NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

Michael of Ephesus’ comments on Aristotle’s De memoria Graduate Programme in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology

Daphne Argyri

Advisor: Katerina Ierodiakonou

Athens 2016

ΔΙΠΛΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ Ονοματεπώνυμο: Δάφνη Αργύρη

Μεταπτυχιακό πρόγραμμα: Ιστορία και Φιλοσοφία των Επιστημών και της Τεχνολογίας (ΙΦΕΤ)

Α.Μ.: 004/13

Υπεύθυνη καθηγήτρια: Κατερίνα Ιεροδιακόνου

Αναγνώστες: Βασίλης Καρασμάνης Παύλος Καλλιγάς

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Τα σχόλια του Μιχαήλ Εφέσιου στο Περί μνήμης του Αριστοτέλη

Στην πραγματεία του Περί μνήμης και αναμνήσεως ο Αριστοτέλης παρουσιάζει τη μνήμη ως βασικό στοιχείο της γνωστικής διαδικασίας, πολύ συγγενές με την αντίληψη. Πρόκειται για μια παθητική κατάσταση (ἕξις/πάθος, 449b25), δηλαδή για μια αποθήκη της ψυχής γεμάτη με εικόνες του παρελθόντος, που σε αντίθεση και συνέχεια του Πλάτωνα διακρίνεται εμφατικά από την σαφώς ενεργητική διαδικασία της ανάμνησης. Η ανάμνηση συνίσταται στη δυνατότητα ανάκλησης στο παρόν, εκουσίως ή ακουσίως, των εικόνων του παρελθόντος και ανήκει, σαν συλλογισμός (οἷον συλλογισμός τις, 453a10), στο μέρος της ψυχής που συνδέεται με την λογική ικανότητα του ανθρώπου. Το υπόμνημα του Μιχαήλ Εφέσιου (12ος αι. μ.Χ.) στο παραπάνω έργο του Αριστοτέλη (Σχόλια εἰς τὸ Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως, 1-41) είναι το μόνο υπόμνημα σε αυτό που σώζεται ως τις μέρες μας και αποτελεί πολύ σημαντική πηγή για την ιστορία των δύο αυτών εννοιών. Οι οξυδερκείς παρατηρήσεις και τα σχόλια του Μιχαήλ φαίνεται κατ΄αρχάς πως έχουν επηρεαστεί από τις διάφορες σχολές σκέψης με τις οποίες ήταν εξοικειωμένος, αλλά παράλληλα εκφράζουν ξεκάθαρα και τις προσωπικές του αντιλήψεις πάνω στο θέμα. Συγκεκριμένα, φανερώνεται μια συγκροτημένη θεώρηση της μνήμης και της ανάμνησης καθώς και του τρόπου με τον οποίο σχετίζονται και αλληλεπιδρούν στο πλαίσιο μιας συστηματικής γνωστικής θεωρίας. Οι ιδέες του συνυφαίνονται με την εξήγηση του αριστοτελικού κειμένου και δικαιολογούν τις εκάστοτε ερμηνείες που προκρίνει έναντι άλλων σε διάφορα προβληματικά χωρία. Ειδικότερα, πραγματεύεται την μνήμη ως ενεργητική διαδικασία (ἐνέργεια) που προϋποθέτει

κρίση και συνεπώς εμπλοκή και της διάνοιας (προσλογίζηται, 15.15). Σε σχέση με την ανάμνηση, έχει για τον σχολιαστή μεγαλύτερο φιλοσοφικό ενδιαφέρον και της αποδίδει εξηγητική προτεραιότητα, αφού ο μηχανισμός της μνήμης και η λειτουργία της προϋποτίθενται για την κατανόηση της ανάμνησης. Επίσης, αν και κάποια ζώα έχουν μνημονική ικανότητα, η ανθρώπινη μνήμη είναι κατά τον Μιχαήλ πιο εξελιγμένη. Οι άνθρωποι θυμούνται συχνά με ακρίβεια τον χρόνο κατά τον οποίο έμαθαν κάτι, καθώς και πρόσθετες λεπτομέρειες για τον τόπο όπου έλαβε χώρα ή το πρόσωπο από το οποίο το άκουσαν. Από την άλλη, η ανάμνηση

παρουσιάζεται ως συγκεκριμένο είδος μνήμης (μνήμη τις, 19.2) που αφορά μόνο

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περιπτώσεις στις οποίες μερική λήθη έχει προηγηθεί. Επιπλέον, ο Μιχαήλ θεωρεί πως πρόκειται πάντα για εκούσια διαδικασία που επιτυγχάνεται και εξασκείται με συγκεκριμένο τρόπο. Είναι, δηλαδή, μια συστηματική αναζήτηση μέσω της σκέψης, με στόχο την αποκατάσταση μιας χαμένης μνήμης, ενώ ακουσίως δεν μπορεί να προκύψει. Αυτές οι θεωρητικές παραδοχές που σκιαγραφούν αδρομερώς τη θεωρία του Μιχαήλ για τη μνήμη και συνακόλουθα για την ανάμνηση, δίνουν συνοχή σε όλο το υπόμνημα της αριστοτελικής πραγματείας, αφού εξηγούν την ερμηνεία πολλών αποσπασμάτων του που χωρίς αυτές θα φαινόταν παράδοξη. Συνεπώς, η έννοια της μνήμης στον Μιχαήλ Εφέσιο εμπλουτίζεται με χαρακτηριστικά που δεν εμφανίζονται στον Αριστοτέλη. Μνήμη και ανάμνηση παρουσιάζουν αυξημένη πολυπλοκότητα, γι’ αυτό και η κατανόησή τους είναι πιο σύνθετη. Συμπεραίνεται, λοιπόν, ότι μέσω του βυζαντινού αυτού σχολιαστή αριστοτελικών έργων πλησιάζουμε ακόμη περισσότερο προς την ευρύτατη και πολυσύνθετη αντίληψη της μνήμης που απασχολεί τη σύγχρονη έρευνα. Ακόμη, αναδεικνύεται στο έργο του η φιλοσοφική πρωτοτυπία, καθώς δεν περιορίζεται σε εξηγητική εργασία ελάσσονος σημασίας, αλλά συμβάλλει καίρια στην ερμηνεία του θέματος που πραγματεύεται.

Λέξεις κλειδιά: μνήμη, ανάμνηση, Αριστοτέλης, Μιχαήλ Εφέσιος

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Contents Abstract ...... 3 Aristotle on memory ...... 5 The concept of memory in the Aristotelian corpus ...... 5 The small treatise De memoria et reminiscentia ...... 6 The Byzantine reception of the De memoria ...... 11 Michael of Ephesus ...... 11 The various paraphrases ...... 14 Michael of Ephesus on memory and recollection ...... 17 Memory ...... 19 a. Memory as an active process ...... 19 b. Memory as prior to recollection ...... 24 Recollection ...... 30 a. Recollection as a kind of memory ...... 30 b. Recollection as a deliberate process ...... 32 Recollection as a process of analysis ...... 35 The importance of mnemonic techniques ...... 37 The Topica and the Rhetorica in the background ...... 40 Concluding Remarks ...... 45 Bibliography ...... 47

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Abstract

In his treatise On memory and recollection Aristotle discusses memory as a part of the cognitive process, very similar to perception; it is a passive state, in the sense that it is the storage of past images in the soul, and is distinguished from the active process of recollection. Michael of Ephesus’ commentary of this Aristotelian work is its only surviving Greek commentary and constitutes an important source for the history of the concept of memory. Michael’s insightful comments and observations seem to have been influenced by various schools of thought with which he was acquainted, but at the same time they clearly present his own views on the subject. These views form a systematic understanding of the concept of memory, according to which he explains the Aristotelian text and adjusts the interpretation. Memory is treated by him as an active process that involves judgement, and thus the reasoning faculty of the soul, too. In comparison to recollection, it is a more philosophically significant concept, since it is exegetically prior to it. Recollection is treated by Michael as a kind of memory, which is always deliberate and only employed when partial memory loss has occurred. This recollecting process is described by Michael as a process of analysis, greatly influenced by Aristotle’s reference to mnemonic teqniques. These theoretical presuppositions that roughly sketch Michael’s conception of memory, and accordingly his account of recollection, provide coherence to his entire commentary of the Aristotelian treatise and support his interpretations of various passages that would otherwise seem arbitrary. Memory in Michael, therefore, is enriched with characteristics that are not to be found in Aristotle; it acquires a higher level of sophistication and, as a result, it turns out to be broader and more elaborate than the simple memory attributed to other animals, and one step more evolved towards the extremely broad and vastly complex contemporary conception.

Key words: memory, recollection, Aristotle, Michael of Ephesus

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Aristotle on memory

The concept of memory in the Aristotelian corpus Aristotle’s views on memory are intertwined with many aspects of his philosophy and it is hard for the researcher to present a unified Aristotelian ‘theory’ of memory that will include every relative element traced in his writings and, at the same time, will be coherent and completely free of contradiction. As the recent literature reveals1, modern scholars are still trying to bring forward the Aristotelian views on the subject and disentangle the complication of the relevant accounts found in his various treatises.

In particular, the concept of memory is closely related to the discussions in Aristotle’s physiological treatises, namely the De anima and the De sensu, since it belongs to the sensing part of the soul, which is responsible for sense perception and imagination (φαντασία). In those treatises, the necessary background of Aristotle’s psychology is provided. A more detailed and thorough account of memory and related topics is given in the De memoria, which focuses on its ontological aspect, namely on the objects of memory and their ontological status, the physiological processes involved in the formation of memories and its demarcation from recollection.

Further, memory holds an important role in the Aristotelian epistemology. As a true successor of Plato2, Aristotle also considers memory crucial for our cognition. Notable similarities can be found in their approaches, especially regarding the importance they both attribute to recollection for the acquisition of scientific knowledge3. The most important treatise in relevance is the second book of the Analytica Posteriora, where the possibility of a higher level of learning is explained. In chapter 19, memory comes up in the famous discussion about the origin of the first principles of knowledge. It holds a key role in the formation of experience, which in turn leads to the knowledge of universals. A similar discussion of memory as a medium between sense (αἴσθησις) and experience (ἐμπειρία) comes up in Metaphysica A1.

1 Cf. e.g. Sorabji, R., Aristotle on Memory, London 1972 (repr. with new foreword 2004); Annas, J., ‘Aristotle on memory and the self’, in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford 1999, 297‐311; King, R., Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory, Berlin 2009; Bloch, D., Aristotle on Memory and Recollection. Text, Translation, Interpretation and Reception in Western Scholasticism, Leiden 2007. Also, Mika Perälä (Helsinki) is currently preparing a monograph as part of his post-doctoral project ‘Aristotle on memory’ (2016). https://www.jyu.fi/ytk/laitokset/yfi/en/research/projects/research-groups/itep/people/perala-mika 2 De memoria in particular can be read as a critical response to Plato’s discussion of memory and recollection. Cf. Lang, H., ‘On memory: Aristotle’s corrections of Plato’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 18, 1980, 379-93. 3 Cf. Coleman, J., Ancient and Medieval Memories, Cambridge 1992, 24-25. 5

Memory is also connected with Aristotle’s views on ethical matters. Already in the De memoria (452a27-b6) memory was connected with habit (ἔθος), which forms the character and regulates changes by creating something like a second nature. Memory is thus involved in ethical learning as well. There is always a function that memory fulfills and, since recollection is something we do, it is always related to an end. The ethical aspect of memory is mainly discussed by Aristotle in the Ethica Nicomachea and in various passages from the Rhetorica. In those works memory is linked with pleasure and pain and participates in the formation of desire. Also, memories are connected with expectations and can reveal important features of the subject's moral character. For instance, in book 9 of the Ethica Nicomachea Aristotle explains how different characters are affected by their memories4. According to him, good people enjoy spending time alone because they enjoy the company of their memories and find pleasure in recollecting their good deeds (Eth. Nicom. 1166a23- 29).

Additional information and scattered references to memory, recollection and remembering are also found in other Aristotelian treatises, such as his logical works (e.g. Topics 111b26-31, Prior Analytics 67a8-30) and some psychological works from the Parva Naturalia (e.g. De insomniis 458b18-20, 462a8-11, De divinatione per somnum 463b3-9). As it becomes obvious, memory for Aristotle is a rich concept that has many aspects and is connected to various topics of his philosophy, which are all important for a general understanding of the concept. But it is the treatise De memoria et reminiscentia the main work where memory and recollection are thoroughly treated and in depth investigated.

The small treatise De memoria et reminiscentia Aristotle’s short treatise De memoria et reminiscentia (On memory and recollection) is his most important work on the subject. It deals exclusively with matters concerning these two capabilities and their relation, treats memory as a faculty of the soul, and explains its function in accordance with the Aristotelian views on sense perception, as these are presented in the preceding treatise of the Parva Naturalia, namely the De sensu et sensibilibus. Memory is defined and the way memories are formed and stored is described based on images previously formed in the heart (De mem. I).

More precisely, remembering is an exercise of the capacity of phantasia (φαντασία), like dreaming5. As such, it is assigned to the perceptual part of the soul rather than

4 Warren, J., The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle and the Hellensitic Hedonists, Cambridge 2014, 157-174. 5 De insomniis 461b21-24: τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος· καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἔνεστι, καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος, ἀλλ' οὐ Κορίσκος. [Each of them is however, as has been said, the remnant of a sensory impression taken 6 the intellect (De mem. 450a12-14). The sensory representations6 (φαντάσματα) provided by phantasia are stored in the heart (πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν), where soul is located, and after some time elapses they become mnemonic impressions (μνημoνεύματα). According to the definition of memory then, it is a matter of having or storing in mind something that was perceived or thought of at some point in the past (De mem. 449b24-25):

Memory, then, is neither sensation nor conception, but a state of having one of these or an affection resulting from one of these, when some time elapses7. [Trans. Bloch (2007) 27]

The importance of time is also underlined and explained (De mem.452b6-29). Memory problems8 are explained too, and certain distinctions are drawn between memory and other similar concepts, such as sense (αἴσθησις), re-learning (δίς μαθεῖν) and, of course, recollection (ἀνάμνησις). In particular, recollection is described in chapter II as an active process, which is more closely connected with the faculty of deliberation (βουλευτικόν), it requires the association of ideas according to certain rules and is, according to Aristotle, similar to deduction (συλλογισμός τις), or like a sort of search (ζήτησίς τις) (De mem. 453a10-14).

