (Mu¨ ftu¨ ler-Bac 1999, 305). We believe that the conservative ideas on gender relations and the ensuing conventional inter- pretations of gender roles are reflected in the low levels of participation of Turkish women in formal employment relations. As the most recent research by Turkey’s State Planning Organization and World Bank (2009) shows, there is a confluence of economic and social hindrances with respect to women’s formal employment participation in Turkey. Women’s higher chances of taking unregistered employment and low payment, along with the lack of affordable institutionalized childcare and finally cultural factors, contribute to the mutual interaction between informal employment and socially conservative discourse. Yılmaz (2008, 58) depicts social conservatism as “focused on the regulation of sexuality and gender relations” in Turkey. Therefore, social conservatism is centered upon an idealized honorable and Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 409 hard-working woman in a holy family. In this context, “religion appeared to be an ideology which legitimized and upheld that ‘holy family’, particularly as regards the ‘equal, honourable and hardworking’ position of women in that family structure” (Yılmaz 2008, 59). Yılmaz’s (2008) observation shows the importance which moderately patriarchal family structures receive in the Turkish public opinion, as evident also in Eslen-Ziya’s (2007) previous findings regarding how Downloaded from the networking and lobbying of women’s activist groups achieve gender equability encountered resistance in Turkey. For instance, in 2001, despite the successful networking and lobbying of women’s groups, the nationalist and religious conservatives engineered a last- minute revision by Parliament in Enactment Law Article 10, pertain- http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ ing to Property Regimes in Marriage. Consequently, the new property regime applied only to marriages that took place after 1 January 2002, not to all existing marriages. As it stands now, the current legislation fails to address the target female population who suffer from economic discrimination (CEDAW Shadow Report 2004) and thus ensures the sanctity of the family.

