Aristotle's Topics in the Greek Neoplatonic Commentaries
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Syllabus for B.H.M.S. (Degree) Course
SYLLABUS FOR B.H.M.S. (DEGREE) COURSE As per the Homoeopathy (DEGREE Course) BHMS regulation, 1983, (as amended up to 2019) ANATOMY Instructions: I. (a) Instructions in anatomy should be so planed as to present a general working knowledge of the structure of the human body; (b) The amount of detail which a student is required to memorise should be reduced to the minimum; (c) Major emphasis should be laid on functional anatomy of the living subject rather than on the static structures of the cadaver, and on general anatomical positions and broad relations of the viscera, muscles, blood-vessels, nerves and lymphatics and study of the cadaver is the only means to achieve this; (d) Students should not be burdened with minutes anatomical details which have no clinical significance. II. Though dissection of the entire body is essential for the preparation of the student of his clinical studies, the burden of dissection can be reduced and much saving of time can be effected, if considerable reduction of the amount of topographical details is made and the following points are kept in view:- (1) Only such details as have professional or general educational value for the medical students. (2) The purpose of dissection is to give the student an understanding of the body in relation to its function, and the dissection should be designed to achieve this goal. (3) Normal radiological anatomy may also form part of practical or clinical training and the structure of the body should be presented linking functional aspects. (4) Dissection should be preceded by a course of lectures on the general structure of the organ or the system under discussion and then its function. -
Michael of Ephesus' Comments on Aristotle's De Memoria
NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS Michael of Ephesus’ comments on Aristotle’s De memoria Graduate Programme in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Daphne Argyri Advisor: Katerina Ierodiakonou Athens 2016 ΔΙΠΛΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ Ονοματεπώνυμο: Δάφνη Αργύρη Μεταπτυχιακό πρόγραμμα: Ιστορία και Φιλοσοφία των Επιστημών και της Τεχνολογίας (ΙΦΕΤ) Α.Μ.: 004/13 Υπεύθυνη καθηγήτρια: Κατερίνα Ιεροδιακόνου Αναγνώστες: Βασίλης Καρασμάνης Παύλος Καλλιγάς i Τα σχόλια του Μιχαήλ Εφέσιου στο Περί μνήμης του Αριστοτέλη Στην πραγματεία του Περί μνήμης και αναμνήσεως ο Αριστοτέλης παρουσιάζει τη μνήμη ως βασικό στοιχείο της γνωστικής διαδικασίας, πολύ συγγενές με την αντίληψη. Πρόκειται για μια παθητική κατάσταση (ἕξις/πάθος, 449b25), δηλαδή για μια αποθήκη της ψυχής γεμάτη με εικόνες του παρελθόντος, που σε αντίθεση και συνέχεια του Πλάτωνα διακρίνεται εμφατικά από την σαφώς ενεργητική διαδικασία της ανάμνησης. Η ανάμνηση συνίσταται στη δυνατότητα ανάκλησης στο παρόν, εκουσίως ή ακουσίως, των εικόνων του παρελθόντος και ανήκει, σαν συλλογισμός (οἷον συλλογισμός τις, 453a10), στο μέρος της ψυχής που συνδέεται με την λογική ικανότητα του ανθρώπου. Το υπόμνημα του Μιχαήλ Εφέσιου (12ος αι. μ.Χ.) στο παραπάνω έργο του Αριστοτέλη (Σχόλια εἰς τὸ Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως, 1-41) είναι το μόνο υπόμνημα σε αυτό που σώζεται ως τις μέρες μας και αποτελεί πολύ σημαντική πηγή για την ιστορία των δύο αυτών εννοιών. Οι οξυδερκείς παρατηρήσεις και τα σχόλια του Μιχαήλ φαίνεται κατ΄αρχάς πως έχουν επηρεαστεί από τις διάφορες σχολές σκέψης με τις οποίες ήταν εξοικειωμένος, αλλά παράλληλα εκφράζουν ξεκάθαρα και τις προσωπικές του αντιλήψεις πάνω στο θέμα. Συγκεκριμένα, φανερώνεται μια συγκροτημένη θεώρηση της μνήμης και της ανάμνησης καθώς και του τρόπου με τον οποίο σχετίζονται και αλληλεπιδρούν στο πλαίσιο μιας συστηματικής γνωστικής θεωρίας. -
The Beginnings of Formal Logic: Deduction in Aristotle's Topics Vs
Phronesis 60 (�0�5) �67-309 brill.com/phro The Beginnings of Formal Logic: Deduction in Aristotle’s Topics vs. Prior Analytics Marko Malink Department of Philosophy, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003. USA [email protected] Abstract It is widely agreed that Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, but not the Topics, marks the begin- ning of formal logic. There is less agreement as to why this is so. What are the distinctive features in virtue of which Aristotle’s discussion of deductions (syllogismoi) qualifies as formal logic in the one treatise but not in the other? To answer this question, I argue that in the Prior Analytics—unlike in the Topics—Aristotle is concerned to make fully explicit all the premisses that are necessary to derive the conclusion in a given