The treatise is roughly organized in two chapters, one on memory (449b4-451a17) and one on recollection (451a18-453b11). Regardless of that seemingly simple structure9, those who study Aristotle’s views on the subject are faced with various difficulties arising from the text. First of all, there are many textual problems that obscure the reading of the treatise, some of which of major significance. For instance, there are many problems with regard to the disputed passages 451a18- b10, 452a17-26, 452a27 etc., about which the manuscripts are in complete disagreement. Most importantly, there are also many problems of interpretation. This is mainly due to the succinct and elliptical character of the work, which is a kind of appendix to the De sensu, and therefore the content of that preceding treatise on the theory of sense perception is often taken for granted. Additionally, various details from De anima II-III are presupposed, such as the concept of phantasia

when sense was actualizing itself; and when this, the true impression, has departed, its remnant is still there, and it is correct to say that, though not actually Coriscus, it is like Coriscus. (Trans. by Beare, J. I. in Barnes, J. (ed.), The complete works of Aristotle Vol. I, Princeton 1984, 729-735.)] 6 The exact nature of the images that Aristotle calls phantasmata (e.g. whether they are pictorial or not) is still contested among scholars. Cf. Annas (1999) 297-311, Bloch (2007) 64-70. 7 ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν γένηται χρόνος. 8 For the explanation of episodes of mis-remembering in the De memoria and cases we fail to remember, cf. Sisco, J. E., ‘Space, time and phantasms in Aristotle, De memoria 2, 452b7–25’, Classical Quarterly 47, 1997, 167–75. 9 The simplicity is only phenomenal, since old and modern scholars consider the last part of the text (452b7-453b11) as treating matters concerning both memory and recollection. For instance cf. Sorabji (20042) 108; Annas (1999) 297-298; Lorenz, H., The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford 2006, 148-173. 7

(φαντασία) and its role, and the division of the soul into parts (sensing and thinking faculties). In addition, the relatively loose use of memory terms10 (Aristotle freely uses ‘memory’ words to refer to recollecting) often causes trouble distinguishing between memory and recollection. The main difficulty, as far as this is concerned, is the translation of the memory verbs μνημoνεύειν and μεμνῆσθαι, since often it is not explicit whether there is any distinction in their meaning or not. As a result, the philosophical debate still focuses on the exact content of Aristotle’s concept of memory and its relation with recollection, since it is by no means clear how much of the philosopher’s insights should be attributed to memory and which should be included in his account of recollection.

An exemplary case where the difficulty becomes evident is the problematic passage 452b23-29, from the second chapter of the treatise11:

When, therefore, the movement corresponding to the object and that corresponding to its time concur, then one actually remembers. If one supposes he does without really doing so, he supposes himself to remember. For one may be mistaken, and think that he remembers when he really does not. But it is not possible that when one actually remembers he should not suppose himself to remember, but should remember unconsciously. For that is what remembering is. If however, the movement corresponding to the object takes place without that corresponding to the time, or, if the latter takes place without the former, one does not remember12. [Trans. Beare (1984) 718]

All the difficulties described above can be found in this passage and hinder its interpretation. Firstly, the passage that comes straight before this one (452a) is in bad condition in the manuscripts, so the exact context of the discussion is unclear. Also, it belongs to the last part of the treatise, which means that it can be understood as referring either to recollection or to both memory and recollection. In addition, its opening lines refer to the concept of time and, thus, presuppose the relevant explanation from the De sensu (447a12-448a19 / 448b19-22). There Aristotle discusses how time is perceived through the senses, and whether or not it can be conceived simultaneously with other sensible objects. Lastly, both μνημoνεύειν and μεμνῆσθαι come up as memory verbs, and the passage’s translation can vary significantly according to the exact meaning that these two are taken to convey13.

10 Cf. Annas (1999) 298; Lorenz (2006) 162-163; Bloch (2007) 84-109 (Memory and Terminology). 11 For Michael of Ephesus’ reconstruction of this passage (In mem. 36.19-17.7) see later on, pp. 17-19. 12 ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίγνηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ἂν δ' οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ μνημονεύοντα. ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου ἢ αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται. 13 For example, different translations are offered by Sorabji and Bloch for μεμνῆσθαι in lines 452b26- 28: “However, when exercising his memory a person cannot think he is not doing so and fail to notice 8

A further problem concerning memory as presented in Aristotle’s De memoria is that the views expressed in his other works often seem to contradict the theory presented in this particular treatise. As Bloch points out, if Aristotle holds a theory of memory in the Topica, it seems to be very different from the one in the De memoria14. Also, in his other treatises he doesn’t distinguish so strictly memory from recollection, and the two concepts are often blurred. For instance, contrary to this treatise, in the Rhetorica (1068a30-33) forgetting (λήθη) is opposed to recollection, not to memory.

In general, the Aristotelian account of memory has been criticized as narrow in comparison to its modern counterparts. Remembering along these lines has been interpreted as a mere cognitive process, very similar to sense perception, and it is thus characterized by modern interpreters as 'modest'15. It has been argued that Aristotle focuses on one particular type of memory, while other equally important types escape his attention. In particular, since memory for Aristotle is the capacity for storing past images in the soul, it is roughly understood as the storage of objects or things that are perceived and excludes remembering facts, how to do things or intelligible objects. Lorenz stresses the fact that Aristotle, in his account of memory in De memoria I, says nothing about what he calls dispositional memory, meaning the question of how it is that representations that are retained in the soul are accessed and recalled16. Moreover, as Aristotelian memory strictly requires a remembering or recollecting subject, it is explained on the basis of someone’s particular past experiences and thus, it is highly personal or 'autobiographical'.

The troubling nature of that treatise as described above couldn’t have gone unnoticed by the ancient intellectual world either. Unfortunately, though, no ancient comments on it have survived. The only Greek commentary on the De memoria that we have was composed many centuries after the original treatise. It goes back to the 12th century A.D., and it was written by the Byzantine commentator Michael of Ephesus.

that he is remembering. For this turned out to be what remembering was.” [Sorabji (20042) 110] / “for this is what recalling essentially was” [Bloch (2007) 102]. 14 Cf. Bloch (2007) 122-127. In the Topica IV (125b17-19) memory is defined as ἐνέργεια. 15 Cf. King (2009) 9-11. 16 “If Aristotle’s account is to be anything like tolerably complete, he must at least indicate how representations can become active independently of recollection, as he characterizes it in De memoria II.”, Lorenz (2006) 168-170. 9

The Byzantine reception of the De memoria

Michael of Ephesus Very little information is known about the life of Michael of Ephesus. Modern research dates his life and work in the first half of the twelfth century17. He was a contemporary of Eustratius, Metropolitan of Nicaea, his fellow scholar and commentator18. It appears that they were both members of a broader group of scholars and intellectuals gathered around the Byzantine princess and historian Anna Comnena. According to a very plausible suggestion, Anna’s personal interest in philosophy urged her to form a philosophical circle during her enforced retirement in a monastery, which followed the death of her father Alexios Comnenus (1118). The strongest evidence19 about Michael’s work under Anna’s guidance comes from a short passage in a very long funeral oration on her written by George Tornikes20, Metropolitan of Ephesus. In this passage Anna is presented as the one who noticed an important gap in the transmission of Aristotle’s texts until her time, due to the lack of commentaries on certain Aristotelian works. Indeed, the surviving ancient exegetical tradition almost completely neglects some treatises, the subject of which ranges from politics and rhetoric to zoology. In addition, Michael -or “the wise man from Ephesus”- is mentioned as one of the scholars who, under Anna’s encouragement, guidance and inspiration, undertook the task of commenting anew on such neglected Aristotelian treatises, and thus contributed to the Byzantine revival of the commenting tradition based on ancient models21.

17 Unlike Praechter’s supposition that Michael lived in the first half of the 11th c. (cf. Praechter, K., ‘Michael von Ephesos und Psellos’, BZ 31, 1931, 1-12). Cf. Ebbesen, S., Commentators and commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi, Leiden 1981, 153-199; Mercken, H.P.F., The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics, in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle transformed: The ancient commentators and their influence, New York 1990, 430-432. 18 For general information on Michael see also Tatakis, B., La philosophie Byzantine, Paris 1949 (Modern Greek translation with bibliography for 1949–76 by L. Benakis, Athens 1977, 206-207 / English translation by N. J. Moutafakis, Indianapolis & Cambridge 2003, 201-207); Hunger, H., Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, vol. 1, Munich 1978 (Modern Greek translation by L. Benakis, Athens 1987, 81-83). Also, the relevant entries in Goulet, R. (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Paris 1989 ; Lagerlund, H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, Dordrecht 2011. 19 Cf. Browning, R., ‘An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 188, 1962, 1–12. Reprinted in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London 1990, 393–406. Although, Mercken (1990) 436-437 is hesitant about how much evidence we can infer from this oration about the existence of a ‘philosophical circle’ around Anna. 20 Darrouzès, J. (ed.), ‘Georges et Démétrios Tornikes. — Lettres et discours’, in Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 14, Paris 1970, 283. 21 “The works which philosophers of our time addressed to her bear witness to her love of learning, works concerning those writings of Aristotle on which commentaries had not been written until her time, but the explanation of which was transmitted orally in every kind of form, without certitude and with little zeal.[…]I have myself heard the wise man from Ephesus attribute the cause of his blindness 11

The long list of commentaries written by Michael on such neglected Aristotelian works reveals his engagement in Anna’s research project. He wrote commentaries on Metaphysica V-VIII, on the Politica, on the Ethica Nicomachea, on the Sophistici elenchi, on some treatises from the Parva Naturalia, on the De partibus animaliun, on the De generatione animalium, on the De motu animalium, on the De incessu animalium and on the pseudo-Aristotelian De coloribus22. Also, there are attributed to him commentaries on the De caelo, on the Physica, on the Analytica priora et posteriora and on the Topica, which are unfortunately now lost. Michael must have been focused on the composition of most of these commentaries while he was working under Anna (roughly after the death of her father in 1118 until she died, in 1138), but the matter is by no means settled23. Withal, his works are the sole source of information about his life. The number of physical treatises on which he comments along with the plethora of medical examples and scarce hints on the subject reveal that he was possibly a medical doctor, or at least very much interested in medicine24.

The importance of Michael’s work has been the subject of great controversy. He is appreciated mostly due to his breadth as a commentator and because of the fact that he engaged in the exegesis of neglected Aristotelian treatises. His commentary on the Sophistical Refutations is the first on that treatise and the only one we have for it in Greek, and his work on the first book of the Parts of Animals has been characterized as one of the first important texts on the theory of biology after antiquity25. In general, through his comments he tries to clarify Aristotle’s doctrines by being a consistent, but not militant Aristotelian. Unlike many previous commentators, he is neither a devoted Neoplatonist nor a fanatic Christian, although in his writings there are indications of influence from both of these Byzantine intellectual tendencies26. However, it has also been stressed that Michael’s commentaries aren’t very successful in reconstructing the Aristotelian views. Being a relatively late source, Michael doesn’t hesitate to emend the text even by interpolating his own wording or by inverting the order of particular phrases or

to her, because he spent sleepless nights over commentaries on Aristotle at her command, whence came the damage done to his eyes by candles through desiccation” (fol. 29v, trans. Browning 1962). 22 Michele Trizio, in a conference on Michael of Ephesus (http://www.ruhr-uni- bochum.de/philosophy/antike_ma/ephesus/), presented recent findings in favor of Michael’s authorship of the scholia on De interpretatione, which are also attributed to him but are largely ignored by scholars and often go unmentioned in the literature. 23 Cf. Ierodiakonou, K., ‘Some observations on Michael of Ephesus’ comments on Nicomachean Ethics X’, in C. Barber & D. Jenkins (eds.), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden / Boston 2009, 185-6. 24 Cf. Mercken (1990) 432-433; Ierodiakonou (2009) 187-188, where she underlines the frequent use of medical examples in Michael which seems to require a certain amount of in depth medical knowledge. 25 Louis, P. (transl.), Aristote, Les parties des animaux, Paris 1956, xxxix. 26 Cf. for instance, Ierodiakonou (2009). 12 whole passages. Ebbesen for instance, in the case of Michael’s comments on the Sophistici elenchi, emphasizes his unoriginality, by describing how he methodically composes a new commentary by amending earlier scholia and efficiently ‘stitching’ them together27. Similarly, Bloch remarks on the lack of interest in Michael’s readings found in the De memoria commentary28. His explanations are considered arbitrary and unsatisfactory, and thus his commentaries have in general been judged as unilluminating and mediocre29. In spite of all the criticisms, what is important is that he holds a central role in the Byzantine commentary tradition that began with Photios and Arethas, continued with Michael Psellos and John Italus, a tradition which significantly influenced the Western Medieval philosophy of the 13th century through the various Latin translations30.

The Byzantine commentary of Michael of Ephesus is the only surviving commentary on the De memoria. Many centuries separate Michael’s work from the original Aristotelian composition and there is no doubt that his careful study of the text was hindered by a series of difficulties similar to those mentioned above31. Although we ignore which sources Michael used in order to compose this work, most probably he didn’t have at his disposition any other written commentary to consult32. Thus, unlike the case of the Elenchi, it seems that the method he used and its result is very different, since he had fewer scholia to rely on. His commentary is extant, about four times longer than the De memoria, and thoroughly exegetical. As a textual witness for the Aristotelian treatise, Michael is not considered very significant, although he sometimes deviates from the manuscript tradition. Bloch, in his most recent edition of the De memoria, includes Michael’s readings in the critical apparatus and divides them into lemmata, citations, paraphrases and variae lectiones (when Michael mentions an alternative reading)33, but the above list may not be exhaustive and more research needs to be done on the subject. The various lemmas are accompanied by analytical paraphrases and Michael tries to effectively interpret and

27 “Do not imagine, however, that Michael was fastidious. He could not afford to be, since none of the ancient Elenchi-commentaries had survived for him to pillage. He therefore vacuumed old books for useful passages that might serve as or in scholia on the Elenchi, then emptied the bag of the vacuum cleaner and called the rubbish-heap a commentary.”, Ebbesen, S., ‘Philoponus, ‘Alexander’ and the origins of medieval logic’, in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle transformed: The ancient commentators and their influence, New York 1990, 448. 28 Cf. e.g. Bloch (2007) 15: “[…] his readings, even if they could be established beyond any doubt, are not very interesting.” Also, 237: “the explanation provided by Michael (29.24-30.17) is unsatisfactory. […] and it is impossible to provide a satisfactory interpretation of Aristotle’s following statements.” 29 Cf. Tarán, L., book review in Gnomon, 77/3, 2005, 196-209, where he claims that Michael was mediocre as a commentator. 30 Cf. Tatakis (1977) 206-207. 31 For example cf. Bloch (2007) 9, about 451b14-15: “Michael’s commentary (In mem. 25.23-29) shows that the Byzantines, like modern scholars, were uncertain as to the precise meaning of this sentence”. 32 Cf. Wendland, P. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelis Parva Naturalia, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 22.1, Berlin 1903, vi. 33 Cf. Bloch (2007) 21 (Conspectus Siglorum). 13 explain the meaning encapsulated in the citations of Aristotle’s text. His explanations are enriched by the use of illustrative examples that, according to him, help the clear demonstration of the discussed ideas (ἵνα σαφέστερον εἴπω: In mem. 9.15-20). Among them, some characteristic cases are the story with the donkey that falls in a hole (In mem. 8.11-13), the example with the picture of an elephant in Athens that reminds us of the actual elephant in India (In mem. 9.15-17), the use of Euripides’ Hecuba (vv.1-2)

(In mem. 21.6-7), the example of a picture of a lyre which reminds one of a song (In mem. 26.7-12) and many more.

