Psychological Bulletin Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 2003, Vol. 129, No. 3, 339–375 0033-2909/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition John T. Jost Jack Glaser Stanford University University of California, Berkeley Arie W. Kruglanski Frank J. Sulloway University of Maryland at College Park University of California, Berkeley Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (au- thoritarianism, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justifi- cation). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r ϭ .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (–.32); uncertainty tolerance (–.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (–.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (–.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat. Conservatism is a demanding mistress and is giving me a migraine. Rokeach, 1960; Shils, 1954), but it has withstood the relentless —George F. Will, Bunts tests of time and empirical scrutiny (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998; Billig, 1984; Brown, 1965; Christie, 1991; Elms, For more than half a century, psychologists have been tracking 1969; Sidanius, 1985; W. F. Stone, 1980; W. F. Stone, Lederer, & the hypothesis that different psychological motives and tendencies Christie, 1993; Tetlock, 1984; Wilson, 1973c). A voluminous underlie ideological differences between the political left and the literature, which we review here, facilitates the comparison of right. The practice of singling out political conservatives for spe- cognitive styles and motivational needs of political conservatives cial study began with Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and with those of moderates, liberals, radicals, and left-wingers. In Sanford’s (1950) landmark study of authoritarianism and the fas- addition to classic and contemporary approaches to authoritarian- cist potential in personality. An asymmetrical focus on right-wing ism, we cover less obvious sources of theory and research on authoritarianism (RWA) was criticized heavily on theoretical and individual differences associated with dogmatism and intolerance methodological grounds (e.g., Christie, 1954; Eysenck, 1954; of ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure, and social dominance orientation (SDO) insofar as each of these psychological variables contributes to a deeper and more nuanced John T. Jost, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; Jack understanding of political conservatism. Glaser, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berke- The study of authoritarianism and other personality theories of ley; Arie W. Kruglanski, Department of Psychology, University of Mary- political attitudes is often dismissed a priori as an illegitimate, land at College Park; Frank J. Sulloway, Institute of Personality and Social value-laden attempt to correlate general psychological profiles Research, University of California, Berkeley. with specific ideological beliefs (e.g., Durrheim, 1997; J. L. Mar- This work first began while John T. Jost was a postdoctoral fellow at the tin, 2001; Ray, 1988). The psychological study of ideological University of Maryland at College Park, supported by National Institute of conservatism is one that invites controversy (e.g., Redding, 2001; Mental Health Grant R01-MH52578, National Science Foundation Grant Sears, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Sniderman & Tet- SBR-9417422, and a Research Scientist Award KO5-MHO 1213 to Arie W. Kruglanski. Work continued while Jack Glaser was a postdoctoral lock, 1986; Tetlock, 1994; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993), but this fellow at the Institute of Personality and Social Research at the University circumstance does not mean that researchers should avoid it. Our of California, Berkeley and sponsored by National Institute of Mental view is that it is a legitimate empirical issue whether there are Health Grant F32-MH12195 and while Arie W. Kruglanski (supported by demonstrable links between a clearly defined set of psychological National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9022192) and Frank J. Sulloway needs, motives, and properties and the adoption of politically were fellows at the Center for Advanced Studies of Behavioral Sciences at conservative attitudes. The measurement of individual differences Stanford University. Further financial and administrative support for this is an excellent starting point for understanding the psychological project was provided by the Graduate School of Business at Stanford basis of political ideology, but we argue that approaching political University and the Jackson Library Document Delivery Service. conservatism exclusively from the standpoint of personality theory We are grateful for exceedingly helpful comments on previous versions is a mistake. The hypothesis that people adopt conservative ide- of this article by Jeff Greenberg, E. Tory Higgins, Orsolya Hunyady, and Jim Sidanius. We also wish to thank Robert Rosenthal for statistical advice. ologies in an effort to satisfy various social–cognitive motives Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to John T. requires a novel theoretical perspective that overcomes two crucial Jost, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, Califor- limitations of traditional research on the psychology of nia 94305. E-mail: [email protected] conservatism. 339 340 JOST, GLASER, KRUGLANSKI, AND SULLOWAY First, too many measures of individual differences have con- ical motives and political outcomes and helps to explain relations flated psychological and political variables in an attempt to mea- between the two; (c) highlights situational as well as dispositional sure a construct that is really a hybrid of the two. Wilson (1973c), variables that relate to conservatism; (d) takes into account a wider for instance, offered an amalgamated definition of conservatism as variety of epistemic, existential, and ideologically defensive mo- “resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe, traditional tivations than has been considered previously; and (e) provides an and conventional forms of institutions and behaviour” (p. 4). integrative framework for understanding how these motives work However, Wilson and Patterson’s (1968) Conservatism Scale (C- together to reduce and manage fear and uncertainty. Scale)—which is the psychological instrument that has been most widely used to measure conservatism—combines nonpolitical The Motivated Social–Cognitive Perspective stimuli that are meant to elicit general attitudes concerning uncer- tainty avoidance (e.g., modern art, jazz music, horoscopes) and To set the stage, we use the term motivated social cognition to stimuli that have explicitly political referents (e.g., death penalty, refer to a number of assumptions about the relationship between legalized abortion, socialism, religion). The fact that such a seem- people’s beliefs and their motivational underpinnings (e.g., ingly heterogeneous scale would exhibit reasonable psychometric Bruner, 1957; Duckitt, 2001; Dunning, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, properties with respect to reliability and validity suggests that 1991; Greenwald, 1980; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Higgins, 1998; Wilson and his colleagues were accurately perceiving a link be- Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990; Rokeach, 1960). In the post- tween general epistemic motivations and conservative ideology Freudian world, the ancient dichotomy between reason and passion (see also Bagley, Wilson, & Boshier, 1970; Wilson, 1973a). Nev- is blurred, and nearly everyone is aware of the possibility that ertheless, theoretical and empirical efforts are generally hampered people are capable of believing what they want to believe, at least by the failure to distinguish clearly between psychological and within certain limits. Our first assumption, too, is that conservative ideological variables (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). ideologies—like virtually all other belief systems—are adopted in Second, treating political conservatism solely as an individual- part because they satisfy some psychological needs. This does not difference variable neglects growing evidence that situational fac- mean that conservatism is pathological or that conservative beliefs tors influence the experience and expression of conservatism (e.g., are necessarily false, irrational, or unprincipled. From the present Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1990; Jost, Kruglanski, perspective, most human beliefs are subjectively rational in the & Simon, 1999; Kruglanski & Webster, 1991; Sales & Friend, sense of being deduced from a set of premises to which believers 1973; Sulloway, 1996, 2001). If classic personality theories are subscribe (Kruglanski, 1999; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, correct in positing that character rigidity and motivational threat 1999b), and they are also at least partially responsive to reality are related to the holding of conservative attitudes, then system constraints (Kunda, 1990). In this sense, any given person’s