deduction. Keywords formal logic – deduction – syllogismos – premiss – Prior Analytics – Topics 1 Introduction It is widely agreed that Aristotle’s Prior Analytics marks the beginning of formal logic.1 Aristotle’s main concern in this treatise is with deductions (syllogismoi). Deductions also play an important role in the Topics, which was written before the Prior Analytics.2 The two treatises start from the same definition of what 1 See e.g. Cornford 1935, 264; Russell 1946, 219; Ross 1949, 29; Bocheński 1956, 74; Allen 2001, 13; Ebert and Nortmann 2007, 106-7; Striker 2009, p. xi. 2 While the chronological order of Aristotle’s works cannot be determined with any certainty, scholars agree that the Topics was written before the Prior Analytics; see Brandis 1835, 252-9; Ross 1939, 251-2; Bocheński 1956, 49-51; Kneale and Kneale 1962, 23-4; Brunschwig 1967, © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi �0.��63/�5685�84-��34��86 268 Malink a deduction is (stated in the first chapter of each). -
1 the Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian
1 The Aristotelian Method and Aristotelian Metaphysics TUOMAS E. TAHKO (www.ttahko.net) Published in Patricia Hanna (Ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies (Athens: ATINER), pp. 53-63, 2008. ABSTRACT In this paper I examine what exactly is ‘Aristotelian metaphysics’. My inquiry into Aristotelian metaphysics should not be understood to be so much con- cerned with the details of Aristotle's metaphysics. I am are rather concerned with his methodology of metaphysics, although a lot of the details of his meta- physics survive in contemporary discussion as well. This warrants an investigation into the methodological aspects of Aristotle's metaphysics. The key works that we will be looking at are his Physics, Meta- physics, Categories and De Interpretatione. Perhaps the most crucial features of the Aristotelian method of philosophising are the relationship between sci- ence and metaphysics, and his defence of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). For Aristotle, natural science is the second philosophy, but this is so only because there is something more fundamental in the world, something that natural science – a science of movement – cannot study. Furthermore, Aristotle demonstrates that metaphysics enters the picture at a fundamental level, as he argues that PNC is a metaphysical rather than a logical principle. The upshot of all this is that the Aristotelian method and his metaphysics are not threatened by modern science, quite the opposite. Moreover, we have in our hands a methodology which is very rigorous indeed and worthwhile for any metaphysician to have a closer look at. 2 My conception of metaphysics is what could be called ‘Aristotelian’, as op- posed to Kantian. -
Metaphysics Translated by W
Aristotle Metaphysics translated by W. D. Ross Book Α 1 All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others. And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee, and any other race of animals that may be like it; and those which besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught. The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings. Now from memory experience is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience. And experience seems pretty much like science and art, but really science and art come to men through experience; for ‘experience made art’, as Polus says, ‘but inexperience luck.’ Now art arises when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced. -
Al-Farabi's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics
Al-Farabi’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Nicholas Rescher University of Pittsburgh Press AL-FARABI’S SHORT COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S PRIOR ANALYTICS AL-FARABI’S SHORT COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S PRIOR ANALYTICS Translated from the Original Arabic with Introduction and Notes BY NICHOLAS RESCHER Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pittsburgh UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH PRESS 1963 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 63-10581 Printed in Great Britain by Butler & ‘Tanner Ltd, Frome and London This book is dedicated, with gratitude and with love, to my mother and to the memory of my father. PREFACE This English version of al-Farabi’s “Short Commentary on Prior Analytics”, made from Mlle Mubahat Tirker’s recent edition of the Arabic text (Revue de la Faculté des Langues, d Histoire, et de Géographie de? Université d Ankara, vol. 16 [1958]), is the first appearanceof this treatise in a European language. It is hoped that this addition to the dozen or so Arabic logical texts now accessible to the non- Orientalist will contribute to a wider appreciation of the great mass of work constituting the Arabic contribution to logic, which remains so largely terra incognita. I wish to thank Mrs. Shukrieh Kassis and especially Mr. Seostoris Khalil for help with the translation. I am in- debted to Mr. Storrs McCall, Dr. J. Ackrill, and particu- larly to Professor D. M. Dunlop for reading my typescript and suggesting needed improvements. Although some strengths of this work owetheir existence to others, all of its weaknesses and errors must be laid at my own door. -
Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: the Topics of Invention
St. John's Law Review Volume 66 Number 1 Volume 66, Winter 1992, Number 1 Article 3 Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention Michael Frost Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GRECO-ROMAN LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE TOPICS OF INVENTION MICHAEL FROST* I. INTRODUCTION Despite a wealth of commentary on legal reas6ning and legal logic, modern writers on the subject demonstrate a curious and re- grettable disregard for the close connections between classical Greco-Roman theories of forensic discourse and modern theories of legal reasoning and analysis. Two recent treatises on logic and legal reasoning, Judge Ruggero Aldisert's Logic for Lawyers' and Pro- fessor Steven Burton's An Introduction to Law and Legal Reason- ing,2 are exceptions to this rule. Their treatises fall within a 2,000- year-old tradition of rhetorical analysis and discourse especially designed for lawyers. Beginning with treatises on rhetoric by Aris- totle, Cicero, and Quintilian, philosophers and lawyers have re- peatedly attempted, some more ambitiously than others, to de- scribe and analyze legal reasoning and methodology. Judge Aldisert implicitly acknowledges his participation in this ancient tradition with an epigraph drawn from Cicero's Republic, with his choice of subject matter, and with his use of centuries-old rhetori- cal terminology.3 Professor Burton's approach to legal analysis and argument can also be traced back to ancient rhetorical treatises especially written for the instruction of beginning advocates. -
Plato and Aristotle on What Is Common to Soul and Body. Some Remarks on a Complicated Issue
Chapter 8 Plato and Aristotle On What Is Common to Soul and Body. Some Remarks on a Complicated Issue Marcelo D. Boeri Abstract Aristotelian scholars tend to reject the Cartesian dualism as applied to Aristotelian model of the soul, and favor the view that denies that the soul is radically opposed to body. This is so due the fact that Aristotle takes the living being to be a unified whole (composed by form and matter). I start by reminding that both Plato and Aristotle argue that by their very nature soul and body are different, but at the same time they maintain that there are things that are ‘common’ to soul and body. The issue is how it is possible that two entities so different in nature have something in common. I argue that the key to the problem lies in the fact that both Plato and Aristotle regard the soul and the body as capacities, and that – in so far as they are able to act and to be acted upon – such is the ‘commonality’ shared both by soul and body. Given that capacities are relational entities, both of them turn out to be very plastic notions that should not necessarily be understood as entirely foreign to each other. 8.1 Introduction Both Plato and Aristotle famously argue that soul and body are two different kinds of entities: the soul is immaterial and the body material; the former is able to set in motion the body, and the latter is motionless.1 If this is so, one might assume that by their very nature soul and body are two profoundly disparate entities. -
Aristotle on Sign-Inference and Related Forms Ofargument
12 Introduction degree oflogical sophistication about what is required for one thing to follow from another had been achieved. The authorities whose views are reported by Philodemus wrote to answer the charges of certain unnamed opponents, usually and probably rightly supposed to be Stoics. These opponents draw· on the resources of a logical STUDY I theory, as we can see from the prominent part that is played in their arguments by an appeal to the conditional (auvTJp.p.EvOV). Similarity cannot, they maintain, supply the basis of true conditionals of the Aristotle on Sign-inference and kind required for the Epicureans' inferences to the rion-evident. But instead of dismissing this challenge, as Epicurus' notoriously Related Forms ofArgument contemptuous attitude towards logic might have led us to expect, the Epicureans accept it and attempt· to show that similarity can THOUGH Aristotle was the first to make sign-inference the object give rise to true conditionals of the required strictness. What is oftheoretical reflection, what he left us is less a theory proper than a more, they treat inference by analogy as one of two species of argu sketch of one. Its fullest statement is found in Prior Analytics 2. 