The various paraphrases The rest of the commentary tradition on Aristotle’s De memoria definitely depends on Michael’s work, since it consists in paraphrases of different kinds that derive primarily from his comments and are loosely connected to the Aristotelian text. The Greek Medieval paraphrases that belong to the ‘Michaelian tradition’ and are known to us are written by the following Byzantine scholars: Sophonias, Theodoros Metochites, Georgios Pachymeres and Georgios Gennadios Scolarios. Even though their writings are important links to Aristotle’s textual transmission, especially regarding his views on the subject of memory, they are generally considered unworthy of attention and hence little work has been done on them34. Finally, Michael’s work might have also influenced the Latin translation of the treatise by James of Venice (translation vetus, 12th century), who visited Constantinople at the thirties of the 12th century and became acquainted with the works of Aristotle there, before translating them into Latin35.

Sophonias was a Byzantine monk and author of paraphrases of Aristotle’s works, who lived in Constantinople in the second half of the 13th century36. He writes paraphrases, because he believes that Aristotle’s texts are “oracular” and obscure (In

DA 2.12-13: ὥσπερ εἰ χρησμούς τινας πολλαχοῦ τὴν Ἀριστοτελικὴν οὖσαν φράσιν καὶ μαντείας δεῖσθαι), and therefore in need of clarifications and helpful examples, as he notes in the description of his own method in the preface of his De anima commentary (In DA 2.38-3.1). Even if he had the intention to apply these methodological guidelines to the De memoria paraphrase, what he does is that he

34 “This unreflecting usage of Aristotle became more and more pronounced in the eastern part of the empire, and it would only be a minor exaggeration to say that the 6th century A.D. saw the end of independent Aristotelian philosophy in the East […].From about this time the commentaries were merely expository, and this general rule is certainly true in the case of the De memoria commentaries and paraphrases.”, Bloch (2007) 139. About the state of the research on Aristotelian paraphrases cf. Bydén, B., Theodore Metochites' Stoicheiosis astronomike and the Study of Natural Philosophy and Mathematics in Early Palaiologan Byzantium. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 66, Göteborg 2003, 34-35. 35 Cf. Browning (1990) 401. 36 Cf. Hunger (1987) 70; Searby, D. “Sophonias” in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques vol. 6, Goulet, R. (ed.), Paris 2010. 14 draws directly from Aristotle and Michael without citing, combines them and creates an abridged version of the original text. Despite some scarce glosses here and there, his paraphrase is generally unilluminating. In one class of manuscripts his work on the Parva Naturalia is wrongly attributed to Themistius, but the agreement of the text with the inferior group of manuscripts for Michael provides evidence for Sophonias’ authorship. For he was someone who lived long enough after Michael, and that fact would allow for the text transmission to become corrupt37.

Theodoros Metochites (1270-1332) was a philosophical scholar and a statesman. His paraphrase on the De memoria is included in the collection Paraphrases of Aristotle’s writings on Natural Philosophy (39 books), which was translated into Latin in the 16th century by Gentian Hervet. It is very similar to the one by Sophonias, and even more strictly in the genre of the paraphrase, since for the most part he avoids quoting long passages directly from Aristotle. He mostly focuses on the important concepts, and mainly repeats his descriptions and definitions again and again, in what he considers a “definitional” (ὁριστικῶς) kind of paraphrase. As a result, the paraphrase is long, talkative and monotonous38, whereas the difficult details of the original text remain unexplained. His explanations and readings are based on Michael of Ephesus’ comments, and he also often reproduces many of Michael’s examples verbatim39. Even though he is generally critical of Aristotle, and especially on the subject of memory he elsewhere expresses his own views40, he doesn’t speak in his own words in the paraphrase, but just presents straightforwardly the Aristotelian ideas.

Georgios (Gennadios) Scholarios was a later Byzantine scholar, who lived in the first half of the 15th century. He considered himself a better Aristotelian commentator than his Byzantine forerunners, partly on account of his additional excellent knowledge of the Latin literature. Nevertheless, his work41 on the De memoria consists, to the greatest extent, in general comments on memory and he in turn basically reproduces verbatim Metochites’ wording42.

Lastly, the historian Georgios Pachymeres (1242–c. 1310) wrote an extant work called Philosophia43, including paraphrases on various Aristotelian treatises on logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics and ethics. His De memoria paraphrase is more

37 Cf. Wendland P. (ed.), Sophonias (Pseudo-Themistius), In Aristotelis Parva Naturalia Paraphrasis, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 5.6, Berlin 1903, vi / x-xi. 38 For the style of Metochites’ prose cf. Bydén’s essay in Hult, K., Theodore Metochites on Ancient Authors and Philosophy: Semeioseis gnomikai 1–26 & 71, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 65, Göteborg 2002, 273-88. 39 Cf. Bloch, D. (ed.), ‘Theodoros Metochites on Aristotle’s De memoria. An edition’, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin 76 (2005), 4 (n.6). 40 Cf. Bloch (2005) 5-6. 41 In Jugie, M., et al. (eds.), Œuvres Complètes de Gennade Scholarios, Tome VII, Paris 1936, 455-457. 42 For an example see Bloch (2007) 15 (n.50). 43 In Oikonomakos, K. (ed.), Georgios Pachymeres, Philosophia 11, Ethica Nicomachea, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina, vol. 3, Athens 2005. 15 independent from Aristotle and Michael, but Bloch44 claims that his text doesn’t contain anything original, and is thus equally philosophically uninteresting with the others.

As it becomes obvious, the Aristotelian views on memory were extensively mediated by Michael’s commentary on the De memoria et reminiscentia, which affected greatly their reception in the West.

44 Bloch (2007) 15. 16

Michael of Ephesus on memory and recollection

Even if Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on the De memoria et reminiscentia is unsuccessful in reconstructing and explaining the Aristotelian theory expressed there, a close and careful examination of his commentary from a different perspective can lead to very interesting conclusions about his own understanding of memory and its relation to recollection. It seems that there is a systematic way in which the commentator interprets the Aristotelian text, based on certain theoretical presuppositions that reflect his own views on the subject. Systematic study of the Byzantine commentary for its own sake can reveal its writer’s hermeneutical keys and the leading ideas that provide coherence to the whole work and, more often than not, explain his unusual choices in the interpretation of certain Aristotelian passages. Given the difficulty of the original treatise45, Michael’s comments are inevitably guided by his own ideas about memory and recollection and are probably also influenced by the uses of these concepts throughout all the years that separate the two texts. Apparently, the primary aim of the commentator is to present the correct theory about memory and to describe all there is about it, even if it doesn’t always coincide with the word of the Philosopher. This is what explains the interventions and the changes of the text when he considers it appropriate in order to enable his reading. Accordingly, commenting on the Aristotelian treatise is also a means for him to present a piece of original thinking, thus following the philosophical tradition of his time. Of particular interest is the fact that a thorough presentation of Michael’s theory of memory and recollection can help the modern researcher understand better its differences and deviations from the Aristotelian philosophy and trace the development of the two notions over the years.

Michael, therefore, manages to account for a richer, more elaborate concept of memory, and to reduce recollection to it, through his comments on Aristotle’s treatise on the subject. In order to achieve that, he employs various methods. First of all, he reads, interprets and uses the vocabulary of memory and that of recollection as alternative to each other, and also provides synonym words or equivalent phrases (In mem. 24.10: ὡς εἰ ἔλεγε) when needed to clarify the preferred meaning (e.g. In mem. 20.11-13: ὁ γὰρ ἀναμνησθεὶς τρόπον τινὰ ἐμνήσθη, In mem.

22.26: τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι εἴληπται, In mem. 14.8-9:

ζωγραφήματος τὴν ἕξιν καὶ μονὴν μνήμην εἶναι λέγομεν, In mem. 35.15 -16: διὰ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐδήλωσε καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀναμιμνῇσκεσθαι, In mem.

37.32: μνήμη ἤ ἀνάμνησις). Next, not only does he make extensive use of the

Aristotelian examples (e.g. In mem. 7.16-19 / De mem. 449b20, In mem. 14.12-22 / De mem. 450a30-b11), but he also provides many additional examples of his own (e.g.

In mem. 13.15-18, In mem. 19.21-20.11, In mem. 38.26-29), as exegetical analogies that

45 See pp. 5-7. 17 better illustrate his theory46. Another very important characteristic of his method is that he intervenes in the given text in various ways: he offers alternative writings and possible interpretations for the ambiguous passages (e.g. In mem. 27.20-28.12, In mem. 34.15: φέρεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλη γραφὴ ἔχουσα οὕτως), he interpolates words or whole phrases (In mem. 15.2: τοῦτο γὰρ δεῖ προσυπακούειν, In mem. 31.9: δεῖ γὰρ τούτου προσυπακούειν), he changes the word order and the punctuation (e.g. In mem. 22-23)47 and generally clarifies everything elliptical or obscure based on his theory and his personal understanding, without avoiding the difficult passages (e.g.

In mem. 9.34-35: πάνυ δὲ ἀσαφῶς καὶ μεμελανωμένως ἀπαγγέλλει τὰ λεγόμενα, In mem. 16.16-17: ἐλλιπῶς δὲ ῥηθὲν καὶ συντόμως εἴη ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον δυνάμει

τοιοῦτον, In mem. 31.12-13: δεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον προσδιορίσαι περὶ τούτων διὰ τὸ

παραλελοιπέναι τοῦτον ταῦτα διὰ συντομίαν, In mem. 35.5-9: ἀσάφειαν δὲ πολλὴν ἐνεποίησε διὰ τὸ συγκεχυμένως τὴν τῶν στοιχείων ἔκθεσιν ποιήσασθαι […]δεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς πάλιν τὴν λέξιν ἐκθέντας πειρᾶσθαι, ὡς δυνατόν, σαφηνίζειν). Finally, he often brings in other Aristotelian treatises, which he considers relevant and helpful for the understanding (e.g. In mem. 20.14-28 - Problems, In mem. 24.5-12 -Posterior Analytics

(A1), In mem. 29.6-10 –Topics and Rhetoric, In mem. 39.21-26 -On sleep (457a27)). All the above are various means of intervening with the text and bringing forward the correct interpretation. Michael explicitly suggests elsewhere that such is the appropriate way of dealing with the text when commenting, although his fellow commentators rarely achieve it48.

A schematic report of Michael's views on memory and recollection derives from the text of the commentary49. Its close study reveals a systematic effort to adjust the Aristotelian treatise to the Byzantine writer's intuitions on the subject.

46 Also above p. 11. 47 Also pp. 23-24. 48 In De respiratione 142.11-15: οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν παντελῶς εἰσιν ἄφωνοι μηδὲν ὅλως ἐννοοῦντες, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ὅλως τὰ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γεγραμμένα καὶ τίς ὁ τούτων νοῦς, τινὲς δὲ τῶν χαριεστέρων τῆς μὲν διανοίας ἐφάπτονται σποράδην, τοῦ δὲ τὴν λέξιν καθιστάνειν πόρρω ποι ἀποπλανῶνται, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλως· 49 Michael of Ephesus, Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, ed. P. Wendland, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 22.1, Berlin 1903. 18

Memory In what follows, my main focus is on the account of memory, and in particular on two characteristics of memory that differentiate Michael’s views from Aristotle’s. In this way, I will attempt to bring forward the original aspects of Michael’s contribution on the subject and show in what way his theory deviates from the Aristotelian. Firstly, memory for Michael is a process, which involves the active engagement of the person who remembers and the use of his intellect. Secondly, memory is the primary concept, indispensable for the explanation of recollection, which is a mnemonic process put to use under more specific circumstances. a. Memory as an active process To begin with, memory is described as an activity (ἐνέργεια) by Michael already from the introduction of his commentary (e.g. In mem. 4.12-13: ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο

ἐγκατάλειμμα ἐνέργεια, 5.6-8: ἡ γὰρ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐγκατάλειμμα γινομένη

ἐνέργεια, 5.20-24: ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια μνήμη λέγεται), even though Aristotle does not characterize it as such. The emphasis is not any more on the passive aspect of memory, namely its role to preserve images imprinted in the sensing soul. In this context, memory is an active process and except for storing images it also does something with them; in a way it acts upon them. This becomes clearer later on in the commentary, when Michael describes how a mnemonic image can additionally function as a reminder of something else (μνημόνευμα), when it is perceived as a representation (εἰκὼν) and not merely as it is (ᾗ αὐτὸ), a memory impression:

When the person looks at it (i.e. at the picture of an animal), and acts accordingly solely by expressing admiration or reproach, without at all thinking that it is an artistic representation of a particular animal of this kind, then it is called a picture. But if, on the other hand, together with looking he reckons in addition that it is also an artistic representation of a lion or a wolf or of some other animal, this is called a representation. And it is one and the same thing, a representation and a picture, but in a different way in each case. As it was with these, the trace and the picture in the heart – which he called image- should be likewise understood as being something in itself, some nature and one thing, and also an image of something else, exactly like that which was painted on the wall.50

In this passage Michael describes the way we process memories using verbs that refer to critical thinking and understanding, and he by no means refers to memory as simple perception. Verbs like προσεννοῶ (think of / understand in addition),

50 In mem. 15.12-20: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὁρᾷ τοῦτο ὁ ὁρῶν καὶ ἐνεργῇ περὶ αὐτὸ μόνον τὴν τέχνην θαυμάζων ἢ κακίζων, μηδὲν ὅλως προσεννοῶν, ὅτι μίμημά ἐστι τοιουδὶ ζῴου, τότε λέγεται ζῷον· ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τῷ ὁρᾶν προσλογίζηται καὶ ὅτι μίμημά ἐστι λέοντος ἢ λύκου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ζῴου, λέγεται τότε εἰκών. καὶ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν καὶ εἰκὼν καὶ ζῷον, ἄλλως μέντοι καὶ ἄλλως. ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ἐγκατάλειμμα καὶ ζωγράφημα, ὅπερ αὐτὸς φάντασμα εἶπε, δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν, ὡς ἔστι καὶ αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ φύσις τις καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἄλλου φάντασμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ τοίχῳ γεγραμμένον· 19

προσλογίζομαι (reckon in addition) and ὑπολαμβάνω (interpret / understand in a certain way) imply that rationality is involved and a kind of understanding is required besides sense perception. Interestingly enough, the verbs used by Aristotle in the relevant passage (450b18) are θεωρῶ (look at / perceive / contemplate) and αἰσθάνομαι (perceive / apprehend by the senses), and also προσαισθάνομαι (to sense in addition / perceive besides) earlier on (450a21).