As Kandiyoti (1998, 278) also states, the patriarchal family struc- at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 ture in Turkey is intact: where men have the authority over everyone else and are “bound up in the incorporation and control of the family by the state.” The same conservative conventions expect Turkish women to serve as the guards of tradition and custom and be good mothers and wives. “The ideal woman is portrayed as pure, honourable, and unreachable, serving the higher cause of moderniza- tion in Turkey” (Mu¨ ftu¨ ler-Bac 1999, 307). According to Mu¨ ftu¨ ler-Bac (1999, 305), male superiority within the Turkish culture is maintained via honor and shame codes, and in return female oppression is accepted by “society’s rules of appropriate behaviour.” Turkish women are expected to remain virgins until married and to remain faithful to society’s rules. This is a manifesta- tion of our confluence argument stated above. While there is no ban on abortion in Turkey, unlike Poland or Ireland, the issue of virgin- ity can become another tool of patriarchal society to put pressure on and control the lives and bodies of girls and young women. The hardworking Turkish woman is overwhelmed by motherhood and family responsibilities. A vast weight is given to “care giving, nurturing, and self-sacrificing roles of women” while “marriage and motherhood are still the ultimate paths to status attain- ment” (Sev’er and Go¨ kçeçiçek 2001, 969). In fact, as Sev’er and Go¨ kçeçiçek (2001) point out, Turkish customs “explicitly emphasize the family roles of women and deem secondary any work or career aspirations women may have” (2001, 969). Another striking finding of O¨ zer and Biçerli (2004, 55) is that women who participate in the 410 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya labor force in Turkey “undertake their traditional tasks and find jobs which are considered as traditionally women’s jobs.” Women who try to break this cycle and attempt to join the formal work force find themselves encountering difficulties. For instance, the lack of public services for childcare has been the number-one reason why women drop out from the labor market. As in Poland, due to insufficient public services, childcare is seen as the main responsibility of Downloaded from women. Childcare in Turkey is seen as a problem that must be solved by women via their individual networks and capacities. A valid question is whether the population figures justify such vig- ilance and prioritization of fertility at the expense of women’s rights. The population demographics and population policies in http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ Turkey differentiate from those of many EU states. Though the general fertility rate in Turkey is in decline, this decline is not as drastic as it is in Western Europe. Differences also exist among the Turkish regions in terms of fertility rates; the level of education and socio-economic conditions impart further effects on fertility rates in Turkey.4 The fertility rate is higher in the rural and eastern areas 5 compared to urban areas and those in the west. at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 Given the difficulties that women face, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an’s statement in March 2008 that each family in Turkey should at least have three children prompted a huge reaction from the feminist groups. Hence, Erdog˘an advertised this method to overcome the adverse effect of the gradual stagnation and decrease in Turkey’s population growth rate over the next thirty years, with calls that every family should have at least three children. At this stage the West is crying, you shall never fall in that trap. If the same trend continues, in 2030 most of the Turkish population will also be above 60 years of age. My dear sisters, I am not talking as a Prime Minster, I am talking as your dis- tressed brother. Never fall in this trap. We have to keep our young population as it is. The essence of economy is people. [. . .] What do they want to do? They want to put an end to the Turkish nation. If you do not want our population to cease, a family must have three children. Our population is young now, but they will get old in 2030 and this is a danger for us.6 (Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an, March 2008, authors’ translation) As the Prime Minister’s rhetoric demonstrates, what is expected from women is that they work at home, raise as many children as possible, and take care of the household. If a woman wants the double burden, then she can also work outside the house earning money. However, female employees should not expect any help with Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 411 their participation in formal employment if they are to raise families. That is how, on the one hand, the working women with family and children tend to carry a double burden. On the other hand, participation of women predominantly in informal employment does not assist their emancipation. This double work burden of the women— who go out to paid jobs in the workforce and return home at night to start a round of household chores—is often referred to as “second Downloaded from shift.” Despite this second shift and hard work, women’s labor and their contribution to production are both invisible and unnoticeable. As Yılmaz (2008, 59) argues, the golden formula for Turkish conservatism appears to be, “Protect the family; change the economy; ensure political stability; and, make us a member of the EU, without http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ sacrificing our national customs and traditions.” Thereby, as we have suggested, the burden of motherhood, child, and homecare responsibilities of women, enforced by conservative social conventions, intersect with low formal employment of women in Turkey. Sizeable undeclared work prevents Turkish women from becoming full citizens who can rely on state support. Even the limited legisla-

tion in place aligns itself with the conservative social conventions. at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 The situation is similar to that of Poland; although in Turkey, due to larger informalities, the institutions of population politics seeking work/family reconciliation cannot take root. In fact, conservative ideas substitute such institutions.

Conclusion This article raises a few issues regarding family policies, population politics, and gender rights in Poland and Turkey. Demographic decline causes anxiety in both countries despite differences in their pace of population growth. Poland and Turkey were used as two contexts to illustrate the influences of social conservatism on the functioning of population politics per se. A conservative discourse is effective in the delineation of gender roles, family policies, and women’s workforce participation in both countries. This operates acutely in the case of care-giving. Thus, as we argue above, in contrast to formal institutions, socially conservative ideas frame population politics. Those ideas that define gender roles and set certain roles for men and women also define family roles, work force participation and duties, and standards of public good. It is clear that women are the main care-givers in two contexts. We argued that this role is expected from them in order to bolster population growth. In this regard, while looking for the expressions of ideational influence, we used terms such as social conventions, discourses, and frames interchangeably. By placing Poland and 412 V Korkut and Eslen-Ziya