27, ment embraced by the method ofsimilarity they defend. The other the last in a sequence offive chapters whose aim is to establish that: is made up of what we should call inductive arguments or, if we .' not only are dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms [auAAoyw,uol] effected construe induction more broadly, an especially prominent special by means of the figures [of the categorical syllogism] but also rhetorical case of inductive argument, viz. -
The Use of Animals in Higher Education
THE USE OF P R O B L E M S, A L T E R N A T I V E S , & RECOMMENDA T I O N S HUMANE SOCIETY PR E S S by Jonathan Balcombe, Ph.D. PUBLIC PO L I C Y SE R I E S Public Policy Series THE USE OF An i m a l s IN Higher Ed u c a t i o n P R O B L E M S, A L T E R N A T I V E S , & RECOMMENDA T I O N S by Jonathan Balcombe, Ph.D. Humane Society Press an affiliate of Jonathan Balcombe, Ph.D., has been associate director for education in the Animal Res e a r ch Issues section of The Humane Society of the United States since 1993. Born in England and raised in New Zealand and Canada, Dr . Balcombe studied biology at York University in Tor onto before obtaining his masters of science degree from Carleton University in Ottawa and his Ph.D. in ethology at the University of Tennessee. Ack n ow l e d g m e n t s The author wishes to thank Andrew Rowan, Martin Stephens, Gretchen Yost, Marilyn Balcombe, and Francine Dolins for reviewing and commenting on earlier versions of this monograph. Leslie Adams, Kathleen Conlee, Lori Do n l e y , Adrienne Gleason, Daniel Kos s o w , and Brandy Richardson helped with various aspects of its research and preparation. Copyright © 2000 by The Humane Society of the United States. -
Aristotle-Rhetoric.Pdf
Rhetoric Aristotle (Translated by W. Rhys Roberts) Book I 1 Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are con- cerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art. Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have cons- tructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is me- rely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about en- thymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states-especially in well-governed states-were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts 4 Aristotle and forbid talk about non-essentials. -
Colloquium 7 What Use Is Aristotle's Organon? Robin Smith
Colloquium 7 What Use Is Aristotle's Organon? Robin Smith My title is ambiguous. I might be construed as asking what use we, today, as philosophers, can make of the collection of treatises which has been known since the time of the Aristotelian commentators as the "organon." These treatises are, in the main, a collection of works on logic and closely related subjects, including fallacious arguments and demonstrative sci- ence. Tradition regarded them as giving Aristotle's account of scientific philosophical method: the "instrument" necessary for the attainment of knowledge. It was as such that Francis Bacon rejected Aristotle's Organon and offered his own as its replace- ment. Scientific method, he thought, should be a way to attain new knowledge; but he saw in the Aristotelian procedures he had learned at school nothing but rules for argumentation and deduction, which could never lead to the enlargement of what one already knew. For the purposes he took to be important, then, he found the Aristotelian instrument useless. More recent philosophical interpretation of Aristotle has been perhaps more sympathetic to its philosophical superstructure. If we regard the picture of demonstrative science of the Posterior Analytics as an account of scientific explanation rather than an account of scien- tific discovery, its plausibility is much greater. However, the logical theories on which Aristotle relies, especially its theory of inference, are now more or less universally recognized to be inadequate to any formalization even of the sciences Aristotle himself knew: Greek mathematical demonstrations steadfastly resist any translation into categorical syllogisms. Even the use of modern formal methods to interpret Aristotle's works seems at best to permit us to congratulate him for having come close, in his awkward way, to something we have a much better grasp of now.