Further, the definition of memory that he puts together is not limited to describing a passive state. It is required that one can actually recall and express something actively for it to be considered memory:

If then the entire imprint remains strong and clear, so that we can unhindered recite it and say it out loud as a whole, that is memory.51

Apart from the necessary creation and preservation of a mnemonic imprint in the soul, the above passage introduces an additional condition for memory. The person who remembers is expected to be engaged in some kind of activity that involves the use of the various memories. He is supposed to be able to repeat a memory after bringing it to mind and to express loudly the whole thing. The same condition is emphatically repeated a few pages later in the commentary, where again the ability to use memories in what seems to be an active process appears as a criterion for memory along with the affection of the soul and the elapse of some time:

Since in me, who was affected, there are both the affection and the knowledge, which I just acquired. And this is not memory; but if, after time has elapsed, I can say it out loud in me with precision, then it is memory.52

This surely does not cohere with the Aristotelian stress on the passivity of memory, to which Aristotle refers by the words ἕξις (being in a certain state) or πάθος (affection) (449b25). For in Aristotle memory is simply the having of the image of a thing previously sensed (or thought) after some time has passed. Nothing more is required from the person remembering than being in that particular state53. Retaining a memory and putting it into use, or recalling something, such cases would be, in the Aristotelian account, cases of recollection. But for Michael that account seems restricted and somehow elliptical. The Aristotelian definition of memory at the beginning of chapter two doesn’t go unnoticed; it is considered unsatisfactory by the commentator:

51 In mem. 19.22-24: οὗτος δὴ ὅλος ὁ τύπος εἰ μὲν μένει ἰσχυρός τε καὶ καθαρός, ὥστε ἀνεμποδίστως ὅλον ἡμᾶς αὐτὸν δύνασθαι ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ ὅλον προβάλλεσθαι, τοῦτο μνήμη. 52 In mem. 22.12-15: ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἐν ἐμοὶ τῷ παθόντι τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις μοι νῦν ἐγεγόνει. καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο μνήμη, ἀλλ' ὅταν χρονίσαν ἐν ἐμοὶ δύνωμαι ἀπταίστως προβαλέσθαι αὐτό, τότε ἐστὶ μνήμη. 53 Cf. Bloch (2007) 75: “There is no real process to be identified in remembering, or rather: remembering is being in a certain state.”; Nikulin, D., ‘Memory and Recollection in Plotinus’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (2), 2014, 186. 20

For this is what he stated again by the phrase ‘when the state of having or the affection is produced in the person, then it is memory’. The phrase is indeed very elliptical. It would have been more appropriate, if it was something like this: ‘So, when the state or affection is produced in such a way, in which it is possible for us to express it, without at all expecting from one part to gather together the rest, that is memory and not recollection’.54

The Aristotelian phrase at 451a23-24 is taken as a succinct phrase which, according to Michael, needs to be further explained if it is to define memory properly and fully. Again, what is supplied is the demand that the agent is able to recall and express loudly a particular memory, not only to passively keep the mnemonic imprint in his/her soul. Indeed, Michael without hesitation characterises Aristotle’s wording ‘very elliptical’ (λίαν ἐλλιπὴς) and suggests a reconstruction of the text that better supports his own views on memory.

The fact that Michael’s conception of memory is that of an active process also becomes evident from the way he reconstructs the Aristotelian passage 452b23-29, in the second chapter of the treatise55. In this passage Aristotle mentions two different scenarios about memory. In the first, a person thinks he is remembering but is not really doing so, and in the second, a person is remembering but is unaware of that fact56. The second case is impossible for Aristotle (οὐκ ἔστι), since according to his analysis and the definition of memory mentioned earlier57, a person will always know when he is actualizing his memory. This is so because Aristotelian memory is a passive state that belongs to the sensing soul and is closer to sense than to cognition. As Aristotle points out, memory, even of the objects of thought, will belong only accidentally to the intellect, whereas essentially to the primary faculty of sense perception58. Being in a state is not a matter of thinking (one either is in that state or he is not), nor the result of any kind of deduction. Actually being in it is indeed self-evident59. There is no need to figure it out and you cannot be wrong about being in that state, exactly in the same way as someone who is seeing

54 In mem. 21.14-18: τοῦτο γὰρ πάλιν ἐδήλωσε διὰ τοῦ <ὅταν γένηται ἡ ἕξις ἢ τὸ πάθος, τότε μνήμη ἐστίν.> ἔστι δὲ λίαν ἐλλιπὴς ἡ λέξις. ἦν γὰρ ἂν κατάλληλος, εἰ οὕτω πως εἶχεν· ὅταν γὰρ γένηται ἡ ἕξις ἢ τὸ πάθος οὕτως, ὥστε ἀποδιδόναι δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτό, μηδ' ὅλως περιμένοντας ἐκ τοῦ μέρους ἀθροῖσαι καὶ τὸ λοιπόν, μνήμη τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἀνάμνησις. 55 ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίγνηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ἂν δ' οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ μνημονεύοντα. ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι. ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου ἢ αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται. 56 I believe that Aristotle here refers to the theory of memory in 449b22-25, following Sorabji (20042) and others. For a different interpretation see Bloch (2007) 99-103, although he himself recognizes that his reading is not explicit in the text. 57 See p.5. 58 De mem. 450a12-14: ἡ δὲ μνήμη, καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματός ἐστιν, <καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν>· ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ. 59 Cf. Nikulin (2014) 194. 21 something immediately knows that he is actually seeing. What one can be wrong about is only his judgement about the object of sense perception -or memory.

In Michael’s reconstruction, however, all the alterations aim at changing the text in order to avoid such an interpretation. For him it is possible that someone is remembering without thinking that he does so. Since a person’s correct judgement about a mnemonic object has a role to play in the process of memory, one can distinguish between cases of conscious and unconscious remembering. Although unconscious remembering can happen, it is considered as a case of memory problem60. In Michael’s scenario, the text is taken as referring to the case of unconscious memory that is deceived (ἀπάτην ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ), on which ground it is not memory at all (οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη). Memory proper for Michael should involve the understanding of the process as remembering:

Since what has been said was described in an elliptical and inappropriate manner, we should interpolate it appropriately. It should have been like this: ‘If someone thinks that he is remembering, without doing so’, this is not memory· ‘because nothing prevents one from being mistaken and thinking that he is remembering without actually remembering’. Just exactly as it is neither ‘when he is actualising his memory without thinking that he does so, thus he doesn’t realise the fact that he is remembering’. This would have been the complete and appropriate phrasing. And indeed from the phrase ‘but he doesn’t realise the fact that he is remembering, this is not’ the word ‘memory’ is missing, for it to become ‘this is not memory’. Also, this continues from ‘If someone thinks that he is remembering, without doing so’, as it was interpolated. And from the phrase ‘when he is actualising his memory’ the words ‘as it is neither’ are again missing, for it to become ‘as it is neither when he is actualising his memory’. But this is the meaning of the phrase. He says that there are two ways in which we can be deceived into thinking that we are remembering when we are actually not remembering.61

Clearly, Michael doesn’t share the Aristotelian understanding of memory and such a reduction of the concept to absolute passivity would probably be counterintuitive for him. For this reason he is unable to make sense of the text as it is. Thus, he modifies it as described and interprets the two scenarios as two different categories of mnemonic deceptions, one with those cases in which one remembers something wrongly (περὶ τὸ φάντασμα γένηται ἡ ἀπάτη […] ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὸν τόπον ἢ τὸν

60 In mem. 37.14-16: ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως γίνεται ἡ ἀπάτη, ἄλλον δὲ ὅταν οὔτε περὶ τὸν χρόνον οὔτε περὶ τὸν τόπον ἀπατῶμαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ μόνον τὸ μὴ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι μνημονεύω 61 In mem. 36.19-37.7: Ἐπειδὴ ἐλλιπῶς καὶ ἔτι ἀκαταλλήλως ἀπήγγελται τὰ ῥητά, δέον ἡμᾶς καταλλήλως παραγράψαι. ἔδει οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν· <ἂν δ' οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν μνημονεύειν,> οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη· <οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ μνημονεύοντα,> ὥσπερ οὐδὲ <ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον.> τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κατάλληλον τῆς λέξεως τοιοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ λέξει τῇ <ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστι> λείπει τὸ μνήμη, ἵν'ᾖ· οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη. καὶ ἔστι τούτῳ συνεχὲς τὸ <ἂν δ' οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν μνημονεύειν,> ὥσπερ καὶ παρεγράφη. ἐν δὲ τῇ λέξει τῇ <ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ> λείπει πάλιν τὸ ὥσπερ, ἵν' ᾖ ‘ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ μνήμῃ’. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τῆς λέξεως τοιαῦτα. λέγει δὲ διττῶς γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπάτην ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὅτι μνημονεύομεν μὴ μνημονεύοντες. 22

χρόνον), and a second including every case in which someone indeed remembers but doesn’t believe that he does so (διὰ μόνον τὸ μὴ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι μνημονεύω). My mistaken judgement about my condition in the second case is not memory on this account, because the awareness of the fact that I am remembering is another condition added by Michael. Since one has to be actively engaged in a process when remembering, he should definitely be aware of that fact. Therefore, thinking and judging properly the situation is also relevant; an important prerequisite according to Michael’s point of view.

Moreover, he goes on in his comment to present distinctive examples for each group

(In. mem. 37.8-29). The given examples, especially those of the first category, explain as faulty memory mistakes that are due to wrong or weak judgement of the remembered image, or of the relevant information. As a result, a person who thinks he remembers Socrates but has actually Theaetetus in mind is not really remembering, nor is one who is mistaken about the place or the time of a memory. It is important to point out that all these examples provided by Michael are very detailed and elaborate and wouldn’t cohere with the Aristotelian theory. For, in Aristotle’s view, such cases would more likely be examples of recollection rather than memories. It seems, though, that according to Michael more details and information is involved in human memory. Recognising an image as of the past is not enough. One is expected to know not only when and where he first heard the information retained in his memory, but also by whom. Evidently, this is why he interpolates accordingly the following passage by adding the phrase καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τίνος (by whom), where Aristotle only has πρότερον (before):

That is to say that always, when the soul is actively engaged with the imprints of all things, it says that it has heard this before. For, if it doesn’t say so and it doesn’t perceive that it was before and also by whom it has heard it, there is no memory. And when he says that ‘when a person actualizes’, and goes on to say ‘as regards his memory’, he is probably saying: when he is engaged in the activity, through which memory is formed. That was sensing the time and the thing, by which the imprint and the trace were created.62

62 In mem. 7.24-30: Τουτέστιν ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ περὶ τοὺς τύπους ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν πραγμάτων ἁπάντων, λέγει ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσε. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο λέγει μηδὲ συναισθάνεται τοῦ πρότερον καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τίνος ἤκουσεν, οὐκ ἔστι μνήμη. εἰπὼν δὲ ὅτι <ὅταν ἐνεργῇ,> ἐπήγαγε <κατὰ τὴν μνήμην,> δυνάμει λέγων· ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καθ' ἣν ἡ μνήμη εἰδοποιεῖται. αὕτη δὲ ἦν τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ὁ τύπος καὶ τὸ ἐγκατάλειμμα. 23 b. Memory as prior to recollection A second important characteristic of memory according to Michael of Ephesus is its priority to recollection. This priority is first of all exegetical; that is to say, memory is literally indispensable for understanding recollection. He stresses this fact throughout his commentary, beginning from the opening lines of the second chapter of the De memoria, which is about recollection:

He describes distinctly all about memory in this part of the treatise as well, in order to present through them the nature of recollection and the difference between memory and recollection.63

The previous analysis of memory in chapter one is considered as a prerequisite for everything that follows concerning recollection, and in order to understand it one necessarily needs to depend on the more general information about memory. More specifically, the very nature (φύσις) of recollection seems to derive from the concept of memory, since the explanation of memory is the means by which recollection is to be understood and distinguished. Michael elaborates on this point later in his commentary, where he describes memory and recollection together as parallel processes that function in exactly the same way and share a common structure. In other words, he provides a single explanation for both:

Then, based on memory he makes clear all about recollection. What is being said here is possibly the following: we have to look at what happens in the case of memory, how after having remembered something, from this it happens that we also remember something else. As it is with memory, the same will be with recollection. For as in the case of memory, he says, one movement comes after the other, meaning one memory after the other, likewise it will be in the case of recollection.64

The process described in the above passage is by no means Aristotelian. Memory is presented as a dynamic process that takes place in the soul, where movements of stored images follow one another, and so happens in the case of recollection. In fact, the relevant passage in Aristotle (451b25-26: οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ πόρρω, πῶς μεμνήμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὰ σύνεγγυς) only refers to recollection, which indeed for him consists in such a series of connected movements. Interestingly enough, Michael recognises this potential interpretation of these lines as referring solely to recollection and he even mentions it as a second alternative (In mem. 27.27: τὸ μεμνήμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα εἴρηται). Even though he is aware that his

63 In mem. 21.24-26: διαρθροῖ δὲ καὶ νῦν τὰ περὶ μνήμης, ἵνα τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀναμνήσεως διὰ τούτων παραστήσῃ καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς τε μνήμης καὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως. 64 In mem. 27.22-27: ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς μνήμης σαφηνίζει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀνάμνησιν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον· δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς μνήμης ἰδεῖν, πῶς τοῦδέ τινος μνησθέντες ἐκ τούτου συμβαίνει ἡμῖν καὶ ἄλλου μνησθῆναι. καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔχει, οὕτως ἕξει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως· ὥσπερ γάρ, φησίν, ἐπὶ τῆς μνήμης συμβαίνει ἥδε ἡ κίνησις μετὰ τήνδε, τουτέστιν ἥδε ἡ μνήμη μετὰ τήνδε, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως ἔσται. 24 first reading is not the only one, it comes up as a suggested option, for it coheres with his general account and reinforces the point he wants to make. Since according to his theory memory is the primary concept, he applies everything concerning recollection to memory as well. A hierarchical arrangement between the two closely related concepts is presupposed, with recollection being the subordinate one. But this approach is much different from Aristotle’s. For him memory is the philosophically interesting concept and completely distinct from recollection. He is very careful with their demarcation and, at the beginning of the treatise, he also mentions that the people good at remembering are not the same with those who are good at recollecting (De mem. 449b6-8). Recollection in his account is an intellectual capacity of human beings, an active search which cannot be categorised on a par with memory. He only includes both memory and recollection in the same treatise because of some apparent similarities, and in order to carefully underline some important distinctions between the two65.

Another example of how Michael understands the relation between memory and recollection as described above is the way he emends the part of the Aristotelian text which stresses the fact that occasionally memory can be the result of a process of recollection (452b5-6: τῷ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμην ἀκολουθεῖν). For Aristotle, recollection is a process of thought, which we employ in order to retrieve a particular image previously sensed. When that process is successful, it may lead to the state of memory. That is to say, if a past image is successfully recalled, it can also be established and retained in the soul, in which case memory follows after recollection. Nevertheless, the Byzantine commentator obviously doesn’t share this view:

And again, in the phrase ‘and remembering occurs and follows memory’ he uses the verb ‘remembering’ instead of ‘recollecting’. What is being said amounts to ‘it happens that recollection follows memory’.66

As it has already been explained, memory comes always first and recollection is a subsequent process. Without prior memory there can be no recollection, thus recollection always follows memory -never the other way round.