Turkey under its scope, this article demonstrated that countries with variation in formal institutional presence may converge regarding how population politics work in respect of care-giving. We speciﬁed two mechanisms by which ideas subordinate institutions. Hence, in the Polish context, work/family reconciliation policies do not operate as long as care-giving is considered women’s duty. This paradigm appears in societal convictions as well as how Downloaded from employers approach pregnant women and mothers in employment. As North (1990) argues, there can be a tension between the formal rules of the game and the deeply embedded social norms. In Poland, regardless of the prevalence of formal employment relations and work/family reconciliation policies, socially conservative ideas keep http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ their prominence in such a way that they can trump institutions facilitating gender equality. This process shows how ideas supplant formal institutions. In the Turkish context, prevalent conservative convictions about gender relations, also strengthened by the large informal sector, substitute potential institutions of family policies. Hence, in the absence of formal employment relations, social conser-

vatism gains salience in respect of the functioning of population pol- at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 itics. Ideas, as belief systems, are more powerful than institutions since they provide what is perceived as legitimate, acceptable, and good for the societies under study. In the end, irrespective of the presence of formal institutions, socially conservative ideas prevail. We propose these as our major ﬁndings for the literature of population politics.

NOTES Umut Korkut, Lecturer of Economic Studies and International Business at Glasgow Caledonian University Business School. He was admitted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with magna cum laude at the Central European University in Budapest in 2004. Dr Korkut currently has a book under contract with Palgrave/NYU European Studies Series: Europe in Transition entitled Liberalization Challenges in Hungary. His most recent publications include: “Political Religion and Politicized Women in Turkey: Hegemonic Republicanism Revisited”, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2010 (co-authored with Hande Eslen-Ziya); “More Reform, Less Action Dilemmas of Economic Europeanization in Hungary”, in Problems of Post-Communism, 2010; “Reversing the Wave: The Perverse Effects of Economic Liberalism on Human Rights in Poland”, in Czech Review of Sociology, 2009; “Micro and Macro Development in Hungary under the Glance of the EU Cohesion Funds”, in East European Quarterly, 2008; and “The 2006 Hungarian Election: Economic Competitiveness versus Hungarian Solidarity”, in Parliamentary Affairs, 2007. Currently, Dr. Korkut and Dr. Eslen-Ziya are starting a two-year Poland and Turkey Population Politics V 413 project entitled “Construction of Femininity and Masculinity in Friday Prayers in Turkey”. E-mail: [email protected]. Hande Eslen-Ziya, Lecturer of Sociology at Bahc¸es¸ehir University, Istanbul. She received her doctorate degree at Polish Academy of Sciences IFIS PAN, Warsaw in 2008. She also received a Ph.D. Specialization on Gender Studies at the Central European University in Budapest in 2002.

Her research is theoretically informed by social psychology, feminist psy- Downloaded from chology and sociology, as well as gender role strain, conceptions of femininity and masculinity. Since 2009, Dr. Eslen-Ziya is part of a two-year project titled “The Social Construction and Developmental Trajectories of Masculinity”. Her most recent publications are: “Political Religion and Politicized Women in Turkey: Hegemonic Republicanism Revisited”, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2010 (co-authored with http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/ Umut Korkut) and “The EU’s Inﬂuence on Women’s Activist Groups Networking: A Comparison between Turkey and Greece”, in Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2007. E-mail: [email protected]. 1. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction. do?tab=table&plugin=1&init=1&pcode=tsiem010&language=en. 2. Figures reported by Heinen and Portet (2009) demonstrate that Poland ranks at 37 (Human Development Index of 0.862), 35 (Gender

Development Index of 0.859), and 39 (Gender Empowerment Index of at Universidad de Navarra. Servicio Bibliotecas on February 28, 2012 0.610) in 2006. 3. The full article is available at http://www.bianet.org/kadin/bianet/ 122341-kadin-istihdami-ebeveyn-izni-ve-kres-hizmetleriyle-artar. 4. In 2008, the annual population growth rate in Turkey was at 13.1 percent, while it was at 17.0 percent in 1990 (TUIK, http://nkg.tuik. gov.tr/goster.asp?aile=1). 5. The statistics show population increase in ﬁfty-ﬁve provinces out of eighty-one in 2008, while twenty-six provinces experienced decrease in their populations (TUIK, http://nkg.tuik.gov.tr/goster.asp?aile=1). 6. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?i=104290, March 2008.

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