More precisely, in Michael’s view memory seems to include recollection as well, meaning that recollection and memory share some basic generic characteristics and recollection is only distinguished as a more specific mnemonic application. In this way, the differences between the two concepts are blurred and they are treated

65 Cf. Bloch (2007) 76-77 (Reasons for connecting memory and recollection): “All this being true, it is, however, a legitimate question why Aristotle would want to treat memory and recollection in a single treatise. There are at least four conceivable reasons […].” 66 In mem. 23.21-24: πάλιν δὲ ἐν τῇ λέξει τῇ <τῷ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμην ἀκολουθεῖν> τὸ μνημονεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι εἴληπται. ἔστι δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ταὐτὸν τῷ ‘τῇ δὲ ἀναμνήσει συμβαίνει ἀκολουθεῖν τὴν μνήμην’. 25 throughout the commentary as one. This becomes particularly obvious in the comments on the final part of the treatise, where Aristotle, after having explained what memory and recollection are, moves on to clarify some important issues about memory and draws some further conceptual distinctions between the two (De mem. 452b7-453b7)67. For Michael, the Aristotelian remarks of these passages do not refer to memory alone but should be understood as regarding both memory and recollection, even though this isn’t clearly mentioned in the original text. The reason for this is that in his reading the two concepts are intertwined and overlapping, with memory expanding over recollection. Thus a general explanation can cover both.

For example, in the passage of Aristotle’s elaboration on the importance of time for memory, Michael’s paraphrase mentions specifically that what is said in this part is said in common (κοινῶς) for memory and recollection:

Having explained what is recollection, he says for both memory and recollection, that the most important is for as to know the time […].

Thus, time is much needed for recollections and for memories likewise. Because if the soul actualises regarding some image as representation of something, but it doesn’t know determinately or indeterminately, that has seen or heard this before, it will only think that it is now forming it anew.68

In the above explanation Michael alternates recollections and memories as two different words for the same thing and he uses one verb (ἀναπλάττει) to refer to what happens in the soul in any case. Both memories and recollections come about through the re-formation in the soul of a past image, along with the recognition of that image as of something previously sensed. There is no distinction between the two as long as their particular application is not taken into consideration. Most importantly, in what follows as a conclusion of the discussion on time, Michael also interpolates the word ‘recollection’ to construct what looks like a common definition for both concepts, based on the definition of memory69:

67 Even though this part of the treatise has often been regarded as treating issues relevant to both memory and recollection, Michael’s construal is unique in that it is considered as concerned uniformly with memory and consequently with recollection. 68 In mem. 32.11-12 / 18-22: εἰπὼν τί ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις, λέγει κοινῶς περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως, ὅτι τὸ μέγιστον δεῖ ἡμᾶς γνωρίζειν τὸν χρόνον […] ὥστε χρεία πολλὴ τοῦ χρόνου ἐν ταῖς ἀναμνήσεσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς μνήμαις. εἰ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ φάντασμά τι ὡς εἰκόνα τινός, οὐ γινώσκει δὲ ὡρισμένως ἢ ἀορίστως, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσε πρότερον, οἰηθήσεται, ὅτι αὐτὴ τοῦτο νῦν ἀναπλάττει. 69 See also De mem. 449b22-23: ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν, in the chapter about memory. 26

If, he says, the conception of the thing and the conception of time occur simultaneously, either with an exact measure or indeterminately, in that case there is memory or recollection. Since this can be suitably said for both.70

This argument may be further supported by the careful study of the way Michael treats the Aristotelian passages that contradict his view. Such are the parts of the treatise where Aristotle underlines certain differences between memory and recollection, and emphasizes them. For instance, in 451a31-b10, after having introduced the discussion on recollection in chapter two, Aristotle distinguishes more precisely between, on the one hand, recollection and, on the other, memory (451a31-b2: ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι μνημονεύειν ἔστι μὴ νῦν ἀναμνησθέντα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰσθόμενον ἢ παθόντα), relearning or discovering (451b7-9: δὶς γὰρ μαθεῖν καὶ εὑρεῖν ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό· δεῖ οὖν διαφέρειν τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τούτων, καὶ ἐνούσης πλείονος ἀρχῆς ἢ ἐξ ἧς μανθάνουσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι). Obviously, as far as recollecting is concerned, Aristotle here aims mainly at differentiating it from remembering71, since he is aware of the fact that the two concepts could easily be confused in ordinary language usage. Michael is in turn well aware that the above passage, as it is, severely disrupts the coherence of his own theory. In order to overcome the raised difficulties, he rearranges the given text and intervenes in the Aristotelian phrasing in various ways, whilst claiming that the text, as it is, seems obscure and its point is not clearly stated:

It would have been clearer if the phrase was somewhat like the following: It is therefore obvious from the previous what recollection is. Because after having distinctly described what pertains to memory, here he goes on to explain what recollection is. But all this is described obscurely. ‘Furthermore, it is clear that remembering is’. For one thing, ‘that’ is here in the place of ‘what’, and also ‘remembering’ is used instead of ‘recollecting’ –if my conjecture must have something to offer. So, he says ‘it is clear what recollecting is’. And we should put a full stop here and read as the beginning of a new period the phrase ‘not recollecting now, sensing or experiencing something for the first time’, after supplying the verb ‘is’ and the adverb ‘accordingly’, so that the phrase will be like this: ‘Accordingly, recollecting now is not sensing or experiencing something for the first time’. This is how I think we should arrange the phrase, and then read it in inverted order like this: Accordingly, remembering is not sensing or experiencing something now for the first time. Thus, it will be the case that he explains the phrase ‘Furthermore, it is clear that remembering is’ and gives

70 In mem. 36.16-18: Ὅταν οὖν, φησίν, ἅμα τῷ πράγματι καὶ τοῦ χρόνου γίνηται ἔννοια μέτρῳ ἢ ἀορίστως, τότε ἔστι μνήμη ἢ ἀνάμνησις· ἁρμόττει γὰρ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι κατ' ἀμφοτέρων. 71 A secondary probable purpose is to emphasise on the necessity of sense’s prior intervention for recollection to follow, against contrary platonic approaches. Cf. Ross, W.D., Aristotle, Parva Naturalia, Oxford 1955, 243; Sorabji (20042) 88-89/92-93. 27 an account of it. Therefore it is clear, what recollection is, and the rest that follow is the teaching of what is recollection.72

In other words, Michael won’t hesitate to provide necessary “missing” words, to change the word order, to substitute the verb ‘remember’ (μνημονεύειν) with ‘recollect’ (ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι) when he feels it is appropriate, and even to suggest a different punctuation. All the proposed alterations in the above passage of his commentary are much needed to support Michael’s view. As a result, the Aristotelian passage is not anymore interpreted as treating the distinction of recollection from memory, but is taken to introduce recollection and explain what it is, on the basis of what has been already said about memory. Even though Michael himself realises that this reading is a mere conjecture (μαντείᾳ), he is willing to make it, probably because he is primarily concerned to better support his general interpretation and not to strictly preserve the letter of the Aristotelian text. Hence, an Aristotelian passage concerned with the differentiation of recollection is transformed for the shake of the commentator’s argument.

It follows then that in Michael’s commentary memory is the central philosophically interesting theme and it is put forward as the main and primary concept. In principle, in every case that it works properly and no memory problems are involved, memory is autonomous and performs every relevant task independently from recollection. In comparison to recollection, it is a more general concept and it definitely has exegetical priority, since it is a prerequisite for recollection to be understood. It is presented as an active process that also entertains the intellect and requires critical abilities. Memory is responsible not only for the formation of memories from past sense impressions and their storage in the soul, but also for their critical assessment and their activation when they are recalled and put to use. Even though animals remember as well, human memory according to Michael is more elaborate. It involves judgement and critical assessment of the mnemonic information. Our memories are more detailed, since we remember that something is of the past with additional relevant information about the time and place it happened or about the people we were with. Moreover, it includes recollection itself as a subcategory. As a

72 In mem. 22.21-23.5: Ἦν ἂν σαφέστερον, εἰ οὕτως πως εἶχεν ἡ λέξις· δῆλον τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνάμνησις. διαρθρώσας γὰρ τὰ περὶ μνήμης, νῦν λέγει καὶ τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνάμνησις. ἀσαφῶς δὲ πάντα ἀπαγγέλλει. <ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι μνημονεύειν ἐστί.> τὸ μὲν <ὅτι> ἀντὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι εἴληπται, εἴ τι χρὴ τῇ ἐμῇ προσέχειν μαντείᾳ. φανερὸν οὖν, φησί, τί ἐστι τὸ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι. καὶ δεῖ ἐνταῦθα τελείαν στίξαντας ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἀναγινώσκειν τὸ <μὴ νῦν ἀναμνησθέντα, ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰσθόμενον ἢ παθόντα,> προσυπακούοντας τοῦ ἔστι ῥήματος καὶ τοῦ τοίνυν ἐπιρρήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ <ἀναμνησθέντα> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι, ὡς εἶναι τὴν λέξιν τοιαύτην· ἔστι τοίνυν μὴ νῦν ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰσθόμενον ἢ παθόντα. οὕτω μὲν οὖν, οἶμαι, χρὴ τὴν λέξιν καθιστάνειν, ἀναγινώσκειν δὲ ὑπερβατῶς οὕτως· ἔστι τοίνυν ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι μὴ νῦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰσθόμενον ἢ παθόντα, ἵν' ᾖ τὸ μὲν <ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι μνημονεύειν ἐστὶν> ὡς ἀποφαινομένου καὶ λέγοντος· φανερὸν τοίνυν, τί ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις, εἶτα τὰ λοιπὰ δίδαξις τοῦ τίς ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις. 28 result, Michael takes the greater part of the Aristotelian treatise to be about this rich concept of memory and interprets most of the dubious passages of the second chapter as referring to memory, not specifically to recollection. The additional examples that he brings in to better illustrate the views he believes he shares with Aristotle can further illuminate what exactly a memory is in respect to the above.

29

Recollection Michael’s explanation of the recollecting process is analogous to that of memory and often complementary to it. His theory on memory as described before is presupposed, since recollection appears to be a very similar process. The sole difference is its unique application, meaning that the mnemonic process is considered as recollection in every case that one puts it in use on purpose, trying to recall the missing part of a memory which he can only partially remember73. For this reason, Michael uses extra information found in the chapter about recollection in order to present a more detailed account of how memory –and consequently recollection- operates. a. Recollection as a kind of memory The second part of Michel’s commentary covers the Aristotelian chapter on recollection and through his comments it is clearly stated that he conceives of that process as a kind of memory (μνήμη τις). Consequently, his understanding of memory itself is also affected and details from this part of Aristotle’s account are applied uniformly to Michael’s explanation for both concepts. In this chapter Aristotle describes recollection as a process in which memories or past images perceived by the sensing faculty are brought in mind. Recollection is thus an active process by which memories stored in the soul and past sense impressions in general are recalled and put to use. Michael’s account seems very different, since for him recalling a memory-image and almost every case of such bringing in mind is already memory:

Thus, recollection is a kind of memory. What is being said will become clear in the following. When the entire impression and the memory-image, which is present in the primary faculty of sense due to the actualised sense, remains and is preserved distinct and bright and clear, so that the soul is able to move it as a whole and can see the whole thing and bring it forward as a representation of something, this is memory. But when some part of the entire memory-image stays distinct and clear, while the rest is completely faint and superficial, and as a result the soul can neither move it nor can be moved by it, and after some movements are caused in the soul from the distinct and clear part, through the clear it analyses and in a way finds the rest (that which was faint and completely darkened), this is recollection - something like a re-sketch of a previous memory. Not of the entire memory though (since this would be learning), but of a part.74

73 In mem. 20.23-26: ὁ γὰρ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος οὐ τὴν μνήμην ἀναλαμβάνει ἢ λαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τοῦ ἐνόντος καὶ μένοντος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τύπου· τὸ γὰρ ἐνὸν ἔχει καὶ μέμνηται. ἀναλαμβάνει δὲ τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ἀναμνήσει. 74 In mem. 19.3-13: ὥστε ἡ ἀνάμνησίς ἐστι μνήμη τις. ἔσται δὲ σαφὲς τὸ λεγόμενον ὧδε· ὅταν ὁ τύπος ὅλος καὶ τὸ ἀναζωγράφημα τὸ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως ἐνυπάρχον ὑπομένῃ καὶ σῴζηται τρανές τε καὶ φαιδρὸν καὶ καθαρὸν οὕτως, ὥστε ὅλον αὐτὸ δύνασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν καὶ ὅλον ὑπ' αὐτῆς ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ προβάλλεσθαι ὡς εἰκών τινος, τοῦτο μνήμη ἐστίν. ὅταν δὲ μέρος μέν τι τοῦ ὅλου ἀναζωγραφήματος μένῃ τρανὸν καὶ καθαρόν, τὸ 30

In the above passage it becomes clear that memory and recollection are treated in a very similar way. In fact, it happens that the operations that take place in the soul in each case are the same. The memory-images in it are moved, and one movement follows another and is caused by it. This activation of an entire mnemonic sequence is the Aristotelian recollection as described in the De memoria (451b10-11: συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε)75. But Michael employs this very description to explain how memory occurs. It is obvious that he uses the additional information found in this part of the text in order to further enlighten his views on memory, which for him is the foundation for the understanding of both, as has already been argued. Memory in this context is also formed by a series of successive movements that occur simultaneously and are ordered as a whole. When this process runs unhindered and unproblematic, this is memory according to Michael.

With all that emphasis on memory, not much is left to be attributed to recollection alone. Consequently, its role is significantly restricted. It is narrowed down at a specific occasion of memory under more specific conditions. It is somehow like memory, but memory employed when some part of a memory-image is blurry and faint, in order to emend it through the use of the remaining good part. Under such circumstances a memory is partially forgotten and the related mnemonic process malfunctions. This is when recollection resumes the missing part and restores the memory. The way it proceeds in order to complete this task is still the same (i.e. movements caused in the soul), but this time it is initiated by the remaining clear and distinct part, which aims at moving and awaking the fainted one.

Accordingly, Michael’s characterisation of recollection as a kind of memory should be taken to mean a particular application of it when certain conditions are met, rather than an additional kind of memory alternative to it. In other words, it is memory employed for a specific purpose and when that purpose is achieved memory is restored and performs its usual tasks. Recollecting and remembering are almost the same:

So recollection necessarily follows memory. Since he who recollects, in some way remembers; because he resumes some part of a previous memory.76

δὲ λοιπὸν πάμπαν ἀμυδρὸν καὶ ἐπιπόλαιον, ὥστε μήτ' αὐτὸ δύνασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν μήτ' ἐκείνην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τρανοῦ καὶ καθαροῦ τινας κινηθεῖσα κινήσεις τὸ συνεχὲς τῷ καθαρῷ (τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀμυδρὸν καὶ πάμπαν ἐζοφωμένον) ἀναλύσῃ καὶ οἷον εὑρήσῃ, τοῦτο ἀνάμνησις, οἱονεὶ ἀναζωγράφησις τῆς προτέρας μνήμης, οὐ πάσης (τοῦτο γὰρ μάθησις), ἀλλά του μέρους. 75 Cf. Lorenz (2006) 164: “Recollection occurs, he [Aristotle] holds, because sensory affections form ordered sequences, so that the active occurrence of some particular contentful disturbance in one’s perceptual apparatus tends to be followed by the active occurrence of another such disturbance.” 76 In mem. 20.11-13: ἕπεται δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῇ ἀναμνήσει μνήμη. ὁ γὰρ ἀναμνησθεὶς τρόπον τινὰ ἐμνήσθη· μέρους γάρ τινος τῆς προτέρας μνήμης ἐπανάληψιν ποιεῖται. 31 b. Recollection as a deliberate process An additional important characteristic, which follows from Michael’s account of recollection as described above, is that it is deliberate. Since it has a particular role to play in the general mnemonic process, one inevitably employs it on purpose. Recollection will assist someone to remember what is needed but currently forgotten. The intention to remember the missing part of a memory is, therefore, presupposed. The necessary condition is for the agent to be seeking something, otherwise the process is not considered recollection but plain memory. When not seeking, men do not recollect. This is why he provides the following explanation in the last part of his comment on lemma 451b16:

In this way, then, do men recollect when they seek from the similar or the contrary or the closely connected; but even ‘when they don’t seek’ like this (meaning neither from similar things nor from contrary nor from closely connected) they frequently recollect, when by causing some other movement this particular movement occurs. As it often happens, for example with those who remember Socrates by recalling a song; because this song is neither similar to Socrates nor contrary nor closely connected to him. Thus, he says that recollection can also occur like this. ‘In most cases’ though, ‘when other movements of the sort that we have mentioned have occurred’ (meaning similar or contrary or closely related), then recollection occurs.77

This part of the comment is about the Aristotelian passage 451b22-24 (ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω, καὶ μὴ ζητοῦντες δ' οὕτως ἀναμιμνήσκονται, ὅταν μεθ' ἑτέραν κίνησιν ἐκείνη γένηται). With these lines Aristotle mentions two circumstances in which recollection can occur78: a. in seeking (ζητοῦσι) and b. without seeking (μὴ ζητοῦντες). These two are valid cases of recollection for Aristotle and they both come about in the same way, which was described earlier on in the treatise (451b19- 20: ἀφ' ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς. διὰ τοῦτο γίγνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις). What the philosopher says, here, is that in both occasions people recollect in the indicated way, no matter whether they seek or not. For this interpretation οὕτως is taken to refer to ἀναμιμνήσκονται (they recollect in this way). Besides, this is the most usual reading79 and also the one supported by the general context of the chapter on recollection (e.g. 451b10-14). Hence, in the Aristotelian account there is room for

77 In mem. 27.9-17: οὕτω μὲν οὖν ζητοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἢ ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν σύνεγγυς ἀναμιμνῃσκό- μεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτω <μὴ ζητοῦντες,> τουτέστι μὴ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων μηδὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδὲ τῶν σύνεγγυς, πολλάκις ἀναμιμνῄσκονται, ὅταν ἄλλην τινὰ κίνησιν κινηθέντες ἐκείνη γένηται. οἶον πολλάκις ἀναμνησθέντες ᾠδὴν ἀνεμνήσθησαν Σωκράτους· ἥτις ᾠδὴ οὔτε ὁμοία ἐστὶ Σωκράτει οὔτ' ἐναντία οὔτε σύνεγγυς. γίνεται μὲν οὖν καὶ οὕτω, φησίν, ἀνάμνησις· ἀλλὰ <τὰ πολλὰ ἑτέρων γενομένων κινήσεων, ὁποίων εἴπομεν,> τουτέστιν ὁμοίων ἡ ἐναντίων ἢ σύνεγγυς, γίνεται ἢ ἀνάμνησις. 78 For a third cf. Sorabji (20042) 100-101. 79 Lorenz argues that this is the reading strongly suggested by the word order, otherwise the Greek is strained; cf. Lorenz (2006) 164-5: ‘[...] Aristotle also addresses being reminded of something without seeking to recall it’. 32 accidental or involuntary recollection and it is not strictly deliberate. Such would be the case, for example, when one recalls his home town by seeing in a tavern’s menu a traditional dish of the same origin.

On the contrary, in Michael’s interpretation it is taken for granted that recollection is part of a seeking process, thus his reading is adjusted to better fit this view. He takes οὕτως as referring to the immediately previous μὴ ζητοῦντες80, meaning that even when people do not recollect by the suggested way, it is possible that they sometimes recollect. He further explains his reading by providing an example, in which someone who is indeed willing to recall Socrates he manages so, but through bringing in mind a song that is totally irrelevant to him. That is to say, recollecting by something similar or contrary or closely related is a preferable way to recollect, but not one absolutely necessary.

The originality of Michaels reading of the text becomes even more evident, when it is 81 compared with the paraphrase of the same passage by Sophonias (9.26-10.2) :

This is how recollection occurs for those who seek to recollect: it occurs through the ways we have already described, that is through the similar, or the opposite or the closely connected. On the other hand, when they are being reminded without having searched, recollection doesn’t occur in the same way.

Sophonias paraphrases the passage by construing ἀναμιμνήσκονται as passive (ἀναμνησθῆναί). In other words, he takes the second clause to describe a case of being reminded, without having searched. Unlike Michael, he doesn’t seem to have a general theory in mind, nor does he strive to interpret the text in a coherent manner. He simply employs the smoothest and most straightforward reading of the Greek, and by doing so he deviates from Michael’s work, even though he generally depends greatly on him for his paraphrase82.

Apparently, an intentional seeking process is an indispensable characteristic for recollection as conceived by Michael of Ephesus. This is why he also underlines this aspect in his remarks on the subject at an earlier part of the discussion, in what seems to be the sketch of a preliminary definition of recollection:

So, when someone after seeking from the remaining part of his knowledge, finds and recovers the rest as well, this is to recollect something of those mentioned and in that case. This is how we should read the phrase ‘this and in that case is to recollect one of the named

80 Sorabji also adopts this reading for his own reasons, although he admits it is not the most natural. Sorabji (20042) 99. 81 ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω γίνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις, ἀφ' ὧνπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν ἀναμνησθῆναί του γένηται, ἐξ οὐδενὸς τούτων. 82 Cf. Bloch (2007) 15. Also above, p.11. 33 objects’; recollecting occurs when one recovers the rest. The named objects are knowledge, sensation and in general whatever the having state of which we call memory.83

To sum up, recollection for Michael seems to be a subordinate concept entirely dependent on memory. In particular, it is a more 'narrow' concept, a specific kind of memory that arises only in cases of partial memory loss (λήθη). As such, its scope is only restricted in cases that one recalls something deliberately by pondering the relevant facts and trying to remember something forgotten. Recollection is then a memory process that comes about under the necessary condition that something that was first remembered is now partially forgotten. Another important characteristic of recollection in this context is that it is always deliberate. It aims at the full recovery of the missing part of a memory and is thus deliberately activated by the agent towards that goal. For this reason, it is closely related to mnemonic techniques, certain procedures that one has to employ in order to regain what is lost. By treating recollection as a form of memory, Michael takes for granted in his analysis everything he has already said about memory in general and he doesn’t distinguish clearly between the two concepts. Recollection resembles memory a lot, being different only in that it is memory employed towards a particular goal by following an appropriate method to achieve it.

83 In mem. 23.10-15: ὅταν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνόντος μέρους τῆς ἐπιστήμης ζητήσας εὑρήσῃ καὶ ἀνα- λάβῃ καὶ τὸ λοιπόν, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων τι καὶ τότε. οὕτω γὰρ δεῖ τὴν λέξιν ἀναγινώσκειν τὴν <τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ τότε ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων τι·> τότε γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι, ὅταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ καὶ τὸ λοιπόν. εἰρημένα δὲ λέγει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ὅλως οὗ τὴν ἕξιν λέγομεν μνήμην.

34

Recollection as a process of analysis

In the second part of his commentary on Aristotle’s De memoria Michael of Ephesus focuses on recollection, following the structure of Aristotle’s treatise. In the preceding part he has developed his ideas about memory, and the main characteristics of recollection have already been traced, since it is described as a kind of memory. So, what is left to be explained next is under which special conditions an instance of memory is considered as recollection and, more specifically, how this particular function takes place in the soul. Through Michael’s comments on these passages more light can be shed on his views about memory, most importantly regarding the way the various memories are organized in the soul, as well as the broader context and other presuppositions that guide his interpretation and better explain its origin.

To start with, Michael (In mem. 18.32-20.13) comments extensively at the opening lines of the second part of the De memoria (De mem. 451a18-20). Far from paraphrasing Aristotle’s text, he finds the opportunity to explain how he understands recollection, and even offers an original definition for it:

[…] and after some movements are caused in the soul from the distinct and clear part, it analyses through the clear part and in a way finds the rest (that which was faint and completely darkened), this is recollection -something like a re-sketch of a previous memory. Not of the entire memory though (since this would be learning), but of a part; for when we find a part from a part through analysing, this is recollection.84

What is striking in the above passage is the use of the verb ἀναλύω, which is used in the description of the process that takes place when one recollects. The soul has to perform a process of analysis beginning from the clear, remaining part of memory and headed towards the forgotten, missing part in order to recall it. At the end of that analysis we recover what was lost and that is recollection. Although such a conception of recollection as the end of an analyzing process is nowhere to be found in the Aristotelian text, Michael seems to have a very concrete understanding of it. His use of the terminology here is original and the question is how analysis should be understood in this context, that is how it should be understood as the prerequisite for recollection that the commentator implies that it is. Except for the fact that such a process consists in certain movements (i.e. changes, sensory affections) caused in the soul, Michael doesn’t explain much along these lines. Also, he abandons the use of the relevant vocabulary in the rest of his commentary. Nevertheless, in the following comments he elaborates on how recollection takes place by providing

84 In mem. 19.10-14: […] καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μέρους τοῦ τρανοῦ καὶ καθαροῦ τινας κινηθεῖσα κινήσεις τὸ συνεχὲς τῷ καθαρῷ (τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀμυδρὸν καὶ πάμπαν ἐζοφωμένον) ἀναλύσῃ καὶ οἷον εὑρήσῃ, τοῦτο ἀνάμνησις, οἱονεὶ ἀναζωγράφησις τῆς προτέρας μνήμης, οὐ πάσης (τοῦτο γὰρ μάθησις), ἀλλά του μέρους. ὅταν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μέρους ἀναλύσαντες εὑρήσωμεν τὸ μέρος, ἀνάμνησις τοῦτο· 35 more details and examples of what he has in mind. As far as the basic mechanism is concerned, the person that recollects causes at first movements of the mnemonic imprints stored in his soul. The imprints are stored in an orderly way, so that they are attached to one another and linked to each other in the same way as the links of a chain are. As a result, the movement of a mnemonic imprint causes the movements of others in turn and in a way awakens or activates previously inactive, partly forgotten imprints.

After having said what recollection is, he now also explains how it occurs. This is because, he says, a particular movement in the soul naturally follows another particular movement; this is how it happens that we recollect. Just as when a particular link of a chain is being raised or moved, the link next to it is necessarily moved along with it, such is the case with the imprints in the soul. So if the soul is moved by one of them, it immediately moves in turn the imprint next to it.85

Such an explicit description of the recollecting process is not found in Aristotle, who is very elliptical on the subject and he restricts himself to saying that recollection occurs because movements are caused in the soul one after another (De mem. 451b11-12: συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε). In spite of that, Michael uses the Aristotelian text in order to provide evidence for his own, more detailed account of recollection. In particular, according to him, memories are stored in the soul not by chance, but organized in a structure (similar to the links of a chain), which is governed by certain logical rules. The person who recollects has to begin the analysis from the correct starting point and to cause the right movements in his soul by following those rules. Thus, the process of analysis that Michael has in mind is deliberate and very similar to a reasoned train of thought closely related to the formal syllogism of the Aristotelian logic.

The commentator’s strategy in order to support his account has two important features: Firstly, he puts the emphasis for his interpretation on the part of the text where Aristotle mentions an example of a mnemonic technique. He employs the case of recollecting through the aid of mnemonic methods as the paradigm case of recollection, and therefore considers that such mnemonic methods exhibit what happens in general every time we recollect. Secondly, he connects particular Aristotelian passages to the Topica and the Rhetorica, in order to bring in the explanation of recollection background information found there concerning memory’s organization.

85 In mem. 24.15-20: Εἰπὼν τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἀνάμνησις, νῦν λέγει καὶ πῶς γίνεται. ἐπειδὴ γάρ, φησί, πέφυκε γίνεσθαι κίνησις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἥδε μετὰ τήνδε, διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἡμᾶς ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁλύσεως τοῦδε τοῦ κρίκου ἀρθέντος ἢ κινηθέντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης συγκινεῖται καὶ ὁ ἐφεξῆς, οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύποι· κινηθείσης οὖν ὑπό τινος τούτων τῆς ψυχῆς, εὐθὺς κινεῖ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. 36

The importance of mnemonic techniques The introductory remarks of the second chapter of De memoria (451a18-b10) are vague and difficult to interpret, so modern commentators often disagree about their exact meaning. Nevertheless, the general structure of the first part of the chapter is clearer: From 451b11 to 451b22 the focus is specifically on recollection and a general description of it is given. Next, from 451b22 to 452b7, the particular case of deliberate recollection (ὅταν τοίνυν ἀνaμιμνήσκεσθαι βούληται, τοῦτο ποιήσει) is further discussed before the conclusion of the section (τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦτον συμβαίνει τὸν τρόπον)86. There, Aristotle brings on the example from the use of mnemonic techniques (διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε) to better illustrate the special case of deliberate recollection:

[…] they proceed quickly from one to the other, for instance, from milk to white, from white to air, and from this to moist, from which autumn is recalled, if this is the season that one is seeking 87(452a14-16).

This example illustrates the use of techniques that involve some imagery as an aid for memory. Such techniques for remembering were developed in ancient Greece and were very popular. The most famous amongst them was the place system, to which Aristotle might actually be referring here88. That system suggested memorizing a set of places (ἀπὸ τόπων) in a fixed order and then superimposing on them symbols assigned to the things that one wishes to memorize89. For Michael of Ephesus, though, this example holds a key role to the understanding of the recollecting procedure. Based on that, he explains the whole Aristotelian passage on recollection. This is why he presents the text in his commentary by reversing its order. The comment that follows the lemma on 451b16 begins with the presentation of that very example with the milk, taken from the part that comes up later, at 452a14:

By the preceding movements he means the antecedent. For instance, as he will explain later on, someone who wanted to recollect during what season he did this thing, he recalled milk, from milk white, from white air, from air moist, from which he recalled autumn. And supposedly this is the time when he performed the deed. Or someone saw a painted lyre, and from that he recalled a lyre, and from that the musician, and from him the song that he sang, if that was the thing the recollection of which he had to grasp. So he was moved by the preceding movements, until he reached the musician, who brought about the recollection of the song. Since after the movement that regards the musician usually the recollection of the

86 Cf. Sorabji (20042) 108: “452b7 This evidently concludes the discussion of the manner of recollection”. 87 οἷον ἀπὸ γάλακτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ δ' ἐπ' ἀέρα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐφ' ὑγρόν, ἀφ' οὗ ἐμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύτην ἐπιζητῶν τὴν ὥραν. (Transl. Bloch (2007) 43). 88 Cf. Yates, F.A., The art of memory, London 1966, 27-35; Annas (1999) 297. Although for Sorabji that is probably not the case here (Sorabji (20042) 104-105). 89 See also Yates (1966), II. The art of memory in Greece: Memory and the Soul. 37 song occurs. Then, from the present thing, that is from the lyre he is looking at now, he recalled the song. But often also from something else. Because if it happens that next to the imprint of the song there is the imprint of a pillar, from the pillar I will recall the song. Since it is reasonable that if the imprint of the pillar is moved, the imprint of the song will be moved along with it and due to that the song will be recalled.[…]90

Even though Aristotle’s structure is different, in the above passage Michael reverses the order of the text and starts the description of recollection from the reference to the mnemonic technique. He considers that reference of great importance and necessary from the beginning, while he admits that Aristotle will explain later on what he means (ὡς αὐτὸς προϊὼν ἐρεῖ). The intentional change of focus is obvious. Michael not only describes and analyzes the given example in detail, but he also emphasizes it by adding his own similar examples in order to clarify the function of recollection. He elaborates on this sort of examples because he considers this the paradigm and only case of recollecting, since recollection according to his account is always a deliberate search. Except for the example of a painted lyre91 or a nearby pillar that reminds someone of a song, he goes on to mention the picture of Socrates that reminds one of Socrates (ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Σωκράτους εἰκόνος τὸν Σωκράτην), the white color that comes to mind together with its contrasting black (ἀπὸ λευκοῦ μέλαν), the first words of a speech that remind us of the rest (ἀπὸ τοῦ “ἀντὶ πολλῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι” ἀναμνησθῶ “χρημάτων ὑμᾶς ἑλέσθαι νομίζω”) and a dog that reminds us of a wolf (ἀπὸ κυνὸς λύκον), in an extant passage that goes on up to In mem. 26.33.

These examples are very important for Michael because they provide a complete explanation of the occurrence of recollection that is missing from the Aristotelian account. Recollection comes about due to the systematic way in which memories are organized in the soul. Particularly, they are organized on the basis of whether they are similar, contrary or closely connected (In mem. 26.16: ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς). These principles lie at the heart of the recollecting process and they make possible the ἀνάλυσις briefly mentioned in Michael’s definition earlier on. On the other hand, for Aristotle (451b19-20) these principles are mentioned only as a

90 In mem. 26.3-15: Προτέρας κινήσεις λέγει τὰς ἡγουμένας. οἷον, ὡς αὐτὸς προϊὼν ἐρεῖ, βουλόμενος ἀναμνησθῆναι, τίς καθ' οἷον καιρὸν ἔπραξε τόδε τι, ἀνεμνήσθη γάλα, ἀπὸ γάλακτος λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἀέρα, ἀπὸ ἀέρος ὑγρόν, ἀπὸ τούτου μετόπωρον· ἔστω δὲ οὗτος ὁ χρόνος, καθ' ὃν ἔπραξε τὴν πρᾶξιν. ἢ εἶδε γεγραμμένην λύραν, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης ἀνεμνήσθη λύραν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύ- της τὸν μουσικόν, ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἣν ᾖσεν ᾠδήν, εἰ ταύτης ἔδει ἀνάμνησιν λαβεῖν. ἐκινήθη δὴ τὰς προτέρας κινήσεις, ἕως οὗ ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν μουσικόν, μεθ' ὃν γέγονεν ἡ τῆς ᾠδῆς ἀνάμνησις· μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ κίνησιν εἰώθει γίνεσθαι ἡ τῆς ᾠδῆς ἀνάμνησις. ἀπὸ οὖν τοῦ νῦν, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν ὁρωμένης λύρας, ἀνεμνήσθη τὴν ᾠδήν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀπό τινος ἄλλου· εἰ γὰρ τύχοι ἐφεξῆς ὢν τῷ τῆς ᾠδῆς τύπῳ ὁ τοῦ κίονος, ἀναμνησθήσομαι αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κίονος. εἰκὸς γὰρ τοῦ τύπου τοῦ κίονος κινηθέντος συγκινηθῆναι καὶ τὸν τῆς ᾠδῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀναμνησθῆναι αὐτήν. 91 An example with a lyre is also found in Plato’s Phaedo (73c-74a) and it seems that with Michael’s explanation of such standard cases of recollection no distinction needs to be drawn between the Platonic and the Aristotelian theories. Plato is explicitly mentioned later (In mem. 28.23). 38 mnemonic aid, as a means of improving one’s mnemonic skills. One is to organize his memories in the suggested way in order to be able to recollect more easily. He appears to use his references to the mnemonic technique only as illustrations of his argument and most likely they do not express the gist of his thought92.

According to Michael’s account then, what explains every occasion of recollection is such an association of memories, which creates a linkage that enables the one to move after the other. What is missing for the explanation to be complete is the element that initiates the whole process of analysis. There has to be something that is part of the chain of memories and is able to be moved first, enabling in turn the soul to move towards the forgotten part through analyzing. Thus, Michael takes it that the Aristotelian term ἀρχὴ (De mem. 451b31: Διὸ κάλλιστα καὶ τάχιστα γίνονται ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς αἱ ἀναμνήσεις) refers to exactly that indispensable starting point:

Having said these, he explains in what way is recollection different from learning; because they are not the same, as Plato thinks. Accordingly, recollection is when one moves by himself and by the starting point that remains in him towards that which is next to that starting point. But when he does not move on his own, but is moved by someone else, for instance by a teacher, this is learning, not recollection.93

With this comment Michael clearly underlines the need of a remaining part from the mnemonic chain that serves as the starting point for recollection. If something is completely forgotten, recollection cannot take place. In other words, for Michael it is not possible that someone recalls by accident something completely lost, or is reminded of something via a completely irrelevant image. The fact that memory is partly present in someone’s soul is actually what distinguishes recollecting from learning again. This is not the case for Aristotle, who does not restrict the scope of recollection and his treatise leaves room for recollection without search94, in occasions where someone would remember something out of the blue, or after his acquaintance with an irrelevant image. For him the starting point is something more general, whatever can cause someone to recollect, since all recollection has to start somewhere, and he doesn’t explicitly say what it is95. Examples of a special kind of starting point are given only when certain mnemonic techniques are discussed, such as the first item in the series in the version of the place-system (452a14-16), or the middle member of a triplet of memorized items in the technique of mid-points described in the difficult passage 452a17-24. Recollection could be initiated by

92 Cf. Yates (1966) 35. 93 In mem. 28.22-26: εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα λέγει, τί διαφέρει μάθησις ἀναμνήσεως· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν αἱ αὐταί, ὡς δοκεῖ Πλάτωνι. ἀνάμνησις τοίνυν ἐστίν, ὅταν δι' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐνούσης αὐτῷ ἀρχῆς κινῆται ἐπὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς τῇ ἀρχῇ· ὅταν δὲ μὴ δι' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄλλου, οἷον τοῦ διδασκάλου, μάθησις τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἀνάμνησις. 94 Cf. Sorabji (20042) 99. 95 Lorenz argues that the starting –points of many acts of recollection will be thoughts of things that one manages to call to mind directly. Cf. Lorenz (2006) 169. 39 chance, but what is important is that no one else (teacher etc.) is involved (De mem. 452a5-7: δυνήσεταί πως δι’ αὑτοῦ κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν. ὅταν δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄλλου, οὐκέτι μέμνηται).

The Topica and the Rhetorica in the background According to the above, even though Michael relies mainly on an Aristotelian example describing a mnemonic technique, he doesn’t treat it as such at all. On the contrary, he interprets it as an ordinary, typical case of recollection, which is thus very useful for the general understanding of its occurrence. The relevant question that arises is why Michael doesn’t take it as the exceptional case that it is, i.e. as an instance where a special method is being used in order to enhance one’s mnemonic skills. This could be partly due to a difference between the technique described by Aristotle and the well-known place-system, which makes it hard to tell which system in particular the philosopher has in mind. As Sorabji correctly observes96, the special value of the place-system is that one can memorize in a given order a set of images that have no memorable relationship of their own, whereas the items of the series at 452a14-16 (milk, white, air, fluid, autumn) are similar to each other. Most importantly, though, Michael adopts an alternative reading of these lines because of the background on which he bases his account. Specifically, he implies that the content of the Aristotelian treatises Topica and Rhetorica is indispensable for the understanding of recollection, and that they offer necessary information about memory that is relevant to the De memoria. In fact, he interprets the phrase ἀπὸ τόπων in the text (452a13) as a direct reference to these works:

By ‘locations’ he probably means the contrary, those belonging to the same series, the similar, in other words the starting points that are present in us. In the same way as by the locations given in the Topica and in the first book of his Rhetorica we are trained to find arguments on the subject at hand, likewise from the starting points present in us, as from locations of some kind, we find what is next. 97

In his comment of that passage the commentator doesn’t take τόπους as ‘places’ referring to any kind of place-system or other mnemonic aid involving locations. It appears to have the more technical meaning of the beginning of a series of contiguous memories in the soul, prerequisite for recollection to take place. This mnemonic organization is modeled, according to Michael, on the way in which Aristotle suggests arguments are classified for dialectic and rhetoric. The concept of τόπος in the Topica signifies a means of classifying many arguments together. Such

96 Sorabji (20042) 104-105. 97 In mem. 29.6-10: Λέγων τόπους ἢ τὰ ἐναντία τὰ σύστοιχα τὰ ὅμοια, ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐνούσας ἡμῖν. ὡς γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς παραδοθέντων τόπων καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς Ῥητορικῆς αὐτοῦ στομούμενοι ἐπιχειροῦμεν πρὸς τὰ προκείμενα, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνουσῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἀπό τινων τόπων, εὑρίσκομεν τὰ ἐφεξῆς. 40

‘locations’ are headings under which many arguments fall and many of them together construct a filing system for the dialectician98. They are committed to memory in a fixed order and, thus, serve as indices pointing into a structure of arguments and premises. Similarly, for the Rhetorica τόπος is that under which many arguments fall (1403a17-18: εἰς ὅ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει). The term ἀρχή is also used in Theophrastus’ definition of τόπος, as given by Alexander in his commentary on the Topica (In Top. 126.14-16: τόπος ἐστὶν ἀρχή τις ἤ στοιχεῖον, ἀφ’ οὗ λαμβάνομεν τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς). Alternatively, in Topica book 9 Aristotle refers to them as ‘first theses’ (163b17-20: πρώτων θέσεων), in other words as common premises that serve as starting points with which arguments about many different subjects may begin.

Based on that context Michael infers from the cited passage that there is an analogous way (τόπος) in which memories are grouped together and classified in the soul. Those ‘locations’ in the case of memory are again starting points (ἀρχαί), specifically memory imprints that are related to those one wishes to recall by being contrary or similar to them, or belonging to the same series. For Michael, then, the soul recollects in a similar way as it constructs arguments and forms syllogisms. The originality of the method that Aristotle suggests in the Topica for dialectic is the employment of a variant of the place-system for locating easier material useful to the problem at hand: the dialectician only has to memorize a limited list of ‘locations’, under which many more arguments are classified and can be methodically and quickly searched99. Michael acknowledges the interconnection of memorization and dialectic, but he doesn’t consider mnemonic techniques prior to the Aristotelian method for the successful dialectician. For him, not only memorization and recollection are efficiently used in dialectic but also dialectic unlocks the recollecting process. Both the dialectician and the person that recollects reach out to material memorized and stored in the soul classified in a fixed order, and for both ‘locations’ serve as indices. What is more, in his work Sophistici elenchi Aristotle attributes the superiority of his method for dialectic to the more efficient use of memorization in comparison to the earlier teachers of argument, who only encouraged their students to memorize long lists of arguments (Soph. El. 183b36- 184a2). Michael was very well acquainted with that treatise, where Aristotle clearly associates memory and dialectic, since he also wrote a commentary on that work100. His interest in memory could actually be the link that explains why he also chose to comment on that logical Aristotelian work.

98 Cf. Smith, R. (trans.), Aristotle Topics Book I and VIII with excerpts from related texts, Oxford 1997, xxiv-xxviii. 99 Cf. Smith (1997) 155-161. 100 Michael of Ephesus, Commentary on the Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. M. Wallies, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.3, 1898; here Michael also stresses the importance of ἀρχή for a successful search (196-197). 41

Further in his comment on ἀπὸ τόπων, Michael offers a second, alternative interpretation. Even on this more literal reading though, he doesn’t take the phrase as a reference to a mnemonic system. He suggests that it could imply random cases in which we recollect something by bringing to mind first where it happened. Again, there is a memorable relationship between the item and the location of one’s acquaintance with it, which is used to explain how recollection comes about:

So, he either calls ‘locations’ the starting points, or he refers to cases in which, after having seen or heard certain things many times, I see or hear them again; and I consider: “where did I hear this?”; and then, by having remembered the place, I recalled from whom did I hear this, as well as how and in which way did I see or hear it, whether it was by accident or in any other way.101

In any case, what is important for Michael is the systematic way in which memories ought to be linked, forming a series which allows the move of the one after the other. In this context, recollection arises as a process very similar to deduction and, on Michael’s account, intertwined with the theory of syllogisms. Towards the last part of De memoria (453a10-14) Aristotle himself draws an analogy between the two, by saying that recollecting is like a sort of deduction (τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν οἷον συλλογισμός τις). He goes on to explain that in recollection one has to think and deduce that something of the sort happened earlier, a process that, as he adds, is also similar to a kind of search (οἷον ζήτησίς τις) and deliberation (τὸ βουλεύεσθαι). Along these lines, Aristotle uses the word συλλογισμός in a broad sense, meaning that recollection is like a deduction because it involves thinking of various things in addition. In other words, it involves more than just sense perception, as was the case with Aristotelian memory. Recollecting and deducing are similar in that they both involve deliberation. Nevertheless, a stronger claim is made in Michael’s paraphrase of that passage:

Not only, he says, concerning time do memory and recollection differ (since memory is former in time than recollection, with recollection being a renewal of memory), but also in that only man recollects. And he shows that man alone recollects, by putting forward the proof somewhat like this: Recollecting belongs in that to which deducing also belongs; for as the man who is deducing joins together the one premise after the other, likewise the man who is recollecting joins together the minor to the major. Further, in that to which deducing belongs, searching also belongs; for he who is deducing does so because he is searching for something. And in that to which searching belongs, deliberating also belongs; for he who is

101 In mem. 29.10-14: ἢ οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγει τόπους, ἢ πολλάκις ἰδών τινα ἢ ἀκούσας τινὰ καὶ πάλιν ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας διαλογίζομαι, ποῦ τοῦτο ἤκουσα, εἶτα ἐνθυμηθεὶς τὸν τόπον ἀνεμνήσθην, ὑπὸ τίνος τοῦτο ἤκουσα, καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον τοῦτο εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσα, πότερον κατὰ τύχην ἢ ἄλλως πως. 42 deliberating is searching. Therefore, recollecting belongs in that to which deliberating also belongs. And man alone deliberates, thus he alone recollects as well.102

In the above comment, the Aristotelian clause governed by οἷον is missing. Thus, recollecting and deducing are presented as one of a kind, with rationality and deliberation featuring in both. Moreover, Michael takes the word συλλογισμός in the more technical, restricted sense of the particular syllogistic structure that consists in two premises (major and minor) and a conclusion, and which is mostly used in Aristotle’s logical works. The slightly different explanation given by Michael emphasizes on the critical and active role of the person who recollects and presents it as similar to the way in which a person who forms syllogisms carefully chooses the right premises and puts them together. The language he uses in this passage and also the terms he brings forward in his reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument reveal his understanding of recollection in the light of logic and dialectic. In Michael’s thought recollection is enriched with more elaborate characteristics that do not come directly from Aristotle and enhance his account.

102 In mem. 38.6-16: Οὐ μόνον, φησί, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον διαφέρουσιν μνήμη καὶ ἀνάμνησις (πρότερον γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ μνήμη ἀναμνήσεως τῷ ἀνανέωσιν μνήμης εἶναι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν), ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ μόνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀναμιμνῄσκεται. καὶ δείκνυσιν ὅτι μόνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀναμιμνῄσκεται, οὕτω πως τὴν δεῖξιν προάγων· ᾧ τὸ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι· ὡς γὰρ ὁ συλλογιζόμενος τήνδε τὴν πρότασιν συνάπτει μετὰ τῆσδε, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος τὰ ἐλάττονα τοῖς μείζουσιν. ᾧ δὲ τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν· ὁ γὰρ συλλογιζόμενος ζητῶν τι συλλογίζεται. ᾧ δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν, καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ. ᾧ ἄρα τὸ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι· μόνος δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος βουλεύεται, μόνος ἄρα καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεται. 43

Concluding Remarks

The change of focus regarding the relation of memory and recollection is a very important parameter for the history of the conception of memory and the development of its understanding from ancient to medieval philosophy. Recollection’s reduction to memory has at least two major consequences.

Firstly, the concept of memory broadens significantly. Michael’s reading of the challenging Aristotelian text shows that he also noticed the difficulties that still trouble the modern interpreters and tried to deal with them in a consistent and systematic way. He aimed at a coherent interpretation that would do justice to the Aristotelian thought, by presenting the correct account of memory and recollection. In Michael’s interpretation memory is presented in more detail and is more elaborate, since it additionally requires the involvement of the intellect. It acquires an active aspect that we do not find in Aristotle and is also enriched with all the characteristics attributed to recollection, which is now considered a part of it. The extra information from De memoria II is used in order to better explain how stored memories are accessed and recalled as part of the mnemonic process. As such, memory cannot be criticized as ‘modest’, as was the case on the basis of the Aristotelian description in De memoria I.

Secondly, in such a context human memory appears more sophisticated than that of animals, something definitely not implied in the Aristotelian treatise. For by no means do animals recollect, although they admittedly have a simpler kind of memory (De mem. 450a15-16: διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ φρόνησιν). But if human memory, according to Michael, also provides the ability of recollection, it is by far more complex. This is because it employs the faculty of deliberation and performs highly complicated tasks, very similar to syllogisms (De mem. 453a10: τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν οἷον συλλογισμός τις). In addition, Michael suggests that, although the animals that can remember can subsequently perceive time as well, they perceive it in a much simpler way than human beings. For instance, a donkey that fell in a hole last year, by looking at that same hole today it will just remember that it has fell in it before, and will consequently avoid it. All that brute animals can remember is that something has happened to them before, in an indefinite way, whereas human beings are capable of telling with greater precision when exactly did something happened (for 103 example yesterday), and thus define the time of their memories (In mem. 8.8-14) . Further, human beings know the difference between present and future, a

103 τουτέστι δι' ὃ τότε ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται μνήμη, ὅταν αἰσθάνηται καὶ τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι χθὲς ἢ ὅλως πρότερον εἶδον ἢ ἤκουσα. καὶ ἐπεὶ τότε γίνεται μνήμη, ὅτε χρόνου αἴσθησις, ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα καὶ μνημονεύει. ὁ γὰρ πεπτωκὼς ὄνος πέρυσιν εἰς τόνδε τὸν βόθρον, τήμερον δὲ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναχωρήσας, ᾔσθετο, ὅτι πρότερον πέπτωκεν ἐν αὐτῷ. αἰσθάνεται οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τοῦ χρόνου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· 45

104 distinction that animals do not have (In mem. 8.14-17) . Aristotle’s explanation though is supposed to apply uniformly to all those animals which exhibit memory, prominently including humans, and differences as the above are not presupposed105.

An important question that demands further research is why Michael presents memory in the suggested way. For a proper answer, the concept of memory needs to be carefully investigated in the philosophy of late antiquity, before Michael’s time and after, especially its reception in the Latin West106. For the time being, it would be reasonable to assume that Michael was under the influence of the widespread Christian ideas and the dominant philosophical Neoplatonic thought. Even though he was probably not a devoted Christian, religious reasons would explain his belief that animals are not the same as humans, since the latter are superior and closer to God.

Moreover, the views of Plotinus must have affected Michael’s adjustments of the Aristotelian account. The exact role of memory and recollection and their mutual relation in Plotinus requires a careful reconstruction, because sometimes he seems to make contradictory claims throughout his Enneads107. What is clear though is that he dismisses the Aristotelian conception of memory as storage of images or imprints, and he is also critical of the Stoic account, which is based on the corporeality of the soul108. According to Plotinus, memory is not an affection (πάθος) but a capacity (δύναμις), used by the soul to reproduce what it currently does not have109. Memory actively forms or makes images. Also, he compares the motion of reasoning of the logical kind and the work of memory. Still, Plotinus doesn’t make a clear distinction between memory and recollection, and it is possible that he too considered recollection as another kind of memory, since he sometimes applies both terms almost synonymously110. There are many similarities between such an approach and Michael’s account of memory, and it is probable that the commentator largely draws on the preexisting Neoplatonic tradition and hence presents a synthetic and original understanding of the topic.

104 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πότε εἶδε καὶ πότε ἤκουσεν, οἶδε καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος, τὰ δ' ἄλογα τούτου μόνου αἰσθάνεται τοῦ ὅτι νῦν πίπτει ἢ πέπτωκε, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἴσχει. 105 Similar passages where Aristotle makes memory available to non-human animals are Historia Animalium I 488b23-26 and Metaphysics A1 980b21-27. 106 Cf. Bloch (2007) ‘Essay 2: Aristotle’s Theories of Memory and Recollection in the Latin West’, 137- 228. 107 Cf. e.g. King (2009) 106-221; Nikulin (2014) 183-201. The Plotinus’ texts that are especially important in relevance are Ennead IV 3-4 and Ennead IV 6 (On sense perception and memory). 108 Cf. Ierodiakonou, K., ‘The Stoics and the Skeptics on memory’, in Sassi, M.M. (ed.), Trace nella mente. Teorie della memoria da Platone ai moderni, Pisa 2007, 47-65. 109 Cf. Nikulin (2014) 191-192. 110 Cf. Nikulin (2014) 196. 46

Bibliography

Texts, Translations, Commentaries

1. Beare, J. I. and G. R. T. Ross (trans.), Parva Naturalia, Oxford 1908. 2. Beare, J. I. (trans.), ‘On memory’, in Barnes, J. (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton 1984, 714-720. 3. Beare, J. I. (trans.), ‘On dreams’, in Barnes, J. (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton 1984, 729-735. 4. Bloch, D., Aristotle on Memory and Recollection. Text, Translation, Interpretation and Reception in Western Scholasticism, Leiden 2007 (review by H. Lang in The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2, 2008, 216- 218). 5. Georgoulas, E. (trans.), Μικρά Φυσικά, Athens 2014. 6. Jugie, M., et al. (eds.), Œuvres Complètes de Gennade Scholarios, Tome VII, Paris 1936. 7. King, R. A. H. (trans.), De memoria et reminiscentia, Berlin 2004. 8. Louis, P. (trans.), Aristote, Les parties des animaux, Paris 1956. 9. Michael of Ephesus, Commentaria in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos, Wallies, M. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 2.3, Berlin 1898. 10. Michael of Ephesus, Commentaria in Aristotelis Parva Naturalia, Wendland, P. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 22.1, Berlin 1903. 11. Georgios Pachymeres, Philosophia 11, Ethica Nicomachea, Oikonomakos, K. (ed.), Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina, vol. 3, Athens 2005. 12. Ross, G. R. T., Aristotle. De Sensu and De Memoria, Cambridge 1906. 13. Ross, W.D., Aristotle, Parva Naturalia, Oxford 1955. 14. Siwek, P., Aristotelis Parva Naturalia graece et latine, Rome 1963. 15. Smith, R. (trans.), Aristotle. Topics Book I and VIII with excerpts from related texts, Oxford 1997. 16. Sophonias, In libros Aristotelis De Anima paraphrasis, Hayduck, M. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 23.1, Berlin 1883. 17. Sophonias (Pseudo-Themistius), In Aristotelis Parva Naturalia Paraphrasis, Wendland P. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 5.6, Berlin 1903. 18. Theodore Metochites on Ancient Authors and Philosophy: Semeioseis gnomikai 1–26 & 71. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, Notes, 47

and Indexes by K. Hult. With a Contribution by B. Bydén. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 65, Göteborg 2002. 19. ‘Theodoros Metochites on Aristotle’s De memoria. An edition’, Bloch, D. (ed.), Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin 76 (2005), 3-30.

Secondary Literature

20. Annas, J., ‘Aristotle on memory and the self’, in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford 1999, 297-311. 21. Arabatzis, G., Παιδεία και Επιστήμη στον Μιχαήλ Εφέσιο. Εις περί ζώων μορίων Α 1,3 – 2,10, Athens 2006. 22. Bloch, D., ‘Ancient and medieval theories’, in S. Knuuttila and J. Sihvola (eds.), Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind, Dordrecht 2014, 205- 221. 23. Browning, R., ‘An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 188, 1962, 1– 12. Reprinted in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London 1990, 393–406. 24. Bydén, B., Theodore Metochites' Stoicheiosis astronomike and the Study of Natural Philosophy and Mathematics in Early Palaiologan Byzantium. Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 66, Göteborg 2003. 25. Caston, V., ‘Why Aristotle needs imagination’, Phronesis 41, 1996, 20-55. 26. Coleman, J., Ancient and Medieval Memories, Cambridge 1992. 27. Darrouzès, J. (ed.), ‘Georges et Démétrios Tornikes. — Lettres et discours’, Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 14, Paris 1970, 220-323. 28. Ebbesen, S., Commentators and commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, Corpus Latinum Commentatorium in Aristotelem Graecorum, 7.2, Leiden 1981, 153-199. 29. Ebbesen, S., ‘Philoponus, ‘Alexander’ and the origins of medieval logic’, in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle transformed: The ancient commentators and their influence, New York 1990, 445-462. 30. Frede, D., ‘The cognitive role of phantasia in Aristotle’, in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Oxford 1999, 280-296. 31. Goulet, R. (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Paris 1989–. 32. Johansen, T. K., ‘Imprinted on the mind: active and passive in Aristotle’s theory of sense perception’, in B. Saunders and J. van Brakel (eds.), Theories,

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Technologies, Instrumentalities of Colour, University Press of America 2002, 1-18. 33. Johansen, T. K., The Powers of Aristotle’s soul, Oxford 2012. 34. Hunger, H., Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, vol. 1, Munich 1978. Modern Greek translation by L. Benakis, Athens 1987, 50-91. 35. Ierodiakonou, K., ‘The Stoics and the Skeptics on memory’, in Sassi, M.M. (ed.), Trace nella mente. Teorie della memoria da Platone ai moderni, Pisa 2007, 47-65. 36. Ierodiakonou, K., ‘Some observations on Michael of Ephesus’ comments on Nicomachean Ethics X’, in C. Barber & D. Jenkins (eds.), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden / Boston 2009, 185–201. 37. Ierodiakonou, K., ‘Eustratius' comments on Posterior Analytics II 19’, in F. de Haas, M. Leunissen and M. Martijn (eds.), Interpreting Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in Late Antiquity and Beyond, Leiden 2010, 55–71. 38. King, R. A. H., Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory, Berlin 2009 (review by H. Lang in The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 5, 2011, 184-6). 39. Lagerlund, H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, Dordrecht 2011. 40. Lang, H., ‘On memory: Aristotle’s corrections of Plato’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 18, 1980, 379-393. 41. Lorenz, H., The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford 2006. 42. Luna, C., Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens a la Métaphysique d’ Aristote, Leiden-Boston-Koln 2001 (review by L. Tarán in Gnomon, 77/3, 2005, 196-209). 43. Martin, C. B. and M. Deutscher, ‘Remembering’, Philosophical Review 75, 1966, 161-196. 44. Mercken, H.P.F., ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle transformed: The ancient commentators and their influence, New York 1990, 407-443. 45. Nikulin, D., ‘Memory and Recollection in Plotinus’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (2), 2014, 183-201. 46. Praechter, K., ‘Michael von Ephesos und Psellos’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 31, 1931, 1-12.

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47. Praechter, K., review of Hayduck 1904, CAG 22.2: Michael Ephesii In Libros De Partibus Animalium Commentaria, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 168, 1906, 861-907. 48. Searby, D. ‘Sophonias’ in Goulet, R. (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. 6, Paris 2010. 49. Sisco, J. E., ‘Space, time and phantasms in Aristotle, De memoria 2, 452b7– 25’, Classical Quarterly 47, 1997, 167–175. 50. Sorabji, R., ‘The ancient commentators on Aristotle’, in Sorabji, R. (ed.), Aristotle transformed: The ancient commentators and their influence, New York 1990, 1-30. 51. Sorabji, R., Aristotle on Memory, London 1972 (review by J. M. Cooper in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 57, 1975, 63-9) (repr. with new foreword 2004). 52. Tatakis, B., La philosophie Byzantine, Paris 1949. Modern Greek translation with bibliography for 1949–76 by L. Benakis, Athens 1977. English translation by N. J. Moutafakis, Indianapolis & Cambridge 2003. 53. Warren, J., The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle and the Hellensitic Hedonists, Cambridge 2014, 157-174. 54. Yates, F.A., The art of memory, London 1966.

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